Virginia Journal of International Affairs - Fall 2023 by vajournalia

Fall 2

3 2 0

Virginia Journal of International Affairs Fall 2023

Contents Staff Information

4 5

From the Editor

Anna Murray 6

The Bullet in the Gun: RTLM, Kangura, and the Rwandan Genocide

Max Bresticker 9

Primary Impacts of British-India Colonialism and Nepal-India Relations on Nepal

Drishya Mishra 39

Empowering Change: Reasons for Women’s Growing Success in Japanese Local Politics

Stepheney Odom 57 -Thomas

The Ripple Effect: Assessing the Influence of U.S. Domestic Stakeholders on Foreign Policymaking in Cyberspace with China and Beyond

Hongjia Yang 75

Staff Editor-in-Chief

Anna Murray

Managing Editor

Victoria Djou

Co-Production Chair

Neha Jagasia

Co-Production Chair

Maggie Meares

Media Manager

Will Hancock

Event Coordinator

Pratha Purushottam

Staff Editors

Ella Gilmore

Michelle Nguyen

Apal Upadhyaya

Alexander Macturk

Anisha Iqbal

Emmett O’Brien

Avery Sigler

Deetya Adhikari

Wyatt Dayhoff Sydney O’Connell Nithya Hannah Brooke Muthukumar Blosser

Information About the Virginia Journal The Virginia Journal of International Affairs is the University of Virginia’s preeminent publication for undergraduate research in international relations. The Virginia Journal is developed and distributed by the student-run International Relations Organization of the University of Virginia. The Virginia Journal is one of the only undergraduate research journals for international relations in the country, and aims both to showcase the impressive research conducted by the students at UVA and to spark productive conversation within the University community. The Virginia Journal seeks to foster interest in international issues and promote high quality undergraduate research in foreign affirs. The Journal is available online at vajournalia.org.

Submissions Interested in submitting to the Virginia Journal? The Journal seeks research papers on current topics in international affairs that are at least ten pages in length. Only undergraduates or recent graduates are eligible to submit. Submissions should be sent to vajournalia@gmail. com

From the Editor Dear Reader, The Fall of 2023 has brought with it unending difficult questions about the state of our world. Conflict and tension across ethnic, religious, and political lines have made the discussion of international relations more complicated, but also significantly more important. Our discussion of global affairs will always remain one of humanity, of the ties that bind us as a globe and the challenges faced on the international stage. The work of the authors presented in this edition of the Virginia Journal spans the spectrum of history, region, and focus, with the hope of providing more clarity and thought-provoking discussion on the present and future of global connection. The papers included here discuss topics from the role and culpability of media during the Rwandan Genocide to cybersecurity as it relates to US and global national security, from the influence of past and current colonialist influences on Nepalese development to the growth of women’s involvement in Japanese politics. We hope that these articles not only help to strengthen understanding of these crucial topics, but also spark discussion about the topics and their implications for our connections as a globe. These papers are incredibly insightful works,

and I hope you will learn from them as I have over the past couple of months. The production of this journal would not be possible without the collaboration and contribution of many different individuals throughout the production process. The hard work and dedication of the Journal Executive Board over the past few months to plan and produce this final product cannot be overstated. It has been a privilege to work with such a wonderful editorial staff, both on the main papers as well as opinion pieces published on our website and throughout the university community. We as a journal extend our gratitude to the International Relations Organization at UVA for providing the staff with the opportunity to produce such an important publication. I also would like to thank the authors for their contributions to this semester’s publication, as well as the support of UVA faculty at every turn. Finally, I would like to thank you, our readers, for taking the time to interact with the works present in this journal and to learn from the wonderful undergraduate students at this university grappling with difficult topics in foreign affairs. I am honored and excited to present this semester’s journal to you. All the best,

Anna Murray Editor-in-Chief of the Virginia Journal of International Affairs 7

The Bullet in the Gun: RTLM, Kangura, and the Rwandan Genocide By: Max Bresticker

About the Author Max Bresticker graduated from the University of Virginia in May 2023 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in both History and Economics and a minor in Mathematics. At UVA, he served on the executive board of the International Relations Organization in various capacities. Additionally, he was involved in student government and journalism on Grounds. Currently, Max is a J.D. candidate at the University of Pennsylvania.

Abstract This paper explores how Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) and Kangura exacerbated ethnic tensions before and during the Rwandan genocide. This analysis is performed by examining the voluminous trial record for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s (ICTR) conviction of three media executives for their roles in inciting genocidal violence. The atrocities promoted by these outlets spotlights the conflict that can arise between wishing to safeguard free expression and the desire to mitigate violence. This paper concludes with an examination of the developments in international law that resulted from the prosecution of these journalists.

Introduction In December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 19 of this document states that “everyone has the right to… receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (United Nations 1948). This language is indicative of the privileged position that journalism and the freedom of information occupy within international discourse. For this reason, it is notable that on December 3, 2003, three media executives—Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze—were convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), a court organized by the United Nations, for a myriad of crimes. Within the context of free expression, the most significant of these convictions were for the crimes of direct and public incitement to commit genocide and crimes Aaainst humanity (persecution). The Media Trial, as this case became to be known, is, in part, legally significant in that it was the first time since the conviction of Julius Streicher, a Nazi newspaper propagandist, that journalists stood trial before an international court for their role in the commission of genocide (Nahimana et al. 2003, 361–362). The defendants in this case were Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze. Nahimana was a historian who became director of the incendiary radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). Barayagwiza served as a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, during the genocide, acted as chairman of RTLM’s executive committee. Ngeze was the founder, editor, and owner of a newspaper called the Kangura, which frequently published anti-Tutsi propaganda since its inception in 1990. Neither of these three men introduced ethnic hatred into the Rwandan media or civil discourse. However, the outlets they oversaw, RTLM and Kangura, escalated tensions to the point where the customary deference afforded to journalists could not excuse the criminality of their publications. During the lead-up to the Rwandan genocide, Kangura and RTLM used ethnic stereotypes, false accusations, and references to alleged Tutsi conspiracies to inflame ethnic 10

hatred. After Habyarimana’s death, RTLM actively organized and mobilized militias by portraying the genocide as a battle for national survival. These acts substantially contributed to the violence and intensity of the genocide.

Background The Rwandan Media Landscape In order to understand the impact that RTLM and Kangura had, it is important to assess both publications in the context of the media environment they operated in. Independent publications existed in post-independence Rwanda; but they generally only could operate thanks to the protection of the Catholic Church and so long as they did not criticize government policies. In 1988, Kanguka—a Kinyarwandan newspaper founded by a Tutsi—would signal the emergence of a more independent press in Rwanda. Several additional publications, including Ngeze’s Kangura, would emerge from 1988 to 1990. A significant inflection point in the story of Rwandan media occurred in June 1991 when the government legalized opposition parties. Quickly, the number of newspapers in the country increased from roughly a dozen to over sixty (Kirschke 1996, 27). The majority of these publications served as vehicles for the newly-legalized opposition parties to advance their agendas. While the early 1990s witnessed a remarkable growth in print media, radio remained the most important communication medium. This is largely because literacy rates in the country remained low, and many individuals faced restrictions on their movement. Another important factor is that while some Rwandans speak French and English, all generally understand Kinyarwandan. As a result, the vast majority of Rwandans were only able to listen to domestic broadcasts or Rwandan-produced channels in neighboring countries (Kirschke 1996, 23). The Rwandan government’s restrictive and politized licensing regime ensured that until mid-1992, the only radio station accessible to Rwandans was the state-owned outlet known as Radio Rwanda. 11

From 1973 to 1991, President Juvénal Habyarimana and his party, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND) firmly controlled Radio Rwanda Until 1991, the supervisory body that oversaw all state-owned media, l’Office Rwandais d’Information (ORINFOR), reported directly to the office of the president. In 1991, some semblance of political independence was restored when the ORINFOR was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Information (Kirschke 1996, 24). Nevertheless, just as before, the MRND continued to dominate the public broadcasting service. The persistent politicization of Radio Rwanda is evident when observing that, from December 1990 to April 1992, a historian with known extremist anti-Tutsi views—Ferdinand Nahimana—served as Director of ORINFOR. In the early 1990s, there were some attempts to diversify the Rwandan airwaves. Mass protests in 1991 led to opposition parties being allowed 15 minutes of programming per week (Kirschke 1996, 25). Additionally, a pro-RPF station broadcasting from Uganda, Radio Muhabura, could be heard in most of Northern Rwanda. Despite the glacial progress towards a liberalized print and radio media, journalists faced both judicial and extrajudicial repression. During the 1990–1993 war with the RPA, national security concerns were used to justify the censorship of media outlets. Additionally, dozens of reports exist of journalists being harassed and arbitrarily detained. Beginning in 1992, instances of journalists being formally arrested seemed to dissipate. However, this was replaced by the murder and intimidation of independent journalists by politically connected militias such as the Interahamwe (Kirschke 1996, 30). When considering the state of Rwandan media prior to 1994, it would be impossible for independent outlets to operate without tacit state approval— something both RTLM and Kangura enjoyed. RTLM and Kangura: Founding and Overview Of the two outlets involved in the Media Trial, Kangura is the oldest. The first issue of Kangura was released in May 1990. The paper ceased publication from March to September 1994 and eventually released its final issue in 1995. Hassan Ngeze, one 12

of the three defendants, was the founder, owner, and editor of the paper throughout its existence. Ngeze had formerly been a journalist at Kanguka but left the publication in the 1990s, allegedly out of fear that the publication was attempting to sabotage the government of Habyarimana and promote the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The name “Kanguara,” meaning “wake others up,” was chosen to imitate Kanguka, which means “to wake up” (Nahimana et al. 2003, 40). It is unclear whether the government or MRND were directly involved in Kangura’s operations; however, the Trial Chamber found that Ngeze enjoyed enough political influence to enable him to avoid arrest (Nahimana et al. 2003, 80). During the Media Trial, a prosecution expert witness testified that Kangura was likely the most popular newspaper in Rwanda prior to the genocide. Additionally, the paper produced a French version which attracted international attention. A former Kangura journalist estimated a circulation of roughly 1,500 to 3,000 copies per issue (Nahimana et al. 2003, 39). During the trial, the Chamber analyzed lists of names, editorials, cartoons, and articles published by Kangura. From February 1991 to March 1994, the Chamber found that Kangura aimed to attract Rwanda’s Hutu population by including the tagline “The Voice that Awakens and Defends the Majority People ‘’ on every issue(Nahimana et al. 2003, 80). The specific language of resentment and hatred within Kangura’s many issues is analyzed later in this paper. RTLM began broadcasting in 1993 and aired for the last time on July 2, 1994. The operations and establishment of the station were overseen by a steering committee, which functioned akin to a corporate board of directors. Two of the Media Trials defendants, Nahimana and Barayagwiza, held prominent seats on the steering committee. The Trial Chamber found that Nahimana was acknowledged as the founder and director of the company while Barayagwiza served as his second-in-command (Nahimana et al. 2003, 193). While Nahimana fled the country during the early days of the genocide, he still possessed de jure authority over the station. A group of shareholders financed the creation of RTLM. Of the initial fifty 13

shareholders identified, thirty-nine claimed to have been members of Habyarimana’s MRND party. An additional two shareholders, including Barayagwiza himself, were reported as members of the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR)—a far-right Hutu Power party. From its earliest days, RTLM was tightly intertwined with MRND politics. President Habyarimana would become the largest shareholder in RTLM prior to his assassination. Moreover, multiple members of the Rwandan Armed Forces had a stake in the station (Nahimana et al. 2003, 167). RTLM was unique due to its popularity and broadcasting approach. The human rights organization, ARTICLE 19, claims in a report that RTLM likely styled itself after “Western-style radio talk shows, complete with audience participation, offensive jokes and popular music.” Additionally, even though many of the station’s broadcasters had considerable journalistic experience, they adopted “disk-jockey” personas on air (Kirschke 1996, 39). Mainstream music and a humorous presentation style led RTLM to become incredibly popular—especially among the Kigali youth—prior to the genocide. Witnesses report that almost all bars, offices, taxis, and markets had portable radios broadcasting RTLM (Nahimana et al. 2003, 117). Unlike most other radio stations, 66.29 percent of broadcasts were simply monologues by presenters. This is significant because the station’s journalists delivered three-quarters of all ethnically inflammatory remarks on RTLM. The frequency of such language was also profound. A meta-analysis of RTLM recordings performed by Mary Kimani found that only 13.21 percent of broadcasts did not contain inflammatory comments (Kimani 2008, 110–25). The precise language used to instigate violence and denigrate Tutsis was analyzed by the Trial Chamber. The following sections detail the recurring themes and language employed by Kangura and RTLM both before and during the genocide.

Themes Attacks on Officials and Civic-Leaders Frequently, RTLM utilized its platform to threaten and incite attacks on political officials, civic leaders, and even ordinary civilians. With respect to politicians, much of the RTLM’s vitriol stemmed from the negotiations of the controversial Arusha Accords. These accords brokered a ceasefire between RPF and Rwandan forces in August 1993. Pursuant to the Accords, a new broad-based government was to be formed with RPF and oppositional party representation. Additionally, RPF forces were expected to be incorporated within the Rwandan Armed Forces. This arrangement proved unacceptable to the MRND and Hutu Power hardliners who governed RTLM’s programming. From August 1993 onwards, the Accords and Rwandan officials involved in their negotiations were frequently attacked on air. For instance, after Boniface Ngulinzira, the foreign minister who negotiated the Accords, was murdered on April 11, 1994, an RTLM journalist rejoiced, “Mr Boniface Ngulinzira can no longer go to Arusha to sell the country to the RPF” (Somerville 2014, 185). However, a Rwandan politician did not need to be associated with the Arusha Accords to be labeled a traitor by RTLM. Being a moderate Hutu or a non-MRND member was sufficient. On April 2, 1994, a broadcast threatened the lives of Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and head of the Supreme Court Joseph Kavaruganda based on the claim that both had somehow betrayed Rwanda (Somerville 2014, 191). The following day, April 3, RTLM broadcasted a message stating that Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana had been hosting secret meetings at her residence with RPF officers where they plotted to destabilize the Rwandan government (Uwimana 2000). This rhetoric and fabricated reports only served to increase ethnic distrust and diminish the legitimacy of the newly established broad-based government. Those involved in attempts to shutter RTLM or temper its rhetoric found themselves the target of the station’s broadcasters as well. The Minister of Information,

Faustin Rucogoza, held several meetings with Nahimana and other representatives of RTLM where he pleaded with the station to tone down its racially-charged language in order to comply with the Arusha Accords, media laws, and the station’s contract with the Ministry. However, Racogoza and the state prosecutor he collaborated with would fail in their efforts and instead would be ridiculed by RTLM and accused of having “evil intentions”(Somerville 2014, 187). Similarly, Alphonse Nkubito, Kigali’s chief prosecutor, was accused by RTLM of plotting to kill the president. When Nkubito filed a legal complaint in response, the station ominously announced on air the names of all those in the prosecutor’s office associated with the legal proceedings (Somerville 2014, 191). Outside of government officials, independent journalists and human rights activists were also threatened by RTLM broadcasts. A humanitarian researcher, Joseph Matata, produced reports on violent attacks by the Interahamwe. As a consequence, Matata was denounced roughly on a weekly basis by RTLM (Somerville 2014, 190). Monique Mujawamariya was another human rights activist who questioned the narrative of RPF-sponsored massacres in Bugesera promoted by Nahimana and RTLM. Beginning in December 1993, RTLM began mentioning her by name and declaring her a “pest” working on behalf of the RPF. Foreign broadcasters were not immune from such persecution either (Temple-Raston 2008, 160–64). Ali Yusuf Mugenzi of the BBC’s Swahili service reported that the extremist CDR operated RTLM. This was enough for him to be attacked on RTLM. Mugenzi, out of fear for his life, repeatedly called RTLM to plead for the station’s statements to be retracted (Somerville 2014, 191). By intimidating state bureaucrats and members of civil society, RTLM created a potentially explosive environment in the lead-up to the genocide. The popularity of the station’s broadcasts, coupled with the willingness of the station’s journalists to air unsubstantiated reports or outright threaten individuals, created an atmosphere of fear. Trust in the broad-based government established by the Arusha Accords eroded. Furthermore, all those alarmed by ethnic tensions were discouraged from taking pro-

active action out of fear for their safety.

By intimidating state bureaucrats and members of civil society, RTLM created a potentially explosive environment in the leadup to the genocide. The popularity of the station’s broadcasts, coupled with the willingness of the station’s journalists to air unsubstantiated reports or outright threaten individuals, created an atmosphere of fear.

Vilification and Dehumanization Before and during the genocide, RTLM and Kangura employed a variety of narratives to disparage the Tutsi minority and fuel ethnic resentment. Physical stereotyping was one avenue by which these platforms persecuted the Tutsi. Additionally, in a move reminiscent of Nazi-era propaganda, Kangura and RTLM alleged that Tutsis controlled a disproportionate share of Rwanda’s wealth. Moreover, they reported that Tutsis firmly believed in their own superiority over Rwandan Hutus. While the words broadcast by RTLM or put to print by Kangura did not directly harm anyone, the cumulative effect of this hateful rhetoric inflamed an already tumultuous political situation and provided disaffected Hutus with a justification for their violent acts. The distinction between Hutu and Tutsi was largely the product of Belgian colonial policies and socioeconomic disparity. Despite this, Hutu Power propaganda outlets frequently emphasized that the Tutsi were biologically and physically distinct from the Hutu majority. An article from a February 1993 edition of Kangura entitled A Cockroach Cannot Give Birth to a Butterfly stated that “experts on human genetics inform us that the demographic weakness of the Tutsi is due to the fact that they marry among themselves.” This same article claims that, because of their alleged genetic isolation, Tutsis had a unique propensity to be wicked and violent. Throughout the article, these demeaning characterizations lead to dehumanizing comparisons between Tutsis, cockroaches, and snakes throughout the article (Nahimana et al. 2003, 64).

