Spring 2025 Journal

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Virginia Journal of International Affairs Spring 2025

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Contents Staff

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Information

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From the Editor

Maggie Meares

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Cuba’s Special Period and its Significance in its Modern Development

Amairah Islam

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Modern Iran and the Historical Henry Dennis Origins of Political Islam: Implications for the Future of the Broader Region

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Tertiary Education Financing in the Netherlands and Belgium, 2000-2022

Calvin Pan

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OP-ED: Lessons From Ukraine to be Applied to a War Over Taiwan

Charlotte Sparling

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OP-ED: The Congo in Crisis

David Ball

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OP-ED: The Wage Economy Contributes To Food Insecurity Among the Inuit

Priya Buddhavarapu

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Staff Editor-in-Chief

Maggie Meares

Co-Managing Editor

Brooke Blosser

Co-Managing Editor

Apal Upadhyaya

Production Chair

Apal Upadhyaya

Media Manager

Elizabeth Hardin

Event Coordinator

Kaitlyn Fong

Staff Editors

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Priya Buddhavarapu

David Ball

Alexander Macturk

Aliza Susatijo

Charlotte Sparling

Ella Gilmore

Nithya Muthukumar

Avery Sigler

Mary Margaret Sell

Alex Yang

Information About the Virginia Journal The Virginia Journal of International Affairs is the University of Virginia’s preeminent publication for undergraduate research in international relations. The Virginia Journal is developed an distributed by the student-run International Relations Organization of the University of Virginia. The Virginia Journal is one of the only undergraduate research journals for international relations in the country, and aims both to showcase the impressive research conducted by the students at U.Va. and to spark productive conversation within the University community. The Virginia Journal seeks to foster interest in international issues and promote high quality undergraduate research in foreign affairs. The Journal is available online at vajournalia.org.

Submissions Interested in submitting to the Virginia Journal? The Journal seeks research papers on current topics in international affairs that are about ten pages in length. Only undergraduates or recent graduates are eligible to submit. Submissions should be sent to VaJournal.editor-in-chief@iroatuva.org

Contact

Please direct all comments to VaJournal.editor-in-chief@iroatuva. org

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From the Editor Dear Reader, As we welcome the Spring of 2025, we find ourselves navigating a world filled with complexity and uncertainty. The challenges we face—be it political, social, or environmental— are more pressing than ever. The global landscape is shifting in ways that demand our attention, and now more than ever, the importance of engaging with international issues and examining their impact on our shared future cannot be overstated. Therefore, it is with deep gratitude that we present this edition of the Virginia Journal of International Affairs.

In this edition, the authors unpack some of the most critical and timely topics in global affairs. From origins and implications of Political Islam in modern Iran to the tertiary education system in the Netherlands, each paper represents the dedicated work of UVA students as they grapple with some of the most significant challenges of our time. These papers are not just academic exercises; they serve as both a snapshot of our current world and a call to action. The stakes are high, and it is crucial that we grapple with these issues, understand their broader implications, and work toward solutions.

The authors presented here do not just aim to inform; they seek to provoke thoughtful discussion and inspire action.

I am deeply grateful to everyone who contributed to this edition for their hard work and dedication to these projects.

Our authors have poured their time and expertise into researching, writing, and refining their ideas. Their work is a testament to the power of academic inquiry and the passion that drives the next generation of global leaders. I am equally grateful to our editorial team and executive board, whose tireless efforts, collaboration, and creativity have brought 8

this journal to life. I am privileged to work alongside such a talented and committed group. Special thanks is additionally owed to the International Relations Organization at UVA, whose continued support and vision make this publication possible.

Most importantly, I want to thank our readers. Your willingness to engage with uncomfortable and complex topics is what makes this journal so meaningful. In spending time with the ideas contained in the journal, you contribute to a larger conversation that shapes how we understand and interact with the world around us. In a time when global interconnectivity is both a challenge and a responsibility, your engagement matters more than ever.

It is my honor to present this edition of the Virginia Journal of International Affairs to you. May the ideas and insights contained within inspire you to look more closely at the world, to ask difficult questions, and to act with the knowledge that our connections to one another shape the future we all share.

Sincerely, Maggie Meares Editor in Chief of the Virginia Journal of International Affairs, Fall ‘24-Spring ‘25

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Cuba’s Special Period and its Significance in its Modern Development By: Amairah Islam

Author Biography: Amairah Islam is a First-Year international student from Singapore.

She is pursuing a double major in History and Foreign Affairs. She is involved in a variety of organizations on Grounds, including Fralin Student Docents, History Club, IRO, and Salsa Club.

Abstract: This paper examines Cuba’s Special Period in Time of Peace, a transformative era triggered by the Soviet Union’s collapse and marked by the devastation of Cuba’s economy during the 1990s.

Facing severe shortages, the Cuban government implemented austerity measures and market-oriented reforms. These policy changes stabilized the economy but exacerbated social inequality, challenging Cuba’s post-Revolutionary commitment to socialist principles. This paper analyzes the period’s economic, political, and social impacts and the difficulties of balancing socialism with capitalism. This paper concludes that the Special Period not only 11

stabilized Cuba’s economy but also reshaped its social and political landscape in ways still influential in contemporary Cuban development.

Introduction On September 29, 1990, Cuban revolutionary and politician Fidel Castro announced at the 30th Committees for the Defense of the Revolution Anniversary that Cuba was about to enter a “Special Period in Time of Peace” (“Castro Speech Data Base - Latin American Network Information Center, LANIC,” n.d.). It referred to a national emergency during peacetime with potential consequences for the survival of the regime, as serious as those of a war (Pérez-López, n.d.).

Castro’s announcement detailed only the latest in a series of challenges that Cuba had confronted in its modern history, spanning from liberation from Spanish colonialism to the decade-long guerilla campaign of the Cuban Revolution. The revolution was a turning point in Cuba’s history as for the first time, Cuban leaders governed independently from external political interference. Fidel Castro became the president of the republic and rapidly introduced reforms designed to bring Cuba out of the myriad of issues facing the island nation—implemented at varying rates of success. The emerging Cold War greatly determined Cuba’s post-Revolutionary 12

political and economic development. Cuba’s economy relied on its close relationship with the Soviet Union; the fall of the Soviet Union eliminated the trade and aid relationships that had sustained Cuba’s economy for three decades (Chomsky, 2015).

With the collapse of Soviet communism, the Cuban government devised an alternative framework for economic survival during the Special Period (Pérez-Stable, 2012). Special Period policies attempted to counter the economic consequences following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Intended to be a short-term solution to stabilize the country, massive economic changes liberalized Cuban politics and inevitably led to social reforms. Historian Louis A. Perez Jr. illustrates the significance of the Special Period as an event that “will no doubt be remembered as one of those temporal divides by which people experience the momentous transitions of a historical epoch” (Pérez, 2015). The Special Period had a great impact not only on the Cuban population but also on the highest echelons of the Cuban government, playing a critical role in transforming the country and shaping its modern development.

This paper discusses the motivation and aims of the Special Period, explores what economic, political, and social changes occurred, and assesses the varying success of certain policies. The Special Period is a unique demonstration of crisis policymaking in that the Cuban government implemented capitalist-leaning poli13

cies with the hope of rescuing Cuba’s deteriorating economy and ultimately its socialist foundations. This paper evaluates the changes made in Cuba’s Special Period and their influence in modern Cuban development.

The Special Period Economic uncertainty and resource shortages in 1990 underscore the beginnings of the Special Period. Cuba had lost Soviet economic support and its access to basic goods and services. The loss of trading partners and the suspension of economic relations with the former socialist bloc produced further disarray and distress—plunging Cuba into a crisis that threatened to undo thirty-five years of social gains and economic achievements (Pérez, 2015, 311).

To prevent further deterioration of the Cuban economy, the Special Period established a framework in which to implement a series of austerity measures and new rationing schedules for agriculture and energy. Available supplies of gasoline and fuel oil were severely cut. Industrial plants and factories reduced weekly work hours many closed altogether. An estimated 50 percent of industrial plants, and perhaps more, suspended operations due to shortages of fuel, inputs, and replacement parts (Pérez, 2015, 311). Factory closings, production shutdowns, and transportation difficulties 14

led to the displacement of nearly 20 percent of the population.

The government furloughed untold numbers of soldiers and civil servants. Additionally, production declined rapidly, and even failed entirely in many sectors.

“Factory closings, production shutdowns, and transportation difficulties led to the displacement of nearly 20 percent of the population” Agricultural production experienced an especially heavy hit during this period. The sugar crop declined from 8.1 million tons in 1991 to 7 million tons in 1992, the smallest harvest in a decade.

In 1993, it was worse as crop yield plummeted to only 4.2 million tons. The lack of fuel, lubricants, pneumatics, and spare parts forced the closing of dozens of sugar mills, with disastrous consequences. The 1994 sugar harvest declined again, to 4 million tons and in 1995 the harvest fell to a fifty-year low at 3.3 million tons (Pérez, 2015, 311). Furthermore, other nonmarket austerity measures—such as reducing electricity consumption and oil deliveries, and rationing food products and consumer goods—were employed to bring savings and spur production (Pérez-Stable, 2012, 132).

The introduction of these measures resulted in massive 15

changes in Cuba. By 1995, an estimated 500,000 workers were released from state sector employment (Pérez-Stable, 2012, 132).

The oil shortages reduced public transportation, with nearly 40% of national bus and train services suspended by late 1992 (Pérez-Stable, 2012, 294). Cities saw empty streets, darkened neighborhoods, and a striking absence of sound as gasoline and electricity use declined (Pérez, 2015, 295). Animal traction returned to agriculture, with horse-drawn wagons and oxen replacing trucks and tractors.

Bicycles substituted for cars, with nearly 700,000 distributed by 1994. Pérez likened Cuba’s regression to a “free-fall back in time” (2015, 295). What Castro may not have considered when describing the challenges of 1990s Cuba as “special” was just how unique of a situation Cuba found herself in; at a time of rapid modernization and economic integration, Cuba remained in an economic quagmire, unable to perform some of the most basic actions of an industrialized state.

Justifying such severe economic impacts, the Special Period was dedicated to salvaging a Cuban economy in free fall and continuing Cuba’s existence as Castro’s socialist, island nation.

Despite economic reforms, with the basic premise of the Special Period revolving around strengthening Castro’s rule, the United States pursued its anti-Castro doctrine through trade embargoes, including the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Cuban Assets 16

Control Regulations of 1963, the Torricelli Act of 1992, and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996. The logic underpinning these embargoes—which only exacerbated Cuba’s economic woes—was to further deteriorate Cubans’ standard of living and generate political change. In this regard, Special Period policies not only sought to improve economic conditions in Cuba but also to strengthen Cuba’s leadership and protect the social feats of the Cuban Revolution (Valdés and Valdés Paz, 2004).

Chronic Underdevelopment: Why Cuba Needed the Special Period The Special Period was a manifestation of chronic underdevelopment in Cuba’s economy. Cuba’s historical reliance on sugar exports to bolster its economy perfectly represents the trends behind the underdevelopment. This pattern began had been established as far back as at the turn of the nineteenth century when the United States was the primary major purchaser of Cuban goods, rendering Cuba very vulnerable to US economic and therefore political control. The economy was subject to the whims of the external market and constant fluctuations in sugar prices, which impeded its industrial expansion and general economic growth.

Cuban-Soviet Union economic relations originated after President Dwight Eisenhower imposed an embargo on Cuban sug17

ar in July 1960 in response to Cuba’s nationalization of US companies (Wilson, 2011). Given its ties to the USSR and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, the thunderous democratic upheavals in late 1980s had a decisive echo in Cuba. But what is not commonly known or admitted is that those ties and the initial move to embrace the Soviet Union back in the early 1960s were not entirely of Cuba’s choosing (Allahar, 1998). In fact, the US played a central role in this transition. Disputes with the US government over the radical nature of agrarian reforms, the expropriation of certain foreign and domestically owned properties (e.g., the United Fruit Co.), and the nationalization of various foreign-owned businesses (most notably the banks and oil companies), among much else, culminated in the US refusal to cooperate with Cuba’s new government in Havana (Allahar, 1998, 9). American Diplomat Wayne Smith captured American Cold War-era attitudes toward Cuba: “The United States has never been prepared to negotiate seriously with Cuba, and certainly not on teh basis of equal respect for sovereignty (Allahar, 1998, 3).

The Soviet Union stepped forward to buy the sugar that the United States had refused, thus beginning a relationship that would last three decades. While never politically integrated into the socialist bloc to the same extent that European nations were, Cuba did come to rely heavily on the Soviet Union in economic matters.

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In 1972, under a tightening U.S. embargo, Cuba became part of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and began to channel nearly all of Cuban imports and exports through its distant Soviet allies (Allahar, 1998, 3). Within the COMECON, Cuba specialized in the production of sugar, citrus, and nickel (Molina, García, and Jesús, 2005). The benefits of Cuba’s relationship with the socialist camp created a disincentive for trade with noncommunist countries. Consequently, 83.1 percent of Cuba’s trade was with the socialist countries, while only 9.9 percent was with the developed, capitalist countries (Allahar, 1998, 10). Additionally, cheap Soviet oil reinforced the disincentive for Cuba to diversify its exports, or to develop energy-efficient production. The combination of low oil prices and high sugar prices hid the real costs of sugar production, making it seem more lucrative than it really was (Leogrande and Thomas, 2002). From the 1970s until the late 1980s, Cuba benefited from trade with the COMECON, which was heavily subsidized in its favor. Soviet subsidies averaged $4.3 billion a year for the period 1986-1990 and constituted 21.2% of the Cuban GNP (Wilson, 2011, 8). With nearly all of it economy relying on the Soviet Union and its economic spheres, an inability or unwillingness to develop economic institutions, and a misunderstanding of its main export, Cuba’s post-Revolution economy was set upon a weak foundation.

