Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy 6
Claus A. Andersen
Jacob Schmutz (eds.)
DISTINCTION AND IDENTITY IN LATESCHOLASTIC THOUGHT AND BEYOND
Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy
Julia Jorati /Dominik Perler /Stephan Schmid (eds.)
Claus A. Andersen, Jacob Schmutz (eds.)
Distinction andIdentity in Late-Scholastic Thought andBeyond
Schwabe Verlag
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Introduction
Claus A. Andersen: Subtle Scholastic Distinctions and Where to Find Them
I. The FourteenthCentury
Garrett R. Smith: Francis of Meyronnesand Petrus Thomae on the “Less Realist” Interpretation of the FormalDistinction
Vitaly Ivanov:Modus intrinsecus rei in Petrus Thomae’ s Quaestionesdemodis distinctionum
William Duba: Nicolas Bonet’sWhite-Tie Formalism
Apaoan Ramos Machado: Vienna Formalism. Mental, ex natura rei,and Formal Distinctions in Johannes Meyger’ s Tractatus distinctionum
II. The Fifteenth Century
Claus A. Andersen: Parisian Formalism. Bruleferand Sirect on Petrus Thomae’sSeven Distinctions
Sylvain Roudaut: Diverging ViewsonModes in Fifteenth-Century Scotism. Sirect vs. Trombetta on the Modal Distinction
Rafael Ramis-Barceló: Scoto-Lullism. Concept, Development, and Authors
III. The SixteenthCentury
Igor Agostini: The Controversy over the Mutual Inclusion and the Genesis of the Doctrine of the distinctio virtualis minor between the Divine Attributes
Daniel Heider: Suárez on the Formal Distinction. AShift in Opinion?.
IV. The Seventeenth Century
Gabriel Müller: David Gorlaeus (1591–1612)onReal, Fictional, and Modal Distinctions
Roberto Hofmeister Pich: ACentury of Scotistic Metaphysics in Colonial South America. Jerónimo Valera, Alfonso Briceño, and Juan de Fuica on Being, Distinction, and Identity
Daniel D. Novotný: Distinctions in Caramuel’ s Metalogica (1654). ASurvey of Book III
Jean-PascalAnfray: Leibniz on Distinctions and the Simplicity of Monads
Introduction
Subtle Scholastic Distinctions and Where to Find Them
Claus A. Andersen
We distinguish all the time, both in our everyday lives and, if we are philosophers, in philosophy. We distinguish between right and wrong, subjective opinions and objective facts, between the left and the right side of acolumn, between knowing and willing, between Peter as asubject and Peter as apredicate in the proposition ‘Peter is Peter,’ and between singularthings. The distinctions between matter and form and between potencyand actuality are central in Aristotelian philosophy. In the Christian theological tradition, the kind of distinction that holds between the persons of the Trinity (the Father,the Son, and the Holy Spirit)and the divine essence is hotly disputed, and the same goes for the distinction between thedivine attributes among themselves. In the monotheistic religions, God and creature are distinct. And there surely must be some kind of distinction between athing and its mode, albeit only asophisticated metaphysics might be able to tell what kind of distinctionthat is (depending on what one understands as a ‘mode’). There would seem to be as many kinds of identity as there are kinds of distinction – if identity may be taken as the flipside of distinction. This would seem to result in aflexible concept of identity, one with aplurality of degrees of unifying commonness.And that might be worth thinking about, especially in this time of ours with its preoccupation with identity politics. Would aflexible concept of identity not be usefulfor theorizing about all the identities we participate in, as expressed in the proposition ‘Iidentify as…’?1
The publication of this volume and the conference behind it, along with afollow-up workshop, have been funded by the EU as parts of my MSCA-project FORMALITAS – The Formalist Tradition in Late Scholastic Philosophy:A Renaissance Forerunner of Formal Ontology (project nr. 101064452). The project, the conference, and the workshop were hosted at the University of Louvain (UCLouvain). At this place, warm thanks are due to my co-organizer and coeditor Jacob Schmutz (UCLouvain), to Apaoan Machado (UCLouvain)for enriching this introduction with important references, to Robert Andrews (Kristineham)for proofreading of the introduction, to an anonymous reviewer for prompting important improvements, and not least to Christian Barth and Ruth Vachek from Schwabe for patience and efficiency.