Further discussion of the genetic isolation of Tutsis occurred during the December 12, 1993 debate on RTLM where Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza claimed that the “inborn element” was one of the prime indicators of Tutsi-ness (Uwimana 2000). RTLM broadcasts regularly attempted to draw attention to the alleged physical differences between Rwandans in order to further separate Tutsis from the rest of the population. On a December 9, 1993 broadcast, RTLM’s journalist Kantano Habimana described Tutsis as “tall and slim” and possessing a “beautiful, aquiline nose” in a sarcastic tone that conveyed resentment. Habimana repeated such ethnic stereotyping on a January 6, 1993, RTLM broadcast. In this instance, he met with a Tutsi, Dr. Rutaremara, and described him as a “tall Tutsi” who served as a “prototype” of his “species.” Later in the same broadcast, Habimna describes another Tutsi as a “tall man” who “walks very eloquently” and “is very proud of it” (RTLM 1994). The ethnic stereotyping employed in these broadcasts conveyed resentment and promoted the development of a crude system of ethnic identification that would be utilized to carry out killings during the genocide. Another popular anti-Tutsi propaganda theme portrayed Tutsis, the minority, as possessing an economically dominant position in Rwandan society. In a December 1993 broadcast, Habimana explicitly said that Tutsis “are the ones who have all the money.” Additionally, RTLM and the Hutu Power movement falsely claimed during an October 25, 1993 broadcast that “Tutsis who own taxis are 70 percent of all who own taxis in this country,” spreading the idea that 70 percent of the wealthy in Rwanda were Tutsi (Nahimana et al. 2003, 129). The context of this economic stereotyping makes these false accusations particularly dangerous. While Rwanda is a developing state, the early 1990s were particularly dire for the country due to a decline in export income and increased land scarcity. Consequently, accusing Tutsis of grossly dominating the Rwandan economy during a period of severe poverty fueled ethnic resentment (Somerville 2014, 164). Expert witnesses for the prosecution during the trial compared the language of these broadcasts to Nazi-era propaganda, which alleged 18

that Jews had an unjustifiable share of Germany’s wealth (Nahimana et al. 2003, 130). Claims of Tutsi economic dominance were delivered in conjunction with accusations that Tutsis firmly believed in their superiority over the Hutus. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, during the aforementioned December 12th debate, emphasized this point throughout his remarks. When reflecting on how Tutsis were educated, Barayagwiza stated that “the Tutsi had to be brought up knowing that he was the chief, that the Hutu child was under his authority.” He additionally reflected on how, as a child, the Tutsi forbade the Hutu from eating with them, since they did not want to associate with the Hutu. Barayagwiza further recounted being told by his grandfather that “[this] is how things are: we must work for the Tutsi.” Barayagwiza ended this long tirade by stating that the mentality of the Tutsi has not changed and that “Tutsis have kept their culture” (RTLM 1993). While less explicit, references to Tutsis having an innate sense of superiority were laden throughout Habimana’s January 6, 1994 broadcast as well. In this broadcast, Habimana is interviewing multiple Tutsis and attending an event. The Tutsis he meets are frequently described as “haughty” and “very proud.” While attending an event, Habiman described the Tutsis as “[just] wanting to show off with their exaggeration” (RTLM 1994a). During the genocide on April 22, the narrative of Tutsi supremacy was forcefully repeated. In this broadcast, a guest speaker attempts to deliver a pseudo-lecture on the historical background of the “Tutsi supremacy complex.” After detailing the educational and resource inequities from the colonial era, the speaker remarks that many Tutsis “are still convinced that they are intellectually superior to the rest of Rwandans” (Icyitegetse 2000). RTLM and Kangura’s discussion of the physical differences, economic dominance, and supremacist attitudes of Tutsis was an attempt to portray the Tutsis as different from and opposed to the Hutu majority. By stating that the Tutsi were biologically isolated and comparable in demeanor to “snakes” and “cockroaches,” these outlets sought to evoke a sense of separation between Rwanda’s ethnicities, in turn 19

making the commission of violence easier. In a similar vein, broadcasting to an impoverished and economically depressed population that the Tutsi controlled a massively unequal share of Rwanda’s wealth fueled ethnic resentment in a manner completely divorced from fact. Such hostility would only be furthered when RTLM journalists gave anecdotal reports of Tutsis actively viewing their Hutu counterparts as inferior. Between 1993 and 1994, Rwanda’s war with the RPF and the subsequent Arusha Accords left the nation in a politically volatile situation. RTLM and Kangura’s ethnic stereotyping exacerbated tensions by promoting anti-Tutsi rhetoric. Denigration of the Tutsi Woman The treatment of Tutsi and moderate Hutu women by both Kangura and RTLM represents a particularly vile part of these outlets’ efforts to persecute the Tutsi. Frequently, Tutsi women were portrayed as manipulative spies working to undermine Rwanda on behalf of the RPF. When considering the massive scale of rape and other acts of sexual violence committed against Tutsi women, it is reasonable to conclude that the steady stream of disparaging propaganda fed to the Rwandan population by RTLM and Kangura served as at least an enabling influence in the commission of these crimes. A prime example of this gendered and hateful propaganda is in a Kangura article from December 1990 entitled An Appeal to the Consciousness of the Hutu. The first portion of the article devotes considerable time to denouncing the Tutsi as bloodthirsty extremists who seek to reassert their ethnic monarchy by leveraging a network of infiltrators. The article stated that the Tutsi would utilize two weapons—“money and the Tutsi woman”—to conquer Central Africa. In particular, the author speculated that, as part of some overarching conspiracy, the Tutsi would have their women marry high-ranking and prominent Hutu men to gather intelligence. The article concludes by reprinting the Hutu Ten Commandments—a hateful set of mandates first published in other newspapers before being distributed by Kangura. These commandments are particularly vile and explicitly state that any Hutu male who has sexual relations with 20

a Tutsi or employs a Tutsi woman as his secretary “shall be deemed a traitor.” Furthermore, commandment two states that it is evident that “Hutu daughters are more dignified and conscientious in their role of woman” (Nahimana et al. 2003, 45–50). Such language conveys the message that Tutsi are lesser than Hutus and are not to be trusted. Kangura’s cartoons also portrayed Tutsi women and those deemed as collaborators in a sexually explicit manner. Several issues of the paper depicted the prime minister and member of the oppositional MDR party, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, naked and involved in sexual activity with various political figures. Explicit depictions of the prime minister naked even appeared on the cover of Kangura No. 46. Kangura’s cartoons also reinforced the narrative of Tutsi women as spies. UNAMIR General Dallaire, whom Kangura frequently accused of favoring the Tutsi, was drawn sucking on the breasts of a Tutsi woman. Another cartoon featured General Dallaire with his arms around two Tutsi women with the caption, “General Dallaire and his army fell prey to the traps of the femmes fatales” (Nahimana et al. 2003, 45–50). RTLM contributed to the depiction of Tutsi women as enemies. A June 19, 1994 broadcast referred to those Hutus who married Tutsi women as “gluttons.” Later in the broadcast, Hutu husbands were called the “puppets” of their Tutsi wives who “[manipulate] them at will.” The announcer concluded the broadcast by alleging that those who marry Tutsis will ultimately be persuaded to join the RPF (RTLM 1994). In this and other broadcasts, RTLM encouraged listeners to distrust Tutsi women. By denouncing intermarriage between Hutus and Tutsis, RTLM fueled ethnic factionalism and cast moderate Hutus as race traitors. The gendered nature of some of Kanguara and RTLM’s propaganda was undeniably dangerous in light of the mass amounts of rape and sexual violence that occurred during the genocide. By portraying the Tutsi women as categorically hostile to the Hutu people and the Rwandan state, militia members were provided with an insidious rationale for their gendered attacks. The United Nations estimates that be21

tween 250,000 and 500,000 Rwandan women were raped during the genocide (Temple-Raston 2008, 153). When discussing the crime of persecution, the Trial Chamber noted that mass rape was a “foreseeable consequence” of media propaganda during the genocide. This strongly indicates that the justices favored recognizing the media as playing a causative role in the commission of sexual violence (Harvard Law Review 2004). For these reasons, the disparaging treatment of Tutsi women was particularly destructive. The Enemy at the Gate Prior to the assassination of President Habyarimana and the outbreak of the genocide, RTLM and Kangura used their outlets to manufacture a state of collective paranoia. Both platforms frequently ran articles and broadcasts that warned their audiences of Tutsi infiltrators and plots to topple the Rwandan state. These messages promoted a violent distrust and suspicion of the Tutsi, which would be acted upon during the genocide. The trial judgment of the Media Case documents several salient cases of this rhetoric being employed by Kangura. A July 1991 editorial in the paper, proactively titled “Hutus Should Help Kangura Defend the Hutus,” stated that “everyone can see that the Tutsis want to regain the power that was taken from them by the Hutus.” This was followed by an assertion that 85 percent of Tutsis were in some way affiliated with the invading RPF forces (Nahimana et al. 2003, 64). In Kangura No. 26, released in 1991, an article by Ngeze proclaimed that due to the vicious nature of the Tutsi, they had infiltrated Rwanda to reestablish their ethnic monarchy (Nahimana et al. 2003, 59). Later Kangura articles told extreme tales of the wicked plots that the Tutsis and RPF were planning. A July 1993 article speculated that the RPF launched their 1990 invasion of Rwanda in order to “exterminate 4.5 million Hutus.” That same article reported that the RPF castrated a captured Hutu and forced his wife to eat his gen-

itals after a February 1994 attack (Nahimana et al. 2003, 66). A January 1994 article called “The Last Lie” again attempted to escalate ethnic tensions by informing Kangura’s readers that arrested RPF accomplices were found with a list of 1,600 Hutus to be assassinated as part of a Tutsi-led “Final Plan” (Nahimana et al. 2003, 75). These unsubstantiated and exaggerated articles by Kangura continued an us versus them narrative in which the very survival of the Hutus was dependent upon them preventing Tutsi plots from coming to fruition. RTLM propaganda of this sort was broadcast to a larger audience and was just as extreme, if not more so. A November 24, 1993 airing claimed that the RPF was behind the October 1993 coup d’etat in Burundi and that the party had a similar plan for Rwanda. The broadcast blamed mass killings in Rwanda on the RPF and implored Hutus to be vigilant (Mpambara 1997). In a January 5, 1994 broadcast, RTLM journalist Kantano Habimana did not even attempt to allude to a specific plot, but instead, in reference to the Tutsi, says one can “really feel that they want also to get to power” (Nahimana et al. 2003, 127). RTLM further added to the atmosphere of ethnic distrust and paranoia by calling into question the loyalties of physicians and clergy members. This is encapsulated within a few minutes in a January 14, 1994 broadcast where the announcer called a Belgian priest “the chaplain of the RPF.” Immediately following, a local doctor was accused of betraying his Hippocratic oath by providing poor medical care to members of the Interahamwe (RTLM 1994b). In a similar spirit, an April 1 broadcast alleged that two physicians conspired to kill a CDR leader known as Katumba. Reports and rumors of this nature questioned those professions that typically enjoy a high degree of public trust. This conveyed to the Rwandan people that Tutsi conspirators had infiltrated all strata of society. Talk of a looming threat posed by the Tutsis accelerated between late March and early April in the lead-up to the genocide. On March 16, a broadcast claimed that the Rwandan armed forces and people were ready to rise up in order to prevent the 23

RPF from “[seizing] power” (Nahimana et al. 2003, 131). Again, on March 23, RTLM journalists proclaimed, referring to the apparent power-hungry nature of the Tutsis, “that a leopard cannot change its spots.” Later in the same broadcast, an RTLM announcer dismissed the feasibility of the Arusha Accords by claiming that Paul Kagame of the RPF had stated that the RPF “[has] only one goal: to take power” (RTLM 1994). A mere four days before the genocide, on April 3, RTLM would air perhaps one of its most startling broadcasts. The station attempted to create a sense of urgency by alerting listeners that “the Tutsi RPF extremists are bent on overthrowing the government using arms and are planning to launch a major attack before Easter 1994.” The broadcast then elaborated on this alleged plot by stating that the RPF would carry out “operations” consisting “a total clean-up using bullets and grenades” on April 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, and 8th (Uwimana 2000). Notably, the start of the genocide, April 6th, falls within the period of these suspected RPF attacks. RTLM broadcasts thus contributed to creating an expectation of violence immediately before the outbreak of the genocide. When President Habyarimana was assassinated, Hutu extremists could capitalize on the constant fear of a Tutsi power grab in order to justify the killing of Tutsi and moderate Hutu political leaders in the first few days of the genocide. Through the lens of RTLM and Kangura’s propaganda, those Hutu who would take up arms during the genocide were preventing the Tutsis from implementing their years-long plan of restoring minority rule in Rwanda. Ethnic tension and resentment would exist regardless of RTLM or Kangura, but both these outlets’ fear-mongering instilled a culture of distrust across an already unstable country. For this reason, both Kangura and RTLM can be credited with having intensified the violence and bloodshed that resulted from the genocide. A Battle for Survival After the April 6th assassination of President Habyarimana, RTLM began aggressively mobilizing radical Hutus to take up arms as part of a national battle for survival. The language employed was inherently incendiary and provocative. Broadcasts 24

of this sort during the genocide explicitly called for all to participate in the extermination of the Tutsis. Moreover, RTLM named Tutsis and moderate Hutus as RPF-accomplices with little to no evidence—often with lethal consequences.

The

sta-

tion further contributed to the unfolding massacres by using its platform to coordinate directly with the militias. Shortly after the assassination on April 14, RTLM aired a speech by the president of the self-proclaimed interim government, Théodore Sindikubwabo. In this speech, the president called upon Rwandans to form night patrols and to “keep on fighting” (Mpambara 1996). Eight days later, the theme of mass mobilization was repeated once again when Kantano Habimana proclaimed on air that “Rwandans everywhere are waiting with machetes and other weapons” for the RPF to come (RTLM 1994). Later in the genocide, on May 15, an interview with an official of the Rwandan Armed Forces included several calls for civilians to stockpile all the weapons they could find. On multiple occasions, the guest said something to the effect of “all of us should fight” (Eliphaz 1997). As the war dragged on and the situation of the RAF became increasingly dire, RTLM’s incitement became more explicit and dramatic. A broadcast from May 30th, when the RPF seemed poised to attack Kigali, implored listeners to gather arms and attack all those perceived to be aligned with the RPF. At one point, an announcer exclaimed “come out and assist us in exterminating them” (Mutetlie 2000). On one of the last broadcasts before RTLM went offline permanently, Kantano Habimana’s desperation is palpable in his calls for the outright extermination of the Inkotanyi or RPF: “let us simply stand firm and exterminate them, so that our children and grandchildren do not hear that word Inkotanyi ever again” (RTLM 1994). RTLM recordings often presented a blurry distinction between Tutsi civilians and RPF fighters, so calls for mass mobilization and collective defense were made all the more dangerous. A May 14 broadcast claimed that the RPF was “the numerically weak family in Rwanda”—a reference to the Tutsi minority group (Nahimana et al. 25

2003, 140). A broadcast the next day made several more connections between the RPF or Inkontanyi and the Tutsis. At one point, a speaker stated that “the war we are waging is actually between these two ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi.” Later in the show, it is said that “the Inkotanyi form a minority group in Rwanda”—a clear suggestion that being an enemy of Rwanda was not based on political affiliation but instead was determined by one’s ethnic identity (RTLM 1994d). By June 4, RTLM journalists explicitly called for killing Rwandans based on their appearance. Kantano Habimana told his audience, “The reason we will exterminate [the Inkotanyi] is that they belong to one ethnic group.” As a result, RTLM listeners should “look at the person’s height and his physical appearance” when deciding whether to attack them (Nahimana et al. 2003, 140). The inherent danger of these broadcasts is manifest. RTLM’s language frequently suggested that being or just appearing to be Tutsi caused one to be aligned with the invading RPF forces. Consequently, the civil war was not treated as being between two political entities but instead as between two ethnicities. This made it so that, according to RTLM, Tutsi militants were indistinguishable from Tutsi civilians.

The inherent danger of these broadcasts is manifest. RTLM’s language frequently suggested that being or just appearing to be Tutsi caused one to be aligned with the invading RPF forces. Consequently, the civil war was not treated as being between two political entities but instead as between two ethnicities.

The station frequently corresponded with the Interahamwe and the Rwandan Armed Forces, which compounded the vicious effectiveness of RTLM’s war propaganda. In a broadcast from late May, Kantano Habimana spoke directly to those militia members manning the roadblocks when he extolled them to “guard the trench well so to prevent any cockroach [Inyenzi] passing there” (Nahimana et al. 2003, 152). Throughout a May 29 broadcast, an RTLM journalist repeatedly told a militia member who proudly admitted to murdering five Tutsis to “keep it up” (Mpambara 1996). The connection between violent Hutu Power militias and RTLM was made explicit in 26

a June 21 broadcast where RTLM was self-described as “the radio loved by the Interahamwe, the radio that supports the Interahamwe” (RTLM 1994). RTLM’s relationship with violent perpetrators of the genocide extended beyond words of encouragement. On several occasions, the station seemed to provoke or coordinate attacks. On an April 10 broadcast, an RTLM journalist announced the names, nicknames, addresses, and suspected whereabouts of 13 “RPF leaders” (Kirschke 1996, 74). Many of these individuals, as well as countless others who would have their identities announced on air, would later be killed. During the early days of the genocide, RTLM propagated rumors that hundreds of RPF soldiers were residing within mosques and churches throughout Kigali. In reality, the vast majority of these people were displaced Tutsis. This, however, did not deter RTLM from urging militia members to raid these places of worship. Between April 8th and 11th, hundreds of Tutsi refugees were killed at religious sites across Kigali (Kirschke 1996, 76). On several occasions, RTLM’s broadreach provided civil servants and military leaders with a platform for them to request supplies and weapons (Kirschke 1996, 80). As a consequence, RTLM’s broadcasts served as a tool for mobilizing and coordinating violent acts throughout the genocide. Following the downing of Habyarimana’s plane, RTLM’s rhetoric built upon the previous narrative of suspicion that the station had created. When chaos broke out, and hostilities between the RPF and Rwanda resumed, RTLM repeatedly urged Rwandans to mobilize to help exterminate the RPF and their accomplices. However, violence would not fall along political lines, as RTLM frequently obscured who was and who was not an enemy. In fact, the station routinely classified all Tutsis as justifiable targets for violence. As Tutsis were being indiscriminately massacred, RTLM would encourage militia members and direct them toward suspected targets. Ultimately, the station had a violent and destructive impact throughout the genocide.

