Virginia Journal of International Affairs Spring 2024

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Virginia Journal of International Affairs Spring 2024

Table of Contents Staff About the Journal From the Editor Anna Murray Papers Competition in Connectivity: Gauging the Impact of US Effort Abroad in Limiting the Use of Huawei Manufactured 5G Telecommunications Equipment Ben Makarechian Securing Stability: Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive the Post-Covid Era? Michelle Nguyen “The sun has set behind the hills:” Prominent Shidaiqu Artists’ Stories Under the Chinese Communist Party, 1949–1978 Calvin Pan A Stable Status Quo: Finding a Solution to the China-Taiwan Conflict Alex Yang Op-Eds Chaos in ECOWAS and Regionalism’s Regression: America’s Role Wyatt Dayhoff Indonesia’s Nickel Empire at the Expense of Human Rights Apal Upadhyaya

Staff

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Editor-in-Chief

Anna Murray

Managing Editor

Victoria Djou

Co-Production Chair

Neha Jagasia

Co-Production Chair

Maggie Meares

Media Manager

Will Hancock

Event Coordinator

Pratha Purushottam

Staff Editors Ella Gilmore

Michelle Nguyen

Apal Upadhyaya

Deetya Adhikari

Anisha Iqbal

Brooke Blosser

Avery Sigler

Emmett O’Brien

Wyatt Dayhoff

Alexander Macturk

Nithya Muthukumar

Sydney O’Connell

About the Journal The Virginia Journal of International Affairs is the University of Virginia’s preeminent publication for undergraduate research in international relations. The Virginia Journal is developed and distributed by the student-run International Relations Organization of the University of Virginia. The Virginia Journal is one of the only undergraduate research journals for international relations in the country, and aims both to showcase the impressive research conducted by the students at UVA and to spark productive conversation within the University community. The Virginia Journal seeks to foster interest in international issues and promote high quality undergraduate research in foreign affirs. The Journal is available online at vajournalia.org.

Submissions Interested in submitting to the Virginia Journal? The Journal seeks research papers on current topics in international affairs that are at least ten pages in length. Only undergraduates or recent graduates are eligible to submit.

Contact Submissions should be sent to vajournalia@gmail.com

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From the Editor-In-Chief Dear Reader,

The Spring of 2024 has been a testament to the importance of ties that bind cultures across the globe. The conflicts and tensions seen today preempt a discussion not only of current peace and stability, but also the necessary steps to prevent tensions from erupting in the coming years. This semester’s journal primarily focuses on increasing tensions in East Asia to present conflicts in the region as a microcosm of some of these ongoing discussions across the globe.

Our hope is that, taken together with shorter pieces discussing the future of regional institutions and protections for populations caught in the crosshairs of the balance between economic growth and environmental harm, these lessons can help to inform future approaches to national security threats and spark thought-provoking discussion on multilateral relations.

The papers included here discuss topics from the expansion of Huawei to changes and adaptations to protest culture in China, from the future of Taiwanese relations with China to artistic persecution and perseverance during the Cultural Revolution. We hope that these articles not only help to strengthen understanding of these crucial topics, but also spark discussion about the topics and their implications for our connections as a globe. These papers are incredibly insightful works, and I hope you will learn from them as I have over the past couple of months.

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The production of this journal would not be possible without the collaboration and contribution of many different individuals throughout the production process. The hard work and dedication of the Journal Executive Board over the past few months to plan and produce this final product cannot be overstated. It has been a privilege to work with such a wonderful editorial staff, both on the main papers as well as opinion pieces published on our website and throughout the university community. We as a journal extend our gratitude to the International Relations Organization at UVA for providing the staff with the opportunity to produce such an important publication. I also would like to thank the authors for their contributions to this semester’s publication, as well as the support of UVA faculty at every turn.

Finally, I would like to thank you, our readers, for taking the time to interact with the works present in this journal and to learn from the students at this university grappling with difficult topics in foreign affairs. I am honored and excited to present this semester’s journal to you.

All the best,

Anna Murray Editor-in-Chief of the Virginia Journal of International Affairs

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Papers

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Competition in Connectivity: Gauging the Impact of US Effort Abroad in Limiting the Use of Huawei Manufactured 5G Telecommunications Equipment Ben Makarechian

About the Author Ben Makarechian is a third year student at the University of Virginia’s Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy. He is majoring in Public Policy and International Economics. He is also 11

pursuing a minor in Chinese. Ben’s policy areas of interest consist of CCP economic statecraft policies, cross strait relations, and non-proliferation. He resides in Los Gatos, California and hopes to pursue a career in US national security policy.

Abstract As developing nations have begun to implement the next generation of cellular telecommunications equipment into their national infrastructure, the United States and the People’s Republic of China have quietly engaged in a diplomatic struggle to control precisely which infrastructure each country adopts. In the US, fears over the national security implications of allies adopting Huawei-provided telecommunications infrastructure led the Trump and Biden Administrations to implement sanctions against Huawei and begin a global campaign of diplomatic pressure. How successful were these actions, however, at limiting the spread of Huawei technology? This article uses an independently created data set cataloging the 5G equipment provider for over 160 countries using over 50 unique sources to compare the rate of Huawei technology adoption before and after landmark US actions against Huawei. This article finds that while US efforts have been effective at decreasing the rate at which countries adopt Huawei technology, its warnings 12

have not been universally heeded by allies or non-allies, indicating potential concerns about the reliability of key security partners.

Competition in Connectivity: Gauging the Impact of US Effort Abroad in Limiting the Use of Huawei Manufactured 5G Telecommunications Equipment Introduction The rise of China as a great power in the late 2010s has had far reaching implications for the US-led global order in place since the end of the Cold War. In response to China’s rapidly increasing global political influence, the United States, under both the Trump and Biden administrations, has shifted from an anti-terror, Middle East focused foreign policy to one that gives increasing priority to strategic, economic and geopolitical competition with China.

An early battleground emerging from the intensifying struggle for international influence between the two powers is 5G equipment vendor choice for national, next-generation cellular networks. Huawei, a Chinese firm with suspected ties to the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has become a global leader in the provision of 5G systems and equipment, toting cheaper and more efficient technology than its competitors (Balding 1). Huawei’s cheaper systems are already popular in many parts of Africa, and now the company 13

has been increasing its share of the 5G communication equipment market in Europe. Fears over the CCP’s ability to use Huawei’s technology to gather sensitive national security information from the countries it has partnered with have led American officials to place increasingly severe restrictions on the company’s ability to do business in the US and obtain American-made technological components. While the sanctioning campaign has been effective domestically, it has had mixed results at limiting Huawei’s expansion abroad, leading the US to rely on its influence as the West’s dominant power to convince countries to heed its warnings about the dangers of Huawei’s network expansion.

This paper aims to examine the success of the US’ international efforts at limiting the growing influence of the CCP through the spread of Huawei’s 5G communication equipment. First, it will provide background on the international 5G telecommunications equipment market, establish the legitimacy of accusations made about Huawei’s ties to the CCP, and detail the extent of the US’ diplomatic action to limit global adoption of Huawei provided infrastructure. Second, it will detail the experimental methods and data sets used to test the hypothesis that the US’ current efforts have been unsuccessful at decreasing Huawei’s market share of 5G communications networks. Lastly, the analysis will explore 14

the implications of the results for the present level of US influence across both allied and non-allied nations. Huawei’s presence in American allied countries represents a small foothold for the CCP in its effort to increase its global influence. The US must ensure that the measures it is currently taking are sufficient to preserve its global hegemony.

Background The fifth generation technology standard for cellular networks, commonly known as 5G, represents the most substantial improvement in wireless communication since the technology’s inception. Along with fast speeds, the new standard boasts greater connectivity capacity, making 5G networks especially suitable for the group of connected devices known as the Internet of Things.

Despite 5G’s obvious advantages, rollouts of the technology have been slow and costly, partially due to the current structure of the 5G equipment market (Ayyagari and Gröne, 2022). Because of the complexity of the equipment needed to establish a 5G communications network, only three firms are currently able to offer 5G infrastructure at competitive prices: Sweden’s Ericsson, Finland’s Nokia, and China’s Huawei. Currently, Huawei enjoys a clear advantage in marketing its equipment and dominance in the Chinese 15

telecommunications market due in large part to subsidies and direct funding from the Chinese government. Meeting China’s demand for telecommunications equipment has allowed Huawei to operate at economies of scale unmatched by its competitors, giving it the ability to undercut market prices (Kaska et al, 2019).

Allowing foreign companies to establish 5G infrastructure has national security implications no matter the vendor’s country of origin, but unique characteristics of Huawei’s ownership structure and the laws it is forced to comply with make its provision of critical infrastructure an especially concerning national security threat. The high cost of 5G infrastructure as well as differences in equipment architecture between vendors make any potential “roll backs” extremely costly and time consuming, effectively locking a country in with one vendor until the world moves to the next generation of telecommunications technology. Additionally, the growing network of interconnected devices expected to be facilitated by 5G networks increases the scope of potential cyber attacks and blurs the line between vital core and periphery edge networks (Mohan 449). In addition to the cyber security risk factors inherent to 5G technology, Huawei manufactured equipment presents additional risks for the national security of its customers. All Chinese companies are subject to the CCP’s increasingly stringent

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National Intelligence Cyber Security laws, which are both ambiguous in their scope and exact requirements. For example, article 7 of China’s National Intelligence Law states that “[a]ny organization and citizen shall, in accordance with the law, support, provide assistance, and cooperate in national intelligence work, and guard the secrecy of any national intelligence work that they are aware of ,” but it is unclear what the definition of “national intelligence work” is or what actions “providing assistance” entails (Hoffman and Kania). In addition to being subject to the CCP’s influence and ambiguous laws, the specifics of Huawei’s ownership structure are also unclear. While Huawei defines itself as employee (i.e privately) owned, research by Balding and Clark has shown that employees do not own any portion of the company, as the “stock” they are given as compensation is merely part of a profit-sharing incentive program, giving the holder no voting power within the company.

Instead, Balding and Clark find that over 98% of Huawei is owned by an organization called “Huawei Holding Trade Union Committee,” which itself has an unclear ownership structure. Because other Trade Union Committees are frequently heavily influenced

by CCP officials, it is reasonable to assume that the same is true of Huawei (Balding and Clark, 2019). Huawei’s subjection to Chinese laws and the potential for it to be effectively acting as an arm of the CCP abroad combined with the far reaching, long term impli17

cations of 5G infrastructure vulnerabilities should make customers of the Chinese company particularly concerned for the safety of nationally sensitive information.

Due to the established threat presented by Huawei’s provision of 5G telecommunications equipment, the United States has adopted a substantial regime of sanctions and trade restrictions while simultaneously pressuring allies to exclude Huawei from their 5G development plans. The US has taken action against Huawei since as recently as 2008, when the US government blocked the Huawei-financed purchase of Santa Clara-based telecommunications equipment company 3com through regulatory scrutiny. An open letter from Huawei to the US government in 2011 calling for its “fair treatment” prompted a full investigation into its classification as a security threat. After a year of review, however, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence maintained that Huawei was untrustworthy, and urged American companies to “remain vigilant” towards its activities (Tang 4563 - 4564). The most severe domestic action taken against Huawei occurred in 2019, when the Department of Commerce added Huawei to its Entity List, which initiates a sanction requiring American companies to obtain licenses before being allowed to export US manufactured technology to Huawei, while also effectively banning the domestic use of its 18

equipment. Congress is currently considering legislation to publicize license applications and acceptances in order to further ensure that American firms cannot provide Huawei with technologies that may contribute to its current technological advantage (Gallagher, 2022). The US’ actions proved effective, as Huawei has definitively stopped its efforts to enter the US consumer market.

Abroad, the US’s efforts have been more reliant on political pressure than on legislation. Its first international move against Huawei is marked by the creation of the so-called Prague Proposals after the Prague 5G Security Conference in March 2019. The conference, attended by 30 countries consisting of NATO members and global US allies, discussed national security considerations countries should make when choosing 5G telecommunications equipment vendors, with special emphasis on vendors that could be influenced by foreign governments (US Embassy Prague, 2019).

The US continued its opposition of Huawei in 2020 by establishing the so called “Clean Network,” a group of over 30 countries that “addresses the long-term threat to data privacy, security, human rights and principled collaboration posed to the free world from authoritarian malign actors” (State Department 2020). While both the creation of the Prague Proposals and the establishment of the Clean Network are evidence of the US government’s recognition

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of Huawei as a threat to geo-political influence, it has become clear that these measures may not have been effective, as countries involved in booth agreements went on to ignore the non-binding agreements in their 5G network implementation. Currently, the US relies primarily on using diplomatic pressure to convince countries to sign Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) regarding 5G implementation policies. These non-binding agreements build on the framework developed in Prague and outlined in the Clean Network to further restrict Huawei’s expansion. These MOUs often formally establish a country’s commitment to developing a “clean network” that cannot be influenced by authoritarian actors, language which is effectively equivalent to committing to avoid entering a deal awarding a Chinese telecommunications equipment vendor the right to provide national 5G infrastructure (Olteanu 43).

Data and Methods Currently, the conflict between the US and China revolves around the contracts awarded by either national governments or prominent, national telecommunications companies to provide 5G infrastructure. The US aims to limit the amount of nations that choose Huawei as their vendor for 5G equipment, as doing so will limit the scope of the CCP’s intelligence access and its ability to 20

leverage its influence over the critical infrastructure of US allies if a conflict breaks out. These contracts can be used as a means to measure the effectiveness of American efforts to limit Huawei’s expansion. In 2019, the United State’s tenor on Huawei developed 5G equipment decidedly changed, marked by the US’ most extreme domestic action, adding Huawei to the DOC Entity List, and its first concrete international action, the establishment of the Prague Proposals. If analysis of Huawei’s international contracts reveals a steep decline in deals with governments and prominent telecommunications vendors after 2019, then it can also determine that the diplomatic urging of the US alone can sufficiently influence the governments of the world at large to stay away from Huawei-produced technologies. If the volume of contracts awarding Huawei the right to provide national 5G networks increases or remains at the same level after 2019, we can determine that the US’ current policy is failing to limit growing Chinese influence and further action must be taken.

Analysis of Huawei’s 5G contracts is based partially on David Sack’s 2021 research with the Council on Foreign Relations.

