More Informed Than Ever, As Divided As Never: A Comparative Analysis Of The Connection Between Media Trust and Political Polarization

By Sophie Roehse

About the Author

Sophie Roehse is a fourth-year student in the College of Arts and Sciences from Hamburg, Germany, with majors in Foreign Affairs and Spanish. In light of her German-American background, she enjoys studying transatlantic affairs and holds a particular interest in the issue of international migration. As part of the Politics Distinguished Majors Program, she is currently working on a thesis examining the discrepancy in migration policy actions towards unaccompanied minors between the United States and Germany in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Aside from academics, Sophie is an intern at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, working for the Presidential Recordings Program and the Project on Democracy and Capitalism, and is a photographer for the Cavalier Daily. In her free time, she enjoys spending time with friends, exploring the Charlottesville area, reading, and traveling.

Over the past few years, national politics in both the United States and Germany have become more contentious, and radical views have permeated into major government institutions. A series of similar issues has generated significant pushbacks in both countries, manifesting as extremist wings in the Democratic and Republican Parties in the United States and the rise of populist parties and civic movements in Germany. Nonetheless, differences exist between the two countries with regard to the nature of polarization, the lines of political division, and possible contributing factors, which this paper aims to explore.

The first section provides an overview of the nature of polarization in both countries, suggesting that affective polarization dominates in the United States and issue polarization dominates in Germany. Next follows a study of opinions towards the news media and trust in media outlets among different political groups, revealing that the German public holds greater perceptions of confidence and credibility towards the media across the political spectrum than its American counterpart. Finally, the third part establishes the close connections between the nature of mass polarization, lines of political division, and media trust. The paper concludes that general skepticism of and low confidence in the news media, in addition to selfselection of outlets, further deepens the political divide and raises partisan attachment in the United States. In Germany, supporters of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) exhibit different media attitudes than supporters of the center-right and -left parties, yet overall higher levels of trust and more uniform consumption patterns contribute to divisions based on divergent issue positions rather than identity. Though the piece regards views of the news media as a relevant contributor to mass polarization in the two countries, it recognizes other explanatory factors, as well as manners in which the relation may be mutually reinforcing.

Introduction

Democracies across the globe are facing challenges that reach beyond policy issues and instead target core democratic structures. In the United States, increasing animosity across the political aisle and an inability to reach consensus in decision-making has raised doubts about the functioning of American political institutions, while waves of populism in Europe have progressed past the mass public to the height of national governments. Recently, political polarization, broadly defined as a state of division into two antithetical factions with regard to policy, ideology or partisanship, has been blamed for this trend of democratic backsliding (McCarty 2019, 8-9). However, there are critical differences across countries with respect to the nature of political polarization, the underlying causes, as well as future implications. As a contribution to existing studies, this paper offers a comparative analysis of the nature of mass polarization in the United States and Germany. More specifically, it investigates how different levels of trust in the news media are associated with the division of the political spheres in the two countries.

The basis of my theory assumes that political polarization among the mass public exists in both the United States and Germany but that the lines of division extend along different categories. In the American case, citizens are principally split by affective identity, or partisan identification with either the Democratic or Republican side. In Germany, however, opinions on specific policy issues, rather than political parties, emerge as the primary driver of polarization. The two countries also exhibit divergent public attitudes towards the news media that relate to their different sorts of division. As the key link of communication between the political world and the populace, the media may thus hold a formidable role in perpetuating societal cleavages. In a review of existing literature, this work highlights the distinct nature of polarization in the U.S. and Germany, followed by an analysis of public trust in the media that correlates with the different types of polarization. The investigation exposes attitudes towards the news media as both a potential contributor to and consequence of mass polarization, as may be inferred from perceptions of proficiency and objectivity, consumption habits, and notions of trustworthiness that appear connected to respective political divides.