Developments in International Law Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide As stated in this paper’s introduction, out of all the charges listed in the Media Trial’s indictments, direct and public incitement to commit genocide and persecution are the two relevant offenses for issues related to freedom of expression. The Chamber’s analysis of direct and public incitement is unique in that the crime does not depend on whether the incited act occurred. Moreover, this case is significant in that, in the words of the Chamber, the justices had to discern “the broader application of these principles to media programming.” In their judgment, the justices considered the precedents set by the Nuremberg Trials, the United Nations Conventions, and the European Convention on Human Rights (Nahimana et al. 2003, 330–31). Following their analysis of existing case law, the justices found several applicable principles to guide their treatment of direct and public incitement. The justices extensively discussed the role of purpose, context, and causation concerning incitement. For purpose, the concern mainly is said to lie in the actual words presented and if it can be discerned that the author intended to incite or inflame violence. While relevant, the Chamber noted that “the context of a text is taken to be more important than its author.” For instance, while there may be no factual basis to challenge an author’s sincerity, the theoretical possibility that a publication may be intended to inflame violence means that determining the actual intent of an author “is a question of evidence and judicial determination… taking context into account” (Nahimana et al. 2003, 339–40). Concerning incitement, the Trial Chamber noted that, regarding genocide, a “casual relationship is not requisite to a finding of incitement. It is the potential of a communication to cause genocide that makes it incitement” (Nahimana et al. 2003, 343). The justices justified this interpretation of causation on several grounds. First, the Trial Chamber recognized that governments have a “wider margin of appreciation”

when restricting speech that threatens national security or constitutes incitement to violence. Additionally, the Chamber noted that speech aligned with the majority and state interest warrants “more rather than less” scrutiny when directed against a minority ethnic group, such as the Tutsis (Nahimana et al. 2003, 341). With these principles established, the Chamber developed a multi-factor test to determine whether a broadcast or article constitutes incitement. The Chamber considered the accuracy, tone, and context of RTLM and Kangura publications (Nahimana et al. 2003, 345). Based on their findings, the Chamber convicted all three defendants of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. When the defendants appealed, the Appeals Chamber took issue with the Trial Chamber attempting to extend the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR to Kangura and RTLM productions made before January 1, 1994. Additionally, the Appeals Chamber noted that applying hate speech case law to the discussion of media incitement was not necessarily appropriate. These caveats notwithstanding, the Appeals Chamber upheld the convictions of the three defendants for direct and public incitement due to their actions in 1994 (Nahimana et al. 2007, 13). Crimes Against Humanity (Persecution) The other significant charge that concerns freedom of expression is persecution. Here, the defendants were charged with being responsible for “persecution on political or racial grounds, as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.” Unlike the other charges in the indictment, persecution required the establishment of discriminatory intent, a lower intent requirement than incitement to genocide. The Trial Chamber noted that this was easily established due to the frequent assaults on Tutsis and moderate Hutus by Kangura and RTLM. Throughout these outlets’ broadcasts and articles, the lines between political and ethnic groups were often intentionally blurred. Thus, Chamber noted that the discriminatory intent was exercised on “political grounds of an ethnic character.”

An additional requirement of persecution was the “blatant denial of a fundamental right.” The Chamber found that the language employed by RTLM and Kangura solidly met this requirement. This is because the hate speech of these outlets caused irreversible damage by denigrating the Tutsis to a lower status, which, in effect, destroyed their dignity. The Chamber further emphasized that persecution was determined by actual harm rather than intent. To this end, the justices credited both RTLM and Kangura with “conditioning the Hutu population and creating a climate of harm” (Nahimana et al. 2003, 355–6). The Chamber ends its analysis by briefly considering the implications for freedom of speech. After a survey of international conventions and the penal codes of various nations, the Chamber concludes that hate speech “violates the norms of customary international law” (Nahimana et al. 2003, 357). All three defendants were ultimately convicted of persecution, and their convictions were not challenged on appeal. Significance and Reaction The Media Trial is significant in that it is the first time since the trial of Nazi propagandist Julius Streicher that an international tribunal has examined the role of the media in the commission of genocide. As established throughout the paper, the language employed by Kangura and RTLM was hateful and violent. While the defendants’ guilt is not widely contested, the doctrinal implications of the Media Trial have drawn some scrutiny. One such point of criticism comes from the exclusion of genocidal rape as one of the charges in the indictment. Because the prosecutors neglected to explore this avenue extensively, the Trial Chamber could not elaborate a theory of media causation of genocidal rape; however, the justices did note that mass rape was a “foreseeable consequence” of the disparaging treatment of Tutsi women by these platforms (Harvard Law Review 2004). Another concern arises with the theory of causation that the justices employed when evaluating direct and public incitement to commit genocide. As stated above, the justices found that the media’s words alone could be used to obtain a conviction. 30

Thus, only likely causation and not actual causation are required. As applied to RTLM, the Trial Chamber noted the uniquely broad and deep penetration of the outlet as facets in its determination for incitement. However, a Harvard Law Review article notes that such implications are not discussed for Kangura, as the Trial Chamber’s judgment may leave room for “improper malleability” due to the lack of clarity with respect to print media (Harvard Law Review 2004). Furthermore, free speech advocates were unimpressed with the Chamber recognizing that states could use public order and national security as justifications for restricting speech. Worryingly, from a personal liberty perspective, the Chamber cited the speech regulations of China and Vietnam in promulgating its ruling (Temple-Raston 2008, 239–41). Consequently, a legitimate concern emerged that the ruling could be used to justify the suppression of bona fide debate on hate speech grounds.

Conclusion This paper does not attempt to argue that RTLM or Kangura caused the Rwandan genocide. However, a thematic analysis of radio broadcasts and newspaper articles indicates that, prior to the genocide, both outlets primed Rwandans for violence. RTLM and Kangura attacked civil leaders, engaged in ethnic stereotyping, degraded Tutsi women, and created hysteria surrounding an imminent Tutsi conspiracy. The cumulative effect of this propaganda was the creation of a culture of fear and hostility. On April 6th, when President Habyarimana was assassinated, pent-up ethnic resentment encouraged by these outlets exploded. As the genocide unfolded, RTLM broadcasters directed militiamen and encouraged the “extermination” of the Tutsis. From these tragic events, innovations in international law with respect to the media emerged. While RTLM and Kangura did not cause the genocide, they certainly encouraged it and added to its intensity. In the words of the Trial Chamber, if the

downing of Habyarimana’s plane was the trigger, then RTLM and Kangura were the “bullets in the gun” (Nahimana et al. 2003, 324).

Bibliography Eliphaz, Benyihana, trans. “RTLM Broadcast May 15, 1994.” Concordia University, 9 July 1997.http://migs.concordia.ca/links/documents/RTLM_15May94_ eng_tape0047.pdf Icyitegetse, Drocella, trans. “RTLM Broadcast April 22, 1994.” Concordia University, May 30, 2000. http://migs.concordia.ca/links/documents/ RTLM_22Apr94_eng_K026-0705-K026-0731.pdf. “International Law. Genocide. U.N. Tribunal Finds That Mass Media Hate Speech Constitutes Genocide, Incitement to Genocide, and Crimes against Humanity. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze (Media Case), Case No. ICTR-99-52-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Trial Chamber I Dec. 3, 2003).” Harvard Law Review 117, no. 8 (2004): 2769–76. https://doi. org/10.2307/4093416. Kimani, Mary. 2008. “RTLM: the Medium That Became a Tool For Mass Murder.” Essay. In Media and the Rwanda Genocide. Ottawa: International Develo pment Research Center. Kirschke, Linda. 1996. Broadcasting Genocide: Censorship, Propaganda & State-Sponsored Violence in Rwanda 1990-1994. London: Article 19. Mpambara, Lydie, trans. “RTLM Broadcast November 24, 1993.” Concordia University, April 2, 1997. http://migs.concordia.ca/links/documents/ RTLM_24Nov93_eng_tape0039.pdf. Mpambara, Lydie, trans. “RTLM Broadcast April 14, 1994.” Concordia University, November 7, 1996. http://migs.concordia.ca/links/documents/ RTLM_14Apr94_eng_tape0065.pdf. Mpambara, Lydie, trans. “RTLM Broadcast May 29, 1994.” Concordia University, 6 September 1996. http://migs.concordia.ca/links/documents/RTLM_ 29May94_eng_tape0014.pdf.

Mutetlie, Pennine-Joie, trans. “RTLM Broadcast May 30, 1994.” Concordia University, 28 February 2000. http://migs.concordia.ca/links/documents/RTLM_ 30May94_eng_K023-8685-K023-8704.pdf. “Nahimana et al - Judgement and Sentence.” Arusha: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, December 3, 2003. “Nahimana et al - Summary of Judgement.” Arusha: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, November 28, 2007. “RTLM Broadcast January 6, 1994.” Concordia University, http://migs.concordia. ca/links/documents/RTLM_06Jan94_eng_tape0045.pdf. “RTLM Broadcast June 19, 1994.” Concordia University, 12 July 2002. http://migs. concordia.ca/links/documents/RTLM_19Jun94_eng_tape0031.pdf. “RTLM Broadcast January 14 1994.” Concordia University. http://migs.concordia. ca/links/documents/RTLM_14Jan94_eng_K025-9331-K025-9357.pdf. “RTLM Broadcast March 23, 1994.” Concordia University, http://migs.concordia. ca/links/documents/RTML_23Mar94_eng_K026-8048-K026-8066.pdf. “RTLM Broadcast July 2, 1994.” Concordia University, 1 July 2002. http://migs. concordia.ca/links/documents/RTLM_02Jul94_eng_tape0040x.pdf. “RTLM Broadcast June 21, 1994.” Concordia University, 1 July 2002. http://migs. concordia.ca/links/documents/RTLM_21Jun94_eng_tape0036x.pdf. Somerville, Keith. 2014. Radio Propaganda and the Broadcasting of Hatred: Historical Development and Definitions. Palgrave Macmillan. Temple-Raston, Dina. 2008. Justice on the Grass Three Rwandan Journalists, Their Trial for War Crimes and a Nation’s Quest for Redemption. Free Press. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United Nations General Assembly, 1948.

Uwimana, Rosine, trans. “RTLM Broadcast April 3, 1994.” Concordia University, June 12, 2000. http://migs.concordia.ca/links/documents/RTLM_03Apr94_ eng_K016-4817-K016-4838.pdf . Uwimana, Rosine, trans. “RTLM Broadcast December 12, 1993.” Concordia University, May 09, 2000. http://migs.concordia.ca/links/documents/RTLM_ 12Dec93_eng_tape0101.pdf. Uwimana, Rosine, trans. “RTLM Broadcast April 3, 1994.” Concordia University, 12 June 2000. http://migs.concordia.ca/links/documents/RTLM_03Apr94_ eng_K016-4817-K016-4838.pdf

Primary Impacts of British-India Colonialism and Nepal-India Relations on Nepal By: Drishya Mishra

About the Author Drishya Mishra is a third-year Foreign Affairs major. Though she considers Richmond her hometown, she is originally an immigrant from Kathmandu, Nepal. Her research interests include international politics and political psychology. As an effort to connect more to her roots, she centers her academic research around Nepal’s political system and political history. On grounds, she is involved in TEDxUVA and the Career Center.

Abstract This study investigates how British colonialism in India and subsequent Nepal-India relations have impacted Nepal’s development and sovereignty. Through historical analysis, it explores the economic and institutional repercussions of these ties in Nepal. Utilizing the Dependency Theory framework, it reveals how Nepal, while never formally colonized, still grapples with neocolonial influences from its imperialistic past. The research traces Nepal’s economic reliance on India back to the British colonial era and key treaties like the Sugauli Treaty of 1815 and the Nepal-Britain Treaty of 1923. Following India’s independence, it inherited Britain’s role in Nepal, exerting 39

significant influence. Various treaties, including the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950 and trade agreements, cemented India’s control over Nepal’s economic policies. This led to economic constraints, such as unequal trade terms, trade blockades, and limits on arms imports. These dependencies manifest in Nepal’s underdeveloped economy, marked by poverty, slow growth, and high unemployment rates. India’s interference in Nepal’s internal affairs further underscores its institutional dominance. For Nepal to regain sovereignty, the study emphasizes the need to revisit treaties and diversify trade relations to reduce dependence on India. Future research should explore alternative strategies that do not require treaty renegotiation and evaluate India’s role in lessening Nepal’s reliance. Despite limitations, this study enhances our understanding of the persistent impact of British colonialism and neocolonialism on Nepal’s development and sovereignty.

Introduction In 1991, the World Bank reported Nepal to be “one of the world’s poorest countries,” with it ranking 115th in per capita GNP out of 120 countries. Nepal’s poverty can also be characterized by its low, decreasing GDP growth; from 1991 to 2021, Nepal’s GDP growth has decreased from 6.4% to 4.2% (World Bank). Nepal, being a landlocked country, suffers from geographic isolation and heavily depends on India for the transfer of goods (Luitel). This dependency started in the era of British imperialism, in which the British regime took over India. Though never formally colonized, Nepal’s trade relations with the British Raj in the 19th century broke Nepal out of its isolationist shell and gave the British easy methods of exploitation. Without an official imperial background, Nepal still suffers from neocolonialism. Nepal has not yet acted as a sovereign nation, previously due to British influence, and now due to the hegemonic rule India has over Nepalese affairs. This poses an interesting question: what are the primary impacts of British-India colonialism, combined with Nepal’s relationship with India, on Nepal? 40

Case Justification The three states examined in this research will be Britain, India, and Nepal. The Most-Different-System is the best lens to examine the relationship between British-India and Nepal. Britain’s regime in India was a colonial power and at the same time Nepal was a small kingdom that lacked any global power. Britain formed a relationship with Nepal because of its geographical location and natural resources (Suhrwardy 1996). Nepal’s struggles with neocolonialism are evident in its current developmental state. This research explores how countries that were never colonized still suffer from the impacts of imperialism. Additionally, the Most-Similar System can highlight important aspects of India-Nepal relations. However, research on dependency theory usually revolves around a past-colonial power exploiting a newly-independent nation. This research question explores the gray area in this theory, showing dependency between two states that are not yet fully developed.

Literature Review Relevant existing literature on this research topic revolves around the topics of Dependency Theory and the history of British colonialism in India. Dependency Theory The dependency theory is an approach to understanding economic underdevelopment in the Global South and emphasizes the constraints imposed by the global order, primarily due to imperialism. This theory argues that underdeveloped nations in the outside periphery of the world order are stuck in an exploitative cycle with rich nations at the core (Namkoong 1999). This cycle is often seen with the Global South selling natural resources for low prices to the core countries, yet the core countries selling their reformed goods for higher prices (Munro 2023). In summation, the de-

pendency theory explains underdevelopment with the perspective that rich countries exile poor countries to the periphery of the world, enslaving them and thus preventing development (Velasco 2002). British Colonialism in India: The British Raj British imperialism in the subcontinent of India, often referred to as the “British Raj,” existed from 1858 to 1947, ending with the independence of India and followed by the India and Pakistan split. During the British Raj, the British government took complete jurisdiction over India, controlling its economy, political structures, and social systems (Wolpert 2023). With its empire set up in India, the British Raj created connections with buffer nations such as Tibet, Bhutan, and Nepal (Suhrwardy 1996). The British Raj formed these relations for the purposes of British-India’s security and for Britain to gain access to these nation’s natural resources. The impacts of British colonialism continue to damage India’s economy. British exploitation of India came in various forms, such as forceful conversion of India into a manufacturer of Manchester textiles. This forced India to stray from their cultural handicrafts of various luxury items. This and other forms of cruel exploitation, such as India paying for Britain’s war expenses, have led to neo-colonial impacts in present-day India (Thakur 2013). This contextual research on British imperialism is crucial to note in order to understand the neocolonial impacts Britain had on Nepal, as Nepal was and continues to be drained of its natural resources in a similar way. Analysis: Nepal-Britain Relations Though Britain enjoys friendly relations with Nepal now, and even in the later stages of their imperialist empire, this was not always the case. After fighting the Anglo-Nepalese War, the two states formed friendly trade relations through the Sugauli Treaty and the Nepal-Britain Treaty of 1923. The conditions set by these treaties serve as the blueprint for independent India’s later relations with Nepal.