In his research, Sacks compiled a list of every country’s official position on use of Huawei’s 5G technology. Sacks identified 73 countries who had plans to develop 5G technology in 2021. He la-

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beled an additional 106 countries as “not yet considering 5G,” but provided information about those countries’ past business dealings with Huawei or any general statements made by their leaders about national relationships with Huawei or the CCP. Figure 1 shows a map indicating the different stances of countries on the use of Huawei’s 5G network equipment based on Sacks’s research.

This study focused on expanding and updating Sacks’s data set to reflect 5G’s rapid adoption throughout Europe and the developing world between 2021 and the end of 2023. In order to determine the country’s stance on 5G, I conducted internet searches for news articles and official announcements about contracts with Huawei or competing 5G infrastructure firms. The same five searches were conducted for every country missing from Sack’s original 2021 data set in order to maintain consistency and objectivity.

The first search conducted was “[Country name] 5G infrastructure vendor” in order to find any major headlines that had emerged about the country’s 5G infrastructure choice since 2021. The next three searches conducted were “[country name] [equipment vendor name] 5G,” where [equipment vendor name] was either Huawei, Eriksson, or Nokia. These three searches aimed to find any official announcements coming from the vendor themselves. The final search was “[country name] Huawei ban.” The goal of this search 22

was to find any headlines about Huawei bans being considered or enacted by the country in question. Conducting these searches yielded data for the 5G equipment vendors for 48 of the 105 additional countries. For countries not considering building national 5G infrastructure systems, searches for government contracts granting Huawei the right to provide non-5G equipment or infrastructure, such as fiber optic cables and smart city technology, were conducted. This analysis provided data for 43 additional countries. 14 additional countries from Sack’s 2021 analysis were excluded from the final data set either because they had not made significant investments in internet infrastructure or there was no evidence indicating that they had any kind of national relationship with Huawei.

For each observation, the year of publication for the source article was recorded so the 5G equipment vendor decisions could be compared across time. The final data set included information on the 5G infrastructure decisions or the status of the relationship with Huawei for 164 unique countries and gathered information from 51 individual sources. The most commonly cited sources were international telecommunications news website CommsUpdate, international news agency Reuters, and each equipment vendor’s corporate website. A table with the complete data set can be found in the linked Excel file on the sheet labeled “Table 5.”

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Because the search results showed that many countries are currently in different stages of the process of choosing a 5G vendor and implementing 5G infrastructure, and that many countries had bans and restrictions varying in their levels of severity, some generalizations had to be made in order for the data to be interpretable. To generalize each country’s 5G policy, observations were divided into two groups: “not likely to use Huawei 5G equipment” and “Already using or likely to use Huawei 5G equipment.” The first group includes countries that have enacted bans on Huawei’s telecommunications equipment, have significant restrictions on Huawei’s equipment, have already awarded a contract to an alternative telecommunications equipment vendor (Nokia or Ericsson), or have signed an MOU with the United States committing to providing a clean network. The latter group includes countries that have already implemented Huawei’s 5G telecommunications infrastructure, committed or expressed desire to have Huawei build national 5G telecommunications infrastructure, or have had a large telecommunications network provider sign a deal with Huawei to jointly develop 5G infrastructure within their borders.

For countries not yet considering 5G infrastructure, the group includes countries that have made substantial investments in non-5G, Huawei supplied telecommunications or internet infrastructure. In order to test whether the US’ allies are more receptive to its warn24

ings about Huawei’s 5G telecommunications equipment, I divided the sample into US allies and non-allies to analyze the difference in their response to the US’ anti-Huawei rhetoric at the end of 2019.

In this analysis, the designation of “ally” was given to the 47 countries who are either NATO members or listed by the US as Major Non-NATO Allies.

While the new data set is a successful expansion of Sack’s 2021 work, it is difficult to actually test this study’s hypothesis due to the absence of a control for countries that had close working relationships with Huawei prior to 2019. This limitation is partially due the increased degree of difficulty finding news articles from prior to 2019 and partially due to the lack of transparency in national vendor choice before the politicization of the issue by the United States (Strand, 2022). The current data set also fails to control for exogenous factors such as regional vendor availability and budgeted spending on 5G infrastructure. In the future, it also may be useful to control whether a country’s government signs a contract allowing Huawei to provide 5G telecommunications equipment for 5G infrastructure or whether a country’s leading wireless network provider works in tandem with Huawei to develop 5G technology. This difference is important because some governments may have limited input over 5G equipment vendor decisions

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if they leave the choice up to wireless network providers. Compiling two observations for each country, one from 2019 and one from 2023, would control for countries that built 5G infrastructure with Huawei equipment or signed contracts with Huawei before the US began its international Clean Network campaign at the end of 2019. This method would also track countries that changed their telecommunications vendor in response to US rhetoric, which would be a strong indication of receptiveness to American demands due to the substantial costs of the infrastructure “rollbacks” associated with switching equipment vendors.

Results The first analysis considered all 164 countries in the data set. Before 2019, 70 countries were placed in the “already using or likely to use Huawei 5G equipment” category while 12 countries were placed in the “not likely to use Huawei 5G equipment” category. After 2019, 34 countries were categorized as already using or likely to use Huawei 5G equipment and 45 countries were categorized as not likely to use Huawei 5G equipment, indicating a substantial increase in the rate of adoption of technology from Nokia and Ericsson as well as the rate of global bans or restrictions against Huawei. Breaking countries down into allies and non-allies 26

revealed that most of the countries taking measures to limit the likelihood of Huawei technology use after 2019 were US allies. Of the 45 countries taking action making them unlikely to use Huawei technology after 2019, 26 were US allies. US allies were also much less likely to adopt Huawei technology after 2019, as only 7 of the 34 total countries adopting Huawei technology after the increase in US anti-Huawei rhetoric were US allies. US diplomatic pressure was less effective at preventing non-allies from turning to Huawei to provide their telecommunications infrastructure, as the majority of non-allies making decisions about national telecommunications infrastructure after 2019 made deals with Huawei. The results of this analysis are displayed in graphs one and two below and tables one and two in the appendix.

“Breaking countries down into allies and non-allies revealed that most of the countries taking measures to limit the likelihood of Huawei technology use after 2019 were US allies”

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A second analysis considering only countries developing or currently possessing national 5G infrastructure was conducted to ensure that trends are not being distorted by the 43 countries that only had their relationship with Huawei analyzed. Trends emerging in the analysis of all 164 countries were largely reflected in the analysis of the subset of 121 countries with some discernible position on 5G infrastructure. To highlight, there was a sharp decrease in the rate at which countries adopted Huawei’s 5G telecommunications equipment after 2019, with the majority of countries making decisions about 5G infrastructure taking action to make it difficult for Huawei to play a role in the national 5G network. Just as in the first analysis, a country’s receptiveness to US rhetoric depended highly on whether or not the country was a US ally. The vast majority of countries using alternate 5G equipment vendors or implementing bans on Huawei equipment were US allies, while the majority of non-allies making 5G infrastructure decisions after 2019 chose to use Huawei equipment. The second analysis is illustrated in tables three and four and graphs three and four, all of which are included in the appendix.

Discussion The results of the analysis indicate a distinct increase after 28

2019 in the number of countries taking measures to limit the likelihood of Huawei technology use. However, the scope of the decline is by no means all encompassing, and indicates areas where either US influence is declining or Chinese influence is rising due to its increased global outreach. The analysis shows that countries who are not formal allies with the US are much less receptive to its diplomatic pressure against Huawei equipment. Large nations with developing economies in the Middle East and Latin America, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Oman, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, were the most likely to adopt Huawei 5G technology, possibly indicating the desire of growing economies to prioritize development and a place on the cutting edge of mobile technology over strengthened geopolitical relations with the US. Many of these countries are involved in China’s ongoing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an international infrastructure development program that aims to expand Chinese influence through increased financial and economic engagement with emerging market countries. Participation in the BRI, and acceptance of the large public loans from Chinese banks and companies characteristic of the program, provides further indication that these countries may be looking to move away from the US-led global order.

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“Large nations with developing economies in the Middle East and Latin America, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Oman, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, were the most likely to adopt Huawei 5G technology, possibly indicating the desire of growing economies to prioritize development and a place on the cutting edge of mobile technology over strengthened geopolitical relations with the US” The US’ minimal influence over the equipment vendor decisions of non-allies is also visible in Africa. Huawei already enjoys huge influence in the world’s least developed countries due to its long history of providing cheap telecommunications infrastructure in Africa. The analysis shows that the US’ change in rhetoric 30

had little effect on African countries’ telecommunication equipment vendor decisions. Many African countries’ previous relationship with Huawei as an equipment vendor carried over to the new generation of equipment, and those not yet considering 5G, such as Ghana and Guinea, continued to make large investments in infrastructure reliant on Huawei technology after 2019. The economic difficulties many African countries face, combined with Nokia and Ericsson’s history of neglecting the African market, make their selection of Huawei as a telecommunications equipment vendor more likely due to practicality than intentional disregard of American pressure. Thus, while Huawei’s dominance may not indicate declining American influence in Africa, it certainly is an indicator of China’s increasing influence in the region.

While the analysis found the US’ Clean Network to be effective at preventing its smaller, European allies from choosing Huawei to provide 5G telecommunications equipment, some of staunchest allies, both European and non-European, still chose to build 5G networks using Huawei-supplied equipment. Ireland, Iceland, the Philippines, and Pakistan all ignored US warnings and continued to implement Huawei’s telecommunications equipment after 2019. These countries’ decisions may be the clearest indication of the global power structure shifting towards multi-polarity,

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as they indicate openness to working relationships with Chinese companies and governments for the foreseeable future, even as the US begins to sever ties and look elsewhere for trade and business partnerships.

Interestingly, the results of this analysis of 5G telecommunications equipment vendor choices closely parallel the Atlantic Council’s 2021 report by Moyer et. al., which analyzes the scope of the US and China’s global influence. Moyer and his team measure the US and China’s influence using the Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity (FBIC) Index, a metric that measures a combination of the frequency with which countries interact and the dependance one country has on another. Their analysis focused on comparing the amount of countries where the US had the highest FBIC and the amount of countries where China had the highest FBIC, and examining changes in each country’s top influencer between 2000 and 2020. Their report found that while the US did not lose its influence in many countries between 2000 and 2020, the number of countries China had high influence over increased drastically over the same period, as it replaced former colonial powers such as France and the UK as the country with the highest FBIC in many developing nations due to its outreach through the BRI (Moyer et. al. 2021). Telecommunications equipment choices of

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countries before and after 2019 exhibit a similar pattern to the one found in Moyer’s work. The US’ allies largely heed its warnings about the cyber security threat posed by using Huawei’s 5G equipment, but the breadth of its message is limited by the economically favorable relationship with China many developing countries are beginning to establish. Therefore, 5G telecommunications equipment vendor choice, especially in the US-allied countries that chose to implement Huawei’s equipment, may be a leading indicator of who a nation is most influenced by. This means we can expect to see countries like the Philippines and Pakistan continue to develop their relationship with China in the coming years, despite officially being US allies.

It is important to note that the limitations of this data set, mainly its failure to control for countries that already had Huawei equipment before 2019 and its failure to address exogenous factors such as equipment price and regional vendor availability, may decrease the accuracy of its findings. However, the data is robust enough to provide a broad overview of the global influence of the US and China through the lens of global 5G equipment vendor selection.

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Conclusion Analyzing the 5G telecommunications equipment vendor selections of different countries before and after the US increased its diplomatic pressure to reject Huawei’s 5G equipment in 2019 revealed that while US efforts have been effective at decreasing the rate at which countries adopt Huawei technology, its warnings have not been universally heeded by allies or non-allies. The limitations of the data set prevent us from fully rejecting the hypothesis that US diplomatic action has been ineffective at decreasing Huawei’s share of the 5G telecommunication equipment market, but we can be reasonably confident that the growing number of countries adopting bans on Huawei or signing contracts with alternative equipment providers will curb Huawei’s market dominance when it comes time to implement future generations of telecommunication equipment. The fact that certain US allies have chosen to allow Huawei to build their 5G networks should be concerning to American policy makers from both a security and geopolitical perspective. If conflict erupts, taking precautions to ensure secure communications with an ally using a Huawei-built 5G network could significantly hinder American intelligence and military response. Additionally, adverse 5G equipment vendor decisions of US allies could hint that they are considering exploring the benefits 34

of increasing economic and geopolitical relations with China and the CCP. The decision of a select group of US allies to implement Huawei’s 5G equipment shows that staying in American favor is no longer the first priority for countries trying to further their interests on the world stage. In order to ensure the cooperation of allies moving forward, the United States could introduce binding treaties committing countries to banning Huawei manufactured equipment or move to sanction countries that choose to implement Huawei’s systems. As the world around us becomes increasingly connected, we must remain vigilant about who controls the technologies we rely on.

“In order to ensure the cooperation of allies moving forward, the United States could introduce binding treaties committing countries to banning Huawei manufactured equipment or move to sanction countries that choose to implement Huawei’s systems” 35

Appendix Table 1 Before 2019 After 2019 Investing in Huawei Technology (Any Kind)

70

34

Huawei Bans or Adopting Other 5G Infrastructure

12

45

Table 2 Before 2019

After 2019

Allies

NonAllies

Allies

NonAllies

Investing in Huawei Technology (Any Kind)

10

60

7

27

Huawei Bans or Adopting Other 5G Infrastructure

3

9

26

19

Table 3 Before 2019 After 2019

36

Countries with Huawei 5G

30

31

Huawei Bans or Adopting Other 5G Infrastructure

12

45

Table 4

Before 2019

After 2019

Allies

Non-Allies Allies

Non-Allies

Countries with Huawei 5G

9

22

7

23

Huawei Bans or Adopting Other 5G Infrastructure

3

9

26

19

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Of Communication, 14, 22. https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/ view/12624/3204.

U.S. Embassy Prague. “The United States Applauds the Czech Republic for Hosting the Prague 5G Security Conference.” U.S. Embassy in The Czech Republic, May 6, 2019. https://cz.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-applauds-the-czech-republic-for-hostingthe-prague-5g-security-conference/.