In the United States, the salience of identity in the public consciousness has significantly increased over the past decades. This trend permeates the political arena as well, driving polarization in accordance with personal identity as opposed to issue preference. The book Uncivil Agreement explores this phenomenon and argues that a process of social sorting has caused partisanship to represent more than political positions. In today’s America, party divisions encompass differences in ideological, religious, and racial identities as well, thus generating social homogeneity within the Democratic and Republican parties (Mason 2018, 6). As parties evolve into manifestations of supra-political identities, the author shows that this new fundamental line of division amplifies attachment to one’s own “in-group” and the aversion to the other “out-group” (Mason 2018, 66). On the one hand, this negatively impacts opinions towards people on the other side of the political spectrum, leading to infrequent cross-partisan interactions and heightened prejudice and intolerance of disparate views (Mason 2018, 6162). On the other hand, Mason (2018) reveals that sorting now supersedes substantive conflicts of policy, suggesting that party identification replaces views on objective issues in political decision-making (72-73). As such, investment in one’s own party winning exceeds interest in the advancement of policy solutions for the greater good, placing partisanship above substance (Mason 2018, 54). This finding provides a somber outlook for the future of American politics if conditions remain unchanged, considering the significance of bipartisan compromise and cooperation for the proper functioning of American government.

Furthermore, a piece by Iyengar et al. (2012) also presents a notion of polarization in the United States that shifts focus to the concept of social identity over division based on policy preferences (406). Employing a series of national and international studies, the authors’ findings reveal that the opinions of Americans towards their political opponents have notably decreased. First, they demonstrate that the possibility of inter-party marriage garnered rising levels of resentment among the American public between 1960 to 2010 (Iyengar et al. 2012, 417-418). Next, negative stereotypes of supporters of the other party and favoritism to the own party – with regard to perceptions of intelligence and selfishness – both rose from 1960 to 2008, thus driving feelings at the two ends of the political spectrum farther apart (Iyengar et al. 2012, 420). These results show that partisanship in the United States extends to the personal level. It constitutes the primary indicator of identity, even exceeding differences of race or religion (Iyengar et al. 2012, 415). Written six years later, Mason’s results amplify awareness of how intense the effect of partisanship can become if other social identities are divided along the political line as well. Finally, Iyengar et al. discover that attachment to parties surpassed attachment to issue positions in 2004 and has significantly intensified compared to policy. They hence claim that partisanship today is of affective nature and constitutes a factor of selfdefinition, not simply an indicator of ideological preferences (Iyengar et al. 2012, 423-424). Antipathy towards political opponents and growing distance across the partisan spectrum relies not on substantive matters, but on more

2012, 427).

In their groundbreaking book on democratic backsliding, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) provide a final endorsement of the view that affective identity is the principal category of polarization in the United States. They point to legislative gridlock, government shutdowns, and electoral changes as adverse signs of the extreme partisan divide and claim that political divisions have come to encompass racial, religious, geographical, and lifestyle differences as well (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 167). Party association today is “not just a partisan affiliation but an identity” and the opposition is perceived as a genuine threat, instead of merely representing divergent policy preferences (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 168). This demonstrates the deep cleavage of the American political and social spheres that reaches to the most personal level of affective identity.

In a 2021 Journal of Democracy piece, Shari Berman and Hans Kundnani present Europe as a “mirror image” of the United States in considering the drivers of democratic regress and rising antipathy in the populaces (23). While they attribute deepening political divisions in the United States to the rising salience of partisan identity, they establish that in Europe right-wing populism is driving cleavages, as mainstream parties of the center-left and center-right have shifted closer together from their historically distinct profiles (Berman & Kundnani 2021, 23). The authors recognize the power of polarization to change attitudes and imperil the proper functioning of core democratic institutions, but they contend that divergent party platforms and strong partisan attachment are not inherently harmful. In Germany, differences in policy profiles and support bases of the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), the two mainstream parties of the left and right, generated high levels of partisanship and stable patterns of electoral competition during the post-WWII period (Berman & Kundnani 2021, 24).

