The Role of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Improving Education Outcomes

Page 296

260 |  The Role of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Improving Education Outcomes

BOX 9.2

Improving education outcomes in Ceará, Brazil Each year, the state of Ceará in Brazil distributes a fixed sum of money to its municipalities, placing the municipalities in competition with one another for those resources. To receive more resources, municipalities need not have the highest test scores or the lowest dropout rates; they merely need to show improvement. Those that show improvement each year receive more funds, and those that rest on their laurels will likely lose funding. The distribution of funds is based on a formula that includes two results indicators—test scores and dropout rates. The formula takes into account both the levels of the indicators (a municipality with high test scores and low dropout rates will receive more funding) and the changes in the indicators (a municipality that improves test scores and lowers dropout rates will receive more funding). Importantly, the state does not rely solely on the results-based mechanism but also provides technical assistance to municipalities, particularly under its

Program to Achieving Literacy at the Right Age. The program provides schools with learning materials that define a clear timetable for classes and prioritizes basic skills, especially literacy in the early grades. Teachers undergo regular training on how to use these materials, including classroom observation with feedback. Municipalities with low-performing schools get additional support, while those with high-performing schools must ensure that these schools assist their low-performing counterparts to qualify for additional rewards from the state. The state also works with municipalities to improve the management of their education systems. It provides training and materials to municipal education secretariats, with the goal of increasing classroom teaching time, reducing the number of multigrade classes, adopting meritocratic selection criteria for school principals, and offering financial and nonfinancial incentives to teachers whose students meet literacy targets.

Source: Loureiro, Cruz, and Lautharte 2020.

Develop reliable quality indicators and measurement instruments and set clear targets To increase the system’s focus on learning outcomes, better data will be needed to quantify and track learning. Without better data, problems will continue to go unnoticed and unaddressed. As of 2018–19 school year, for example, national assessments were carried out in grades 4, 7, and 12. (The external assessment for students in grade 10 was pending.) The 2018 grade 7 assessment results for Bulgarian language showed that there are a large number of failing schools. The scores of these schools were so low that it is hard to determine whether any learning took place during those seven years. Introducing early grade reading and numeracy assessments and setting clear and easy to understand targets for what all 2nd graders should be able to do would be an important step. Such early grade assessments were critically important in motivating mayors and communities to take action in Ceará, but they are also used by countries that are among the top education performers (such as Singapore) to identify and quantify challenges and take rapid action. These assessments help to quantify problem areas, allowing teachers and teacher training to identify topics or students that need more focus. More broadly, Bulgaria needs a credible and trusted assessment system and to use the data generated from that system to inform decision-making. Assessments


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Notes

2min
page 333

References

9min
pages 334-339

Key policy directions

2min
page 332

Fiscal transfer mechanisms

2min
page 312

education?

2min
page 311

10.2 Education expenditure in Shandong, 2018

7min
pages 307-309

9.1 Evolution of the allocation mechanism in school finance

2min
page 288

9.2 Improving education outcomes in Ceará, Brazil

5min
pages 296-297

Key policy directions to strengthen decentralized education financing

5min
pages 294-295

Introduction

2min
page 301

9.4 Pillars for central government education transfers to municipalities

4min
pages 284-285

governments

7min
pages 274-276

Conclusion

2min
page 265

References

3min
pages 268-270

Notes

7min
pages 266-267

8.2 Change in IDEB scores, 2005–17

1min
page 263

Impact of Brazil’s decentralized financing system on subnational spending and education outcomes

2min
page 258

in Ceará

4min
pages 253-254

8.10 Federal contributions to FUNDEB, 2007–17

2min
page 252

8.7 Brazil’s results on PISA, 2000–18

1min
page 245

8.1 Learning poverty in Brazilian municipalities, 2017

1min
page 244

8.1 Preuniversity education responsibilities of governments in Brazil

4min
pages 240-241

Introduction

4min
pages 237-238

References

1min
pages 235-236

7.9 Impact of total local expenditure on reading

2min
page 230

7.1 Distribution of education transfers as a zero-sum game

5min
pages 217-218

7.9 Subnational education spending by financing source, 2018

4min
pages 211-212

How is the system financed? Effects of decentralized financing system on subnational spending

2min
page 207

and 2018

2min
page 201

6.13 Transfers and education spending

1min
page 191

Context

1min
page 199

7.12 Allocation of education transfers, 2005–19

2min
page 215

6.15 Predicted education outcomes and district spending

1min
page 194

6.14 District spending and education outcomes

4min
pages 192-193

Introduction

1min
page 173

Fiscal transfer mechanisms

2min
page 183

References

12min
pages 168-172

Notes

9min
pages 165-167

Key policy directions to strengthen the decentralized education finance system

5min
pages 163-164

5.24 GERs in government primary schools, by LG, 2019/20

1min
page 155

and high primary GER and falling secondary GER, 1996/97–2019/20

1min
page 152

Effects of the decentralized finance system on subnational spending and education outcomes

4min
pages 150-151

Introduction

4min
pages 121-122

5.2 Government responsibilities under the Education Act

12min
pages 127-132

4.18 Fund flows in education

1min
page 109

for education

5min
pages 103-104

governments

2min
page 93

4.1 Population pyramid of Sudan, 2000–30

1min
page 90

4.9 Gender parity index, by state

2min
page 98

Notes

2min
page 82

Introduction

1min
page 89

References

10min
pages 83-88

Political economy constraints

2min
page 81

transfers for education

13min
pages 75-80

Education (FUNDEB

2min
page 66

Intergovernmental transfers

2min
page 48

3.3 Marginal effects of fiscal transfers on subnational education spending

5min
pages 61-62

3.3 The No Child Left Behind Act in the United States

5min
pages 72-73

outcomes?

5min
pages 70-71

Tax assignment

2min
page 47

Impact of fiscal transfers in education: A literature review

7min
pages 51-53
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