Virginia Journal of International Affairs - Spring 2022

Virginia Journal of International Affairs

Spring 2022

Staff

Editor-in-Chief

Co-Managing Editor

Co-Managing Editor

C0-Production Chair

Co- Production Chair

Media Manager

Event Coordinator

Special Projects

Emily Ma

Sukanya Barman

Maya Nir

Nicole Luz

Aria Zareibidgoli

Priya Viswanathan

Akshi Kalavakonda

Manaal Khwaja

Staff Editors

Clare Atkinson

Anna Grace Calhoun

Victoria Djou

Madeleine Green

Anna Heetderks

Sarah Liu

Jack Massingill

Anna Murray

Pratha Purushottam

Carina Ritcheson

Alex Sarchet

Sagarika Shiehn

Addie Simkin

Elisabeth Tamte

Dao Tran

Nick Wells

About the Virginia Journal

The Virginia Journal of International Affairs is the University of Virginia’s preeminent publication for undergraduate research in international relations. The Virginia Journal is developed and distributed by the studentrun International Relations Organization of the University of Virginia. The Virginia Journal is one of the only undergraduate research journals for international relations in the country, and aims both to showcase the impressive research conducted by the students at UVA and to spark productive conversation within the University community. The Virginia Journal seeks to foster interest in international issues and promote high quality undergraduate research in foreign affairs. The Journal is available online at vajournalia.org.

Submissions

Interested in submitting to the Virginia Journal? The Journal seeks research papers on current topics in international affairs that are at least ten pages in length. Only undergraduates or recent graduates are eligible to submit. Submissions should be sent to vajournalia@gmail.com.

Please direct all comments to vajournalia@gmail.com

From the Editor

Dear reader,

This first part of 2022 has brought with it dramatic changes on the world stage, most notably those related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in late February of this year. Conflicts such as these have only made the necessity of international engagement by an informed community even more pressing. Against the backdrop of this increasingly complex global geopolitical environment, I hope the latest edition of the Virginia Journal provides readers with some critical insights into a variety of world issues. This issue contains six papers spanning diverse geographic regions and subject areas. Our articles this semester highlight issues such as air travel restrictions on Covid-19 spread, Okinawan resistance to U.S. military bases, media trust and polarization in the U.S. and Germany, the longevity of Article 9 in Japan’s Constitution, great power competition, and the profitability of fait accompli conquest. By showcasing the passion and talent of undergraduate students at the University of Virginia, the Virginia Journal aims to educate and spark dialogue on a range of topics in foreign affairs. Throughout my years with this organization, I have repeatedly found myself learning about interesting and unexpected issue areas, and I hope to share some of that experience with readers old and new.

This semester marks my eighth and final semester with the Virginia Journal and having served in a few different roles on the staff, I can truly say that each edition is a reflection of the hard work and collaboration of many individuals in our academic community.. I would first like to recognize and thank the International Relations Organization for their truly invaluable financial and logistical support for the Virginia Journal. Great thanks are also due to the authors for submitting their thought-provoking research as well as UVA faculty members for their support of our undergraduate scholars. Moreover, I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the Virginia Journal’s Executive Board and editorial staff for their work. You all have worked tirelessly this semester to make this edition possible. As I conclude my term as Editor-in-Chief, I want to convey how much I

appreciate all of your efforts. It has been a great privilege and pleasure to know and work with all of you over the past few years.

Finally, last but certainly not least, thank you to all of those reading. I hope in these pages you find something that interests, informs, or inspires you to continue learning about the field of foreign affairs. We are honored to have you join us.

Without further ado, it is with great pride that I present the Spring 2022 edition of the Virginia Journal of International Affairs.

Sincerely,

Emily L. Ma Editor-in-Chief

The Profitability of Fait Accompli Conquest

By Emma Ross

About the Author

Emma Ross is a fourth year at the University of Virginia pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Foreign Affairs and Russian & Eastern European Studies. She focuses her studies on issues concerning Russia and National Security, as well as Post-Soviet conflicts. She is currently working on research and analytic projects in support of the US Air Force and has worked in support of SOCOM.

Abstract

This paper investigates the question, “Can conquest still be profitable in the modern day?” It reviews the latest existing literature concerning partial conquest and full scale conquest, and serves as a proof-of-concept piece to argue how there may still be a path to profit for some states in the modern day. It discusses how aggressor states may employ various tactics to avoid incurring domestic or international cost as a result of their actions. This paper primarily investigates Fait Accompli conquest, or partial conquest, and examines the unique traits associated with this style of invasion. This paper then conducts a preliminary cost-benefit analysis of conquest for any given state, and discusses how costs of invasion are calculated. The discussion later focuses on how costs of invasion may be avoided by employing particular tactics. This paper has enormous implications for aggressor states in the modern day who seek to seize territory, and grants helpful perspective to other states and international institutions who wish to avoid further challenges to Post-World War Two borders.

Introduction

Prevailing forms of conquest have changed to reflect the nature of the modern world order. Traditional models of conquest entailed a full-scale military takeover of another state and the extraction of its economic resources. While this was once a viable option to strengthen one’s instruments of national power, it is no longer a common strategy. The costs of launching this type

of offensive tactic have become too high in the modern day to remain the common strategy (Coe and Markowitz, 2021). In light of this new reality, states who have interests which would have been served by a full-scale conquest attempt, may instead pursue partial territorial seizures. There are several strategic benefits to a partial territorial seizure that prove to be more effective in the modern international environment. For one, global institutions are hostile to complete conquest. However, partial seizures which occur on a smaller scale are less likely to incur harsh consequences for the country pursuing the conquest. When partial seizure through fait accompli is carried out, states target a specific territory, carry out a military occupation, and then seek to avoid war by forcing the victimized country to simply accept the new situation (Altman, 2017). While full-state conquest, as argued by Coe and Markowitz, is no longer profitable, I believe that the differences in the types of conquest are key in explaining how fait accompli conquest can be profitable.

Evolution of Conquest

Since World War II, global borders have become more rigid and conquest has decreased, changing its prevailing form. Changing borders can reflect a challenge to the status quo, and the current world order will resist this change to preserve its power structures (Debs and Montiero 2014). Full country conquests, such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, have been rebuffed and condemned by powerful countries with stake in the status quo. Deterred by these examples of failed conquest, countries are less tempted to exploit their neighbors through full-scale overpowering. An invasion with the intention of capturing an entire country will be countered by the victim and/ or international actors. The international community will condemn the action, institute repercussions, and the investment into the military buildup will become a sunken cost (Altman, 2020). Facing this fate, countries who wish to capture outside resources must envision another path to pursue their strategic goals.

Pursuing the tactic of fait accompli conquest addresses many of the issues faced by a full conquest approach. Partial conquest reduces the costs to a state which a full conquest would incur by making it easier for potential interfering states and the victim to choose inaction. The theory behind fait accompli works to coerce acceptance of the new situation, often through brute

Emma Ross

force. The aggressor only targets a specific territory, and makes the victim question its willingness to expend resources to reobtain its lost land. If the aggressor is militarily superior, or has a powerful ally, the victim might choose to forgo war in fear of incurring further cost without a chance of succeeding. Furthermore, the victim might have a more difficult time recruiting allies due to the partial nature of the conquest. The aggressor may also deny they have violated the territorial integrity norm by claiming the land was rightfully theirs (Altman, pg.517). Without a clear picture of which side has the true claim to the territory, outsiders may choose inaction to save their resources and avoid interfering in a complicated conflict.

In sum, partial conquest reduces the mechanisms which launch repercussions from external actors. Without external force to condemn their actions, aggressors may evade consequences for seizing foreign land. While external actors are motivated by preserving the status quo, small land seizures don’t often amount to a enough of a threat to merit a serious military or economic response. The seizure may violate the territorial integrity norm in principle, but with the burden of action on the international community, fait accomplis do not always represent a serious enough threat to merit the expenditure of capital.

Recent scholarship in the field of modern conquest explores the limitations this foreign policy presents to the real world. Andrew Coe and Jonathan Markowitz pose the question: why do powerful countries such as the United States not invade resource rich territories, such as in the Persian Gulf? Throughout their discussion, they muster evidence which supports the claim that such an exploit would not be profitable in the modern world. Their central argument was that the costs which go into waging an invasion would not be worth the benefits they would reap. In discussing the various costs that compose an invasion they conclude that the assets that aid a foreign invasion would be much more profitable in serving a domestic civilian pursuit. In effect, the opportunity cost of an invasion is such that a highly developed country would be better served without exploiting foreign resources, and instead investing at home.

One of the key argumentative points about conquest profitability stems from military investment. To refute modern conquest profitability, we must critically examine military expenditure, as it is one of the greatest upfront costs of invasion. As a rule, we see that the more productive a country

is, the costlier their assets will be in their pursuit of conquest. They can afford more efficient and devastating technology. However, by investing in military technology, aggressor countries lose the opportunity to invest in domestic goals that could yield greater returns (Coe and Markowitz, pg.7). In this sense, a country’s very asset of productivity is the key reason why full conquest wouldn’t be monetarily beneficial. The investment into an invasion would be better served as an investment into the domestic economy.

What makes their study even more interesting is that conquest is not profitable for more developed countries, but could be profitable for less developed countries. The opportunity cost of investing elsewhere in one’s economy acts as the main mechanism for refuting invasion’s profitability. Therefore, less developed countries’ main incentive for not pursuing invasion must be the cost imposed on them by the international community. This also means that the revenue from plunder for high income countries is not enough to make up for the lost opportunity in domestic investment. This consideration of the unprofitability of conquest for more powerful countries is part of what triggers the conquest prevention or punishment response by which the international community deters those who are able to profit through conquest. The more important question this paper will explore is how a country could avoid triggering this punishment mechanism.

To conclude this discussion on the topic of total conquest’s nonprofitability, I will again emphasize the role of the international community. It is their power which acts as the main force in preventing and punishing tresspasses against international sovereignty. It has been determined by Article 39 of the United Nations charter that in response to an act of international aggression, measures will be taken against an aggressor country. However, in order for this article to take effect, an action must be defined as an aggression by the UNSC. Crucially, the international community is historically hesitant to become involved in a matter that is complicated and unclear. Although there are rare examples of international inaction in response to total conquest, fait accompli conquest can avoid this retaliation

As a rule, we see that the more productive a country is, the costlier their assets will be in theirpursuitofconquest.

mechanism more consistently. In their article, Hodeg and Yahel write, “The classic annexations occur when the dominating state believes that there will be silent international consent” (Hodeg and Yahel, 2017). It seems this silent consent, or at least non-intervention, occurs much more often in cases of fait accompli conquest.

Costs and Benefits of Fait Accompli Conquest

To address the issue of fait accompli profit, it must be broken down into its component parts. The first step in this process is to define profitability, which in this paper entails reckoning monetary expenses with returns. In any conquest, the aggressor state expends resources in building up its military, which are necessary to maintain control of the captured territory (Carter, 2010). It may also face some international consequences for its actions, such as sanctions and decreased trade. The returns from conquest may also be defined broadly in terms of natural resources and other forms of wealth extraction. In order to determine if the exploit was profitable, these aspects must be compiled and studied. Existing scholarship provides a great framework for this undertaking in Coe and Markowitz’s paper. However, their focus concerns the hypothetical total conquest attempt of a rich country over a poorer but resource-rich country. This paper is undertaking the questions of whether similar profit prevention mechanisms would prohibit partial territorial conquest from being profitable.

Coe and Markowitz examine traditional conquest and conclude that the cost of full-country conquest is no longer worth incurring. For the purposes of a side-by-side comparison, a study concerning fait accompli conquest should apply their stricter economic definitions and methods concerning profit. The authors examine measurable economic activity to discern gains or losses in their study, and fait accompli conquest could very well differ from their findings about full-scale conquests. Essentially, the logic for further investigation stems from this puzzle: why would fait accompli persist today if it was not profitable, while full-scale conquest has diminished? This paper seeks to understand whether partial conquest is profitable in order to rationalize its continued existence. If it is not profitable, there must be some different compelling reason why it persists, and further study would be needed.

I will now examine the costs of fait accompli conquest and

Emma Ross

determine how they might compare to traditional conquest. The cost of military buildup is composed of several factors: the target’s proximity, terrain type, area, population, will to resist, military personnel, and military quality (Coe and Markowitz, 2021). Some of these costs shrink proportionally as the target of conquest shrinks in a fait accompli conquest, as opposed to in a total conquest endeavor. This means that the potential for extracting benefits also decreases. Another important cost in military conquest is loss of life, which no matter the productivity of any given country, is always an asset that could have been diverted to another purpose for a domestic investment. These military costs have yielded varied returns in profit over time, and in general, have produced decreased or negative returns in cases of traditional conquest (Gartzke, 2011). One of the key contrasts Coe and Markowitz note is that lower income countries don’t have as much profit to lose by diverting resources to the military as higher income countries do. This factor of deterrence from conquest for developed countries through virtue of greater profit elsewhere is therefore not as relevant for lower income countries. The other major cost to be taken into account when making a decision to invade another country are the sanctions that may be imposed upon you after the invasion. Masahiko Asada’s writings on sanctions note that, “Article 39 triggers the sanction mechanism. The starting point is based on a finding by the Security Council of a threat to peace, a breach of peace, or an act of aggression” (Asada, 2020). The UNSC has determined there were acts of aggression when North Korea invaded South Korea, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, and in a few other instances1. Even when the UN decides not to impose sanctions, they can still be imposed by regional economic organizations, such as the European Union, or by individual states. All this is to say that there are mechanisms in place to rebuff conquest by malicious actors. Each actor who could impose sanctions has to find enough justification in a breach of peace or other capacity to find sanctions worth imposing.

Sanctions are one of a nation’s largest foreign policy tools, and they send diplomatic signals as well as yield economic consequences. Actors may feel disinclined to impose sanctions for a few reasons. Short of an obvious breach of international peace, such as in the Korea and Iraq examples, states may attempt to negotiate their way out of acting as an international peacekeeper to avoid diplomatic and economic costs. Fait accompli conquest

can then potentially avoid triggering the sanctions mechanism by arming reluctant powers with arguments as to why the aggressor's actions don’t constitute a breach. Daniel Altman describes this process when, “In territorial disputes, states can claim that the territory they seized is rightfully theirs, thus denying that occupying it violated the norm” (Altman, 2020). If the norm of territorial sovereignty is not clearly violated, the powerful states and institutions may remain content with the status quo. To sanction an actor, especially one with some importance on the world stage, invites retaliatory sanctions and reduced diplomatic cooperation. This discussion illustrates how, in theory, the cost imposed by sanctions for conquest could be avoided in fait accompli conquest.

Another less easily calculable cost of traditional conquest includes the enmity of the victimized country. In typical conquest, the entire country is targeted for invasion and dissent is addressed during the conflict. The added cost which dissent creates is typically factored into the military cost in the “will to resist” factor explained earlier, until the invasion fails or all meaningful dissent is crushed. However, continually putting down dissent as it arises should be factored in as a recurring cost of conquest. In fait accompli conquest, only a specific territory is targeted for conquest, so the state who formerly held the territory is still able to impose cost or try to recruit the support of allies to counter the aggression. Ideally, as Altman describes in his paper, the aggressor has an overwhelming amount of brute force in fait accompli and forces the victim country to accept the situation (Altman, 2020). This may not always be the case, and the weaker country may eventually grow stronger. The cost of creating or inflaming an enemy definitely varies between situations and acts as the potentially substantial long-term military and infrastructure costs.

The cost of invasion can also be substantially reduced through the recruitment of an aggressor’s ally to aid the effort. Compounded strength increases the effort the victim needs to successfully fight back, and can quicken the mechanism which forces the victim to accept the new situation. It can also make the international community more reluctant to rebuke the conquest because some third-party countries had already accepted it, which means that in order to respond, they would need to antagonize multiple actors to punish aggressors. The introduction of an ally is a strong force in reducing the cost of fait accompli conquest.

Emma Ross

Taking a look at the profits which states can gain from fait accompli conquest, the results are similarly complicated. The first most obvious profit from conquest is the natural resources from the territory. These can be incredibly lucrative and are also stationary assets that cannot flee when a change in power occurs. Resources such as oil and gas can be sold on international markets, assuming sanctions or trade barriers were not erected in response to the conquest. Resources also serve as one of the most compelling motives and profitable products of the government for conquest, as noted by Gartzke in his study. However, through fait accompli conquest, resource profit will be proportionally decreased as the target territory decreases. Another, albeit less dependable, mode of returns is profit from the people who live in the conquered territory. This may come from the monetary addition of their labor into the conqueror’s economy, and also through taxation. This source of profit is much less dependable and valuable than resource wealth. Profit from people is liquid, and can flee the territory, along with their private financial assets (Coe and Markowitz, 11). Through fait accompli conquest, those who live in conquered territory have the option to relocate to the part of their country which has not been invaded, though relocating is not cheap. Some may have little choice but to stay, some will stay due to their affiliation with and affection for the land. Only the most wealthy will have the ability to leave. Ultimately, profiting from the people likely will not present a significant source of profit unless the people wish to stay, or the population benefits from the invasion due to cultural affiliation with the aggressor.