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Securing Stability: Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive in the Post-Covid Era? Michelle Nguyen

About the Author

Michelle Nguyen is a second-year student pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Government. Aside from writing for the Virginia Journal of International Affairs, she is involved in the Multilingual Outreach Volunteer Effort and the Global Inquirer Podcast. After completing her undergraduate studies, she hopes to pursue a legal career and further explore the complex relationship between citizens and political institutions.

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Abstract

Political protests are often viewed as challenges that threaten the stability of the ruling regime. In certain contexts, however, political protests instead serve as a mechanism to alleviate tensions between citizens and their government. In the People’s Republic of China, political protests enable citizens to communicate their grievances to the Chinese Communist Party, strengthening the Party’s grip on power. This paper seeks to address the sources of stability of the Chinese party-state, as well as explore the implications of the Zero COVID policy on regime stability. It begins by examining the tradition of rules consciousness, which underlies the paradoxical nature of political protests in China. It then analyzes how the CCP manipulates a federalist governmental structure to preserve legitimacy and evaluates the implicit social contract between citizens to explain acquiescence to the governing regime. This paper concludes with an analysis of how COVID-19 protests differ from previous political demonstrations in China and thus pose a distinctive threat to the party-state.

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Securing Stability: Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive in the Post-Covid Era?

I. Introduction

“The discrepancy between political protests and regime support is one of the central paradoxes of contemporary Chinese politics”’ (Dickson, Shen, and Yan 2017). The unprecedented economic reforms of the post-Mao era have induced numerous conflicts between citizens and the government. From 1993 to 2005, the magnitude of popular protests increased tenfold (Cai 2008). Common causes of protests include economic inequality, forced displacement in exchange for low compensation, and environmental pollution brought about by industrialization and urbanization. Dramatic increases in civil unrest are often believed to erode state legitimacy and lead to political liberalization, yet no such bottom-up transformation has occurred in China.

Three core components enable the coexistence of civil unrest and political stability in Chinese society. First, a tradition of rules consciousness permeates Chinese political culture. In protesting, citizens intend to promote their interests rather than challenge the party-state. The regime sustains this culture by implementing a

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decentralized government structure. Second, the regime deliberately generates a local legitimacy deficit, which increases support of the central government to the detriment of local institutions. Third, the implicit social contract between the party-state and its citizens contributes to the regime’s resilience, such that citizens are willing to offer political acquiescence in exchange for economic prosperity. Although the Chinese party-state has survived many instances of popular revolt, the protests against the Zero COVID policy pose a distinct challenge to the authoritarian regime, as they undermine these core tenets. Protests against pandemic restrictions break from the pattern of rules consciousness; such demonstrations target both local officials and the central government. The decline in individual income has thus shattered the social contract which has long served as a stabilizing force in state society interactions.

II. The Tradition of Rules Consciousness

The Chinese people adhere to a deep-rooted tradition of rules consciousness; protestors express their discontent while simultaneously acknowledging the authority of the party-state.

Protestors are careful to prove their loyalty to the central government by petitioning for redress of grievances within the state-es-

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tablished legal framework. This tradition can be traced back to the imperial era when rural peasants petitioned for lower taxes. After these petitions proved futile, the peasants demonstrated en masse on the streets and looted the local yamens. Still, the difference was shown to the central government. Protestors prevented the looting from reaching the emperor’s treasury and designated a select group to protect his financial assets (Perry 2016). This tradition continued during the economic reforms of the post-Mao period. In the late 1980s, local governments increased tax rates to offset the revenue losses caused by decollectivization. Villagers initiated protests by filing letters of complaint, in which they denounced local officials and cited the specific regulations these authorities violated. However, most letters did not challenge the legitimacy of central authorities or the policies they passed. Only after their petitions were disregarded did the protestors engage in violent acts, such as arson and the killing of local officials (Perry 2016).

III. The Benefits of Chinese Federalism

Authoritarian governments possess two major tools to manage popular resistance: repression and concession.

When faced with large numbers of protests, authoritarian governments cannot dismiss repression as a viable re49

sponse. However, overreliance on repression may antagonize apolitical citizens and potential supporters of the party-state. Moreover, excessive repression insulates regimes from the grievances of citizens, fuels resentment, and undermines the state’s legitimacy. Unconditional concessions are often interpreted as indications of state weakness and thus provoke greater resistance. Therefore, authoritarian governments must balance repression and concessions in order to maintain social stability. A decentralized governmental structure enables the Chinese party-state to utilize repressive tactics while minimizing harm to the regime’s legitimacy. This structure also allows the regime to grant concessions without undermining state strength. In this system, high-level officials grant autonomy to, but also impose restraints on, local authorities to handle social unrest.

This divided system creates differing incentive structures for the central and local governments. The central government holds greater interest in maintaining the regime’s legitimacy, compelling it to be more tolerant of protests.

The local government, in contrast, prioritizes social stability. This is because in response to increasing social unrest during the late 1990s, the central government required the provincial government to enact reforms. The cadre evalu50

ation system was then amended to include stringent social stability targets to be met by local authorities (Heurlin 2016). Local governments face a lower cost for, and are thus more likely to use, tactics of repression.

“A decentralized governmental structure enables the Chinese party-state to utilize repressive tactics while minimizing harm to the regime’s legitimacy.

This structure also allows the regime to grant concessions without undermining state strength.”

In addition, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) purposefully manipulates the decentralized government structure to produce a local legitimacy deficit. Chinese citizens report a 16% higher level of trust and support in the central government compared to the local government (Dickson, Shen, and Yan 2017). By

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delegating responsibilities of managing social unrest to local governments, the central government deflects the blame for mishandling of grievances. Interventions by the central government—in the form of granting concessions and implementing policy changes—enhance the party-state’s image.

This strategy of deflection is evident through the central government’s response to a 2004 protest in Hanyuan. As part of a dam development project, the government seized farmland and homes. Approximately 100,000 peasants had petitioned local authorities for higher compensation but were unsuccessful in their attempts. These peasants then staged an occupation of the construction site to halt the project. The local government deployed upwards of 10,000 soldiers and 1,500 police officers to restore order. Violent confrontations ensued, resulting in the deaths of villagers and police officers. To appease the protestors, the provincial government pledged to increase compensation and to relocate the homes of the peasants. The central government detained several senior county officials, including the deputy city mayor, on charges of corruption (Cai 2008). Although expanding infrastructure is a key component of the central state’s agenda, it was able to avoid blaming its policies by allowing local authorities to handle the immediate aftermath.

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IV. The Implicit Social Contract

The expansion of the middle class often results in democratic transitions. Societies with a dominant middle class have a more equal distribution of socioeconomic resources, leading to a more balanced distribution of political resources. Moreover, many members of the middle class earn their income through business ownership. They thus demand rule of law to constrain state power and protect their assets, resulting in implementation of a democratic system (Lu 2005). Despite the growth of the Chinese middle class since the 1970s, the Chinese Communist Party has maintained its grasp on power.

The implicit social contract between the regime and its citizens serves as a source of stability for the Chinese party-state. Citizens acquiesce to authoritarian political governance in exchange for economic prosperity. A multivariable analysis of regime support in urban China found that pocketbook factors indicating personal prosperity, specifically the rise of individual income, is statistically significantly and positively associated with support of both the central and local governments. Contrary to conventional wisdom, sociotropic factors that suggest aggregate

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economic growth, such as increased per capita GDP, do not correspond to greater support for central or local institutions (Dickson, Shen, and Yan 2017).

This contract especially influences the middle class’s support for democratization. Survey research by Jie Chen and Chunlong Lu in cities across China regarding support for democratic institutions indicated a negative and statistically significant correlation between economic satisfaction and support for democratization. This correlation was stronger among middle-class individuals than working-class individuals (Chen and Lu 2011).

The relationship indicates that the greater citizens’ satisfaction with their economic circumstances, the higher their support for the ruling party-state. Furthermore, the support of Chinese citizens will continue even in the face of a declining economy, as long as individual incomes are unaffected.

V. The Distinctive Challenge COVID-19 Poses to Regime Stability

In late December 2019, Dr. Li Wenliang issued warnings regarding the novel coronavirus in an online chat forum. Local authorities forced Li to disavow his claims and censored the information he disseminated. Afterwards, Li contracted COVID-19 and 54

died, catalyzing criticism of the party-state. In order to quell doubts about the effectiveness of its governance system, the CCP implemented the Zero COVID policy. The party enacted strict measures to contain the spread of the virus, including prolonged lockdowns of major cities and large-scale COVID testing.

By March 2020, new cases ceased to emerge in China.

The seeming success of China’s public health policies enabled the party-state to revise the narrative of the outbreak. Originally, it seemed as if the party-state was willing to forfeit lives to preserve its own image. The unyielding COVID-19 policies proved that the party-state would sacrifice anything, including a growing economy, to protect the life of the common people. The policy also demonstrated the advantages of an authoritarian system in dealing with a public health crisis. Chinese leaders framed the failure of the United States, India, and Brazil to contain the virus as an indication of the deficiencies of liberal democracy. “Some may object that this [low number of COVID-19 deaths in China] was because China restricted freedoms more than ‘democracies,’ … But what kind of democracy would sacrifice millions of lives for some individuals’ freedom not to wear masks?” (Mark and Schuman 2022).

The Zero COVID policy seemed to prove the superiority of the Chinese party-state, bolstering support for the regime.

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“The COVID measures that were once hailed as the saving grace of the people’s health now seemed unreasonable” However, the Chinese people became weary after enduring two years of draconian pandemic restrictions. Citizens were prevented from earning income to support their families. They constantly feared the prospect of being forced into quarantine facilities. Tensions escalated when lockdown measures prohibited citizens from entering grocery stores. The Chinese people faced starvation when the state delayed food deliveries to individuals’ homes. The COVID measures that were once hailed as the saving grace of the people’s health now seemed unreasonable.

Protests against the Zero COVID policy initially followed the pattern of rules consciousness rooted in Chinese history.

Demonstrations were confined and directed grievances towards local authorities. In mid-2022, protests called attention to the harm pandemic restrictions had caused to citizens’ livelihoods. In Guangzhou, migrant workers demolished barriers established to prohibit entry into their stores. In Zhengzhou, Foxconn factory em56

ployees walked out in protest of delayed bonuses and the contaminated environment of quarantine dormitories.

However, protests began to deviate from the pattern of rules consciousness in November 2022. These demonstrations spread across regions and the public expressed anti-regime sentiments. During the White Paper protests, citizens took to the streets to demonstrate against pandemic barriers, which prevented emergency services from extinguishing a fire in a building of Urumqi and ultimately resulted in the death of ten civilians.

Protestors displayed blank sheets of printer paper, representing their loss of civil liberties. These demonstrations escalated over the span of two days and became the largest anti-regime protest in China since the Tiananmen Square Movement. The White Paper protests are significant as they broke the psychological barrier the Chinese party-state had carefully constructed. Up until these demonstrations, public expressions of anti-regime sentiments were unthinkable. Protestors now view the state as the source of their grievances, rather than the problem solver.

To reduce social unrest, the Chinese party-state utilized repressive tactics. Local authorities analyzed cell phone data to apprehend protestors, interrogating them about their organizing methods. The CCP’s successful repression of protests came at a high 57

cost, as it reduced the elevated confidence the Chinese citizens placed in their authoritarian system. In turn, this impaired the trustbased arrangement that dominates governance in China. The CCP has established two opposing systems of repression to maintain social stability. A coercive and surveillance-based system is implemented in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang. In all other regions of China, the CCP utilizes a trust-based model. This trust-based system of governance was vital to the implementation of the Zero COVID policy. Residents’ committees mobilized civil servants, party cadres, and unpaid volunteers to convince fellow citizens to comply with rigid lockdown measures and submit to frequent testing. This system deteriorated as the pandemic progressed. As the Omicron variant spread, the local government was forced to hire more pandemic workers, many of whom held no ties to the communities where they were employed. These new workers were less successful in compelling citizens to abide by COVID restrictions.

Local governments were then forced to hire security guards who used violent tactics to coerce citizens to comply. Shocking videos published online exposed security guards beating elderly citizens to enforce restrictions, provoking public outrage.

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“Protestors now view the state as the source of their grievances, rather than the problem solver” The widespread protests led the Chinese Communist Party to completely reverse its Zero COVID Policy. Although this measure was successful in decreasing the number of protests, new forms of social contention have emerged. For instance, in Nanjing, young adults honored the statue of Sun Yat-sen with flowers as a demonstration of their disapproval of the Chinese Communist Party. Such acts of social contention reveal citizens’ declining trust in the party state’s capacity to fulfill the implicit social contract. COVID lockdowns have reduced individual incomes, yet the party-state still demands unquestioned compliance. The Chinese economy has suffered downturns before, such as the large increase in unemployment rates due to state-owned enterprise reforms and the 2008 global financial crisis. Post-COVID economic recovery will prove more difficult. China’s annual economic growth rate has decreased from approximately 11 percent to 3 percent, making the effects of unemployment and reduced income more impactful.

Moreover, The Zero COVID policy has reduced the level 59

of citizen buy-in required for the trust-based model of governance. Initially, citizens were willing to abide by strict Zero COVID guidelines, as they believed the policies protected lives.

As the pandemic persisted, citizens saw a decline in their quality of living and began defying public health policies. The aftermath of the Zero COVID policy may create a dilemma that gradually deteriorates the resilience of the regime. In order to enforce future policies on a less compliant citizenry, the state must utilize more coercive methods. Excessive use of repressive tactics, however, may undermine the legitimacy of the regime.

It should be noted that tactics of repression were effective in restabilizing the Chinese party-state following the Tiananmen Square movement. Eyewitness accounts report soldiers unleashing gunfire and teargas upon the protestors, as well as tanks crushing the demonstrators to death (Calhoun 1989). These assaults were followed by a state-sponsored campaign of intimidation in which criminal courts severely punished alleged rebels.

However, the context of the suppression of the Tiananmen Square movement differs from that of the Zero COVID policy.

China enjoyed a robust economy during this period. Economic reforms implemented under Deng Xiaoping had improved the standards of living for numerous citizens, such that the Chinese 60

people saw their individual incomes rise with state-sponsored wage increases. The private sector manufactured a consistent output of consumer goods. The household responsibility system increased the earnings of rural peasants. In this prosperous economic climate, citizens were more willing to overlook the regime’s actions (Baum 1992). The post-COVID economic conditions of China are less conducive to such a reaction.