Expanding on the conventional literature, Berman and Kundnani (2021) argue that the loss of distinction among political alternatives can harm a democracy, as voters feel that mainstream parties are detached from mass preferences and thus look to populists, particularly on the right, to seek responses on topics relevant to them (33). Over the past decades, ideological convergence of the center-left and center-right in Germany, most clearly evidenced by the three “grand coalitions” of SPD and CDU/CSU under Chancellor Merkel, destabilized the previously stable electoral environment (Berman and Kundnani 2021, 23). On the one hand, the authors assert that changes in the economic approach of the SPD motivated the emergence of “Die Linke” (The Left), a democratic-socialist party promoting workers’ rights and anti-capitalist ideas (Berman and Kundnani 2021, 29). On the other hand, the cultural transformation of the CDU towards a more multiculturally-oriented and immigration-friendly party estranged traditionally-minded adherents, prompting greater support for the rightwing populist “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) (Berman and Kundnani 2021, 30-31). Though the authors refer to the European case as “ideological convergence,” I view this development as polarization that creates division between mainstream and populist parties, rather than between the left and right.

In another piece, authors Berman and Snegovaya (2019) study in detail the stances of European political parties and point to the reorientation of Social Democrats on economic policy as the key driving factor of populism, particularly on the extreme right (6). The center-left, including the German SPD, acceded to a “neoliberal consensus” previously advocated by the center-right, accepting greater market authority relative to government (Berman and Snegovaya 2019, 7-9). In response to SPD’s economic policy pivot, right-wing populist parties adapted their platforms to integrate the economic discontent of those traditional social democratic voters. They began promoting greater social welfare and denouncing expanding competencies of the European Union. Moreover, increasing agreement between the mainstream left and right on economics shifted attention to issues in the cultural and social realms,enabling new forms of party distinction. With the CDU becoming more moderate in the cultural and social arena in Germany, particularly since Merkel’s chancellorship, the populist right seized the opportunity to appeal to more extreme voters. The AfD emphasized its conservative stances regarding immigration and national identity and thus captured those long-standing supporters of the CDU/CSU alienated by their party’s realignment (Berman and Snegovaya 2019, 9-11).

In considering implications for democracy, Berman and Snegovaya (2019) stress that social and cultural affairs introduce more complex considerations in contrast to economic matters. The authors contend that economic disputes are more amenable to compromise and tradeoffs, while many traditionalists view national culture and identity as zero-sum. They apply this assessment to the current populist movement in Europe, including the right-wing AfD in Germany. They even hint at a crisis of democracy due to insufficient responsiveness of the established European center-left and center-right towards their base voters (Berman and Snegovaya 2019, 15-16). The contemporary primacy of social and cultural matters thus facilitates unity among supporters of the populist right despite underlying disagreements on economic preferences (Berman and Snegovaya 2019, 16).

Finally, a 2018 paper entitled “The Illusion of Radical Right Partisan Stability” offers a response to the frequent claim that populist voters are opponents of the political establishment per se, or “anti-system voters” (Chou et al. 2018, 2). The authors perform a panel study and experiment to resolve whether support stems from a fundamental attachment to populist causes using the German example of the Alternative for Germany (Chou et al. 2018, 3). Their research reveals that AfD voters really constitute “frustrated issue publics,” basing choices on appropriate representation of interests (Chou et al. 2018, 2). According to the results, the undeviating, uniform positioning of both center-left and center-right on the major issue of immigration perpetuated strong support for the right-wing populist party over past years, which offers the only conservative policy option in terms of borders, migrant ceilings, and national identity. However, in a hypothetical study of mainstream party movement towards more restrictive positions on immigration, a significant proportion of AfD voters choose established groups over the populists. The authors infer that stability of right-wing extremist support is an “illusion” sustained by the inability of the center-left and center-right to better accommodate public preferences on contested issues such as immigration (Chou et al. 2018, 3-4).