Analysis and Implications

This exploration has shown that for fait accompli conquest, there is unfortunately still a path to profit in the modern day. As has already been established by other papers, conquest may still be profitable for lower income countries if you ignore the international community’s punishment mechanisms. Therefore, should a country wish to pursue conquest to profit, a country would engage in fait accompli conquest and do its best to avoid triggering punishment mechanisms. Their likelihood of success is compounded when they have a strong military, a powerful ally, and some semi-legitimate claim to the territory. However, through fait accompli, often a smaller territory is targeted and therefore the profits will also be

proportionally smaller.

This work outlines how the allure of conquest should not be dismissed in the modern day simply because we have some prevention mechanisms in place. In fact, conquest has never fully disappeared as a feature of the international environment. Conquest was a prominent feature of the 12th century, as Mongols expanded across Asia. It persisted through the 19th century, with the European “Scramble for Africa,” and now in the 21st century, as Russia overtakes Crimea. Despite the goals of post-World War II institutions, territorial integrity is still not guaranteed and conflict continues to stem from questioning borders. While existing work examines why full-state conquest is pursued much less often than partial territorial conquest, these studies do not examine whether these same constraints on profitability of conquest exist in cases of partial territorial conquest. Testable implications of this paper could be found in examples of countries who have already pursued fait accompli conquest, as one could examine whether they subsequently profited. Cases such as the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh conflict and the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea serve as two case studies which could illustrate this argument. In sum, a more controlled military undertaking has the potential to incur fewer costs due to its limited strategic nature and its potential to avoid war and international repercussions. While existing models do not scrutinize this process, it is nevertheless important to examine this issue due to its wide-ranging modern day applicability. While China would never occupy Japan, it may one day decide to pursue fait accompli conquest in the disputed Senkaku Islands or in the South China Sea. Furthermore, an entire war was fought only a few months ago, when Azerbaijan seized the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia (Rubin, 2020). Further research in the profitability of fait accompli could help us to better understand the motivations of aggressors, and this study begins the work in determining the role that profit has in influencing a state. It could also teach us how to identify a profitable conquest undertaking, and how an international community could impose a higher cost, such that the offensive would no longer be worth it.

Bibliography

Altman, Dan. 2017. “By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion: How States Wrest Territory from Their Adversaries.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 61, no. 4, pp. 881–891., doi:10.1093/isq/sqx049.

Altman, Dan. 2020. “The Evolution of Territorial Conquest After 1945 and the Limits of the Territorial Integrity Norm.” International Organization, vol. 74, no. 3, pp. 490–522., doi:10.1017/s0020818320000119.

Asada, Masahiko, editor. 2020. Economic Sanctions In International Law and Practice. Routledge.

Carter, David B. 2010. The Strategy of Territorial Conflict. American Journal of Political Science 54 (4):969–87.

Coe, Andrew J., and Jonathan N. Markowitz. "Crude Calculations: Productivity and the Profitability of Conquest."

Debs, Alexandre, and Nuno P. Monteiro. "Known unknowns: Power shifts, uncertainty, and war." International Organization (2014): 1-31.

Gartzke, Erik and Dominic Rohner. 2011. "The Political Economy of Imperialism, Decolonization and Development." British Journal of Political Science 41(3): 525 556.

Honig, Or Arthur, and Ido Yahel. 1 Aug. 2017. "The Art of 'subversive Conquest': How States Take Over Sovereign Territories Without Using Military Force." Comparative Strategy, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 293308.

Rubin, Michael. 15 Nov. 2020. Three Intelligence Failures from NagornoKarabakh Conflict. American Enterprise Institute, www.aei.org/threeintelligence-failures-from-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-need-inve stigating/.

A Story of Continuing Struggle and Sacrifice: Explaining Okinawan Public Resistance to American Military Bases

By Geetanjali Gandhe

About the Author

Geetanjali Gandhe is a third-year student from Herndon, Virginia, pursuing a double major in Computer Science and Foreign Affairs in the College of Arts and Science. She is also minoring in Japanese literature and language. Her academic interests include American security strategies abroad and theirits effects on local populations. A proud product of Virginia public schools, she hopes to pursue an interdisciplinary career in public service by bridging the gaps between her fields of interests.

Foreword

I’m happy to introduce Geetanjali Gandhe’s essay examining why the movement to force the United States to remove its bases from Okinawa has grown more vehement in recent years, some 75 years after the bases were first established in the aftermath of World War II. Geetanjali wrote the paper originally for my Fall 2021 class on Japanese Politics, which asked each student to write a research paper on an aspect of politics in the country. While the bases are clearly an issue in international relations as well, this topic is an example of a foreign affairs issue that is complicated by domestic politics—that can only be understood if you look inside the country (indeed, inside the politics on the island of Okinawa). Geetanjali does an excellent job of drawing on a wide range of sources to capture the current climate surrounding this issue in Okinawa and to explain why voters there continue to elect anti-base politicians.

Len Schoppa Department of Politics

University of Virginia

Abstract

Since their establishment, American military bases in the southern Japanese island of Okinawa have been considered by Japanese and American governments to be an indispensable cornerstone of security in the highly significant Indo-Pacific region. However, the Okinawan peoples’ relationship to the bases has always been fraught, and in recent years opposition to the bases has become more entrenched due to a combination of social, political, and economic factors changing Okinawan perception of military bases. These factors explain why even the most probable compromise to reconfigure military assets on Okinawa will not be the end of anti-base public sentiment in Okinawa.

Introduction

After the bloody conclusion of World War II, American military bases in foreign countries became an indispensable instrument of United States foreign policy. Only the U.S. military maintains the military and financial capital to run its constellation of bases in far-flung locations around the world. The total number of overseas military bases operated by the United States military is estimated to be around 750. Of these, 120 are located in Japan, with a forward-deployed troop presence of approximately 53,713. Japan hosts not only the largest number of military bases, but also the greatest number of deployed troops (Hussein and Haddad 2021). Of these bases, 70 percent are hosted in the southern island of Okinawa, which as a result has developed a particularly unique relationship with both the United States military and the Japanese government.

Throughout and after the American occupation, Okinawan response to military presence varied from destructive protest to tentative support. In the period after the pivotal Battle of Okinawa, Okinawans tended to support the American military due to the many atrocities that they endured under the Imperial Japanese Army (Altenberg 2019). However, in recent times, a legacy of incidents has entrenched Okinawan opposition to American basing. A 2016 poll found that 43 percent of Okinawans supported the

complete withdrawal of American military forces from the island, the highest percentage since Okinawa returned to Japanese control (Robson 2016). A 2019 referendum called by Okinawa’s governor Dennis Tamaki showed that 72 percent of the electorate opposed the construction of a new base at the northern Henoko site to replace the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, often referred to as the “most dangerous military base on Earth” (BBC News 2019). Although there seems to be universal consensus that the removal of the Futenma Air Base is necessary, it is clear that Okinawan voters would rather see the military bases completely relocated off the island. This antibase sentiment appears to be getting stronger. Today, about 44 percent of Okinawans have positive views towards American military bases, compared to 48 percent with negative views. Among the general public, only 20 percent have a negative view of American bases, as compared to 71 percent with a positive view. The percentage of Okinawans who feel that mainland Japan does not understand them has always been high, but it has risen about ten points to 71 percent from the period between 1973 to 2012. So what factors have caused Okinawan voters to become so resistant to the American military presence on their island, a sentiment in tension with the policies of the central Japanese government?

In this essay, I will argue that Okinawan resistance to basing has become harder to overcome for pro-base actors because of five non-exclusive factors: (1) declining economic dependence on the bases, (2) basing as an issue of heightened national political significance, (3) the emergence of a unique brand of Okinawan identity politics, (4) grassroots mobilization leading to a greater sensitivity towards recurring incidents caused by U.S. Marines, and (5) a lengthy and frustrating base relocation process. These factors have all contributed towards building a much more sustained and deep-rooted opposition towards the bases. I will start with a discussion of the strategic value of the Okinawan bases, followed by addressing each of the five planks that have resulted in Okinawans’ decreased tolerance towards the interruption of military bases in their daily lives. Subsequently, I will examine other possible explanations for Okinawan reactions towards the bases and assert why these explanations are insufficient. Finally, I will conclude by addressing future solutions as this contentious issue plays out.

Background: Why are the bases there?

After the United States victory in the combat-intense Battle of Okinawa, an invasion staged as part of a greater plan to invade the Japanese home islands, Okinawa was placed under American military occupation from 1945 to 1972 under an administration that was separate from Japanese home control until repatriation. The 1951 San Francisco U.S.-Japan Security Treaty allowed the United States to maintain military bases with few restrictions on Japanese soil in exchange for a security commitment (Leonard Schoppa, in-class lecture, 2020). A 1960 revision increased Japanese parity in the alliance and solidified U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan. As a result, the U.S.-Japan alliance is vital to the security of Japan and for U.S. interests in the Far East, with Okinawans bearing the greatest burden of this commitment in what many Okinawans consider an externalization of risk by the central Japanese government. At the same time, the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) makes clear the legal status of American service members in Japan, and attempts to clear up the more general logistics of how the military can operate in Japan (The Mainichi 2020).

In terms of rationale for the American military presence, policymakers in Washington and Tokyo maintain that the bases have a deterrence value, shore up the U.S-Japan alliance, and enhance rapid response time to security and other humanitarian threats. During the Cold War, the bases’ strategic position served as a bulwark against communist spread supported by the Soviet Union. Geostrategically, Okinawa has an optimal position thanks to its proximity to China, Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and mainland Japan. This means that in the hypothetical situation of an attack on American allies, the U.S. could respond with timely military action by deploying either the Marines from Futenma or Air Force personnel from Kadena Air Base (Reisener 2018).

The presence of the Marines in Okinawa means that the ability of North Korea to logistically sustain a prolonged ground offensive against South Korea is severely limited. Combined with the U.S. presence in South Korea, the Okinawan bases enhance the regional security situation, as F-22s from Kadena Air Base can and have been deployed in order to respond to North Korean missiles and nuclear tests (Heginbotham 2008). Okinawa’s proximity to the heavily disputed Senkaku Islands allows the United States to project power into the East China Sea and limit China’s attempts to

claim ownership over the Islands (Reisner 2018). If China were to claim the Senkaku Islands, Okinawa would serve as the major hub for logistical and air support operations, and the U.S. Marine Corps would be heavily involved in directing the Japan Self-Defense Force’s Western Infantry Regiment, Japan’s amphibious assault force.

Another major China-related contingency includes military movement in the Taiwan Strait. Should China threaten Taiwan militarily, Okinawa is much closer to Taiwan than any of the mainland Japanese bases, Guam, or Hawaii. Okinawa would also serve as a major logistics hub in this scenario, with tankers from Okinawa able to refuel planes flying towards Taiwan. P-3 aircraft from Okinawa could provide anti-submarine and surveillance support, while fighters based in Okinawa could react effectively to tactical situations and recover speedily. The Okinawan bases are and will remain strategically significant in terms of providing air and naval power projection to South Korea and Taiwan (Heginbotham 2018). Therefore, proposals to move all of the marines off of Okinawa are not likely to be considered seriously by Washington or Tokyo, but both governments are cognizant of the long-standing need to reevaluate the current configuration of military assets, particularly marine ones, maintained on Okinawa.

Peace with (non)prosperity: Bases as economic barriers

After World War II, Okinawa relied on U.S. bases for more than 50 percent of its total economic output. By the time control of Okinawa had reverted to the Japanese, this dependence had decreased to 15 percent, falling even further to 5 percent today. After reversion, Okinawa lacked foundational industries and was heavily dependent on the service industry, a problem which persists to this day. In 1972, the gross prefectural product of Okinawa was 445 billion yen, consisting of about 0.0445 percent of total Japanese GDP. By 2006, the gross prefectural product had risen to 3.7 trillion yen, consisting of 0.74 percent of total Japanese GDP (Shimabukuro 2019). Okinawa today has the highest child poverty percentage rates of Japanese prefectures, estimated to be around 29.9 percent, while the national child poverty rate is 16.4 percent (The Mainichi 2017). Additionally, Okinawa records higher rates of single-mother households and percentages of people with non-regular employment compared to mainland Japan, in addition to lower wages (Shimabukuro 2019).

Okinawa has struggled to shake its perception of being an impoverished rural backwater region of Japan. While Okinawans may have seen their living standards rise over the decades, compared to the mainland, Okinawa lacks a vibrant and prosperous economy. Accusations of Okinawa’s economy being dependent on the military bases do not ring true in the 21st century, however, in 2008, sightseeing revenue was $4.1 billion compared to $3.3 billion for base-related revenue (Yoshikawa 2012). As the Okinawan Prefectural Government writes, “The U.S. military bases are the greatest impediment to Okinawa’s economic development” (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2018).

Many Okinawans see increasing tourism, particularly from China, as one viable way to boost their economic output and diversify development. However, as 15 percent of the island’s land is occupied by the bases, base relocation—particularly that of centrally located Futenma—would assist in this goal. As long as there is a military presence on the island, there will be businesses and contractors that target the patronage of U.S. service personnel and military procurement. Today, with the bases contributing to an economic all-time low and continuing to occupy patches of prime real estate that could be developed for other uses, they are a prohibitive barrier to the productive restructuring of the Okinawan economy, thus further driving Okinawans to oppose the bases.

Basing becomes a national campaign issue

In 2009, candidate Hatoyama Yukio of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) made a campaign pledge to move the Futenma Air Station out of Okinawa completely. When the DPJ achieved a landslide victory in the 2009 elections and Hatoyama took office in 2009, party officials attempted find a location for the base relocation other than the previously agreed to bilateral agreement on relocating Futenma to the northern area of Henoko, a coastal region in the small town of Nago. Hatoyama was unable to persuade the Foreign Ministry and effectively negotiate with U.S. officials and President Barack Obama’s administration. Ultimately, Hatoyama reneged on his promise and became the first DPJ minister to resign after only eight months in office (The Japan Times 2019).

Hatoyama explained to Okinawans at the time: “In terms of the role of the Marine Corps in the totality of all U.S. forces in Okinawa, the more

I learned, the more I have come to realize their interoperability. I have come to believe that it was the [only] way to maintain deterrence.” The belated realization of “deterrence” as rationale for the bases angered many Okinawans, who felt that it was being used as an excuse to avoid the U.S.’ explicit promise of moving the Futenma base (Norimatsu 2011). After turning Futenma into an issue of national political significance and winning an election on the promise of bold change, this blatant betrayal by the Japanese government may have further outraged Okinawans and hardened already underlying anti-base sentiments. Additionally, the central government reneging on their promise aggravated tensions between the already-strained Okinawa-Tokyo relationship, further adding to the multitude of grievances Okinawans have accumulated against the central government.

Frontierism: A new Okinawan identity politics

Hijino and Vogt (2019) argue that a new identity politics is developing in Okinawa, primarily born out of distrust for mainstream parties and the central government. Notable anti-base governor Onaga Takeshi’s 2014 speech reflected this attempt to develop an Okinawan political identity: Against attempts to place U.S. bases in the prefecture by the rest of Japan, it is necessary to correct the false impression that Okinawa is a base-dependent economy. I believe we must overcome [divisions of] ideology, unify the hearts of the prefectural citizens, and continue to demand a resolution of the base problem…We must band together not on ideology, but through our identity as prefectural citizens (Hijino and Vogt 2019, 2).

Takeshi’s campaign catchphrase of “identity, not ideology” also showed an effort to build a populist, pan-ideological coalition that explicitly appealed to the electorate’s sense of Okinawan identity and their collective grievances against the central government. Hijino and Vogt use candidate manifestos for gubernatorial elections post-reversion to quantitatively analyze how identity politics have changed over time. They find that the use of two phrases: aidentiti (identity) and kenmin no hokori (pride of Okinawans) spiked during Takeshi’s 2014-2018 term, and that governors’ inaugural speeches have shown an increasing emphasis on matters of Okinawan culture and identity. It culminated in 2014 with Takeshi explicitly deploying identity politics in the form of Okinawan cultural and linguistic appeals as a way to mobilize voters

and bridge the gap between pro- and anti-base voters.

Another prominent anti-base governor, Masahide Ota, differentiated the Okinawan experience during World War II from the Japanese mindset in a 1999 speech:

Okinawa, formerly a peaceful nation-state (heiwa kokka), had no choice but to go along with a military state (gunkoku), Japan. This, one may say, was the beginning of Okinawa’s fortification (Okinawa no kichika) (Hijino and Vogt 2019, 14).