Historical Context When Britain controlled its empire in India, a string of buffer states secured the northern border. These states included Bhutan, Sikkim, Tibet, and Nepal. Suhwardy states, “Britain had not found it necessary to incorporate these states into the Indian empire as it was able to secure its interest through special relationships with these Himalayan Kingdoms,” (Suhrwardy 1996). Before the creation of the special relationship with Nepal, Nepal and Britain struggled to form a friendly relationship. Prithvi Narayan Shah, the ruler of Nepal during the early 19th century, kept a strong closeddoor policy to Britain’s efforts to expand their sphere of influence. However, Britain’s persistence in gaining access to trade with the Himalayan states led to a clash between the two, resolved through the Sugauli Treaty (Katel 2022). Sugauli Treaty The Sugauli Treaty that ended the Anglo-Nepalese war established the trade relations that would develop between the British Raj and Nepal in the decades that followed, marking the start to British-India’s exploitation of Nepal’s resources. This treaty resulted in a large loss of Nepal territories including Gandhwal, Kumaon, Musouri, Dehradun, and Darjeeling— territories that were never returned to Nepal (Nepali-Times 2021). Through this treaty, the British Empire transformed Nepal’s economy into a capitalist one. By taking Nepal’s territories, the British East India Company expanded and cultivated its exportation of goods, such as tea, in the territories it took from Nepal. The British also invested in wage labor recruitment for the development of commercial agriculture in areas accessible to major Indian seaports (English 1985). It granted Britain full access to the markets of Nepal and with Nepal’s economic weaknesses, they had no choice but to accept this relationship. To legitimize their power, Britain and Nepal signed the Britain-Nepal Treaty of 1923 (Katel 2022). Nepal-Britain Treaty of 1923 The Nepal-Britain Treaty of 1923 revoked the Sugauli Treaty but legitimized 43

the relationship between British India and Nepal. The treaty established Nepal as an independent nation by Britain. The treaty declared that Nepal and Britain would be on friendly terms but Britain would have an overpowering grip on Nepalese affairs (Katel 2022). The treaty achieved many diplomatic successes for Nepal, but the motivation was not selfless for the British Empire. Despite the peace it brought, Nepal was still not free from British constraints. Nepal’s sovereign rights to import arms and ammunition from other countries were not fully respected. The economic access given to Britain through the Sugauli Treaty was still in effect. Though the Nepal-Britain Treaty declared independence, it did not allow Nepal to be completely sovereign (Bhattarai 2021). The trade relations formed by the countries before this treaty had grown drastically, but this did not economically benefit ordinary Nepali citizens. The Rana regime and other upper classes took large parts of the profits. Britain-Nepal relations benefited the kingdom of Nepal, but resulted in the demise of many average Nepali citizens (Vashishtha 2003). This economic exploitation led by the British highlights the basis of Britain’s sphere of influence. Independent India and Nepal After India’s independence in 1947, the British Raj no longer controlled Indian affairs. This meant India now could decide what to do with all the nations the British had created relationships with. Rather than Nepal gaining complete sovereignty, India decided to take up the role Britain once had with Nepal (Rana 1971). This resulted in various treaties between the two nations, treaties that still influence their relationship today. Though the treaties have caused turmoil between the two, neither country has agreed to revocation. India as Britain’s Replacement India established an assertive policy over Nepalese affairs in which they replaced Britain’s influence directly. Before British interference, Nepal operated under an isolationist policy. Britain’s exit shattered any expectations Nepal had of gaining 44

independence as the exploitation of Nepal’s economy became south-oriented through India (Rana 1971). As stated by scholar in the field Hasan Askari Rizvi, “India’s policy towards Nepal was an extension of the British colonial policy which regarded Nepal as an integral part of its defense parameters in the North.” India held on to Nepal because the British deemed Nepal to be valuable for security and economic reasons. (Rizvi 1982). India never gave Nepal its territories back and cultivated their industrialization sector near the border of Nepal, especially through the Indian railway system. This influence marked the start of Nepal’s dependence on India that still exists today. India’s hegemonic control over Nepal’s economy made it difficult for Nepal to form relations with other nations (Rana 1971). Various treaties declared the enforcement of this relation, the first one being the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950. Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950 The Nepalese-Britain Treaty of 1923 governed India and Nepal relations until Nepal and India decided on a new treaty, the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950 (Rizvi 1982). This treaty dealt with questions of defense and the treatment of each other’s nations (Subedi 1994). Critics of this treaty often describe it as a reflection of India’s desire to dictate terms to a poor, vulnerable landlocked country and force Nepal’s subservient state. The treaty’s terms are essential to understanding the root of India-Nepal dependency today. Nepal struggles with economic independence today because of the unfair terms it was forced into through this treaty. Article 2 of the Peace and Friendship Treaty establishes an official friendship between the two. The treaty states, “[t]he two governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighboring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two governments.” With India having an upper hand in the drafting of this treaty, they intentionally ensured that Nepal did not form any alliances with other countries, such as China, that could put India’s regional hegemony at risk. In terms of military assistance, the treaty states, “American and British assistance would be sought only when 45

India was not in a position to supply the necessary equipment,” forcing Nepal to rely primarily on India, strengthening the dependency. This treaty also restricted Nepal’s freedom in arms importation—Nepal could import arms from nations only in coordination with India (Baral 1992).

Critics of this treaty often describe it as a reflection of India’s desire to dictate terms to a poor, vulnerable landlocked country and force Nepal’s subservient state. The treaty’s terms are essential to understanding the root of India-Nepal dependency today. Nepal struggles with economic independence today because of the unfair terms it was forced into through this treaty

These unfair terms were a legacy of terms once set by the British over Nepal—India merely continued a preexisting practice. These unfair trade treaties between the two nations hardened India’s tight control over Nepal’s economy. The Trade Treaties Nepal had already suffered economically at the hands of the British Kingdom, and once India received the opportunity, India began to guide Nepal’s internal and external policies (Suhrwardy 1996). Trade and transit treaties between the two contributed to the suffering of Nepal’s economy and Nepal’s growing reliance on India. This treaty consisted of a harmful provision which read as the following: “The Government of Nepal agrees to levy taxes at rates not lower than those for the time benign in India, customs duties on imports from, and exports to countries outside India. The government of Nepal also agrees to levy on goods produced or manufactured in Nepal that are exported to India, export duty at rates sufficient to present their sale in India at prices more favorable than those of goods produced or manufactured in India which are subject to central excise duty (Baral 1992). “ This agreement imposed Indian tariff policies on the Nepalese government and 46

ignored Nepal’s sovereign right to determine the prices of commodities imported from, or exported to foreign countries, restricting any chance of independent control of Nepal’s economy (Rizvi 1982). This unequal agreement once again enforced India as a dominant power that is easily able to take advantage of Nepal. Impacts on Nepal While the British Raj formed a relationship with Nepal for the sake of security and economic interests, this relationship became Nepal’s main source of aid. When the British Empire left India, the Indian Government took an interest in continuing this dependent relationship with Nepal. To secure India’s dominance, the Indian government created the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950 and various trade treaties Nepal’s reliance on India for its statehood and prosperity grew as the Nepalese government had little choice but to accept treaty agreements. The two primary impacts of British colonialism and Nepal’s dependence on India on Nepal have been a struggling economy and a lack of institutional control. Nepal’s Current Economic State It is crucial to analyze the state of Nepal’s economy. Nepal’s stage of development can be best described as early, with an unskilled workforce, weak managerial capacity, and a failure to transform agricultural productivity (Luitel). Nepal is one of the 48 Least Developed Countries, with 50% of its population living on less than $1 per day. The low development has resulted in slow economic growth, high population growth, high levels of illiteracy, and high unemployment (Pande et al. 2003). Both the World Bank and the UN Human Development Index define Nepal as an underdeveloped state. History with the British-India empire and the current dependence on India has contributed to these low levels of development. Economic Impacts This research paper argues that British colonialism in India has created un47

breakable Nepalese dependency on India. These ties have led to the economic suffering of Nepal’s development. Nepal has always remained a focal point for world powers for the exploitation of Nepal’s natural resources, such as the Himalayan River waters, mines, and other biological resources (Katel 2022). There has been a long-established dominance of Indian capitalists in the industrial sector of Nepal. This has led to the pushback of Nepali entrepreneurs as petty traders, and the Nepalese have become the cheap labor force for Indian businesses (Luitel). This lack of equal opportunities for Nepalese individuals has stopped the Nepalese business sector from prospering to its full potential, negatively impacting their economy. Nepal’s dependence on India has also created economic disturbances in Nepal. When Nepal and India could not agree on renegotiations of the previous Trade and Transit Treaty, India threatened Nepal by withholding fuel supplies in 1971 and 1988, demonstrating India’s power to restrict Nepal’s economic sovereignty (Luitel). Additional trade and transit disputes in 1989 and 1990 exposed the fragile foundation of Nepal’s economy as India’s actions caused damage to Nepalese individuals’ economic stability. Even prior to this, the economic conditions of the people had been very poor and slow to improve. These conditions led to Nepal’s low ranking on the list of the World’s Poorest Nations (Khadka 1991). Other forms of economic control India has taken include trade blockades, disputes related to open border alignments and encroachments, and unjust trade and transit treaties.

There has been a long-established dominance of Indiancapitalists in the industrial sector of Nepal. This has led to the pushback of Nepali entrepreneurs as petty traders, and the Nepalese have become the cheap labor force for Indian businesses (Luitel). This lack of equal opportunities for Nepalese individuals has stopped the Nepalese business sector from prospering to its full potential, negatively impacting their economy. The Peace and Friendship Treaty perpetuated the economic constraints; the

treaty requires Nepal to get its permission before making any trade/economic deals with any other countries. This provision maintains India’s tight hold on Nepal, leaving Nepal little choice but to agree to India’s conditions (Katel 2022). To conclude, the unfair treaties signed by Nepal and India has caused Nepal’s economic state to decline and strengthened Nepalese dependance on India and British colonialism. The treaties, especially the Trade and Transit agreements, have made Nepal subservient to India in relation to its economic policies (Suhrwardy 1996). Institutional Restraints by India Besides the economic impacts caused by India’s actions, India has restricted Nepal’s freedom to establish their own institutional policies in relation to immigration, secularism, and many other regulations. India has historically micromanaged Nepal’s internal affairs through the Indian Embassy. For example, India forcefully influenced Nepali citizenship politics for people of Indian and Tibetan origin (Katel 2022). Nepal has tried to resist this control: Since the 1960s, Nepal has made countless efforts to build the economic foundations for an independent foreign policy, one that did not allow Indian dominance (Rana 1971). For example, Nepal proposed a constitution that declared itself a secular country. However, the Modi administration in India pressured Nepal to not move forward. In 2015, Nepal pressed forward, presenting the new constitution, just to be met with trade blockades from India. This Indian hegemony has been claimed to be “the greatest imperialist intrusion in Nepal to date” (Katel 2022). This shows India’s institutional control, while also conveying the economic constraints India has historically placed on Nepal for going against Indian interests. This dominance is a result of India continuing practices from the British Raj era. These two effects evidence neocolonialism present in Nepal and show a pattern of indirect intervention by India in Nepalese affairs.

Implications and Limitations The implications of this study allow researchers to further understand why nations such as Nepal, who were never colonized, face the effects of imperialism today. Research also shows that even if Nepal tries to renegotiate treaty terms, or goes against the treaty, it has been fruitless. The two nations need to devise a comprehensive economic agreement that promotes sustainable growth in sectors of the Nepalese economy. Due to the overwhelming portion of aid in Nepal being solely from India, Nepal needs to form trade relations with other nations. There have been reports of a growing trade relationship between Nepal and China, which has led to less dependence on Indian ports. This relationship causes issues because of the rivalry between India and China, and India may perceive Nepal-China relations as a ‘betrayal’ (Jaiswal 2014). As for institutional control, India needs to allow Nepal to function with the rightful sovereignty and independence they deserve. The economic partnership between India and Nepal is not entirely negative, but it needs restructuring to bring more benefit rather than turmoil to Nepal. However, this study also contains limitations. This research aims to find connections between British colonialism, dependency theory, and Nepal’s current economic state. Unfortunately, there is limited pre-existing research on Nepal during times of British colonialism. This restricts researchers’ ability to analyze the long-term effects of treaties such as the Nepal-Britain Treaty of 1923.

Conclusion This paper aimed to explore the primary impacts of British-India colonialism, combined with Nepal’s relationship with India, on Nepal. Nepal remains one of the under-developed nations on the world stage, and this lack of development can be traced back to British imperialism (Luitel). The line of reasoning in this research is showcased in Figure 1 below. The British Raj formed relations with Nepal to begin the 50

exploitation of Nepal’s natural resources and mercenaries. After independence, India continued the exploitation the British started in Nepal through various treaties (Rana 1971). This also created a strong dependence on India by Nepal, in which Nepal cannot sustain itself without India’s economic aid. India took advantage of this dependence causing a negative impact on Nepal’s economy and robbed Nepal of its sovereign institutional rights. In conclusion, the combination of British colonialism in India and Nepal’s dependence on India has contributed to Nepal’s suffering in the economic sector and its lack of independence in institutional affairs. The implications of this research suggest that India and Nepal need to decide on new treaties that give Nepal more sovereignty. Additionally, Nepal needs to form new trade relations with states other than India so aid can flow in from various sources, lessening Nepal’s dependence on India. The limitations of this study are the lack of proper evidence available from the era in which British India had strong relations with Nepal. Moreover, since Nepal has attempted its recent efforts to lessen its dependence on India, there has not been enough time to know whether these efforts are a success or failure. For future research, it would be beneficial to analyze various policy solutions other than renegotiating treaty terms. A potential research direction would be to evaluate alternatives for India to reduce Nepal’s dependence on them. In conclusion, Nepal’s suffering economy can be explained through Nepal’s previous relationship with the British Raj and its dependence on India.

Figure 1. 51

Bibliography Baral, Lok Raj. “India-Nepal Relations: Continuity and Change.” Asian Survey 32, no. 9 (September 1992): 815–829. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645073. Bhattarai, Kamal Dev “What if... the 1923 Nepal-Britain treaty was not signed?” The Annapurna Express, December 25, 2021. https://theannapurnaexpress.com/ news/what-if-the-1923-nepal-britain-treaty-was-not-signed-3883. English, Richard. “Himalayan State Formation and the Impact of British Rule in the Nineteenth Century.” Mountain Research and Development 5, no. 1 (1985): 61–78. https://doi.org/10.2307/3673223. World Bank Open Data. “GDP growth (annual %).” Accessed April 27, 2023. https:// data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG Jaiswal, Pramod. “Caught in The India-China Rivalry: Policy Options for Nepal.” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09164. Katel, Shambhu. “Imperialism in Nepal: Past and present.” Jamhoor. February 10, 2023. https://www.jamhoor.org/read/imperialism-in-nepal-past-and-present Khadka, Narayan. “Nepal’s Stagnant Economy: The Panchayat Legacy.” Asian Survey 31, no. 8 (August 1991): 694–711. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645224. Magar, Santa Gaha. “Looking back at the 1923 Nepal-Britain treaty.” Nepali Times. December 22, 2021. https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/looking-backat-the-1923-nepal-britain-treaty. Namkoong, Y. (1999). Dependency Theory: Concepts, Classifications, and Criticisms. International Area Review, 2(1), 121-150. https://doi. org/10.1177/223386599900200106 Luitel, Samira. “Dependency and underdevelopment: The Nepalese context.” Occasional Papers in Sociology and Anthropology 11 (2009): 202–220. https:// 53

doi.org/10.3126/opsa.v11i0.3037. Munro, André. “Dependency theory”. Encyclopedia Britannica. Last modified September 24, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/topic/dependency-theory. Pande, Badri, Anibal Aguilar, Brian Jones, Lucian Msambichaka, Badre Pande, Nipon Poapongsakorn, Daniel Thieba, Seth Vordzorgbe, and Maheen Zehra. “NEPAL.” Edited by Barry Dalal-Clayton, Krystyna Swiderska, and Stephen Bass. STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUES ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES: Lessons, Opportunities and Developing Country Case Studies. International Institute for Environment and Development, 2002. http://www.jstor. org/stable/resrep18132.13. Rana, Pashupati Shumshere J. B. “India and Nepal: The Political Economy of a Relationship.” Asian Survey 11, no. 7 (July 1971): 645–660. https://doi. org/10.2307/2642972. Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. “INDO-NEPALESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS.” Strategic Studies 5, no. 4 (1982): 56–64. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45181944. Subedi, Surya P. “India-Nepal Security Relations and the 1950 Treaty: Time for New Perspectives. Asian Survey 34, no. 3 (March 1994): 273–284. https://doi. org/10.2307/2644985. Suhrwardy, Zahir. “India’s Relations with Nepal.” Pakistan Horizon 49, no. 1 (1996): 35–54. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41393550. Taneja, Nisha, Subhanil Chowdhury, and Shravani Prakash. “India-Nepal Economic Cooperation: Towards a New Paradigm.” India Quarterly 67, no. 2 (2011): 129–47. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45072998. Thakur, Kundan Kumar. “BRITISH COLONIAL EXPLOITATION OF INDIA AND GLOBALIZATION.” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 74 (2013): 405–15. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44158840. Vashishtha, Somendra. “BRITISH INDIA’S RELATIONS WITH NEPAL: A PHASE OF RESTRICTED INTER COURSE AND FRIENDLY ISOLATION (1846-57).” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 64 (2003): 1315–25. http://www. 54

Empowering Change: Reasons for Women’s Growing Success in Japanese Local Politics By Stepheney Odom-Thomas

About the Author Stepheney Odom - Thomas is a third-year student from Yorktown, Virginia pursuing a double major in Foreign Affairs and Global Studies on the Environments and Sustainability Track. She is also minoring in Korean Language and Literature. The focus of her studies is on the politics of East Asia and global environmental challenges with particular interest in social justice issues within both overarching topics. Beyond academics, she is the Prime Minister of the International Residential College’s student council, Co-director of Growing for Change, and founder of the Lorax Society at UVA.

