5 0 Billion Euros: Europe's Child Labour Footprint in 2019

Page 59

59 Might trade-related pressure help to reduce child labor? The U.S. government has repeatedly considered restricting trade or trade preferences for countries where child labor is endemic […]. At the international level, some advocate for the World Trade Organization or the International Labor [sic] Organization to oversee harmonized child labor standards, with violators to be punished via trade sanction [...]. At the consumer level, boycotts of products produced by child labor and more generally antisweatshop activism have become popular. Such campaigns seek to pressure multinational producers of high-profile brand name products to improve their labor practices. Although these trade policies have highlighted the issue of child labor on the political agenda, there are several problems in using them in practice. First, if these policies lead to trade sanctions that reduce average family income, they could potentially increase the incidence of child labor. On the other hand, if the sanctions are only implemented very rarely, then they will not be a credible threat. Second, the recent history of trade sanctions aimed to promote broader political change does not suggest much optimism about their efficacy (Elliott & Freeman, 2003). Third, it’s not clear what specific action the trade pressures should be seeking to create. For example, preventing children from working in one high-profile job may do nothing more than force children to change employers—perhaps for the worse. Attempts to require either bans on child labor or compulsory school attendance are subject to the problems above. Fourth, it is difficult to distinguish whether these measures reflect genuine interest in the well-being of children in poor countries or whether they are just a palatable excuse for protectionism. Overall, it is difficult to make a strong case for trade policy or consumer boycotts as an effective tool to combat child labor. Consumer activism has brought the problem of child labor into the spotlight, but we are not aware of any systematic empirical evidence of the effectiveness of consumer activism in reducing child labor. It seems a blunt tool that is unlikely to reach the typical child laborer who helps parents on the family farm and in domestic chores. Yet the fundamental question arises whether a do-no-harm approach must translate into a laissez-faire approach, or whether a smart mix of interventions can effectively curtail its manifestation. Three economic effects of child labour, as a matter of fact, speak for intervention: (1) direct bodily harm to the child, (2) negative economic consequences for the child, and (3) the macro argument against child labour. 1. Morbidity and mortality of hazardous labour Children working in hazardous conditions risk physical and psychological injury, as well as death. Apart from the tragic human loss, such events are a great setback for a family’s welfare optimisation. If significant child morbidity and mortality occurs, this would also impact a country’s macroeconomic prospects at the aggregate level. The case where health consequences bar child labourers from pursuing their education was again illustrated in the recent NORC study on child labour in the cocoa sectors of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire: 12% of Ivorian children working in agriculture stated that they “could not go to school” due to an injury sustained through farming (Sadhu et al., 2020). Given the most drastic welfare losses occur where children are exposed to hazardous work, some scholars argue that it should be a priority to withdraw children from WFCL. Mansoor


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Annex III – Examples of TSD Chapters

4min
pages 150-152

Bibliography

38min
pages 153-181

XI. About Development International e.V

1min
page 143

X. About the Authors

1min
page 142

3. Child Labour Monitoring Systems

1min
page 110

2. IPEC

3min
pages 108-109

6. Suggested carrots and sticks

14min
pages 127-132

2. Switzerland

2min
page 119

2. The Netherlands

8min
pages 114-116

C. EU Investment Protection Agreements

2min
page 121

B. Mandatory corporate due diligence legislation

7min
pages 133-135

5. Use of other measures to justify exceptions

2min
page 126

D. U.S. support for trade partners

2min
page 104

Instrument

7min
pages 101-103

3. List of Goods, coordination of enforcement

10min
pages 89-92

4. U.S. Trade Policy

5min
pages 93-95

2. Support through dialogue and cooperation platforms

6min
pages 98-100

1. DHS mechanism

18min
pages 80-86

2. EO mechanisms

5min
pages 87-88

B. U.S. trade policy enforcement vis-à-vis child labour

2min
page 79

6. EU trade sanction instruments

3min
page 78

5. EU “essential elements” human rights clause

2min
page 77

4. EU-UK Free Trade Agreement

2min
page 76

1. Morbidity and mortality of hazardous labour

2min
page 59

2. Stringency of child labour provisions

5min
pages 73-74

Dimension 2: Quality of the education system

5min
pages 63-65

3. Local impact dimension of TSD chapters

2min
page 75

Dimension 3: Government capacity

5min
pages 66-67

2. How could unconditional trade bans and sanctions lower child welfare?

2min
page 57

G. Laissez-faire vs. intervention

2min
page 58

4. Forced/indentured child labour findings

5min
pages 45-50

E. Factors of child labour

8min
pages 51-53

3. Child labour footprint findings

9min
pages 36-44

2. USDOL’s “List of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor”

2min
page 27

C. Sectors and geographies with child labour practices

2min
pages 28-29

I. Introduction

5min
pages 20-22

2. Example child labour commodities

6min
pages 33-35

Executive Summary

17min
pages 4-13

Acronyms

3min
pages 14-16

II. Research Objectives

4min
pages 23-24

Foreword by Saskia Bricmont

6min
pages 17-19
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