While Ota was not as prone to using the Ryukyuan identity as Takeshi, he, too, sought to appeal to a distinct Okinawan identity that honored the Okinawan sacrifices during and after the war and to build a more dignified and secure future for the island (Hijino and Vogt 2019). However, one reason that Okinawan opposition to the bases has hardened could be that identity-based mobilization increased during Takeshi’s term, blurring the policy differences between the traditionally pro- and anti-base elements in the Okinawa electorate by causing them to identify with the frontier cause. Of course, Takeshi’s popularist framing of the “bad” Japanese government against the innocent, victimized Okinawans may have also been successful at changing the policy views of the Okinawan electorate.

Grassroots mobilization increases awareness of Marine incidents

Anti-base Okinawans have seen remarkable success at organizing grassroots-level movements, often sparked as a result of incidents caused by marines. A major example of such a mobilizing incident is the 1995 rape of a twelve-year-old girl by three GIs, which triggered protests of over 85,000 people and led Governor Ota to refuse to sign the five-year lease that authorizes American use of the land for the bases. Ota took his argument to the Supreme Court, where he argued that the bases violated the fundamental rights of Okinawans to live in peace and security; however, the Supreme Court rejected this argument. Unfortunately for Ota, a referendum that he himself called came in a few days later, showing 89 percent support for reducing American military presence (Mikanagi 2004). However, Ota had no choice but to reverse course and sign the lease agreement, frustrating the anti-base groups that had supported him until now. Ota went on to lose his reelection bid to a much more pro-basing governor. Concurrently, both the United States and Japan agreed to a revision of SOFA, and both countries

agreed to form a Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). The Committee proposed relocating Futenma to a sea-based facility and heliport in Henoko, Nago. Although this solution addressed the concerns many had with the location of Futenma being an air base in the middle of a densely populated city, Nago has a considerable amount of biodiversity that would be affected by the construction of a coastal air base. Additionally, 82 percent of Nago residents were opposed to the Henoko base (Mikanagi 2004).

Socialmovementssuchastheanti-basemovement benefitfromhavingaclearframingandadedicated involvementfromordinarypeoplewhoarerallying againstacausethatpermeatestheirday-to-day lives(Ketelaars2016).Theanti-basemovementhas allofthesecharacteristics,translatingintoaclear andeffectivemessagethatwillresonateeasilywith Okinawans.

A key factor in such hardened opposition to the bases is undoubtedly the relentless work done by groups like the Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, a women’s group who organized the various groups protesting the 1995 rape, which culminated in an 85,000-person strong protest. Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence has been successful at organizing on two different tiers: on the international scale, they have organized different groups focused on military violence, and on a local level, organizing different anti-base groups within Okinawa (Mikanagi 2004). Women in particular tend to be on the front lines of the anti-base movement because they feel that they are fulfilling their roles as wives and mothers by protecting their children from the environmental, noise, and safety concerns of the base. Other protest groups include environmental, anti-militarism, and elderly-oriented groups. The groups keep a list of atrocities and injustices resulting from the American bases and regularly remind the public through the media and other venues (Vine 2019).

Social movements such as the anti-base movement benefit from having a clear framing and a dedicated involvement from ordinary people who are rallying against a cause that permeates their day-to-day lives (Ketelaars 2016). The anti-base movement has all of these characteristics,

translating into a clear and effective message that will resonate easily with Okinawans. Through protest, rally, and organization, citizen groups have achieved remarkable success raising awareness among Okinawans, Japanese, and the international community at large about their objections to the bases.

The lengthy and frustrating base relocation process

Multiple botched attempts to execute a relocation of Futenma have crystallized anti-base sentiment among Okinawans. The SACO first proposed relocation to Henoko, while a 2006 agreement formally recognized this solution. Even though PM Hatoyama had promised relocation of Futenma would not occur within Okinawa, he ultimately endorsed the Henoko plan, which many Okinawans had come to oppose. In 2006 and later 2012, agreements were made to move Marines out of Okinawa into Guam. The current agreement is that around 9,000 Marines will be moved into deployments in Guam, Australia, and Hawaii. This realignment is still currently underway. Members of the U.S. Congress also periodically raise concerns about the costs incurred of relocation, which further jeopardizes confidence in the process (Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2014).

When anti-base Governor Onaga Takeshi took office in 2014, he declared his intent to do everything in his power to block construction at Henoko. His prefectural government repeatedly sued the central government and created administrative hurdles to construction, effectively delaying construction by several years while the legal processes played out. A drawnout, politically fraught contestation is the last reason why public opinion in Okinawa is so anti-base. Okinawans have become exasperated at the gridlock of the relocation process, and the lack of speedy action undoubtedly leads many to question three different sets of authorities’ commitments towards addressing their concerns, further solidifying anti-base sentiment.

Other Explanations: An independent, anti-imperial Okinawa?

Considering the Ryukyu Kingdom’s sovereign status until its 1879 accession to Japan, as well as its distinct cultural identity, some may question whether or not a desire for Okinawan independence could be a driving factor in resistance to current basing solutions. Serious advocates like Jon Mitchell have raised the possibility that an independent Okinawa could manage their affairs better than the United States or Japan. However, Okinawa today is an

unremovable part of Japan. A Ryukyu independence movement has failed to attract any significant attention. Self-determination of Okinawa, with its struggling economy and small population, is not a serious consideration.

Framing the anti-base movement as an anti-imperialist one also falls flat on its face. The United States jointly negotiates the finances and logistics of bases with the host country, who enters into a voluntary agreement with the U.S. in exchange for defense. Rather than being an imperial or occupying force, military basing is a mutually beneficial agreement for both the host nation and the hegemon. Therefore, these two reasons are not adequate framings for understanding the strength of anti-base sentiments in public opinion.

Concluding Remarks: Evaluations and future recommendations

The Okinawan experience of the U.S. military presence has been fraught since its inception. In a country as advanced and safe as Japan, the threat Okinawans feel as a result of hosting the bases is unacceptable. Not lost on many Okinawans is the fact that they are bearing these externalized costs of mainland Japan’s defense after being treated as second-class citizens during their accession to the Japanese state and enduring horrific atrocities on behalf of the Japanese during the Battle of Okinawa. Adding to the injustice, Okinawa remains the poorest prefecture, with lower education rates, higher poverty rates, and a struggling economy.

Arguably complicating the issue of basing pressures is that Okinawans have become even more resistant to any kind of U.S. presence. Primarily as a result of markedly increased Okinawan opposition, the location of Futenma has become untenable. As I have shown, five interacting factors have contributed to cementing this opposition in public opinion: (1) declining economic dependence on the bases, (2) basing as a national political issue, (3) Okinawan identity politics, (4) grassroots mobilization, and (5) aggravation at the politics of the base relocation process. However, the most easily operationalized solution, relocation to Henoko, is now unlikely to pacify many anti-base Okinawans.

Fundamentally, the Okinawa question is whether grand, realist strategic ambitions can be reconciled with the horrors of war-making in the 21st century. From the United States perspective, it is less than ideal to have the entire Indo-Pacific Command be at risk of collapsing due to one rape

incident. Despite near-daily accusations of the end of American hegemony, its military bases in Okinawa are indeed essential to deterring the North Korean nuclear threat and Chinese threat to Taiwan. If the U.S. military leaves Okinawa, China may take it as an indication of America’s declining commitment to Taiwan’s freedom. Furthermore, the American presence serves as a good faith example of American commitment to Japanese defense, and an American police presence aligns with Japan’s strategic goal of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as it reckons with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Even as their anti-base resolve hardens, the Okinawan people have been admirable in their nonviolent and tolerant opposition to the bases. In the future, the United States would be wise to grant more concessions to Okinawa, like more favorable SOFA agreements. Future iterations of current basing solutions and asset packages should strive to be more innovative and less invasive. Base relocation to mainland Japan should be seriously considered by officials in Washington . Additionally, base co-location with the Japan Self-Defense Forces may also serve to alleviate some of the antiAmerican sentiment in Okinawa, although this element is not as much antiAmerican as it is anti-base. Attempts have been made to prevent incidents involving Marines, which have a particularly checkered history in Okinawa, but more training and greater education of Marines regarding Okinawan history could serve as another preventative measure. No matter how the Okinawa question is resolved, it is clear that the U.S.-Japan alliance truly is the cornerstone of free movement and democratic values in the East. Any resolution must address both the concerns of the Okinawan people as well as safeguard this critical alliance.

Altenberg, Blake. 2019. “In the Shadow of Shuri Castle: The Battle of Okinawa in Memory.” MA Thesis, Chapman University. https://doi. org/10.36837/chapman.000057.

BBC News. 2019. “Okinawa: Tokyo to Overrule Referendum on US Base.” BBC News, February 25, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-47353504.

Chanlett-Avery, Emma and Ian E. Rinehart. 2014. “The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy.” Congressional Research Service, August 14, 2014. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ ark:/67531/metadc462421/.

Heginbotham, Eric. 2008. “U.S. Strategy in East Asia: Impact of the China Factor.” In Strategic Yet Strained: US Force Realignment in Japan and its Effects on Okinawa, edited by Yuki Tatsumi. The Henry L. Stimson Center.

Hijino, Ken Victor Leonard andGabriele Vogt. 2021. “Identity politics in Okinawan elections: the emergence of regional populism.” Japan Forum, 33 (1): 50-76. https:/doi.org/10.1080/09555803.2019.1646784.

Hussein, Mohammed and Mohammed Haddad. 2021. “Infographic: History of US Interventions in the Past 70 Years.” Al Jazeera, September 10, 2021.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/10/infographic-us-militarypresence-around-the-world-interactive.

Ketelaars, Pauline. 2016. “What Strikes the Responsive Chord? The Effects of Framing Qualities on Frame Resonance among Protest Participants.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 21 (3): 341–60. https://doi. org/10.17813/1086-671X-21-3-341.

Mikanagi, Yumiko. 2004. “Okinawa: women, bases and US-Japan relations.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 4: 97-111. https://doi. org/10.1093/irap/4.1.97.

Norimatsu, Satoko. 2011. “Hatoyama's Confession: The Myth of Deterrence and the Failure to Move a Marine Base Outside Okinawa.” The Asia-Pacific Journal 9 (3).

Okinawa Prefectural Government. 2018. “What Okinawa Wants You to Understand about the U.S. Military Bases.” March 2018. https://dcoffice.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/E-all.pdf.

Reisener, Matthew. 2018. “Improving the U.S.-Japan Alliance Begins on

Okinawa.” The National Interest, December 24, 2018.

Robson, Chiyomi Sumida Seth. 2016. “Poll Shows Strong Okinawa Resistance to US Base Realignment Plan.” Stars and Stripes, June 15,2016.

Shimabukuro, Takashi. 2019. “Working Conditions in Postwar Okinawa and the Problem of ‘Child Poverty.’” 経営論集, 66 (2): 249-259.

The Mainichi. 2017. “Central Gov’t Support Failing to Reach Okinawa's Most Vulnerable.” The Mainichi, May 16, 2017.

The Mainichi. 2020. “Editorial: Time to Discuss Revisions to 60-Year-Old Japan-US Sofa.” The Mainichi, June 24,2020.

The Japan Times. 2019. “Former PM Hatoyama regrets reneging on pledge to move Futenma airbase out of Okinawa.” The Japan Times, September 5, 2019.

Vine, David. 2019. “No Bases? Assessing the Impact of Social Movements Challenging US Foreign Military Bases.” Current Anthropology 60 (19): 158-172.

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The Impact of Air Travel Restrictions on the Spread and Severity of the First Wave of COVID-19

By Lydia Smith

About the Author

Lydia Smith is a 4th year Foreign Affairs major and a French and Russian minor. She is also a member of the UVA Women’s Rugby team and Shakespeare on the Lawn. Her article is taken from the introduction of her Distinguished Majors Program thesis, where she is writing on the impact of air travel regulations on the first wave of COVID-19.

Forward

I am very pleased to see that Lydia Smith’s paper, “The Impact of Air Travel Restrictions on the Spread and Severity of the First Wave of Covid-19” will be published in the Virginia Journal of International Affairs Lydia’s article is part of the research she is conducting in the Distinguished Major Program in the Department of Politics. On the one hand, Lydia seeks to explain how international air traffic might have contributed to the worldwide spread of Covid, and on the other hand how stopping that traffic is fraught with difficulties. It is not only that stopping air travel has negative political and economic consequences, but the timing of the stoppage usually arrives after the pandemic has already started. In fact, it is only in the aftermath of Covid’s spread, that most governments banned international air travels. The bans were thus imposed too late to prevent the contagion. As Lydia put it: “although they seem to be effective if put in place immediately, they do not appear to be significantly effective over the long term during a global pandemic.”

Lydia derives this conclusion from several case studies that vary in terms of the volume of air traffic. She identified New York, Singapore, and

Sweden, as territories with high levels of air traffic that enacted, however, quite different policies on international travels. She also studied Libya and Venezuela as countries that have relatively low levels of air traffic, which imposed strict public policy measures which they ultimately had difficulty enforcing.

Lydia is not quite finished with her research, and she is still drafting her thesis. As the chair of the DMP, I have been privileged not only to have her as one of the eleven students enrolled in a yearlong seminar, but I have also been her thesis advisor. We have had several long conversations about her research, and she will complete her thesis in late April and present it at a DMP meeting in presence of the other DMP students and their advisers. I expect Lydia to produce a first-class thesis on a topic of vital interest.

Robert Fatton Department of Politics

University of Virginia

Abstract

This article looks at restrictions on travel implemented in an effort to mitigate the effects of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. The link between air travel and the spread of infectious diseases has been welldocumented before the onset of COVID-19; however, in the context of the 21st century, travel restrictions had to have been imposed at the very moment the disease began in order to prevent the global spread of a pandemic. Undoubtedly, travel restrictions would have slowed the spread of COVID-19 significantly and would have had clear benefits had they been implemented before the virus spread to every country; however, though every country had put some sort of air travel restriction in place before the first few months of the pandemic were out, most of these restrictions came too late to make a significant difference. This article examines the examples of New York State, Sweden, Singapore, Libya, and Venezuela and ultimately argues that the travel restrictions imposed by world governments were ineffective at stopping the spread of the pandemic.

Where people go, disease follows. We have understood that for centuries, and the use of travel bans, quarantines, and stay-at-home orders to

Lydia Smith

try to prevent the spread of infectious diseases can be traced back to the Black Plague and earlier. The most effective way to overcome an illness, it would seem, is to stop it from reaching you in the first place. While in decades past human travel was largely limited by how far it took to get somewhere by land or by sea, modern-day commercial air travel allows us to fly halfway around the world in under twenty-four hours; hence, a new disease can spread just as rapidly.

With this in mind, it is necessary to impose travel restrictions almost immediately in order to prevent a pandemic from going global. In the case of a virus like COVID-19, which can spread before symptoms even begin, those restrictions need to be put in place before the threat is even noticeable. Undoubtedly, successful travel restrictions would have slowed the spread of COVID-19 significantly and would have had clear benefits had they been implemented before the virus spread to every country; in practice, although every country had put some sort of air travel restriction in place during the first few months of the pandemic, in the vast majority of cases, these restrictions came too late to make a significant difference. By the time they were imposed, the virus was already virtually everywhere and had in many places become self-sustaining, meaning that travel restrictions did very little to stop the epidemic from spreading.

Of course, COVID-19 was not the first significant epidemic which spread largely via air travel. In 2002, the SARS epidemic spread to twentynine countries and caused several local epidemics (Findlater and Bogoch 2018, 775). Ultimately, public health measures were successful in containing the virus, and this case was instrumental in demonstrating the need for international cooperation in order to successfully combat the spread of infectious disease, especially during a time when it can spread so rapidly. After the SARS epidemic made it clear that the likelihood of a pandemic spreading due to air travel was high, more research explored the links between air travel, passenger volume, and disease transmission. One particularly applicable study conducted by Liang Mao et al. noted that the World Health Organization could potentially use its data to track high-risk routes and predict where infectious diseases could spread (Mao et al. 2015, 59). Such preemptive analysis of airport patterns could be vital in the early stages of a pandemic, when contact-tracing and understanding where a disease is spreading is critical for effectively stopping it.

In mid-December of 2019, hospitals in Wuhan (in the province of Hubei, China) began to receive patients with a mysterious flu-like illness. By late December, Chinese doctors began to warn people about the disease through social media despite backlash from the Chinese government. On December 31, the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, which was a possible starting point for many early cases of the virus, was closed by authorities, and on January 3, 2020, China officially reported the outbreak to the WHO. Almost as soon as knowledge of the virus became public, speculation began that there was a significant risk of importation of the virus via air travel. The first official case outside of China was identified in Thailand on January 13, but whether other international cases might have gone unreported in those early days is unknown. The risk of the virus spreading to countries with high levels of travel contact with China was significant, and it was estimated that countries with multiple central travel hubs (for example, Germany, which has several major airports) would be more vulnerable to early spread than countries with less air travel or only one major travel hub (Pullano et al., 2020).