Preface for Stepheney Odom-Thomas, “Women in Japanese Local Politics” By Leonard Schoppa I was thrilled to learn that the VJIA was going to feature the paper Stepheney Odom-Thomas wrote for my class last year on “Women in Japanese Local Politics.” The paper was the product of an assignment that asked students to pick from a list 57

of fairly broad topic areas and write a research paper exploring some aspect of topic, drawing on library and online sources. Every year, students write on the topic “women and politics in Japan,” and they have consistently produced depressing accounts of how slowly women are advancing into leadership roles. Japan ranks 125th out of 146 nations in the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Index and performs especially poorly in the proportion of women in the national legislature. What I found exciting about Stepheney’s paper is that she found an optimistic angle on this topic for a change. Instead of focusing on the slow progress at the national level, she searched out relatively hard-to-find data on how women are doing on winning local offices in Japan. As in many other nations, the local level is where many politicians first get the experience they need to compete for higher office. What she found was that Japanese women are winning significant and growing shares of local assembly seats (a majority in some cities), and she profiles a few instances in which women have moved on to assume the role of mayor and governor. I hope you enjoy reading the paper as much as I did.

Abstract In Japan, where political representation of women has long lagged behind global standards, a remarkable shift is occurring in local politics. Despite a persistent 10% representation of women in the national House of Representatives, local politics have witnessed substantial growth in relative female participation since the early 2000s. This paper explores the multifaceted reasons behind this change, including the strategic use of gender roles, the “socialization of care” policy shift, the acquisition of political experience through grassroots activism and bureaucratic careers, the emergence of women’s support groups, municipal mergers, and sporadic institutional support from political parties. Collectively, these factors have driven the surge in women’s success in Japanese local politics, and this trend holds the potential to 58

impact national politics positively, promising a brighter future for women’s representation in Japanese governance.

Empowering Change: Reasons for Women’s Growing Success in Japanese Local Politics Despite Japan’s prominence, the political representation of women is severely lacking in comparison to most of the world. In 2021, Japan ranked 147th amongst 153 countries for women’s political empowerment with persistently low numbers at both the national and local levels (Takeuchi 2021). However, according to long-term trends, there is hope for women at the local polls. While the percentage of women in Japan’s national House of Representatives has leveled off around 10% for the last two decades, representation at the local level has been steadily increasing (Shin KiYoung 2019, 78). From 1998 to 2018, the subnational legislative representation of women grew by 13% in Tokyo’s special wards, 7% in government-decreed city assemblies, 7% in other city assemblies, 5% in prefectural assemblies, and 5% in towns and villages (Shin Ki-Young 2019, 86). In terms of women in local executive positions, all seven female governors, thirty-four out of the total thirty-eight city or special ward mayors, and nineteen out of the total thirty-four town or village mayors were all elected since 2000 (McCurry 2019; Tsuji 2017, 37) In 2019 local elections alone, a record-breaking six women were elected city mayors in one election round, an increase from four in 2015, and an unprecedented 1,239 women were elected to city assemblies (McCurry 2019). With the addition of these winners, there are now around 4,078 women serving on Japanese subnational assemblies (Steel, Gill, and Martin 2019, 216). While most academic writing focuses on finding the reason for the lack of women’s representation in Japanese politics, far less focus is placed on their increasing successes in the local sphere. The difficulty for women to establish a career while being expected to take care of children and family, frequent sexual harassment in the political workspace, and difficulty gaining the reputation and funding equivalent to the men that have been in government for years are the most common barriers to 59

entry (Nakano 2018, 75-76). So, how are some women succeeding in local politics despite these barriers?

While most academic writing focuses on finding the reason for the lack of women’s representation in Japanese politics, far less focus is placed on their increasing successes in the local sphere.

This essay compiles potential explanations for why women’s local representation began to significantly increase since the start of the 21st century. The examined reasons include greater emphasis on the socialization of care and the utilization of gendered stereotypes, the acquisition of political or lawmaking experience, growth of women’s support groups, and institutional reasons such as the backing of political parties and municipal mergers. To properly display each of these explanations, this analysis will start by discussing how gender identity has boosted women’s political careers through the discussion of the socialization of care, housewife activism, and the perception of women as “clean” or less corrupt than male politicians in Japan. Beyond gender, this paper will then discuss how previous political experience in local assemblies, bureaucratic careers, or national legislatures has contributed significantly to the political careers of female governors and mayors. Additionally, I will cover women as the opposition’s strategy, the rise of a women’s party, and municipal mergers, reviewing the considerable growth and contribution of women’s support groups. The analysis will conclude with thoughts on the relative importance of factors, the continued efficacy of the discussed strategies, and avenues for further research. The first explanation for recent increases in female political participation at the local level is a shift in policy to focus more on welfare issues and “socialization of care” (Tsuji 2017, 43). Starting in the 1990s, elderly care and child care became priorities for Japan, and the national government decentralized authority to make municipal governments more responsible for elderly nursing services, public daycare 60

funding, and generational support action plans (Tsuji 2017, 43). This new locally-based focus on welfare boosted women’s political careers because women are seen by voters as having natural expertise in areas of welfare due to established gender roles and stereotypes (Tsuji 2017). This pathway for Japanese women is commonly called “housewife activism,” where female politicians utilize their identity as housewives to claim control of policy issues related to elderly care, child care, education, food safety, and more (Nakano 2018, 79). Political participation associated with motherhood occurred in the form of grassroots women’s movements and community groups far before it was utilized by women seeking elected positions (Gelb, Joyce, and Kubo 1994, 121). However, many politicians have more recently found success utilizing this strategy at the leadership level. For example, Hayashi Fumiko, who became Mayor of Yokohama City in the Kanagawa Prefecture in 2009 by appealing to issues like childcare waiting lists, support for working mothers, and community medical care (Tsuji 2017, 51-52). Okuyama Emiko, Mayor of Sendai City, also made appeals to childcare and education in her mayoral campaign (Tsuji 2017, 53). While this has proven successful so far, prominent scholars in the field argue that this method will lose its efficacy for female politicians in the future as they seek to break down gender stereotypes or wish to appeal to different policy areas like security or fiscal policy (Nakano 2018, 80). In other words, if the “housewife platform” continues to be seen as the basis for electing women to political leadership roles, it severely limits the policy subject areas in which women can perform. In addition to the housewife-caregiver image, another gendered image of women that has contributed to their campaign successes is that of a clean, less corrupt image. This stereotype has led to the election of many women following the revelation of scandals or corruption surrounding male incumbents (Tsuji 2017, 42). In other words, Japanese women are often politically endorsed as clean-up candidates. For example, Fusae Ota became Japan’s first prefectural governor primarily from having the image of a “pure” female politician who could clean up the misdo-

ings of the outgoing incumbent. She was first elected to be governor of the Osaka prefecture after her predecessor, Knock Yokoyama, was caught up in a sexual assault scandal against a female campaign aide (TIME Staff 2000). Ota, having experience as a career bureaucrat, was endorsed by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi for the position despite Ota not being from Osaka prefecture. Although Ota was a former career bureaucrat, her gender proved to be more decisive for her selection and success (TIME Staff 2000). Academic Susan Pavloska claims that this ideal, clean female political image also helped with Tokyo’s current governor, Koike Yuriko’s, campaign as citizens were angry over corruption and cronyism present in Tokyo politics prior to her election (Steel, Gill, and Pavloska 2019, 154). Similar to the housewife platform, the use of this “clean” platform by women receives skepticism from scholars for its continued use in Japanese politics. For one, the political setting where there was previously a scandal will not always occur (Tsuji 2017, 43). Secondly, as women get more involved in the male-dominated world of politics, they will inevitably get involved with money politics and develop politically beneficial relationships – things that metaphorically dirty a politician’s image and would ruin any clean image held by women (Nakano 2018, 80). With this future concern in mind, this strategy may become less prevalent but would open up opportunities for women to attack more political campaigns with issues separate from gender stereotypes. Besides utilizing their gender to their advantage, women have found success in progressing toward local political leadership after garnering experience in other political or law making roles. First, they gain experience from the ground-up due to candidate movement from volunteer-based community groups into elected local assemblies and then into higher leadership positions. Starting in the 1980s, there has existed an observable trend of women becoming more involved in grassroots community/citizen movements and acquiring knowledge on the networking and funding required to pursue local leadership (Tsuji 2017, 42). Amongst these grassroots organizations were many schools and training programs specifically attacking

female representation in assemblies–some of which will be further discussed in the section about increased women’s movements (Takao 2008, 6). Following the growth of these local movements, women’s participation in assemblies started to grow with their newly-gained experience (Tsuji 2017). Then, as women gained experience within these assemblies, many began pursuing mayoral positions. By the 2000s, the most prominent pathway for women to become governor or mayor was to first participate in the local assembly of their municipality, town, or prefecture; as of 2016, statistics show that thirty-six out of fifty-eight mayors whose careers were documented were previously a part of local assemblies (Tsuji 2017, 44-45). Past the time of Tsuji’s journal entry, this grounds-up strategy continues to succeed for municipal mayoral elections. In the 2019 elections, two women who were previously members of assemblies gained mayoral positions by beating long-term incumbents. First, Akemi Fujita became the mayor of Kamo, a city in the Niigata Prefecture, after previously serving on the corresponding city assembly (Shin Yasutaka 2019). Second, Ritsuko Fuhii became mayor of Shunan City in Yamaguchi prefecture after serving on the prefectural assembly (Shin Yasutaka 2019). Unlike the other two gendered platform strategies, this progression pathway is likely to remain a route for Japanese women in the coming years. An exceptionally rarer pathway than working up from assemblies into local leadership is Japanese women gaining experience in national government before going local. Although less frequent, this pathway is worth noting as an explanation for some local leaders’ successes. For example, Tokyo’s first female governor, Koike Yuriko, is one politician whose background greatly differs from the majority as she established herself at the national level before winning a governor position in 2016 (Steel, Gill, and Martin 2019, 215). She was first elected to the House of Councillors in 1992 as a part of former Prime Minister Hosokawa’s reformist party (Steel, Gill, and Pavloska 2019, 157). Over the following years, Koike was a part of the House of Representatives under the LDP. She then held a number of cabinet positions as

Minister of the Environment, Minister of State, and eventually, Minister of Defense (Steel, Gill, and Pavloska 2019, 154). Her established national career undoubtedly helped with the name recognition that is required to win governorship of large cities like Tokyo (Steel, Gill, and Pavloska 2019). While very few have previously been a part of the national Diet before becoming local representatives like Koike Yuriko, some women achieved elite bureaucratic experience like her prior to entering local leadership. Before the 1990s, garnering bureaucratic experience used to be a more prominent pathway into the mayor and governor positions, but was eventually superseded by the grounds-up assembly strategy (Tsuji 2017, 44). Tsuji supports this claim by noting that only three of fifty-eight mayors whose careers were documented were previously bureaucrats, two local and one national (Tsuji 2017, 45). However, by observing female governors’ biographies after the 1990s, it is notable that a few of them do have bureaucratic experience behind them, suggesting that it is a prevalent pathway for the prefectural governorship. While Fusae Ota was primarily chosen under the clean-up strategy for her governor position, she did also have an established bureaucratic career beforehand at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry that put her on the radar for endorsement (“State Minister of Economy.”). Like Fusae Ota, Hokkaido Governor Harumi Takahashi also held a bureaucratic position in the MITI, previous experience in lawmaking that gained her crucial Komeito backing in her 2003 election (Aiuchi 2004). Takahashi originally tried to utilize gender-related issues to appeal to women voters through her campaign, but ultimately the exit poll showed that most women voted for men during the Hokkaido election–evidence that her gender had little effect on her win (Aiuchi 2004). To reiterate, Koike Yuriko can also be placed under the umbrella of Japanese female governors who formerly held ministerial positions, meaning that three out of the seven total female governors in Japan had recent exposure to law making in bureaucratic or ministerial positions before pursuing gubernatorial elections.

Another explanation for increasing women’s representation in local politics at the turn of the century is the increased organization of community support groups and training programs to help women gain seats in local politics. Amongst these support groups are organizations that help women enter local assemblies, citizen-led candidate campaigns, and training centers or academies that teach the necessary skills to run for elected office. One of the first of these groups was The Alliance of Feminist Representatives, developed in 1992, which ran the campaign ‘Eliminate Zero-Women Representatives Assemblies” in 1997 to increase female representation in local assemblies (Takao 2008, 5-6). Another was the Promotion Center for Women’s Political Participation, a political training program established in 1994. The program found immediate success in the 1995 elections where twenty-four of its original participants won elected seats (Takao 2008, 6). The Promotion Center went on to train over seven hundred women over the next nine years and sparked similar educational training programs to open over the following years until twenty-four out of forty-seven prefectures had them by 2003 (Takao 2008, 6). One specific local leader who benefited from the organized effort of citizen support was Akiko Domoto, governor of the Chiba Prefecture from 2001 to 2009. Before she became governor in 2001, she was a broadcaster for TBS who brought attention to women’s rights and childcare issues, recognizable to many citizens (Steele 2022). It was those citizens, many of them women and youth, who drove her to run for elected office and who ran the campaign that eventually led to her successful acquisition of the Chiba governor position (Kyodo 2001). During her time as governor, Domoto continued to appeal to this citizen support by holding citizen conferences to ensure that she was addressing the issues desired by the community (Steele 2022). A more recent example of women’s cooperative candidate support is Yamada Yukio, who was elected to the Koshigaya city council in 2014 and then again in 2019 due to the support of mothers and activists attempting to change the ratio of female politicians (Kambayashi 2022).

The momentum for female political support groups does not appear to be waning as two women’s educational programs were launched in 2022. The first was an educational camp teaching women how to finance and conduct a campaign held this past summer in Kyoto by the Academy for Gender Parity (Kambayashi 2022). The other is a newly-proposed project called “Kosodate Senkyo Hack!” to help mothers better run for local government positions (Otake 2022). This group intends to support mothers who find balancing a political career and child-rearing difficult by educating them on campaign tactics and how to avoid harassment during the campaign (Otake 2022). If the group is successful in its mission, more mothers will potentially run in upcoming local elections in April 2023. The above examples are just a few of many cooperative women’s organizations that exist and are developing in Japan to support women’s political careers in the local spheres. As cooperation amongst women remains diligent, there is a great likelihood that the upwards trend will continue and female presence in Japanese local politics will continue to grow.

As cooperation amongst women remains diligent, there is a great likelihood that the upwards trend will continue and female presence in Japanese local politics will continue to grow.

While most women at the local and regional levels rely on female-support groups, such as those above, some female politicians find support in political parties. At the municipal and town level, women in assemblies who manage to gain national party support tend to be backed by either the Japanese Communist Party or Komeito–the exact number of these assemblywomen is unclear (Steel, Gill, and Martin 2019, 224-225). Beyond assembly nominations, however, there lacks a clear trend of major national parties supporting mayors (Tsuji 2017, 39). There tends to be more party politics at the prefectural level and instances where opposition-backing, in particular, has been crucial for women gaining local leadership positions. For example, Governor Mieko Yoshimura won her race in Yamagata prefecture in 2009 due to 66

support from the Democratic Party of Japan (Kyodo News 2009). Yoshimura’s upset with her LDP-supported predecessor, Hiroshi Saito, came during a time when LDP approval was down and the DPJ would end up winning by a massive landslide in the 2009 national election. To this day, Yoshimura maintains her position as Governor of the Yamagata Prefecture with continued support from the DPJ and additional support from the Japanese Communist Party, Democratic Party for the People, and the Social Democratic Party (“Yoshimura Wins 4th Term”). This party-affiliation strategy may become more prevalent in the future if Japan’s opposition chooses to utilize women to boost their campaigns at local levels. However, following the trend, national party support will mainly apply to governors with enough exposure and experience to gain backing. In the late 1970s, around the time that women’s representation in local politics started climbing, the Netto party was formed by women and has contributed to increasing electoral successes over time (Shin Ki-Young 2019, 79). Though there are other larger contributors to the accelerated growth in the early 2000s, the Netto party has supported female politicians for the last 40 years and saw its peak number of candidates in the mid-2000s (Shin Ki-Young 2019, 79 and 85). The most recent figure from 2018 shows that 105 Netto candidates sat in elected seats across seventy-four local assemblies (Shin Ki-Young 2019, 79). The party originally stemmed from local co-ops; both its support base and participants are primarily housewives and mothers concerned with children welfare issues, food safety, and their local environment (Shin Ki-Young 2019, 91). While the Netto party has not produced nearly as many candidates as some of the training programs, it has given a number of Japanese mothers an organization through which they can voice their political opinions (Shin Ki-Young 2019, 92). The final potential reason for increased local representation is Japan’s municipal mergers, which produced larger districts that were more favorable to women. Japan’s “Great Heisei Merger” refers to the period of time in the early 2000s when 67

many of Japan’s municipalities were influenced to merge together by the promise of fiscal rewards and multiple revisions to merger law (Takao 2008, 11). Between 1999 and 2010, the number of municipalities in Japan decreased from 3,229 to 1,727 and the number of municipal and town assembly seats decreased by the tens of thousands as a result (The MIC 2009; Takao 2008). During this time frame, “the proportion of seats held by women increased in every prefecture” (Steel, Gill, and Martin 2019, 224). The growth in district sizes due to mergers caused the increase in seats held by women. Women win more elected positions in larger districts due to increased electorate size and diversity (Steel, Gill, and Martin 2019, 223). Additionally, these mergers broke up previously-embedded political support bases, which gave new candidates, including women, an opportunity to start fresh with new electorates (Steel, Gill, and Martin 2019). While the number of women in Japanese local politics still remains low, there are significant positive growth trends in relative representation for a number of reasons. Utilizing gender as a political strategy, the grounds-up approach, and increased women’s support groups were the most important contributors to women’s growth in local political representation at the turn of the century. While some candidates may have strayed from the specifics of the “housewife platform” or “clean-up strategy,” every candidate utilized women’s related issues in their campaigns–from welfare expertise to women’s representation. The groundsup approach was also far more salient for female candidates in the last twenty years than the other experience-garnering pathways of ‘national to local’ or ‘bureaucracy to local’ because it is difficult for women to get senior posts at those higher levels. Additionally, the growth in representation directly corresponded with the start and progress of political training programs and citizen-led campaigns. In regards to party-related explanations, national support of local candidates is too rare to count as a significant contributor and the local Netto party is having trouble winning a number of seats in recent elections (Shin Ki-Young 2019, 79). Finally, while municipal 68

mergers may have contributed to increase the proportion of local female politicians with seats, there was a slight decrease in the absolute number of seats controlled by women (Steel, Gill, and Martin 2019, 224). Of the three most important cited, the research shows that women’s support groups in tandem with the grounds-up strategy will continue to be more crucial in the future as a shift away from gender-based platforms will create more opportunities for women. There is undoubtedly a renewed vigor for women’s participation in government as more and more support groups and educational programs arise every year to help women break into male-dominated leadership roles. As more women gain experience within these organizations, the female candidate supply will increase for assembly, mayoral, and gubernatorial elections.

