Great Power Competition: A Challenge to Liberal Order?

By Evan Miler

Evan Miller is a fourth-year student in the College of Arts & Sciences majoring in Russian Politics, History, and Culture. After graduating, he intends to pursue a career in academia studying Russian history and politics.

Evan Miller has written an important paper. He argues that Russia, contrary to the fears of most Western analysts, does not pose a threat to the liberal international order – the rules-based system that the United States built after the Second World War and has sustained, along with other wealthy democracies, ever since. Rather, Russia, like China, seeks a place the leaders of that order. Mr. Miller purports to show that some elements of the international order, such as open national economies, are central, while others, such as human rights, have always been peripheral. He shows that Russia is indeed trying to alter the latter but is determined to maintain the former intact. In other words, Vladimir Putin’s Russia is not trying to build a Eurasian empire that is separate from and opposed to the liberal international order; it is instead trying to “co-opt and pluralize U.S. leadership within” the order and to keep it going. Mr. Miller takes on some of the most important writers on international order today and mounts credible arguments against them.

Mr. Miller wrote the paper in the Fall 2021 semester for my seminar, “The Clash of Ideas in World Politics.” It may interest readers that I disagree with Mr. Miller’s argument, and told him so; and yet I gave his paper the highest grade possible because it was a serious, lucid, well-argued piece of work. In a time when Americans have trouble disagreeing productively or even civilly, it is vital that we in colleges and universities – students and faculty alike – practice and model productive disagreement over important issues of the day. Readers trying to make sense of Russia today will profit from reading Mr. Miller’s essay. As I did.

John Owen Department of Politics

University of Virginia

This article investigates the nature of the “great power competition” that has recently developed between emerging powers like Russia and China and established powers such as the United States. Policymakers and scholars generally argue that great power competition stems from emerging powers challenging the core principles of the liberal international order. I will argue that this conflict instead stems from a struggle over the leadership of the existing order, rather than a struggle over the principles of the order itself. Using Russia as a case study, I analyze significant points of tension between Russia and the West, and demonstrate why they are conflicts of leadership rather than principle.

In recent years, the rhetoric of “great power competition” has come to dominate US foreign policy discourse. The Trump administration labeled it the “primary concern in US national security” and the Biden administration has adopted a similar outlook (Cohen 2021). But what does great power competition mean? At its core, it describes the reemergence of multipolarity on the world stage, a shift away from the unipolarity of post-Cold War international relations. However, as used in its current context in policymaking circles, the term does not suggest a realist multipolarity in the vein of the 19th century “great game.” Rather, the phrase is inextricably linked to the present, US-led liberal international order (O’Rourke 2021). The prevailing interpretation of this order-based conception of great power competition has been a liberal account, stressing that Russia and China, as emerging powers, are pursuing policies that “mount a sustained challenge” to the established norms of the liberal international order (Biden Jr. 2021).

I argue against this view by asserting that emerging powers are not attempting to challenge or dismantle the existing international order, but rather are attempting to increase their influence within it. More specifically, emerging powers seek to exercise their newfound power in order to (1) co-opt the “managerial” role of the US over the liberal international order within their own regions/spheres and (2) band together with other emerging powers to pluralize leadership of the existing order through international institutions. As the United States receives significant national benefits from its managerial and hegemonic positions, it opposes this intra-order challenge, thus creating an environment of “competition” among the great powers. Yet, despite the presence of such competition, each great power generally adheres to the norms of the existing liberal international order and wishes to remain inside of it. In sum, great power competition is an intra-order struggle over the leadership and management of the existing, liberal order, not the principles of the order itself.

To demonstrate this point, I will use Russian foreign policy as a case study. I will begin by providing a brief theoretical background to the concept of international order before detailing the history and characteristics of the existing order. I will then investigate important, contemporary points of conflict between the US and Russia and show why they represent an intra-order struggle over leadership and managerial authority rather than a challenge to the order itself. Finally, I will conclude by describing the policy implications of this interpretation of great power competition.