The celebration of Lunar New Year in mid-January 2020 led millions of people to travel to and from Wuhan, most likely exacerbating the spread of the virus. At 2 a.m. on January 23, officials announced a lockdown via a notification sent to local smartphones. Airports, train stations, and buses were shut down at 10 a.m. local time, initiating a quarantine that would last until April 8, 2020 (Timeline: China's COVID-19 outbreak and lockdown of Wuhan, 2022); however, because the doubling time of COVID-19 was four to five days, it is estimated that the early Wuhan travel ban delayed the spread of COVID-19 within mainland China by less than a week. By late January, COVID-19 had spread to several other major cities within China, and because up to 75 percent of very early cases also went undetected, it is possible that COVID-19 spread to several other cities domestically and internationally without anyone realizing (Chinazzi et al., 2020).

One study published on January 30, 2020, estimated that it was extremely likely that COVID-19 would eventually spread to every country in Europe. This study took into account the many cases that went undetected and contributed to the international spread without being officially counted. Despite the travel ban to Hubei province, COVID-19 had already spread to other provinces and cities and was thus able to spread internationally (Pullano

et al., 2020). It is important to read early studies like this one in order to understand the perspective of global health officials and governments at the time. Thanks to SARS and other epidemics, the global health community was well aware of the risk of disease importation from the earliest days of the COVID-19 pandemic, and as early as January, many experts were advocating for widespread travel bans in order to stop the spread of COVID-19 to other countries. Unfortunately, most governments did not take quick action.

In early February, fifty-nine airline companies limited or suspended flights to mainland China, and many governments imposed travel restrictions; however, because the pandemic had already spread to other countries and was spreading domestically at an exponential rate, those travel restriction measures did not stop COVID-19 from spreading to virtually every country in the world. One study published in March 2020 by Matteo Chinazzi et al, found that the restrictions imposed by the United States were ineffective unless they were combined with strict domestic containment measures. The study used a metapopulation disease transmission model which divided the world into subpopulations grouped around airports. The researchers took data from previous studies of the flow of air traffic, as well as data from the International Air Transport Association, and they factored in age and health when considering how mobile different populations were likely to be. This research. found that even a 90 percent decrease in travel to and from China would only delay the spread of COVID-19 for less than two weeks (Chinazzi 2020). In the long run, domestic containment measures and public health education would be much more effective than travel restrictions in stopping the spread. By summer 2020, imported cases made up less than 10 percent of cases and travel restrictions had a very small impact on the overall caseload in most countries. Very stringent travel restrictions only had a significant impact where there were already very low caseloads of COVID-19 coupled with very large numbers of arrivals from other countries; however, because there was a strong correlation between international travel and high levels of COVID-19, not many countries fit that description, and stringent travel restrictions were not generally very impactful (Russell et al. 2020, 12) .

Aside from their conditional practicality, there are other reasons why travel restrictions should not be and are not always immediately imposed as the first line of defense. According to the 2005 International Health Regulations, which were heavily revised after the SARS epidemic, travel

restrictions “shall not be more restrictive of international traffic and not more invasive or intrusive to persons than reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level of health protections” (Revision of the International Health Regulations, 2005). There are humanitarian, economic, and legal reasons to ensure that travel restrictions are only implemented when the benefits outweigh the costs.

Inthelongrun,domesticcontainmentmeasures andpublichealtheducationwouldbemuchmore effectivethantravelrestrictionsinstoppingthe spread.

Among the other obstacles to travel restrictions’ efficacy at containing the spread of disease is the complexity of implementation. In order to screen incoming travelers, airports face logistical problems arising from the inaccuracy of self-reported symptoms, the need to temperaturescreen travelers, and the possibility of asymptomatic travelers potentially spreading the virus. Additionally, most governments did not implement travel restrictions in time to stop COVID-19 from entering their countries in 2020 because airlines have economic incentives to maintain high connectivity. While many airlines did suspend travel independently, government regulation earlier in the process could have led these travel bans to be more effective. Internationally, public support for travel restrictions is mixed. In 2021, Steffen Kallbekken et al. conducted a study suggesting that public support for air travel restrictions due to COVID-19 was initially high as the public perceived the pandemic to be an imminent and severe threat; but support for travel restrictions lessened as time went on because the public began to expect extended negative consequences and because the severity of the pandemic no longer sat at the front of the public’s mind. Even when governments managed to put bans into place, different countries enacted different policies, causing inconsistency and complications. To understand how these different policies worked, it is useful to look at several representative case studies: New York, Singapore, Sweden, Libya, and Venezuela. The cases of New York, Singapore, and Sweden are revealing because they are all places with high levels of air traffic that enacted very different policies with regards to international travel and domestic measures. Libya and Venezuela, on the other hand, are useful

case studies because both countries have relatively low levels of air traffic, and although they both implemented strict quarantine measures, those measures were difficult to enforce.

After the first official case of COVID-19 was confirmed on March 1, 2020, New York State closed schools, houses of worship, and large gathering facilities and declared a state of emergency on March 7, 2020, a week before the United States government declared a national emergency. On March 12, a federal travel ban was implemented that prevented European Union nationals from entering the United States, and borders were closed to other countries, including Canada, by the 18th. New York, however, never banned travel between states, meaning that it was still possible for people to travel and spread the virus within the United States. As COVID-19 was already spreading in New York at an exponential rate, and federal travel restrictions did not prevent people from moving from one state to another, the restrictions had very little impact on slowing the spread of COVID-19 in New York and in the United States (Tiwari et al, 2021).

In Sweden, the first case of COVID-19 was reported on January 31, 2020. Restrictions in Sweden were very relaxed domestically, though public gatherings of more than 500 people were prohibited on March 11, and citizens were advised against all unnecessary travel on March 13; however, the decision to allow schools to close was left up to the individual schools, and the Swedish government deemed social distancing and quarantine voluntary. A study done by Bo Yan et al. noted that Sweden has a very individualistic culture and a decentralized regime, with historical preference for individualism over collectivism. This may help to explain Sweden’s “nudge” strategy of pandemic response: The government designed its response to change behaviors without prohibiting options or imposing upon individuals’ freedom of choice.

Sweden’s relatively relaxed approach was the subject of much criticism, as it differed from the strategies of Sweden’s neighbors. Sweden could have enacted much stricter lockdown measures, and it received criticism for leaving things relatively open (Claeson and Hanson 2021). Notably, when Prime Minister Stefan Lofven gave his first televised address to the nation regarding COVID-19 on March 22, he made no mention of concrete policy changes; instead, he asked Swedes simply to “play their part” (Prime Minister’s address to the nation, 22 March 2020, 2022). Sweden was the only

country in Europe that did not impose a general lockdown. During the first wave of COVID-19, Sweden fared worse than its Scandinavian neighbors, though perhaps not to the degree that one would have expected. Sweden’s many pre-existing advantages, such as a relatively healthy population, high GDP per capita, and less international travel than other major European cities may have contributed to Sweden’s unusually low COVID-19 case rate, despite looser restrictions.

In contrast to Sweden, Singapore responded to COVID-19 by imposing very strict public policy measures. The government created a COVID-19 task force before the first official reported case and enacted an intense lockdown on April 10 (albeit this was later than most other nations). Today, Singapore has one of the lowest case fatality rates in the world thanks to mass testing, contact-tracing, quarantining, and a rigorously-structured medical plan. In this case, it seems that Singapore’s domestic measures were incredibly effective at slowing the spread of the virus, despite the fact that Singapore did not enact a travel ban until nearly a month after most other countries.

Saleem Ahmed et al. give a first-hand account of what it was like to be a doctor in Singapore during the early stages of the pandemic, stressing how quickly Singapore implemented measures domestically to curb the spread. These measures included emergency hospital response plans, the prioritization of COVID-19 patients when possible, and streamlined clinic and hospital services (Ahmed 2020, 1075-1076). John E. L. Wong et al. also describes Singapore’s early countermeasures, including their extensive travel restrictions and contact-tracing policies. Wong et al. argue that Singapore learned from its experience with SARS and was therefore relatively better prepared for COVID-19 than most other countries (2020).

In contrast, Libya was relatively ill-equipped to respond to the pandemic. Libya’s first confirmed case was reported in Tripoli on March 24, 2020. The Libyan healthcare system was not prepared to handle a pandemic, and continuous armed conflict prevented the government from enforcing its quarantine and isolation orders. The conflict also hurt healthcare infrastructure and made it impossible to know for sure how badly the pandemic has affected certain areas; however, Libya has had fewer COVID-19 cases than many other countries, possibly due to Libya’s low rate of international air travel or alternatively, the high rate of Bacillus-Calmette-

Guerin vaccinations. In sum, 98 percent of Libyans have had this vaccine, which may have built immunity to respiratory viruses like COVID-19, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic (Gasibat, Raba, and Abobaker 2020). This validates the correlation between air travel and rate of infection, despite domestic policy drawbacks.

Similarly, Venezuela has experienced much fewer COVID-19 cases than its neighbors. The first confirmed case was reported on March 13, 2020, and the government announced a stay-at-home order two days later and a lockdown two days after that. It is possible that low levels of international travel may have delayed the initial spread of COVID-19 in Venezuela because although Venezuela did employ domestic containment efforts, it was very difficult to enforce a quarantine order because so much of the population needed to go outside of their homes daily to work and to obtain basic necessities like food and water (Cooper 2020, 241-5).

Although the data for Libya and Venezuela especially is difficult to draw causation from, there is a strong correlation between high levels of international traffic and high levels of COVID-19, at least during the beginning of the pandemic. However, there is less proof that international travel bans were effective, especially when compared to domestic efforts to slow the spread. Internationally, support for travel restrictions is mixed. Steffen Kallbekken et al. conducted a study that showed that, at least initially, public support for air travel restrictions due to COVID-19 was high, as there is a perceived threat and imminence of the problem. Kallbekken et al. explain that this is because people expect that these restrictions will go away soon, but that the support for travel restrictions lessens when there are perceived extended negative consequences (2021).

However, some critics argue that travel restrictions violate international law, and that although they might be useful in containing pandemics, their costs are more than their benefits. They argue that travel restrictions do more harm than good, particularly in today’s global economy, and that although they slow the pandemic, they did not effectively stop it. Travel restrictions can be very damaging to a nation’s economy, and the brunt of travel restrictions’ negative effects is forced onto countries who have large tourism sectors. Additionally, there is some research suggesting that travel bans can lead to increased levels of racism and xenophobia, and can discourage globalization and international cooperation (Meier 2020).

Clearly, travel restrictions are a complex issue, and there is no clear solution, especially during times like early 2020, when there were few places to look for precedent. In conclusion, restrictions are effective if governments impose them immediately, but they are not otherwise significantly effective over the long term of a global pandemic.

Despite travel restrictions’ contested effectiveness, this pandemic still might change air travel forever. The Lancet journal published an article that suggested that the impact of COVID-19 on air travel could be comparable to that of 9/11, when TSA and other security measures were widely implemented. It is difficult to predict what will happen, especially since the pandemic is ongoing, but it is not hard to imagine that measures such as wearing masks on planes might become commonplace for many years to come.

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More Informed Than Ever, As Divided As Never: A Comparative Analysis Of The Connection Between Media Trust and Political Polarization

By Sophie Roehse

About the Author

Sophie Roehse is a fourth-year student in the College of Arts and Sciences from Hamburg, Germany, with majors in Foreign Affairs and Spanish. In light of her German-American background, she enjoys studying transatlantic affairs and holds a particular interest in the issue of international migration. As part of the Politics Distinguished Majors Program, she is currently working on a thesis examining the discrepancy in migration policy actions towards unaccompanied minors between the United States and Germany in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Aside from academics, Sophie is an intern at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, working for the Presidential Recordings Program and the Project on Democracy and Capitalism, and is a photographer for the Cavalier Daily. In her free time, she enjoys spending time with friends, exploring the Charlottesville area, reading, and traveling.

Abstract

Over the past few years, national politics in both the United States and Germany have become more contentious, and radical views have permeated into major government institutions. A series of similar issues has generated significant pushbacks in both countries, manifesting as extremist wings in the Democratic and Republican Parties in the United States and the rise of populist parties and civic movements in Germany. Nonetheless,

differences exist between the two countries with regard to the nature of polarization, the lines of political division, and possible contributing factors, which this paper aims to explore.

The first section provides an overview of the nature of polarization in both countries, suggesting that affective polarization dominates in the United States and issue polarization dominates in Germany. Next follows a study of opinions towards the news media and trust in media outlets among different political groups, revealing that the German public holds greater perceptions of confidence and credibility towards the media across the political spectrum than its American counterpart. Finally, the third part establishes the close connections between the nature of mass polarization, lines of political division, and media trust. The paper concludes that general skepticism of and low confidence in the news media, in addition to selfselection of outlets, further deepens the political divide and raises partisan attachment in the United States. In Germany, supporters of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) exhibit different media attitudes than supporters of the center-right and -left parties, yet overall higher levels of trust and more uniform consumption patterns contribute to divisions based on divergent issue positions rather than identity. Though the piece regards views of the news media as a relevant contributor to mass polarization in the two countries, it recognizes other explanatory factors, as well as manners in which the relation may be mutually reinforcing.

Introduction

Democracies across the globe are facing challenges that reach beyond policy issues and instead target core democratic structures. In the United States, increasing animosity across the political aisle and an inability to reach consensus in decision-making has raised doubts about the functioning of American political institutions, while waves of populism in Europe have progressed past the mass public to the height of national governments. Recently, political polarization, broadly defined as a state of division into two antithetical factions with regard to policy, ideology or partisanship, has been blamed for this trend of democratic backsliding (McCarty 2019, 8-9). However, there are critical differences across countries with respect to the nature of political polarization, the underlying causes, as well as future implications. As a contribution to existing studies, this paper

offers a comparative analysis of the nature of mass polarization in the United States and Germany. More specifically, it investigates how different levels of trust in the news media are associated with the division of the political spheres in the two countries.

The basis of my theory assumes that political polarization among the mass public exists in both the United States and Germany but that the lines of division extend along different categories. In the American case, citizens are principally split by affective identity, or partisan identification with either the Democratic or Republican side. In Germany, however, opinions on specific policy issues, rather than political parties, emerge as the primary driver of polarization. The two countries also exhibit divergent public attitudes towards the news media that relate to their different sorts of division. As the key link of communication between the political world and the populace, the media may thus hold a formidable role in perpetuating societal cleavages. In a review of existing literature, this work highlights the distinct nature of polarization in the U.S. and Germany, followed by an analysis of public trust in the media that correlates with the different types of polarization. The investigation exposes attitudes towards the news media as both a potential contributor to and consequence of mass polarization, as may be inferred from perceptions of proficiency and objectivity, consumption habits, and notions of trustworthiness that appear connected to respective political divides.

Literature on Mass Polarization in the United States and Germany

Affective Identity Driving Divisions Among the American Mass Public

In the United States, the salience of identity in the public consciousness has significantly increased over the past decades. This trend permeates the political arena as well, driving polarization in accordance with personal identity as opposed to issue preference. The book Uncivil Agreement explores this phenomenon and argues that a process of social sorting has caused partisanship to represent more than political positions. In today’s America, party divisions encompass differences in ideological, religious, and racial identities as well, thus generating social homogeneity within the Democratic and Republican parties (Mason 2018, 6). As parties evolve into manifestations of supra-political identities, the author shows that this new fundamental line of division amplifies attachment to one’s own “in-group”

and the aversion to the other “out-group” (Mason 2018, 66). On the one hand, this negatively impacts opinions towards people on the other side of the political spectrum, leading to infrequent cross-partisan interactions and heightened prejudice and intolerance of disparate views (Mason 2018, 6162). On the other hand, Mason (2018) reveals that sorting now supersedes substantive conflicts of policy, suggesting that party identification replaces views on objective issues in political decision-making (72-73). As such, investment in one’s own party winning exceeds interest in the advancement of policy solutions for the greater good, placing partisanship above substance (Mason 2018, 54). This finding provides a somber outlook for the future of American politics if conditions remain unchanged, considering the significance of bipartisan compromise and cooperation for the proper functioning of American government.

Furthermore, a piece by Iyengar et al. (2012) also presents a notion of polarization in the United States that shifts focus to the concept of social identity over division based on policy preferences (406). Employing a series of national and international studies, the authors’ findings reveal that the opinions of Americans towards their political opponents have notably decreased. First, they demonstrate that the possibility of inter-party marriage garnered rising levels of resentment among the American public between 1960 to 2010 (Iyengar et al. 2012, 417-418). Next, negative stereotypes of supporters of the other party and favoritism to the own party – with regard to perceptions of intelligence and selfishness – both rose from 1960 to 2008, thus driving feelings at the two ends of the political spectrum farther apart (Iyengar et al. 2012, 420). These results show that partisanship in the United States extends to the personal level. It constitutes the primary indicator of identity, even exceeding differences of race or religion (Iyengar et al. 2012, 415). Written six years later, Mason’s results amplify awareness of how intense the effect of partisanship can become if other social identities are divided along the political line as well. Finally, Iyengar et al. discover that attachment to parties surpassed attachment to issue positions in 2004 and has significantly intensified compared to policy. They hence claim that partisanship today is of affective nature and constitutes a factor of selfdefinition, not simply an indicator of ideological preferences (Iyengar et al. 2012, 423-424). Antipathy towards political opponents and growing distance across the partisan spectrum relies not on substantive matters, but on more

fundamental perceptions of social difference (Iyengar et al.