The literature reveals that in the United States, strong party attachment and increasing alignment of social and political identities transforms partisanship into a factor of self-definition. This sense of affective identity has emerged as the most potent driver of polarization among the American public. In Germany, on the other hand, opinions on specific questions perceived as important by individuals appear more relevant to political positioning than devotion to a specific party. In contrast to the U.S., the right-wing AfD indicates a political division of the public advanced by divergent issue positions of mainstream parties versus populists, rather than a fundamental identification with partisan identity. More specifically, the sense of invisibility among many voters with conservative views on cultural and social issues caused a notable part of the electorate to support the populists as the only political “alternative” to adequately represent their preferences. In both countries, the focus on culture and identity over economic matters constitutes the greatest threat to democratic values and the proper functioning of institutions. In the United States, this has produced gridlock due to an inability to reach cross-partisan consensus. In Germany, it has propelled extreme issue polarization, due to the center-right and center-left’s lack of distinct social and cultural policy offerings.

A trusting relationship between the news media and the public in the United States appears deficient, as several studies exhibit. Many Americans seem to view the media as an opponent – subject to doubt and denunciation – instead of a member of their own team in making sense of the political world and beyond. A telephone survey conducted by Gallup, Inc. in late-summer of 2020 among U.S. adults indicates this low level of trust in the media across the populace (Brenan 2020). The results reveal that less than one in ten adults hold “a great deal” of trust and confidence that news reports are “fully, accurately, and fairly” depicted, while 60% of the public admit they trust the media “not very much” or not “at all” (Brenan 2020). The combined 40% “great deal” and “fair amount” of confidence in 2020 stands among the lowest recorded numbers over past decades, with Americans’ trust in the media ranging around 70% in the 1970s and 55% in 1999 (Brenan 2020).

Closely connected to this lack of trust is the low ratings the news media receive on the quality of information they provide. As a survey conducted between November 2019 and February 2020 through a collaborative effort by Gallup and the Knight Foundation (2020) demonstrates, almost half of Americans perceive “a great deal” of political bias in news coverage (6). A combined total of 83% of adults in the United States discerned a “great deal” or “fair amount” of bias in news reports in both 2017 and 2019, as opposed to 62% and 67% in 2007 and 2012 (Gallup 2020, 6). The perceived lack of objectivity stems from concerns about outlets promoting particular viewpoints, partiality in the selection of issues covered and omitted, as well as prejudice in the presentation of objective stories (Gallup 2020, 7). Nonetheless, the public in principle attributes a crucial role to the news media as a mechanism to hold powerful actors accountable and communicate information on relevant issues. Besides low trust levels, the same survey found that 42% of the U.S. public viewed the news media as critically important to American democracy, while an additional 39% viewed it as “very important” (Gallup 2020, 14). It is thus not the disregard for the media as an institution driving cold opinions, but a sense of inadequate fulfillment of core democratic responsibilities.

Though Americans hold generally critical views of the media, significant differences exist among the supporters of the two political parties. According to the effort by Gallup and the Knight Foundation, “party affiliation remains the key predictor of attitudes about the news media” in 2020 (Gallup 2020, 1). Republicans’ negative opinions stand out in particular, while Democrats hold more favorable views. In assessing basic attitudes towards the news media, 67% of Republicans feel “somewhat” or “very” unfavorable, in contrast to over half of Democrats who report “somewhat” or “very” positive opinions of the news media (Gallup 2020, 19). Moreover, the 2020 Gallup, Inc. telephone survey reveals a drastic gap in levels of confidence in adequate coverage between the two parties. While 2016 exhibited a stark drop among Republicans, their trust hit a record-low in 2020 with only 10% conveying great or fair confidence. No confidence “at all” was expressed by almost 60% of Republicans. Democrats, conversely, came close to a record-high at 73% holding great or fair confidence (Brenan 2020).