“Four decades after China’s opening up and reform, it seems as if social mobility has hit a ceiling” The Chinese party-state will face greater challenges in repairing the implicit social contract with its citizens. The Zero COVID policy has had a detrimental impact on the Chinese economy. Four decades after China’s opening up and reform, it seems as if social mobility has hit a ceiling. The economy is stagnating, and unemployment rates have reached upwards of 30 percent in cities (Ong 2023). The Chinese economy seemed to recover from its pandemic policies; its economic growth rate decreased to 2.2 percent in 2020 but increased to 8 percent in 2021.

However, pocketbook factors are more determinative of regime 61

support than sociotropic factors. Zero Covid policies have severely damaged factors related to individual income, specifically the growth of small businesses. In 2020, approximately 6 million new enterprises registered whereas 4.5 million unregistered.

This trend worsened in 2021: roughly 1 million small enterprises formed whereas 4.4 million unregistered. This is particularly devastating to ordinary citizens, as small businesses generate 80% of urban jobs in China (Mark and Schuman 2022). The state must enact reforms to increase individual economic prosperity— rather than solely focusing on macroeconomic growth—to preserve the regime’s resilience.

However, a similarity that both the Chinese people living during the Tiananmen Square movement and Zero COVID policy protest share is the memory of the Cultural Revolution. During the Tiananmen Square massacre, this memory created a fear of chaos, which diminished popular support for the protests. Survivors of the Cultural Revolution were haunted by the deaths, torture, suicides, and destruction of homes they witnessed. Victims also lost trust in their social networks, as citizens were encouraged to turn in individuals of a landowning background (Thurston 1984). The Chinese people pass down memories of the Cultural Revolution within their families, such that younger generations in 62

China continue to prioritize political and social stability. Chinese citizens report corruption and stability as the top issues requiring reform (Le and Alon 2004). It is likely that the Chinese party-state will exploit this fear of chaos to preserve the regime’s survival in the aftermath of the Zero COVID policy.

VI. Conclusion

The Chinese party-state has survived due to a historical tradition of rules consciousness, a decentralized governance system, and the continued fulfillment of the implicit social contract with its citizens. The tradition of rules consciousness dictates that protestors express their grievances, while also demonstrating their loyalty to the state. Protests often include petitions filed according to state-sanctioned procedures. Rather than challenging the authority of the party state, protestors call upon the regime to fulfill its promises. The Chinese federalist system also serves as a source of political stability. The structure allows the state to balance repression and concession as methods of enforcement. Moreover, the state intentionally produces a local legitimacy deficit in order to increase support of the central government. Finally, the social contract that forms the basis of state-society interactions contributes to the regime’s resilience. Citizens are willing to acquiesce to the party-state in exchange for greater economic opportunities.

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These fundamental tenets have enabled the Chinese party-state to survive numerous protests. The COVID-19 pandemic poses a substantial challenge to the resilience of the regime, as it undermines these core elements. Chinese citizens hold the central government responsible for draconian pandemic measures, leading them to deviate from the tradition of rules consciousness.

Unlike previous protests, the Chinese party-state cannot simply deflect blame onto local governments. Most importantly, the Zero COVID policy has damaged the social contract between the state and its citizens. The Chinese people are no longer willing to abide by pandemic restrictions, which both deprive them of their civil liberties and harm their economic prosperity. In order to ensure its survival, the Chinese party-state will attempt to implement reforms that repairs these fragmented fundamental tenets. The success of the central government in doing so remains to be seen.

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Cai, Yongshun. “Power Structure and Regime Resilience: Contentious Politics in China.” British Journal of Political Science 38, no. 3 (2008): 411–32. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27568354.

Calhoun, Craig. “Revolution and repression in Tiananmen Square.” Society 26, no. 6 (1989): 21-38.

Chen, Jie, and Chunlong Lu. “Democratization and the Middle Class in China: The Middle Class’s Attitudes toward Democracy.” Political Research Quarterly 64, no. 3 (2011): 705–19. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23056386.

Dickson, Bruce J., Mingming Shen, and Jie Yan. “Generating Regime Support in Contemporary China: Legitimation and the Local Legitimacy Deficit.” Modern China 43, no. 2 (2017): 123–55. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44505164.

Heurlin, Christopher. 2016. “Disruptive Tactics and Buying Stability in Local Government Responsiveness.” Responsive Authoritarianism in China: Land, Protests, and Policy Making.

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Cambridge University Press. pp 54-89.

Le Lu, and Ilan Alon. “Analysis of the Changing Trends in Attitudes and Values of the Chinese: The Case of Shanghai’s Young & Educated.” Journal of International and Area Studies 11, no.

2 (2004): 67–88. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43111449.

Lu, Chunglong. “Middle Class and Democracy: Structural Linkage.” International Review of Modern Sociology 31, no. 2 (2005): 157–78. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41421642.

Mark, Jeremy, and Michael Schuman. “The Party Wins.” China’s Faltering “Zero COVID” Policy: Politics in Command, Economy in Reverse. Atlantic Council, 2022. http://www.jstor.org/stable/ resrep41248.4.

Ong, Lynette H. “The CCP after the Zero-Covid Fail.” Journal of Democracy 34, no. 2 (2023): 32-46.

Perry, Elizabeth. 2010.“Popular Protest in China: Playing by the Rules,” in China Today, China Tomorrow edited by Joseph Fewsmith (Routledge), Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Thurston, Anne F. “Victims of China’s Cultural Revolution: The Invisible Wounds: Part I.” Pacific Affairs 57, no. 4 (1984): 599620.

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“The sun has set behind the hills:” Prominent Shidaiqu Artists’ Stories Under the Chinese Communist Party, 1949–1978 Calvin Pan

About the Author Calvin Pan is a first-year UVA student from McLean, Virginia, majoring in Foreign Affairs and minoring in Data Science and French.

Having lived in China for half his life, Calvin is immensely interested in Chinese history and China-US relations. He’s also an avid jazz pianist, playing in a small jazz group at UVA in addition to a funk rock band (favorite pianist: Bill Evans). Calvin is currently working on another research project about Tibetan Buddhism

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in Taiwan. Outside of writing, Calvin is the Treasurer of UVA’s International Relations Organization, the parent organization of the Journal. Calvin also is a trial counselor with the University Judiciary Committee, and loves to run/hike/bike/do anything outdoorsy!

Abstract The shidaiqu tradition was a style of music that emerged in China’s cosmopolitan port cities and fused Western musical conventions and jazz vocabulary with Chinese lyrics and instrumentation, becoming wildly popular in China from the 1920s-1950s. Shidaiqu was particularly reviled by the Communist Party as being decadently capitalist and insufficiently nationalist, and as a result, its practitioners were ostracized and often treated severely once it came to power. This paper uses a number of Chinese primary and secondary sources in translation to, for the first time in English, piece together the stories of three shidaiqu practitioners (Li Jinhui, He Lüting, and Zhou Xuan) in a narrative format. Those stories are often forgotten in both China and the wider world, but still hold critical importance in explaining the nature of the Communist Party’s earliest years of rule.

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“The sun has set behind the hills:” Prominent Shidaiqu Artists’ Stories Under the Chinese Communist Party, 1949– 1978 Introduction If you flipped open a copy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s official state newspaper, the People’s Daily, any time during the 1950s, chances are that you’d see language like the following: “Used to corrupt and anesthetize the fighting will of the people.” “It only serves the depraved bourgeoisie, Western slave masters, and Chinese traitors employed by the enemy” (Xu, 1958). “Vulgar and ugly” (People’s Daily Commentator, 1958). The CCP was attacking one of its greatest enemies with those harsh words: not opium, or drinking, not even Chiang Kai-Shek, but rather, a far more sinister foe—popular music.

After its 1949 victory in the Chinese Civil War, the CCP systematically repressed non-revolutionary popular music, or shidaiqu, as part of its Anti-Rightist campaigns aimed at restructuring society. Labeling it “yellow music” – and thereby painting it as an ideological enemy associated with Western constructs of decadence, pornography, and capitalism – the Communist Party succeeded in nearly eradicating the once

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wildly-popular art form. Over the course of this violent crackdown, thousands of composers and singers associated with the pop music industry were labeled as enemies of the state and either persecuted or made to flee China, while others strategically moved to producing state-sanctioned “red music” instead (Mittler, 1997). This essay aims to chronicle the stories of three notable figures in the shidaiqu world who experienced this suppression first-hand, countering the underrepresentation of individual artists’ stories in the field of Chinese pop culture studies. In doing so, it also endeavors to restore an oft-forgotten sense of agency to those musicians’ stories by highlighting their individual decisions and actions in responding to a brutal regime.

Historical Context Historical context—both immediate to the 1940s and 1950s and a longer culmination of historical trends—illuminates the CCP’s decision to brutally repress shidaiqu artists.

After the death of the Qing Emperor Qianlong in 1796, heralding the end of China’s last true golden age, the Chinese state entered a steady decline. Defeat at the hands of the British in the First Opium War in 1839 signaled the start of a “century of humiliation,” during which military and economic stagnation, 74

as well as an increasingly corrupt state, led China to suffer disasters like the Taiping Rebellion. This left the nation vulnerable to embarrassments like the loss of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, allowing Western empires to carve out treaty ports—most notably the city of Shanghai—and zones of influence from the nation. Eventually, this downward spiral sparked the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Angered by the imperial government’s lackluster efforts at reform, millions of Chinese, led by a Western-educated elite and Westernized regiments of the Qing Army, overthrew the Qing Dynasty—a movement which would also spur a mass drive to modernize Chinese art and culture in the May 4th Movement. The dream of a resurgent modern China was never realized, however, as a rift between rival governments established by the two leaders of the Revolution, Yuan Shikai and Sun Yat-sen, eventually spiraled in 1916 into a decade-long Warlord Era with various generals battling for power.

In 1928, the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) under Chiang Kai-Shek reunified the nation under a government based in the city of Nanjing, ushering in an era of relative stability.

At the same time, the Communist Party (CCP) emerged as a contender, with Mao Zedong eventually becoming the leader.

Originally the KMT’s left wing until its members were brutal75

ly massacred by the KMT, the CCP started waging a guerilla civil war against the KMT. Many Chinese artists during this time oriented their work towards making political statements in support of either side, with shidaiqu musicians generally being more in support of the KMT (Wilson Lewis et.al, 2023).

This low-intensity civil war would be put on hold with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1937, starting the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), which saw the KMT and CCP join forces in a Chinese United Front. Art in China during this period shifted overwhelmingly to mass nationalist art that aimed to inspire the Chinese populace in its war effort, and shidaiqu artists were criticized for not devoting themselves to this cause. Following the defeat of Japan in the Second World War (of which the Second Sino-Japanese War had become a theater), the CCP and KMT renewed their civil war. Initial KMT victories were quickly reversed due to the Soviet Union providing the nascent CCP with large amounts of material aid and much greater support amongst a Chinese populace who saw the KMT as elitist. By 1949, the CCP had conquered most of mainland China, declaring a new People’s Republic of China (PRC) and pushing the KMT to relocate the island of Taiwan.

It then undertook a series of ill-fated mass campaigns to restructure the Chinese nation under Mao Zedong’s model of 76

agrarian socialism—most notably the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957–59), Great Leap Forward (1958–62), and Cultural Revolution (1966–76)—leading to the deaths of millions through purges and famines caused by economic mismanagement. The party especially targeted artists and the intelligentsia during this period, as they were viewed as agents of reactionary thought.

Following the death of Mao Zedong, reforms by his successors (most notably Deng Xiaoping) would see the PRC undertake programs of limited economic liberalization and reversing its stringent focus on ideological purity, leading it to experience rapid economic growth and allowing it to finally reemerge into a leading role on the world stage in the 21st century (Wilson Lewis et.al, 2023).

It was in this tumultuous political environment that shidaiqu emerged. China’s gradual decline on the world stage had spurred many Chinese intellectuals to advocate for the adoption of Western thought in many areas, including culture, believing that those ideas were the key to China’s reclaiming the title of a modern global power. In the aftermath of the Xinhai Revolution, those sentiments culminated in the May 4th Movement. Originating in 1919 through student protests against Western powers unilaterally ceding the province of Shandong to Japan in the Treaty of Versailles, the movement 77

eventually transformed into a nationalist anti-elite movement calling for the rapid transformation of all Chinese culture and society (Encylopaedia Britannica, 2019). At the forefront of the May 4th Movement were musicians who sought to revolutionize and “modernize’’ Chinese popular music. In the Western concession cities of China, particularly Shanghai—which, as cultural crossroads between “East” and “West,” represented the perfect environment for their fusionist endeavors—those artists labored to combine traditional folk music with American jazz and Hollywood film music (“时代曲 (Shidaiqu/Shanghainese jazz),”, 2022). Eventually, they created a new genre, shidaiqu.

Li Jinhui is widely regarded as the first artist and father of this new music, composing pieces such as “毛毛雨” (“Drizzle”) that featured a traditional pentatonic folk melody combined with Western instrumentation, exemplifying the fusion-based nature of the genre (Jones, 2023). In the relative stability of the Nanjing Decade, new imported technologies such as radios and record players allowed for the mass dissemination of shidaiqu.

This newfound popularity led to infrastructure springing up to support the burgeoning art form, such as record companies like Shanghai Pathé Records, and training grounds for new artists like Li Jinhui’s Bright Moon Song and Dance Troupe. Shidaiqu’s ties to Shanghai’s growing film industry also bolstered 78

its influence, with immensely successful movies like 馬路天 使 (Street Angels) featuring soundtracks by notable composers like He Luting and offering promising stars like Zhou Xuan a path to fame in both the film and music worlds (Lun Chun et.al, 2015).

By the early 1940s, shidaiqu had become an integral part of the cultural fabric of China, with famous musicians playing to packed dance halls (NPR, 2014). Yet, political realities, both global and domestic, saw the genre increasingly come under attack as useless. As Dale Wilson states in his review of Andrew F. Jones’ 2001 book, Yellow Music: Media Culture and Colonial Modernity in the Chinese Jazz Age, Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria prompted those in both leftist and rightist circles to consider “urgent [political] issues of the day, such as modernity, gender, class, and a politics of national salvation” in evaluating music (Wilson, 2001). Due to not focusing on any of those issues, and rather on themes of love and beauty, shidaiqu came to be condemned as “yellow,” a color often associated with pornography and decadence in Chinese culture. This criticism was heightened by shidaiqu’s marked contrast with qunzhong yinyue, a form of leftist mass music that was concurrently popular with shidaiqu and was oriented around those political themes (Wilson, 2001).

