5 0 Billion Euros: Europe's Child Labour Footprint in 2019

Page 58

58 and their families would be given a stipend to help prevent the necessity of their returning to work. Rahman et al. (1999) report that before the introduction of the bill, most of the jobs done by the children were light but monotonous, and the working conditions left much to be desired in terms of sanitation and excessively long hours. More than half reported that they could not attend school because of their poverty. Yet after the bill’s introduction multiple studies (see: Powell, 2014; UNICEF, 1997) reported that most children who were summarily dismissed from the garment industry did not return to school, but: found alternative, less secure, and less lucrative employment in the informal sector [including in prostitution]. … [The threat of the Harkin Bill] brought untold misery. … [It] viewed one particular right in isolation from all the others. By limiting its vision to the right to education, it threatened to violate the children’s fundamental right to survival, leaving them in a more vulnerable position than before. (Rahman et al., 1999, pp. 995–997) Thereafter the ILO and UNICEF were asked to step in to assist. An agreement with the employers’ association was established to determine the number of working children under the age of 14; to implement a monitoring system aimed to remove them from work (the original Child Labour Monitoring System (CLMS); to set up education programmes; and to provide partial compensation for loss of income to children formerly in child labour and to their families. As a result, more than 8,000 children were withdrawn from 800 garment factories and enrolled in special education programmes. In conclusion, Rahman et al. (1999) recommend instead compensating families to encourage their children to go to school, such as the successful conditional cash transfers in Brazil and Mexico, and reducing the cost of education for poor families to eliminate child labour.

G. Laissez-faire vs. intervention Proponents of a laissez-faire approach to child labour regard it as a brute necessity for survival along the arch a country’s development, pointing to its widespread practice in times of the industrial revolution and agricultural contexts in the U.K. and U.S. The practice is painted as a multidimensional problem and a stark “reality” in which there is no viable alternative where the caretaker’s poverty is profound – e.g. due to endemic unemployment or menial wages earned, or e.g. in the event of a caretaker’s death. This view is for example represented by Thomas DeGregori (2002): It is clear that technological and economic change are vital ingredients in getting children out of the workplace and into schools. Then they can grow to become productive adults and live longer, healthier lives. However, in poor countries like Bangladesh, working children are essential for survival in many families, as they were in our own heritage until the late 19th century. This view thus treats child labour tantamount to a “necessary evil” – a stepping stone on a country’s developmental path. A case against intervention is further argued by Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005, pp. 217–218):


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Articles inside

Annex III – Examples of TSD Chapters

4min
pages 150-152

Bibliography

38min
pages 153-181

XI. About Development International e.V

1min
page 143

X. About the Authors

1min
page 142

3. Child Labour Monitoring Systems

1min
page 110

2. IPEC

3min
pages 108-109

6. Suggested carrots and sticks

14min
pages 127-132

2. Switzerland

2min
page 119

2. The Netherlands

8min
pages 114-116

C. EU Investment Protection Agreements

2min
page 121

B. Mandatory corporate due diligence legislation

7min
pages 133-135

5. Use of other measures to justify exceptions

2min
page 126

D. U.S. support for trade partners

2min
page 104

Instrument

7min
pages 101-103

3. List of Goods, coordination of enforcement

10min
pages 89-92

4. U.S. Trade Policy

5min
pages 93-95

2. Support through dialogue and cooperation platforms

6min
pages 98-100

1. DHS mechanism

18min
pages 80-86

2. EO mechanisms

5min
pages 87-88

B. U.S. trade policy enforcement vis-à-vis child labour

2min
page 79

6. EU trade sanction instruments

3min
page 78

5. EU “essential elements” human rights clause

2min
page 77

4. EU-UK Free Trade Agreement

2min
page 76

1. Morbidity and mortality of hazardous labour

2min
page 59

2. Stringency of child labour provisions

5min
pages 73-74

Dimension 2: Quality of the education system

5min
pages 63-65

3. Local impact dimension of TSD chapters

2min
page 75

Dimension 3: Government capacity

5min
pages 66-67

2. How could unconditional trade bans and sanctions lower child welfare?

2min
page 57

G. Laissez-faire vs. intervention

2min
page 58

4. Forced/indentured child labour findings

5min
pages 45-50

E. Factors of child labour

8min
pages 51-53

3. Child labour footprint findings

9min
pages 36-44

2. USDOL’s “List of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor”

2min
page 27

C. Sectors and geographies with child labour practices

2min
pages 28-29

I. Introduction

5min
pages 20-22

2. Example child labour commodities

6min
pages 33-35

Executive Summary

17min
pages 4-13

Acronyms

3min
pages 14-16

II. Research Objectives

4min
pages 23-24

Foreword by Saskia Bricmont

6min
pages 17-19
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