The Role of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Improving Education Outcomes

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Uganda Case Study AL ASDAIR FRASER1 AND MARLAINE LOCKHEED

INTRODUCTION Uganda was an early leader in expanding primary school enrollment, supported by “unusually authentic and powerful” fiscal decentralization reforms in the 1990s (World Bank 2013). However, improvements in learning and retention2 have not followed. In part, this is due to Uganda’s high poverty rates, low revenue generation, and the low share of government financing devoted to education.3 However, the government’s de-emphasis of local government support since 2006 and the increasing number of local governments are also responsible. Despite recent funding increases, local governments lack the resources and capacity to carry out their responsibilities, which include monitoring and inspecting primary schools, and there are many opportunities for political patronage. As in many countries, the education decentralization process has not proceeded uniformly. Prior to Uganda’s independence in 1962, a local government structure was introduced, but this structure was abolished under the second president. Since the adoption of the 1995 Constitution, Uganda has implemented extensive political and fiscal decentralization, with many responsibilities for the delivery of primary, secondary, and some postsecondary education devolved to local governments (LGs). This chapter focuses on primary and secondary education, which are delivered through LGs and account for the vast majority of students. LG education provision is accompanied by firm fiscal oversight from the central government’s Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) and by budget limits on personnel costs set by the Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) and the Ministry of Public Service (MoPS). Since 2002, the central government has increasingly intervened in, while reducing its real-terms fiscal contribution to, primary and secondary education. This has resulted in such anomalies as teaching personnel policies not being funded in the budget. Also, over the past two decades, the central government has curtailed the ability of LGs to generate their own revenue. The vast majority of the central government’s financial support to local governments has been earmarked for specific purposes, including universal primary education (UPE) and universal secondary education (USE). Conditional grants,  85


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Notes

2min
page 333

References

9min
pages 334-339

Key policy directions

2min
page 332

Fiscal transfer mechanisms

2min
page 312

education?

2min
page 311

10.2 Education expenditure in Shandong, 2018

7min
pages 307-309

9.1 Evolution of the allocation mechanism in school finance

2min
page 288

9.2 Improving education outcomes in Ceará, Brazil

5min
pages 296-297

Key policy directions to strengthen decentralized education financing

5min
pages 294-295

Introduction

2min
page 301

9.4 Pillars for central government education transfers to municipalities

4min
pages 284-285

governments

7min
pages 274-276

Conclusion

2min
page 265

References

3min
pages 268-270

Notes

7min
pages 266-267

8.2 Change in IDEB scores, 2005–17

1min
page 263

Impact of Brazil’s decentralized financing system on subnational spending and education outcomes

2min
page 258

in Ceará

4min
pages 253-254

8.10 Federal contributions to FUNDEB, 2007–17

2min
page 252

8.7 Brazil’s results on PISA, 2000–18

1min
page 245

8.1 Learning poverty in Brazilian municipalities, 2017

1min
page 244

8.1 Preuniversity education responsibilities of governments in Brazil

4min
pages 240-241

Introduction

4min
pages 237-238

References

1min
pages 235-236

7.9 Impact of total local expenditure on reading

2min
page 230

7.1 Distribution of education transfers as a zero-sum game

5min
pages 217-218

7.9 Subnational education spending by financing source, 2018

4min
pages 211-212

How is the system financed? Effects of decentralized financing system on subnational spending

2min
page 207

and 2018

2min
page 201

6.13 Transfers and education spending

1min
page 191

Context

1min
page 199

7.12 Allocation of education transfers, 2005–19

2min
page 215

6.15 Predicted education outcomes and district spending

1min
page 194

6.14 District spending and education outcomes

4min
pages 192-193

Introduction

1min
page 173

Fiscal transfer mechanisms

2min
page 183

References

12min
pages 168-172

Notes

9min
pages 165-167

Key policy directions to strengthen the decentralized education finance system

5min
pages 163-164

5.24 GERs in government primary schools, by LG, 2019/20

1min
page 155

and high primary GER and falling secondary GER, 1996/97–2019/20

1min
page 152

Effects of the decentralized finance system on subnational spending and education outcomes

4min
pages 150-151

Introduction

4min
pages 121-122

5.2 Government responsibilities under the Education Act

12min
pages 127-132

4.18 Fund flows in education

1min
page 109

for education

5min
pages 103-104

governments

2min
page 93

4.1 Population pyramid of Sudan, 2000–30

1min
page 90

4.9 Gender parity index, by state

2min
page 98

Notes

2min
page 82

Introduction

1min
page 89

References

10min
pages 83-88

Political economy constraints

2min
page 81

transfers for education

13min
pages 75-80

Education (FUNDEB

2min
page 66

Intergovernmental transfers

2min
page 48

3.3 Marginal effects of fiscal transfers on subnational education spending

5min
pages 61-62

3.3 The No Child Left Behind Act in the United States

5min
pages 72-73

outcomes?

5min
pages 70-71

Tax assignment

2min
page 47

Impact of fiscal transfers in education: A literature review

7min
pages 51-53
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