The Role of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Improving Education Outcomes

Page 155

Uganda Case Study | 119

FIGURE 5.24

LGs

GERs in government primary schools, by LG, 2019/20

0

100

200

Percent Source: MoFPED 2020c. Note: Each bar shows the GER for an individual LG. GER = gross enrollment ratio; LG = local government.

(Twaweza 2018b) was considerably higher than the central government’s estimate of the student-teacher ratio for 2019. Through the full decentralization of the primary payroll to LGs in 2015–16, LGs were granted full autonomy to deploy teachers. Incentives to improve teacher deployment were introduced in the performance assessment of 2017. Our analysis did not find any improvement in the equity of teacher allocations within most of the 31 LGs surveyed in the 2018 Uwezo survey (Twaweza 2018b). We measured equity in teacher allocation using the standard deviation of the student-teacher ratio within an LG for government-funded staff in government schools, with a higher standard deviation indicating less equitable teacher allocation. In fact, equity within districts appears to have worsened (see figure 5.26). The standard deviation within 21 of the 31 districts increased between 2015 and 2018, remained relatively unchanged in five districts, and declined in five districts. The ratio of students to government primary teachers between 2011 and 2018 at the 90th percentile of LGs, was half that at the 10th percentile of LGs, and this was a persistent pattern over the seven years from Uwezo 2011 to 2018. Although the analysis in the previous paragraph is only an indication, it is impossible to claim that teacher deployment has become more equitable; this is unfortunate given the greater responsiveness from LGs to issues raised, as well as other improvements reported by Ernst & Young (2019). LGs may have legitimate reasons for the current diverse allocation of teachers, but our analysis suggests that the central government needs to give more attention to this issue, following a final school survey from the MoES expected in 2020; a draft survey


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Notes

2min
page 333

References

9min
pages 334-339

Key policy directions

2min
page 332

Fiscal transfer mechanisms

2min
page 312

education?

2min
page 311

10.2 Education expenditure in Shandong, 2018

7min
pages 307-309

9.1 Evolution of the allocation mechanism in school finance

2min
page 288

9.2 Improving education outcomes in Ceará, Brazil

5min
pages 296-297

Key policy directions to strengthen decentralized education financing

5min
pages 294-295

Introduction

2min
page 301

9.4 Pillars for central government education transfers to municipalities

4min
pages 284-285

governments

7min
pages 274-276

Conclusion

2min
page 265

References

3min
pages 268-270

Notes

7min
pages 266-267

8.2 Change in IDEB scores, 2005–17

1min
page 263

Impact of Brazil’s decentralized financing system on subnational spending and education outcomes

2min
page 258

in Ceará

4min
pages 253-254

8.10 Federal contributions to FUNDEB, 2007–17

2min
page 252

8.7 Brazil’s results on PISA, 2000–18

1min
page 245

8.1 Learning poverty in Brazilian municipalities, 2017

1min
page 244

8.1 Preuniversity education responsibilities of governments in Brazil

4min
pages 240-241

Introduction

4min
pages 237-238

References

1min
pages 235-236

7.9 Impact of total local expenditure on reading

2min
page 230

7.1 Distribution of education transfers as a zero-sum game

5min
pages 217-218

7.9 Subnational education spending by financing source, 2018

4min
pages 211-212

How is the system financed? Effects of decentralized financing system on subnational spending

2min
page 207

and 2018

2min
page 201

6.13 Transfers and education spending

1min
page 191

Context

1min
page 199

7.12 Allocation of education transfers, 2005–19

2min
page 215

6.15 Predicted education outcomes and district spending

1min
page 194

6.14 District spending and education outcomes

4min
pages 192-193

Introduction

1min
page 173

Fiscal transfer mechanisms

2min
page 183

References

12min
pages 168-172

Notes

9min
pages 165-167

Key policy directions to strengthen the decentralized education finance system

5min
pages 163-164

5.24 GERs in government primary schools, by LG, 2019/20

1min
page 155

and high primary GER and falling secondary GER, 1996/97–2019/20

1min
page 152

Effects of the decentralized finance system on subnational spending and education outcomes

4min
pages 150-151

Introduction

4min
pages 121-122

5.2 Government responsibilities under the Education Act

12min
pages 127-132

4.18 Fund flows in education

1min
page 109

for education

5min
pages 103-104

governments

2min
page 93

4.1 Population pyramid of Sudan, 2000–30

1min
page 90

4.9 Gender parity index, by state

2min
page 98

Notes

2min
page 82

Introduction

1min
page 89

References

10min
pages 83-88

Political economy constraints

2min
page 81

transfers for education

13min
pages 75-80

Education (FUNDEB

2min
page 66

Intergovernmental transfers

2min
page 48

3.3 Marginal effects of fiscal transfers on subnational education spending

5min
pages 61-62

3.3 The No Child Left Behind Act in the United States

5min
pages 72-73

outcomes?

5min
pages 70-71

Tax assignment

2min
page 47

Impact of fiscal transfers in education: A literature review

7min
pages 51-53
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