2012, 427).

In their groundbreaking book on democratic backsliding, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) provide a final endorsement of the view that affective identity is the principal category of polarization in the United States. They point to legislative gridlock, government shutdowns, and electoral changes as adverse signs of the extreme partisan divide and claim that political divisions have come to encompass racial, religious, geographical, and lifestyle differences as well (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 167). Party association today is “not just a partisan affiliation but an identity” and the opposition is perceived as a genuine threat, instead of merely representing divergent policy preferences (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 168). This demonstrates the deep cleavage of the American political and social spheres that reaches to the most personal level of affective identity.

Issue Frustration Fostering Right-Wing Populism in Germany

In a 2021 Journal of Democracy piece, Shari Berman and Hans Kundnani present Europe as a “mirror image” of the United States in considering the drivers of democratic regress and rising antipathy in the populaces (23). While they attribute deepening political divisions in the United States to the rising salience of partisan identity, they establish that in Europe right-wing populism is driving cleavages, as mainstream parties of the center-left and center-right have shifted closer together from their historically distinct profiles (Berman & Kundnani 2021, 23). The authors recognize the power of polarization to change attitudes and imperil the proper functioning of core democratic institutions, but they contend that divergent party platforms and strong partisan attachment are not inherently harmful. In Germany, differences in policy profiles and support bases of the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), the two mainstream parties of the left and right, generated high levels of partisanship and stable patterns of electoral competition during the post-WWII period (Berman & Kundnani 2021, 24).

Expanding on the conventional literature, Berman and Kundnani (2021) argue that the loss of distinction among political alternatives can harm a democracy, as voters feel that mainstream parties are detached from mass preferences and thus look to populists, particularly on the right, to seek responses on topics relevant to them (33). Over the past decades, ideological

convergence of the center-left and center-right in Germany, most clearly evidenced by the three “grand coalitions” of SPD and CDU/CSU under Chancellor Merkel, destabilized the previously stable electoral environment (Berman and Kundnani 2021, 23). On the one hand, the authors assert that changes in the economic approach of the SPD motivated the emergence of “Die Linke” (The Left), a democratic-socialist party promoting workers’ rights and anti-capitalist ideas (Berman and Kundnani 2021, 29). On the other hand, the cultural transformation of the CDU towards a more multiculturally-oriented and immigration-friendly party estranged traditionally-minded adherents, prompting greater support for the rightwing populist “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) (Berman and Kundnani 2021, 30-31). Though the authors refer to the European case as “ideological convergence,” I view this development as polarization that creates division between mainstream and populist parties, rather than between the left and right.

In another piece, authors Berman and Snegovaya (2019) study in detail the stances of European political parties and point to the reorientation of Social Democrats on economic policy as the key driving factor of populism, particularly on the extreme right (6). The center-left, including the German SPD, acceded to a “neoliberal consensus” previously advocated by the center-right, accepting greater market authority relative to government (Berman and Snegovaya 2019, 7-9). In response to SPD’s economic policy pivot, right-wing populist parties adapted their platforms to integrate the economic discontent of those traditional social democratic voters. They began promoting greater social welfare and denouncing expanding competencies of the European Union. Moreover, increasing agreement between the mainstream left and right on economics shifted attention to issues in the cultural and social realms,enabling new forms of party distinction. With the CDU becoming more moderate in the cultural and social arena in Germany, particularly since Merkel’s chancellorship, the populist right seized the opportunity to appeal to more extreme voters. The AfD emphasized its conservative stances regarding immigration and national identity and thus captured those long-standing supporters of the CDU/CSU alienated by their party’s realignment (Berman and Snegovaya 2019, 9-11).

In considering implications for democracy, Berman and Snegovaya (2019) stress that social and cultural affairs introduce more complex

considerations in contrast to economic matters. The authors contend that economic disputes are more amenable to compromise and tradeoffs, while many traditionalists view national culture and identity as zero-sum. They apply this assessment to the current populist movement in Europe, including the right-wing AfD in Germany. They even hint at a crisis of democracy due to insufficient responsiveness of the established European center-left and center-right towards their base voters (Berman and Snegovaya 2019, 15-16). The contemporary primacy of social and cultural matters thus facilitates unity among supporters of the populist right despite underlying disagreements on economic preferences (Berman and Snegovaya 2019, 16).

Finally, a 2018 paper entitled “The Illusion of Radical Right Partisan Stability” offers a response to the frequent claim that populist voters are opponents of the political establishment per se, or “anti-system voters” (Chou et al. 2018, 2). The authors perform a panel study and experiment to resolve whether support stems from a fundamental attachment to populist causes using the German example of the Alternative for Germany (Chou et al. 2018, 3). Their research reveals that AfD voters really constitute “frustrated issue publics,” basing choices on appropriate representation of interests (Chou et al. 2018, 2). According to the results, the undeviating, uniform positioning of both center-left and center-right on the major issue of immigration perpetuated strong support for the right-wing populist party over past years, which offers the only conservative policy option in terms of borders, migrant ceilings, and national identity. However, in a hypothetical study of mainstream party movement towards more restrictive positions on immigration, a significant proportion of AfD voters choose established groups over the populists. The authors infer that stability of right-wing extremist support is an “illusion” sustained by the inability of the center-left and center-right to better accommodate public preferences on contested issues such as immigration (Chou et al. 2018, 3-4).

Highlighting Differences Between the United States and Germany

The literature reveals that in the United States, strong party attachment and increasing alignment of social and political identities transforms partisanship into a factor of self-definition. This sense of affective identity has emerged as the most potent driver of polarization among the American public. In Germany, on the other hand, opinions on specific

questions perceived as important by individuals appear more relevant to political positioning than devotion to a specific party. In contrast to the U.S., the right-wing AfD indicates a political division of the public advanced by divergent issue positions of mainstream parties versus populists, rather than a fundamental identification with partisan identity. More specifically, the sense of invisibility among many voters with conservative views on cultural and social issues caused a notable part of the electorate to support the populists as the only political “alternative” to adequately represent their preferences. In both countries, the focus on culture and identity over economic matters constitutes the greatest threat to democratic values and the proper functioning of institutions. In the United States, this has produced gridlock due to an inability to reach cross-partisan consensus. In Germany, it has propelled extreme issue polarization, due to the center-right and center-left’s lack of distinct social and cultural policy offerings.

Literature on Public Trust in the News Media in the United States and Germany

Americans Generally and Republicans Especially Distrust the Media

A trusting relationship between the news media and the public in the United States appears deficient, as several studies exhibit. Many Americans seem to view the media as an opponent – subject to doubt and denunciation – instead of a member of their own team in making sense of the political world and beyond. A telephone survey conducted by Gallup, Inc. in late-summer of 2020 among U.S. adults indicates this low level of trust in the media across the populace (Brenan 2020). The results reveal that less than one in ten adults hold “a great deal” of trust and confidence that news reports are “fully, accurately, and fairly” depicted, while 60% of the public admit they trust the media “not very much” or not “at all” (Brenan 2020). The combined 40% “great deal” and “fair amount” of confidence in 2020 stands among the lowest recorded numbers over past decades, with Americans’ trust in the media ranging around 70% in the 1970s and 55% in 1999 (Brenan 2020).

Closely connected to this lack of trust is the low ratings the news media receive on the quality of information they provide. As a survey conducted between November 2019 and February 2020 through a collaborative effort by Gallup and the Knight Foundation (2020) demonstrates, almost half of Americans perceive “a great deal” of political bias in news

coverage (6). A combined total of 83% of adults in the United States discerned a “great deal” or “fair amount” of bias in news reports in both 2017 and 2019, as opposed to 62% and 67% in 2007 and 2012 (Gallup 2020, 6). The perceived lack of objectivity stems from concerns about outlets promoting particular viewpoints, partiality in the selection of issues covered and omitted, as well as prejudice in the presentation of objective stories (Gallup 2020, 7). Nonetheless, the public in principle attributes a crucial role to the news media as a mechanism to hold powerful actors accountable and communicate information on relevant issues. Besides low trust levels, the same survey found that 42% of the U.S. public viewed the news media as critically important to American democracy, while an additional 39% viewed it as “very important” (Gallup 2020, 14). It is thus not the disregard for the media as an institution driving cold opinions, but a sense of inadequate fulfillment of core democratic responsibilities.

Though Americans hold generally critical views of the media, significant differences exist among the supporters of the two political parties. According to the effort by Gallup and the Knight Foundation, “party affiliation remains the key predictor of attitudes about the news media” in 2020 (Gallup 2020, 1). Republicans’ negative opinions stand out in particular, while Democrats hold more favorable views. In assessing basic attitudes towards the news media, 67% of Republicans feel “somewhat” or “very” unfavorable, in contrast to over half of Democrats who report “somewhat” or “very” positive opinions of the news media (Gallup 2020, 19). Moreover, the 2020 Gallup, Inc. telephone survey reveals a drastic gap in levels of confidence in adequate coverage between the two parties. While 2016 exhibited a stark drop among Republicans, their trust hit a record-low in 2020 with only 10% conveying great or fair confidence. No confidence “at all” was expressed by almost 60% of Republicans. Democrats, conversely, came close to a record-high at 73% holding great or fair confidence (Brenan 2020).

With regard to perceived undue influence in news reports, the views of Democratic identifiers are far more favorable than the national average, with just over one quarter perceiving “a great deal” of political bias, as opposed to almost half of all Americans. Republican identifiers express the most hesitant views, with 68% observing “a great deal” of news bias (Gallup 2020, 6). When it comes to assessing the value of news media in society, both Democrats and Republicans attribute a high relevance to the news

media, with 96% and 91%, respectively, recognizing at least some importance for democracy in 2019 (Gallup 2020, 14). Yet the partisan divide becomes clear again when considering the practical realization of roles. While half of Democrats deem the news media as carrying out its functions “well” or “very well,” 67% of Republicans assess the media as supporting democracy “poorly” or “very poorly” (Gallup 2020, 21). In considering a specific issue, less than half of Americans perceive coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic to be “largely accurate,” “for the benefit of the public,” or “helping the country” (Gottfried et al. 2020, 6). Republicans remain particularly critical of media performance during the pandemic outbreak, with majorities expressing that news is mostly inaccurate, benefitting the outlet, and harmful to the country. On all of these accounts, majorities of Democrats hold the opposite views (Gottfried et al. 2020, 8).

Perhaps as a response to the divergent levels of confidence in the news media, Democrats and Republicans in the United States drift apart in the news outlets they typically turn to for reliable political coverage. A Pew Research Center survey executed in the fall of 2019 makes this clear. Over half of Democrats consult CNN on a regular basis for politics and election news, while six in ten Republicans get this type of information from Fox News (Jurkowitz et al. 2020, 17). These consumption behaviors are relevant, as they reflect differential levels of trust partisans place in certain sources. Democratic identifiers indicate CNN as their most trusted outlet, whereas Fox News is most trusted by Republican supporters (Jurkowitz et al. 2020, 10). In reverse, the most trusted outlets for each party constitute the most distrusted one for the other, with 61% of Democrats doubting the reliability of Fox News and 58% of Republicans feeling this way about CNN (Jurkowitz et al. 2020, 12).

Positive Attitudes Towards the Media Among German Mainstream Voters

In Germany, an overall high level of positivity towards the media sector and its supply of information becomes evident throughout a number of studies. The German research institute Infratest dimap in fall 2020 conducted a series of telephone surveys to gain insights into the attitudes of Germans over the age of 18 towards the media (Infratest dimap 2020).

Most importantly, the research reveals that an overwhelming majority of the public perceives the information supplied by the media as highly valuable, with 90% of respondents offering a consistent “good” or “very good” rating

from 2018 to 2020, up from 88% in 2015 and 89% in 2016. Moreover, the collected data indicate a considerable rise in media credibility among the public, from 52% in 2015 to 67% in 2020 – with the exception of a slight drop in 2019 (Infratest dimap 2020, 7). With respect to public broadcasting in particular, the öffentlich-rechtlicher Rundfunk, which makes up 60% of total annual broadcast spending in Germany (“Public” n.d.), the various outlets show an overall increase in positive attitudes in 2020 compared to 2019. For public broadcast television, radio, and online sources, credibility rose from the previous year’s rating. The perception of balance in media reporting also increased for public broadcast television and radio in 2020 (Infratest dimap 2020, 9).

Focusing more on the intersection of media and politics, Germans have growing confidence in the independence of news sources. The percentage of study respondents rejecting the notion of governmental influence on the selection of issues for coverage increased from 54% in 2015 to 60% in 2020, while the proportion of those concerned with governmental influence decreased from 42% to 35% in the same time period (Infratest dimap 2020, 12). In assessing different attitudes by party affiliation, the differences remain comparatively small among the two established parties of the center-left, the SPD, and the center-right, the CDU/CSU. First, the view of credibility of information presented by the German media reached 79% among those identifying as Christian Democrats and 77% among Social Democrats, while the lowest view of credibility was held by affiliates of the populist right Afd at 23% (Infratest dimap 2020, 24). Second, the vast majority of citizens across the board rate the quality of information supplied by the media as “good” or “very good”, with the CDU/CSU and SPD at 95% and 98%, respectively, and even the AfD at 65% (Infratest dimap 2020, 21). Finally, in centering on the quality of reporting on a specific issue, 90% of Christian Democrats and 85% of Social Democrats deem coverage of the coronavirus pandemic as “very good” or “good,” while only 50% of AfD identifiers reported this assessment (Infratest dimap 2020, 34).

Additional notable information comes from a study by Pew Research Center on political and media attitudes throughout eight European countries, including Germany, in late-2017 (Mitchell 2018). Most fundamentally, an inquiry about the perceived importance of the news media for society suggests that Germans highly value the role of the news media, with 61% of

respondents expressing they find it “very” important, while an additional 29% view it as “somewhat” important (Mitchell 2018). With respect to media trust, the survey recorded that 20% of Germans have “a lot” of trust in the news media, while 44% trust it “somewhat” (Mitchell 2018).

Beyond a general inquiry of opinions, the Pew survey also reveals differences in media attitudes depending on political views. In terms of ideological affiliation with the political right or left, identifiers on the right hold slightly more negative opinions in rating the importance of the news media in society and its trustworthiness. Of greater significance, however, is the divide in perspectives between populist and non-populist – or mainstream center-left and center-right – subjects. In response to the claim that the news media is very important to society, only 51% of populists offer approval, in contrast to 75% of non-populists. The gap between media trust levels is most pronounced, with only 47% of populists trusting the news media, as opposed to 78% of non-populists (Mitchell 2018). Moreover, the distance between right and left identifiers constitutes less than half of that between populists and non-populists, the latter of which reaches 24% on media importance and 31% on trust in the news media (Mitchell 2018). In addition, the principal media outlets consulted by those on the right and left largely overlap, with the public-service broadcaster “ARD,” also known as the “first German television station,” constituting the primary source of news for 33% on the left and 27% on the right (Mitchell 2018, 27). Overall, 80% of the German public generally trust this outlet, with 82% of those on the ideological left and 72% on the ideological right expressing this view (Mitchell 2018). Media attitudes in Germany thus diverge mainly along the populist/non-populist line, instead of between different ideological affiliations.

Highlighting Differences Between the United States and Germany

The review of studies on attitudes towards the media points to overall higher levels of confidence and credibility among the German mass public than in the United States. Although voters in both countries in theory attribute a relevant role to the media in terms of protecting transparency, promoting accountability, and helping people stay informed, Americans appear to perceive more inadequacies in the practical realization of these functions than Germans.

With respect to considerations of political polarization, the widespread doubt about the reliability of news reports, particularly among Republicans, may be connected to a general social, cultural, and political climate of acrimony and suspicion in the American mass public. The stark divergences in news sources and trust in certain outlets between Democratic and Republican identifiers correlate with the notion that partisanship encompasses more than issue positions. Through reliance on completely different channels, party adherents may encounter disparate presentations of stories that further separate the worlds in which partisans spend time. In Germany, on the other hand, increasing levels of confidence in media independence from governmental influence and the similar opinions of center-left and center-right supporters show a lack of an outright partisan divide between the left and right. Stronger divergences in the judgments of mainstream party identifiers and right-wing populist affiliates suggest a different type of polarization than in the U.S., one that depends more on evaluations of issues than partisan identification. This is in accordance with the finding that AfD supporters are principally driven by their opinions on specific matters. The presented studies support the argument that polarization in Germany occurs mainly along the populist/non-populist line and is issue-driven, rather than due to ideological affiliation.