1 Just to mention one example from present-day philosophy, the latest edition (2023)of Alyssa Ney’ s Metaphysics – An Introduction,includes achapter (anexpanded version of a chapter in the previous edition)called “The Metaphysics of Race and Gender,” at 158–83. I submit that current debates on this subject might benefit strongly from the rich late-scholastic discourse on distinctions and identity.
This present book is not about identity politics,but ratherabout identity metaphysics. Medieval and Early Modern philosophers and theologians were specialistsinthis field, which they often approached from the side of distinction. They were especially good at telling the difference between various kinds of distinctions. To take someofthe examples mentionedabove, the same kind of distinction does not seem to apply in the example of the left and the right side of a column as in the example of singular things. Whereas in the first case some intellectual activity projects adistinction onto the real column, in the second case the distinctionexists already before any such activity. While these two cases seem clear enough, things get much more complicated when we turn to metaphysical and theological matters. Exactly what kind of distinction obtains between the internal features of acomposite object, or between the persons of the Trinity and the divine essence?Does adistinction imported into reality by an intellect or rather areal distinction apply in these cases, or maybe some kind of distinction that is neither fully real nor only rational (orconceptual,mental)?
The scholastic philosophers and theologians famously advocated strongly diverging answers to these questions, answers originating in the fundamental ontological assumptionsatthe coreoftheir metaphysical systems. Distinction theory, along with its ontological implications, was in thefocus of aspecial literature that developed from the early fourteenthcentury onwards. The concepts of identity and distinction were thus under special scrutiny in the so-called Formalist treatises that had rootsinLate-Medieval scholasticism, especially in the works of the Franciscan John Duns Scotus († 1308)and his early followers. This literatureenjoyed vast diffusion during the Renaissance and still played asignificant role in textbooks of scholastic philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Formalist tradition has never before been thesubject matter of acollective volume. While the scope of the present book is much wider than just the Formalist tradition and its peculiar literature, the contention of the book – and certainly of this introduction – is that this particular tradition within late scholasticism had an enormousimpact both on contemporary and later thought. Much of the development, external to Formalism properly speaking, in philosophical and theological discourse concerning distinctions and identity may be viewed as – immediate or more remote – repercussions exactly of the Formalist tradition. This insight itself is not new. In his research classic The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus – AStudy in Metaphysics from 1944, long used as aguide to the formal distinctioninScotus, Maurice Grajewski aptly pointed out thehistorical importance of the Formalist tradition:
The Formalists, or the writers of the Tractatus Formalitatum,wielding enormous influence in their age, were responsible for the growing distaste for subtleties and Scotistic doctrine. Ahistorical and doctrinal study of the Formalists is indispensable for acom-
plete knowledge of the history of philosophy from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century and, more so, for the history and development of the Scotistic School.2
The Formalists were indeed extremely influential in their age, and they were so not only within the Scotist tradition. The German scholar Wolfgang Hübener, in aseminal article from 1987, likewise strongly emphasized the influence of the Formalist tradition, calling it a “discourse formation” of unparalleled diffusion in the history of Early Modern metaphysics.3 This is no exaggeration, and scholarship, since thetime when Grajewski and Hübener wrote on the subject, has done much to elucidate important aspects of theFormalist tradition.4 And yet, Formalism as adiscourse formation of the magnitude signaled by Hübener has hardly received the amount of attention it deserves, and it has certainly not yet entered the broader historical consciousness of present-day academic philosophy. Thereisa concatenation of reasons for this neglect. The “distaste for subtleties” mentioned by Grajewski is apart of thestory;the conceptual complexity cultivated among the Formalists clearly always was, and still is, achallenge for readers of their treatises.5 Another reason is that key writings of the Formalists
2 Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus,198. Grajewski’sobservation on the indispensability of research into the Formalist tradition for an adequate understanding of both Scotism and, more broadly, of the history of metaphysics from the Middle Ages to Early Modernity is as relevant today as when the book came out. In other respects, the book is outdated. The considerable progress since made in Scotus scholarship includes abetter understanding of the evolution of Scotus’sthought on the formal distinction (asreflected in Garrett R. Smith’sarticle in the present volume, with references to further literature). Also in regard to the Formalist tradition, Grajewski’sindications are not reliable, as when he refers to the seventeenth-century Scotist Bernard Sannig as asource for the doctrine of seven different kinds of distinctions (Grajewski, ibid.,xiii), when this was in fact akey doctrine in Formalist literature from the early fourteenth century onwards (about which see below).