John Ikenberry defines international order as “the settled rules and arrangements between states that define and guide their interaction” (Ikenberry 2012, 11). International order can take the form of geopolitical blocs, exclusive regional spheres, closed imperial systems, or – as is most relevant for this paper –liberal systems. Liberal international order is defined as an order that is both “open” (i.e. states trade and exchange on the basis of mutual gain) and “loosely rules-based” (i.e. rules and institutions operate as relatively autonomous mechanisms of governance) (18).

The US-led liberal international order first came into existence in its modern form following the allied victory in World War II. Emerging from the war with unprecedented military, economic, and political power, the US chose to create a relatively coherent international order with liberal characteristics. The resulting system was characterized as one of economic openness underwritten by the American security umbrella and governed by a wide variety of agreed-upon rules and institutions. The order supported a number of different values and norms to varying degrees, but the liberal order as it actually existed focused on a more limited group of accepted norms. Most importantly, these norms included economic openness in the form of open trade and the free flow of key natural resources. Principles such as human rights and democracy - though supported to some degree in the “liberal core” of the West - had little bearing over the global character of the order (Stokes and Raphael 2010).

As the order’s preeminent, or “hegemonic” power, the US largely created the international institutions and rules that defined the new order and molded them in its domestic interest. The US also accepted responsibility for underwriting the entire system. This “managerial role” entailed the US exercising its hegemonic influence –especially its military power –to secure markets and ensure the free flow of raw materials for the rest of the order. Though this managerial role demanded significant costs, it also provided many benefits. As manager, the US could structure new rules, agreements, and institutions in its favor and even break its own rules when needed (Stokes, 22). As Doug Stokes writes, “although an open door order benefits the US more than most, the [US] has worked to retain a firm hand on that door and close it whenever its core economic interests appear unduly threatened” (33). This is not to say that other members did not benefit from the US-led order. The order was, generally speaking, positive-sum. Notably, the benefit of this managerial role –as well as the benefit of hegemony within international institutions –is crucial for understanding the rise of great power competition within the existing US-led liberal international order. Emerging powers like Russia have sought to co-opt this managerial role in their own neighborhoods and increase their influence within key international institutions to accrue the benefits of these positions. And in order to retain or expand its existing privileges as hegemon, the US has opposed these efforts.

In the early post-war years, the US-led international order was subordinate to the larger, bipolar order of the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US became the world’s lone superpower and the liberal order that it led became global. During this period of “unipolarity” the US played a largely hegemonic role in global institutions as well as in its capacity as “manager” of the international order. However, in recent years, emerging powers in the Global South have started challenging the US’ managerial capacity and its dominance over liberal institutions. This challenge represents the basis of “great power competition.”

Within the post-Soviet sphere - which Russia claims as its “zone of influence” - Russia pursued a number of different policies that provoked conflict with the West. Notable examples include economic integration, energy security, and military assertiveness in the post-Soviet sphere. Some have characterized these conflicts as challenges to the existing, international order. However, in each of these cases, questions of leadership within the order motivate Russia’s actions, not the viability of the order itself.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is an integrated block of post-Soviet states with a single market and common policies on trade and energy investment (Bayramov, Breban, and Mukhtarov 2018, 208). Officially formed in 2014, the EAEU evolved into its present form from long-standing Russian efforts to integrate the economies of the post-Soviet sphere. The EAEU is an important aspect of Russia’s economic policy and Moscow has claimed that “strengthening and expanding” the union is its number one priority in the region (Tsygankov 2018, 416).

Many western observers expressed concerns regarding the organization and have suggested that it serves as merely a tool for Russia to “re-Sovietize” the economies of its neighbors and threaten the economic openness of Eurasia (Radio Free Europe). However, the policies of the EAEU did the opposite. They supported the integration of the post-Soviet states around liberal economic principles through rules-based institutions. In the past six years, the union has liberalized more than fifty key sectors of the regional economy; lowered tariffs and duties abroad in Iran, Vietnam, and Serbia; increased foreign direct investment among member states and attempted to introduce a rules-based institutional structure to the region’s economy (Troitskiy 2020) (Karliuk 2017, 35-45). Furthermore, the EAEU is a voluntary and positive-sum union like the European Union and the World Trade Organization. While Russia occupies a dominant role within the institution,using its power to shape the EAEU’s policies and rules in its favor, other member-states stand to benefit as well (Knobel et al. 2018).