How Are Political Polarization and Media Trust Related?

As established in the previous sections, the United States and Germany differ in types of polarization, which is reflected by disparate lines of division splitting the publics politically. In the U.S., affective identity drives deep attachment to political parties because these groups now represent broader social identities. In Germany, a sense of detachment of the centerright and center-left parties from the concerns of the citizenry prompted some voters to turn to right-wing populists for policy responses. At the same time, sharply distinct attitudes towards the news media are evident in

Strongerdivergencesinthejudgmentsofmainstream partyidentifiersandright-wingpopulistaffiliates suggestadifferenttypeofpolarization[inGermany] thanintheU.S.,onethatdependsmoreon evaluationsofissuesthanpartisanidentification.

Sophie Roehse

the two countries. First of all, negative perceptions of trustworthiness and objectivity in the United States present a contrast to more positive feelings in Germany. Furthermore, varying levels of trust exist within the populaces that correlate with the political cleavages in the two countries. Among Americans, Democrats consistently express more favorable views of the media than Republicans, while German mainstream voters hold more favorable attitudes than populist supporters. There are several reasons to believe that the trends in polarization and media trust are intricately related and mutually reinforcing.

Most principally, a fundamental connection becomes clear when considering the role of the media as part of democracy in the United States and Germany. As elaborated in sections III.a. and III.b., voters in both countries overall attribute high levels of importance to the news media in creating a link between the political world and the public. It constitutes the central avenue of communication to provide citizens with information about current events in the domestic as well as international realms and as a way to keep powerful individuals and organizations in check. At the same time, this critical function conveys major responsibility to the news media, rendering it authority to select what topics to cover or omit, and framing how the public understands, evaluates, and interprets issues (Robison and Mullinix 2016, 262). Interestingly, a majority of Americans see the media as partially culpable for driving the public into two mutually antagonistic partisan camps. Overall, 47% of the public places “a great deal of blame” on the news media for political polarization, in addition to 36% who say it deserves “a moderate amount” of blame (Gallup 2020, 50).

Now, considering a situation of low public confidence in the news media to satisfy its democratic functions and present unbiased information, as is the case in the United States, people’s perspectives about the political world may become distorted. Even if coverage is accurate and objective, distrust forms an obstacle to acceptance of information and instead prompts reverting to existing beliefs. As such, political convictions are reinforced and partisan attachments strengthened, further entrenching political divides (Ladd and Podkul 2019, 65). Adding to this, the American environment of intense affective polarization may lead partisans to consider perceived biased reports as attacks not only on their political but also their social, more personal sense of identity. This heightens antipathy for the opposing political side and

fortifies devotion to one’s own party. Conversely, in Germany, generally higher levels of media trust may suggest that people are more open and receptive to new information. Political opinions are hence more fluid and likely to evolve with insight on specific matters perceived as relevant. Moreover, even in instances of apparent subjective news, weaker identification with parties averts interpretation of news coverage as a personal attack. As such, partisanship is not strengthened, but rather frustration about certain issues and differences of opinion generate splits among the public, as demonstrated by the emergence of the populist AfD as a contrast to the established center. Another relevant factor is the divergence of consumption patterns in the two countries. A 2020 report by the Reuters Institute offers insight into the continued strong reliance on television in Germany, while online platforms in the United States now constitute the dominant source of news (Newman et al. 2020). Many Germans continue to seek out nightly news casts of the main public broadcasting channels, whereas Americans today face a heavily fractured media landscape largely owned by private conglomerates. The results of previously-mentioned surveys reveal high trust in public broadcasters, particularly television, in Germany (Infratest dimap 2020, 9). However, in the U.S. corporate control raised doubts about the intentions of outlet leaders and may have contributed to overall distrust (Gallup 2020, 13). As Iyengar et al. (2012) indicate, the more fragmented and diverse American environment invites people to choose news sources that coincide with prior perspectives, which lowers exposure to new viewpoints and creates partisan echoes (427). Fewer interactions across the political aisle and repetition of existing opinions amplify the sorting phenomenon depicted by Mason (2018), extending political positions to broader social categories. In addition, the tendency to resort to attitude-conforming sources manifests the priority of partisan preference and identity over any objective interest in substantive information. However, in Germany, the continued central role of television newscasts implies that the majority of Germans receive the same news reports. Furthermore, the publicly-funded coverage tends to highlight topical complexities over tone or partisan inferences. These two points suggest that divisions among the electorate are principally driven by distinct opinions on certain issues stemming from a common stock of news, instead of different information or presentation of matters that generate two separate communication bubbles.

Finally, examining the meaning of “trust” provides a further explanation for the connection of polarization and media attitudes in the United States and Germany. The results of an experiment by Suiter and Fletcher (2020) reveal a negative correlation of partisanship and trust in the news (493), which supports the argument that affective polarization and unfavorable views of the media in the United States are connected. The authors further introduce a definition of trust as an “expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms” (Suiter and Fletcher 2020, 486). Considering the previously elaborated nature of polarization in the U.S., the perception of fundamental differences of not only political but also social identity across the political spectrum lowers the expectation for shared values and beliefs, and thus raises distrust. In Germany, as noted earlier, polarization still exists yet partisan attachment is weaker and differences lie more in divergent issue standpoints. Consequently, overall levels of media trust are higher due to a division not based on a missing sense of community and common principles, but rather frustration with lack of responsiveness and inadequate issue handling of politicians on behalf of some voters, as demonstrated by support for right-wing populists.

Conclusion

Political Polarization and Media Attitudes as Mutually Reinforcing

The comparative studies of the United States and Germany lead to the conclusion that a strong connection exists between the nature of mass polarization and trust in the news media. On the one hand, the existing environment of polarization impacts attitudes and behaviors towards the media. High levels of partisan resentment and distrust of people with different viewpoints in the U.S. foster a more general atmosphere of skepticism, thus encouraging low confidence in the media as well. Furthermore, self-selection of news outlets with similar-minded outlooks strengthens existing opinions and raises the distance between partisans across the political aisle. The same notion of cynicism among right-wing populists in Germany due to perceived incompetence of the established center parties to respond adequately to issues is reflected in the views of populist versus mainstream adherents towards the media. On the other hand, perceptions of media reliability as well as consumption patterns fortify the lines of division

in the two places. As views on accuracy and objectivity in news reports worsen in the U.S, there is a tendency to revert to already-held opinions and reject new, unfamiliar information and perspectives, which leads to amplified partisan attachment. Negative views of AfD supporters compared to centerparty adherents in Germany reflect frustration with political rigidity. News coverage thus reinforces disappointment and confirms their resorting to populists for more decided policy responses, though, as seen, weaker partisan identities allow for more dynamism of Germans’ political positions in accordance with changing party stances.

Limitations

The case studies of this paper on their own are insufficient to establish any definite influence of media attitudes on the types of polarization, or conversely of political divisions on divergent opinions towards the media. Though strong connections are evidenced, a carefully crafted experiment or survey is critical to make any explicit claims about causation. Moreover, several other factors may impact both polarization and media trust in the United States and Germany that should be accounted for in any further studies on this topic. Additional considerations range from different institutional structures and party systems in the two countries –parliamentary and multi-party in Germany versus presidential and two-party in the U.S. – to disparate national cultures, political histories, as well as social climates, which may generate distinct habits and traditions that are difficult to equivalate across societies.

Another shortcoming of this work is the complexity of any study of “the media.” Particularly since the start of the 21st century, rapid advances in technology have transformed communication systems and changed the nature and availability of news reports. Though the analysis at hand focuses principally on television as a traditionally relevant medium, it is important to recognize the increasing significance of the internet and social media platforms in transmitting information to the public. To account for the developments in trust and consumption patterns of the various individual media sources was beyond the scope of this project, though the connection between specific outlets and polarization should be explored in future research.

Finally, many of the studies mentioned in this paper rely on survey

results. Though surveys represent an effective method to observe general trends, there are several ways in which collected data may distort real attitudes. From question wording and lack of attention in online or telephone surveys, to the reluctance of people to share their true opinions or efforts to please organizations with their responses, drawbacks are to be kept in mind when evaluating outcomes.

To close, the findings of this study exhibit strong evidence that differences in media trust among the American and German populaces are closely related to the distinct types of mass polarization. As stated by Ladd and Podkul (2019), there exists great reason to believe that “media distrust is a symptom of, and also contributes to, [the] growing partisan polarization” in the United States and polarization between the mainstream and populist parties in Germany (75). Nonetheless, an applied experiment is necessary in order to establish causal relations with certainty. This future research should recognize differences in institutions and culture between the U.S. and Germany as potential factors of influence and allow for specifications with regard to distinct media outlets that have become more prevalent in recent years. Until then, it may be said that on both sides of the Atlantic people have greater access to news than ever, yet views have become increasingly distinct in accordance with broader political divisions. The two trends have surely fortified each other, though the exact underlying dynamics remain to be uncovered.

Sophie Roehse

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The Sustaining Longevity of Article 9: Why does it continue to survive?

By Donna Reynolds

About the Author

Donna Reynolds is a third year undergraduate in the College of Arts and Sciences majoring in Economics and Foreign Affairs with a minor in History and is also pursuing the Accelerated Master of Public Policy in the fall of 2022. Donna is originally from Seoul, South Korea but has moved around a lot her whole life. She is interested in topics in foreign policy largely centering around East Asia and US-Asia security relations, specifically South Korea and Japan, and topics in legal racial theory centering on mixed race marriages and children. Outside of academics, Donna is involved in Honor, Class Council, Student Council, Seriatim, Music Organizations at UVA, and does research.

Foreword

I’m happy to introduce Donna Reynolds’ essay examining why Japan’s unusual constitutional provision renouncing the use of force in settling international disputes continues to remain unamended even as the nation faces growing threats from North Korea and China in its back yard. Donna wrote the paper originally for my Fall 2021 class on Japanese Politics, which asked each student to write a research paper on an aspect of politics in the country. The constitutional provisions at issue—Article 9—has been central to the politics of Japan ever since it was incorporated into the constitution at the insistence of U.S. Occupation authorities. While it has the support of many voters, the Liberal Democratic Party, which has ruled the country for all but four years since 1955, has run campaigns ever since on platforms calling for revision on the grounds that it was imposed on the country after its defeat and constrains Japan’s ability to defend the country. That is remains unamended despite this continuous effort is indeed a puzzle, and Donna does a great job in this essay identifying the full range of factors that together brought about this outcome.

Jan Vogler Department of Politics

University of Virginia

Abstract

Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan was established in 1947 post World War Two under the Allied Occupation, essentially renouncing the nation’s right to war, prohibiting a standing army, the use of force, and more. Now, nearly three-quarters of a century later, the Article’s original text has remained untouched and is still in effect in 2021, along with the rest of the constitution which has lasted longer without amendment than any other constitution worldwide. Though Article 9 has not been revised in 74 years, the meaning and extremity of it has shifted over time through various constitutional reinterpretations. With Japan holding a considerable role in the international community having the world's third-largest economy, it is curious that such a powerhouse nation is neither able nor seems to have much desire to have its own standing army to protect its interests. Though there have been attempts to officially revise Article 9 and the related security policy of Japan, these proposals have been resoundingly unpopular and unsuccessful. This paper explores the reasons behind the curious phenomenon of the continued longevity of Article 9: a combination of the US-Japan Security alliance, a longstanding and still prominent post-war memory, domestic politics, foreign affairs, and various other factors.

Introduction

Established under the Allied Occupation in 1947, post World War II, Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan essentially renounced the nation’s right to war, prohibiting a standing army, the use of force, and more. It reads: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

(The Constitution of Japan)

Now, nearly three-quarters of a century later, the Article’s original text has remained untouched and is still in effect in 2021, along with the rest of the

constitution which “has lasted longer without amendment than any other constitution” worldwide (Isdp et al. 2018, 8). Article 9 has not been revised in 74 years, though the meaning and extremity has shifted over time. With Japan holding a “considerable” role in the international community with the world’s third-largest economy, it is curious that such a powerhouse nation neither is able nor seems to have much desire to have its own standing army to protect its interests (BBC News, 2021). Though there have been attempts to officially revise Article 9 and the related security policy of Japan, these proposals have been resoundingly unpopular and unsuccessful. The reason behind this curious phenomenon of the continued dominance and longevity of Article 9 lies in a combination of the US-Japan security alliance, a longstanding and still prominent post-war memory, domestic politics, foreign affairs, and various other factors.

Creation of Article 9 and Origins of US-Japan Alliance

Following Japan’s defeat in WWII, the Allied Powers formally occupied Japan and replaced the Meiji Era Constitution with one written by American occupants, the most famous provision in it being Article 9. Outside of forming this new, democratic constitution, the US, with incredible, “sweeping powers… institute[d] new political and economic policies,” rebuilt the destroyed economy, and established American banking systems (Johnston 2020). This Allied occupation of Japan formally ended five years later when Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 despite “restraints” to “return to the fold of the international community as an independent nation” (Takahashi 2021). This autonomy, however, did not extend to defense capabilities, as the US-Japan Security Treaty granted all military responsibilities, power, and a considerable number of bases on “rent-free land” to the US (Johnston 2020).

Though the US-Japan relationship stemming from this era continues to be of great importance in Japan, it is important to note the imperialistic characteristics in its origin. This mainly lies in the fact that, though it was important to the US to reconstruct a war-torn Japan, the ultimate objective was to control its reintegration “in a manner that benefited the United States” (Cha 2009, 158-96). To support this, the US even provided funds to domestic Japanese politicians so that politics “did not move in a direction” contrary to “U.S. interests,” in effect bribing and controlling Japanese domestic and

foreign policy to American benefit (Cha 2009, 115).

History of Revision Attempts

The issue of revising the constitution is a heavily debated one among politicians since the inception of the Article and continues to be a major point of contention in Japanese politics. For several decades, Japan’s security policy was tied to the Yoshida doctrine, which emphasized peaceful and pacifist foreign policy. Indeed, for much of Japan’s history, the government has “sought to articulate abstention from military power as something that made Japan unique” in a world in which “economic great powers inevitably” become military powers (Hanssen 2019, 82-85). Japan clarified as such in its first White Paper Defense of Japan publication in 1970, where it stated that Japan would remain a “peace state,” not a “military great power,” with only a “necessary minimum of self-defense capabilities” (Hanssen 2019, 93).

Thus, rather than make revisions to the constitution itself, the approach of many Prime Ministers has been to reinterpret and ‘stretch’ the meaning of Article 9 and pass legislation within its bounds. Some key examples and pieces of legislation stemming from this approach include the 1954 establishment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, the 1992 Act of Cooperation signed with the United Nations Peacekeeping forces, the post9/11 Anti-Terrorism Legislation spearheaded by Koizumi with his “top-down style of leadership supported by strong public approval,” and most recently, the 2014 passage of Abe’s ‘collective self-defense’ provision (Shinoda 2003, 19-34; ISDP et al. 2018, 8).

What is key to recognize in all of these constitutional reinterpretations is their core emphasis of Japan’s right to and ability of self-defense while establishing a method by which Japan can interact with its allies as a fellow economically-powerful global leader in times of security crises without reclaiming a right to a standing military. In the original creation of the 1951 Bilateral Military Alliance between the US and Japan, there was a provision that acknowledged the “inherent right” of Japan for “individual and collective self-defense” (Bilateral Treaty n.d.). This established grounds to create the Japan Defense Forces in 1954 and has served as the basis for numerous other pieces of legislation since. All of these actions fall within the bounds of inarguable ‘natural rights’ of a nation to ensure its survival when threatened.

TABLE 1: CONDITIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE IN EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE

The most recent, and perhaps most consequential and “historic” example of this line of constitutional reinterpretation legislation is in Abe’s passing of the ‘collective self-defense’ provisions. The table below is helpful in differentiating what specifically changed in the 2014 legislation from previous politics, outlining the specific provisions that allow Japan the “use of force to aid an ally under attack” (Liff 2017, 139-72).

This change, however, can be described as more “evolutionary than revolutionary” with the conditions to use force remaining strict, necessitating an “armed attack posing existential threat to Japan’s security” for Japan to take action (Liff 2017, 160). Thus, despite the varying reinterpretations of the constitution, substantial change has been limited and minimal in effect since the inception of Article 9, with Japan’s “persistent, albeit stretched” security policy maintaining a self-defense focused approach (Liff 2017, 162).

Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration have spearheaded the shift from proposals to reinterpret the constitution to proposing revision in order to more “fundamentally transform” Article 9, especially in more recent years. These attempts have not only been made through political avenues in the Diet, but also in domestic politics through efforts at altering historical perceptions and memories to a more nationalist rhetoric. The most significant of these revision attempts was the “official party-wide proposal in 2012,” which called for “revision to Article 9’s existing

two clauses” (Liff 2021, 479-510) Though there wasn’t much dramatic change proposed, the most significant alterations were turning the wording more nationalistic and explicitly stating the right to collective self-defense. These proposed revisions, among others, have been met with resounding disapproval and failure (Liff 2021). Despite these efforts from the dominant, rightwing, and conservative LDP to amend the Article to allow more liberty and flexibility in military and security policy, the moderate and left-wing parties are firmly in opposition. They instead support constitutional reinterpretation and passing legislation within the narrow bounds of Article 9 (Nippon 2020). In the next section, these factors of political disagreement—along with a variety of other reasons behind the continued failure of politicians, specifically Abe, to enact constitutional revision—will be examined.