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Sugar, Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz had argued in 1940, also meant foreign, colonial domination. It meant slavery and dispossessed workers; it meant dependence, backwardness, and underdevelopment, which explains the natural aversion to sugar (Wilson, 2011, 41). Although after the Cuban Revolution, there were attempts to diversify the economy and establish a system of self-sufficiency, events during the 1960s led to a return to sugar production, which was supported by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union played a key role in facilitating and pressing for the return to monoculture sugar production, taking measures to ensure that Cuba would give absolute primacy to sugar (Tsokhas, 1980). In this, sugar was given a renewed prominence in the economy. This led to a symbiotic relationship with the Soviet Union where Cuba would produce a single crop, sugar, and the Soviet Union, complex industrial items. This is an example of the classical division of labor between periphery and metropole and was embodied in trade agreements (Tsokhas, 1980, 325).

“...a symbiotic relationship with the Soviet Union where Cuba would produce a single crop, sugar, and the Soviet Union, complex industrial items” 20

This relationship with the Soviet bloc meant that the collapse of the Eastern European and Soviet regimes devastated the Cuban economy. For three decades, the Cuban economy had benefited from massive economic assistance from the Soviet Union— mainly in the form of heavily subsidized exchanges of Cuban sugar exports for Soviet oil imports. Cuba obtained such significant amounts of subsidized Soviet oil beyond its domestic consumption needs that the Cuban government was allowed to sell it at world market prices and to use the proceeds to finance hard currency imports (Hernández-Catá, 2000). By the 1990s, the USSR provided approximately 70 percent of Cuba’s imports and purchased 70 percent of Cuba’s exports—all at subsidized prices that greatly favored Cuba (Eckstein, 2003).

Cuba lost not only its preferential prices for key resources but also its guaranteed market. The heaviest economic blow was the loss of Soviet assistance—worth between three and four billion dollars a year in aid. The end of these subsidies reduced Cuba’s capacity to import by 74 percent. The resulting shortages of energy and raw materials caused production losses, forcing the adoption of severe austerity measures. Consumer goods of all types became extremely scarce, unemployment rose, and the standard of living fell sharply (Leogrande and Thomas, 2002, 342).

The Special Period was a temporary restructuring reform 21

launched by the Cuban government to confront a 35 percent decline in GDP, a 75 percent fall in foreign trade, and the termination of $65 billion worth of non-repayable Soviet aid(Mesa-Lago, 2006). Trade shocks following the collapse of the Soviet Union and loss of Eastern European trading partners triggered Cuba’s existential economic crisis (Pastor, 1996).

Political and Social Changes During the Special Period The Special Period was a short-term strategy, intended to model a wartime economy, to survive a transition during which Cuba would reorient its international trade relations and adapt to the loss of Soviet subsidies; the Castro regime did not want to fundamentally alter its centrally-planned domestic economy (Leogrande and Thomas, 2002, 343). However, counteracting the sudden uncontrollable economic decline with a series of necessary economic reforms forced Cuba’s government to create caveats in its hardline socialist ideology. In order to survive in the new, post-Soviet international context, the Cuban government implemented dramatic economic reforms that contested their socialist ideology,---opening up the island to foreign investment, allowing limited forms of private enterprise, and promoting tourism (Chomsky, 2015, 126).

This begrudging ideological departure is significant be22

cause many of the reforms made during the Special Period necessitated the decentralization of economic decision-making and the embrace of policies associated with capitalism. These economic reforms influenced changes in Cuba’s political structure and society, thereby augmenting their significance; political reforms were carried out to enable these changes to take place. 1992 amendments to the Cuban Constitution removed some foreign investment limits, demonstrating that regime-led political reforms occurred during the Special Period. However, a key aim of Cuban leadership was to preserve the social gains of the Revolution, which had included advancements in education, healthcare, and gender equality.

In post-revolutionary Cuba, universal access to public education had been introduced. During the Special Period, Cuba’s commitment to universal access to public education at all levels and the government’s responsibility for financing and implementing education across the island remained untouched. Funding for education decreased somewhat during the depth of the crisis but began returning to pre-Special Period levels by 1996, with substantial capital investment in teacher support, technology in schools across the island, and initiatives to motivate children to stay in school (Uriarte, 2003). While there were consequences to the economic restructuring and reforms that affected education, it was clear that Cuba kept the education of the Cuban people at the 23

center of its strategies for social development (Uriarte, 2003, 4).

For instance, one consequence of the changes was that dollarization (the introduction of a dual currency in Cuba with the US dollar), led to a “domestic brain drain” in which highly trained workers that were paid in pesos left skilled positions in the state sector for unskilled work that paid more in dollars (Chomsky, 2015, 131). In the context of education, during 1993-1994, almost 8% of teachers made this leap (Uriarte, 2003, 9). In order to address the mass exodus of teachers from the educational system and into the lower-skilled-but-highly-paid sectors of the economy, the salaries of teachers and support staff were increased by 30% to make careers in education more competitive with the combination of salaries and benefits offered in such sectors (Uriarte, 2003, 9).

By 1995, the crisis had reached its lowest, and the economy began to recover slightly , and with this began a re-investment in education (Uriarte, 2003, 13). In addition, Cuba boldly moved to refurbish all of Cuba’s elementary and middle schools. Along with the repairs of the schools came the improvement of their technological capacity - these measures were able to energize the educational system as well as inject new energy among teachers, students, and parents (Uriarte, 2003, 14). Furthermore, steps were taken to provide post-graduation incentives for students to stay in school, such as the introduction of social work training programs. This initiative 24

included thousands of young people from ages 16 to 22 who had not attained admission at a university due to decreased enrollments and had shown preferences to join social work training programs.

Their starting salaries would reach up to 400 pesos (high in comparison with average Cuban salaries). Once these young Cubans in the programs began to work, they were eligible to attend the university social work program or any other undergraduate program. As a result, enrollments at both secondary and post-secondary levels improved markedly since their lowest numbers in 1997 (Uriarte, 2003, 15).

Alongside education, healthcare was another priority for Cuban leadership in the years after the Revolution. Although Cuba was a small, developing country, its healthcare track record was praised globally. To achieve universal free health care, the Cuban revolutionary government began its public health sector reform almost immediately after taking power in 1959 (Feinsilver, 1993).

Private clinics and pharmaceutical companies were nationalized and health service providers were gradually integrated into a single system that was expanded throughout the country. These reforms were consolidated in the 1970s, which saw an administrative reorganization to enable their goal of integrated planning. This restructuring was completed in 1976 when Cuba’s 14 provinces and 169 municipalities were divided into health zones, each under 25

the responsibility of a polyclinic, effectively decentralizing the health system. The system was developed further in the 1980s to include the planning of preventive and curative health activities for the entire Cuban population according to citizens’ individual needs (Feinsilver, 1993, 192). In 1984, the country implemented the Family Doctor program, which aimed to train thousands of primary care doctors and place a doctor in every neighborhood of the country. As a result, the number of healthcare workers tripled between 1970 and 2005 (Chomsky, 2015, 50). In 1987, 22 percent of the Cuban population was covered, and by 1995, 95 percent of Cubans had their own family doctor. Cuba’s healthcare system had been gaining momentum since 1959, but the collapse of the Soviet Union severely impacted the country’s progress.

The crisis of the 1990s resulted in a general deterioration of medical equipment and facilities. What had been problematic all along, such as shortages of some basic medicines and disinfectants, among other supplies, reached crisis proportions during the Special Period (Feinsilver, 1993, 222). To correct course, the Special Period strategy prioritized further development, deepening, and expansion of a series of extant measures. Emphasis on health promotion and disease prevention had been a decades-old national healthcare priority—in part responsible for frequent system reforms. Cuba during the Special Period looked abroad for 1990s healthcare re26

forms via outreach programs in foreign countries. Cuba’s medical cooperation program with Venezuela was by far the largest it ever attempted. Approximately one-third of Cuban doctors went to Venezuela to provide health services in an oil-for-doctors exchange.

Economic recovery—a good deal of which could be attributed to the deepening of Cuba’s strategic alliance with Hugo Chavez’ Venezuela—allowed the Cuban government to begin to rebuild its weakened health infrastructure (Feinsilver, 1993, 223). In Cuba’s attempt to consolidate post-1959 gains in healthcare, the government realized internal reforms were not sufficient and set its sights overseas for assistance.

Another of Castro’s socialist aims was to ensure equal rights for all Cubans, which was realized with many policies directed towards women. This commitment to women’s advancement and rights protection began with the creation of the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) in 1960 with the purpose of preparing women politically, and socially to participate in the revolution.

Main FMC functions were the incorporation of women in work and raising the educational consciousness of women (Pérez, 2015, 251). From membership ranks of 17,000 in 1961, the FMC expanded to 2.6 million members in 1985, representing approximately 82 percent of all women over the age of fourteen years. Over this period, women increasingly joined the militia and by 1963 27

constituted 44 percent of the 1.5 million members of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, with the responsibility of combating internal subversion and sabotage (Pérez, 2015, 251).

By the late 1960s, women in significant numbers also participated directly in production. However, an unprecedented result of this was that women were not able to balance between their simultaneous calle (workforce) and casa (domestic) roles.

Consequently, an estimated 76 percent of the women who entered the labor force in 1969 dropped out within one year. Therefore, in 1974 the government enacted the Family Code, which stipulated that both marriage partners possessed the right to pursue careers and improve their education. Divorce procedures were simplified and it further mandated shared housework in order to counter machismo attitudes (Pérez, 2015, 283). The changes occurring in the workplace were accompanied by changes in educational centers. Even as women in greater numbers were being incorporated into the economy, they were also incorporated into the educational system at every level. More than 56 percent of those who learned to read and write during the Literacy Campaign were women, and by the early 1970s, 73 percent of all Cuban women had reached the sixth-grade level (Pérez, 2015, 282).

The Special Period entailed a gendered process of re-localization in which the household was re-signified for Cuban women.

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The daily lives of women in post-Soviet Cuba centered upon the household in terms of activities, income, and social status—to a degree that might seem surprising given the socialist revolution’s promotion of equality of the sexes and more than four decades of provision of extensive state services (Pertierra, 2008). In their traditional role as primary caregivers, women were forced to devote more time to domestic tasks and acquiring food in the face of drastic food, transport, and energy shortages. Worsening this challenge to women’s social progress, the workplace services created in the 1970s to alleviate women’s domestic burden were either cut back or withdrawn entirely due to funding troubles. The increasing importance of the household in Cuba did not necessarily represent a complete reversal or erasure of the changes to women’s lives that occurred in earlier phases. While socialist policies increased women’s participation in the workforce, they had also been encouraged to contribute from within the household. This was more prevalent during the 1990s compared to before as more women were seen running domestic economies and undertaking domestic labor (Pertierra, 2008, 766). The social and economic progress that began with the creation of the FMC did not continue on a linear path--as it had seemed it would--during the Special Period. Expectations of progress in Cuban politics were similarly challenged.

Perhaps most significantly, the Special Period warranted 29

political changes in order to facilitate economic reforms. In the years prior to the 1990s, political reforms were aimed at maintaining strong foundations of socialism throughout the country. Cuban civil society underwent a radical transformation in the aftermath of the 1959 revolution and much of it was erased completely.

Most forms of association such as political parties, professional institutions, and religious groups disappeared. The 1960s saw the reorganization of the entire system of institutions responsible for producing and disseminating the new ideological paradigms that had become the building blocks for the new era: the development of the education system and transformation of the media into an instrument of public interest. The agrarian reforms of 1959 and 1963 abolished all private farms over 67 hectares, and with the Urban Reform Law in 1960, the state took over all rental housing and set rents at no more than 10 percent of a family’s income (Chomsky, 2015, 44). Many social sectors that had previously played a passive role, or because of their marginalized status could not have been considered involved at all, became active participants in this civil society. It was this new civil society that enabled the revolution to achieve hegemony. The “institutionalization process” of the 1970s led to a number of gradual but important changes. The state held a virtually exclusive monopoly over the allocation of resources as well as societal values. It also occupied nearly all aspects of social 30

life and people’s livelihoods were inextricably linked to the presence of the state (Chomsky, 2015, 133).

The 1990s marked a turning point for all areas of Cuban society. Cuban leaders recognized that a strategy for economic survival implied either political stagnation or a longer-term mismatch unless political adjustment or even change was also addressed. The question for the Cuban government was how much change would take place and what form this change would take. While capitalist elements could be contemplated in controlled areas of economic activity, it was clear that any movement toward pluralism and competitive elections carried serious risks to the Castro regime. However, while the economy was still based on a socialist model, it was compelled to open up significant space for foreign investment, different forms of ownership, and self-employment. There were a number of other political reforms that also took place during the 1990s. For example, the Fourth Party Congress of 1991 ratified a variety of measures, including the introduction of direct secret ballot elections of members (Pérez, 2015, 306). The National Assembly in 1992 altered electoral procedures and provided for a direct popular vote to elect provincial delegates and Assembly deputies. Amendments to the Cuban Constitution in 1992 eliminated important restrictions on foreign investment, permitting property ownership by mixed enterprises and the transfer of state property 31

to joint ventures with foreign capital, usually between the foreign party and a Cuban enterprise. Additionally, although Cuba’s system of land tenure was changed in the 1990s, the agrarian reforms of the 1960s were not exactly reversed. In terms of peasant access to land, the 1993 reform actually put more land into the hands of small farmers, by dismantling the state farms and turning them into cooperatives or small plots (Chomsky, 2015, 134).