With regard to perceived undue influence in news reports, the views of Democratic identifiers are far more favorable than the national average, with just over one quarter perceiving “a great deal” of political bias, as opposed to almost half of all Americans. Republican identifiers express the most hesitant views, with 68% observing “a great deal” of news bias (Gallup 2020, 6). When it comes to assessing the value of news media in society, both Democrats and Republicans attribute a high relevance to the news media, with 96% and 91%, respectively, recognizing at least some importance for democracy in 2019 (Gallup 2020, 14). Yet the partisan divide becomes clear again when considering the practical realization of roles. While half of Democrats deem the news media as carrying out its functions “well” or “very well,” 67% of Republicans assess the media as supporting democracy “poorly” or “very poorly” (Gallup 2020, 21). In considering a specific issue, less than half of Americans perceive coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic to be “largely accurate,” “for the benefit of the public,” or “helping the country” (Gottfried et al. 2020, 6). Republicans remain particularly critical of media performance during the pandemic outbreak, with majorities expressing that news is mostly inaccurate, benefitting the outlet, and harmful to the country. On all of these accounts, majorities of Democrats hold the opposite views (Gottfried et al. 2020, 8).

Perhaps as a response to the divergent levels of confidence in the news media, Democrats and Republicans in the United States drift apart in the news outlets they typically turn to for reliable political coverage. A Pew Research Center survey executed in the fall of 2019 makes this clear. Over half of Democrats consult CNN on a regular basis for politics and election news, while six in ten Republicans get this type of information from Fox News (Jurkowitz et al. 2020, 17). These consumption behaviors are relevant, as they reflect differential levels of trust partisans place in certain sources. Democratic identifiers indicate CNN as their most trusted outlet, whereas Fox News is most trusted by Republican supporters (Jurkowitz et al. 2020, 10). In reverse, the most trusted outlets for each party constitute the most distrusted one for the other, with 61% of Democrats doubting the reliability of Fox News and 58% of Republicans feeling this way about CNN (Jurkowitz et al. 2020, 12).

In Germany, an overall high level of positivity towards the media sector and its supply of information becomes evident throughout a number of studies. The German research institute Infratest dimap in fall 2020 conducted a series of telephone surveys to gain insights into the attitudes of Germans over the age of 18 towards the media (Infratest dimap 2020).

Most importantly, the research reveals that an overwhelming majority of the public perceives the information supplied by the media as highly valuable, with 90% of respondents offering a consistent “good” or “very good” rating from 2018 to 2020, up from 88% in 2015 and 89% in 2016. Moreover, the collected data indicate a considerable rise in media credibility among the public, from 52% in 2015 to 67% in 2020 – with the exception of a slight drop in 2019 (Infratest dimap 2020, 7). With respect to public broadcasting in particular, the öffentlich-rechtlicher Rundfunk, which makes up 60% of total annual broadcast spending in Germany (“Public” n.d.), the various outlets show an overall increase in positive attitudes in 2020 compared to 2019. For public broadcast television, radio, and online sources, credibility rose from the previous year’s rating. The perception of balance in media reporting also increased for public broadcast television and radio in 2020 (Infratest dimap 2020, 9).

Focusing more on the intersection of media and politics, Germans have growing confidence in the independence of news sources. The percentage of study respondents rejecting the notion of governmental influence on the selection of issues for coverage increased from 54% in 2015 to 60% in 2020, while the proportion of those concerned with governmental influence decreased from 42% to 35% in the same time period (Infratest dimap 2020, 12). In assessing different attitudes by party affiliation, the differences remain comparatively small among the two established parties of the center-left, the SPD, and the center-right, the CDU/CSU. First, the view of credibility of information presented by the German media reached 79% among those identifying as Christian Democrats and 77% among Social Democrats, while the lowest view of credibility was held by affiliates of the populist right Afd at 23% (Infratest dimap 2020, 24). Second, the vast majority of citizens across the board rate the quality of information supplied by the media as “good” or “very good”, with the CDU/CSU and SPD at 95% and 98%, respectively, and even the AfD at 65% (Infratest dimap 2020, 21). Finally, in centering on the quality of reporting on a specific issue, 90% of Christian Democrats and 85% of Social Democrats deem coverage of the coronavirus pandemic as “very good” or “good,” while only 50% of AfD identifiers reported this assessment (Infratest dimap 2020, 34).