That is not to say that Russia has been a perfect liberalizer. Since the “lost decade” of the nineties, Russia approached economic liberalization gradually and on its own terms, favoring liberalization in general, but protecting industries that are highly important to its national interest. However, in general, Russia has become a fairly liberal power with low tariff rates and a steadily shrinking role for the state in the economy (at least in terms of GDP). As such, US opposition to Russia’s economic initiatives in Eurasia must be understood in terms of leadership. With both countries pursuing liberalization, each wants to do so on its own terms.

The post-Soviet sphere holds some of the largest energy reserves in the world and is a crucial part of the world energy market. For this reason, the free flow of energy out of Eurasia is a major concern for world energy markets. Pipeline stoppages could drastically alter energy prices as well as produce shortages in consumer markets dependent on Eurasian energy. As such, political control over existing and potential transit networks such as oil and gas pipelines is a contentious issue. Some argue that while the US acts as a “responsible” manager of energy transit networks by securing the free flow of energy into international markets, Russia seeks to control regional energy flows in order to hold political leverage over dependent consumer markets like Europe.

It is true that Russia has interrupted energy flows in the past. However, Russia is, in general, a reliable energy provider (Dellecker and Golmart 2011, 162). The gas conflicts in Ukraine and Belarus were shortlived disputes over failed renegotiations of expired contracts, and crucially in both cases Russia attempted to raise subsidized prices closer to the market rate - a liberalizing effort. Fears that these instances point to a broader trend of illiberal economic practices are misplaced. An energy conflict with Europe would be economically disastrous for Russia and would tarnish its image as a reliable provider of energy, an important image within the European business community and one that Russia seeks to maintain (59).

Of course, Putin almost certainly recognizes and embraces the political power that control of energy provides. Yet, that same political motivation has always existed in US energy policy. What Westerners regard as “responsible leadership”, other countries often regard as predatory. There is a common aversion in the Global South, for example, to US sanctions policies that distort resource flows in the same way that Westerners fear from Russia. In Venezuela, for example, US sanctions decreased the country’s crude oil exports to almost a fourth of their pre-sanction numbers and eliminated exports to the United States altogether (Sachs and Weisbrot 2019). So, it is true that Russia has and likely will continue to use the control of energy flows as political leverage. But, in the bigger picture, Russia – like the US – is generally committed to securing the free flow of energy into the world market.

In recent years, Russia has become increasingly assertive in the post-Soviet sphere. It has claimed territorial waters in the Arctic beyond what it is designated by international law; it has strengthened and expanded the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a regional military alliance; it has invaded and annexed territories from Georgia and Ukraine, and some fear that it will soon invade Ukraine again. Some observers have used these actions as evidence of Russia promoting an illiberal, imperial project in the post-Soviet sphere.

However, before such judgements are made, it is important to look at the nature of Russia’s military assertiveness. In the case of the Arctic, Russia has indeed claimed sovereignty over sea lanes that extend past its allotted 15 miles. However, it has not used this control to create a protectionist sphere; rather, it has supported and invested in shipping and commerce by all nations. As manager of these shipping lanes, Russia has its “hand on the open door” so to speak. But this is no different in concept than what the major Arctic powers - including the US - have done for years (Blunden 2012). The major difference is that Moscow, not Washington now claims this managerial authority.