The Special Period did result in social reforms but mainly to maintain Cuba’s commitment to a socialist approach to its education, health, and minorities, rather than change it. Similarly, the changes in the political landscape were by and large necessitated by the economic challenges and to enable economic reform, rather than a purposeful departure from Cuba’s socialist ideology and structure.

Evaluation of the Special Period During the Special Period, Castro sought to stabilize Cuba’s economy without abandoning the extensive social support that his regime had established since the 1959 Revolution. The Cuban Communist Part (PCC) sought to end the crisis by legalizing a short list of economic activities, which led to substantial political and social changes.

With the most extensive policies enacted between 1993 and 32

1996, the reforms included the legalization of the dollar; decentralization of economic decisions; transformation of state farms into cooperatives (UBPCs), reopening of free agricultural markets and distribution of small state land parcels to private farmers; reauthorization of self-employment; insertion in the world trade market, and opening to foreign investment (Mesa-Lago, 2006, 160). These reforms represented a major transition from the largely socialist economic landscape prior to the 1990s. In the agricultural sector, state farms began to be converted into UBPCs in 1993, which were granted 42 percent of Cuba’s usable land (Hernández-Catá, 2000, 10). By the end of 1996, the percentage of farms under state control had dropped from 82 percent to 24.4 percent. As economic decision-making became decentralized, farmers’ markets were legalized which allowed for wholesalers to sell farm products at decontrolled prices. This Special Period economic decentralization continued until, in 1997, an estimated 76 percent of Cuba’s usable land was held by the non-state sector—mainly UBPCs. The 1993 decriminalization of both the possession and use of hard currency by the population represented another major successful policy shift during the Special Period. The government created stores in which those able to pay in US dollars could buy goods not available outside those sanctioned stores. Legalizing the dollar in 1993 brought capital—and capitalism—into the socialist 33

country. Additionally, in 1993, the government issued a decree legalizing self-employment. Self‐employment reached a high of 208,500 workers in 1996, and by 2000, 22 percent of Cuba’s workers were employed in the non-state sector—either through self-employment or working for foreign enterprises (Chomsky, 2015, 128). Foreign revenue in the form of tourism also became much more prevalent as a result of the Special Period. Hopes that tourism could provide a source of much-needed foreign exchange were not misplaced as tourists visited Cuba in record numbers: from 350,000 in 1990 to more than 740,000 in 1995. Gross tourist earnings almost doubled from $530 million in 1993 to approximately $1.8 billion in 1998 (Pérez, 2015, 309). This tourism was another crucial step in bringing valuable US dollars and hard currency into the country.

These state-enacted economic policies were intended as temporary measures to mitigate the effects of the Special Period, but each ended up also reshaping Cuba’s social terrain. The economic reforms greatly liberalized the Cuban economy and began a process of gradual recovery—but economic liberalization also brought newfound social inequality to Cuba. Growing economic inequality was the inevitable result of the changing economic landscape. The most acute manifestation of inequality lay in the fact that those Cubans who had access to the new market econ34

omy— particularly those with access to dollars—enjoyed better living standards than those reliant on the peso economy (Chomsky, 2015, 136). And despite the important role of introducing foreign capital to Cuba, tourism brought mixed results. New tourism was dollar tourism in a peso economy, so the arrival of many tens of thousands of foreign visitors during a time of economic crisis highlighted the sharp contrast between deteriorating national living standards and affluent tourists—-a situation made all the more egregious by the availability of goods and services—not readily available to most Cubans—to foreigners. Furthermore, the government-run dollar stores symbolized the contradictions of Cuba’s tentative, partial opening to capitalism in the 1990s. The stores sold luxury items when even basics were not available in the peso economy. Their profits were to be used to fund state services for the benefit of all, but the dollar store system placed the government in the paradoxical position of fostering inequality to subsidize equality (Chomsky, 2015, 128). These examples illustrate that the main source of social inequality was the introduction of a dual currency; the huge value difference between dollars and pesos created barriers amongst Cubans defined by the access to goods and services that they had—even if this reform was able to stabilize the economy.

The years after the Cuban Revolution were characterized 35

by a number of changes but always attempted to align with Castro’s socialist ideology. Reducing dependence on exploitative foreign powers was one of the major successes of the Special Period. Castro’s socialist ideology had a major influence on how Cuba developed after the revolution as well as how it continued and changed during the Special Period. Castro’s socialist ideology was largely formed in response to the political environment surrounding him and was a unique product of Cuban-US relations; US interaction with Cuba’s economy continued to dictate economic and policy responses before, throughout, and after the Special period. Antagonism against the Americans created a huge amount of pressure against free-market reforms in Cuba. Additionally, the US created the situation in which sugar was monopolized in Cuba, resulting in weak structural foundations as Cuba was not able to diversify its economy and achieve self-sufficiency, and this later had detrimental consequences. The US sought to maintain at least a strategic interest in Cuba if not only an economic one.However, in its pursuit of this aim, the US caused fundamental weaknesses in the Cuban economy and society. This continued during the special period when the US actions through the strengthening of the US economic embargo with the Torricelli Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 added to the structural problems of the Cuban economy (Pérez, 2015, 178).

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Soviet interests similarly shaped the development of the Cuban economy after the 1959 Revolution. The Special Period stands out in post-1959 Cuban history because the Soviet collapse enabled Cuba’s political liberation and freedom from foreign political control and intervention—which was subsequently reflected in policy shifts. There was prior increasing dependence on the Soviet Union to bolster Cuba’s economy after Castro minimized US economic interests on the island—dependence on Soviet assistance represented a comparatively outsized portion of Cuba’s economic development than US sugar imports. This Soviet-Cuba trade relationship was an imbalance in the Soviets’ favor as Cuba was not a key market for Soviet exports the Soviet Union’s aid and trade were far more important to Cuba, than vice versa (Tsokhas, 1980, 326). Providing economic relief and aid in Cuba was certainly for Soviet self-interest and a step to further its agenda. This created a situation of unequal power that existed in favor of the metropole— and Castro admitted as much. The Soviet Union was not primarily interested in the economic returns obtained through a relationship with Cuba. Rather, the Soviet ruling circles were motivated by the political and ideological uses of a Cuban proxy (Tsokhas, 1980, 319). The power dynamic in favor of the Soviet Union allowed them to use their relationship to manipulate Cuba’s economic dependence on them in order to obtain Cuba’s adoption of Soviet 37

approaches to economic management. For example, Soviet leadership would withhold or delay deliveries of strategic materials to Cuba, forcing Castro to concede when Cuban and Soviet policy differed (Tsokhas, 1980, 325). The Soviet Union was Cuba’s only ally, but it was an exploitative relationship that was based on the Soviet Union’s strategic aims. Cuba was not able to break the cycle of foreign dependence that began with the US and then shifted to the Soviet Union.

Despite the above discussion on capitalist-leaning reforms of the Special Period, it is important to note that not all of the changes in the Special Period fully embraced a free-market, economic recovery ethos. In fact, some Special Period reforms were aimed at maintaining and even strengthening the socialist sector.

In 1990, Cuba spent 20 percent of its GDP on social services, including health care, social security, and education (Tsokhas, 1980, 132). Cuban government policies to deal with the crisis were markedly different from the pattern of economic adjustment that other countries, formerly reliant on Soviet assistance,had adopted.

Essential social services such as education and health care were provided universally and at no cost even in the worst moments of the crisis. Subsidized food—although in relatively reduced amounts—guaranteed a minimum level of nutrition, while other important social programs were designed to support particular 38

social groups. Inspired by Revolution ideals, adherence to norms of fairness and social justice continued to be the hallmark of Cuban adjustment policies during the 1990s. Despite the economic crisis, Cuba continuously increased its spending on domestic health as a percentage of total government spending in order to shield its most vulnerable population from the worst effects of the crisis. Not only did health spending increase but so did spending on social security and education. Even during the worst years of the crisis, these areas grew both in absolute terms and as a proportion of GDP. In 1998, 32 percent of the GDP was spent on social services (Chomsky, 2015, 132).

Social policies during the Special Period were largely very successful despite the lack of hard currency and shortages of resources. However, these reforms were underpinned by an economy built on extremely weak foundations. Additionally, despite the problems and subsequent reforms, Castro did not abandon basic socialist policies despite the liberal economic reforms passed that usually appear hostile to socialism.

The difficulty of reversing the policies introduced during the Special Period is evidence that they fundamentally changed the Cuban economy and of their relative success. Castro, an ardent socialist, tried to reverse some of the changes afterward. If many of the 1993-96 reforms went in the direction of market opening, 39

the period from 2003 until 2006, saw an attempt to restrict and turn back some of these reforms (Chomsky, 2015, 150). The post-2003 period saw a retreat to drastic re-centralization measures in economic decision-making and further reduction of the small private sector. As part of re-centralization, the architects of the market openings were removed from the Cuban Cabinet. The Minister of Economics and Planning, the Minister of Finance and Prices, and the Minister of Basic Industry, all of whom were involved in the earlier reforms, were replaced between 2003 and 2004 by officials who set about re-establishing greater government control (Chomsky, 2015, 150). Re-centralization extended itself to de-dollarization, where the government introduced the convertible peso to replace dollars, and enabled the government to take greater control of the monetary supply. These measures served as a kind of levy on dollar-holders—those who had benefited from the economic openings—that required them to subsidize the socialist, peso economy. Additionally, new restrictions and taxes imposed more controls on the self-employed and on small businesses. As a result, the number of self-employed dropped from its 1996 high of 208,500 to only 149,990 in 2004 and continued to fall as restrictions and taxation increased (Chomsky, 2015, 151). The reversal was unsuccessful because Cuba had already liberalized to such an extent that the changes had solidified within society and it was 40

therefore difficult to reverse without creating severe weaknesses and undoing the progress made thus far. In fact, the economy suffered rapidly when such policies were reversed.

The strength of the legacy of the Special Period is also evident in the policies of Fidel Castro’s younger brother and successor, Raúl Castro. When Raúl Castro came to power in 2008, he proposed a system to “update the model” without abandoning socialism (Jamison, 2009). Raúl was quick to make the economy his priority. He abandoned his brother’s call for the resurgence of socialist policies. Just four days after his induction into power, Raúl implemented a series of continuity-based policies and free-flowing economic reforms that pragmatically recognized Cuba’s economic situation, while instituting a long modernization process. He began reintroducing the very reforms Castro killed off after the Special Period. One set of reforms sought to stimulate agricultural production by offering incentives to small farmers, including leasing state land to private farmers, and raising state prices for agricultural goods. Development of agriculture to reduce dependence on imports, Raúl argued, was a matter of national security (Chomsky, 2015, 156). In early 2009, he overhauled the Cabinet, creating what journalist Marc Frank called “a seismic shift in the political landscape,” and, perhaps most significantly, naming Marino Alberto Murillo Jorge as Minister of Economy and Planning, who 41

would oversee a decisive shift towards new market openings. In late 2010, Raúl announced that 500,000 state employees—almost a tenth of Cuba’s labor force—would be laid off in the coming months, and Cubans were urged to take advantage of new openings for self-employment and small businesses. Other market-oriented reforms followed (Chomsky, 2015, 156). The Sixth Party Congress in 2011 passed a new set of guidelines for the country that emphasized market reforms and decentralization. Reforms were also in the works with regard to the dual currency and the dual exchange rate. While individuals could exchange pesos for convertible pesos (CUC) at the rate of 24-1, the rate for businesses was 1-1 (Chomsky, 2015, 151). This undermined state companies producing for export and made it hard for local producers to compete with imports that were essentially subsidized. As a result, in early 2014, the government announced that state enterprises were being prepared to shift to an all-peso system in the hopes of resolving the dual currency system that had created problems for so many years.

These “transformations constitute a new paradigm”. On the political side, the guidelines called for a limit of two five-year terms for Cuba’s highest political offices and made it clear that the era of one-man rule was over. This meant that Raúl Castro would have to cede power no later than 2018—which he later confirmed was his intent (Jamison, 2009, 158). The government has moved from con42

ceiving the new policies as a “necessary evil” to viewing them as a “strategic necessity.” The government is ‘letting go.’” (Hernández and Domínguez, n.d.).

Fidel Castro’s reversal of the liberal economic reforms from the Special Period in 2003-2006, followed by Raúl Castro’s re-implementation of them after coming to power in 2008, is a recognition of the fact that Castro’s aims to reduce foreign dependence right from 1959, solve the economic crisis of 1991 and maintain state support for key social sectors were all enabled by the Special Period. The reversal of policies had adverse effects on the economy, while the return to them indicated progress, and this highlights the significance of the Special Period showed that liberal economic reforms were successful in Cuba’s economic growth.