Additional notable information comes from a study by Pew Research Center on political and media attitudes throughout eight European countries, including Germany, in late-2017 (Mitchell 2018). Most fundamentally, an inquiry about the perceived importance of the news media for society suggests that Germans highly value the role of the news media, with 61% of respondents expressing they find it “very” important, while an additional 29% view it as “somewhat” important (Mitchell 2018). With respect to media trust, the survey recorded that 20% of Germans have “a lot” of trust in the news media, while 44% trust it “somewhat” (Mitchell 2018).

Beyond a general inquiry of opinions, the Pew survey also reveals differences in media attitudes depending on political views. In terms of ideological affiliation with the political right or left, identifiers on the right hold slightly more negative opinions in rating the importance of the news media in society and its trustworthiness. Of greater significance, however, is the divide in perspectives between populist and non-populist – or mainstream center-left and center-right – subjects. In response to the claim that the news media is very important to society, only 51% of populists offer approval, in contrast to 75% of non-populists. The gap between media trust levels is most pronounced, with only 47% of populists trusting the news media, as opposed to 78% of non-populists (Mitchell 2018). Moreover, the distance between right and left identifiers constitutes less than half of that between populists and non-populists, the latter of which reaches 24% on media importance and 31% on trust in the news media (Mitchell 2018). In addition, the principal media outlets consulted by those on the right and left largely overlap, with the public-service broadcaster “ARD,” also known as the “first German television station,” constituting the primary source of news for 33% on the left and 27% on the right (Mitchell 2018, 27). Overall, 80% of the German public generally trust this outlet, with 82% of those on the ideological left and 72% on the ideological right expressing this view (Mitchell 2018). Media attitudes in Germany thus diverge mainly along the populist/non-populist line, instead of between different ideological affiliations.

The review of studies on attitudes towards the media points to overall higher levels of confidence and credibility among the German mass public than in the United States. Although voters in both countries in theory attribute a relevant role to the media in terms of protecting transparency, promoting accountability, and helping people stay informed, Americans appear to perceive more inadequacies in the practical realization of these functions than Germans.

With respect to considerations of political polarization, the widespread doubt about the reliability of news reports, particularly among Republicans, may be connected to a general social, cultural, and political climate of acrimony and suspicion in the American mass public. The stark divergences in news sources and trust in certain outlets between Democratic and Republican identifiers correlate with the notion that partisanship encompasses more than issue positions. Through reliance on completely different channels, party adherents may encounter disparate presentations of stories that further separate the worlds in which partisans spend time. In Germany, on the other hand, increasing levels of confidence in media independence from governmental influence and the similar opinions of center-left and center-right supporters show a lack of an outright partisan divide between the left and right. Stronger divergences in the judgments of mainstream party identifiers and right-wing populist affiliates suggest a different type of polarization than in the U.S., one that depends more on evaluations of issues than partisan identification. This is in accordance with the finding that AfD supporters are principally driven by their opinions on specific matters. The presented studies support the argument that polarization in Germany occurs mainly along the populist/non-populist line and is issue-driven, rather than due to ideological affiliation.

As established in the previous sections, the United States and Germany differ in types of polarization, which is reflected by disparate lines of division splitting the publics politically. In the U.S., affective identity drives deep attachment to political parties because these groups now represent broader social identities. In Germany, a sense of detachment of the centerright and center-left parties from the concerns of the citizenry prompted some voters to turn to right-wing populists for policy responses. At the same time, sharply distinct attitudes towards the news media are evident in

Sophie Roehse

the two countries. First of all, negative perceptions of trustworthiness and objectivity in the United States present a contrast to more positive feelings in Germany. Furthermore, varying levels of trust exist within the populaces that correlate with the political cleavages in the two countries. Among Americans, Democrats consistently express more favorable views of the media than Republicans, while German mainstream voters hold more favorable attitudes than populist supporters. There are several reasons to believe that the trends in polarization and media trust are intricately related and mutually reinforcing.

