The Role of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Improving Education Outcomes

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298 |  The Role of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Improving Education Outcomes

2. Government Expenditure on Education as a Percentage of GDP, UNESCO Institute for Statistics Database, UNESCO, Paris, data.uis.unesco.org.  3. The divisions of provinces and prefectures are usually stable, while counties and townships can merge or divide. At the end of 2000 (as compared to 1990), there were 31 (30) provinces, 333 (336) prefectures, 2,861 (2,833) counties, and 49,668 (65,188) townships in mainland China.  4. In 2003, China started a pilot reform that shifted the management and supervision of township finance upward to counties, although the township was still regarded as an independent accounting entity. In the same year, the government resumed a pilot reform aimed at “flattening the governance hierarchies,” which required designated provinces to directly supervise some counties as well as their direct subordinate prefectures. By 2012, about 72 percent of townships were financially managed by counties, and about 37 percent of counties were directly supervised by provincial governments.  5. There are a small number of centrally affiliated pretertiary schools. The expenditure on these schools was less than 0.5 percent of the total expenditure on pretertiary schools in 2016.  6. As compensation for the reduction in local tax revenues under tax reform, a special form of transfer, known as tax return, is allocated to subnational governments based on a predetermined formula. We treated tax return the same way as other government revenues and did not consider it transfer. The scale of tax return has been declining substantially. In 2018, it amounted to only about 11.5 percent of total transfers and 7.6 percent of the subnational revenue, including tax return.  7. Opinions of the State Council on Reforming and Improving the Central-to-Local Transfer Payment System, Guofa [2014] No. 71, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-02/02​ /­content_9445.htm.  8. In 2009, there was a sizable increase in the compulsory education transfer, which might be related to the three-year Safe School Building Project. It declined gradually thereafter.  9. Data limitations prevented us from distinguishing between general and conditional transfers at the provincial level. 10. China launched the massive college expansion in 1999–2005. The promotion rate for senior high school students increased from 46 percent in 1998 to 79 percent in 2001. 11. Report on China’s Migrant Population Development 2018, National Health Commission of China, http://www.nhc.gov.cn/wjw/xwdt/201812/a32a43b225a740c4bff8f2168b0e9688​ .shtml. 12. Under the Texas Ten Percent Plan, students in the top 10 percent of their high school class are guaranteed admission to any public university in the state.

REFERENCES Chyi, Hau, and Bo Zhou. 2014. “The Effects of Tuition Reforms on School Enrollment in Rural China.” Economics of Education Review 38 (February): 104–23. Ding, Yanqing, Fengming Lu, and Xiaoyang Ye. 2020. “Intergovernmental Transfer under Heterogeneous Accountabilities: The Effects of the 2006 Chinese Education Finance Reform.” Economics of Education Review 77 (August): 101985. Fu, Wenlin, and Kunrong Shen. 2012. “Equalizing Transfer Payment and the Structure of Local Government’s Expenditure.” Economic Research Journal (5): 45–57. Guo, Qingwang, and Ruixue Jia. 2008. “Central Government’s Fiscal Transfers and the Provision of Local Public Services.” Journal of World Economy (9): 74–84. Ha, Wei, Hongbin Wu, and RenZhe Yu. 2015. “A New Research on the Capitalization of School Quality in Housing Prices: An Empirical Study Based on Repeated Cross-Sectional Data in Beijing.” Education and Economy (5): 3–10. Ha, Wei, and Ye Liu. 2018a. “Impact Evaluation of Rural Education Finance Guarantee Scheme on Compulsory Education Expenditure in Rural China: Evidence from Provincial Panel Data.” China Economics of Education Review (4): 46–63.


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Articles inside

Notes

2min
page 333

References

9min
pages 334-339

Key policy directions

2min
page 332

Fiscal transfer mechanisms

2min
page 312

education?

2min
page 311

10.2 Education expenditure in Shandong, 2018

7min
pages 307-309

9.1 Evolution of the allocation mechanism in school finance

2min
page 288

9.2 Improving education outcomes in Ceará, Brazil

5min
pages 296-297

Key policy directions to strengthen decentralized education financing

5min
pages 294-295

Introduction

2min
page 301

9.4 Pillars for central government education transfers to municipalities

4min
pages 284-285

governments

7min
pages 274-276

Conclusion

2min
page 265

References

3min
pages 268-270

Notes

7min
pages 266-267

8.2 Change in IDEB scores, 2005–17

1min
page 263

Impact of Brazil’s decentralized financing system on subnational spending and education outcomes

2min
page 258

in Ceará

4min
pages 253-254

8.10 Federal contributions to FUNDEB, 2007–17

2min
page 252

8.7 Brazil’s results on PISA, 2000–18

1min
page 245

8.1 Learning poverty in Brazilian municipalities, 2017

1min
page 244

8.1 Preuniversity education responsibilities of governments in Brazil

4min
pages 240-241

Introduction

4min
pages 237-238

References

1min
pages 235-236

7.9 Impact of total local expenditure on reading

2min
page 230

7.1 Distribution of education transfers as a zero-sum game

5min
pages 217-218

7.9 Subnational education spending by financing source, 2018

4min
pages 211-212

How is the system financed? Effects of decentralized financing system on subnational spending

2min
page 207

and 2018

2min
page 201

6.13 Transfers and education spending

1min
page 191

Context

1min
page 199

7.12 Allocation of education transfers, 2005–19

2min
page 215

6.15 Predicted education outcomes and district spending

1min
page 194

6.14 District spending and education outcomes

4min
pages 192-193

Introduction

1min
page 173

Fiscal transfer mechanisms

2min
page 183

References

12min
pages 168-172

Notes

9min
pages 165-167

Key policy directions to strengthen the decentralized education finance system

5min
pages 163-164

5.24 GERs in government primary schools, by LG, 2019/20

1min
page 155

and high primary GER and falling secondary GER, 1996/97–2019/20

1min
page 152

Effects of the decentralized finance system on subnational spending and education outcomes

4min
pages 150-151

Introduction

4min
pages 121-122

5.2 Government responsibilities under the Education Act

12min
pages 127-132

4.18 Fund flows in education

1min
page 109

for education

5min
pages 103-104

governments

2min
page 93

4.1 Population pyramid of Sudan, 2000–30

1min
page 90

4.9 Gender parity index, by state

2min
page 98

Notes

2min
page 82

Introduction

1min
page 89

References

10min
pages 83-88

Political economy constraints

2min
page 81

transfers for education

13min
pages 75-80

Education (FUNDEB

2min
page 66

Intergovernmental transfers

2min
page 48

3.3 Marginal effects of fiscal transfers on subnational education spending

5min
pages 61-62

3.3 The No Child Left Behind Act in the United States

5min
pages 72-73

outcomes?

5min
pages 70-71

Tax assignment

2min
page 47

Impact of fiscal transfers in education: A literature review

7min
pages 51-53
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