There is undoubtedly a renewed vigor for women’s participation in government as more and more support groups and educational programs arise every year to help women break into male-dominated leadership roles. As more women gain experience within these organizations, the female candidate supply will increase for assembly, mayoral, and gubernatorial elections.

While it was beyond the scope of this paper, it would be interesting to observe if this local ground-up strategy extends to the national level. More analysis could examine if there are instances of Japanese women finding success in the national Diet after working up through local leadership. A discovery of that nature would provide even more hope for women’s representation in Japanese politics.

Bibliography Aiuchi, Masako. 2004. “The Governor’s Race in Hokkaido: The Election of a Female Governor and Its Impact.” Political Science & Politics 37, no. 1 (January): 6263. doi:10.1017/S1049096504003701 Gelb, Joyce, and Kimiko Kubo. “Obstacles and Opportunities: Women and Political Participation in Japan.” Women of Japan and Korea: Continuity and Change, Temple Univ. Press, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (1994): pp. 120–149. Kambayashi, Takehiko. “How women are banding together to change Japanese politics.” The Christian Science Monitor, 23 Aug. 2022, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2022/0823/How-women-are-banding-together-to-change-Japanese-politics. Kyodo. “Domoto’s win in Chiba reflects voter discontent.” The Japan Times, 27 Mar. 2001, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2001/03/27/national/domotos-win-in-chiba-reflects-voter-discontent/ Kyodo News. “LDP-backed governor Booted out in Yamagata.” The Japan Times, 27 Jan. 2009, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2009/01/27/national/ldpbacked-governor-booted-out-in-yamagata/. McCurry, Justin. “Japanese City Gets Its First Ever Female Politician.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 23 Apr. 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2019/apr/23/japanese-city-gets-its-first-ever-female-politician-misuzu-ikeda. Nakano, Lynne Y. “Women in Politics in Japan: Beyond Housewife Activism.” Asian Anthropology, vol. 17, no. 2 (2018): pp. 71–84., https://doi.org/10.1080/1683 478x.2018.1458405. Otake, Tomoko. “Project Aims to Help Mothers Run in Japan’s Local Elections next Year.” The Japan Times, 18 Oct. 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/ news/2022/10/17/national/politics-diplomacy/mothers-local-elections-support-project/.

Shin, Ki-Young. “An Alternative Form of Women’s Political Representation: Netto, a Proactive Women’s Party in Japan.” Politics & Gender, vol. 16, no. 1 (2019): pp. 78–98., https://doi.org/10.1017/s1743923x19000606. Shin, Yasutaka. “Record No. of Female City Mayors, Assembly Members Elected in Japan’s Unified Local Polls.” The Mainichi, 22 Apr. 2019, https://mainichi.jp/ english/articles/ 20190422/p2a/00m/0na/004000c. “State Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.” State Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry / METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, https:// www. meti.go.jp/english/aboutmeti/profiles/individual/ota_fusae.html. Steele, Jackie F., host. “日本語のエピソード: Women and politics in Japan: Thought partner ing with Akiko Domoto.” Diversity Rocks Innovation, episode 18, Apple Pod casts, 15 May 2022, https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/women-and-pol itics-in-japan-thought /id1571426584?i=1000561475180. Steel, Gill, and Sherry Martin. “Japan’s Growing Base of Women in Elected Of fice .” Beyond the Gender Gap in Japan, University of Michigan Press (2019): pp. 215–229. Steel, Gill, and Susan Pavloska. “Tokyo’s First Female Governor Breaks the Steel Ceiling.” Beyond the Gender Gap in Japan, University of Michigan Press (2019): pp. 153–169. Takao, Yasuo. “Women in Japanese Local Politics: From Voters to Activists to Politicians.” The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus, vol. 6, no. 1 (2008): pp. 1-18. Takeuchi, Yusuke, et al. “Shamed by 147th Ranking, Japan Pushes for More Women in Politics.” Nikkei Asia, Nikkei Asia, 31 Mar. 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/ Politics/Shamed-by- 147th-ranking-Japan-pushes-for-more-women-in-poli tics. The MIC. “Changes in the Number of Municipalities and Characteristics of the Great Meiji-Showa Merger.” Soumu.go.jp, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Commu nications, 2009, https://www.soumu.go.jp/gapei/gapei2.html. “The Structure of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG).” Japan’s Local Gov ernment System - Tokyo Metropolitan Government, https://www.metro. tokyo.lg.jp/ENGLISH/ABOUT/STRUCTURE/structure01.htm.

TIME Staff. “Going Boldly Where No Woman Has Gone Before.” Time, Time Inc., 7 Feb. 2000, https://content.time.com/time/world/arti cle/0,8599,2053745,00.html. Tsuji, Yuki. “Explaining the Increase in Female Mayors: Gender-Segregated Employ ment and Pathways to Local Political Leadership.” Social Science Japan Jour nal, vol. 20, no. 1, (2017): pp. 37–57. JIJI Press. “Yoshimura Wins 4th Term as Yamagata Governor.” Arab News Japan, 25 January 2021,https://www.arabnews.jp/en/japan/article_37172/.

The Ripple Effect: Assessing the Influence of U.S. Domestic Stakeholders on Foreign Policymaking in Cyberspace with China and Beyond By: Hongjia Yang

About the Author Hongjia Yang is a fourth year double-majoring in Foreign Affairs and Statistics from the University of Virginia. His academic interests include congressional legislation to high-tech industries and US-China tech competitions. He plans to work in a D.C. based think tank upon graduation, and later pursue a Ph.D. in political science.

Abstract As the digital age progresses, global data privacy challenges have emerged as a paramount concern with implications for US foreign policymaking. This paper addresses the multifaceted challenges posed by data privacy, cybersecurity, and foreign policy in cyberspace. Notably, it delves into the pivotal role of US domestic stakeholders in shaping foreign policy decisions within this realm. The intricate interplay between data privacy, national security, and economic interests poses complex 75

challenges for policymakers. However, the existing US regulatory landscape remains fragmented, hindering effective foreign policymaking. This paper addresses this gap through empirical analysis, offering insights into how domestic actors influence and shape US foreign policy agenda in cyberspace. Through two case studies—one focusing on Huawei’s exclusion from the US market and the other on the TikTok ban proposal—this paper unravels the intricate dynamics of domestic stakeholder interactions and their impact on policymaking processes. These analyses shed light on the relationship between the U.S. and China and the international community, advancing our understanding of how domestic stakeholders shape US foreign policy in cyberspace. Ultimately, this research contributes to a nuanced understanding of the interplay between data privacy, national security, and foreign policy in the digital age.

Introduction As the digital age advances, global data privacy challenges have become a matter of paramount concern (Nuala, Lange, and Lange 2015). These challenges are multifaceted, with profound implications for US foreign policymaking in cyberspace. In particular, there is a pressing need to understand how US domestic stakeholders exert influence on foreign policy decisions in the realm of cyberspace. With the proliferation of digital technologies and online services, there has been a substantial increase in data breaches and cyber threats. Malicious actors, including state-sponsored hackers and organized cybercriminals, have exploited vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access to sensitive data. Their attacks result in financial and reputational damages to individuals, businesses, and governments. As these threats evolve and intensify, US foreign policymaking in cyberspace faces a complex set of challenges. At the core of this policy debate lies the inherent tension between data privacy, national security, and economic interests. On the one hand, there is a demand for

strong data protection measures to safeguard individual privacy rights and prevent misuse of data (Borghard 2018). On the other hand, governments seek to maintain surveillance capabilities for national security purposes, while businesses seek to harness data for economic growth. Balancing these competing interests is a formidable task for US policymakers, who must navigate an intricate web of domestic and international considerations. Despite the growing awareness of data privacy challenges, the US regulatory landscape remains fragmented and inconsistent. At present, the U.S. lacks a comprehensive federal privacy law (Rich 2022). Instead, data privacy regulations are predominantly sector-specific, addressing particular industries such as healthcare (HIPAA) and finance (GLBA). Additionally, state-level privacy laws, such as the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), introduce further variation in privacy standards. This patchwork approach to privacy regulation results in several limitations. First, the absence of a unified federal framework creates legal uncertainty for businesses operating across state lines, as they must navigate a multitude of different privacy requirements. Second, the lack of federal standards leaves gaps in privacy protection for consumers that leads to unequal treatment with geographic disparities. These regulatory shortcomings impede the effectiveness of US foreign policymaking efforts in cyberspace, as international partners may view the US regulatory environment as instating insufficient data privacy protections. While the intersection of data privacy, cybersecurity, and foreign policy has been the subject of extensive inquiry, there exists a noticeable gap in the literature regarding the influence of US domestic stakeholders in cyberspace foreign policymaking on cyberspace (Pozen 2016; Healey 2017; Ireland 2017). Existing scholarship has primarily centered on the broader geopolitical and international dimensions of cybersecurity and data protection, often overlooking the contributions and motivations of domestic actors, such as technology companies, advocacy groups, and government agencies (Maurer 2015; Schwitz 2011). Furthermore, very few empirical 77

case studies offer an in-depth exploration of how these stakeholders engage with, and shape, policy decisions related to cyberspace and data privacy. Recognizing this lacuna in the literature, this paper endeavors to make a significant scholarly contribution by examining the influence of US domestic stakeholders in shaping the country’s foreign policy agenda in cyberspace. Through rigorous empirical analysis, this paper will provide a comprehensive understanding of the diverse interests, policy preferences, and power dynamics that characterize domestic stakeholder interactions. By shedding light on the complex negotiation processes and advocacy efforts undertaken by these actors, this paper will elucidate the mechanisms through which domestic stakeholders can impact the formulation and implementation of foreign policy in the digital domain. The significance of this paper is manifold. Not only will it generate new academic insights into the interplay between domestic factors and foreign policymaking in cyberspace, but it will also offer practical implications for policymakers seeking to navigate the competing demands of data privacy, national security, and economic interests. Ultimately, this paper aims to contribute to more effective and comprehensive policy solutions that can address real-world challenges and promote a secure, open, and trustworthy cyberspace. This paper will embark on a comprehensive exploration of the diverse domestic stakeholders influencing US foreign policymaking with respect to cybersecurity in the context of China and beyond. Beginning with an overview of the various stakeholders involved, the paper will then narrow its focus to the US and China bilateral relationship, specifically within cybersecurity. Next, to understand the underlying mechanisms between domestic stakeholders and policymakers, the paper will discuss two case studies: the exclusion of Huawei from the US market in 2019 and the proposal and the subsequent hearing of a TikTok ban in 2023. The case studies included in this analysis can provide a comprehensive examination of how the interactions of various stakeholders resulted in the exclusion of Huawei, with the exception of non-5G item purchases allowed by the US Department of Commerce. However,

with regards to the TikTok case, the analysis of lobbying and interaction processes is currently hindered by several factors. First, the dynamic nature of the issue means that many developments are still unfolding, making it challenging to offer a clear analysis of the situation. Additionally, many private sector stakeholders involved in the TikTok case have been reluctant to publicly express their thoughts and positions. This lack of public discourse from private sector stakeholders further complicates the analysis as their perspectives and influence have not been readily accessible. As the situation continues to evolve, future research will be necessary to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the lobbying efforts and stakeholder interactions in the TikTok case. Last but not least, three hypotheses will be tested based on the results of the two case studies and will investigate which relationship is impacted most significantly: bilateral relations between the US and China, bilateral relations between the US and other countries, or the multilateral relations and the international image of the US By testing the hypothesis through case studies, the paper aims to elucidate the mechanisms by which various stakeholders shape US foreign policymaking concerning cybersecurity in relation to China and beyond.

Overview of US domestic stakeholders in cyber-related foreign policymaking The realist perspective in international relations theory posits that national security and state interests are paramount in shaping foreign policy (Lynch 2001, Synder 2002). Within this framework, cybersecurity—an issue of critical national security— may be expected to foster consensus among stakeholders who prioritize the protection of state interests. However, consensus in foreign policymaking may not always be achievable in the realm of cybersecurity due to conflicting interests, such as economic goals and privacy rights, leading to competing priorities among stakeholders.

The multifaceted nature of data privacy and cybersecurity has given rise to a diverse array of domestic stakeholders in the United States, each wielding influence over the policy landscape

This section provides an overview of the key US domestic stakeholders involved in shaping the discourse and policies related to data privacy, including public sectors (the US Government, US Military, and the US Congress), private sectors, and nonprofits. a) Stakeholders in the public sector State Department As the principal diplomatic arm of the US government, the State Department plays a pivotal role shaping foreign policymaking related to cybersecurity and data privacy (US Department of State 2022). Its key priorities include promoting international norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which encompass non-aggression, respect for human rights, and the prohibition of cyber theft and espionage. Through bilateral and multilateral cybersecurity dialogues, such as the US-China Cybersecurity Dialogue, the State Department seeks to establish consensus on these norms, reduce tensions, and address specific challenges such as intellectual property theft and election interference. Additionally, the department prioritizes the facilitation of cross-border data flows to support global digital trade, while ensuring robust data protection standards. This is reflected in the negotiation and implementation of data protection agreements, such as the EU-US Privacy Shield. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) The DHS is primarily concerned with national security, and its foreign policymaking priorities in the realm of cybersecurity and data privacy reflect this focus. A 80

key priority of the DHS is to strengthen international cooperation to protect critical infrastructure from cyber threats. To achieve this, the DHS, through its Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), collaborates with foreign partners to enhance information sharing, build capacity, and develop joint response protocols for significant cyber incidents (US Department of Homeland Security 2023). The DHS also aims to strike a balance between national security imperatives and individual data privacy rights in areas such as cross-border data sharing for law enforcement purposes. Department of Commerce The Department of Commerce is a significant stakeholder in shaping foreign policy related to digital trade and the global internet economy. It prioritizes the removal of trade barriers and the promotion of an open and interoperable internet. The Department of Commerce achieves this by advocating for free data flows and minimal data localization requirements. This department also emphasizes the importance of international standards for privacy and data protection in order to ensure that US businesses can thrive in the global market while protecting consumers’ privacy (US Department of Commerce). Department of Justice (DOJ) The DOJ plays a critical role in addressing cybercrime and the misuse of data at an international level. Its foreign policy priorities include enhancing legal frameworks and international cooperation to combat cybercrime, extradite cybercriminals, and disrupt global cybercriminal networks. The DOJ also works to establish mechanisms for cross-border law enforcement cooperation, including mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) for data sharing (US Department of Justice 2020). Department of Defense (DOD) / The Military As part of the DoD, the NSA and US Cyber Command are tasked with safeguarding national security through signals, intelligence, and offensive and defensive cyber 81

operations. Their foreign policy priorities include deterring adversaries from conducting malicious cyber activities against the US and its allies while promoting stability and norms of responsible behavior in cyberspace. These agencies also prioritize building partnerships with foreign intelligence and defense agencies to share threat intelligence, enhance cyber defense capabilities, and collaborate on countermeasures (White 2020). The Congress As a legislative body, Congress is responsible for crafting and enacting laws that govern various aspects of cyberspace, including cybersecurity, data protection, and digital trade. Additionally, Congress exercises oversight and accountability over executive branch actions in the realm of foreign policy, ensuring that the United States’ interests and values are upheld in the international arena. One of the key interests of Congress is data privacy, especially as it relates to cross-border data flows and international privacy standards. As countries around the world implement varying data protection regulations, Congress is tasked with ensuring that US businesses can participate in the global digital economy while adhering to privacy standards that protect the rights of individuals. This includes engaging in dialogues and negotiations with foreign governments and international organizations to harmonize privacy standards and facilitate cross-border commerce. Appendix (a) provides a detailed comparison of the roles different committees play in cybersecurity legislation. Within the public sector itself, generally speaking, stakeholders have already exhibited a diverse array of priorities in foreign policymaking related to cybersecurity and data privacy. This conclusion is furthered by Appendix (a), where a detailed table comparing the priorities between various public sector stakeholders is shown. These priorities, which are often complex and at times conflicting, underscore the multifaceted nature of the challenges confronting policymakers in this domain. The interplay of these varying interests could become a central feature of the US public sector’s approach to addressing cybersecurity and data privacy in the international 82

arena. b) Stakeholders in the Private Sector The US private sector, consisting of both large multinational firms and small startups, plays an influential role in shaping the digital economy — these private entities are not only at the forefront of technological innovation, but they are also directly affected by international regulations and norms governing cyberspace. For big multinational firms, their expansive global footprint and interconnected supply chains make cybersecurity and data privacy critical components of their business operations. Such companies often prioritize establishing a predictable and harmonized regulatory environment for cross-border data flows, allowing them to operate seamlessly across international markets. These firms also advocate for strong cybersecurity standards to protect their intellectual property, customer data, and reputation from cyber threats.

These private entities are not only at the forefront of technological innovation, but they are also directly affected by international regulations and norms governing cyberspace

Furthermore, multinational corporations are active participants in international dialogues and partnerships by working with governments and industry groups to shape policy frameworks that promote both innovation and security. In contrast, small startups may have different priorities, given their unique challenges and limited resources. Startups are often drivers of innovation and disruption, and they may prioritize a regulatory environment that supports entrepreneurship and access to global markets. As they navigate an increasingly complex cybersecurity landscape, startups may also seek support and collaboration with governments and larger industry players to access resources for building cybersecurity resilience.