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During the Second Sino-Japanese War, shidaiqu also became negatively associated with occupying Japanese authorities, as the art form flourished in the city of Shanghai while it was under Japanese rule (Wilson, 2001). All this led the Nanjing KMT government to suppress shidaiqu starting in 1947 as part of a broader nationwide campaign against vice, particularly the cabarets often associated with the music. Though this crackdown was largely successful in most of China, musicians alongside entertainment industry workers in Shanghai protested in a “Dancers’ Uprising,” wuchao, on January 31, 1948—an effort that, alongside other organized resistance, was enough to persuade the Nanjing government to reverse its crackdown (Field, 2010). When the CCP came to power after the Chinese Civil War, they similarly took a stance against shidaiqu and other forms of Westernized and non-revolutionary “bourgeoisie” art, viewing music as “one of the battlegrounds for Mao’s revolutionary ideology” (Parham, 2014). Learning from the mistakes of the KMT government, the CCP initially took a gradual approach towards the eradication of shidaiqu, forming a number of pro-government musicians’ unions to generate support among musicians, and slowly phasing out shidaiqu from radio- and record-based distribution while providing alternative employment to now-jobless industry workers (Jones 80

2006). However, as the CCP became increasingly totalitarian in governance in service of Mao’s individual agenda thousands of artists, such as Li Jinhui, were persecuted, imprisoned, and even executed as part of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and Cultural Revolution in the 1950s and ‘60s. Others, like He Lüting, attempted to cooperate with authorities and met various fates, while some, like Yao Li, fled overseas to Hong Kong and Taiwan, starting new lives and careers there.

The following narratives will explore the experiences of three shidaiqu artists as they reacted to and made courageous decisions in the face of this oppression. Though it is impossible to encompass the stories of all shidaiqu artists in this work, an effort has been made to account for a broad range of experiences through the selection of two composers (Li Jinhui and He Lüting) and one singer (Zhou Xuan), with each individual taking a different response to repression. Those narratives are based on a range of primary and secondary sources, including interviews, newspaper articles, and encyclopedias of musicians.

By presenting those vastly different narratives full of individual agency, it is this paper’s aim to disrupt the linear narrative of “those who comply with oppressive authority get rewarded, while those who do not get persecuted” that is common in academia.

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Narrative One: Li Jinhui (黎锦晖) Young man, the sun has just risen over the hills Young girl, the lotus flowers are starting to show their petals Don’t wait ‘til the flowers are dead and the sun has set behind the hills Aiyoyo! The sun has set behind the hills…

Li Jinhui, “毛毛雨“ (“Drizzle”)

As the “Father of Chinese Contemporary Music and Dance,” Li Jinhui (1891–1967) is widely regarded as the progenitor of shidaiqu and fusion music in China (Jones 73). Between 1927 and 1936, he recorded hundreds of songs for companies like Pathé-EMI, RCA Victor, and Great China, scored fifteen films, and led the nation’s first all-Chinese big band at a Shanghai nightclub. He also started the careers of virtually every shidaiqu artist—including Zhou Xuan and Yao Li—with his Bright Moon Song and Dance Troupe, which dominated the airwaves of Shanghai in the 1920s and ‘30s. Li had a complicated relationship with both the KMT and CCP. On the one hand, Li was a staunch supporter of the May 4th movement who distributed Mandarin Chinese textbooks nationwide to promote the modernization of the Chinese language, an educator who promoted meiyu (aesthetic education) for children by composing many children’s operas and editing China’s first children’s mag82

azine, and a patriot who wrote dozens of nationalistic anthems during the Sino-Japanese War. On the other hand, Li’s work with popular music earned him an unbreakable association with the notion of “yellow music,” and he was constantly denounced by many for his work’s decadence and vulgarity. In contemporary. Mainland China, this complicated perception of Li lives on, with many celebrating his earlier work while denouncing his later shidaiqu creations as the product of a mind corrupted by capitalistic greed (Jones 73).

After China’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War, the 54-year-old Li returned from Chongqing, where he had been living to hide from Japanese forces alongside his third wife and three children, to his adopted home of Shanghai (Yang, 2021). Li had always aligned more to the left politically (despite leftists being some of his strongest critics) and viewed the KMT government as corrupt. As such, when the Communists looked to be winning the Chinese Civil War, he, unlike many of his colleagues, did not flee to Taiwan (Yang, 2021). After Shanghai came under the control of CCP forces in May 1949, he joined the newly-reestablished Shanghai Film Studio (上 海电影制片厂) as a staff member, writing excitedly in a November 1949 letter that the “new China was making him look forward to writing music again, and would lift his once reticent 83

mind out of his slumber” (Yang, Episode 73).

It seemed, however, that the Party was not as enthused about having the prolific composer around. In 1950, as the CCP was starting its program of bangjiao (helping and teaching) aimed at “raising the political awareness of intelligentsia like [Li Jinhui], helping them cleanse their minds and hearts,” a special bangjiao small group was formed in the film studio specifically dedicated to re-educating him (Yang, Episode 73). Over a period of three years, Li was made to repeatedly criticize himself for his earlier failings in creating “yellow music,” and under the direction of the small group, extensively studied socialist dialectic. Outwardly, it seemed that this reeducation was working. At the First Shanghai Cultural General Assembly (上 海第一文大会) in 1950, Li publicly acknowledged the severity of his prior offenses, stating: “I have created a lot of ‘yellow songs.’ The culprit must be dealt with and should be shot. Now that the Party has not punished me, I must ardently study, reform myself, and work to be reborn” (Yang, Episode 74). This statement of guilt, more extreme than most offered by those deemed “cultural offenders,” alongside Li’s seemingly incessant efforts, earned him praise at the Second Shanghai Cultural General Assembly (上海第二文大会) in 1953 from his peers, who acknowledged how far he had come (Yang, Episode 74).

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In his private writings during the time, however, Li often expressed his disagreement with the statements he was making, believing that though some of his work was for capitalistic gain, any personal failings were balanced out by his work to promote the use of Mandarin and to elevate children’s education (Yang, Episode 74). The Li family also lived with relatively meager means during this period, with their primary income coming from Li’s low 115 yuan wage and the intermittent commissions he was able to get whenever political winds allowed him to publish one of the children’s books he provided zhuyin (phonetic transliterations) for (Yang, Episode 75). This meant that the entire family, three children included, shared one bed, and Li did copious amounts of overtime work on a children’s desk. In a reflection of how heavily those circumstances impacted Li, he went with his son every week to countless operas and musicals to “relieve the depression in his heart” (Yang, Episode 73).

In 1956, Li’s fortunes changed for the better. Attending the National Music Week (全国音乐周) in Beijing, he met Premier Zhou Enlai, who he had talked with four or five times during the 1940s in Chongqing. Premier Zhou acknowledged Li “had suffered humiliations, some of which we cannot resolve

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right now,” but thanked him for his work, and asked him if he had any problems (Yang, Episode 74). Always humble, Li replied that he had no problems, but the Premier nevertheless ordered the Shanghai Party Chief to assist. As a result of this intervention, Li saw his wages doubled to 215 yuan, which enabled the family to live much more comfortably (Yang, Episode 75). The beginning of the Hundred Flowers Campaign (百花齐 放) in late 1956, a period of limited press freedom, also empowered Li to express himself more freely. It was then that he authored an editorial, “黎锦晖为抒情歌曲名不平” (“The Reputation of Li Jinhui for Lyrical Songs is Unfair”) in the People’s Daily that sought to clear his name. Li also thought about voicing his support for reviving shidaiqu on the Mainland due to its roots as a form of music for the people, and toyed with the idea of restarting the Bright Moon Song and Dance Troupe. However, after being advised by his wife about the risks of both endeavors, Li ultimately decided against pursuing them. This was a prudent decision, for the Anti-Rightist Movement (反右运动) that started in 1957 saw the punishment of 500,000 individuals who had been vocal during the Hundred Flowers Movement as “rightists,” among which Li certainly would have been included if he had implemented his plans (Yang, Episode 77).

Even though he had not taken full advantage of the 86

Hundred Flowers Movement, Li was still attacked extensively during the Anti-Rightist Movement, with multiple articles in journals like People’s Music (人民音乐) targeting him as the founder of “yellow music” and a documentary released that implicated him in the death of Nie Er, the composer of China’s national anthem. Amidst this intensifying political climate and persistent health problems involving chronically high blood pressure, Li stopped composing nearly entirely, with his last works being a series of children’s operas in 1963 (Yang, Episode 78). In 1966, the sudden start of the Cultural Revolution saw Li Jinhui targeted as a reactionary figure. The People’s Daily, People’s Liberation Army Paper, and Red Flag Magazine jointly published an editorial near the end of the year that criticized him by name as the father of “yellow music” and an associate of Liu Shaoqi, one of Mao Zedong’s chief political enemies. In response, Red Guards quickly occupied the Li family’s house and seized many of Li’s papers, and interrogated him while his children cowered in the corner. He watched, stunned, as many of his coworkers were dragged out of their workplaces and, one by one, subjected to pidou (denunciation by a mob) and compelled to commit suicide (Yang, Episode 80).

This intense climate caused Li’s health to rapidly deteri87

orate: the stress from the Cultural Revolution made him frailer by the day (Xu, 2021). A brutally cold winter, compounded by a city-wide prohibition on the “bourgeoisie” activity of burning coal, was the final nail in his coffin. Li quickly developed pneumonia and started coughing up blood. On February 15, 1967, he passed away at the age of 76 at Shanghai’s Yan’an Hospital, head resting in his wife’s arms (“黎锦晖 (Li Jinhui)”).

“The story of Li’s treatment at the hands of the CCP first reflects the Party’s blinding ideological zeal in its early years” The vitriol against Li did not abate after his death. Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong’s influential wife, personally wrote an article denouncing him in China Musical Research (中国音乐研究 所) as a poisonous influence, and routinely criticized artists for “sounding like Li Jinhui” (Yang, Episode 81). It was only until the late 1970s, with the advent of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up,” that Li’s name was rehabilitated, and he began to

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be commemorated with events like a 1991 scholarly conference marking the centennial of his birth (Yang, Episode 81).

The story of Li’s treatment at the hands of the CCP first reflects the Party’s blinding ideological zeal in its early years.

Many talented individuals with a proven background of wanting to help the Chinese people, like Li with his immense prior dedication to China’s cultural modernization, faced immense political persecution under the CCP that prevented them from using their potential to help the Chinese people. Moreover, Li’s story also reflects the capricious nature of the CCP’s rule during this period, and the huge influence of individual figures on the lives of millions. Li’s fortunes changed essentially at random in line with the incredibly unstable nationwide political climate— increasing during periods of relative liberalization and decreasing during periods of repression—and were often dictated by the whims of powerful figures like Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Jiang Qing. Those two trends of a wastefully ideological and inconstant political system are mirrored in the experiences of the individuals featured in the following narratives.

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Narrative Two: He Lüting (贺绿汀) With autumn comes the fragrance of lotus, and the maiden dreams of her hometown every night.

Waking up, she can’t see the faces of her parents, Only the moonlight in front of her window.

He Lüting, “四季歌“ (“Song of the Four Seasons”)

Between the 1930s and 1980s, He Lüting (1903–1999) was a perennial presence on the Chinese music scene. He composed 260 songs, including many revolutionary mass anthems for which he is most well-known today, wrote multiple definitive books on music theory like My Thoughts on the Revolution of Show Music (我对戏曲音乐改革的意见), and was the first Director of the Shanghai Conservatory of Music, serving from 1949 to 1984 (“贺绿汀 (He Lüting),”). From 1934 to 1937, he composed a number of shidaiqu standards while scoring music for Shanghai’s burgeoning leftist movie scene, creating classics like “四季歌“ (“Song of the Four Seasons”) with artists like Zhou Xuan. A devoted leftist who had joined the Communist Party in 1926, He Lüting nevertheless voiced his criticisms of many of Mao’s policies towards culture in the 1950s and ‘60s.

It was this outspoken nature, in addition to his prior involvement with shidaiqu, that saw him and his family subjected to persecution during the Cultural Revolution. After being impris90

oned from 1968 to 1973, He Lüting was freed on the personal command of Mao Zedong, and took up his post as the Director of the Shanghai Conservatory again from 1979 to 1984 before retiring. He passed away in Shanghai in 1999, at the age of 96 (“贺绿汀 (He Lüting),”).

The years following the founding of the PRC were prosperous ones for He Lüting. He was named the Director of the Shanghai Conservatory, his alma mater, in 1949, and in that position wrote many of his seminal books on music theory (红 网 (Red Net)). In 1956 and 1957, however, during the height of the Hundred Flowers Movement, He used the brief period of press freedom to issue several critiques of the government, arguing in several People’s Daily editorials that, though he ideologically aligned with the CCP, its restrictions on musicians were stifling innovation and China’s cultural growth. With the advent of the Anti-Rightist Movement and its crackdown on those who had been vocal in the Hundred Flowers Movement, He Lüting, though not officially labeled a “rightist” due to his track record of devotion to the CCP, nevertheless was in political hot water (Ye Yonglie, 2021).

He Lüting’s tendency to speak out against the government would manifest itself again during the Cultural Revolution, this time with more severe consequences. Two of the 91

main victims of the Revolution were educators and artists, and as the president of a music university, Li was a natural target.

