The Role of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Improving Education Outcomes

Page 183

Indonesia Case Study | 147

The challenge for Indonesia moving forward is to continue to expand access to education, especially at the secondary school level, while substantially improving the quality of education at all levels. Achieving both objectives will depend at least in part on how education services are financed, especially through the intergovernmental fiscal system, discussed in the next section.

FISCAL TRANSFER MECHANISMS The Indonesia system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers comprises DBH, DAU, DAK, and other kinds of grants. DBH, through which the central government distributes a portion of national tax revenues to local governments, involves both tax and nontax mechanisms. The tax mechanisms (pajak) consist of revenue from property taxes, the personal income tax, and the tobacco excise tax;3 the nontax mechanisms consist of natural resource revenues (SDA) from forestry, fisheries, mining (geothermal and other), and gas and oil. The DAU is a fiscal equalization instrument. There are two types of DAK: capital (DAK fisik) and noncapital (DAK non-fisik). Officially, districts that receive a capital grant are meant to provide counterpart funds in the amount of 5 percent of the grant, but in recent years the matching component seems to have been relaxed. The noncapital DAK consist of teacher certification grants and BOS. Other grants include special autonomy funds (Dana Otsus) for Ache, Papua, and West Papua; a special transfer to Yogyakarta (Dana Keistemewaan); and a small regional incentive grant (DID). Provinces also make transfers to districts from their ownsource revenue (raised from motor vehicle taxes, a fuel tax, a surface water tax, and a cigarette tax).4 All transfers except the DID are judged according to inputs rather than results. The DID is the government’s only ongoing incentive-based (performance) grant, although other transfers—especially the DAU—include implicit (and perverse) incentives. The focus in the present subsection is on DBH, the DAU, and DAK (fisik) grants.

Transfer objectives Each of the major transfers has its own specific objectives. Officially, DBH is intended to reduce fiscal imbalances between the central government and the subnational governments by raising the revenue of districts and provinces. However, the real aim of the DBH is political. Its introduction fulfilled the political objective of persuading resource-rich provinces not to secede from the nation at the beginning of decentralization, and this is a continuing objective. The clear aim of the DAU is to increase equity in fiscal resources among provinces and among districts according to their fiscal needs and capacities, and particularly to counteract the very concentrated distribution of DBH allocations in certain provinces and districts. The stated objectives of the DAK are: (1) to reduce inefficiencies that are a function of spatial (benefit) spillovers, especially in education, health, and infrastructure; (2) promote the application of minimum service standards across all functions; and (3) foster economic stabilization by stimulating increased capital spending. In practice, DAK allocations are very strongly associated with DAU distributions; therefore, implicitly at least, the DAK also reduces inequity (see figure 6.6). Overall, the system of intergovernmental transfers in Indonesia is mostly concerned with correcting horizontal fiscal imbalances.


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Notes

2min
page 333

References

9min
pages 334-339

Key policy directions

2min
page 332

Fiscal transfer mechanisms

2min
page 312

education?

2min
page 311

10.2 Education expenditure in Shandong, 2018

7min
pages 307-309

9.1 Evolution of the allocation mechanism in school finance

2min
page 288

9.2 Improving education outcomes in Ceará, Brazil

5min
pages 296-297

Key policy directions to strengthen decentralized education financing

5min
pages 294-295

Introduction

2min
page 301

9.4 Pillars for central government education transfers to municipalities

4min
pages 284-285

governments

7min
pages 274-276

Conclusion

2min
page 265

References

3min
pages 268-270

Notes

7min
pages 266-267

8.2 Change in IDEB scores, 2005–17

1min
page 263

Impact of Brazil’s decentralized financing system on subnational spending and education outcomes

2min
page 258

in Ceará

4min
pages 253-254

8.10 Federal contributions to FUNDEB, 2007–17

2min
page 252

8.7 Brazil’s results on PISA, 2000–18

1min
page 245

8.1 Learning poverty in Brazilian municipalities, 2017

1min
page 244

8.1 Preuniversity education responsibilities of governments in Brazil

4min
pages 240-241

Introduction

4min
pages 237-238

References

1min
pages 235-236

7.9 Impact of total local expenditure on reading

2min
page 230

7.1 Distribution of education transfers as a zero-sum game

5min
pages 217-218

7.9 Subnational education spending by financing source, 2018

4min
pages 211-212

How is the system financed? Effects of decentralized financing system on subnational spending

2min
page 207

and 2018

2min
page 201

6.13 Transfers and education spending

1min
page 191

Context

1min
page 199

7.12 Allocation of education transfers, 2005–19

2min
page 215

6.15 Predicted education outcomes and district spending

1min
page 194

6.14 District spending and education outcomes

4min
pages 192-193

Introduction

1min
page 173

Fiscal transfer mechanisms

2min
page 183

References

12min
pages 168-172

Notes

9min
pages 165-167

Key policy directions to strengthen the decentralized education finance system

5min
pages 163-164

5.24 GERs in government primary schools, by LG, 2019/20

1min
page 155

and high primary GER and falling secondary GER, 1996/97–2019/20

1min
page 152

Effects of the decentralized finance system on subnational spending and education outcomes

4min
pages 150-151

Introduction

4min
pages 121-122

5.2 Government responsibilities under the Education Act

12min
pages 127-132

4.18 Fund flows in education

1min
page 109

for education

5min
pages 103-104

governments

2min
page 93

4.1 Population pyramid of Sudan, 2000–30

1min
page 90

4.9 Gender parity index, by state

2min
page 98

Notes

2min
page 82

Introduction

1min
page 89

References

10min
pages 83-88

Political economy constraints

2min
page 81

transfers for education

13min
pages 75-80

Education (FUNDEB

2min
page 66

Intergovernmental transfers

2min
page 48

3.3 Marginal effects of fiscal transfers on subnational education spending

5min
pages 61-62

3.3 The No Child Left Behind Act in the United States

5min
pages 72-73

outcomes?

5min
pages 70-71

Tax assignment

2min
page 47

Impact of fiscal transfers in education: A literature review

7min
pages 51-53
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