While startups may have limited influence in international policymaking, their agility and ability to rapidly adapt to emerging technologies can contribute valuable insights to shaping cyber policies. The uniqueness of the private sector in the field of cybersecurity and data privacy lies in its leadership in driving technological advancements. Unlike many other policy areas, the private sector, particularly tech firms, determines the future trajectory of the digital landscape. This dynamic position distinguishes the private sector as a critical stakeholder in shaping foreign policy, as governments and international organizations seek to keep pace with rapid technological changes. The private sector’s expertise, coupled with its practical experience in mitigating cyber risks and navigating regulatory complexities, positions it as an essential collaborator in forging cybersecurity and data privacy policies that balance innovation, security, and privacy on a global scale.

The private sector’s expertise, coupled with its practical experience in mitigating cyber risks and navigating regulatory complexities, positions it as an essential collaborator in forging cybersecurity and data privacy policies that balance innovation, security, and privacy on a global scale

Given the central role of technology companies in driving the digital revolution, their influence on US foreign policymaking in cybersecurity and data privacy is both significant and indispensable. As governments grapple with the challenges of formulating effective and forward-looking cyber strategies, collaboration with tech companies is essential for ensuring that policies align with technological advancements, address evolving security concerns, and promote an open and secure digital ecosystem. In light of this, the following section will focus on the specific role that tech companies play in influencing US foreign policymaking in the realm of cybersecurity and data privacy. 84

c) Stakeholders in Nonprofits and Advocacy Groups Non-profit organizations and advocacy groups often provide valuable perspectives that complement those of government and private sector stakeholders. One priority of many nonprofits is the protection of individual privacy rights and civil liberties in the digital domain. These groups advocate for robust data protection standards and transparency in government surveillance practices both domestically and internationally. They often engage in public awareness campaigns and contribute to policy debates, promoting privacy-enhancing technologies and calling for accountability in data collection practices. Additionally, some nonprofits focus on enhancing cybersecurity practices and fostering a culture of security. They may provide educational resources, conduct research, and offer guidelines to help organizations and individuals safeguard their digital assets from cyber threats. Notably, there are non-profit organizations that are fully funded by tech leaders, reflecting a relatively different set of priorities. One prominent example is the Gates Foundation, established by Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates and Melinda French Gates, which plays a significant role in supporting initiatives proposed by Microsoft. Both the Gates Foundation and Microsoft are contributing to public welfare in an interconnected and rapidly evolving global landscape (Bouskill and Smith 2019). Given the strong links between these NGOs and private tech companies, subsequent case studies will also include them into the discussion.

1. Understanding the Mechanism: The Cases of a Huawei Exclusion (2019) and a Proposed TikTok Ban (2023) After providing an overview of four types of stakeholders, this paper will now discuss two representative cases—the exclusion of Huawei in 2019 and the proposal of a TikTok ban in 2023—for a better understanding of the role each stakeholder played in favoring or opposing specific foreign policymaking decisions for the United States. 85

The exclusion of Huawei from the US market was a complex process that involved a variety of stakeholders, from the US government to telecommunications companies like Cisco and Qualcomm. There was a concerted effort from these entities to influence the decision-making process leading to Huawei’s exclusion, due to concerns over national security, intellectual property theft, and potential espionage activities linked to the Chinese tech giant (“Telecoms and Tech Influence” 2019). In 2019, the Trump administration initiated a ban on Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei from operating within the US market. The ban was based on concerns over national security, particularly the potential for the Chinese government to use Huawei for spying on the US. The heightened competition in the race to roll out 5G wireless network infrastructure, an area where Huawei was an industry leader, also played a significant role in the decision (Kang and Sanger 2019). The US government, under the Trump administration, was one of the most active stakeholders in promoting the exclusion of Huawei. The US Department of Commerce’s decision to place Huawei on its Entity List in May 2019 was pivotal. This move effectively prohibited American companies from doing business with Huawei without a government license (Bureau of Industry and Security 2019). Key government stakeholders in favor of the exclusion included the US intelligence community, the Department of Defense, and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), all of which raised concerns about Huawei’s close ties to the Chinese government and the potential for espionage activities. The intelligence community’s stance was aligned with these concerns: in the Worldwide Threat Assessment report from 2019, they stated that China presents a persistent cyber espionage threat and a growing attack threat to our core military and critical infrastructure systems (Coats 2019). On the legislative side, Senators Marco Rubio and Mark Warner played a pivotal role in urging the government to safeguard the national telecommunications infrastructure. Rubio has been particularly vocal by tweeting that Huawei and ZTE are a “national security risk” for the US and its allies, if these Chinese telecom firms are given “unfettered access”

to US telecommunications infrastructure (Rubio 2020; Rubio 2018). Warner also expressed his concern by stating that he was worried that before Huawei was allowed to dominate the 5G market, “it is imperative that Congress address the complex security and competitiveness challenges that Chinese-directed telecommunication companies pose” (Warner 2022; Reardon 2020). Telecommunications companies like Cisco and Qualcomm also supported the exclusion, perceiving Huawei’s dominance in the 5G market as a threat to their market share. However, these companies were in a delicate position, as they also had substantial business dealings with Huawei. For instance, Qualcomm and Intel, which did an estimated $11 billion worth of business with Huawei in 2018, deployed lobbyists to engage with federal agencies and Capitol Hill, in order to seek exceptions to the exclusion order(Freifeld 2019). In the wake of Huawei’s blacklisting, high-ranking executives from Intel and Xilinx Inc. attended a meeting with the Commerce Department to discuss a response strategy. Qualcomm, another major player, also lobbied the Commerce Department over the issue. These tech companies argued that the units of Huawei that sell products such as smartphones and computer servers use commonly available parts and therefore do not present the same security risks as Huawei’s 5G networking gear (Telecompaper 2019). In essence, these companies were advocating to continue their business relationships with Huawei, with Qualcomm expressing a desire to continue shipping chips to Huawei for devices like phones and smartwatches. In this context, the exclusion was not a blanket ban but a more targeted approach among private sector stakeholders who focused on Huawei’s supply chain, specifically its 5G sub-sector, rather than its consumer cell phone manufacturing (Duchâtel 2023). Companies like Intel, Micron Technology, and Broadcom, which supplied critical components to Huawei, faced the prospect of losing a significant source of revenue; these companies expressed concerns about the potential economic impact of the ban, as well as the disruptions to their global supply chains. For instance, 87

Broadcom anticipated that the U.S.-China trade tensions and the Huawei ban would lead to a $2 billion decrease in annual sales. Lobbyists hired by Qualcomm argued that Huawei’s consumer products did not present the same security concerns as its 5G equipment, and they sought to continue shipping common parts to Huawei for devices like phones and smartwatches. The Semiconductor Industry Association, a trade group, also took part in discussions with the US government to convey the impact of the ban on its member companies, advocating that technologies unrelated to national security should not fall within the scope of the order. This sentiment was shared by Google, which sought to maintain its sales to Huawei, arguing that it was in compliance with the new rules. Google lobbied the government to continue its business with Huawei, as confirmed by Huawei’s chairman in an interview. Furthermore, Google’s parent company, Alphabet, engaged in substantial lobbying efforts due to its position within Huawei’s supply chain. In response to the pushback from the industry, the Commerce Department granted a temporary general license that allowed Huawei to purchase US goods to maintain the reliability of networks and equipment (Freifeld 2019). While its American partners were lobbying for a relaxation of the ban, Huawei itself made relatively little effort to directly influence the US government. Huawei’s vice president of public affairs clarified that the company had not explicitly asked anyone to lobby on its behalf — these lobbying efforts were initiated by the companies themselves, which saw Huawei as a major customer. Instead, Huawei was mainly focused on maintaining its image, investing in public relations campaigns, and defending itself against the US government’s allegations in court. Huawei launched a robust legal and public relations campaign to contest the US government’s allegations (Lee and Jiang 2019). The company even employed two public relations firms, Racepoint Global and Burson Cohn and Wolfe, to lead an influence campaign. Regarding lobbying efforts, it did consider sending a letter to the Commerce Department, but it is unclear if this ever materialized (Stacey 2019).

Civil liberties and free-market advocacy groups, such as the Cato Institute, were also critical of the exclusion (Ikenson 2019). These groups argued that the decision represented government overreach and could set a dangerous precedent for targeting other foreign-owned companies in the future. They emphasized the importance of due process and the potential implications for the global technology ecosystem. The lobbying efforts appeared to have some effect when the U.S. and China declared a trade truce after President Trump talked to President Xi, allowing U.S. companies to sell high-tech equipment to Huawei, albeit with a continued ban on goods related to national security. This decision was met with disappointment by members of Congress from both parties, who expressed concern over the significant efforts that would be required to reimplement the restrictions on Huawei if the need arose (Rampton and Martina 2019). By contrast, the possibility of banning TikTok has become a subject of intense debate in 2023 among a wide range of domestic stakeholders. With over one billion monthly active users worldwide, TikTok has become a cultural phenomenon, but its international reach has raised concerns about data privacy, national security, and foreign influence. Advocates for the ban argued that TikTok poses a unique threat to US national security due to its ability to collect vast amounts of user data and its ownership by the Chinese company ByteDance. They contended that TikTok’s data collection practices could provide the Chinese government with a trove of information about US citizens, including their locations, interests, and social networks (Treisman 2022). One vocal proponent of the ban was Senator Josh Hawley, a Republican from Missouri, who had long expressed concerns about the potential national security implications of Chinese-owned technology platforms operating in the US (Hawley 2020). Hawley introduced legislation aimed at prohibiting federal employees from using TikTok on government devices (Hawley 2019). The TikTok ban also garnered support from bipartisan lawmakers in Congress. For example, Democratic Senator 89

Chuck Schumer of New York and Republican Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas sent a joint letter to the Director of National Intelligence, requesting an assessment of the national security risks posed by TikTok (Office of Senator Tom Cotton). The bipartisan nature of the concern underscored the perceived gravity of the issue. In the public sector, the US intelligence community played a significant role in highlighting the potential risks associated with TikTok. Intelligence agencies, such as the FBI and the National Security Agency (NSA), expressed concerns about the app’s data privacy practices and the possibility of foreign influence campaigns (Fung 2023). It is also worth noting that some major US tech companies, such as Facebook and Google, may have viewed the ban as an opportunity to limit competition in the social media space. Facebook, in particular, had launched a TikTok-like feature called “Reels” on its Instagram platform, and the TikTok ban could have created an opening for such competing services. On the other side of the debate, TikTok itself actively pushed back against the proposed ban, launching a public relations campaign to assure users and policymakers of its commitment to data privacy and security. The company announced plans to open a “Transparency Center” in the US to provide insights into its data privacy practices, and it also appointed an American CEO to further distance itself from its Chinese parent company (Kang, Maheshwari, and Mccabe 2023). Similar to their position in the Huawei case, a group of civil liberties organization, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), and the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), opposed the proposed ban to TikTok, arguing that it would infringe upon First Amendment rights and the freedom of expression (ACLU 2023; ACLU of Montana 2023). These groups argued that while data privacy and security concerns were valid, an outright ban on TikTok was not the appropriate solution. Instead, they advocated for more comprehensive privacy legislation that would protect user data across all platforms, regardless of the country of origin. Some further contended that a ban would set a 90

dangerous precedent for government interference in social media and online content. The tech industry and some business groups also expressed concerns about the potential impact of the ban on the global technology ecosystem. They emphasized the importance of an open internet and warned against actions that could contribute to the balkanization of the digital world, as well as highlighted the potential negative impact on users who rely on TikTok for communication and entertainment. These advocacy groups used their platforms to raise public awareness about the issue, engage with policymakers, and provide expert testimony during congressional hearings; their perspectives contributed to the broader debate about the TikTok ban and the importance of nuanced policy solutions to address digital privacy challenges. The positions of major technology companies regarding US foreign policymaking toward China in the realm of cyberspace are not always consistent and may reflect divergent interests. Prominent technology corporations, including Microsoft, Google, and Facebook, have been known to provide financial support to advocacy organizations that champion open internet principles and advocate for legislative or diplomatic solutions to global data privacy protection. Philanthropic foundations, such as the MacArthur Foundation and the Ford Foundation, have also contributed support to these advocacy efforts. This phenomenon exemplifies the multifaceted nature of the private sector’s stance on US foreign policy concerning cyberspace and China — on the one hand, large technology companies may support certain government actions that lead to the exclusion of foreign competitors, as such measures can confer commercial benefits by reducing competition in the market. However, on the other hand, these same technology companies may value and promote principles of internet openness, data privacy, and global collaboration, which may not always align with the government’s or Congress’s policy approaches. The dual role of major technology companies as both profit-seeking enterprises and thought leaders in the private sector is reflected in their engagement with a range of stakeholders, including civil liberties and digital rights groups. The continuous and deliberate support

provided to these advocacy groups suggests a nuanced and complex approach to US foreign policymaking in cyberspace, where economic interests coexist with a commitment to democratic values and international cooperation. The cases of Huawei’s exclusion in 2019 and the proposed TikTok ban in 2023 offer insightful comparisons of the roles and preferences of various groups of stakeholders in the US as they navigated complex foreign policy decisions in cyberspace. While both cases involved concerns about Chinese technology companies and their potential impact on US national security and data privacy, the preferences and actions of stakeholders evolved in response to the unique dynamics of each case.

The continuous and deliberate support provided to these advocacy groups suggests a nuanced and complex approach to US foreign policymaking in cyberspace, where economic interests coexist with a commitment to democratic values and international cooperation.

The exclusion of the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei from the US market was primarily driven by national security considerations, stemming from concerns about potential espionage and threats to critical infrastructure. Key government agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security and the intelligence community, played a prominent role in advocating for this exclusion. Congress also showed bipartisan support for keeping Huawei out of the US market, with lawmakers from both parties perceiving the company as a potential conduit for Chinese government influence. However, while certain US tech companies competing in the telecommunications and network infrastructure sector may have supported Huawei’s exclusion, several major tech companies, particularly those with business interests in China, expressed concerns about the potential disruptions to global supply chains and technology cooperation. Their lobbying efforts to request exceptions for the purchase of non-national security-related items were successful, as the US De92

partment of Commerce granted such exceptions. This further underscores the notion that the Huawei case is primarily driven by national security concerns rather than broader economic or geopolitical considerations. It is influenced by the deteriorating relations between the United States and China, but not to the extent that economic interests are completely disregarded. In the case of TikTok, the proposed ban had a dual focus on US-China relations, aimed at countering Chinese influence campaigns and data privacy concerns. The debate extended beyond these issues to encompass matters of free expression and digital rights. This broader discussion touched upon the topic of data privacy issues within the social media platform, highlighting the relative lack of a robust privacy regime in the US, such as that of the EU. This divergence can be attributed, in part, to the diversity of stakeholders in the US. This expanded framing in the TikTok case attracted a more diverse range of stakeholders to engage in the discussion. Notably, civil liberties and digital rights advocacy groups, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), emerged as vocal opponents of the proposed TikTok ban. These groups advocated for more comprehensive privacy protections instead of targeted bans, finding support from major tech companies that share similar values regarding internet openness and user privacy. Additionally, content creators on TikTok, who were not a prominent stakeholder group in the Huawei case, became active participants in the TikTok debate. They emphasized the personal and economic implications of the ban while advocating for their right to free expression. In summary, the TikTok case involved a broader range of considerations, including U.S.-China relations, data privacy, free expression, and the impact on a variety of users. More involvement of civil liberties and digital rights groups compared to those in the Huawei case, as well as the participation of content creators, highlighted the complexity of the issue and the diverse array of stakeholders involved. Overall, while national security and data privacy concerns were prominent in 93

both the Huawei and TikTok cases, the composition and preferences of stakeholders differed, reflecting the unique context and implications of each case. In the Huawei case, government agencies and national security considerations were dominant, whereas in the TikTok case, a broader range of stakeholders, including advocacy groups and content creators, influenced the discourse. The evolution of stakeholder roles and preferences in these cases underscores the multifaceted nature of foreign policymaking in cyberspace and the need for nuanced consideration of a wide range of interests and values.

Hypothesis Testing: Impact on US-China Relations or Far Beyond? The influence of domestic stakeholders on US foreign policymaking in cyberspace, as exemplified by the Huawei and TikTok cases, raises important questions about the potential scope and reach of stakeholder impact. While these cases clearly demonstrate the significance of stakeholders’ preferences and actions in shaping US-China relations, it is critical to consider whether their impact extends beyond this bilateral relationship. To this end, this paper conducts a hypothesis test to assess the extent to which stakeholders’ actions influence foreign policymaking in other bilateral and multilateral contexts. The response variable is the scope of stakeholders’ impact on US foreign policymaking in cyberspace (limited to U.S.-China relations or extending to other bilateral and multilateral relations), and explanatory variables include stakeholders’ preferences, actions, and advocacy efforts regarding foreign policymaking in cyberspace, as well as the specific policy issues and contexts in which stakeholders are engaged. The null hypothesis (H0) posits that the impact of stakeholders’ actions is limited to the U.S.-China bilateral relationship, as quite a few media reports and policy analysis have assumed (Wells 2023; Gertz 2022). Conversely, the alternative hypothesis (H1) posits that stakeholders’ actions have wider-ranging effects beyond U.S.-China rela-

tions, influencing other bilateral relationships (e.g., EU-U.S. relations) and multilateral interactions. To test these hypotheses, evidence from the Huawei and TikTok cases is examined, and additional sources of evidence are considered. In the Huawei Case, the exclusion of Huawei from the US market influenced other countries’ approaches to the company. Following the US government’s decision, countries such as Australia and Japan implemented similar restrictions on Huawei’s participation in their 5G networks. Additionally, the US encouraged its European allies to take similar measures, resulting in divided responses within the EU. This suggests that stakeholder actions in the US can reverberate in other bilateral and multilateral contexts. In the TikTok case, the proposed TikTok ban sparked discussions in other countries about the handling of foreign-owned social media platforms. India, for example, implemented its own ban on TikTok, and the EU considered regulatory measures to address data privacy concerns. This case demonstrates that stakeholder-driven policy decisions in the US can set precedents that shape policy discussions globally. Regarding the advocacy groups who behaved actively in Huawei and TikTok cases, these stakeholders’ strong preference for international norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace has implications beyond U.S.-China relations. For example, Microsoft’s call for a Digital Geneva Convention influenced multilateral discussions at the United Nations. This engagement by a major tech company demonstrates the potential for stakeholders to shape broader global discourse. US tech companies and privacy advocacy groups have also actively engaged in debates surrounding transatlantic data flows. The EU-US Privacy Shield framework, which was invalidated by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2020, is an example of how US stakeholders’ preferences on data privacy impact relations with other key partners. In light of the evidence presented, the null hypothesis appears to be rejected in 95

favor of the alternative hypothesis – this result shows that the impact of domestic stakeholders’ actions is not limited to the US-China bilateral relationship but extends to influence other bilateral relations (e.g., EU-US) and multilateral interactions. The hypothesis test result underscores the multifaceted and far-reaching influence of US domestic stakeholders in foreign policymaking related to cybersecurity.