On June 8, 1966, a month after the start of the Revolution, He Lüting was eating breakfast while listening to the news program of Shanghai’s People Radio Station (上海人民广播电台) (Yonglie). Suddenly, he heard an announcement about himself: that “today, the Liberation Daily (解放日报) and Cultural Forum Magazine (文汇报) would simultaneously be issuing an important full-page article: “Uncovering the Anti-Party, Anti-Socialist Agent He Lüting.” Infuriated by this attack, he published a response, “My First Big-Character Poster,” in both papers’ Criticism Column that satirized the ideological zeal of his critics as naïve—a move that inflamed criticism of him and expanded the ranks of his critics from just the Conservatory to the entire city. Soon, he was brought before his very own Conservatory for a pidou dahui (criticism meeting), during which he was made to kneel on the floor in silence for several hours (Yonglie). Then, on September 16, 1966, a group of Red Guards kidnapped both him and his wife, Jiang Ruizhi, and brought them to the Conservatory. There, both He Lüting and his wife were “beaten with a belt until his clothes were torn and mixed with blood,” and they were both tortured for an entire night. Their home was also ransacked, with the belongings 92

“smashed to pieces” (专记一：’文化大革命’中的上海红卫兵 运动).

Despite these bloody acts, He Lüting remained defiant, issuing a combined total of more than 50 statements totaling more than 200,000 words in response to mounting criticism of him (Yonglie). Eventually, his critics decided that he would need to be brought down even more harshly, and so arranged a televised denunciation of him on March 13, 1968. It was here that He Lüting had his most courageous moment. In front of a nationwide audience, the following dialogue occurred: He Lüting’s revolutionary critic: “He Lüting, tell me, did you say that you were beaten by the Japanese in the past, then by the Kuomintang, and now by the Red Guards?”

He Lüting: “Before this conference, were the Red Guards not beating me?”

Critic: “He Lüting, tell me, was it not you who said, ‘I won’t give in?’”

He Lüting: “I’ve said that, said that many times!”

Critic: “Resistance to the end will only lead to death!”

He Lüting: “Well! Then, before I die, I have two requests! First, to complete my seven orchestral pieces; second, I want to clarify the facts and refute all charges against me!” (Yonglie).

After this point, fearing that the sheer defiance He Lüting exhibited would stoke similar acts of public defiance by 93

other artists, the broadcasters televising this denunciation cut the transmission. He was almost immediately arrested after this point as a “current counter-revolutionary,” and all his relatives were interrogated for being part of the “He Lüting Counter-Revolutionary Group” (Yonglie). His second daughter, He Xiaoqiu, was questioned as a gugan, “core supporter,” of He’s activities on April 4, 1968, and responded to her interrogators, “In regard to the Cultural Revolution, I can’t figure it out!

Nor do I want to figure it out!” (Yonglie). Two days later, she died from suicide via her gas stove. At the start of his imprisonment, He Lüting’s critics held a second televised denunciation for him on April 25, during which he was similarly defiant, at one point wrestling for the microphone with his critics. He Lüting was imprisoned for nearly five years.

On January 24, 1973, his wife Jiang Ruizhi received a knock on the door and a terse message to immediately report to the Shanghai Conservatory. Fearing the worst, Jiang hurriedly went with her copy of Mao’s book of quotes, the Little Red Book, preparing to defend herself against interrogation.

However, she instead received the following message from an official: “We’ve decided to release He Lüting because his record has been proven clean—but make no mistake, he must continue repenting for his crimes” (Yonglie). It turned out that 94

He Lüting’s third brother, He Peizhen, a vice mayor of Guiyang who had been classmates with Mao Zedong at the same teacher’s college in Hunan, had paid a visit to Beijing to ask for He Lüting’s release. Though He Peizhen never met personally with Mao and instead with a number of officials delegated to meet with him, Mao had gotten wind of He Lüting’s plight, and tersely ordered: “Stop fixing up He Lüting!” (Yonglie).

“His story also contains many powerful moments of courageous agency, showing how in the face of the CCP’s brutal repression, many individuals refused to passively be victims, but instead bravely voiced their dissent—a narrative that is frequently overlooked in historiography of the Cultural Revolution.”

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The very next night, He returned home, “in a threadbare shirt with an anxious and concerned expression on his face.”

(Yonglie). After embracing his family, he asked where his second daughter was. His youngest daughter told him that she was in a dance troupe in Guilin, lying to spare her father more pain. Though He Lüting would be spared more persecution for the rest of the Cultural Revolution, he would not be reinstated to his post as the Shanghai Conservatory’s director until 1979, following the death of Mao Zedong and the beginning of China’s era of “reform and opening up.” He would retire from his post in 1984, from politics in 1988, and would pass away from untreated pneumonia in Shanghai in 1999.

He Lüting’s brutal treatment by the Communist Party reflects many of the same themes as Li Jinhui’s story: that of shortsighted ideological zeal ruining the potential of a talented individual who had done much for the CCP and Chinese people, and powerful leaders being able to capriciously toy with individuals’ fates. However, his story also contains many powerful moments of courageous agency, showing how in the face of the CCP’s brutal repression, many individuals refused to passively be victims, but instead bravely voiced their dissent—a 96

narrative that is frequently overlooked in historiography of the Cultural Revolution.

Narrative Three: Zhou Xuan (周璇) Nicknamed “The Golden Voice” for her smooth vocals, Zhou Xuan (1920–57) was undoubtedly the biggest star of Shanghai’s shidaiqu era. Emerging out of a troubled childhood that saw her adopted by three different families and nearly sold into prostitution, Zhou joined Li Jinhui’s Bright Moon Song and Dance Troupe in 1931 with the dream of a better life. Over the next two decades, she would dominate the airwaves and screens of China, with hits like “The Winds of May” propelling her to fame and starring roles in films like 1937’s Road Angel ( 马路天使) leading the Shanghai Daily to crown her the “Queen of Film” in 1941. In 1946, she left Mainland China for Hong Kong, where she starred in many movies and released “Night Time in Shanghai”, the most popular song of the shidaiqu era.

In 1950, she returned to Shanghai. To this day, Zhou remains a figure in Mainland China’s popular consciousness, with three separate TV shows—in 1989, 2004, and 2010—portraying her life and work. However, in a reflection of her troubled background, Zhou’s personal life was extremely turbulent, having married in 1938 before divorcing just three years later, and then 97

having two children from two affairs with men who defrauded and took advantage of her. It was this stress, in addition to the intense political climate of 1950s China, that led Zhou to be committed to a mental asylum in 1953, where she died in 1957. The exact circumstances of her death remain an enigma, but many suspect that the CCP was involved, using foul play in an attempt to seize her great wealth.

When the CCP won the Chinese Civil War, Zhou Xuan was still living in Hong Kong, having left the Mainland for the then-British territory in 1946. There are no readily available records of Zhou Xuan’s political leanings, but she was likely not a Communist, never registering as a member of the party and clinging onto her great wealth from her prior films and songs even after the peak of their popularity. Nor was she a KMT sympathizer, having broken up with her prior husband in part due to his KMT friends threatening her with accusations (Leyda, 1972). Regardless of her political leanings, she was content enough with the idea of a Communist China to return to her home of Shanghai in 1950, motivated by a desire to be with her adoptive mother, Ye Fengzhu, with whom she lived until her death in a condo complex, Brookside Apartments, home to many of China’s cultural elite.

During this time, Zhou had a turbulent affair. She had 98

previously married Yan Hua, a composer, in 1938, but divorced him just three years later as both thought the other was engaging in an affair. In Hong Kong, she met the silk merchant Zhu Huaide, with whom she lived for a year before moving back to Shanghai with him, pregnant with his child. Accused by the general public of seducing Zhou Xuan and then defrauding her, Zhu almost immediately published a newspaper editorial upon reaching Shanghai that publicly disavowed their relationship. Zhou would still give birth to her baby, however, naming him Zhou Min. The first signs of Zhou’s mental issues appear around this time. Zhou Xuan begins her 1951 diary, published in 2003 by one of her sons, Zhou Min, with a statement of her condition: “I have contracted a mental illness”. Throughout 1951, she received both inpatient and outpatient treatment for her mental state at Hongqiao Hospital.

Zhou Xuan’s condition only worsened with time. In a letter to lyricist Li Houcheng, who had remained in Hong Kong, Zhou Xuan wrote: “Recently, because I sang on the radio, I’ve been criticized in the press—there are factions in every environment, and I don’t know what I’ll do for future films… I feel that my will is uncertain, and my heart is too straight, so I hurt myself. I have suffered much to this day” (Xi, 2015). Zhou’s statement suppression reveals just how 99

suffocated she felt under the CCP’s suppression, a naïve singer struggling to navigate a cutthroat political environment. Zhou’s condition was also worsened by a second affair that she had.

In 1951, she fell in love with an art teacher, Tang Di, and was preparing to marry him. Zhou also gave birth to a son from this affair, Zhou Wei. However, a mere eighteen days before the ceremony was scheduled on October 12, 1952, Tang Di was arrested on charges of seduction and fraud and sentenced to three years of jail (Xi, 2015). Those charges were in some way valid, reflecting criticism of the relationship as inappropriate given Zhou’s mental state and accompanying inability to consent. However, this abrupt arrest could have been part of a conspiracy targeting Zhou Xuan’s mental health: some sources allege that Tang was indicted by an inner party member who claimed Tang was a hidden counter-revolutionary, and who wanted to ruin Zhou’s mental health to claim her wealth. At the time, Zhou had roughly 400,000 yuan, equivalent to having 3.2 million USD in the United States in 2024 (University of Pennsylvania, US BLS), all from lucrative deals like a bar of gold for every episode as the lead actress in The Secret History of the Qing Dynasty, making her a tantalizing target (Xi, 2015).

Another theory for why this happened is that the CCP wanted to destroy any artists who could potentially pose a political 100

threat to its rule and could have included Zhou Xuan under this umbrella. At the time, Mao Zedong was urging cultural campaigns against ‘yellow music,’ and specifically targeted The Secret History of Qing Dynasty—a TV show which Zhou Xuan had played a central role in (Xi, 2015).

Whatever the government’s motives were in arresting Tang, Zhou Xuan’s mental health certainly declined rapidly after this point, being described as “having lost awareness of basic things”. She was essentially confined to the hospital for the last four and a half years of her life. During this time, she received well wishes—letters, souvenirs, medicines—from her many admirers, both in China and around the world (Xi). However, in the months before she died, she wrote an open letter in a newspaper stating: “My illness has been cured, and I’ll soon leave the hospital and begin work again.” The Central Studio of News Reels Production also published a newsreel nationwide that showed her singing and playing basketball: everything seemed to be going in the right direction (Xi). She even met her birth mother for the first time. This recovery abruptly ended: throughout September, her condition rapidly deteriorated, and on September 22, 1957, Zhou Xuan was officially pronounced dead from encephalitis following a nervous breakdown. The causes of Zhou’s death remain a topic of heavy speculation in 101

China. A common theory is that the CCP was again involved for the same reasons as their earlier arrest of Tang Di. As Johnathan Stock wrote in a 1995 article profiling Zhou Xuan, “her death coincided with Mao Zedong’s Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957, which dealt severely both with critics of the new regime and those whose pre-revolutionary connections made them ideal scapegoats” (Stock, 1995). In a 2003 interview, Zhou Xuan’s second son, Zhou Wei, lists seven reasons explaining why he suspected foul play, including that Zhou’s medical records were arbitrarily destroyed, that her doctors refused to use ice packs to reduce her fever, that she was forced to take tranquilizers, and that she was barred from communicating with the outside world and received a name change while in the asylum. Regardless of if the CCP was involved, Zhou received a lavish funeral from the party, with many important dignitaries in attendance. The government also seized most of her wealth, leaving her two sons both destitute (Xi).

Zhou Xuan’s treatment at the hands of the CCP adds another dimension to the stories of shidaiqu artists on the Mainland. Not only did the CCP attempt to stifle individuals who it had a historical grievance against (Li Jinhui) or who were actively outspoken against it (He Lüting), but it also targeted artists without cause, seeking to obtain their money or stifle any 102

potential for future dissent. It did so both in the heavy-handed ways it targeted Li Jinhui or He Lüting and through subtle means: destroying Zhou’s relationship to ruin her mental health and tampering with her medical treatment to cause her eventual death. In many ways, Zhou’s story most vividly illustrates the viciousness of the early Communist state.

Conclusion The experiences of these three famous luminaries under the Chinese Communist Party’s rule from 1949 to 1978 accurately reflect the uniformly grim yet nevertheless diverging fates of most shidaiqu artists during that period. All three of those artists were repressed by the regime, with their artistic livelihoods, their freedoms, and, in two cases, their lives taken away from them—reflecting the brutal attitude of the Party towards non-revolutionary artists. Yet, because of differences in their willingness to collaborate with the CCP, their political stature, and personal circumstances, these three artists’ fates significantly diverge, demonstrating the reality that no two artists had identical stories. Li Jinhui, because of his prominent status as the founder of ‘yellow music’ and therefore an unmistakable class enemy, was never given the chance to reha-

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bilitate himself with the CCP, and would have almost certainly met a grisly end in the Cultural Revolution had he been alive at its apex. Empowered by his high standing as the Shanghai Conservatory’s director and outspoken nature, He Lüting was able to courageously voice his opposition to the Cultural Revolution in front of a nationwide audience, though it was those same factors that subjected him and his family to constant harsh interrogation and imprisonment. His prior revolutionary credentials, however, were what prevented this punishment from being even harsher than it was. Finally, though she was relatively apolitical, Zhou Xuan’s mental vulnerability enabled the CCP to cause her early death, incentivized by the possibility of seizing her immense wealth—though her broad popularity forced the Party to do so discreetly.

By presenting those vastly different narratives, it has been this paper’s aim to complexify the narrative of shidaiqu’s demise in Shanghai, demonstrating the range of methods—from insidiously hidden to outright brutal—used to suppress artists, emphasizing the outsized role individual leaders played in the fates of many artists, and highlighting moments of individual agency and courageous resistance. Most accounts of shidaiqu musicians in Western academia simply reduce those artists to the indifferent subjects of the Chinese government’s actions.

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Though it offers an excellent chronicle of Li Jinhui’s musical accomplishments, Andrew F. Jones’ 2001 book, Yellow Music: Media Culture and Colonial Modernity in the Chinese Jazz Age, presents an example of such reductionist tendencies in its description of Li Jinhui’s eventual fate. Jones simply states, “Li died in 1967 at the height of the Cultural Revolution, a victim of political persecution,” boiling down an intricate tale to one sentence without offering any additional information about Li’s complex relationship with the Party, the Party’s motivations in targeting him specifically, how he was persecuted, and how he reacted to this persecution (Jones 74). Similarly, though it offers a masterful analysis of how He Lüting’s philosophy of music interacted with politics, Barbara Mittler’s 1997 Dangerous Tunes: The Politics of Chinese Music in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the People’s Republic of China Since 1949 presents very little information about He Lüting’s personal relationship with Chinese politics. The only information in that realm given throughout a book that mentions He Lüting 16 times is when Mittler states in a footnote that “in 1973, the political climate relaxed and allowed for the rehabilitation of several musicians: He Lüting and Liu Shikun were both allowed to reappear,” without explaining why the political climate relaxed or why He Lüting specifically was allowed to reappear (Mittler 139).