Conclusion The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered the immediate economic downturn of the Cuban economy whose prior development was dictated by Cold War geopolitics and relied heavily on subsidized trade; the Special Period saw a series of policies passed

by Cuba’s regime, dedicated to socialist ideals but willing to liberalize elements of Cuba’s social and economic life, in response to the economic crisis. This period was characterized as one of rapid change and adaptation. A country that had relied on the Soviet 43

Union for three decades was suddenly left isolated in the hemisphere without the reassurance of a safety net that could come to its aid. Cuba also had to bear the brunt of continued US actions to bring about a regime change and remove the socialist state that was at its doorstep. Despite these pressures, Fidel Castro never wavered from his socialist ideology and was governed by its principles as he led the country, first in ensuring its survival during the collapse of the Soviet Union and socialist bloc, and then guiding the country through the years after the economic crisis.

The Special Period was significant for Cuba because it represented a major turning point in the country’s history, marking the end of its period of economic dependence on the Soviet Union and the beginning of a new era of economic and political changes. The collapse of the Soviet Union left Cuba without its primary source of economic support, forcing the government to undertake a series of measures to promote economic self-sufficiency and adapt to a new economic reality. It marked the beginning of a series of changes in the economic model to guarantee the survival of socialism in extremely difficult conditions (Bobes, 2013). It did this through the introduction of capitalist-oriented policies in a dedicated socialist country and t​​his indicated the significance of the Special Period because it showed the effectiveness of capitalist policies in stabilizing Cuba without abandoning its socialist ideals. Additionally, despite 44

the economic crisis, Cuban government policies to deal with the crisis were markedly different from the pattern of economic adjustment that other countries have adopted. Two areas in particular, the education system and the health industry, especially demonstrated Cuba’s exceptional performance in attempting to mitigate the impact of the economic crisis on the Cuban people through such a difficult economic time (Chomsky, 2015, 132).

Many outside observers have imagined that Cuba would in time follow Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in making a transition toward a more market-oriented economic system and perhaps a Western style of pluralistic democracy, but this has not happened (Ritter, 2010). Cuba’s commitment to socialism, especially in its strengthening of social sectors such as healthcare and education as well as its maintenance of social support for the state, allowed it to forge its own unique economic, social, and political model.

The Special Period achieved its aim of rescuing the Cuban economy and was ultimately a defining event in providing a new model for Cuba, not just economically, but politically and socially.

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Modern Iran and the Historical Origins of Political Islam: Implications for the Future of the Broader Region By: Henry Dennis Abstract: This paper explores the root historical causes of political polarization in the Middle East, and explores the implications of that history for the future of the region. To clarify, “polarization” in this context refers to the growing prominence of Islamic extremism in political realms, making for tense, often violent geopolitical dynamics driven mainly by religious classifications rather than by other cultural and societal delineations. The resulting regional conflicts have spurred much academic discourse about the nature of the history in the Middle East, with many prominent scholars drawing similarities to the Thirty Years War in Europe in the seventeenth century, citing the “rising of religious identification as the principal motive for political action.” These viewpoints, however, are indicators of the European tendency towards the “medi53

evalization” of the Middle East, as they boil down its conflicts to essentialized ethno-religious divides. On the contrary, much of the history of the Middle East prior to European contact is characterized by diverse and multidimensional local contexts. Understanding this disparity in historical viewpoints, the question of how the Middle East arrived at its current polarized state can be addressed by looking specifically at the historical origins and development of Islam as a rigid form of political philosophy. The Islamic Republic of Iran is thus the main case study discussed in this paper, not only because of its high-profile position in the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, but also because of the notable ways in which it came to be an Islamic theocracy.

This in-depth observation and analysis of Iran from its dynastic period in the nineteenth century until the 1979 Islamic revolution and through to present day the overall conclusion, which is that political Islam as it exists today originated as a reactionary force with nationalist overtones, directed against the pressures of Western imperialism. This notion of Islamic extremism continues to be reflected in the modern policies of theocratic Middle Eastern nations.

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Author Biography: Henry Dennis is a first-year student interested in Global Development Studies, in addition to Philosophy and Film Studies. From Brooklyn, New York, he enjoys studying languages: he learned Spanish in high school, is studying French at UVA, and is striving to pick up Italian as well. In his spare time, he enjoys playing tennis, doing crossword puzzles, watching old movies, and listening to world music.

Paper: The Middle East has occupied a notable space in the history of the world. Serving as the birthplace of human civilization and the site of numerous literary, scientific, and political advances throughout its ancient and medieval history, it has constituted a global converging point of ideas across geographic and cultural boundaries, leading to periods of unprecedented prosperity. However, recently the region has been marred by violence and instability. Today, the Middle East finds itself in an incredibly polarized state, embroiled in a tangled web of proxy conflicts and geopolitical power struggles, all under the control of militant authoritarian regimes and economic hardship (Haass). A driving force in all of these problems is Islamic extremism, which rose to prominence as a political entity near the end of the twentieth century. Since then, 55

conflicts throughout the Middle East have taken on a particularly religious tone, with both governments and independent militias using Islam as motivation for military and political action.

One major example of this is the proxy war between the countries of Iran and Saudi Arabia that continues to divide the region to this day. Since Iran represents the largest population of Shia muslims in the world, and Saudi Arabia declares itself to be the global leader of Sunni Islam, the rivalry is inherently religiously motivated. The development of such hostile dynamics throughout the Middle East has prompted much discourse on the topic of religion and its relationship with politics, with some historians viewing the region today through a lens similar to medieval Europe. These academic circles suggest that the Saudi-Iran conflict draws parallels to the Thirty Years’ War, citing “the rising of religious identification as the principal motive for political action” as the definitive link between the two historical contexts (Kamel 1). Such interpretations, however, tend to essentialize the multidimensional dynamics in the region, making assumptions that geopolitical animosities have always been synonymous with religion.

This “medievalization” of the Middle East creates a historiography of the region which denies the larger, more complex forces at play.

As such, to truly understand how the Middle East arrived at its

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current polarized state, we must recognize that political Islam as it exists today emerged as a populist movement, garnering support by aligning itself with revolutionary sentiments directed against the pressures of authoritarianism and Western imperialism. Having recognized this, we can better understand how the dominance of Islamism is representative of the Middle East’s complex history, and make further insights into what the future looks like for the region.

When looking at the origins and development of political Islam in the Middle East, the country of Iran serves as a pertinent case study, not only because of the Islamist policies that dominate its internal and external affairs and its consequent alignment with the broader dynamics of the Middle East, but also because of the notable way in which it came to be an Islamic republic. The beginnings of the country’s shift towards revolution can be traced back to the early nineteenth century and the Qajar dynasty. Throughout this time period, Iran was under the rule of an absolute monarchy, situated around the unquestioned authority of the shah. This centralized ruling power contrasted with Iran’s changing global environment, which saw it increasingly coming under the dueling influences of European imperialist powers. To the north in the Caucasus, Russia made swift military advances and established control in the region, and to the southeast, Britain expanded its geographic

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domain, concerned for the security of its “most precious colonial possession” in India (Amanat 190). With these opposing European strategic and commercial ambitions, Qajar Iran increasingly became a buffer state between the two powers, and acted with resistance despite also adopting certain aspects of Europe’s material and intellectual cultures (Amanat 179). It was through these mixed interactions with foreign influences that the beginnings of an Iranian national identity began to form. Another effect of European influence in the Qajar era was the rise of a powerful clerical establishment, which used its prominence in Iranian society to challenge the shah’s westernizing measures (Amanat 180). The tension between the clergy and the monarchy fueled by Iran’s interactions with its global environment would only continue to grow as the country entered a new era under a new shah in the latter half of the nineteenth century, known as the Naseri era. This saw the continuation of European intervention in Iran’s domestic affairs accompanied by a growing sense of urgency for a nationalist movement. Mirza Malkom Khan, a young French-educated diplomat and essayist, articulated the threat that European colonialism posed to Iranian sovereignty in 1858: Put the map of Asia in front of yourself and read the history of the past one hundred years and examine

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carefully the course of the two bursting deluges that were propelled in the direction of Iran from Calcutta [the administrative capital of British India] and St. Petersburg and see how these two streams which in the beginning were not noticeable in a short time became so great… Then you can tell how many minutes remain in the life of this state. (Amanat 267) The growing number of dissenting voices responded not only to the encroachment of European powers on Iranian affairs, but also to the despotic rule of the shah, whose lack of action in curbing famine, outbreaks of disease, and the growing wealth disparities led to widespread and intense popular protests. These demonstrations, though, were met by the royal government with equally intense suppression in a variety of forms, ranging from torture and imprisonment to execution (Amanat 265). Thus, Iran entered the twentieth century as a nation in a state of growing unrest, whose strengthening national identity sprang from a disdain for imperialist expansion and authoritarian subjugation.

Throughout these periods of turmoil, Islam had not yet emerged as the galvanizing popular and political force. Instead, the clerical establishment used their influence in society to contribute 59

to the democratic movement for the adoption of a constitution, one which would limit the powers of the shah and assure that governance lay mainly in the hands of the Iranian people (Amanat 315).

In order for political Islam to rise to the level of dominance in Iran that it now occupies, a truly destabilizing event had to occur, which came in the form of the 1953 coup of Mohammad Mossadegh.

Born from a prominent family of the Iranian ruling elite, Mossadegh obtained his education in Europe, and entered politics in 1914 (Britannica). As a political figure, he came to movements against Great Power intrusions on Iranian independence, championing national sovereignty and constitutional rule while “advocating [for] the political rights of Iranian citizens against the authority of the shah” (Gasiorowski xiv). Naturally, the nationalist Iranian populace that had developed over the past number of decades gravitated towards his charismatic leadership, and Mossadegh enjoyed massive popularity leading up to his appointment as prime minister in 1951. The main target of his reforms was the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, a British private corporation which had dominated Iran’s oil industry and, consequently, the majority of its economy.

Mossadegh nationalized the company as soon as he gained the premiership, and in response the CIA covertly orchestrated a coup to overthrow him, which had complex motives and a steep global impact. . The 1953 coup of Mohammad Mossadegh marked a pivotal 60

moment in the development of political Islam in Iran and the entire region. For one part, it brought the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, back into power. Pahlavi, like his predecessors, put in place a rigid authoritarian regime that suppressed all forms of opposition and took dramatic steps towards Westernization, including his “White Revolution” progressive campaign. This saw the introduction of a comprehensive land reform program which eliminated nearly all of Iran’s large landowners, thereby eradicating the traditional upper class and leading many Iranian peasants to relocate to urban areas (Zahrani 97). With the swelling of an urban lower class discontented by the shah’s suppressive regime, Iran was primed for another nationalist revolutionary movement. However, since Mossadegh had been ousted from power, there was no figure to lead it, and the shah’s dictatorial rule over the country left little room for the development of moderate political opposition in Mossadegh’s absence (Zahrani 97). Consequently, radicalism arose as the only viable outlet for the intensifying dissident movement. And so, Islamic fundamentalism, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was poised to become the main vehicle for revolutionary change.

In order to truly consolidate the power of Islam as a revolutionary force in the wake of the 1953 coup, Khomeini needed to transform it from a religion into a political ideology. This new iter-

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ation of Islam, known as Revolutionary Shi’ism, centered around his binary worldview which differentiated between the mustakberin (the oppressors) and the mustazefin (the oppressed) (Aarabi). To Khomeini, the purpose of Revolutionary Shi’ism was to uphold justice for the mustazefin in the face of their unjust oppressors. He then used this dynamic to mobilize a revolutionary movement by reorienting it towards Iran’s historical context, painting western intervening powers and the rule of the shah as the root of Iran’s problems, and Islam as the sole solution (Aarabi). One example of this comes from a speech of Khomeini’s from 1964, in which he denounces the United States, saying: “let the American President know that in the eyes of the Iranian nation, he is the most repulsive member of the human race today because of the injustice he has imposed on our Muslim nation. Today, the Qur’an has become his enemy, the Iranian nation has become his enemy” (Khomeini).

By speaking of injustice on the part of the United States towards Iran, Khomeini invokes the central oppressor-oppressed narrative of Revolutionary Shi’ism, portraying America as the enemy while also using both national and religious descriptors “Iranian” and “Muslim” to characterize the country. In doing so, he asserts that the fight against injustice and all oppressive elements is a nationalist matter that is inherently entwined with religion. Herein lies the power of Khomeini’s philosophy. It merged two complementary 62

forces in Iran’s history: one, Islam, which had existed for over one thousand years and had formed the backbone of Iranian society, and the other, nationalism, which had emerged relatively recently out of Iran’s interactions with its global environment. Both were central to the Iranian identity, and together they gave way to a powerful ideology that sparked an unprecedented revolutionary movement, culminating in the removal of the shah and the establishment of Iran as an Islamic Republic in 1979.

Not only did Iran’s Islamic Revolution dramatically transform its domestic government, it also reshaped the geopolitical landscape of the entire Middle East by granting Islamism legitimacy as a political entity. This could be seen through the galvanization of other existing radical organizations throughout the region, to whom “the idea of a religious revolution was compelling and gave new energy and hope” (Byman). Some of these organizations included the Egyptian Islamist Jihad, which assassinated Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, which instituted an Islamist uprising against Syria’s Assad regime.

Both revolutionary movements called for the establishment of an Islamic state, very much modeled after the one installed in 1979 in Iran (“Anwar Sadat’s Assassination”; “Remembering the Hama Massacre” ). Though ultimately unsuccessful, they demonstrated

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how Iran’s revolution offered Islam as a political ideology to the rest of the Middle East, which could be used to fight authoritarianism and energize populist movements. In this fashion, the years that followed 1979 saw the exportation of Khomeini’s ideology throughout the region. After the uprisings in Egypt and Syria, many others followed, including in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon.