3 Hübener, “Robertus Anglicus OFM,” 329: “Die in zahlreichen Formalitätentraktaten seit etwa 1320 bis ins späte 17. Jahrhundert versuchte schulmäßige Klärung der metaphysischen Metabegrifflichkeit ad mentem doctoris subtilis ist zugleich die historisch am weitesten ausgreifende Diskursformation der neueren Metaphysikgeschichte.” Hübener touched on the Formalist tradition in various other publications, always stressing its historical importance;see in particular his articles “Leibniz’ gebrochenes Verhältnis zur Erkenntnismetaphysik der Scholastik” (1985)and “‘Objektivität’ und ‘Realisierung’” (2007).
4 See the following general studies:Poppi, “Il contributo dei formalisti padovani”;Bolliger, Infiniti contemplatio,218–362;Marrone, Res e realitas in Descartes;Andersen, “Scientia formalitatum.” For new research on particular aspects of the Formalist tradition, including its beginnings in the fourteenth century, see below.
5 Criticism of this kind may be found in Erasmus of Rotterdam’s(† 1536) Praise of Folly, when he mocks the scholastics for their over-abundant use of distinctions, with which they will always be able to cut themselves loose of any doctrinal problem they may encounter;see Erasmus Roterodamus, Moriae encomium,146: “[ ]nec Vulcaniis vinculis sic possint irretiri, quin elabantur distinctionibus (quibus nodos omneis adeo facile secant, vt non Tenedia bipen-
are available only in manuscripts or early printed editions.6 Afurther factor, and probably the most crucial one, lies in the transepochal nature of late-scholastic Formalism:Weare dealing with one continuous traditionrunning directly across thehistoriographical divide between the MiddleAges and the Early Modern period, with the result that neither Medievalists nor scholars of Early Modern philosophy, bound by the conventions of their fields, will attempt agrasp of the Formalist tradition as awhole. Both of these perspectives, that of Medieval Studies and that of Early Modern Studies, are necessary for an adequate understanding of the historical significance of the Formalist tradition.
The conference in thebackground of the present book gathered scholars working on various aspects of Late-Medieval and Early-Modern metaphysics.7 The book accordingly has articleswith focus on the emergence of the Formalist tradition in the fourteenthcentury, its development in the fifteenth century, and its legacy in sixteenth- and seventeenth-centurydiscussionsofdistinctions, thus presenting one important development within metaphysical thought from the immediate wake of Duns Scotus up until thetime of Leibniz. In addition to this book, awebsite (www.formalitas.eu)has been launched for thepurpose of facilitating further research into the Formalist tradition. The website features catalogues of both manuscripts and early printed editions of Formalist treatises and related literature, including Early Modern university dissertations on identity and distinction, as well as afull research bibliography.8 nis melius).” Of the same sort is Francis Bacon’s(1561–1626)advice, in his essay Of Studies, 253–54: “So if aman ’swit [ ]benot apt to distinguish or find differences, let him study the schoolmen;for they are cymini sectores.” One could also mention Immanuel Kant’steacher at Königsberg, Martin Knutzen (1713–1751) who, in his Elementa philosophiae,31, submitted that in fact the scholastics did not contribute much else to the history of philosophy than “infinitely many sorts of distinctions” (Praeter infinitas distinctionum formulas, parum huic genti Philosophia debet). The criticism we encounter in these authors does not specifically target the Formalist tradition, but rather the extravagant scholastic recourse to distinctions in all sorts of contexts. However, insofar as one may see Formalism as the the theoretical foundation of such recourse, all of this criticism indirectly attests to the diffusion of Formalism in the Early Modern period.
6 Iamcurrently preparing avolume with editions of aselection of Formalist treatises.
7 See the published conference report:Andersen, “Distinction and Identity.”
8 The catalogue of Late-Medieval manuscripts of Formalist literature was generously contributed by Garrett R. Smith. See the review of the website:Knebel, “www.formalitas.eu,” with a succinct discussion of some of the reasons, why the Formalist tradition never entered the modern historiography of philosophy;this negligence is paradoxical given that Formalism standardly figured in pre-twentieth-century historiographies, as evidenced by Trent Pomplun in his essay “John Duns Scotus in the History of Medieval Philosophy from the Sixteenth Century to Étienne Gilson (†1978).”