Why Have Attempts at Revision Failed?

There is not a single explicit reason behind why various attempts at constitutional revision, most specifically and pertinently from Abe, have been resoundingly unsuccessful. Various explanations that help account for the sustained life of the original Article 9 include the influence of the US-Japan security alliance, domestic inter-Diet political conflict and division, foreign politics, and nationalistic, occasionally inflammatory rhetoric.

Whatiskeytorecognizeinalloftheseconstitutional reinterpretations is their core emphasis of Japan’s right to and ability of self-defense while establishingamethodbywhichJapancaninteract with its allies as a fellow economically-powerful global leader in times of security crises without reclaimingarighttoastandingmilitary.

Political Division: How Reinterpretations Succeeds Where Revisions Fail

A. Ratifying Revisions Versus Reinterpretations

A specific question many have is why constitutional reinterpretations have found marginal success, but revisions have never successfully been passed. Indeed, oftentimes the only major difference between a proposed constitutional revision and reinterpretation is the word itself, with a piece of legislation failing to pass under the name revision but being approved of as a

reinterpretation. A possible explanation for this lies in the significant political and institutional difficulty in passing a constitutional revision as opposed to a far simpler constitutional reinterpretation process (CFR n.d.). Article 96 of the Japanese Constitution outlines the process for revision as requiring a “two-thirds” majority in both the Upper and Lower Houses, after which the proposed revision will be “submitted to the people for ratification” where a majority vote would pass the legislation (Constitution of Japan n.d.).

Looking at the distribution amongst parties of Diet seats during the past twenty years, the LDP alone has never been able to gain a two-thirds majority. By combining with its longtime coalition partner, the Komeito, it can often meet the majority, but this alliance then presents the issue of the Komeito’s pacifistic principles and strong opposition to revision (Liff and Maeda 2019, 53-73). In 2021, election results left the LDP with 261 out of 456 seats in the lower house, which is roughly 57% of the house (Reynolds 2021). Given these numbers, it is unlikely that proposed revision would even pass the first requirement of garnering a two-thirds majority vote in both houses of the Diet.

However, even assuming that both houses ratified the proposed revision, it would most certainly fail to pass in a public referendum. Public support for actual revisions to the constitution is a minority opinion held by roughly a third of the population, and revisions only continue to grow less popular despite Abe’s efforts (Liff 2021, 486). As opposed to the extensive and difficult process of constitutional revision, reinterpretation and passing legislation within the bounds of Article 9 is a relatively simple process that

FIGURE 2: LOWER HOUSE ELECTION RESULTS IN SEATS, 2003-CURRENT

only requires a simple majority in the Diet, which the LDP often holds.

B. Role of the Komeito

To expand on the previously discussed role of the Komeito, they are a smaller political party and have been a longtime coalition partner of the LDP. They are similarly conservative, but they hold pacifist views and are thus opposed to proposed amendments of Article 9. Despite this key difference in policy and other “ideological differences on fundamental policy,” the LDP-Komeito cooperation has persisted for over two decades (Liff and Maeda 2019, 67). The origins of this coalition lie in the LDP’s “pursuit of a controlling majority” in the upper house, which the Komeito helped and continues to help to provide, with the Komeito receiving the backing of the dominant party in both electoral races and within the Diet (Liff and Maeda 2019, 70).

FIGURE 3

The LDP cannot pick and choose which policy issues they collaborate with the Komeito on in the Diet, as the coalition requires consistent negotiation and agreement. As there is a mutual dependence between the two parties and the Komeito are opposed to revisions of Article 9, the LDP has time and time again had to revise their proposals surrounding revisions both in scope and nature by turning them into reinterpretations in order to appease the Komeito. This has been one of the most consequential reasons behind Diet failures to pass constitutional revisions: maintaining the crucial support of the Komeito, who, despite being a “small party,” provide

the invaluable “numerical support to achieve a powerful two-thirds majority” (Walton 2020).

C. Continued Hesitancy

Outside of constitutional revisions, the LDP, despite having the power to pass reinterpretations and enact new security policies that can either stay within or push the bounds of Article 9, rarely do so. One example of this relative inactivity of the LDP is in defense spending. Though a ban on spending more than 1% of GDP on defense was lifted in 1987, there is still a de facto ceiling in effect since Japan has yet to push this boundary (Nippon 2018).

This example reflects the overall continued hesitancy of the LDP and Japanese politicians in general to extend beyond established boundaries of their security policies, even in factors as seemingly non-threatening as spending more than 1% on defense, especially when compared to other countries. The US, for example, easily spends triple this amount. whether or not the member states provide the UN with money, personnel, or the legal right to inspect weapons’ sights, coordinate peacekeeping operations, regulate commerce, measure pollution, or any other litany of actions the UN might want to take to address the aforementioned issues (Sengupta, 2017).

Abe’s Rhetoric: Its Effects on Domestic and Foreign Opinions

The second key reason behind the failures of revision proposals

FIGURE 4: DEFENSE SPENDING COMPARED WITH GDP

is the rhetoric and symbolism behind changing the actual wording and firm meaning of Article 9, which negatively affects significant political and domestic support. In examining why there is such a marked difference in response to proposals of revision versus reinterpretation, the way that politicians present and discuss the significance of revisions to the public is key. Abe often depicts revisionism as Japan “breaking out of the postwar regime” and “tak[ing] back Japan,” an idea that may work as a campaign slogan but is otherwise wholly ineffective in pushing constitution reform (Hanssen 2021, 177). Despite LDP officials’ insistence that revision proposals would not be substantially different from reinterpretations, opposition lawmakers often argue that revisions have more significant effects and have the potential to “drastically expand the legal scope” of Japanese security policy and the SelfDefense Forces (Yoshida 2017). What presents the biggest fear to Japanese lawmakers and citizens alike is the substantial and dramatic symbolism of revising a constitution which—for three-quarters of a century—has gone untouched and the message it would send to allies and the international community (Auer 1990, 171–87). Thus, the combination of institutional and political challenges in passing constitutional revision, along with the significant symbolism in passing actual revision over reinterpretation, has made revision unlikely to occur. Abe, in employing this hawkish approach and rhetoric of “promoting [excessive] nationalism,” was forced to “settle for relatively marginal gains” in defense policy and national discourse on defense (Berger 2014).

Additionally, one of Abe’s major policy efforts was to reverse the Yoshida Doctrine’s policy of navigating through the international system as “a defeated and low-profile power” and instead return Japan to its “rightful… place amongst the great powers” by promoting nationalism (Hughes 2015, 9). While this may not initially present itself as a contentious and controversial decision, Abe’s approach to accomplish this was historical revision—specifically in terms of Japanese war crimes and actions taken during its imperial era and World War II—and in nationalistic education. Through these policy and rhetoric shifts, Abe hoped to “overturn taboos on constitutional revision and garner support from the populace but achieved much of the opposite—only further alienating both politicians and the public who still seek to distance themselves from the memories and mistakes of the war period, and thus constitutional revision (Hughes 2015, 9).

Domestic Politics: A Longstanding and Prominent Post-War Memory

Beyond the Diet and the failure of politicians to agree upon and pass constitutional revisions, the largest barrier in this effort is the lack of domestic desire and support for revision. Japan’s postwar identity focused on being “anti-militarist” and “peaceful,” a significant divergence from the militaristic prewar Japan (Kolmaš 2018, 4). Thus, the “idea of a pacifist, Yoshida-doctrine reactive state has been rooted into institutions and public emotions,” making Abe’s overt revisionist and nationalistic rhetoric surrounding constitutional revision unpopular, unconvincing, and unsuccessful (Kolmaš 2018, 65). Abe’s revisionist narrative has centered on downplaying, and even erasing, certain dark and unsettling aspects of Japanese history, such as Japan’s cruelty in the colonization of Korea and actions like the Nanking Massacre during World War II.

His rhetoric in the past decade and its effect on domestic politics and perception of the constitution are intimately intertwined, to the detriment of revision advocacy. In associating constitutional revision with a reclaiming of pre-war national pride and in historical revisionism that has raised the ire of many Asian countries, many in the public see these reforms as dangerously nationalistic and militaristic and thus undesirable.

FIGURE 5: PUBLIC OPINION POLL ABOUT ARTICLE 9 REVISION

This is a constant reflected in public opinion polls over the years, with desire to revise the constitution never reaching the 50% majority level

that would potentially ratify such changes in a referendum. In fact, the numbers have been decreasing over the years, and they continue to do so. These numbers were even falling at a slightly accelerated pace during Abe’s Prime Ministership—further evidence of the ineffectiveness of his nationalist posturing of constitutional revision. The two major constraints that hindered Abe’s revisionist attempts, therefore, were the institutional and political factors combined with public and emotional factors (Kolmaš 2018). Thus, “without major domestic political realignments” in Japan, it is “unlikely” that any “ambitious effort to fundamentally transform” Article 9 will ever be formally ratified; domestic barriers are perhaps the greatest obstacle in constitutional revision efforts (Liff 2017, 160).

Foreign Politics: A Highly Visible yet Largely Unimportant Influence

A. US-Japan Security Alliance

Without the capability to maintain a standing army, Japan still very much relies upon the United States for its security and military protections in the region. Japan consistently refers to the US-Japan Alliance as the “cornerstone” of not only their defense but also of “regional peace and stability” (Liff 2021, 486). Since 2012, the movement to “strengthen the Japan-US alliance” has “significantly accelerated,” with Japan’s 2017 Defense White Paper devoting an entire chapter to the relationship (Japan Ministry n.d.).

However, it is important to note that the United States has never been opposed to proposed Japanese revisions to Article 9 and expansions of Japanese security policies but rather has encouraged it. Even the original 1951 Security Treaty stated that the US expected Japan to “increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression,” something that has not been upheld by Japan (Bilateral Treaty n.d.). This was evidenced as recently as the ‘Iraq Shock’ during the Gulf Conflict, in which the US encouraged Japan to send military forces. When Japan staunchly denied the request and instead sent billions of dollars in support, they were criticized for being nothing more than a “cash machine” (Purrington 1992, 161-81). Even the recent passage of the collective self-defense provision was seen as a “major step” in creating more of an “equal alliance” and a “step in the right direction” for the U.S.-Japan alliance (Blair 2020).

The continuation of a security policy centered on the U.S.-Japan alliance echoes the desire of the vast majority of the Japanese public, despite

statements and efforts of the previous Prime Minister Abe and the LDP to reinstate Japan’s military and increase defense capabilities (Liff 2021, 502). In fact, the majority of senior members of his own party, the opposing parties, and the vast majority of the public are deeply in favor of continuing the U.S. military alliance and maintaining bases in Japan without significant revision (Yoshida 2017). Thus, while the U.S. itself is not a significant barrier preventing constitutional reinterpretation or revision but rather encourages security and defense developments, Japan itself often employs American military presence as a reason to not revise or pass reform.

B. Korea and China Response

Since Japan’s emergence as an economic powerhouse on the world stage in the 1970s, there have been concerns from China and Korea that Japan becoming a “military great power is not too distant,” which would place Asia back on “high alert” (Dong-a Ilbo 1970, 3). Though Japan has yet to become, and is unlikely to become, this great military power that was feared so many decades ago, whenever discussions surrounding Japanese security policy and constitutional revision arise, tensions between these nations also rise.

Returning to the discussion of the role of Abe’s rhetoric, during Abe’s Prime Ministership, the majority of these tensions were not a result of proposed legislation but rather his inflammatory and controversial rhetoric surrounding revision efforts. Most specifically, rhetoric surrounding his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which had become a “focal point of ire” for a perceived “lack of remorse for wartime deeds,” as well as his historical revisionism, which has only “served to continue to alienate” South Korea and China (Fackler 2007; Hughes 2015, 9).

Though these conflicts have had drastic effects–such as the South Korea-Japan trade war in 2019 that was largely based on disputes about “colonialism and historical grievances,” –negative responses from South Korea and China likely have not had a significant impact in decisions surrounding changes to Article 9 (Kim 2019). This is evidenced by the lack of significant response to the actual policy questions, reinterpretations, and proposed revision of the constitution; rather, focus has mainly centered on Japanese rhetoric surrounding these proposed shifts.

Conclusion: Current Status and Modern Complications

In a rapidly changing geopolitical environment which is becoming increasingly corrosive and dangerous to Japan, with North Korean missile threats and Chinese incursions in the South China Sea and disputed island chains, the US—rather than reaffirming its military and defense commitment to Japan—has become a more flippant and less reliable ally. This was particularly true during the Trump administration, during which Japan was told to almost quadruple its contribution from $2.5 billion to $8 billion for the cost of the US military in Japan under the threat of “withdraw[ing] all US forces” from the island (Johnson 2020). Policymakers in both the US and Japan have additionally questioned the continued US presence in the country as the “common threat presented by the Cold War diminishes” while “skepticism of the military presence” increases (Hosokawa 1998, 2-5). Despite all these possible points of contention, however, the U.S.-Japan military alliance remains a ‘cornerstone’ of Japanese security policy. This is all incredibly relevant to the question of sustaining Article 9, as a significant constitutional revision will remain unlikely while the alliance thrives, or at least survives, as it negates the necessity of significant change to its provisions. Besides the significant role of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, the domestic and inter-Diet political barriers and disagreements have yet to—and, in the near future, are unlikely—to support revision. Though foreign affairs, Japan’s security policy, and the politics of constitutional revision are sensitive areas of policy that are highly subject to change, in examining the trends and reasons behind the continued failed attempts at changing Article 9, it seems likely that this 75-year provision will last through the century and beyond.

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Great Power Competition: A Challenge to Liberal Order?

By Evan Miler

About the Author

Evan Miller is a fourth-year student in the College of Arts & Sciences majoring in Russian Politics, History, and Culture. After graduating, he intends to pursue a career in academia studying Russian history and politics.

Foreword

Evan Miller has written an important paper. He argues that Russia, contrary to the fears of most Western analysts, does not pose a threat to the liberal international order – the rules-based system that the United States built after the Second World War and has sustained, along with other wealthy democracies, ever since. Rather, Russia, like China, seeks a place the leaders of that order. Mr. Miller purports to show that some elements of the international order, such as open national economies, are central, while others, such as human rights, have always been peripheral. He shows that Russia is indeed trying to alter the latter but is determined to maintain the former intact. In other words, Vladimir Putin’s Russia is not trying to build a Eurasian empire that is separate from and opposed to the liberal international order; it is instead trying to “co-opt and pluralize U.S. leadership within” the order and to keep it going. Mr. Miller takes on some of the most important writers on international order today and mounts credible arguments against them.

Mr. Miller wrote the paper in the Fall 2021 semester for my seminar, “The Clash of Ideas in World Politics.” It may interest readers that I disagree with Mr. Miller’s argument, and told him so; and yet I gave his paper the highest grade possible because it was a serious, lucid, well-argued piece of work. In a time when Americans have trouble disagreeing productively or even civilly, it is vital that we in colleges and universities – students and faculty alike – practice and model productive disagreement over important issues of the day. Readers trying to make sense of Russia today will profit from reading Mr. Miller’s essay. As I did.

John Owen Department of Politics

University of Virginia

Abstract

This article investigates the nature of the “great power competition” that has recently developed between emerging powers like Russia and China and established powers such as the United States. Policymakers and scholars generally argue that great power competition stems from emerging powers challenging the core principles of the liberal international order. I will argue that this conflict instead stems from a struggle over the leadership of the existing order, rather than a struggle over the principles of the order itself. Using Russia as a case study, I analyze significant points of tension between Russia and the West, and demonstrate why they are conflicts of leadership rather than principle.

Introduction

In recent years, the rhetoric of “great power competition” has come to dominate US foreign policy discourse. The Trump administration labeled it the “primary concern in US national security” and the Biden administration has adopted a similar outlook (Cohen 2021). But what does great power competition mean? At its core, it describes the reemergence of multipolarity on the world stage, a shift away from the unipolarity of post-Cold War international relations. However, as used in its current context in policymaking circles, the term does not suggest a realist multipolarity in the vein of the 19th century “great game.” Rather, the phrase is inextricably linked to the present, US-led liberal international order (O’Rourke 2021). The prevailing interpretation of this order-based conception of great power competition has been a liberal account, stressing that Russia and China, as emerging powers, are pursuing policies that “mount a sustained challenge” to the established norms of the liberal international order (Biden Jr. 2021).