The CSTO is a military alliance that in part seeks to oppose the West, but also works to underwrite the regional, liberal economic order. Its members coordinate in a number of areas such as anti-terrorism, counterrevolution, counter-insurgency, peacekeeping, and emergency response with the primary intention of ensuring regional stability (Tsygankov 2018, 416-7, 426). Such actions not only protect existing regimes, but also the existing liberal economic infrastructure such as trade and energy transit networks and commercial agreements and institutions, as seen in Kazakhstan in January. In fact, the CSTO’s function in Central Asia almost identically mirrors NATO’s own (NATO 2016). By promoting alternate mechanisms of regional stability, Russia seeks to underwrite the regional order, not challenge it.

The cases of Georgia and Ukraine are more complicated. Russia’s interventions have not promoted regional stability and they have violated the core liberal principle of the territorial sovereignty of the nation-state. However, Russia’s interventions in these countries do not suggest an effort on the part of Putin to rebuild a Eurasian empire. Instead, as Richard Sakwa argues, they are realist reactions to the gradual expansion of a hostile military alliance across its Western border (Sakwa 2016). And realist actions in violation of liberal principles are well within the norm of great power behavior. It is not for nothing that Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea all claim the “Kosovo precedent” as justification for their secession. Russia’s realist interventions in certain strategic areas should not distract from the order that they are attempting to build in general.

In addition to co-opting the managerial role of the US in the postSoviet sphere, Russia banded together with other emerging powers to create global institutions and agreements that function as alternatives to parallel Western-led institutions and exclude Western powers from membership. Some observers have characterized these actions as an attempt to create an entirely separate international order independent from and opposed to the principles of the US-led order. I will argue that these alternative institutions and agreements constitute an effort by emerging powers to pluralize global leadership of the existing liberal international order, not challenge it. To do so, I will analyze the two most prominent examples of these alternative organizations: BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

BRICS is a diplomatic club consisting of five key powers from the Global South (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) that coordinate in various ways to “pursue their shared interests” (Roberts, Katada, and Leslie Elliott Armijo 2018, 4). Some observers have suggested that the club presents an “institutional challenge” to the existing, liberal order as its fundamental principles fall “outside the framework” of the order (Layne 2018). However, this view mischaracterizes BRICS.

It is true that one of the primary objectives of the club has been to create financial institutions alternative to the ones created by the US in the post-war era. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), for example, protects against liquidity crunches and mirrors the International Monetary Fund (IMF). What is notable about these alternative institutions is that they generally adhere to the liberal practices of their US-led counterparts. The CRA, New Development Bank (NDB), and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – the three major creations of BRICS - all support programs of economic openness and capitalist development (Roberts, Katada, and Leslie Elliott Armijo 2018, 11). The major difference between these alternative institutions and existing ones is that they exclude the US and other Western powers, suggesting that tensions between the US and BRICS-led institutions stem from leadership within the order, not the order itself.

Likewise, these parallel institutions are not intended to replace or oppose existing US-led global institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. They have had a largely complementary rather than adversarial relationship with US led institutions. The CRA, for instance, cooperates with the IMF during financial crises and the NDB co-finances development projects with the World Bank (IMF Staff 2017). Furthermore, BRICS has aimed at reforming existing global governance institutions in order to expand the influence of emerging powers within them (Roberts, Katada, and Leslie Elliott Armijo 2018, 73). BRICS, for instance, has been instrumental in pushing for voting reforms in the IMF and the World Bank that still disproportionately favor Western countries. Again, such actions represent a commitment to the existing international order, not an opposition to it, suggesting that opposition to these organizations by the US signals a fear of losing economic and financial leverage, not principles.

Evan Miller

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a formal political, economic, and security partnership that facilitates cooperation and coordination among its members (including China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and four Central Asian countries) in the areas of “security promotion, consensus building, and cooperation” (Chao 2021, 1-10). Critics often refer to the organization as “anti-NATO” in policy-making circles due to its image as a military alliance against the West and the US-led international order more broadly (Green and Janik 2020, 1, 15). Some truth lies in this claim, as the SCO both excludes Western countries and has called for the withdrawal of US troops from certain Asian countries.