Conclusions and Discussion In conclusion, this study has shed light on the complexities and multifaceted nature of US foreign policymaking in cyberspace, particularly in the realms of cybersecurity and data privacy. Through an examination of the roles, preferences, and actions of various domestic stakeholders, the study illuminated how both public and private sector entities navigate the dynamic landscape of cybersecurity challenges and data privacy concerns. Key case studies, including the exclusion of Huawei and the proposed TikTok ban, exemplified the interaction of interests, priorities, and advocacy efforts in shaping policy outcomes in the context of U.S.-China relations. The significance of this study lies in its contribution to our understanding of the diverse and often competing interests that influence foreign policymaking in cyberspace. By highlighting the distinct roles and perspectives of government agencies, legislators, the private sector, advocacy groups, and other stakeholders, the study underscores the need for nuanced consideration of multiple interests and values in shaping policy decisions. Furthermore, the study’s exploration of the potential impact of stakeholders’ actions beyond bilateral relations to include multilateral and global contexts underscores the interconnectedness and global implications of cybersecurity and data privacy policies. To address these issues effectively, US foreign policymakers should consider the following practical implications. Firstly, policymakers need to strike a balance between data privacy and national security concerns. They should develop comprehensive legal frameworks and regula-

tions that protect individuals’ privacy rights while ensuring robust national security measures. This can be achieved by establishing clear guidelines on data collection, storage, and usage, along with strong oversight mechanisms to prevent abuse. Secondly, considering the ripple effect of the influence of domestic stakeholders, policymakers should promote international cooperation and engagement to address these challenges. Collaborative efforts with other nations can foster the development of common standards and norms for data privacy and cybersecurity, enabling consistent protection across borders. Thirdly, policymakers must recognize the interconnectedness of economic interests and data privacy. They should seek to create an enabling environment for innovation and economic growth while safeguarding privacy rights. This can be achieved through the implementation of privacy-by-design principles for a country with multiple stakeholders like the US. Such principles would promote responsible data practices and foster public-private partnerships to develop privacy-enhancing technologies. More importantly, policymakers should engage a diverse range of stakeholders, including emerging interest groups like content creators in TikTok, in the decision-making process. Consulting with these new stakeholders can help policymakers better understand different perspectives, identify potential trade-offs, and develop policies that are both effective and acceptable to various stakeholders. Despite its valuable contributions, this study has certain limitations. While the study on the Huawei case successfully provides a comprehensive explanation of how different stakeholders lobby for their interests and interact with one another in supporting or opposing the exclusion of Huawei, the study on the TikTok case lacks sufficient evidence to construct a similarly comprehensive narrative of stakeholder interactions prior to the early 2023 hearing. This scarcity of analysis can be attributed to the recency of the incident, resulting in a limited amount of available research.

Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that the scope of this study is confined to two specific incidents and may not fully capture the complete range of stakeholder interactions and policy considerations in other contexts. The rapidly evolving nature of technology and geopolitical dynamics also poses challenges in gathering extensive data for quantitative hypothesis testing or extrapolating current findings to future policy scenarios. Looking ahead, there are several areas that merit further development and research. One such area pertains to the case of TikTok, which has sparked a debate among different interest groups in the US regarding the need for a robust data privacy regulation akin to the EU’s framework for social media data. Some members of Congress have expressed concerns about data privacy in relation to TikTok, while showing little interest in implementing similar regulations on US social media platforms operated by large tech firms. This discrepancy raises important questions about the motivations and priorities behind these policy positions and warrants further investigation. Moreover, while this study provides limited space for discussing the role of military stakeholders, it is evident that the military has a keen interest in cybersecurity and data privacy protection. As they increasingly explore AI-based technologies and advancements in warfare within combat units, it is essential to examine the specific offices and departments within the Department of Defense (DoD) and their roles in influencing US foreign policymaking in cyberspace. The Appendix (b) of this paper provides initial findings on the interests and roles of relevant military entities, which serve as the next step in expanding our understanding. Overall, this study has illuminated the complexities and challenges of US foreign policymaking in cyberspace, while also identifying promising avenues for future research. As technology continues to transform our world, understanding the interplay of stakeholders in the digital domain will be crucial for ensuring an inclusive global cyberspace.

Appendix a) Comparison Table of public sector stakeholders The table is meant to serve as an overview of the stakeholders’ general areas of interest and priorities; please note that the specific priorities and policy positions of each stakeholder may vary based on individual members, leadership, or context. Additionally, the table only includes major public sector stakeholders in US foreign policymaking in cyberspace, and there may be other relevant stakeholders in the US public sector that are not listed in this table. Category

Name of the Stakeholder

Affiliated Institutions (if applicable)

Government

Department of State

Department of Homeland Security Department of Justice

Department of Commerce

Role inside foreign policymaking mechanism in cyberspace Execution; Diplomacy; Oversight Execution; Lawmaking; Oversight Lawmaking; Oversight; Enforcement Execution; Lawmaking; Oversight

Prioritize Open Internet or National Security Both

Other Special Priority

Promoting International Norms

Nation- Critical Inal Secu- frastructure rity Protection Nation- Legal Enal Secu- forcement and rity Cybercrime Open Internet

Digital Trade and Commerce

Congress

100

House Subcommittee on Communications and Technology House Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce House Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Innovation House Subcommittee on National Security

House LawmakCommittee ing; Overon Energy sight and Commerce

Open Internet

Telecommunications and Cybersecurity

House LawmakCommittee ing; Overon Energy sight and Commerce

Open Internet

Consumer Privacy and Data Protection

House LawmakCommiting; Overtee on sight Homeland Security

Nation- Critical Inal Secu- frastructure rity Protection

House LawmakCommittee ing; Overon Oversight sight and Reform House Sub- House Lawmakcommittee Committee ing; Overon Research on Science, sight and Technol- Space, and ogy Technology Senate Sub- Senate Lawmakcommittee Committee ing; Overon Commu- on Comsight nications, merce, Technology, Science, Innovation, and Transand the Inportation ternet Senate Sub- Senate Lawmak-

Nation- Countering Cyal Secu- ber Espionage rity

committee

Committee ing; Over-

al Secu- Operations

on Cyberse-

on Armed

rity

curity

Services

sight

Open Internet

Innovation and Emerging Technologies

Open Internet

Internet Governance and Infrastructure

Nation- Military Cyber

Military

Cyber Com-

Depart-

Execution; Nation- Defending DoD

mand

ment of

Oversight

National Se-

Defense Depart-

rity Execution; Nation- Signals Intel-

curity Agen-

ment of

Oversight

cy (NSA)

Defense

al Secu- Networks

al Secu- ligence and rity

Information

Chief Digi-

Depart-

Execution; Both

Assurance Advancement

tal Artificial

ment of

Oversight

of AI and Digi-

Intelligence

Defense

Office

tal Modernization

b) Current Findings of the role of US Military (Department of Defense/DoD) in influencing the US foreign policymaking related to cyberspace The US military, through the Department of Defense, plays a significant role in protecting US national interests in the cyber domain besides the executive and legislative branches of the US government. Besides the summary in the text and in Appendix (a), here are some key points to consider: Cyber Command: The US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) is a major component of the DoD responsible for conducting cyberspace operations, defending DoD networks, and providing cyber capabilities to combatant commanders. The commander of USCYBERCOM plays a crucial role in advising policymakers on cybersecurity strategies, capabilities, and threats. Their input and expertise contribute to shaping U.S. foreign policy decisions on cyber defense and deterrence. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA): DISA is an agency within the DoD that provides secure and reliable communications and information systems for the military. It plays a role in developing and implementing policies related to cyberspace infrastructure and operations. 101

Bibliography ACLU. “Congressional Efforts to Ban Tiktok in the U.S. Remain a Danger to Free Speech.” American Civil Liberties Union, March 23, 2023. https://www.aclu. org/press-releases/congressional-efforts-to-ban-tiktok-in-the-u-s-remain-adanger-to-free-speech. ACLU of Montana. “Coalition Letter Opposing Montana House Bill That Would Ban TikTok.” American Civil Liberties Union, April 11, 2023. https://www.aclu.org/documents/coalition-letter-opposing-montana-house-bill-that-would-ban-tiktok. Borghard, Erica D. “Protecting Financial Institutions Against Cyber Threats: A National Security Issue.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018. http://

www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20722.

Bouskill, K. E., & Smith, E. “Global Health and Security: Threats and Opportunities.” RAND Corporation, 2019. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19904. Bureau of Industry and Security, “Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List, Final Rule Effective May 16, 2019,” U.S. Department of Commerce, last modified May 16, 2019, https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/all-articles/17-regulations/ 1555-addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-list-final-rule-effectivemay-16-2019. Coats, Daniel R. “2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community.” Congressional Testimonies, 2019. https://www.odni.gov/index .php/ newsroom/congressional-testimonies/item/1947-statement-for-the-recordworldwide-threat-assessment-of-the-us-intelligence-community. Duchâtel, Mathieu. “Huawei’s 5G Supply Chain: Taiwan Winning Twice?” Institut Montaigne. Accessed May 8, 2023. https://www.institutmontaigne.org/ en/ expressions/huaweis-5g-supply-chain-taiwan-winning-twice. Freifeld, Karen. “Exclusive: U.S. May Scale Back Huawei Trade Restrictions to Help Existing Customers.” Reuters, May 17, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-usa-huawei-tech-exclusive-idUSKCN1SN2QA.

103

Fung, Brian. “US Senators Unveil Bipartisan Bill Empowering Biden to Ban TikTok and Other Services | CNN Business.” CNN, March 8, 2023. https://www.cnn. com/2023/03/07/tech/senators-bill-tiktok-ban/index.html. Gertz, Geoffrey. “Why Is the Trump Administration Banning TikTok and WeChat?” Brookings, March 9, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/ 2020/08/07/why-is-the-trump-administration-banning-tiktok-and-wechat/. Hawley, Josh. “TikTok, National Security Threats the Focus of Hawley’s ‘Dangerous Partners’.” Senator Josh Hawley, March 4, 2020. https://www.hawley. senate.gov/tiktok-national-security-threats-focus-hawleys-dangerous-partners-big-tech-and-beijing-hearing. Hawley, Josh. “Senator Hawley Introduces Bill to Address National Security Concerns Raised by Big Tech’s Partnerships with Beijing.” Senator Josh Hawley, November 18, 2019. https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senator- hawley-introduces-bill-address-national-security-concerns-raised-big-techs-partnerships. Healey, Jason. “Who’s in Control: Balance in Cyber’s Public-Private Sector Partnerships.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 18, no. 3 (2017): 120– 30. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26395931. Ikenson, Daniel J. “Blacklisting Huawei Could Cost Trillions, so Let’s Look Before We Leap.” Cato Institute, July 5, 2019. https://www.cato.org/commentary/ blacklisting-huawei-could-cost-trillions-so-lets-look-we-leap. Ireland, Leslie. “21st Century Intelligence: The Need for a One-Team-One-Fight Approach.” PRISM 7, no. 1 (2017): 46–57. http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 26470497. Kang, Cecilia, and David E. Sanger. “Huawei Is a Target as Trump Moves to Ban Foreign Telecom Gear.” The New York Times, May 15, 2019. https://www. nytimes.com/2019/05/15/business/huawei-ban-trump.html. Kang, Cecilia, Sapna Maheshwari, and David Mccabe. “TikTok’s New Defense in Washington: Going on the Offense.” The New York Times, January 26, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/26/technology/tiktok-bytedance-data-security.html. Lanhee Lee, Jane and Sijia Jiang, “Huawei’s U.S. research arm slashes jobs as trade ban bites,” Reuters, July 22, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us- huawei-tech-usa-layoffs-idUSKCN1UH23D.

104

Lynch, Allen C. “The Realism of Russia’s Foreign Policy.” Europe-Asia Studies 53, no. 1 (2001): 7–31. http://www.jstor.org/stable/826237. Maurer, Tim. “Cybersecurity and Asia.” New America, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/resrep10468. O’Connor, Nuala, Alethea Lange, and Ali Lange. “Privacy in the Digital Age.” Great Decisions, 2015, 17–28. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44214790. Office of Senator Tom Cotton. “Cotton, Schumer request assessment of national security risks posed by China-owned video-sharing platform, TikTok, a potential counterintelligence threat with over 110 million downloads in U.S., alone.” US Senate, 23 Oct 2019. https://www.cotton.senate.gov/news/ press-releases/ cotton-schumer-request-assessment-of-national-security-risks-posed-by-china-owned-video-sharing-platform-tiktok-a-potential-counterintelligence-threat-with-over-110-million-downloads-in-us-alone. Pozen, David E. “Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs.” The University of Chicago Law Review 83, no. 1 (2016): 221–47. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43741598. Rampton, Roberta, and Michael Martina. “Trump Says China Trade Talks ‘back on Track,’ New Tariffs on Hold.” Reuters, June 28, 2019. https://www.reuters. com/article/cbusiness-us-g20-summit-trade-idCAKCN1TT373-OCABS. Reardon, Marguerite. “Nervous about Huawei, US Senators Propose over $1B in 5G Subsidies.” CNET, January 14, 2020. https://www.cnet.com/tech/mobile/ senators-propose-more-than-1-billion-in-subsidies-to-fund-5g-alternativesto-chinas-huawei/. Rich, Jessica. “After 20 Years of Debate, It’s Time for Congress to Finally Pass a Baseline Privacy Law.” Brookings, March 9, 2022. https://www.brookings. edu/blog/techtank/2021/01/14/after-20-years-of-debate-its-time-for-congress-to-finally-pass-a-baseline-privacy-law/. Rubio, Marco. “It Is True @potus Did What Previous Administration Didn’t Do.” Twitter, June 12, 2018. https://twitter.com/marcorubio/status/ 1006505055032311808 Rubio, Marco. “Sen. Rubio Applauded the @FCC Action to Protect U.S. Communications Networks from Security Risks by Designating #Huawei and #ZTE as National Security Threats.” Twitter, July 1, 2020. https://twitter.com/SenMarcoRubio/status/1278321459857932291. 105

Schwitz, John G. “Risk-Based Cybersecurity Policy.” American Intelligence Journal 29, no. 1 (2011): 115–25. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26201928. Snyder, Glenn H. “Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay.” International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): 149–73. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092155. Stacey, Kiran. “Huawei Turns to US Group in Public Relations Battle.” Financial Times, March 26, 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/7f32addc-4f34-11e9b401-8d9ef1626294. Telecompaper. “US Chip Suppliers Quietly Push Commerce Dept to Ease Ban on Huawei.” Telecompaper, June 18, 2019. https://www.telecompaper.com/ news/us-chip-suppliers-quietly-push-commerce-dept-to-ease-ban-on-huawei-report--1297178. “Telecoms & Tech Influence: Huawei under the microscope,” OpenSecrets.org, last modified July 2019, https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/07/ huawei-under-the-microscope/. Treisman, Rachel. “The FBI Alleges TikTok Poses National Security Concerns.” NPR, November 17, 2022. https://www.npr.org/2022/11/17/1137155540/ fbi-tiktok-national-security-concerns-china. U.S. Department of Commerce. “Global Cross-Border Privacy Rules Declaration.” U.S. Department of Commerce. https://www.commerce.gov/globalcross-border-privacy-rules-declaration. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. “Cybersecurity.” Cybersecurity | Homeland Security. Accessed May 8, 2023. https://www.dhs.gov/topics/cybersecurity. U.S. Department of Justice. “276. Treaty Requests.” The United States Department of Justice, January 22, 2020. https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminalresource-manual-276-treaty-requests. U.S. Department of State. “Cyber Issues - United States Department of State.” U.S .Department of State, April 4, 2022. https://www.state.gov/policy-issues/ cyber-issues/. Warner, Mark. “Sen. Warner Applauds FCC Plan to Ban Sale of New Huawei and ZTE Devices.” Mark R. Warner, October 13, 2022. https://www.warner. senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2022/10/sen-warner-applauds-fcc-decision-to106

ban-sale-of-new-huawei-and-zte-devices.

Wells, Georgia E. “Tiktok Fight Rocks U.S.-China Relations.” The Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2023. https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-ban-ceo- congress-hearing-4bca3e2a. White, M. “A Natural Partner? Intelligence Cooperation with India and Australia’s Regional Interests.” Security Challenges 16, no.2 (2020): 88–105. https:// www.jstor.org/stable/26910354

107

Virginia Journal of International Affairs Fall 2023 University of Virginia Printed by Bailey Printing Inc., Charlottesville, Virginia Sponsored by the International Relations Organization, a contracted independent organization