New European Competition Trends in Digital Markets

Índice Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

PART I: NEW TOOLS AND ITS APPLICATION ON DIGITAL MARKETS

Chapter I. A buse proceedings against digital gatekeepers under section 19a of the german competition act: taking stock of early results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

Prof. Dr. Jens-Uwe Franck

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

II. Key features of the 19a tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. No self-executory obligations: the two-step activation design . . . . . .

B. Targeting digital gatekeeper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C. Seven categories of conduct presumed to be abusive . . . . . . . . . . . .

D. Normative statements on the standard for underlying efficiency and welfare analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

E. Abridged judicial review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25 25 26 28

III. Three abuse proceedings that led to first results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Meta VR Glasses: concessions on tying, but proceedings on data linking still pending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Google News Showcase: closure on 21 December 2022 following various measures taken by Google . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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31 32

34 35

New European Competition Trends in Digital Markets

1. The Google News Showcase service and the smouldering dispute over fair ancillary copyright fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Integration into other Google services: self-preferencing and impediment of publishers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. Terms of contract: undue obligations imposed on publishers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4. Discrimination in access to Google News Showcase . . . . . . . . .

5. Preliminary rejection of further allegations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C. Google Data Processing: commitment decision of 5 October 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. Exploitation of consumers and harm to competitors . . . . . . . . .

2. No objective justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4. Relationship with the DMAs’ requirements on inter-services data processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36 37 38 39 39 41 41 42 42 43

IV. Preliminary observations on the effectiveness of the 19a tool . . . . . . .

A. Synergies resulting from the two-stage structure of the instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Forward-looking bureaucratic rulemaking, repeated interaction, and the option of a (more) compliance-oriented enforcement style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C. Reduced evidentiary burden on the authority, restrictions and uncertainty on judicial review, and increased incentive for gatekeepers to cooperate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

V. Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

Chapter II. T he new § 32f gwb and the german sektoruntersuchung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53

45

46

48

Prof. Dr. Juan Ignacio Ruiz Peris

I. General presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. The lasts GWB reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Precedents of the paragraph 32f GWB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C. General questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

54 54 55 59

II. Relevant and continuous disturbance of competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62

III. Theories of harm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Market power asymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Restrictions on market entry by new competitors; or restrictions on changing supplier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C. Explicit or tacit coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

D. Exclusionary strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63 64

IV. Oligopolistic markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

4

64 65 65

Índice

V. Remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

VI. Property rights’ and legitimate expectations safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . .

68

VII. Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

69

VIII. Final words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

PART II: MERGERS IN DIGITAL MARKETS

Chapter III. T he return of the conglomerate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

Ass. Prof. Dr. Carmen Herrero Suárez

I. The dusting-off of an almost forgotten concern: conglomerate mergers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

II. The traditional role of conglomerate effects in merger policy . . . . . . .

A. USA: Early abandonment of conglomerate concerns . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. European policy on conglomerate mergers: an ever-present guest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77 77

III. The concentrations of the big 5 in digital markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. The formation of large digital conglomerates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Conglomerate effects in the recent enforcement practice . . . . . . . . .

1. Europe: conglomerate effects in digital markets . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. USA: Conglomerate mergers... those who must not be named . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87 87 89 90

IV. The path ahead: mere uneasiness or real calls for reform? . . . . . . . .

93

V. Bibiliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95

Chapter IV. Startups and killer acquisitions in technology and digital markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

81

91

Ass. Prof. Dr. Carlos Gómez Asensio

I. Acquisitions in technological and digital markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Killer acquisitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97 104

II. Startups and merger control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Organizational agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

106 111

III. Antitrust analysis of startup acquisitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Antitrust analysis of organizational agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Ancillary restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C. Ex-post control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

113 114 116 119

IV. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

120

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New European Competition Trends in Digital Markets

V. Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

121

Chapter V. Conditioned mergers in digital platforms . . . . . . . . . .

125

Ass. Prof. Dr. Carmen Rodilla Martí

I. Organic and inorganic growth of platforms. ii. tools to address the harms of mergers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

126

II. Tools to address the harms caused by mergers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Antitrust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C. Regulatory antitrust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. Type I and Type II errors in disruptive markets . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Designing commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a. Reach and extension of the condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . b. Impact of clarity and feasibility in commitment drafting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . c. Coordination among different authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

128 128 130 131 131 133 133

III. Conditions or remedies in merger proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Remedies that serve market wellfunctioning and investors… and something else? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Adapting remedies to market needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. Remedies touching upon the market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a. The extent of the conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . b. Data driven mergers and relevant conditions . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Formulas for ensuring compliance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

136

IV. Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

143

Chapter VI. I nnovation and ecosystem theories of harm in digital mergers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

145

135 135

136 137 137 138 141 142

Ass. Prof. Dr. Francisco Hernández Rodríguez

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

146

II. The problems of merger control in digital markets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

147

III. Theories of harm in digital mergers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Horizontal theories of harm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Non horizontal theories of harm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