This all seemed to be part of Khomeini’s grand vision as, in 1989, he stated: “The Iranian people’s revolution is only a point in the start of the revolution of the great world of Islam” (Aarabi). With the rapid spread of Khomeini’s Revolutionary Shi’ist doctrine, the Middle East eventually at its current state, in which religious designations became vehicles for broad, complex, and intense sectarian disputes that fuelled violence and political instability. One only has to look at the ongoing proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran to grasp this notion, where continuing violent conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, many of which were inspired by Iran’s 1979 revolution, can all be traced back to the fundamental Sunni-Shia divide between the two nations (Boghani). So fierce has this antagonism become that Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince referred to Iran’s Supreme Leader as “the new Hitler of the Middle East” in regards to the expansion of Iran’s influence in the region (“Iran’s Supreme Leader”). The ferocity of this rivalry is a prime example of how proponents of Islamic extremism have simplified the exist64

ing complex and multidimensional regional tensions and exploited them to sow division, incite conflict, and gain power.

Despite Islam’s tight grip over the Middle East’s political landscape, its domestic authority, especially in Iran, is starting to become contested. This stems from the reality that, in spite of the lofty ideals of Khomeini’s vision, Iran’s Islamic Republic is a strict autocratic regime, subjecting those who “don’t follow [its] perceived vision of Islam” to harsh suppression (Saafein). Nowhere is this more visible than in the regime’s treatment of women, especially in regards to their freedom of expression. On September 13, 2022, Mahsa Zhina Amini, a Kurdish woman, was detained and beaten to death by Iran’s morality police for incorrectly wearing her headscarf, an event which sparked widespread protests across the country calling for the rights of women to be properly recognized by the government (Saafein). The resulting movement highlighted not only the regime’s extreme policies towards women, but also its persecution of the Kurdish people, an ethnic minority group which has historically posed a threat to the authority of Iran’s ruling powers (Saafein). Iran’s suppression of dissenting elements also extends into politics, as in 2021, the Iranian government blatantly altered the course of the nation’s presidential election in favor of a more conservative candidate, when a “hardline

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election body barred heavyweight moderates and conservatives from standing” (Hafezi). As a result, Ebrahim Raisi, who was already under US sanctions for human rights violations, gained the presidency with a vast majority of the votes in an election whose voter turnout was a record low of 48.8% (Hafezi). This number likely derived from the Iranians who boycotted the election entirely, in addition to the 3.7 million blank ballots that were submitted in protest (Hafezi). Altogether, the current state of the Islamic Republic sees it distancing itself from the values of democracy and anti-authoritarianism that had catapulted it into popularity in 1979, instead leaning into a radical Islamist, anti-western narrative. Consequently, it has lost the support of its people, who are increasingly becoming disconnected from the republic’s ideological purpose. In fact, only 14% of Iran’s population is above the age of 54, meaning that the vast majority of the country’s population was either too young or not yet alive to experience Iran’s revolutionary past (CIA 443). Therefore, the new generation of politically conscious Iranians subscribes more to a holistic call for democracy and fundamental human rights instead of an ideological movement with religious overtones. This can be seen in the prevailing slogans of Iran’s two movements. Today’s movements, such as “Women, Life Freedom” and “Iranians Die but Will Not Be Suppressed” (“Bi-Sharaf”), notably contrast with the more ideologically charged slogans of 1979, 66

such as “Death to America” and “Neither East or West, Islamic Republic!” (Bajoghli 6). This generational shift away from the polarizing grasp of Islamism can be seen throughout the broader Middle East as well. In Saudi Arabia’s burgeoning protest movement for example, “reform is not a Sunni or Shia idea, but a means to dignity and equality” (“Saudi Arabia’s Protest Movement”), and in Iraq in 2019, protests against the government’s failure to deliver basic services were notably not sectarian. Instead, the Iraqi people were “collectively demanding a better future” (Hamasaeed). This growing trend of democratic, noticeably secular, movements led by young people throughout the region leads to the question: What is the future of radical Islamism in the Middle East?

Up until now, Islamic extremism had risen to prominence by inserting itself into nationalist and anti-authoritarian movements, rapidly becoming synonymous with political upheaval across the region. However, in today’s era of changing economic and technological frontiers, political orders, and climatic conditions, the state of political Islam in the Middle East is somewhat uncertain. The recent wave of popular movements throughout the region may suggest the waning of its influence, as the emerging generation which grew up in the turbulent world that it created now has the opportunity to achieve regional stability through

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democratic reform. That is one optimistic approach to the issue, but there are other possible outcomes. In a more grim view, ruling governments will continue to eschew political and social reform in the effort to maintain control, despite outcries from their citizens.

This, coupled with the stress inflicted on the region’s oil-dependent economies due to a global transition away from fossil fuels, will ignite public animosity to another fatal boiling point, offering yet another opening for insurgent radical groups, just as it did years ago in revolutionary Iran. Above all, one thing can be stated for certain, which is that radical Islamism will never disappear completely. At its very core, it is entwined with matters of social hierarchy, nationhood, and cultural identity, permeating the fundamental fabric of the Middle East. Therefore, as long as political and economic instability exist in the region, Islamism will exploit that instability to maintain control and sow further division. So, the dilemma presents itself as to how to create the necessary tension through popular protest for meaningful political progress to occur, without the eruption of another radicalist movement. As a result, the Middle East will gain an even more important place in the global stage, as it finds itself at a pivotal crossroads of how it will come to define itself in the near and distant future, a struggle for redefinition which will have a significant impact on the continuously changing way in which nations, cultures, religious groups, 68

and races conceive of themselves in the broader world. Thus, whether the Middle East’s future path is one towards stability and reform, or one towards further polarization and violence, its history demonstrates that both outcomes will be intrinsically connected to the development of political Islam.

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Bibliography Aarabi, Kasra. “The Fundamentals of Iran’s Islamic Revolution.”

Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. February 11, 2019. www.institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/fundamentals-irans-islamic-revolution.

Amanat, Abbas. Iran : A Modern History. Yale University Press, 2017. EBSCOhost, discovery.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/ plink?id=00a40608-8ff7-349f-8df7-02d90f8b3856.

“Anwar Sadat’s Assassination.” Dan Rather: American Journalist. danratherjournalist.org/anchorman/breaking-news/anwar-sadats-assassination.

Bajoghli, Narges. Iran Reframed : Anxieties of Power in the Islamic Republic. Stanford University Press, 2019. EBSCOhost, discovery.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=b6f60bd60d67-3f10-9b0c-c1937a6edc65. “’Bi-Sharaf!’: A Guide to the Slogans Heard at Protests in Iran.”

IranWire. September 22, 2022. iranwire.com/en/society/107735-guide-to-the-slogans-heard-at-protests-in-iran/.

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nica.com/biography/Mohammad-Mosaddegh.

Byman, Daniel L. “The Iranian Revolution and Its Legacy of Terrorism.” The Brookings Institution. January 24, 2019. www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/24/ the-iranian-revolution-and-its-legacy-of-terrorism/. Accessed 21 May 2023.

Central Intelligence Agency, compiler. The CIA World Factbook 2022-2023. New York City, Skyhorse Publishing, 2022.

Gasiorowski, Mark J., and Malcolm Byrne, editors. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. Syracuse University Press, 2004. EBSCOhost, discovery.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=056d4703-3588-3d0d-aae1-af11783a2b2a.

Accessed 17 May 2023.

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Hafezi, Parisa. “Khamenei protege wins Iran election amid low turnout.” Reuters. June 20, 2021. www.reuters.com/ world/middle-east/irans-sole-moderate-presidential-candidate-congratulates-raisi-his-victory-state-2021-06-19/.

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Hamasaeed, Sarhang. “As Protests Continue in the Street, Iraq Reaches a Crossroads.” United States Institute of Peace.

November 18, 2019. www.usip.org/publications/2019/11/ protests-continue-street-iraq-reaches-crossroads.

“Iran’s Supreme Leader ‘the New Hitler’, Says Saudi Crown Prince.” BBC News. November 24, 2017. www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east-42108986.

Kamel, Lorenzo. The Middle East From Empire to Sealed Identities. Edinburgh University Press, 2019. EBSCOhost, discovery.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=27702fca-603332f0-9c17-5ae561ecac0c.

Khomeini, Ruhollah. “Speech Denouncing American Influence in Iran.” 1964. professorcampbell.org. www.professorcampbell.org/sources/khomeini.html.

“Remembering the Hama Massacre.” Council on Foreign Relations. February 12, 2012. www.cfr.org/blog/remembering-hama-massacre.

Saafein, Judy. “Iranians Are Protesting an Oppressive Regime.”

Berkeley Political Review. November 6, 2022. bpr.berkeley.edu/2022/11/06/iranians-are-protesting-an-oppressive-regime/. Accessed 21 May 2023.

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November 7, 2012. humanrightsfirst.org/library/saudi-arabias-growing-protest-movement/.

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Tertiary Education Financing in the Netherlands and Belgium, 2000-2022 By: Calvin Pan Abstract: In Belgium, university students must navigate a labyrinthine system of terms and conditions that differ by region to see if their income is low enough to receive a means-tested study grant. In contrast, the Netherlands shockingly simple: every student receives a universal study grant, no questions asked—and also a transit pass!

This provokes the question: how did the Netherlands and Belgium, two very similar states, end up with such distinct systems? Some claim that the difference lies in what ideologies dominant political parties believe in. However, I argue that what political parties claim to believe is actually very different from the policy they propose, and that the structures of welfare programs are more often based in economic realities, the beliefs of constituents, and the strength of factions within parties (e.g, unions). These non-ideological factors allowed the Dutch to create a more unconditional welfare system that has not only raised its employment rate for young people, but has also allowed other universalist programs like 77

universal healthcare to continue operating. This idea that successful universal welfare programs can make other programs operate more smoothly and therefore legitimize them is incredibly useful, especially in an era of increased reaction on both left and right against unconditional, non-means tested welfare.

Author Biography: Calvin Pan is a current Jefferson Scholar at UVA from McLean, Virginia, planning to graduate with a Bachelor’s in Foreign Affairs with minors in French and Data Science in Spring 2026 before pursuing an Accelerated Master’s of Public Policy at the Batten School. Calvin is very interested in exploring in the international development space with a focus on West Africa, and is particularly intrigued by how states’ constructions of national identities and welfare systems aid or hinder them economically. Outside of writing, Calvin is the President of UVA’s International Relations Organization, and competes with the UVA Model UN team regularly.

Calvin also is Senior Data Manager for the University Judiciary Committee. Calvin loves to run/hike/bike/do anything outdoorsy, and is also an avid jazz pianist, playing in a small jazz group at UVA in addition to a funk rock band (favorite pianist: Bill Evans).

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Introduction In Belgium, university students must navigate a labyrinthine system of terms and conditions that differ by region to see if their income is low enough to receive a means-tested study grant.

In contrast, the Netherlands is shockingly simple: every student receives a universal study grant, no questions asked—and also a transit pass! This provokes the question: how did the Netherlands and Belgium, two very similar states, end up with such distinct systems? Some authors, like Gøsta Esping-Andersen, would claim that the difference lies in what ideologies dominant political parties believed in. However, I argue using the case of the Netherlands and Belgium that what political parties claim to believe is actually very different from the policy they propose. As will be seen, the structures of welfare programs are more often based in economic realities, the beliefs of constituents, and the strength of factions within parties (e.g, unions).

And how does the difference in education funding between the two nations affect the affordability of university and wider society as a whole? Regardless of how the two nations decided on the shapes of their welfare programs, I argue that the more unconditional Dutch program has not only raised the nation’s tertiary education attainment rate, but also its employment rate for 79

young people – and has even allowed for other universally oriented programs like universal healthcare to continue operating. This idea that successful universal welfare programs can make other programs operate more smoothly and therefore legitimize them is incredibly useful, especially in an era of increased reaction on both the left and right of the political spectrum against unconditional, non-means tested welfare.

“I argue using the case of the Netherlands and Belgium that what political parties claim to believe is actually very different from the policy they propose” Tertiary Education Financing in the Netherlands Financing for higher education in the Netherlands has long been characterized by a universal approach: every eligible student, regardless of income, receives some sort of subsidy. Though this unconditioned system has come under fire many times from left and right alike, it has survived largely intact to the modern day.

Before WWII, students wishing to attend universities in the Netherlands received no government support, and largely relied on their 80

own family’s assistance to pay their tuition, room, and board (Pers 2018). However, following the devastation of the war, many families no longer had the means to support their children throughout college. In response, the 3rd Drees Cabinet instituted the Netherlands’ first tertiary education subsidy in 1953 – granting every family a tax credit and increasing their child benefit payments for each child that went to college, regardless of the family’s income level (Pers 2018). The universal nature of this plan came as a compromise between the two main factions in the Drees III Cabinet – the Labour Party (PvdA) wanted a strong welfare program, but the Christian conservative Catholic People’s Party (KVP), wanting to preserve traditional structures, was only amenable to it if it operated by giving benefits to each family, not each student (Slaman 2015). This universal system only came about due to post-war economics – starting a trend of economic conditions heavily influencing what the Dutch educational financing system looked like.