Hierarchies of Distinctions from Henry of Ghent to Early Modernity
The defining aspect of the Formalist tradition is its preoccupation with avariety of kinds of distinctions, often paired with aseries of kinds of identity as their counterparts. Where did this traditionarise?Where did it go?Medieval Studies may provide an answer to the first question, Early Modern Studies to the second. Many details of the development and legacy of the Formalist traditionare investigated in the individualarticles of thepresent book. To set an adequateframe for these investigations, in what follows Ishall trace the development of the key Formalist motif of ahierarchy of distinctions from the late thirteenth century up through the Early Modern period.
1. Before Formalism: Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus
The theme of avariety of hierarchically ordered distinctions is found already in Henry of Ghent (ca. 1217–1293), asecular master with adecades-spanning teaching career at theUniversity of Paris. Henry of course did not appear from nowhere, but was himself rooted in the scholastic debates of his time and was in particular influenced by Augustine, Avicenna, and the early Franciscan tradition at Paris. We should also not forget that both identity (sameness)and distinction (difference, diverseness)have been key concepts of philosophy and theology since Antiquity. However, because Henry has long been recognized as aprimary source of inspiration for Scotus – even despite Scotus’sovert criticism – and as the originator of much of what in later times passed as Scotist doctrine,9 it seems reasonable to begin our story with him, and specifically with his discussion of distinctions in his fifth Quodlibet,atext that reports adisputation held at Paris in 1280 or 1281.10 The sixth question is devoted to the problem of how real relations in God differ fromGod’ sessence –“according to intention” (secundum intentionem)orinsome other way.11 Other options would be areal or arational
9 Schmutz, “Les paradoxes métaphysiques,” 146;Hoffmann, “Henry of Ghent’sInfluence,” 339;Friedman, Intellectual Traditions,223–24 and 416. Especially in regard to distinctions, see Noone, “Alnwick on the Origin, Nature, and Function of the Formal Distinction,” 240–44, remarking at 242 that Scotus and the early Scotists, despite their criticism, agreed with Henry on adeep level – so much so that “they could not refrain from pointing out repeatedly the remarkable basis of agreement prior to the grounds of disagreement.” 10 Wilson, “Henry of Ghent’sWritten Legacy,” 6.
11 For an extensive analysis of this text, see Teske, “Distinctions in the Metaphysics of Henry of Ghent,” 235–41;see also Teske’sdiscussion of apassage on distinctions in Henry’ s Summa,art. 27, q. 1, at ibid.,229–35.
distinction. The context of Henry’sdiscussion is the problem of God’sunity visà-vis the Trinity, the relations in question being those of the Trinitarian persons (such as sonhood and fatherhood). Areal distinctionisirrelevant in this context, because realrelations hold only between things that have aproper nature or essence. Such things can be either simple (form and matter are examples)or composite (the species human being and donkey are examples). There is no real distinction, but rather real identity between athing and its relations. The thing is the foundation of avariety of intentions and notions (rationes).12 An intention is something that pertains to an essence, but which can be conceived separately. Henry gives an etymological definition of it as a “tending within” (intus tentio), because it occasions acertain concept about an aspect of theessence. Owing to such intentions, an intellect may form various concepts of one and thesame thing.13 The notions, or rationes,give rise to concepts of aspects that are not only really identical, but also identical according to intention. The divine attributes are examples of this, and so are the divine essence and its relations – which is indeed Henry’ssolution to the disputed problem.14 Between the realand the rational distinctions, however, there is aspectrum of six different intentional distinctions that all apply within creation:
But in those that differ according to intention, there are degrees according to greater or lesser difference. Concerning those that are really the same in the same, sometimes diverse concepts are formed, such that none of them includes the other in its concept, as with the concepts of diverse differences that concur in the same [thing], as is the case with ‘rational,’‘sensible,’ and ‘vegetative’ insofar as they are differences in human beings. And likewise the concepts of genus and difference which constitute asimple species, as is the case with ‘animal’ and ‘rational.’ And in these two kinds there is amaximal difference of intentions. There are four further kinds, in which there is alesser difference because the concept of one intention includes another, but not conversely, as with the concept of aspecies that includes the concept of agenus and that of adifference, but not conversely;likewise, the concept ‘to live’ in creatures includes the concept of being, but not conversely;likewise, the concept of asupposit, such as human being, includes the concept of nature, such as humanity, but not conversely;and likewise, the concept of a relation, such as being, includes that of essence, but not conversely. And here one must note that in these four kinds that which includes the other does not differ in intention from what is contained by it, but rather due to the ratio of that other part contained in the signification of the same. So that those two are properly said to differ in intention, as happens in the aforesaid two kinds. But in these last four kinds the whole itself, which contains the other, is not properly called an intention, nor is it properly said to differ in
12 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V, q. 6, ed. 1518, 161rK.