However, it is important to note that the organization’s main function is in keeping with the principles of the liberal-international order. As a security promoter, members of the SCO coordinate their militaries against the common security threats of separatism, terrorism, and extremism that threaten not only the political stability of the organization’s member-states but also the stability of Eurasia’s trade routes, resource flows, and capital investments. These actions underwrite the Eurasian liberal order in the same way that the US military's actions underwrite the global liberal order. It is reasonable to assume then, that negative perceptions of the organization in US policy-making circles represent a fear of losing influence rather than a desire to protect core liberal principles.

Thus far, this paper has focused on the idea that the US-led international order is based primarily on integration around liberal economic principles. However, some scholars disagree with this claim and argue that politically liberal principles such as human rights and democracy also constitute a fundamental pillar of the existing order (Ikenberry 2020). As evidence, they point to the existence of various international organizations and agreements within the existing order that promote political liberalism globally. From this perspective, even if emerging powers like Russia promoted an agenda that aligns with the existing order’s core economic principles, their support for political illiberalism still presents a challenge to other fundamental principles of the order such as human rights and democracy.

One oft-cited example of this illiberal challenge is China and

Russia’s attempts to promote watered down interpretations of human rights in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) (Piccone 2018). Some claim that these countries are attempting to “build a bias for autocracy” into the international system (Owen 2020). It is inarguable that China is trying to build normative approval in international institutions for its own illiberal interpretations of human rights. However, the significance of these interpretive changes should not be exaggerated. The UNHRC is a largely impotent body. It has weak membership criteria, no serious coercive mechanisms, and its power is largely limited to publishing critical resolutions and reports (Vriens 2009). Unlike economic organizations such as the WTO or the IMF, the council has little influence over how the international order actually functions in the real world. So, while authoritarian countries like Russia and China can use these revisions to perhaps lessen the public scrutiny they receive for human rights violations, it would be a stretch to say they are revising the existing order in a meaningful way. The UNHRC is not influential enough for that to be the case.

Another example of this illiberal challenge at the regional level is conditionality clauses in economic and strategic agreements. In the postSoviet sphere, for example, aid agreements from the US typically come with liberal strings attached such as domestic governance reform or new human rights laws. Conversely, parallel Russian agreements almost never contain such stipulations. Some observers describe these conditionality clauses as crucial for regional political liberalization and fear that Russian hegemony in the post-Soviet sphere would significantly hurt the region’s liberal-democratic character (Omelicheva 2014, 75-94). But here too, the significance of these clauses should not be overemphasized. Their presence is relatively minor compared to the more primary, economic and strategic aspects of these agreements. In the United States Agency for International Development’s most recent Central Asian Strategy outline, for example, the two main regional objectives included liberalizing the region’s economy and countering Russian influence (USAID, 2020, 7-28). Concrete considerations of human rights and democracy constituted a fairly minor portion of the overall strategy and could hardly be described as a fundamental component in shaping how the order functions.

While the US emphasizes and promotes human rights and democracy more than emerging powers like China and Russia do, these values remain peripheral to the more central economic and strategic principles that largely define the actual order. Russian support for –or at least apathy towards –political illiberalism does not challenge the existing order, because principles such as human rights and democracy never defined the order. As such, the loss of US managerial power or hegemony would likely not radically change the fundamental character of the regional order or global institutions, even if controlled by authoritarian regimes like Russia.

However undesirable Russian or Chinese hegemony over parts of the world may be to US policymakers, these emerging powers are not going to disappear anytime soon, and in all likelihood their relative power will continue to grow. As President Biden himself said, “[w]e cannot pretend the world can simply be restored to the way it was 75, 30, or even four years ago.” In the face of this new, international reality, it is important that the US does not misinterpret or overreact to the strength and assertiveness of emerging powers. These countries seek no radical change. They do not want to overthrow or create an alternative to the existing liberal international order. Instead, they seek to co-opt and pluralize US leadership within it. Thus, the US must decide whether retaining its managerial role in certain regions and sole hegemony in certain institutions is worth the price of a potential conflict with powerful, nuclear states like Russia or China.

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