Kenny and Wee on the Necessity of ‘Liberty of Indifference’ in Descartes’ Theory of Judgment Larsa Ramsini
§ 2. The Need for Free Will Descartes discusses the notion of free will in order to solve the so-called problem of evil. In the Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes puts forward his arguments for the existence of a non-deceiving God, the distinction between the body and the soul, and the existence of the external world. The Fourth Meditation, “Concerning the True and the False,” follows his proof of God’s existence, where he shows that we are able to trust our clear and distinct ideas. Descartes’ version of the problem of evil, however, still exists. If God is omnibenevolent and non-deceiving, why does He allow us to make mistakes (since falling into error constitutes sin for Descartes)? It is here where Descartes explains his theory of judgment and error, and as a result, conveys his beliefs for the requirements of human free will in order to take the responsibility of our mistakes off of God’s shoulders, and therefore solve the problem of evil. Descartes believes that the judgments we make depend on both the intellect and the
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On a first reading of Descartes’ Fourth Meditation, it seems quite evident that he believes it is not a requirement of human free will that we be able to choose one option over another, since, as he explains in the meditation and elaborates on in a letter he writes in 1640, “our mind is of such a nature that it cannot fail to assent to what is clearly understood” (Kenny, CSMK 147). But Cecilia Wee reads what Descartes requires for free will much differently, and as a result, her view also differs from the position Anthony Kenny advocates. Kenny argues that Descartes believes, even though our free will often does entail liberty of indifference, this type of freedom is not necessary, and that free will sometimes consists only in liberty of spontaneity, “and that is all that is essential to it” (147). Wee contends that along with liberty of spontaneity, Descartes also requires that liberty of indifference, in the sense of being able to choose one option over another, be a necessary requirement for human freedom. In this essay I will explain how Kenny and Wee come to their conclusions by focusing on what Descartes claims in the Meditations, the Replies to the Objections, the Principles, and various letters, and then show that it is as a result of these different interpretations that they are not able to come to an agreement about one rather informative letter written by Descartes to Jesuit Denis Mesland in 1645, concerning how the freedom of one’s will depends on the perspective we take to the time the judgment is made.
aegis 2008
§ 1. The Problem