13 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V, q. 6, 161rL.
14 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V, q. 6, 161vM–N. For Henry’stheory of Trinitarian relations, see Friedman, Intellectual Traditions,227–57;for the rational distinction between them, see especially ibid.,245–46 and 253.
intention from that which is like apart of it, unless insofar as it includes in itself something other with which it posits some ratio of composition in the whole. For as conceived in itself it must be said to be an intention.15
The six intentional distinctions are ordered into two groups according to the extent of the diversitythey express. The two firststand out from the rest, because they hold between intentions that are not included in one another. There is awider difference between them than between such pairs of intentions, where one intention is included in the other, while that other is not included in the first. The firstexample given is that of aspecies (for example, human being)that includes, or is composed of, its genus (living being)and difference (rationality), but is not itself included in them. The distinction between genus and difference rather falls in the first group, because none of these items includes the other.The six intentionaldistinctions are all explained by way of examples. Aparticular order within the two groups is not discernible. The most interesting thing about Henry’sexamples is that they represent avariety of conceptual levels at which the created world may be analyzed:properties, predicables, supposits and natures, being and essence. The being of creatures is called arelation, because Henry sees it as arelation to God as the efficient cause of actually existing creatures (like the essences of creatures being relations to God as their exemplar cause) 16 Absolute being is only found in God, and so, for Henry, there is no univocal concept of being applicable to both God and creatures, but ratherananalogical
15 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. V, q. 6, 161rL–vL: “Sed in eis quae intentione differunt sunt gradus secundum differentiam maiorem et minorem. De eis enim quae sunt idem re in eodem, aliquando sic formantur conceptus diversi, ut neutrum eorum in suo conceptu alterum includat, ut sunt conceptus diversarum differentiarum quae concurrunt in eodem, sicut sunt in homine rationale, sensibile, vegetabile, inquantum differentiae sunt. Et similiter conceptus generis et differentiae, quae constituunt simplicem speciem, sicut sunt animal et rationale. Et in istis duobus modis est maxime differentia intentionum. Sunt et alii quatuor modi, in quibus minor est differentia quia conceptus unius intentionis includit alterum, sed non econverso, ut conceptus speciei conceptum generis et differentiae, non autem econverso. Similiter conceptus vivere in creaturis, conceptum esse, non econverso. Similiter conceptus suppositi sicut hominis, conceptum naturae ut humanitatis, non autem econverso. Et similiter conceptus respectus sicut entis conceptum essentiae, non econverso. Et est hic advertendum quod in istis quatuor modis id quod alterum continet non differt intentione ab illo quod ab eo continetur, nisi ratione alterius partis contentae in significato eiusdem. Ita quod ista duo proprie dicuntur differre intentione, sicut contingit in praedictis duobus modis. In istis autem quatuor ultimis modis ipsum totum quod alterum continet non proprie dicitur intentio, neque proprie dicitur differre intentione ab eo quod est sicut pars eius, nisi quatenus includit in se aliquid aliud cum quo in toto illo ponit aliquam rationem compositionis. Quia si secundum se concipiatur proprie debet dici intentio.” All translations in this introduction are my own.
16 See, among other places, Henry of Ghent, Summa,art. 21, q. 4, vol. 1, ed. 1520, 127vO; see also Teske, “Distinctions,” 232.
concept that expresses the orderbetween them.17 Fundamental features of Henry ’sonto-theology are presupposed in his teaching on distinctions. Crucially as regards later developments, the list of intentional distinctions taken together with the realand rational distinctions, totaling ahierarchy of eight distinctions, expressesanontology of all of reality.