This family- and tax-credit-reliant system quickly became unsustainable as the cost of living for students kept increasing, and as more and more students desired financial independence from their parents. From 1967 to 1984, ministers from the Ministry of Education repeatedly attempted to place child benefit funds on the education budget, but kept running into objections from the Chris-

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tian-democrat-dominated Ministries of Social Affairs and Finance that the consequences for the income position of households would be too great (Slaman 2015). Eventually in 1984, in the midst of the 1980s economic crisis that further strained families’ abilities to pay for college, PvdA members in the Lower House threatened to reject increases in tuition fees (Dutch university tuition rates are near-universally set by the government) if a new system of student financing was not presented quickly. The Ministry of Social Affairs eventually gave in and designed a new system of financing: the basisbeurs or basic grant (Slaman 2015). Launched in 1986 under a newly-elected CDA-majority cabinet, the basisbeurs was the same size as the previous increased child benefit for college students in terms of size and distributive effect, but was directly given to students instead of to families. This was a compromise between the PvdA and the KVP’s successors, the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), with the CDA agreeing because it would still preserve all families’ income positions across the board by being non-means tested (Slaman 2015). The preservation of an unconditional was therefore only possible because the 1953 child credit system had set a precedent of universality, and because of the political strength of Christian conservatives.

However, economic winds soon shifted, and the left and

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liberals alike began to protest the basisbeurs’ universality. The PvdA, in line with many other European social democratic parties in the aftermath of the USSR’s collapse, began to moderate in the 1980s and abandoned their support for universal programs in favor of means-tested ones. Meanwhile, the centrist liberal VVD, influenced by the depression of the 1980s, began to shift in a more neoliberal direction (emulating figures like Reagan and Thatcher) and often found the grant too generous (Andeweg and Irwin 2009).

In 1993, a PvdA who was in coalition with the CDA-led Lubbers III cabinet was granted control of the Ministry of Education and Science, and reformed the basisbeurs by making it a tempobeurs, or tempo grant. Under this system, the pro-means-testing PvdA introduced a supplementary grant for students of lower income to replace part of the basisbeurs, and students now had to complete a certain number of credits a semester to continue receiving the now-reduced basisbeurs (Pers 2018). In 1996, the PvdA-VVD Kok I cabinet further reduced the basisbeurs and increased the low-income supplementary grant, and replaced the tempo grant credit requirement with the idea of a performance grant: that students had to graduate in 10 years with a diploma or else pay the government back for all funds recieved (Slaman 2015).

In the 2000s, the PvdA and VVD’s attempts to reform the

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basisbeurs continued, against the wishes of the CDA and students alike. In 2010, Mark Rutte’s VVD-led first cabinet attempted to end the basisbeurs after the 2008 financial crisis as part of a general policy of austerity, but strong student protests at universities like TU Delft led the government to retract its proposal (Anp 2010).

Student opposition could not stop, however, the abolition of the basisbeurs for the 2015-2016 school year by Rutte’s VVD-PvdA second cabinet, who replaced it with a student loan system. University unions like the National Student Union (LSVb) and Intercity Student Consultation (ISO) continually protested this change, citing that as many as 100,000 students would be unable to pay student loan debts, and that the increasing cost of housing made university unaffordable without a grant (Radar 2017). Rutte’s 4th Cabinet, featuring a powerful D66 party that had a heavy student base and fearing CDA opposition to other bills, eventually yielded, restoring the basisbeurs for the 2023-2024 school year. Currently, educational financing for first-time university students consists of a basisbeurs and a supplementary grant for low income students, both of which require students to graduate in 10 years or else pay back the grants as loans (Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs, n.d.).

In contrast to Belgium, the Dutch system of providing students universal grants has largely survived despite intense political

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opposition. Somewhat ironically, this unconditional system, which would be supported by social democratic parties elsewhere, initially emerged and has continued due to a strong Christian conservative movement that views it as preserving the incomes of all families. The Netherlands’ universal basisbeurs has allowed it to build a more inclusive tertiary education system relative to Belgium.

Tertiary Education Financing in Belgium The first Belgian forms of national university aid were created in 1835, when 60 grants of 400 francs for gifted students were established. Belgian student aid has long followed in this meritocratic tradition of being performance based. In 1954, a National Study Fund was established in the aftermath of WWII to formalize and greatly expand the many scholarships that previously existed.

Due to the conservative ideology of the reigning Christian Social party that created the Fund, scholarships were only offered to a select number of Belgian students – only 27,000 out of the nation’s over 100,000 secondary graduates every year (Government of Flanders, n.d.). This was in accordance with the party’s belief that most students should settle, to quote then-Prime Minister Jean Van Houtte, for a “vocational education that allows one to pursue a stable, traditional career and family.”

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This system of competitive, non-universal grants persisted in the aftermath of the splitting of Belgium’s educational ministry into a Flemish Community and French Community division in the 1970s. Both communities featured strong center-left movements that called for students to receive more democratized financial aid, but those demands were consistently stonewalled by the Christian conservative coalition governments of the Christian Democratic & Flemish (CD&V) and Christian Social Party (CVP), who held onto majorities in the Federal Parliament from 1974-1999 (Vanthemsche and De Peuter 2023). It was only until the creation of separate parliaments for the Flemish and French Communities in 1993 with legislative authority over local educational affairs that social democratic parties were able to make inroads and create reforms (Vanthemsche and De Peuter 2023).

In Flanders, the richer region of the two, reforms were passed more easily following the 1990s. Reforms in 2001 under the Somers government’s coalition between the liberal Open Vld and social democratic SP. As parties –the first time Flanders was not administered by a Christian conservative government in 25 years –created a more inclusive financial aid system via joker grants (Verbrugghe and Noel 2023; Government of Flanders, n.d.).

Those grants were open to less successful students, removing the

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traditional emphasis on needing to be a high performer to receive government aid. Though still not a universal grant like the Netherlands, those grants made funding available to a vast majority of the Flemish population. Flanders also adjusted its study grants to account for direct study costs and raised minimum allowances, highlighting the Flemish government’s attention to ensuring that financial barriers do not prevent students from accessing education (Government of Flanders, n.d.). These reforms aligned with the broader political emphasis in early-2000s Flanders on economic liberalism – moving past the conservative consensus of supporting “stable vocational education” for the majority by enabling college to be a ready alternative.

By contrast, Wallonia has maintained a more conservative approach to educational welfare, influenced by its Catholic and Christian-democratic political heritage and its lack of budget for more universal grant programs due to its poorer state (Witte, Craeybeckx, and Meynen 2009). Unlike the Netherlands and Flanders, Wallonia’s financial aid system has remained non-universal to the modern day, with most students relying on family funds or outside/government loans instead of grants. The Wallonian government does offer variable grants based on family income and specific personal circumstances such as divorce or the death of a parent,

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but most students do not qualify for such grants. This reflects Wallonia’s more cautious approach to public spending, influenced by the region’s political tendency towards Catholic social teaching, which emphasizes family and community over individual autonomy (Witte, Craeybeckx, and Meynen 2009). This lack of significant reform has also persisted despite multiple Socialist Party (PS) governments from 2004 onwards, with Belgian political analysts such as Julien Nicaise indicating that the party’s moderate position of just expanding currently extant grants as opposed to creating a universal system in the 2004 election was due to “the rationalization and budgetary restriction measures announced in the summer of 1995” (Nicaise 2004). The region’s status as a lower-income region compared to Flanders has presented hurdles when considering universal education welfare programs, resulting in fewer students receiving financial aid and limiting access to higher education for lower-income students.

Unlike in the Netherlands, Christian conservative parties were not an asset towards Belgium’s creation of more inclusive and universal tuition aid programs, but rather the major roadblock.

Another major difference that contributed to Belgium’s less universal tuition aid is the nation’s federal structure, which stopped funds from the richer Flanders from flowing to Wallonia and has led to

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Wallonia passing only limited reforms to this day due to budgetary concerns. Finally, the lack of strong student unions in Belgium as compared to the Netherlands has also been a major factor in both regions’ lack of stronger tuition aid.

Diverging Outcomes Between the Netherlands and Belgium

Fig. 1: Dutch, Flemish, and Walloon financial aid to students at the tertiary education level as % of total public expenditure, 2012-2022. Tertiary education level defined as between levels 5-8 on the 2011 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), Original data from Eurostat, with chart made using Eu89

rostat built in tools (“Financial Aid to Students by Education Level - as % of Total Public Expenditure” 2024).

From 2012 to 2021, the Netherlands consistently allocated a much larger percentage of its total public expenditure on education to student financial aid for tertiary education compared to Belgium. Notably, the Netherlands maintained a financial aid expenditure rate fluctuating between 25% and 35%, peaking in 2015 and 2016, while Belgium remained relatively stagnant at around 15% throughout the same period.

“Christian conservative parties were not an asset towards Belgium’s creation of more inclusive and universal tuition aid programs, but rather the major roadblock” Although discrete data for Flanders and Wallonia is not available, this does not significantly hinder the analysis. Belgium’s national data still reflects the overarching trend of lower financial commitment to tertiary student aid, which can be attributed to the 90

country’s selective aid policies influenced by the conservative leadership and relative poverty in Wallonia. Meanwhile, Flanders, though potentially more generous, does not have the kind of student aid programs that match the scale of the Netherlands, leading to the overall stagnation in Belgium’s expenditure as a whole. The lack of specific data on a regional level is thus unlikely to obscure the broader pattern, which shows Belgium’s relatively restrained support for student financial aid compared to the Netherlands.

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Fig. 2: % of Dutch, Flemish, and Walloon 25-64 population with tertiary education, 2000-2022. Original data from Eurostat, with chart made using Eurostat built in tools (“Population by Educational Attainment Level, Sex and NUTS 2 Region (%)” 2024).

A primary effect of the discrepancy in funding of scholarships described in the last analysis is evident in the gradual divergence in tertiary educational attainment between the Netherlands, Flanders, and Wallonia from 2000 to 2022. All three regions experienced increases in tertiary educational attainment, but Wallonia fell behind as Flanders retained its leading position, and the Netherlands went from the lowest of the three to nearly tying Flanders at highest.

In 2000, Flanders led the three in tertiary education attainment at around 27%, with Wallonia next at 25% and the Netherlands at 24%. By 2023, all three regions had experienced increases, but of different sizes. Flanders grew by 18% to 45%, while the Netherlands grew by a high 21% to 45% – a product of the foundations laid by its universalized basisbeurs system, Meanwhile, Wallonia grew by a mere 15% to 40% – reflecting the difficulty of attending university for students given its relatively exclusive tuition grant system and reliance on student loans.

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Fig. 3: Percentage of all young people employed 1-3 years after their last degree, Belgium and the Netherlands, 2014-2023.

Employed is defined as all persons who worked at least one hour for pay/profit during the reference week. Young people are defined as ages 15-34. Original data from Eurostat, with chart made using Eurostat tools (“Employment Rates of Young People Not in Education and Training by Sex, Educational Attainment Level and Years since Completion of Highest Level of Education” 2024)

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Fig. 4: Employment rates of young people without tertiary 94

education. Fig. 5: Employment rates of young people with tertiary education. Both figures are for people 1-3 years after completing their last degrees, and compare across Belgium and the Netherlands, 2014-2023. Original data from Eurostat, with chart made using Eurostat tools (“Employment Rates of Young People Not in Education and Training by Sex, Educational Attainment Level and Years since Completion of Highest Level of Education” 2024)

Not least of the consequences of this disparity in tertiary educational attainment is the difference in employment outcomes for young people between the Netherlands and Belgium. From 2014-2023, there was a consistent 10% lead for the Netherlands in the employment rate for young people 1-3 years out of their terminal degree. When the sample of young people is further broken down by those with tertiary education and those without, the reason for this discrepancy becomes clear. For those without tertiary education, Belgium consistently had a 15% lower employment rate, an astoundingly low 70% in 2023 compared to the Netherlands’ 85%. Meanwhile, for those with tertiary education, the two countries had only a 5% gap in employment rate – suggesting that the group without tertiary education was largely influential in creating the gap between the nations’ youth post-degree employment 95

rates.

Part of this divergence in employment rate for non-university educated youth can probably be attributed to the weaker Belgian (and especially Wallonian) economy and structural issues with it that may prevent youth entrance into trades and other typical stable non-university jobs. However, the lesser affordability of tertiary education in Belgium definitely also plays a role. Using D. Bruce Johnstone’s theories from his field-defining 2006 article, without universal grants like the basisbeurs, many Belgian students who may not be suited for lower-education jobs would have been unable to go to college, leaving them trapped in unstable employment without the university educations they need to become truly employable (Johnstone 2006). The economic benefits of a universal grant system are also visible in the 5% employment gap for the university-educated. As Johnstone postulates, given the leeway of an unconditional grant (which removes the time pressure for students to graduate quickly to avoid accruing debt), many students choose to gain additional qualifications like a master’s or a specialization and also take harder classes—all of which would make them more employable (Johnstone 2006).

The ability of all young people, not just those with means, to quickly obtain steady employment is the single most important 96

factor in building an equal society that allows every individual to build up wealth. As illustrated by the success of the Netherlands compared to Belgium, universal funding for higher education can be a tremendous contributor to youth employment – suggesting that all welfare states which seek to destratify their societies should look to such educational financing reforms.

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Fig. 6: Physician graduates per year, per 100,000 people. Fig. 7: Pharmacist graduates per year, per 100,000 people. Fig. 8: Nurse graduates per year, per 100,000 people. All figures and definitions of individual professions sourced from the OECD’s Graduates dataset (“Graduates” 2024). Note that COVID may have caused some anomalies in the dataset due to delaying time of graduation for many professions, though the discontinuity in 2019 Belgian physician graduates is not explained by this.