148 148 149

IV. Innovation theories of harm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

149

V. Ecosystem theories of harm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

152

VI. Digital mergers under the digital markets act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

154

VII. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

156

VIII. Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

157

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Índice

Chapter VII. Cloud gaming services: a distinct product market ? analysis of the issue following miccrosoft ’s acquisition of activision blizzard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

159

Miquel Aznar Company

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

160

II. The difficulties of determining the relevant market in digital markets: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

161

III. Are cloud gaming services a distinct product market? . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Competition and Markets Authority’s assessment: Cloud Gaming services are a distinct product market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. European Commission assessment: Cloud Gaming Services are just another method of video game distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C. Cloud Gaming is not a Distinct Market report: Cloud Gaming Services are a boarder technology that cannot be classified in a single distinct market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

162 163 165

166

IV. Cloud gaming services should be considered as a distinct product market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. A distinct market for a specific use of cloud technology . . . . . . . . .

B. Market analysis from demand and supply side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

167 167 169

V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

171

VI. Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

172

PART III: ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN DIGITAL MARKETS

Chapter VIII. I nnovation competition in the generative ai space: future -proofing competition policy (again)? . . . . . . . . . . . . .

177

Simonetta Vezzoso

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

178

II. A more evolutionary approach to thinking about innovation and competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

180

III. Diversity Of Innovation Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

181

IV. Competition policy’s interaction with different innovation scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

183

V. Conclusion: do we have the right tools to protect innovation competition in the genai space? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

186

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New European Competition Trends in Digital Markets

Chapter IX. Dominance, bigtechs and digital payment services: regulatory approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

189

Ass. Prof. Dr. Pedro-José Bueso Guillén

I. Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

190

II. Bigtechs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

190

III. Current activity of bigtechs in the payment and e-money services eu internal market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

194

IV. Regulatory approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

196

V. Ruling competition and payment services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Sectorial-Specific Regulatory Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Antitrust Regulatory Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

199 199 204

V. Final remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

206

VI. Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

206

VII. Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

208

Chapter X. How does A ndroid protects its dominance in the mobile ecosystem, and why might the Digital M arkets Act not be enough? Concerns on A lphabet practices on Operating Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

209

Ass. Prof. Dr. Eugenio Olmedo Peralta

I. Operating systems as a core platform service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. The Notion of Operating System and its Consideration as a Core Platform Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Android as an Open Ecosystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C. Reasons for the Failure of Competing Operating Systems . . . . . . . . .

D. The Designation of Alphabet as a Gatekeeper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

210

II. Android operating system license regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Free Licences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. License Modalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C. Is Android Really an Open System? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

D. Economic Incentives for the Standard License: Revenue Sharing Agreements (RSAs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

E. Competition in the Secondary Market of App Stores . . . . . . . . . . . .

216 216 217 219

III. Antitrust evaluation of android license agreements and regulatory remedies imposed by the dma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. The Google Android Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Link Between Operating System and App Store . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C. Bundling (Tying) and Self-Preferencing of Its Own Applications . . .

D. Google Search: Sharing Profits in Exchange for Exclusivity . . . . . . .

8

211 213 214 215

219 220 222 222 223 225 227

Índice

IV. Critical analysis of android’s strategy and the regulatory framework for competition in operating systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

230

V. Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

234

PART IV: DATA PROTECTION IN DIGITAL MARKETS

Chapter XI. Data access and data portability in the platform economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

239

Prof. Dr. Björn Lundqvist*

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

240

II. The data act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

242

III. Digital markets act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

247

IV. The digital service act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

250

V. Open data directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

252

VI. Directive on payment services II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

254

VII. A. ‘Comparative’ analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

255

VIII. A solution – a general access and transfer right for users . . . . . . . . .

256

Chapter XII. Compliance with the dma obligations: the prohibition of data combination under art. 5(2) dma . . . . . . . . . .

259

Prof. Dr. Marco Botta; Dr. Danielle Borges

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

260

II. Dma and the obligations for gatekeepers: art. 5(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

262

III. Consent as a legal basis for data processing activities under the gdpr and the dma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. The Relationship between DMA and the GDPR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Consent under the GDPR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C. Consent under Art. 5(2) DMA – a Privacy-Setting Solution . . . . . . .

D. Complying with Art. 5(2) DMA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

264 264 265 271 275

IV. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

278

V. Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

279

Chapter XIII. Data-protection related abuses by digital platforms: a spanish enforcement alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

281

Prof. Dr. Carmen Estevan de Quesada

I. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

282

New European Competition Trends in Digital Markets

II. Breach of data-protection rules as a competition law infringement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Unfair competition acts as antitrust infringements: article 3 of the Spanish Competition Act (LDC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Breach of law as an unfair competition act: article 15 of the Spanish Unfair Competition Law Act (LCD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

286 286 287

III. Breach of legal rules ex art. 15 LCD: preliminary questions . . . . . . . .

A. The behaviour: breach of data-protection rules by digital platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Art. 15 LCD: legal requirements ex paragraphs 1 and 2 . . . . . . . . .