I argue against this view by asserting that emerging powers are not attempting to challenge or dismantle the existing international order, but rather are attempting to increase their influence within it. More specifically, emerging powers seek to exercise their newfound power in order to (1) co-opt the “managerial” role of the US over the liberal international order within

their own regions/spheres and (2) band together with other emerging powers to pluralize leadership of the existing order through international institutions. As the United States receives significant national benefits from its managerial and hegemonic positions, it opposes this intra-order challenge, thus creating an environment of “competition” among the great powers. Yet, despite the presence of such competition, each great power generally adheres to the norms of the existing liberal international order and wishes to remain inside of it. In sum, great power competition is an intra-order struggle over the leadership and management of the existing, liberal order, not the principles of the order itself.

To demonstrate this point, I will use Russian foreign policy as a case study. I will begin by providing a brief theoretical background to the concept of international order before detailing the history and characteristics of the existing order. I will then investigate important, contemporary points of conflict between the US and Russia and show why they represent an intra-order struggle over leadership and managerial authority rather than a challenge to the order itself. Finally, I will conclude by describing the policy implications of this interpretation of great power competition.

International Order and the US-led Liberal International Order

John Ikenberry defines international order as “the settled rules and arrangements between states that define and guide their interaction” (Ikenberry 2012, 11). International order can take the form of geopolitical blocs, exclusive regional spheres, closed imperial systems, or – as is most relevant for this paper –liberal systems. Liberal international order is defined as an order that is both “open” (i.e. states trade and exchange on the basis of mutual gain) and “loosely rules-based” (i.e. rules and institutions operate as relatively autonomous mechanisms of governance) (18).

The US-led liberal international order first came into existence in its modern form following the allied victory in World War II. Emerging from the war with unprecedented military, economic, and political power, the US chose to create a relatively coherent international order with liberal characteristics. The resulting system was characterized as one of economic openness underwritten by the American security umbrella and governed by a wide variety of agreed-upon rules and institutions. The order supported a number of different values and norms to varying degrees, but the liberal order

as it actually existed focused on a more limited group of accepted norms. Most importantly, these norms included economic openness in the form of open trade and the free flow of key natural resources. Principles such as human rights and democracy - though supported to some degree in the “liberal core” of the West - had little bearing over the global character of the order (Stokes and Raphael 2010).

As the order’s preeminent, or “hegemonic” power, the US largely created the international institutions and rules that defined the new order and molded them in its domestic interest. The US also accepted responsibility for underwriting the entire system. This “managerial role” entailed the US exercising its hegemonic influence –especially its military power –to secure markets and ensure the free flow of raw materials for the rest of the order. Though this managerial role demanded significant costs, it also provided many benefits. As manager, the US could structure new rules, agreements, and institutions in its favor and even break its own rules when needed (Stokes, 22). As Doug Stokes writes, “although an open door order benefits the US more than most, the [US] has worked to retain a firm hand on that door and close it whenever its core economic interests appear unduly threatened” (33). This is not to say that other members did not benefit from the US-led order. The order was, generally speaking, positive-sum. Notably, the benefit of this managerial role –as well as the benefit of hegemony within international institutions –is crucial for understanding the rise of great power competition within the existing US-led liberal international order. Emerging powers like Russia have sought to co-opt this managerial role in their own neighborhoods and increase their influence within key international institutions to accrue the benefits of these positions. And in order to retain or expand its existing privileges as hegemon, the US has opposed these efforts.

Great Power Competition

In the early post-war years, the US-led international order was subordinate to the larger, bipolar order of the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US became the world’s lone superpower and the liberal order that it led became global. During this period of “unipolarity” the US played a largely hegemonic role in global institutions as well as in its capacity as “manager” of the international order. However, in recent years, emerging powers in the Global South have started challenging the US’

managerial capacity and its dominance over liberal institutions. This challenge represents the basis of “great power competition.”

Regional Competition

Within the post-Soviet sphere - which Russia claims as its “zone of influence” - Russia pursued a number of different policies that provoked conflict with the West. Notable examples include economic integration, energy security, and military assertiveness in the post-Soviet sphere. Some have characterized these conflicts as challenges to the existing, international order. However, in each of these cases, questions of leadership within the order motivate Russia’s actions, not the viability of the order itself.

A. Eurasian Economic Union

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is an integrated block of post-Soviet states with a single market and common policies on trade and energy investment (Bayramov, Breban, and Mukhtarov 2018, 208). Officially formed in 2014, the EAEU evolved into its present form from long-standing Russian efforts to integrate the economies of the post-Soviet sphere. The EAEU is an important aspect of Russia’s economic policy and Moscow has claimed that “strengthening and expanding” the union is its number one priority in the region (Tsygankov 2018, 416).

Many western observers expressed concerns regarding the organization and have suggested that it serves as merely a tool for Russia to “re-Sovietize” the economies of its neighbors and threaten the economic openness of Eurasia (Radio Free Europe). However, the policies of the EAEU did the opposite. They supported the integration of the post-Soviet states around liberal economic principles through rules-based institutions. In the past six years, the union has liberalized more than fifty key sectors of the regional economy; lowered tariffs and duties abroad in Iran, Vietnam, and Serbia; increased foreign direct investment among member states and attempted to introduce a rules-based institutional structure to the region’s economy (Troitskiy 2020) (Karliuk 2017, 35-45). Furthermore, the EAEU is a voluntary and positive-sum union like the European Union and the World Trade Organization. While Russia occupies a dominant role within the institution,using its power to shape the EAEU’s policies and rules in its favor, other member-states stand to benefit as well (Knobel et al. 2018).

That is not to say that Russia has been a perfect liberalizer. Since the “lost decade” of the nineties, Russia approached economic liberalization gradually and on its own terms, favoring liberalization in general, but protecting industries that are highly important to its national interest. However, in general, Russia has become a fairly liberal power with low tariff rates and a steadily shrinking role for the state in the economy (at least in terms of GDP). As such, US opposition to Russia’s economic initiatives in Eurasia must be understood in terms of leadership. With both countries pursuing liberalization, each wants to do so on its own terms.

B. Energy Security

The post-Soviet sphere holds some of the largest energy reserves in the world and is a crucial part of the world energy market. For this reason, the free flow of energy out of Eurasia is a major concern for world energy markets. Pipeline stoppages could drastically alter energy prices as well as produce shortages in consumer markets dependent on Eurasian energy. As such, political control over existing and potential transit networks such as oil and gas pipelines is a contentious issue. Some argue that while the US acts as a “responsible” manager of energy transit networks by securing the free flow of energy into international markets, Russia seeks to control regional energy flows in order to hold political leverage over dependent consumer markets like Europe.

It is true that Russia has interrupted energy flows in the past. However, Russia is, in general, a reliable energy provider (Dellecker and Golmart 2011, 162). The gas conflicts in Ukraine and Belarus were shortlived disputes over failed renegotiations of expired contracts, and crucially in both cases Russia attempted to raise subsidized prices closer to the market rate - a liberalizing effort. Fears that these instances point to a broader trend of illiberal economic practices are misplaced. An energy conflict with Europe would be economically disastrous for Russia and would tarnish its image as a reliable provider of energy, an important image within the European business community and one that Russia seeks to maintain (59).

Of course, Putin almost certainly recognizes and embraces the political power that control of energy provides. Yet, that same political motivation has always existed in US energy policy. What Westerners regard as “responsible leadership”, other countries often regard as predatory. There

Evan Miller

is a common aversion in the Global South, for example, to US sanctions policies that distort resource flows in the same way that Westerners fear from Russia. In Venezuela, for example, US sanctions decreased the country’s crude oil exports to almost a fourth of their pre-sanction numbers and eliminated exports to the United States altogether (Sachs and Weisbrot 2019). So, it is true that Russia has and likely will continue to use the control of energy flows as political leverage. But, in the bigger picture, Russia – like the US – is generally committed to securing the free flow of energy into the world market.

US opposition to Russia’s economic initiatives in Eurasia must be understood in terms of leadership. With both countries pursuing liberalization,eachwantstodosoonitsownterms.

C. Military Assertiveness

In recent years, Russia has become increasingly assertive in the post-Soviet sphere. It has claimed territorial waters in the Arctic beyond what it is designated by international law; it has strengthened and expanded the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a regional military alliance; it has invaded and annexed territories from Georgia and Ukraine, and some fear that it will soon invade Ukraine again. Some observers have used these actions as evidence of Russia promoting an illiberal, imperial project in the post-Soviet sphere.

However, before such judgements are made, it is important to look at the nature of Russia’s military assertiveness. In the case of the Arctic, Russia has indeed claimed sovereignty over sea lanes that extend past its allotted 15 miles. However, it has not used this control to create a protectionist sphere; rather, it has supported and invested in shipping and commerce by all nations. As manager of these shipping lanes, Russia has its “hand on the open door” so to speak. But this is no different in concept than what the major Arctic powers - including the US - have done for years (Blunden 2012). The major difference is that Moscow, not Washington now claims this managerial authority.

The CSTO is a military alliance that in part seeks to oppose the West, but also works to underwrite the regional, liberal economic order. Its

members coordinate in a number of areas such as anti-terrorism, counterrevolution, counter-insurgency, peacekeeping, and emergency response with the primary intention of ensuring regional stability (Tsygankov 2018, 416-7, 426). Such actions not only protect existing regimes, but also the existing liberal economic infrastructure such as trade and energy transit networks and commercial agreements and institutions, as seen in Kazakhstan in January. In fact, the CSTO’s function in Central Asia almost identically mirrors NATO’s own (NATO 2016). By promoting alternate mechanisms of regional stability, Russia seeks to underwrite the regional order, not challenge it.

The cases of Georgia and Ukraine are more complicated. Russia’s interventions have not promoted regional stability and they have violated the core liberal principle of the territorial sovereignty of the nation-state. However, Russia’s interventions in these countries do not suggest an effort on the part of Putin to rebuild a Eurasian empire. Instead, as Richard Sakwa argues, they are realist reactions to the gradual expansion of a hostile military alliance across its Western border (Sakwa 2016). And realist actions in violation of liberal principles are well within the norm of great power behavior. It is not for nothing that Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea all claim the “Kosovo precedent” as justification for their secession. Russia’s realist interventions in certain strategic areas should not distract from the order that they are attempting to build in general.

Global Competition

In addition to co-opting the managerial role of the US in the postSoviet sphere, Russia banded together with other emerging powers to create global institutions and agreements that function as alternatives to parallel Western-led institutions and exclude Western powers from membership. Some observers have characterized these actions as an attempt to create an entirely separate international order independent from and opposed to the principles of the US-led order. I will argue that these alternative institutions and agreements constitute an effort by emerging powers to pluralize global leadership of the existing liberal international order, not challenge it. To do so, I will analyze the two most prominent examples of these alternative organizations: BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Evan Miller

A. BRICS

BRICS is a diplomatic club consisting of five key powers from the Global South (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) that coordinate in various ways to “pursue their shared interests” (Roberts, Katada, and Leslie Elliott Armijo 2018, 4). Some observers have suggested that the club presents an “institutional challenge” to the existing, liberal order as its fundamental principles fall “outside the framework” of the order (Layne 2018). However, this view mischaracterizes BRICS.

It is true that one of the primary objectives of the club has been to create financial institutions alternative to the ones created by the US in the post-war era. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), for example, protects against liquidity crunches and mirrors the International Monetary Fund (IMF). What is notable about these alternative institutions is that they generally adhere to the liberal practices of their US-led counterparts. The CRA, New Development Bank (NDB), and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – the three major creations of BRICS - all support programs of economic openness and capitalist development (Roberts, Katada, and Leslie Elliott Armijo 2018, 11). The major difference between these alternative institutions and existing ones is that they exclude the US and other Western powers, suggesting that tensions between the US and BRICS-led institutions stem from leadership within the order, not the order itself.

Likewise, these parallel institutions are not intended to replace or oppose existing US-led global institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. They have had a largely complementary rather than adversarial relationship with US led institutions. The CRA, for instance, cooperates with the IMF during financial crises and the NDB co-finances development projects with the World Bank (IMF Staff 2017). Furthermore, BRICS has aimed at reforming existing global governance institutions in order to expand the influence of emerging powers within them (Roberts, Katada, and Leslie Elliott Armijo 2018, 73). BRICS, for instance, has been instrumental in pushing for voting reforms in the IMF and the World Bank that still disproportionately favor Western countries. Again, such actions represent a commitment to the existing international order, not an opposition to it, suggesting that opposition to these organizations by the US signals a fear of losing economic and financial leverage, not principles.

Evan Miller

B. Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a formal political, economic, and security partnership that facilitates cooperation and coordination among its members (including China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and four Central Asian countries) in the areas of “security promotion, consensus building, and cooperation” (Chao 2021, 1-10). Critics often refer to the organization as “anti-NATO” in policy-making circles due to its image as a military alliance against the West and the US-led international order more broadly (Green and Janik 2020, 1, 15). Some truth lies in this claim, as the SCO both excludes Western countries and has called for the withdrawal of US troops from certain Asian countries.

However, it is important to note that the organization’s main function is in keeping with the principles of the liberal-international order. As a security promoter, members of the SCO coordinate their militaries against the common security threats of separatism, terrorism, and extremism that threaten not only the political stability of the organization’s member-states but also the stability of Eurasia’s trade routes, resource flows, and capital investments. These actions underwrite the Eurasian liberal order in the same way that the US military's actions underwrite the global liberal order. It is reasonable to assume then, that negative perceptions of the organization in US policy-making circles represent a fear of losing influence rather than a desire to protect core liberal principles.

Human Rights and Democracy: Peripheral Principles?

Thus far, this paper has focused on the idea that the US-led international order is based primarily on integration around liberal economic principles. However, some scholars disagree with this claim and argue that politically liberal principles such as human rights and democracy also constitute a fundamental pillar of the existing order (Ikenberry 2020). As evidence, they point to the existence of various international organizations and agreements within the existing order that promote political liberalism globally. From this perspective, even if emerging powers like Russia promoted an agenda that aligns with the existing order’s core economic principles, their support for political illiberalism still presents a challenge to other fundamental principles of the order such as human rights and democracy.

One oft-cited example of this illiberal challenge is China and

Russia’s attempts to promote watered down interpretations of human rights in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) (Piccone 2018). Some claim that these countries are attempting to “build a bias for autocracy” into the international system (Owen 2020). It is inarguable that China is trying to build normative approval in international institutions for its own illiberal interpretations of human rights. However, the significance of these interpretive changes should not be exaggerated. The UNHRC is a largely impotent body. It has weak membership criteria, no serious coercive mechanisms, and its power is largely limited to publishing critical resolutions and reports (Vriens 2009). Unlike economic organizations such as the WTO or the IMF, the council has little influence over how the international order actually functions in the real world. So, while authoritarian countries like Russia and China can use these revisions to perhaps lessen the public scrutiny they receive for human rights violations, it would be a stretch to say they are revising the existing order in a meaningful way. The UNHRC is not influential enough for that to be the case.

Another example of this illiberal challenge at the regional level is conditionality clauses in economic and strategic agreements. In the postSoviet sphere, for example, aid agreements from the US typically come with liberal strings attached such as domestic governance reform or new human rights laws. Conversely, parallel Russian agreements almost never contain such stipulations. Some observers describe these conditionality clauses as crucial for regional political liberalization and fear that Russian hegemony in the post-Soviet sphere would significantly hurt the region’s liberal-democratic character (Omelicheva 2014, 75-94). But here too, the significance of these clauses should not be overemphasized. Their presence is relatively minor compared to the more primary, economic and strategic aspects of these agreements. In the United States Agency for International Development’s most recent Central Asian Strategy outline, for example, the two main regional objectives included liberalizing the region’s economy and countering Russian influence (USAID, 2020, 7-28). Concrete considerations of human rights and democracy constituted a fairly minor portion of the overall strategy and could hardly be described as a fundamental component in shaping how the order functions.

While the US emphasizes and promotes human rights and democracy more than emerging powers like China and Russia do, these values

remain peripheral to the more central economic and strategic principles that largely define the actual order. Russian support for –or at least apathy towards –political illiberalism does not challenge the existing order, because principles such as human rights and democracy never defined the order. As such, the loss of US managerial power or hegemony would likely not radically change the fundamental character of the regional order or global institutions, even if controlled by authoritarian regimes like Russia.

Conclusion

However undesirable Russian or Chinese hegemony over parts of the world may be to US policymakers, these emerging powers are not going to disappear anytime soon, and in all likelihood their relative power will continue to grow. As President Biden himself said, “[w]e cannot pretend the world can simply be restored to the way it was 75, 30, or even four years ago.” In the face of this new, international reality, it is important that the US does not misinterpret or overreact to the strength and assertiveness of emerging powers. These countries seek no radical change. They do not want to overthrow or create an alternative to the existing liberal international order. Instead, they seek to co-opt and pluralize US leadership within it. Thus, the US must decide whether retaining its managerial role in certain regions and sole hegemony in certain institutions is worth the price of a potential conflict with powerful, nuclear states like Russia or China.

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