Most principally, a fundamental connection becomes clear when considering the role of the media as part of democracy in the United States and Germany. As elaborated in sections III.a. and III.b., voters in both countries overall attribute high levels of importance to the news media in creating a link between the political world and the public. It constitutes the central avenue of communication to provide citizens with information about current events in the domestic as well as international realms and as a way to keep powerful individuals and organizations in check. At the same time, this critical function conveys major responsibility to the news media, rendering it authority to select what topics to cover or omit, and framing how the public understands, evaluates, and interprets issues (Robison and Mullinix 2016, 262). Interestingly, a majority of Americans see the media as partially culpable for driving the public into two mutually antagonistic partisan camps. Overall, 47% of the public places “a great deal of blame” on the news media for political polarization, in addition to 36% who say it deserves “a moderate amount” of blame (Gallup 2020, 50).

Now, considering a situation of low public confidence in the news media to satisfy its democratic functions and present unbiased information, as is the case in the United States, people’s perspectives about the political world may become distorted. Even if coverage is accurate and objective, distrust forms an obstacle to acceptance of information and instead prompts reverting to existing beliefs. As such, political convictions are reinforced and partisan attachments strengthened, further entrenching political divides (Ladd and Podkul 2019, 65). Adding to this, the American environment of intense affective polarization may lead partisans to consider perceived biased reports as attacks not only on their political but also their social, more personal sense of identity. This heightens antipathy for the opposing political side and fortifies devotion to one’s own party. Conversely, in Germany, generally higher levels of media trust may suggest that people are more open and receptive to new information. Political opinions are hence more fluid and likely to evolve with insight on specific matters perceived as relevant. Moreover, even in instances of apparent subjective news, weaker identification with parties averts interpretation of news coverage as a personal attack. As such, partisanship is not strengthened, but rather frustration about certain issues and differences of opinion generate splits among the public, as demonstrated by the emergence of the populist AfD as a contrast to the established center. Another relevant factor is the divergence of consumption patterns in the two countries. A 2020 report by the Reuters Institute offers insight into the continued strong reliance on television in Germany, while online platforms in the United States now constitute the dominant source of news (Newman et al. 2020). Many Germans continue to seek out nightly news casts of the main public broadcasting channels, whereas Americans today face a heavily fractured media landscape largely owned by private conglomerates. The results of previously-mentioned surveys reveal high trust in public broadcasters, particularly television, in Germany (Infratest dimap 2020, 9). However, in the U.S. corporate control raised doubts about the intentions of outlet leaders and may have contributed to overall distrust (Gallup 2020, 13). As Iyengar et al. (2012) indicate, the more fragmented and diverse American environment invites people to choose news sources that coincide with prior perspectives, which lowers exposure to new viewpoints and creates partisan echoes (427). Fewer interactions across the political aisle and repetition of existing opinions amplify the sorting phenomenon depicted by Mason (2018), extending political positions to broader social categories. In addition, the tendency to resort to attitude-conforming sources manifests the priority of partisan preference and identity over any objective interest in substantive information. However, in Germany, the continued central role of television newscasts implies that the majority of Germans receive the same news reports. Furthermore, the publicly-funded coverage tends to highlight topical complexities over tone or partisan inferences. These two points suggest that divisions among the electorate are principally driven by distinct opinions on certain issues stemming from a common stock of news, instead of different information or presentation of matters that generate two separate communication bubbles.

Finally, examining the meaning of “trust” provides a further explanation for the connection of polarization and media attitudes in the United States and Germany. The results of an experiment by Suiter and Fletcher (2020) reveal a negative correlation of partisanship and trust in the news (493), which supports the argument that affective polarization and unfavorable views of the media in the United States are connected. The authors further introduce a definition of trust as an “expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms” (Suiter and Fletcher 2020, 486). Considering the previously elaborated nature of polarization in the U.S., the perception of fundamental differences of not only political but also social identity across the political spectrum lowers the expectation for shared values and beliefs, and thus raises distrust. In Germany, as noted earlier, polarization still exists yet partisan attachment is weaker and differences lie more in divergent issue standpoints. Consequently, overall levels of media trust are higher due to a division not based on a missing sense of community and common principles, but rather frustration with lack of responsiveness and inadequate issue handling of politicians on behalf of some voters, as demonstrated by support for right-wing populists.

