The Role of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Improving Education Outcomes

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Colombia Case Study JUANITA BODMER AND PEDRO CERDÁN-INFANTES

CONTEXT Colombia decentralized the provision of education services almost 30 years ago.1 The National Political Constitution of 1991 transferred decision-making power and resources to local governments at two levels (municipalities and states2) with the aim of increasing the efficiency of spending and improving social results and equity by closing regional gaps in resources. These objectives have only been partially met. Although access to education has increased significantly and regional gaps in basic education have narrowed to some extent, learning outcomes have not improved at a similar pace and regional inequities in resources and outcomes persist in both access to postsecondary education and learning outcomes. This case study shows that the ways in which decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal transfers have been designed and implemented are partly responsible for these results. Since 1991, access to education has increased significantly, although it has stagnated in recent years, particularly since 2005. Between 1996 and 2017, both gross enrollment rates and net enrollment rates have increased at all levels (see figure 7.1). Total net enrollment rate for all levels increased from 76 percent in 1996 to 85 percent in 2017, while the total gross enrollment rate increased from 86 percent to 96 percent in 1996 to 2017, respectively. The total number of students enrolled in the system went down, however, between 2010 and 2017,3 and enrollment rates are stubbornly low in postsecondary and early childhood education. Quality has not improved at the same pace and learning outcomes remain low. Results for public school students on the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test show that between 2009 and 2018 the gap in average math and reading scores between countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Colombia fell from 105 points to 98 points, which is not a significant improvement (see figure 7.2). More worrisome is the fact that 50 and 65 percent of students in Colombia score at or below level 1 in reading and math, respectively, as compared with 23 and 24 percent of students in OECD countries. The share of high performers (levels 5 and 6) accounts

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Notes

2min
page 333

References

9min
pages 334-339

Key policy directions

2min
page 332

Fiscal transfer mechanisms

2min
page 312

education?

2min
page 311

10.2 Education expenditure in Shandong, 2018

7min
pages 307-309

9.1 Evolution of the allocation mechanism in school finance

2min
page 288

9.2 Improving education outcomes in Ceará, Brazil

5min
pages 296-297

Key policy directions to strengthen decentralized education financing

5min
pages 294-295

Introduction

2min
page 301

9.4 Pillars for central government education transfers to municipalities

4min
pages 284-285

governments

7min
pages 274-276

Conclusion

2min
page 265

References

3min
pages 268-270

Notes

7min
pages 266-267

8.2 Change in IDEB scores, 2005–17

1min
page 263

Impact of Brazil’s decentralized financing system on subnational spending and education outcomes

2min
page 258

in Ceará

4min
pages 253-254

8.10 Federal contributions to FUNDEB, 2007–17

2min
page 252

8.7 Brazil’s results on PISA, 2000–18

1min
page 245

8.1 Learning poverty in Brazilian municipalities, 2017

1min
page 244

8.1 Preuniversity education responsibilities of governments in Brazil

4min
pages 240-241

Introduction

4min
pages 237-238

References

1min
pages 235-236

7.9 Impact of total local expenditure on reading

2min
page 230

7.1 Distribution of education transfers as a zero-sum game

5min
pages 217-218

7.9 Subnational education spending by financing source, 2018

4min
pages 211-212

How is the system financed? Effects of decentralized financing system on subnational spending

2min
page 207

and 2018

2min
page 201

6.13 Transfers and education spending

1min
page 191

Context

1min
page 199

7.12 Allocation of education transfers, 2005–19

2min
page 215

6.15 Predicted education outcomes and district spending

1min
page 194

6.14 District spending and education outcomes

4min
pages 192-193

Introduction

1min
page 173

Fiscal transfer mechanisms

2min
page 183

References

12min
pages 168-172

Notes

9min
pages 165-167

Key policy directions to strengthen the decentralized education finance system

5min
pages 163-164

5.24 GERs in government primary schools, by LG, 2019/20

1min
page 155

and high primary GER and falling secondary GER, 1996/97–2019/20

1min
page 152

Effects of the decentralized finance system on subnational spending and education outcomes

4min
pages 150-151

Introduction

4min
pages 121-122

5.2 Government responsibilities under the Education Act

12min
pages 127-132

4.18 Fund flows in education

1min
page 109

for education

5min
pages 103-104

governments

2min
page 93

4.1 Population pyramid of Sudan, 2000–30

1min
page 90

4.9 Gender parity index, by state

2min
page 98

Notes

2min
page 82

Introduction

1min
page 89

References

10min
pages 83-88

Political economy constraints

2min
page 81

transfers for education

13min
pages 75-80

Education (FUNDEB

2min
page 66

Intergovernmental transfers

2min
page 48

3.3 Marginal effects of fiscal transfers on subnational education spending

5min
pages 61-62

3.3 The No Child Left Behind Act in the United States

5min
pages 72-73

outcomes?

5min
pages 70-71

Tax assignment

2min
page 47

Impact of fiscal transfers in education: A literature review

7min
pages 51-53
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