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It is undoubtedly true that both those works were published in the late 1990s and early 2000s, in an era where information about composers’ lives was not yet digitized or openly available and therefore hard to access for Western scholars. But in the past decade, virtually no scholarship has emerged that addresses the fates of shidaiqu artists with any complexity, with new works still using reductionist and linear narratives. This can most likely be attributed to the interest in shidaiqu coming from an ethnomusicological perspective: academics are only interested in the lives of artists insofar as those experiences can potentially influence their production of music, and given that most shidaiqu artists stopped producing music after 1949, the lives of those artists after that point is not viewed as relevant.

This paper aims to bridge that gap by providing, for the first time in Western academia, a comprehensive, complex account of the experiences of shidaiqu musicians after the 1950s.

The narratives presented in this paper offer meaningful conclusions for not only the field of shidaiqu studies, but also for the broader study of all victims of the Chinese Communist Party’s actions. During its initial period of ideological rule from 1949 to 1978, the CCP’s treatment of dissidents and all other possible opponents—capitalists, the intelligentsia, those with feudal backgrounds—was as capricious and as driven by the 106

decisions of individual leaders as its suppression of shidaiqu musicians. In determining its actions towards those individuals, the Communist government used similar factors as the ones it used to judge the fates of the three artists in this paper: physical and mental states, prior loyalties to the Party, popular opinion, and sheer pragmatism. And many individuals chose to respond to those oppressive acts not with meek acceptance, but instead with brave action. Applying the conclusions from this paper towards this wider scope of all those suppressed in the CCP’s initial years will allow the field to shift away from its current status quo of portraying all who suffered as passive recipients of the same brand of brutality, and towards recognizing the complex range of stories present amongst victims and promoting instances of courageous defiance within those stories.

This paper opens up several possible pathways for future exploration, each with their own rich possibilities. First, there are still many artists in the realm of shidaiqu whose stories are immensely interesting but are still yet to be told.

Those include those like Yao Li, who fled abroad in the face of persecution, and the other five of China’s “Seven Great Singing Stars”; regime-friendly composers who largely escaped criticism like Ni Er; and Mao Zedong’s personal band, the Cultural Works Troupe, which often performed shidaiqu and other jazz 107

standards at his parties (Li Zhishui). Second, there are other artforms whose practitioners were similarly oppressed and deserve to have their stories told: non-socialist visual artists, poets, dancers, and many more. Finally, there are countless possibilities for comparative studies: comparing the outcomes for artists with other types of cultural workers (publishers, critics, etc.), or contrasting the treatment of artists in China with those in other totalitarian regimes, like the USSR and Nazi Germany.

This paper will hopefully open up avenues for the exploration of those and other prescient subjects, and push studies of shidaiqu—a supremely unique artform—towards the direction of greater complexity.

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Glossary shidaiqu (时代曲)

qunzhong yinyue (群众音乐)

wuchao (舞潮）

Hundred Flowers’ Movement (百花齐放)

A Chinese term with two meanings: 1) any sort of Western-inspired popular music, 2) a specific style of popular music originating in the city of Shanghai in the 1920s, characterized by the fusion of jazz and traditional rhythms and instrumentation, usually accompanied by a singer. This paper primarily focuses on the latter.

A Chinese adaptation of a Stalinist term, meaning people’s mass music—the idea that music should be used as a tool for capturing the collective (revolutionary) sentiments of the people. Used extensively by Andrew F. Jones in his definitive book, Yellow Music: Media Culture and Colonial Modernity in the Chinese Jazz Age. The Dancers’ Uprising of 1948, in which thousands of Shanghainese cabaret dancers and those associated with the industry (including musicians) rose up in response to the then-KMT government’s prohibition on cabarets.

A brief period of liberalization in China from 19561957, in which press freedom was temporarily relaxed and individuals were encouraged by Mao Zedong to ‘let a hundred flowers bloom:’ to offer the state helpful advice on its policies. Quickly ended once the state lost control of the criticisms that were being levied.

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Anti-Rightist A movement starting in 1957 that saw 500,000 Movement Chinese individuals labeled as ‘rightists:’ intellec(反右运动) tuals and party members who had been too vocal in the Hundred Flowers Movement against the government. Those individuals were imprisoned, exiled to the countryside, subjected to forced labor, and more.

Cultural RevA movement lasting from 1966-1978, started by olution Mao Zedong in an attempt to regain political power (文化大革命) after the faliure of his Great Leap Forward. Saw the mass mobilization of Chinese society to tackle ideas and people viewed as feudal or bourgeosie, including the intelligentsia and Western-associated culture. Individuals were put on trial, publicly denounced (pidou), sent to the countryside, or summarily arrested, tortured, and executed.

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A Stable Status Quo: Finding a Solution to the China-Taiwan Conflict Alex Yang

In her New York Times opinion piece, “In Taiwan, Friends Are Starting to Turn Against Each Other,” former Taiwan Cultural Minister Yingtai Lung explores the different viewpoints of Taiwanese citizens on the longstanding Taiwan-China conflict and weighs the likelihood of impending war between the two states (Lung, 2023). The article ultimately underscores the importance of sustaining the current status quo surrounding Taiwan through pragmatism to sustain peace and avoid the devastating consequences of military conflict. Yingtai also raises several fundamental questions in this piece: Should Taiwan embrace complete separation from China or foster closer relations? What is the right approach to defusing a conflict that seems, at times, to be imminently on the verge of exploding into war?

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The conflict between Taiwan and China began nearly a century ago when the Qing dynasty was overthrown and China entered a volatile and insecure phase of its history. From 1912 until 1949, the Kuomintang Party (KMT), historically referred to as the Chinese Nationalist Party, ruled China. Under its leadership, extreme poverty and corruption marred the country, facilitating the rise of communist ideals that would, in theory, eliminate the different social classes (Constitutional Rights Foundation, 2016). This instability culminated in the birth of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by Mao Zedong. Beginning armed conflict against each other in 1927, the KMT and the CCP paused tensions and created a united front against the Japanese invaders during World War II. This unity was short-lived, as after World War II, the Communists and the Nationalists restarted their civil war. After years of bloody fighting, the conflict eventually ended in 1949, with the CCP taking over China and the KMT fleeing to Taiwan.

After the Chinese Civil War ended, the KMT ruled Taiwan under martial law. Two crises erupted in the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s – both involving the Communist army attacking the Taiwanese islands of Kinmen and Matsu with the hope of using them as bases to take over Taiwan. With the help of the United States, however, Taiwan successfully repelled this invasion (Sheng,

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2008). Since these crises in the 1950s, a status quo has emerged between China and Taiwan in the eyes of outside observers, where Taiwan is viewed as neither apart from nor independent from China. In 1992, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) met to establish cross-strait relations. The two states forged an agreement stating that only one China existed but that both sides held different interpretations of what constituted China. Even though the PRC and the ROC both claim Taiwan and mainland China as part of their territory, the status quo, as defined in the 1992 consensus, makes it politically ambiguous whether Taiwan is a part of China (Maizland, 2023). This ambiguity has led to differing interpretations of the situation from both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

“Since these crises in the 1950s, a status quo has emerged between China and Taiwan in the eyes of outside observers, where Taiwan is viewed as neither apart from nor independent from China” 125

From the CCP perspective, Taiwan is a breakaway region that will be properly reunited with China in the future.

In China’s eyes, Taiwan is bound by the One China principle, which expresses the belief that the PRC represents all of China, including Taiwan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2022). Other countries have largely abided by this view of China that Taiwan be considered part of Mainland China. As a result, Taiwan has not been accepted as a member nation in the United Nations and other international bodies. China currently adheres to the One China principle to such an extent that its government aggressively pressures other countries to cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan. As a result, only 12 countries in the world maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Since China views Taiwan as a region that will be reintegrated, the CCP has also engaged in subtle tactics to expedite the reintegration without the use of military intervention. The PRC attempts to lure Taiwanese businesspeople back to the mainland to further foster economic and social integration between the two systems and to gain political leverage (Keng, 2010). This strategy reflects China’s hope to fuse the economies of the two countries. For example, Taiwan is the main source of the world’s semiconductors.

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Since the operations of many of the world’s biggest technology companies, such as Apple, Amazon, and Google, heavily rely on the production of semiconductors, this is the “crown jewel” of the island. China, therefore, would like to have control over this market. Contrary to what may be the main narrative for many Western observers of the conflict, economic growth and fusion – rather than political and military advantages and domination – are the main reasons for China’s interests in claiming Taiwan (Pemple, 2022).

Nevertheless, China has not hesitated to demonstrate its willingness to employ military maneuvers to secure what it believes is rightfully Chinese territory.

“Contrary to what may be the main narrative for many Western observers of the conflict, economic growth and fusion – rather than political and military advantages and domination – are the main reasons for China’s interests in claiming Taiwan” 127

Taiwan’s perspective of the conflict varies more than China’s and reflects its democratic institutions in which various political viewpoints are allowed expression. In 1987, martial law was lifted, initiating a democracy on the Island. Since, the island’s views on relations with China have drastically changed depending on the party in power. Currently, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) controls the government and favors little to no relations with China. The current DPP president of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen, reinforces her party’s position in her speeches and policies. However, in previous years, the KMT has argued for closer relations with Mainland China and subscribes to the One China Principle more than the DPP (Keegan, 2022). Strikingly, the KMT led talks with China to establish the 1992 consensus; despite the long standing status quo, the DPP has never endorsed this agreement.

Taiwan-China relations thus heavily depend on the party currently in power in the Taiwanese democracy.

Regardless of which of Taiwan’s political parties is in power, the country’s desire for autonomy and the continuation of its identity as a liberal democracy is shaped by the intimidation it has withstood from China and China’s successful territorial takeovers. China has frequently conducted military exercises to intimidate Taiwan, such as flying missiles over the country’s airspace or 128

encroaching their air or naval space with warplanes or ships. A notable example of this belligerence occurred in the summer of 2022 when United States House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, when China subsequently launched missiles over the island and deployed fighter jets to aggressively circle Taiwanese airspace. Such acts of escalation have influenced how Taiwanese citizens view China. In recent years, there has been a growing cultural sentiment among Taiwanese people that they feel more Taiwanese than Chinese. According to a survey by National Chengchi University, nearly 61% of the people in Taiwan believe themselves exclusively Taiwanese, while the number of people considering themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese has been declining over the last ten years (Brown, 2023). With this growing sense of cultural distance from Mainland China, there has been growing resistance to China’s reunification proposal.

Considering both China’s and Taiwan’s perspectives on this issue makes it clear that maintaining the 1992 status quo is the best solution to ensure sustainable peace between the two states.

China benefits from the ambiguous agreement because Taiwan’s lack of international recognition allows China to foster economic and social ties with the global community without undermining its legitimacy. Taiwan continues to reap the economic benefits and de

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facto political independence in adhering to the KMT-CCP agreement. Two possible outcomes could ensue if the status quo is not maintained. First, China could invade Taiwan of its own volition.

Second, Taiwan could declare full independence, leading to the same outcome as a Chinese invasion (Leng, 2022). War on the Taiwan Strait would create massive problems for the global economy. Moreover, if the status quo were to be disrupted and China were to invade Taiwan, it would endanger millions of lives across East Asia. However, for China, the key aspect of the invasion is the economic impact that this conflict would have, especially since the CCP has a history of human rights violations.

Taiwan’s importance to the global economy is largely due to the semiconductor chips that theTaiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSM) builds. TSM supplies most of the world’s best semiconductors, which are subsequently used to build many of the smart devices used today, making up around 15% of Taiwan’s GDP. An invasion by China could cause this company to either fall into the hands of China or have its facilities destroyed.

Neither outcome bodes well for the global economy. The surrender of a globally significant company to the CCP, a party that practices a restrictive philosophy toward internet use via censorship, would give China vast leverage over the global economy. Meanwhile,

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the company’s surrender would cause massive supply chain issues worldwide. Since Taiwan is also one of the PRC’s biggest trade partners, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would only hurt China’s own economy. Thus, if the CCP’s goal is ultimately to take over Taiwan, war would not be the best means of doing so, undercutting claims that a Chinese military invasion is imminent.

“The idea that a Chinese military takeover of Taiwan is inevitable stems from a mistaken belief held by many Western countries and commentators: that the status quo must be broken because this invasion is inevitable and the current state of affairs is leading inexorably toward war” As Yingtai argues in her opinion piece, cultivating closer relations with China, as opposed to keeping China at arm’s length, is the best way to ensure peace and improve the status quo to a more manageable, less threatening level. One method of securing 131

these closer relations is for Taiwan to promote more economic ties with the mainland. Reciprocal trade relations would allow for continued economic growth on both sides of the strait, and this combined growth would work to de-escalate the military conflict that has risen in recent years. The idea that a Chinese military takeover of Taiwan is inevitable stems from a mistaken belief held by many Western countries and commentators: that the status quo must be broken because this invasion is inevitable and the current state of affairs is leading inexorably toward war. These commentators point to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year as a model that China hopes to follow with Taiwan. However, a careful look at the situation reveals the improbability that such an invasion will take place: the economic costs are far too severe for China and better economic opportunities could be accomplished by seeking peaceful economic unification rather than brute military domination (Pemple, 2022). In addition, these commentators ignore the fact that China would be further wary of attempting an invasion because doing so would invite severe punishment from the United States and other major powers in the form of either crippling sanctions or military assistance to Taiwan. The prospect of this punishment acts as a major deterring factor for China.

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Many Western commentators have also stated that the status quo cannot be maintained because of the contentious events of the last decade in East Asia, from Nancy Pelosi and other major US political leaders visiting Taiwan to China’s takeover of Hong Kong and its stifling of dissent and free speech in that territory. However, this perspective only takes the short-term view.