We see something similar in Scotus, who discusses distinctions at many places throughout his works. At just afew of these places, he also touches, more or less explicitly, on the idea of ahierarchy of distinctions. Since Duns Scotus’ s formal distinction has absorbedmost of the scholarly attention devoted to Scotist distinction theory, it may seem surprising that the discussion of avariety of kinds of distinctions should become so central in the Scotist tradition. Acomparable caseisthat of univocation and analogy:while Scotus is generally associated only with adoctrine of univocation, the long Scotisttraditionwas always, with a few exceptions, fond of the dictum that “analogy is compatible with univocation” (analogia stat cum univocatione). Recent research has revealedthe extent to which this view may in fact already be found in Scotus’ sown works.18 In the case of distinctions too, the Scotists could find some support in Scotus’stexts. Of particular importance is apassage from the first book of his Oxford commentary on Peter Lombard’ s Sentences (called the Ordinatio), where Scotus only indirectly speaks of distinctions. Although thecontext of the quote is adiscussion of the formal distinction (inthe wider context of adiscussion of the Trinity, as in Henry of Ghent), Scotus’sfocus in this passage is on various kinds of unity and identity:
Just as we can find many degrees of unity – first, the least one is that of aheap;inthe second degree there is the unity of order, which adds something to the heap;inthe third [degree]there is unity by accident, where beyond order there is formation, albeit an accidental one, of one from another of those thus united;inthe fourth [degree]there is per se unity of what is composed by the essential per se actual and per se potential principles; in the fifth [degree]there is unity of simplicity, which is truly identity, for whatever is here is really the same as something and is not only one with it in the unity of union, as it is the case in the other degrees; – so too, beyond this, not all identity is formal. Now, I speak of formal identity where what is thusly identical includes that with which it is thusly identical in its formal or quidditative description and according to the first mode of per se predication. But in the case at hand, the essence does not include the property of the supposit in its formal quidditative description, nor the other way around. Hence, it may be conceded that prior to any act of an intellect there is areality of the essence, which is communicable, and the reality of the supposit as supposit is incommunicable,
17 See Henry of Ghent, Summa,art. 21, q. 2, vol. 1, 124rI–F.
18 Smith, “The Analogy of Being in the Scotist Tradition”;Pini, “Before Univocity,” 214;for the diffusion of the dictum that analogy is compatible with univocation in the later Scotist tradition, see Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus,386–87.
and before an act of an intellect this reality formally is not that [reality], or it is not formally the same as that one.19
There are five degrees of unity;the weakest is that of amere heap and thestrongest one that of true identity. But this true identity itself has degrees:one is “formal” and in accordance with Aristotle’sfirst mode of per se predication, where the identical items are essentially included in one another;alesser degree of identity, corresponding to Aristotle’ssecond mode of per se predication, allows for identity between items not essentially included in one another, such as an essence and its properties. In the case under discussion in Scotus’stext, thedivine essence is shared(“communicable”)bythe divine persons, whereas the divine persons, being supposits,cannot be shared (“incommunicable”).20 Thus, even though there is real identity between the divine essence and the Trinitarian persons, there is room for some distinction between them – namely, aformal distinction, at this place cautiously called a “formal non-identity” by Scotus.21
William Duba has argued that since the contextofthis passage is adiscussion of theformal distinction, Scotus “creates the expectationthat he will draw a parallel between degrees of unity and degrees of distinction.”22 There would indeed seem to be as many kinds of distinctions as there are kinds of unity and identity, simply by their negation. Yet, in order not to make the impression he is introducingany actual discrepancy into God’sperfect unity, Scotus here avoids the language of distinctions. However, that Scotus was not unfamiliar with the idea of ahierarchy of distinctions is clear from apassage in his Questionson Aristotle’sMetaphysics,book 7, quaestio 19, atext belonging to Scotus’slater
19 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–4, n. 403, ed. Vat. 2, 356–57: “[S]icut possumus invenire in unitate multos gradus – primo, minima est aggregationis;insecundo gradu est unitas ordinis, quae aliquid addit supra aggregationem;intertio est unitas per accidens, ubi ultra ordinem est informatio, licet accidentalis, unius ab altero eorum quae sunt sic unum;in quarto est per se unitas compositi ex principiis essentialibus per se actu et per se potentia;in quinto est unitas simplicitatis, quae est vere identitas (quidquid enim est ibi, est realiter idem cuilibet, et non tantum est unum illi unitate unionis, sicut in aliis modis) – ita, adhuc ultra, non omnis identitas est formalis. Voco autem identitatem formalem, ubi illud quod dicitur sic idem, includit illud cui sic est idem, in ratione sua formali quiditativa et per se primo modo. In proposito autem essentia non includit in ratione sua formali quiditativa proprietatem suppositi, nec econverso. Et ideo potest concedi quod ante omnem actum intellectus est realitas essentiae qua est communicabilis, et realitas suppositi qua suppositum est incommunicabile;etante actum intellectus haec realitas formaliter non est illa, vel, non est formaliter eadem illi.”
