The Role of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Improving Education Outcomes

Page 72

36 |  The Role of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Improving Education Outcomes

BOX 3.3

The No Child Left Behind Act in the United States Federal funding accounts for only about 2 percent of total public education funding in the United States. The 2001 No Child Left Behind Act made a substantial proportion of these funds conditional on the states’ measuring learning outcomes and using these indicators to set annual school improvement targets. States were required to test students in reading and mathematics and report the results achieved by specific disadvantaged groups. States also committed to achieving state-defined student learning proficiency levels over a 10-year period. Within this timeframe, schools were given annual achievement targets, and the state would introduce remedial measures and sanctions if a school failed to meet them. For example, states could shut schools down, convert schools into charter schools, or use other improvement strategies if schools continued to miss their annual targets. Each state had to prepare and implement plans that included these elements in order to qualify for federal funding. The overall weight of evidence suggests that the No Child Left Behind policy improved learning outcomes and reduced inequality. Studies have used different approaches to identify its impact. A comprehensive study of the effects of the Act shows that it led to increases in per student district education spending, specifically increases in teachers’ pay, and in the proportion of teachers with graduate qualifications. It also appears to have increased the amount of

instructional time spent on mathematics and reading (the two subjects included in the Act’s assessment requirements). There is also evidence that it led to improvements in mathematics achievement, particularly in the early grades, and that these improvements were larger at the bottom of the achievement distribution. However, it does not appear to have had as significant an impact on reading achievement. Overall, the improvements identified in the evidence fell short of the targets that the state plans originally set. Despite these generally positive findings, the No Child Left Behind Act faced significant resistance, and the 2015 Every Child Succeeds Act changed many elements of the original Act. Although the original Act resulted in increased instructional time spent on mathematics and reading, it diverted time and resources away from other subjects that were not included in testing. Moreover, even in the tested subjects, instruction was focused on the tested items rather than on the subject as a whole. The Act was also criticized for giving schools an incentive to inflate their overall achievement scores, and, in extreme cases, the pressure to meet targets encouraged cheating. As a result, the subsequent Every Child Succeeds Act expanded indicators of performance beyond test scores and limited the ability of the federal government to tie state funding to specific requirements, including using test scores to evaluate teachers.

Source: Dee and Jacob 2010; Klein 2015, 2016; Koretz 2017;National Research Council 2011.

transfers a quarter of the total transfer to municipalities. Since 2008, the State of Ceará has allocated 72 percent of these discretionary funds based on municipalities’ performance in the education sector, with the remaining funds being allocated based on their performance on health and the environment. These transfers are a very significant revenue source for municipalities and represent as much as one-third of all revenue for poorer municipalities in Ceará (Loureiro and Cruz 2020). The amounts transferred are determined by a primary “education quality index” that is designed both to measure performance and to increase equity between students within municipalities. The index consists of indicators on early grade literacy, learning measured at the end of primary school, and the proportion of children transitioning to the next grade. Municipalities are allocated transfer resources based on their scores on these indicators as well as on the magnitude of their educational improvements over the preceding year.


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Notes

2min
page 333

References

9min
pages 334-339

Key policy directions

2min
page 332

Fiscal transfer mechanisms

2min
page 312

education?

2min
page 311

10.2 Education expenditure in Shandong, 2018

7min
pages 307-309

9.1 Evolution of the allocation mechanism in school finance

2min
page 288

9.2 Improving education outcomes in Ceará, Brazil

5min
pages 296-297

Key policy directions to strengthen decentralized education financing

5min
pages 294-295

Introduction

2min
page 301

9.4 Pillars for central government education transfers to municipalities

4min
pages 284-285

governments

7min
pages 274-276

Conclusion

2min
page 265

References

3min
pages 268-270

Notes

7min
pages 266-267

8.2 Change in IDEB scores, 2005–17

1min
page 263

Impact of Brazil’s decentralized financing system on subnational spending and education outcomes

2min
page 258

in Ceará

4min
pages 253-254

8.10 Federal contributions to FUNDEB, 2007–17

2min
page 252

8.7 Brazil’s results on PISA, 2000–18

1min
page 245

8.1 Learning poverty in Brazilian municipalities, 2017

1min
page 244

8.1 Preuniversity education responsibilities of governments in Brazil

4min
pages 240-241

Introduction

4min
pages 237-238

References

1min
pages 235-236

7.9 Impact of total local expenditure on reading

2min
page 230

7.1 Distribution of education transfers as a zero-sum game

5min
pages 217-218

7.9 Subnational education spending by financing source, 2018

4min
pages 211-212

How is the system financed? Effects of decentralized financing system on subnational spending

2min
page 207

and 2018

2min
page 201

6.13 Transfers and education spending

1min
page 191

Context

1min
page 199

7.12 Allocation of education transfers, 2005–19

2min
page 215

6.15 Predicted education outcomes and district spending

1min
page 194

6.14 District spending and education outcomes

4min
pages 192-193

Introduction

1min
page 173

Fiscal transfer mechanisms

2min
page 183

References

12min
pages 168-172

Notes

9min
pages 165-167

Key policy directions to strengthen the decentralized education finance system

5min
pages 163-164

5.24 GERs in government primary schools, by LG, 2019/20

1min
page 155

and high primary GER and falling secondary GER, 1996/97–2019/20

1min
page 152

Effects of the decentralized finance system on subnational spending and education outcomes

4min
pages 150-151

Introduction

4min
pages 121-122

5.2 Government responsibilities under the Education Act

12min
pages 127-132

4.18 Fund flows in education

1min
page 109

for education

5min
pages 103-104

governments

2min
page 93

4.1 Population pyramid of Sudan, 2000–30

1min
page 90

4.9 Gender parity index, by state

2min
page 98

Notes

2min
page 82

Introduction

1min
page 89

References

10min
pages 83-88

Political economy constraints

2min
page 81

transfers for education

13min
pages 75-80

Education (FUNDEB

2min
page 66

Intergovernmental transfers

2min
page 48

3.3 Marginal effects of fiscal transfers on subnational education spending

5min
pages 61-62

3.3 The No Child Left Behind Act in the United States

5min
pages 72-73

outcomes?

5min
pages 70-71

Tax assignment

2min
page 47

Impact of fiscal transfers in education: A literature review

7min
pages 51-53
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