These contentious events have occurred under Tsai Ing-Wen’s leadership and her DPP administration. With Tsai’s Presidency coming to a close in 2024 and President-elect Lai Ching-te promising to prioritize maintaining the status quo, there is a possibility that a more conciliatory administration will replace hers after 2024, leading to the necessary maintenance of the current situation, which has threatened to collapse in recent years.

In conflicts like the one between Taiwan and China, where there appears at first to be a clear aggressor and a clear victim, mainstream observers from the West – as well as politically engaged citizens within the two states – view the conflict in very black and white terms. They want to see their side ‘win.’ However, such a viewpoint too often misses the real motivations of the central participants in the conflict and the long-term historical background that informs it. As Yingtai points out in her New York Times opinion piece, pragmatic solutions, as opposed to the pas-

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sions of ideology, are often the best course of action when dealing with an international conflict (Lung, 2023). In international disputes that have simmered for decades, the more realistic and practical solution is not for one side to defeat the other, but rather for the status quo to continue and for the simmering to continue indefinitely. This careful maintenance of the status quo would satisfy few people but would preserve a necessary measure of peace.

Mild dissatisfaction on both sides is preferable to a one-sided satisfaction that comes at the cost of bloodshed and destruction.

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Op-Eds

Chaos in ECOWAS and Regionalism’s Regression: America’s Role Wyatt Dayhoff

The Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS, was founded in 1975 to advance economic integration across fifteen West African states as they struggled to cope with skyrocketing debt and the enduring legacy of colonialism. When civil wars and political instability hampered its efforts, the organization pivoted to facilitate peace and security in the region. Since then, it has helped end numerous political crises, playing a large role in the region’s complete democratic stability from 2015-2020, and has been hailed as the most successful model of regional governance in Africa.

Then, on January 28th, 2024, three of its founding members declared their resignation from the bloc, sending shockwaves through the organization and the continent as a whole. Burkina

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Faso, Mali, and Niger, all engulfed by coups since 2020, blamed the organization for kowtowing to foreign powers and betraying the roots of the organization.

Why did they leave? All members of the new “Alliance of Sahel States” (AES) had been facing scrutiny, both verbal and economic, of their junta-led regimes from ECOWAS and Western powers prior to their secession. Mali, for example, was slapped with sanctions by the bloc while it endeavored to recover from COVID- and Ukraine-induced shocks, causing devastating inflation and price hikes for basic commodities. These sanctions, in tandem with an apparent failure to prevent terrorism, turned public sentiment against ECOWAS, which is now seen by many as a puppet of the West. The Alliance’s grievances, then, are not surprising, and ECOWAS was unable to negotiate a return to democracy as it had previously done so well. This followed multiple failures to intervene when other West African leaders (Ouattara in Cote D’Ivoire and Conde in Ghana) used manipulative tactics to receive extra terms.

Even before this landmark event, experts noted that ECOWAS was at a crossroads. Divided and discombobulated, the bloc was hemorrhaging authority and legitimacy. Now, its raison d’etre teeters on the brink: outside of its confines, the organization cannot 144

hope to even attempt to restore democracy to the three nations, much less facilitate trade. The AES will likely suffer, too; on February 19, Niger defaulted up to $520 million in debt, and without access to regional markets the nation will plunge even deeper into economic strife. Sahelian border closures will recreate the very problems that ECOWAS was formed to solve. ECOWAS lifted existing sanctions on February 25th to account for the default, but it still remains unable to provide broader support given Niger’s lack of membership.

The future paints a grim picture for the West African region, reflecting larger concerns about regionalism in developing nations. ASEAN, arguably the most influential regional bloc, was fractured by Myanmar’s 2022 coup and remains paralyzed. Regionalism and multilateralism, concepts that showed such promise in the 2010s, now lay tattered after COVID’s enormous economic and political impact. Instead, neo-Cold War thinking has surged, with countries joining either the Chinese or the Western camp.

While China and the United States are working together to create a debt relief package for emerging markets, bandwagoning with one party or the other has become the norm, making aid and support contingent on politics.

The world can ill afford a continuation of this trend. De145

mocracy has declined precipitously in recent years and remains shaky, economic growth has stagnated in many countries, and global income inequality is at the same levels as the early 20th century. In other words, developing nations are not developing, and the lack of a regionally based framework for cooperation and resistance to outside pressures certainly adds to the strain.

While the states of ECOWAS must work better in tandem, the United States has also been complicit in such stagnation, repeatedly burying coalition-led plans in the United Nations and imposing neoliberal economic deregulation that has lowered living standards. In pursuing its own economic interests, America has often neglected the needs of others, and without a profound shift in how it approaches developing nations, it will continue to draw the ire of those it tries to court.

American partnership, not peonage, is needed. Otherwise, organizations like ECOWAS will continue to falter under adversity because positions taken become attached to big brother. Given its size, it is difficult for America to not loom large and lurk in the back of decision-making. That said, acknowledging that intervention has and continues to fail is needed for American policymakers to help actualize a more inclusive future that benefits both American and its partners.

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Until then, we can only hope that the trust destroyed during the pandemic can be reignited going forward. West Africa has come a long way already, and effective institutions, if maintained, could secure the livelihoods of some of the youngest, fastest-growing populations in the world.

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Bibliography Carothers, Thomas. “Is the Global Tide Turning in Favor of Democracy? - Carnegie ...” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 May 2023, carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/30/is-global-tide-turning-in-favor-of-democracy-pub-89838.

Ferdjani, Hannane. “Economic Hardship, Insecurity Spike in Mali as Ecowas Exit Looms.” Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 9 Feb. 2024, www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/2/8/economic-hardship-insecurity-spirals-in-mali-as-ecowas-exit-looms.

Grossman, Derek. “With ASEAN Paralyzed, Southeast Asia Seeks New Security Ties.” Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, 15 Sept. 2023, foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/15/southeast-asia-asean-china-us-security-geopolitics-south-china-sea-alliances/.

Martin, Eric, and Shawn Donnan. “US, China Exploring New Debt Relief Options to Avoid Emerging-Market Defaults.” Bloomberg.

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Com, Bloomberg, 22 Feb. 2024, www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2024-02-22/us-china-exploring-new-debt-relief-optionsto-avoid-emerging-market-defaults?cmpid=BBD022324_politics&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&utm_term=240223&utm_campaign=bop.

Mhaka, Tafi. “ECOWAS Is Undoubtedly in Trouble, but It Still Has Potential.” Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 27 Sept. 2023, www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/9/27/ecowas-is-undoubtedly-in-troublebut-it-still-has-potential.

“Niger Misses Debt Payment, Default up to Almost $520 Million | Reuters.” Reuters, 19 Feb. 2024, www.reuters.com/world/ africa/niger-misses-debt-payment-default-up-almost-520-million-2024-02-19/.

“Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso Quit ECOWAS, Testing Regional Unity.” Reuters, 28 Jan. 2024, www.reuters.com/world/ africa/niger-mali-burkina-faso-quit-ecowas-testing-regional-unity-2024-01-28/#:~:text=The%20juntas%20said%20in%20a,Islamist%20insurgents%20and%20ending%20insecurity.

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Obadare, Ebenezer, and Reina Patel. “ECOWAS Split Spells Trouble for Democracy in West Africa.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 Feb. 2024, www.cfr.org/in-brief/ ecowas-split-spells-trouble-democracy-west-africa.

Stanley, Andrew. “Global Inequalities.” IMF, 1 Mar. 2022, www. imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2022/03/Global-inequalities-Stanley.

Thomson, Michael, et al. “Structural adjustment programmes adversely affect vulnerable populations: A systematic-narrative review of their effect on child and maternal health.” Public Health Reviews, vol. 38, no. 1, 10 July 2017, https://doi.org/10.1186/ s40985-017-0059-2.

“World Economic Outlook.” IMF, 29 Jan. 2024, www.imf.org/en/ Publications/WEO.

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Indonesia’s Nickel Empire at the Expense of Human Rights Apal Upadhyaya

Indonesia has more than quadrupled its nickel production in less than ten years, positioning the island nation to dominate the international nickel market. Nickel is necessary for the production of stainless steel and lithium-ion batteries found in essential everyday items like electric toothbrushes, laptops, computers, and cellphones. These batteries increasingly find use in next-generation technologies to power electric vehicles and e-bikes. Further, the demand for nickel is expected to increase 6-fold by 2030 fueled by growing demand for electric vehicles, a climate-friendly alternative form of transportation. Indonesia’s islands of Halmera and Sulawesi are home to the most identified nickel reserves in the country, making land there extremely lucrative for potential nickel mining companies.

However, because of the land’s overwhelming value, thousands of Indonesian pepper farmers and other landowners have reported their

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land being seized by mining companies. Police intimidate locals and sell private lands well below market value with little negotiation. Furthermore, while the Indonesian government paints its nickel mining initiatives as green and energy friendly, the seizing and excavating of lands has resulted in thousands of acres of deforestation. The little regard and respect the Indonesian government and mining companies have for the Indonesian people whose ancestral lands have been seized blatantly violates property and human rights. While Indonesia has made it its goal to disrupt the international nickel market, it has lost its sense to protect the rights of its people.

In Indonesia, formal land titles are difficult to acquire, especially for ancestral lands. In 2021, local governments began transferring land deeds to mining companies without the consent of the land’s residents.

In one case, a widow and her family was given around $50 million Indonesian rupiah ($3,223) in exchange for the land. With the farm, the widow could make up to 6 million rupiah ($386) in one month from her harvests, and without her farm-based income, the widow has resorted to selling cooked food at a stall to make a fraction of that income she would have made if she still had her land. Notably, these land deals and disputes are predatory and disproportionately affect Indonesia’s poorest populations. This exploitative approach to nickel mining is not going away. The number of land disputes increased from 1,520 conflicts between 20052015 to 2,939 conflicts between 2015-2023 under President Joko Widodo. This has affected 135,608 households, or close to one million people.

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On the island of Gelam, which is part of the Kendawangan conservation area zone, local government officials claim that land deeds were only given to mining companies because of residents’ requests.

Residents refute this claim and argue that they never willingly gave up their lands to mining companies. Local Indonesian governments and officials have abused the lack of land deeds among their poorest populations to better position themselves for success in future nickel mining operations. The Indonesian government has recently become a controlling shareholder of PT Vale Indonesia, one of the mining companies seizing land in Sulawesi. Thus, the government of Indonesia is complicit in this seizing of land affecting almost a million citizens. The government’s gross disregard of its own citizens violates the property rights and threatens the livelihoods of the millions of people who live off their land to gain a reliable income.

The Indonesian government frames this focus on nickel as a push towards clean energy, but massive deforestation and pollution undermines the government of President Joko Widodo’s goals. Over 13,173 acres (5,331 hectares) of forest have been cleared on Halmahera, driving away deer and boars and polluting the water of local rivers. PT Weda Bay Nickel, the largest nickel miner on Halmahera, has deforested 3,600 acres of forest as of 2022. Widodo has sought to support developing industries, hasten recognition of land ownership, and slow deforestation.

However, based on the actions of mining groups backed by the Indonesian government, deforestation in Indonesia still continues.

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While Indonesian nickel mining can make the nation a key player in the international nickel market, the violation of property and human rights to undertake such a project cannot be understated. Seizing and evicting people from ancestral lands for the sake of mine development is wrong. Excavating such lands in a way that pollutes key water sources and destabilizes the surrounding environment is wrong. Indonesian policymakers must stop issuing permits to mine and hold leaders accountable for violations of community members’ rights. If safeguards and restrictions do not materialize, the people of these islands will be displaced and the environment will be destroyed, both reduced to an afterthought of innovation.

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Bibliography Ackerman, Daniel, Meghna Chakrabarti, and Tim Skoog. “The Promise of Nickel: Power and Prosperity in Indonesia.” WBUR, 14 Mar 2024. https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2024/03/14/ nickel-power-prosperity-indonesia-green-metal-energy#.

Cosier, Susan. “As Demand Grows for Electric Cars, So Does the Market for Green Jobs in the EV Industry.” NRDC, 15 Feb 2024. https://www. nrdc.org/stories/demand-grows-electric- cars-does-market-green-jobs-evindustry.

Guild, James. “Why the Indonesian State Took Majority Ownership of PT Vale Indonesia.” The Diplomat, 5 Mar 2024. https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/why-the-indonesian-state-took- majority-ownership-of-pt-vale-indonesia/.

Home, Andy. “Nickel Producers Fear Growing Indonesian Pricing Power.” Reuters, 5 Mar 2024. https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/ nickel-producers-fear-growing-indonesian-pricing-power-2024-03-05/.

“Indonesia.” Global Forest Watch, 2024. https://www.globalforestwatch. org/dashboards/country/ IDN/?map=eyJjYW5Cb3VuZCI6dHJ1ZX0%3D#.

Jong, Hans Nicholas. “Indonesian Nickel Project Harms Environment and Human Rights, Report Says.” Mongabay, 26 Feb 2024. https://news. mongabay.com/2024/02/ indonesian-nickel-project-harms-environment-and-human-rights-report-says/.

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“Mine Production of Nickel in Indonesia from 2010 to 2023.” Statista, 1 Feb 2024. https:// www.statista.com/statistics/260757/indonesian-mine-production-of-nickel-since-2006/.

Pahlevi, Aseanty. “Phantom Deeds See Borneo Islanders Lose Their Land to Quartz Miners.” Mongabay, 7 Mar 2024. https://news.mongabay. com/2024/03/phantom-deeds-see- borneo-islanders-lose-their-land-toquartz-miners/.

Rothbard, Murray N. “Human Rights Are Property Rights.” Foundation for Economic Education, 1 Apr 1959. https://fee.org/articles/humanrights-are-property-rights/.

Stambaugh, Alex and Masrar Jamaluddin. “‘They Destroyed Our Trees’: Women Say Their Farms Were Seized to Support Indonesia’s Electric Vehicle Boom.” CNN, 8 Dec 2023. https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/08/ asia/indonesia-sulawesi-nickel-ev-as-equals-intl-hnk/.

“The Role of Nickel in EV Battery Manufacturing.” Innovation News Network, 27 Oct 2023. https://www.innovationnewsnetwork.com/therole-of-nickel-in-ev-battery-manufacturing/38877/.

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