Another implication of the aid-availability-induced discrepancy in tertiary education attainment comes in the number of new health-sector professionals. From 2004-2016, the Netherlands held a significant advantage over Belgium in the density of physician and nurse graduates, and a nearly 4-1 ratio in the density of pharmacist graduates. After the abolition of the basisbeurs for 98

an interest-bearing loan system in 2016, the number of physicians graduating quickly fell in the Netherlands. This is explainable by 2011 research from the Intercity Student Council (ISO), a university union, finding that 53%, or an additional 12%, of bachelor’s students would not choose to pursue a master’s without a basisbeurs – including the additional 3-year masters’ needed to become a Dutch doctor (Sloot 2011). For positions requiring a bachelor’s degree or less only, that being of nurse and pharmacist, the density of graduates remained consistent until 2019, where the number of nurse graduates presumably dropped due to COVID, while the number of pharmacists kept increasing.

It is evident that the presence of a universal tuition grant system can increase the number of students in critical professions like medicine. The presence of more qualified medical staff in the Dutch healthcare system than in Belgium likely results in less strain on hospitals and lower waiting times for patients – translating into better care and therefore societal outcomes. Better care outcomes also prevents public discontent against the Netherlands’ current state-provisioned healthcare system, as there is no need for a private, more efficient alternative – preserving a more egalitarian society. This same conclusion can likely be applied to other facets of welfare states: unconditional tuition aid allows nations to train

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more staff for their social services, resulting in better (and less stratifying) welfare outcomes in realms far beyond education.

Analysis Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) has often been thought of as the gold standard of the political economy of welfare (Esping-Andersen 1993). Esping-Andersen first introduces two standards through which to measure the welfare state: decommodification and stratification. He defines decommodification as the degree to which the welfare state is designed to emancipate individuals from the market and allows them to live a life separate from it. He also defines the standard of stratification, or how much a welfare state intensifies (stratifies) or corrects (destratifies) current inequalities (Esping-Andersen 1993).

Andersen then provides his causal explanation for why states decide to design their welfare states to achieve different levels of commodification and stratification. Esping-Andersen proposes that each combination of the two metrics has a standard origin and root cause: social democratic welfare states (decommodifying and destratifying) emerge from states with strong labor movements that prize the idea of inherent human worth, while conservative welfare states (sometimes decommodifying and stratifying) emerge from 100

states where strong religious or traditional factions want to help others through strengthening the family/societal unit (Esping-Andersen 1993).

This paper contradicts this simple categorization. Dutch tertiary education financing comes in the form of a highly decommodifying and destratifying program normally to be expected of a social democratic welfare state, the basisbeurs, but this universal status was actually pushed by Christian conservatives despite social democratic opposition. This shows that the standard narrative that some groups always push for certain types of welfare states may not be true. Instead, their decisions around commodification and stratification may be heavily influenced by simple economics and what their constituents desire. In Wallonia, three successive Socialist Party governments – ideologically in favor of commodifying welfare – failed to create universal tuition aid due to a poor financial state that pushed constituents to favor austerity to avoid increased taxes. Federal/local structures that can either boost or limit localities’ abilities to provision and finance welfare should also therefore be investigated.

Conclusion

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In conclusion, this paper has shown that the stark differences in tuition assistance between the Netherlands’ universal basisbeurs, Flanders’ non-universal but extensive grant system, and Wallonia’s limited grant system cannot be attributed to the ideologies of political forces. Rather, more tactical or realistic considerations – like the presence of a strong student movement in a coalition partner’s base (which motivated the reinstatement of the Dutch basisbeurs in 2024), or simple budgetary constraints (which has hampered Wallonia from instating an unconditional system despite strong Social Democratic parties) are often at play. This difference has contributed to not only stronger educational and economic outcomes for young people under the Dutch universal systems, but greater efficiency and therefore support for other universal welfare programs too.

The first main takeaway is that Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s ideology-based causal explanations of why a nation ends up with a certain type of welfare state necessitate more nuanced consideration of the aforementioned practical considerations. The second main takeaway is that universal welfare programs are powerful and can help lend legitimacy to other universal programs. The post1980s neoliberal epoch has meant an era of global regression away from unconditional, non-means tested programs, reinforced by

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austerity becoming a common and sometimes permanent practice following the 2008 and COVID recessions. Given the clear power of universal programs like the basisbeurs to improve national outcomes, it is worth nations examining if this trend should be reversed in their own policy. If such a decision is made, knowing how exactly to implement these types of powerful programs by not just pulling the levers of ideology like many do, but being aware of practical considerations, will be essential

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Bibliography Andeweg, R. B., and Galen A. Irwin. 2009. Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. 3rd ed. Comparative Government and Politics. Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Anp, Door. 2010. “Studenten betogen voor behoud basisbeurs.”

NU. May 21, 2010. https://www.nu.nl/economie/2251913/ studenten-betogen-behoud-basisbeurs.html.

Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs. n.d. “Studiefinanciering - DUO.” duo.nl. Accessed December 7, 2024. https://www.duo.nl/ particulier/studiefinanciering/index.jsp.

“Employment Rates of Young People Not in Education and Training by Sex, Educational Attainment Level and Years since Completion of Highest Level of Education.” 2024. Eurostat. https://doi.org/10.2908/EDAT_LFSE_24.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1993. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University press.

“Financial Aid to Students by Education Level - as % of Total Public Expenditure.” 2024. Eurostat. https://doi.org/10.2908/ EDUC_UOE_FINA01.

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Government of Flanders. n.d. “Historisch overzicht van de studiefinanciering |.” Accessed October 11, 2024. https://studietoelagen.be/historisch-overzicht-van-de-studiefinanciering-1.

“Graduates.” 2024. OECD. https://data-explorer.oecd.org/ vis?pg=0&bp=true&snb=16&tm=graduation&vw=tb&df[ds]=dsDisseminateFinalDMZ&df[id]=DSD_ HEALTH_REAC_EMP%40DF_GRAD&df[ag]=OECD. ELS.HD&df[vs]=1.0&dq=NLD%2BBEL..10P5HB...

PHST...&pd=2004%2C2023&to[TIME_PERIOD]=false.

Johnstone, D. Bruce. 2006. Financing Higher Education: Cost-Sharing in International Perspective. BRILL. https:// doi.org/10.1163/9789087900939.

Nicaise, Julien. 2004. “Les positions des partis politiques francophones en matière d’enseignement pour les élections du 13 juin 2004.” Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP 1831 (6): 1–48. https://doi.org/10.3917/cris.1831.0005.

Pers, Daimy Comijs, Patrick Karg, Hoofdredactie Red. 2018. “De Opkomst En Ondergang van de Basisbeurs – Een Geschiedenis.” Red Pers (blog). August 7, 2018. https://redpers. nl/2018/08/07/de-opkomst-en-ondergang-van-de-basisbeurs-een-geschiedenis/.

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“Population by Educational Attainment Level, Sex and NUTS 2 Region (%).” 2024. Eurostat. https://doi.org/10.2908/ EDAT_LFSE_04.

Radar. 2017. “100.000 studenten kunnen studieschuld niet terugbetalen.” Radar. April 10, 2017. https://radar.avrotros.nl/ artikel/100000-studenten-kunnen-studieschuld-niet-terugbetalen-21470.

Slaman, Pieter. 2015. “De Basisbeurs Als Onbegrepen Erfenis.”

KNHG-Studiemiddag, January. https://www.academia. edu/14821344/De_basisbeurs_als_onbegrepen_erfenis.

Sloot, Sarah. 2011. “Aanpassing studiebeurs pakt slecht uit.” October 12, 2011. https://www.medischcontact.nl/arts-in-spe/ nieuws/ais-artikel/aanpassing-studiebeurs-pakt-slecht-uit.

Vanthemsche, Guy, and Roger De Peuter, eds. 2023. “The Metamorphoses of a Nation-State (from 1945 to the Present Day).” In A Concise History of Belgium, 311–46. Cambridge Concise Histories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139018005.011.

Verbrugghe, Sophie, and Zoé Noel. 2023. “Youth Policy in the Three Communities of Belgium.” EU Needs Youth. https:// euyouth2024.be/uploads/Youth-policy-in-the-three-commu107

nities-of-Belgium_2024-02-13-112134_fgep.pdf.

Witte, Els, Jan Craeybeckx, and Alain Meynen. 2009. Political History of Belgium: From 1830 Onwards. 2nd ed. Brussels: ASP.

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OP-ED: Lessons From Ukraine to be Applied to a War Over Taiwan By: Charlotte Sparling The war in Ukraine has entered its fourth year. Despite predictions that Ukraine would quickly succumb to the Russians, they are still fighting.

In response to aerial attacks, Ukraine’s drone strikes targeting airfields, oil refineries, and other critical institutions seek to cripple Russia. Furthermore, since the start of 2025, Ukrainian forces have “stabilized much of the 800-mile front line inside Ukraine, stalling Russian advances and counter attacking” in the surrounding area by the cities of Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

Through these efforts, Ukrainian forces continue to fight to hold the line. Russia has responded to Ukrainian defense by employing extensive resources, with North Korean troops only adding to that. Combined Russian and North Korean troops seized villages and cut supply lines to main Ukrainian forces in Sudzha.

The United States and Europe have continued to provide Ukraine with key support. As questions arise about future Ameri111

can support, the status of Ukraine is becoming increasingly contingent on European aid. The United States currently provides roughly half of the aid to Ukraine. If that is to substantially decrease, Europe would need to quickly step up.

Together, Europe’s resources “constitute a massive air force, giant navy and formidable army.” Yet, the quantity of resources has decreased compared to during the Cold War. Consequently, these countries have begun to revamp their stockpiles. The collective European resource pool surpasses Russian resources, but this rebuilding focus is still crucial.

Global leaders must learn from the Russo-Ukrainian war and apply these lessons in preparing Taiwan for the possibility of a Chinese invasion.

In East Asia, China continues to pressure Taiwan, as seen by their aggressive posturing. For decades, Taiwan has faced this threat, with China almost every day probing Taiwanese defenses with warships and fighter jets with the aim to “to destroy the sovereignty of a free and democratic Taiwan and subordinate it to communist China.”

Former Director of the CIA, William Burns, noted instructions from Chinese president, Xi Jinping, to prepare for an invasion

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of Taiwan by 2027. The implications of an invasion “are enormous, potentially including a global economic crisis far worse than the shock caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.” Preventative measures are vital to prevent such a calamity for the surrounding region.

Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Australia would become especially vulnerable if the US failed to act.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Taiwanese leaders stood by the victim, Ukraine.“ ‘Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow’ is now a commonly used phrase in Taiwan.” Therefore, the US needs to secure Ukrainian sovereignty if it hopes to do the same with Taiwan. Just like dominos, if one is to stand, so too must the other.

The West failed to deter Putin’s invasion, and Ukraine’s future does not contain a guarantee of a reversal to pre-invasion conditions. Russia probed responses to its actions in 2014 amidst its invasions of Crimea, Donbas, Syria, Georgia, and Chechnya.

Later, in 2022, Russia carried out the invasion of Ukraine itself.

“If you want peace, be prepared for war.”

China is watching America’s reactions to Ukraine to anticipate what American involvement would look like if China invaded Taiwan. While there are heavy economic costs weighing on Europe

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following their break with Russia, the costs of a Taiwanese invasion would be far greater.

If the US abandons Ukraine, roughly half of its support would disappear. Simultaneously, a Russian victory would embolden China to move against Taiwan.

These two conflicts are intertwined. Accordingly, Taiwanese officials have learned from Ukraine and have made changes such as restructuring their military by lengthening service terms and training. They have also expanded their drone program after observing the key role drones have played in Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine has exposed modern warfare challenges, US and European military readiness to respond, and has brought about crucial lessons for the future. While deterrence with Russia failed, there is an increased need for it to work with China.

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Bibliography Buckley, C., & Chien, A. C. (2025, February 25). Taiwan watches Trump undercut Ukraine, hoping it won’t be next. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/25/world/ asia/trump-ukraine-taiwan.html Freymann, E., & Bromley, H. (2024, December 31). Opinion | A China-Taiwan war would start an economic crisis. America isn’t ready. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes. com/2024/12/31/opinion/china-taiwan-war-america.html Global Taiwan Institute. (2023, June 28). The Russo-Ukrainian War: Implications for Taiwan. https://globaltaiwan. org/2023/06/taiwanese-perspectives-on-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-and-its-implications/ Kantchev, Georgi, and Isabel Coles. “Ukraine Hits Russia’s Capital With Biggest Ever Drone Attack.” WSJ, 11 Mar. 2025, www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-hits-russia-with-major-droneattack-hours-before-talks-d3f1de98.

Luxmoore, Matthew, et al. “Russia’s Putin Rejects Immediate Cease-Fire in Ukraine.” WSJ, 13 Mar. 2025, www.wsj.com/ world/russia-kursk-witkoff-ukraine-b1349c4f.