20 This distinction between two kinds of per se predication, treated by Aristotle in Post. Anal. I, cap. 4, 73a34–b5, is the single most important Aristotelian motif discussed in the subsequent Formalist literature;see Bridges, Identity and Distinction,20–21.
21 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–4, nn. 404–8, ed. Vat. 2, 357–58.
22 Duba, The Forge of Doctrine,180.
production and that may indeed be his final word on distinctions;Scotus here talks of three kinds of real distinctions (called differentiae):
But the real difference is posited to have degrees. The greatest is the one between natures and supposits;the middle one is between natures in one supposit;the least one is between various perfections or perfectioning rationes unitively contained in one nature.23
In contrast to Henry of Ghent, Scotus places the hierarchy of distinctions under the realdistinction, not under adistinction that is intermediary between the real and the rational distinction (his first real distinction holds between the properties of the Trinitarian persons and the divine essence, the second between the two natures in Christ, and the third between, e. g., animality and rationality in human nature). Timothy B. Noone has shown that with this maneuver, Scotus manages to stress the real character of his formal distinction, being the third distinction in his list, and thereby avoiding the criticism that had been levelled (byGodfrey of Fontaines)againstHenry’sintentionaldistinction for violating the principle of the excluded middle.24 Since all being, and hence also any distinction, is either real or mind-dependent, there is no room for akind of being, or akind of distinction, between them, so this argument goes. This criticism was indeed soon levelled against Scotus’sformal distinctiontoo, and from there entered the standardrepertoire of Thomistarguments against this central Scotist doctrine.25 Aflexible conceptionofwhat may count as areal distinction was the Scotist way out.
In two other late works, his Parisian Reportationes and anewly edited Quaestio de formalitatibus (also called Logica Scoti)from Scotus’slast yearsin Paris, the real character of the formal distinction, i. e., that it holds between ex natura rei distinct formalities, is confirmed. Instead of avoiding the language of distinctions, Scotus there says the formal distinction is adistinction in a “quali-
23 Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis,VII, q. 19, n. 44, Opera philosophica 4, 370: “Sed realis differentia ponitur habere gradus. Est enim maxima naturarum et suppositorum;media naturarum in uno supposito;minima diversarum perfectionum sive rationum perfectionalium unitive contentarum in una natura.” Ithank Lukáš Novák for pointing out to me the very late date of this text.
24 Noone, “Alnwick on the Origin,” 242–43.
25 For the early application of this argument against Scotus, see Schneider, Die Trinitätslehre,143, quoting the Dominican John of Naples’ s Quodl. 11 (John read the Sentences at Paris in 1310–11). For just one example, out of many, of the use of this argument in later antiScotist discussions of distinctions, see Manzoli, also aDominican, Formalitates secundum viam Sancti Thome (published in 1518), cap. 10, 34rb: “Omnis distinctio aut est realis aut rationis; probatur, quia omne ens aut est reale aut rationis;ergo omnis distinctio aut est realis aut rationis;probatur consequentia, quia distinctio est ens. ” Manzoli then reports the strategy of subsuming the formal distinction under various kinds of real distinctions; ibid.,35rb: “Dividitur autem distinctio realis in essentialem, accidentalem, formalem ex natura rei, et subiectivam.”
18 Claus A. Andersen