The Role of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Improving Education Outcomes

Page 230

194 | The Role of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Improving Education Outcomes

TABLE 7.9  Impact

of total local expenditure on reading PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN IN GRADES 3, 5, AND 9 SCORING ABOVE LOWEST ACHIEVEMENT LEVEL RATE IN READING OLS COEFFICIENT

Percentage of children in grades 3, 5, and 9 scoring above lowest achievement level in reading (t−1)

0.7442651***

Ln of per capita total expenditure

0.1742293

Ln of public enrollment

−1.608015***

FIXED EFFECTS t

61.04

0.22 −2.95

COEFFICIENT

0.0504962**

DPD t

2.21

COEFFICIENT

t

0.7084338***

5.82

−4.31737***

−2.60

5.682704

0.93

7.237776

1.61

−0.9597614

−0.52

Ln municipal value-added

0.6154466

1.47

2.32376

1.62

0.4038417

0.42

Prenatal controls

1.334119***

4.10

1.05966

1.46

2.37953**

2.37

Minority enrollment/total enrollment

−3.987472**

−2.38

26.95006*

1.89

Mortality under 1 year

−0.1247323***

−3.50

−0.1441042***

Displaced population

−0.0004002*

−1.78

−0.0007656**

−3.21142

−1.00

−3.50

−0.1253349**

−2.56

−2.39

−0.000538

−1.58

Ln teachers with graduate degree

0.8486343***

3.75

0.4867234

1.29

0.9629324*

1.81

CTE

2.708227***

3.28

n.a.

n.a.

1.201391

0.57

−0.1178591***

−5.47

n.a.

n.a.

−0.1394361

−1.00

1.479624***

4.43

n.a.

n.a.

1.383466

1.45

Poverty index Rurality

Sources: Expenditure, revenue, and transfer data are from the Investment Expenditures Database, Unique Territorial Form (accessed October 2019), https:// sisfut.dnp.gov.co/app/login; poverty index, mortality under 1 year, prenatal controls, municipal value-added, displaced population, and rurality data are from Terridata (database), National Planning Department, Bogotá (accessed October 2019), https://terridata.dnp.gov.co/index-app.html#/descargas; municipal public enrollment and minority enrollment rates are from the Municipal Statistics for Preschool, Basic, and Upper Higher Education Database, National Ministry of Education, Bogotá (accessed in October 2019), https://www.datos.gov.co/Educaci-n/MEN_ESTADISTICAS_EN_EDUCACION_EN​ _­PREESCOLAR-B-SICA/nudc-7mev; teachers with graduate degrees data from the Public Teachers in Preschool, Basic, and Upper Higher Education Database, National Ministry of Education, Bogotá (accessed in October 2019), https://www.datos.gov.co/Educaci-n/MEN_DOCENTES-OFICIALES_EPBM​ /­fjw5-pzau; reading results from the Saber 3, 5, and 9 standardized tests are from the Colombian Institute for Education Evaluation. Note: CTE = Certified Territorial Entity; DPD = dynamic panel data; n.a. = not applicable; OLS = ordinary least squares. Significance level: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.

Fiscal capacity and its correlation with learning outcomes It is crucial to factor in the extent of local capacity when analyzing decentralization and its results. Local governments that have little or no capacity to implement public policies or effectively deliver social services will not improve their social outcomes regardless of the level of resources they receive and the number of functions allocated to them. As the national government recognized in the National Development Plan 2018–22, local capacity in Colombia is a major concern for decentralization. The Plan identified inefficiency in public spending as one of the major causes of regional inequality, in addition to limitations in public management, limited capacity to identify local needs (leading to an inability to invest efficiently and improve results), and low levels of contract performance. The Plan also identified the lack of mechanisms to create and promote local capacity and attract quality human talent to the local public sector. One way to analyze how capacity concerns explain education outcomes is through the relationship between the Municipal Fiscal Performance Index—an index that measures the capacity of municipalities to (1) spend resources; (2) have enough resources to finance their costs; (3) stay within the spending limits set by the national government; (4) raise sufficient own-source resources; (5) maintain high investment levels; (6) service their debt; and (7) produce savings— and the SIEQ (see figure 7.22).


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Notes

2min
page 333

References

9min
pages 334-339

Key policy directions

2min
page 332

Fiscal transfer mechanisms

2min
page 312

education?

2min
page 311

10.2 Education expenditure in Shandong, 2018

7min
pages 307-309

9.1 Evolution of the allocation mechanism in school finance

2min
page 288

9.2 Improving education outcomes in Ceará, Brazil

5min
pages 296-297

Key policy directions to strengthen decentralized education financing

5min
pages 294-295

Introduction

2min
page 301

9.4 Pillars for central government education transfers to municipalities

4min
pages 284-285

governments

7min
pages 274-276

Conclusion

2min
page 265

References

3min
pages 268-270

Notes

7min
pages 266-267

8.2 Change in IDEB scores, 2005–17

1min
page 263

Impact of Brazil’s decentralized financing system on subnational spending and education outcomes

2min
page 258

in Ceará

4min
pages 253-254

8.10 Federal contributions to FUNDEB, 2007–17

2min
page 252

8.7 Brazil’s results on PISA, 2000–18

1min
page 245

8.1 Learning poverty in Brazilian municipalities, 2017

1min
page 244

8.1 Preuniversity education responsibilities of governments in Brazil

4min
pages 240-241

Introduction

4min
pages 237-238

References

1min
pages 235-236

7.9 Impact of total local expenditure on reading

2min
page 230

7.1 Distribution of education transfers as a zero-sum game

5min
pages 217-218

7.9 Subnational education spending by financing source, 2018

4min
pages 211-212

How is the system financed? Effects of decentralized financing system on subnational spending

2min
page 207

and 2018

2min
page 201

6.13 Transfers and education spending

1min
page 191

Context

1min
page 199

7.12 Allocation of education transfers, 2005–19

2min
page 215

6.15 Predicted education outcomes and district spending

1min
page 194

6.14 District spending and education outcomes

4min
pages 192-193

Introduction

1min
page 173

Fiscal transfer mechanisms

2min
page 183

References

12min
pages 168-172

Notes

9min
pages 165-167

Key policy directions to strengthen the decentralized education finance system

5min
pages 163-164

5.24 GERs in government primary schools, by LG, 2019/20

1min
page 155

and high primary GER and falling secondary GER, 1996/97–2019/20

1min
page 152

Effects of the decentralized finance system on subnational spending and education outcomes

4min
pages 150-151

Introduction

4min
pages 121-122

5.2 Government responsibilities under the Education Act

12min
pages 127-132

4.18 Fund flows in education

1min
page 109

for education

5min
pages 103-104

governments

2min
page 93

4.1 Population pyramid of Sudan, 2000–30

1min
page 90

4.9 Gender parity index, by state

2min
page 98

Notes

2min
page 82

Introduction

1min
page 89

References

10min
pages 83-88

Political economy constraints

2min
page 81

transfers for education

13min
pages 75-80

Education (FUNDEB

2min
page 66

Intergovernmental transfers

2min
page 48

3.3 Marginal effects of fiscal transfers on subnational education spending

5min
pages 61-62

3.3 The No Child Left Behind Act in the United States

5min
pages 72-73

outcomes?

5min
pages 70-71

Tax assignment

2min
page 47

Impact of fiscal transfers in education: A literature review

7min
pages 51-53
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