C. Are data-protection rules «aimed at regulating competitive activity»? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

288

IV. Article 15.1 LCD: legal analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Breach of legal rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Legal breach resulting in a competitive advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. Competitive advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Causal link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C. Significant advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

D. Availing oneself of the advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

292 292 294 294 296 297 298

V. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

298

VI. Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

299

Chapter XIV. T ext and data minig, market power and the governance of innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

305

288 289 291

Assist. Prof. Dr. Antonio Alonso-Bartol Bustos

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

306

II. Property rules, regulatory law, and a little bit of history. The never-ending story of exclusive rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

306

III. Do we need this text and data mining exception? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Text and data mining, negotiations, and market structure.

For whom is it intended? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. What impact would a refusal to deal have on the market? . . . . . . .

308 312 314

IV. Should data generators be the assignees of the entitlement over data. From creators to miners: consequences for the governance of innovation in the AI sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. An entitlement for those who leave a data trace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. An entitlement for those who mine the data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

316 317 318

V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

320

VI. Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

321

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Foreword In recent decades, companies operating in digital markets, particularly digital platforms, have proliferated and have become, at times, some of the most relevant globally in terms of market capitalization.

This growth has not been without problems from a competitive perspective.

Competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic began to monitor more closely, in the last decade, the actions of the most relevant companies from the perspective of dominance or monopolization, giving rise to a series of administrative proceedings or judicial processes, in which thousands of millions of euros or billions of dollars in fines have been imposed on these companies.

The interest of the American and European competition authorities, both at the European Union and national level, has also extended to the area of mergers.

The results of the experience gained are new regulatory instruments such as the Digital Markets Act approved by the European Union or the German 10th and 11th GWB Novelle of 2022 and 2023 that the Bundeskartellamt has begun to apply.

Our research group has been working for years in these areas. At present, thanks to the research projects PID2021-128072OB-I01 «Concentration, Abuse and Cooperation in Digital Markets» and CIAICO/20202OB-I01 «Competition Power Control (COMPOWCONT)» of which this book is the result.

Within the framework of these projects, we convened three Valencia International Meetings on Competition Law, the first of which was devoted to business cooperation in digital markets, the second to dominance, dependence and mergers in digital markets and the third to compensation for damages in digital markets.

The book you have in your hands includes the written version of the presentations held during the second of these Valencia International Meetings on Competition Law. We have called upon a number of European experts who have participated in analyzing some of the most relevant and current issues arising in this area, not only from a European perspective but also from the viewpoint of the legal system of the most active Member State in this area, Germany.

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New European Competition Trends in Digital Markets

From the latter perspective, the work includes an analysis of the two main new competition instruments included in GWB Novelle: paragraphs 19a GWB and 32f GWB. Professor Jens-Uwe Franck addresses the former in his paper «Abuse Proceedings Against Digital Gatekeepers Under Section 19a Of The German Competition Act: Taking Stock Of Early Results», while Professor Juan Ignacio Ruiz Peris discusses the latter in his paper «The New Paragraph 32f GWB and the German Sektoruntersuchung».

Regarding mergers, four papers analyze different issues raised. These include the works of Associated Professors Carmen Herrero Suarez on «Conglomerate Mergers... back in action in Digital Markets?», Carlos Gómez Asensio on «Startups and Killer Acquisitions», Carmen Rodilla Martí on «Conditioned Mergers in Digital Platforms» and Francisco Hernández Rodríguez on «Innovation and Ecosystem Theories of Harm in Digital Mergers».

In the field of abuse of dominance Professor Simonetta Vezzoso reflects on «Innovation Competition in The Generative AI Space: Future-Proofing Competition Policy (Again)?», Associate Professor Pedro José Bueso Guillen discusses «Dominance, Bigtech And Payment Services: Regulatory Approaches» and Associate Professor Eugenio Olmedo Peralta examines «How Does Android Protect Its Dominance In The Mobile Ecosystem And Why The Digital Markets Act May Be Not Enough: Concerns On Alphabet Practices On Operating Systems».

The third main question in this book is Data protection in digital markets.

Professor Björn Lundqvist has present a paper on «Data Access and Data Portability in the Platform Economy», Professor Marco Botta addresses the central question of consent «Compliance with the DMA Obligations: the Prohibition of Data Combination under Art. 5(2) DMA» and Professor Carmen Estevan de Quesada discusses «Data-Protection Related Abuses by Digital Platforms: a Spanish Enforcement Alternative».

The book also contains two other contributions derived from papers selected for publication.

We hope you enjoy reading the book as much as we enjoyed the presentation of the papers from which the different chapters originate.

Juan Ignacio Ruiz Peris and Carmen Estevan de Quesada, Valencia 2024

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