5 0 Billion Euros: Europe's Child Labour Footprint in 2019

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In terms of enforcement, the draft law opts for a public enforcement mechanism through a public regulatory authority (BAFA). The designated public regulatory authority has the power to issue fines in connection with non-compliance with the law. Furthermore, noncomplying companies can be excluded from the award of public procurement contracts (Law on Corporate Due Diligence in Supply Chains, 2021). Concerning the question of a business termination, the German draft law advances the principle of engagement before disengagement (“Befähigung vor Rückzug”) as the advised modus operandi, with business termination only to be employed as the very last option (ultima ratio) (Law on Corporate Due Diligence in Supply Chains, 2021). Unlike the French Duty of Vigilance Law, the German draft law does not establish a judicial enforcement mechanism with a new civil cause of action for affected individuals. The two types of enforcement mechanisms differ significantly: while enforcement through a public supervisory body may play a very important role in ensuring compliance with the law, it fails to provide remedy for affected individuals and communities, in line with the requirements under the 3rd pillar of the UNGPs. In March 2021, the author of the UNGPs – Professor John Ruggie – published a letter addressed to German Ministers welcoming elements of the new draft German law whilst expressing concerns about certain areas which are not so closely aligned with the UNGPs. These include, inter alia, the fact that “the specific obligations on companies to proactively identify risks and take action to address them apply only to the company’s own operations and its direct suppliers – that is, to Tier 1 suppliers” which “for a significant number of German companies [...] is not where the most severe risks lie.” Ruggie highlighted that “a focus on Tier 1 alone would lead companies to focus on relationships that are less likely to pose significant human rights risks, while ignoring others (beyond Tier 1) where the probability of such risks is higher.” He also emphasised that the approach requiring to go beyond Tier 1 if the company obtains “substantiated knowledge” of a possible violation is not satisfactory insofar as identifying human rights impacts constitute the first step of the HRDD process, and that if substantiated knowledge of a possible violation is already available, then the company should determine the appropriate remedial action based on its degree of involvement with the human rights harm (Ruggie, 2021).

2. Switzerland In Switzerland, the Swiss Responsible Business Initiative launched in 2016 obtained a popular majority in the vote of the 29th of November 2020, even though it was eventually rejected for failure to obtain support from a majority of the cantons. As a result, the Indirect Counter-Proposal of the Council of States will most likely enter into force. The latter provides for reporting requirements whereby certain large Swiss public-interest companies50 will be required to publish a non-financial report reporting on environmental issues, including CO2 targets, social and employee-related matters, respect for human rights and the fight against corruption (The Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation, 2020). It 50

Companies, whose registered office, central administration or principal place of business is in Switzerland (see: Bueno, 2019).


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Annex III – Examples of TSD Chapters

4min
pages 150-152

Bibliography

38min
pages 153-181

XI. About Development International e.V

1min
page 143

X. About the Authors

1min
page 142

3. Child Labour Monitoring Systems

1min
page 110

2. IPEC

3min
pages 108-109

6. Suggested carrots and sticks

14min
pages 127-132

2. Switzerland

2min
page 119

2. The Netherlands

8min
pages 114-116

C. EU Investment Protection Agreements

2min
page 121

B. Mandatory corporate due diligence legislation

7min
pages 133-135

5. Use of other measures to justify exceptions

2min
page 126

D. U.S. support for trade partners

2min
page 104

Instrument

7min
pages 101-103

3. List of Goods, coordination of enforcement

10min
pages 89-92

4. U.S. Trade Policy

5min
pages 93-95

2. Support through dialogue and cooperation platforms

6min
pages 98-100

1. DHS mechanism

18min
pages 80-86

2. EO mechanisms

5min
pages 87-88

B. U.S. trade policy enforcement vis-à-vis child labour

2min
page 79

6. EU trade sanction instruments

3min
page 78

5. EU “essential elements” human rights clause

2min
page 77

4. EU-UK Free Trade Agreement

2min
page 76

1. Morbidity and mortality of hazardous labour

2min
page 59

2. Stringency of child labour provisions

5min
pages 73-74

Dimension 2: Quality of the education system

5min
pages 63-65

3. Local impact dimension of TSD chapters

2min
page 75

Dimension 3: Government capacity

5min
pages 66-67

2. How could unconditional trade bans and sanctions lower child welfare?

2min
page 57

G. Laissez-faire vs. intervention

2min
page 58

4. Forced/indentured child labour findings

5min
pages 45-50

E. Factors of child labour

8min
pages 51-53

3. Child labour footprint findings

9min
pages 36-44

2. USDOL’s “List of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor”

2min
page 27

C. Sectors and geographies with child labour practices

2min
pages 28-29

I. Introduction

5min
pages 20-22

2. Example child labour commodities

6min
pages 33-35

Executive Summary

17min
pages 4-13

Acronyms

3min
pages 14-16

II. Research Objectives

4min
pages 23-24

Foreword by Saskia Bricmont

6min
pages 17-19
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