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Michaels, D. (2025, March 13). How Europe’s military compares to Russia’s. WSJ. https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europe-military-compared-russia-without-us-1ccd751b Pollpeter, K., Tsai, T.-K., Herlevi, A., CNA Corporation, & Kivlehan-Wise, M. (2024). Taiwan Lessons Learned from the Russia-Ukraine War [Report]. https://www.cna.org/ reports/2024/12/Taiwan-Lessons-Learned-from-the-RussiaUkraine-War.pdf Ratiu, A. (2025, February 13). To secure Taiwan, the United States must first secure Ukraine - Atlantic Council. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-researchreports/issue-brief/to-secure-taiwan-the-united-states-mustfirst-secure-ukraine/

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OP-ED: The Congo in Crisis By: David Ball

The conflict in the Eastern Congo has been the deadliest war since World War 2, with over 5 million killed. What has been a 25-year-old conflict might be reaching another boiling point, in which could reshape the DRC and the lives of millions for years to come. The recent capture of Goma and Bukavu has led to 7,000 deaths, over 940,000 people displaced, and hundreds of human rights abuses, such as: rape, abduction, child soldier recruitment, and claims of ethnic cleansing. While this is currently occurring, the international world and the United States are largely apathetic to the crisis and the millions of people it has and will affect.

The main rebel group in Eastern Congo, named the M23, takes its name from the March 23, 2009 agreement between the Congolese government and the CNDP militia—a peace treaty whose implementation many former CNDP fighters, predominantly Congolese Tutsis, later found unsatisfactory. Frustrated by the treaty’s failure to fully integrate them into the national military and broader society, these fighters rebelled, giving rise to the M23 121

movement in 2012. M23 has direct ties to Rwanda’s Tutsi-led government, which has provided direct military assistance, including recruitment and logistical aid to the rebels.

Beyond ethnic and political grievances, economic motives play a significant role in Rwanda’s support for the rebels. North and South Kivu, where M23 operates, is rich in minerals, including diamonds and cobalt. The DRC is the world’s largest cobalt producer and the fourth-largest diamond producer, and has an estimated $24 trillion in mineral deposits under its soil. By backing M23, Rwanda can control these resources, and exploit the Congo’s vast untapped wealth.

The conflict between M23, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo is far from new. M23 first came into prominence in 2012, when it invaded Goma with backing from Rwanda.

The subsequent fallout from the invasion unleashed a wave of human rights abuses, including sexual violence, arbitrary arrests, and executions. However, with support from the UN, the Congolese army, and international strong-arming, the M23 was eventually forced to retreat, and Rwanda agreed to stop funding its operations.

This time, however, the situation is different. Not only is M23 stronger, with increased backing from Rwanda, but the UN and the Congolese government have struggled to push back the 122

advancing rebels. On February 17, the M23 captured Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province, home to over 800,000 people. The continued instability and territorial expansion of M23 forces have already displaced an estimated 1.65 million people in the region, and over 800 thousand children are out of school due to the conflict.

While the conflict has escalated, there is still an opportunity for a solution. Many European nations including the UK are in talks to plan sanctions against Rwanda,in order to pressure Kagame to pull back his military and logistical support. While this helped resolve the conflict in 2012, Kagame will be harder to convince this time around. Rwanda has increasingly relied on China for foreign assistance, and the cessation of USAID programs in the region has cut off the economic pressure that the U.S. can put to curb Rwanda’s support for M23. On February 22nd, the UN Security Council demanded that Rwanda withdraw all its troops from eastern Congo, as proposed by France. While this is certainly a step forward, the UN’s credibility in the region is mediocre at best.

Its peacekeeping efforts have been largely controversial, facing domestic opposition - even at the point that the Congo’s president - Tshisekedi asked the organization to withdraw from the Congo in 2023. Additionally, it has been unable to operate in areas occupied

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by M23 forces, severely limiting its effectiveness.

It is clear that there needs to be a new approach to curb the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Eastern Congo. The U.S. should cut military aid to programs that support M23, and sanction Rwandan military members who are directly imbedded with the rebels and others who commit war crimes, as they did in 2012.

Ugandan forces have also been embedded in Eastern Congo since 2021, to help fight jihadist rebel groups. If Uganda decides to take advantage of the chaos, there could be a repeat of the Second Congo War, which caused the deaths of between 3-5 million and the displacement of millions more. To stop the conflict from expanding, the U.S. should leverage its diplomatic prestige to bring Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda to the negotiating table. This conflict should also be more publicized, both in academic circles and online. Rwanda uses sports to advertise itself. By spreading the word about brands such as Arsenal, Bayern, and PSG supporting Rwanda, we can put pressure on Kagame to resolve the conflict.

While this issue may seem distant, its consequences affect the livelihoods of millions of people. In March of 2023, Human Rights Watch released a report stating that “A 46-year-old mother of six, who fled Mushaki in Masisi territory on February 25… said [that] … four of them raped me. As they were raping me, one said: 124

‘We’ve come from Rwanda to destroy you.’”

60 years ago, the first president of the DRC, Patrice Lumumba wrote his last letter to his wife, before his assassination. He stated “We are not alone. Africa, Asia, and the free and liberated peoples in every corner of the globe will ever remain at the side of the millions of Congolese who will not abandon the struggle until the day when there will be no more colonizers and no more of their mercenaries in our country.”

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Bibliography BBC News - DR Congo war deaths “exaggerated.” (n.d.). BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8471147.stm Chibelushi, W. (2025, February 22). How DR Congo’s Tutsis become foreigners in their own country. https://www.bbc. com/news/articles/c9d5zqg3228o Cinamula, P., & Kabumba, J. (2025a, February 18). Rwanda-backed M23 rebels tighten their grip on second major city in eastern Congo | AP News. AP News. https:// apnews.com/article/congo-rebels-rwanda-m23-bukavu-9082c196b1a05e2b0b8992af770227df Cinamula, P., & Kabumba, J. (2025b, February 18). Rwanda-backed M23 rebels tighten their grip on second major city in eastern Congo | AP News. AP News. https:// apnews.com/article/congo-rebels-rwanda-m23-bukavu-9082c196b1a05e2b0b8992af770227df Cullinan, K. (2025, February 14). China Has Invested Heavily In Rwanda’s Healthcare And USAID’s Closure Opens More Doors For Chinese. Health Policy Watch. https://healthpolicy-watch.news/china-has-invested-heavily-in-rwandashealthcare-and-usaids-closure-opens-more-doors/ 127

Democratic Republic of the Congo - Mining and Minerals. (2024, March 14). International Trade Administration | Trade.gov. https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/democratic-republic-congo-mining-and-minerals Democratic Republic of the Congo situation. (n.d.). Global Focus. https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/situations/democratic-republic-congo-situation DR Congo crisis: Occupation blocks UN mission from protecting civilians. (2025, February 21). UN News. https://news. un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160371 DR Congo crisis: WFP condemns looting in Bukavu after M23 rebels take key city. (2025, February 17). UN News. https:// news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160186 DR Congo: Killings, rapes by Rwanda-Backed M23 rebels. (2023, August 29). Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/ news/2023/06/13/dr-congo-killings-rapes-rwanda-backedm23-rebels#:~:text=A%2046,%E2%80%99%E2%80%9D Jones, M. (2025, February 20). Rwanda says DRC criticism of Arsenal, Bayern and PSG deals threatens regional peace.

Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rwandasays-drc-criticism-arsenal-bayern-psg-deals-threatens-re128

gional-peace-2025-02-20/ Kamale, J., & Mcmakin, W. (2025, February 24). More pressure on Rwanda as Congo says rebel uprising has killed over 7,000 people this year | AP News. AP News. https:// apnews.com/article/congo-rebels-death-roll-rwanda-goma-b9751306586dc3aec20bd90cd20b68e0 Muhumuza, R. (2021, December 1). Ugandan soldiers enter Congo to fight extremist ADF rebels | AP News. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/africa-uganda-islamic-state-group-kampala-21432d12dbc44e774490232b71bc8fd7 NEWS WIRES. (2025, February 22). UN Security Council demands Rwanda withdraw troops from eastern DR Congo. France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/ africa/20250222-united-nations-security-council-demands-rwanda-withdraw-troops-from-congo OHCHR. (n.d.). Press briefing notes on Democratic Republic of the Congo, Hissène Habré and Laos. https://www. ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2012/12/press-briefing-notes-democratic-republic-congo-hissene-habre-and-laos

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Poidevin, O. L. (2025, February 24). UK will impose sanctions on Rwanda “soon” in response to Congo conflict. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/uk-will-impose-sanctionsrwanda-soon-response-congo-conflict-2025-02-24/ Reuters. (2022, June 13). Congo says Rwandan forces supported latest rebel attacks as thousands flee. Reuters. https://www. reuters.com/world/africa/congo-says-rwandan-forces-supported-latest-rebel-attacks-east-2022-06-12/ VOA News. (2012, July 21). US cuts military aid to Rwanda. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/us-cuts-militaryaid-to-rwanda/1442521.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

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OP-ED: The Wage Economy Contributes To Food Insecurity Among the Inuit By: Priya Buddhavarapu

We live in a world where one jar of Nutella costs $48 for some Inuit communities.

The Inuit people, traditionally spread across the northern regions of North America, Greenland, and Russia, are a vast and diverse indigenous group that have, for centuries, thrived in the relentless Arctic environment. By engaging in cultural practices such as seasonal subsistence hunting, gathering, and preservation methods, as well as values such as sharing, respect for elders, and extended familial units, the Inuit people are able to call the Arctic tundra their home. The term Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit (IQ) refers to the various types of Inuit traditional knowledge that encompass these values.

In the recent past, many of these communities have been undergoing a transition from the traditional subsistence economy to a wage economy, perpetuated by the increasing costs of hunting and fishing, the effects of climate change in Arctic regions, 133

changing interests, and loss of IQ. The average Inuit wage worker, however, faces an extreme disparity compared to the average urban citizen. From factors such as job shortages to a lack of affordable housing and healthcare, there exist several barriers to the economic wellbeing of several Inuit communities.

One consequence of this economic transition stands out, an acute food security crisis. Food insecurity refers to when a household or community has limited or uncertain access to safe and healthy food. Due to environmental changes and the manpower of communities being diverted to the wage economy, many Inuit people are no longer able to rely on IQ and traditional practices to self-sustain. In one Inuit region, 70% of adults were found to be living in a food-insecure household. In Nunavut, a large region in northern Canada populated by twenty-five Inuit communities, food insecurity is at crisis level.

A solution to this, some offer, is to treat Inuit individuals like other citizens, expecting them to rely on the transport and purchase of market foods, or food shipped from southern areas. This is, in fact, what is currently being done in several communities across Canada and Alaska.

This, however, is unfeasible.

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Due to the longer distance and lack of adequate transportation across these northern regions, produce spoils quickly. If products do make it to their destination, costs are unattainably expensive. Additionally, the food that is readily available in these areas is usually highly processed and calorically dense, leading to high obesity rates among Inuit populations. This is juxtaposed with the starvation arising from inconsistent access. Furthermore, Inuit adolescents and children are at heightened risk for mental health issues such as depression and anxiety, compounding the adverse health effects of food insecurity.

Moreover, the shift to the wage economy has also driven a shift in traditional Inuit values. Most notably, this has been the destruction of the Inuit family structure and culture of sharing.

Research has consistently shown that subsistence hunting is crucial to Inuit identities and economic wellbeing. Fully employed Inuit are significantly more likely to adapt to solely sharing within a nuclear family structure, whereas partially employed or sport-hunting guides are more likely to share subsistence food with extended family and distant kin.

Values of sharing, cooperation, and the traditional Inuit familial structure are being disrupted by this economic shift. What was once collective now is becoming individualistic.

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The issues that the shift from a subsistence to a wage economy has caused have severely contributed to the enormous food insecurity crisis present in these regions. Compounded with the effects of climate change, communities are seeing effects from health degradation to community collapse.

In combating this issue, governments must listen to the voices of representative Inuit bodies, relying on IQ and their longstanding knowledge of their lands to address and ensure consistent access to safe and nutritious foods. While a solution to this complex issue will not come easy, it is imperative to rely on deeply relevant guidance that has survived centuries of obstacles.

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Bibliography Correspondent, U. (2024, December 26). If you think groceries are expensive, the eye-popping prices in Inuvik, Canada will leave you speechless. https://scoop.upworthy.com. https:// scoop.upworthy.com/if-you-think-groceries-are-expensivethe-eye-popping-prices-in-inuvik-canada-will-leave-youspeechless Food Insecurity - Healthy People 2030 | odphp.health.gov. (n.d.). https://odphp.health.gov/healthypeople/priority-areas/ social-determinants-health/literature-summaries/food-insecurity#:~:text=Food%20insecurity%20may%20be%20 long%20term%20or%20temporary.&text=It%20may%20 be%20influenced%20by,is%20limited%20or%20not%20 available.

Ford, J. D., Clark, D., & Naylor, A. (2019). Food insecurity in Nunavut: Are we going from bad to worse? Canadian Medical Association Journal, 191(20), E550–E551. https://doi. org/10.1503/cmaj.190497 Funk, R., & Funk, R. (2024, October 3). The Inuit way of life - U Multicultural. U Multicultural - Media Platform. https://uchannel.ca/the-inuit-way-of-life/ 139

Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami. (2024, October 18). Inuit Food Insecurity Canada | The Nuluaq Project. https://www.itk.ca/projects/ nuluaq-mapping-project/inuit-food-insecurity-canada-background/ Inuit participation in the wage and land-based economies in Inuit Nunangat. (2019, June 13). https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/ n1/pub/89-653-x/89-653-x2019003-eng.htm Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit | Nunavut Impact Review Board. (n.d.). https://www.nirb.ca/inuit-qaujimajatuqangit US, A. R. C. O. T. (n.d.). Witness the Arctic. Arctic Research Consortium of the U.S. https://www.arcus.org/witness-the-arctic/2009/3/article/509

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