The comparative studies of the United States and Germany lead to the conclusion that a strong connection exists between the nature of mass polarization and trust in the news media. On the one hand, the existing environment of polarization impacts attitudes and behaviors towards the media. High levels of partisan resentment and distrust of people with different viewpoints in the U.S. foster a more general atmosphere of skepticism, thus encouraging low confidence in the media as well. Furthermore, self-selection of news outlets with similar-minded outlooks strengthens existing opinions and raises the distance between partisans across the political aisle. The same notion of cynicism among right-wing populists in Germany due to perceived incompetence of the established center parties to respond adequately to issues is reflected in the views of populist versus mainstream adherents towards the media. On the other hand, perceptions of media reliability as well as consumption patterns fortify the lines of division in the two places. As views on accuracy and objectivity in news reports worsen in the U.S, there is a tendency to revert to already-held opinions and reject new, unfamiliar information and perspectives, which leads to amplified partisan attachment. Negative views of AfD supporters compared to centerparty adherents in Germany reflect frustration with political rigidity. News coverage thus reinforces disappointment and confirms their resorting to populists for more decided policy responses, though, as seen, weaker partisan identities allow for more dynamism of Germans’ political positions in accordance with changing party stances.

The case studies of this paper on their own are insufficient to establish any definite influence of media attitudes on the types of polarization, or conversely of political divisions on divergent opinions towards the media. Though strong connections are evidenced, a carefully crafted experiment or survey is critical to make any explicit claims about causation. Moreover, several other factors may impact both polarization and media trust in the United States and Germany that should be accounted for in any further studies on this topic. Additional considerations range from different institutional structures and party systems in the two countries –parliamentary and multi-party in Germany versus presidential and two-party in the U.S. – to disparate national cultures, political histories, as well as social climates, which may generate distinct habits and traditions that are difficult to equivalate across societies.

Another shortcoming of this work is the complexity of any study of “the media.” Particularly since the start of the 21st century, rapid advances in technology have transformed communication systems and changed the nature and availability of news reports. Though the analysis at hand focuses principally on television as a traditionally relevant medium, it is important to recognize the increasing significance of the internet and social media platforms in transmitting information to the public. To account for the developments in trust and consumption patterns of the various individual media sources was beyond the scope of this project, though the connection between specific outlets and polarization should be explored in future research.

Finally, many of the studies mentioned in this paper rely on survey results. Though surveys represent an effective method to observe general trends, there are several ways in which collected data may distort real attitudes. From question wording and lack of attention in online or telephone surveys, to the reluctance of people to share their true opinions or efforts to please organizations with their responses, drawbacks are to be kept in mind when evaluating outcomes. knightfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/AmericanViews-2020-Trust-Media-and-Democracy.pdf.

To close, the findings of this study exhibit strong evidence that differences in media trust among the American and German populaces are closely related to the distinct types of mass polarization. As stated by Ladd and Podkul (2019), there exists great reason to believe that “media distrust is a symptom of, and also contributes to, [the] growing partisan polarization” in the United States and polarization between the mainstream and populist parties in Germany (75). Nonetheless, an applied experiment is necessary in order to establish causal relations with certainty. This future research should recognize differences in institutions and culture between the U.S. and Germany as potential factors of influence and allow for specifications with regard to distinct media outlets that have become more prevalent in recent years. Until then, it may be said that on both sides of the Atlantic people have greater access to news than ever, yet views have become increasingly distinct in accordance with broader political divisions. The two trends have surely fortified each other, though the exact underlying dynamics remain to be uncovered.

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