Japan’s Green Energy at a Crossroad: Nuclear or Solar as the Way Forward?
Climate Change and International Security: How Environmental Stress Fuels Conflict and Cooperation
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OP-ED: Boat Strikes Make Everyone Less Safe
OP-ED: The Cost of Exclusion: How H-1B Visa Policy Changes Threaten U.S. Innovation and Security
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From the Editor
Dear Reader,
Building on the global events of the spring, the Fall of 2025 has continued posing the same difficult questions of our world. Ethnic, religious, and political conflicts have left an almost unrecognizable world amid a shifting global order. The development of conflicts makes international relations more complicated yet more important today than ever before. The works featured in this edition of the Virginia Journal deliberately provides a survey of multiple areas in need of a deeper research focus for the future of international relations. These works are presented with the hope of providing clarity and encouraging facilitation of deeper, critical conversations that must be addressed for a more peaceful future.
The papers included in the Fall 2025 Journal include topics from the impact of the tourism industry in China to the emerging yet understudied threat of climate and what it means for international cooperation, from discussions of Japan’s options for energy independence to continuing discussions on the religious fundamentalism within India and Pakistan. Our goal for this edition of the Virginia Journal was to not only display works with a variety of focus, but also to encourage deeper discussions in each of these different subject areas. I sincerely hope that our readers will learn and thoughtfully engage with these papers and their content beyond the pages on which they are printed.
The production of this journal would not have been possible without the collaboration and contributions of many different people throughout the editing and production process. The hard work members of the Virginia Journal Executive Board and our staff editors cannot be overstated. We are also grateful for the trust of the authors whose papers are featured in this edition and for their contributions throughout the editing process. Furthermore, the Virginia Journal extends our gratitude to the Internation Relations Organization at UVA for providing us their continued support to produce this semester’s edition of the Journal.
Lastly, I would like to show appreciation to our readers for taking the time to read and learn from the works presented in this edition of the Virginia Journal. Thank you for taking the time to support undergraduate research in a time more important than ever before. Now, I am honored to present the Fall 2025 edition of the Virginia Journal of International Affairs.
Sincerely,
Apal Upadhyaya Editor-in-Chief of the Virginia Journal of International Affairs Fall ‘25
Tourism and Transformation: China’s Path to Sustainable Growth and Global Influence
By: Yaxi Huang
About the Author:
Yaxi Huang is a second-year student from Millburn, NJ, majoring in Economics and Commerce. She currently works as an economic research assistant at UVA. She is passionate about the intersection of economics and politics, with a particular focus on how policies shape different businesses and industries around the world. Last summer, she was lucky enough to solo-travel (her first time solo-traveling anywhere) and study abroad in China, which strengthened her curiosity in foreign affairs and comparative approaches to economic research.
Abstract:
This paper explores the economic and geopolitical implications of tourism, assessing both its benefits and costs. It further examines various models of sustainable tourism around the world, highlighting practices and challenges in implementation. It analyzes these concepts as they apply to China, examining the dynamics of domestic, inbound, and outbound tourism in the modern era, and recent developments in China’s tourism industry, including its rapid growth, evolving tourist offerings, and digital transformation. This paper addresses key consequences of tourism such as environmental degradation and regional disparities, and challenges affecting the sector. Finally, it investigates the role of the Chinese government in shaping tourism policy, promoting sustainable practices, and using tourism as a tool for soft power and economic development.
Introduction
Tourism is one of the largest and fastest growing sectors in the global economy, with revenues accounting for more than 10% of the global GDP (World Economic Forum n.d.). Tourism is defined as the movement of people for leisure, recreation, or business
(Sustainability Directory 2025). By boosting demand for goods and services, tourism stimulates economies, which creates jobs, increases revenues, and reduces poverty. For example, in 2022, the tourism industry supported over twenty-two million jobs, which does not account for the many jobs indirectly supported by tourism (Truyols 2025).
“By boosting demand for goods and services, tourism stimulates economies, which creates jobs, increases revenues, and reduces poverty”
Tourism acts as an injection of cash into an economy. Tourists directly spend in the country, contributing to travel and hospitality, in addition to non-travel sectors like retail, sports, food service, and entertainment. Tourism also leads to indirect spending in related industries. For example, tourism provides the government and private sector with revenue to invest in new infrastructure required for tourism, which benefits local residents as well. Lastly,
there are induced effects from the re-spending of money within the community. This is the multiplier effect of tourism, where the economic effects of tourism are multiplied throughout the community. The degree to which they are multiplied depends on internal factors. According to the Journal of Risk and Financial Management, “The impact of tourism activity on economic development is determined by the current multiplier mechanism created by the existing revenue-expenditure flow in the sector due to international tourism movements” (Truyols).
Other benefits of tourism for a country include increased global awareness and learning. This can help improve the perception of a country, and even lead to foreign investments. Tourism also incentivizes countries to preserve historical sites and cultural traditions, as tourists generate funds for cultural conservation efforts. Similarly, tourism can play a role in incentivizing the protection of some natural resources and ecosystems, although its overall impact depends on the implementation of sustainable tourism practices.
Tourism also has significant geopolitical implications, and is a tool in economic statecraft. Small nations can become vulnerable if they are heavily dependent on tourism revenues. On the other hand, nations with robust tourism sectors that are also key players
in international organizations can have significant voices in global economics (Truyols). Being a major tourist attraction gives these countries more soft power and international influence. Tourism allows countries to project calculated images and values in order to improve their interests.
For all these reasons, many governments are looking to improve their tourism offerings. One metric to judge the quality of tourism offerings is the “5 A’s”: attractions, activities, accessibility, accommodation, and amenities (O 2023). Many developing countries are adopting strategic plans that encompass marketing, cooperation between different levels of government, and targeted investments. For example, the Ministry of Tourism in India launched the Swadesh Darshan scheme to promote theme-based tourism (“Swadesh Darshan Scheme” n.d.). By increasing hotel capacity with an addition of 7,200 new hotel rooms in 2024, Egypt aims to attract 30 million tourists by 2031 with an annual growth rate of 25-30% (Hassan 2025). Data analytics plays a critical role in the modern tourist industry, and local governments use data analytics to predict peak travel times, track hotel occupancy, and analyze tourist preferences. This information can help governments to improve their strategy and implement targeted marketing campaigns (Szem 2023).
However, there are significant costs tied to tourism. Travel and tourism currently contributes 6.5% to global greenhouse gas emissions. By 2034, travel and tourism could contribute to 15% of global greenhouse gases, 10% of global energy consumption, and 7% of solid waste production (“Reimagining Travel and Tourism”). This represents a significant threat to the environment.
Tourism also often creates harsh competition for resources between residents and visitors. As a result, governments are striving to create more sustainable and environmentally conscious development models. According to the World Tourism Organization, sustainable tourism “takes full account of its current and future economic, social and environmental impacts, addressing the needs of visitors, the industry, the environment and host communities” (“Sustainable Development”). Sustainable tourism initiatives take many different forms. For instance, Bhutan uses a system of strict entry requirements and visitor tariffs. This allows Bhutan a high level of control over tourism, which is important to maintain the local residents’ way of life. The visitor tariffs pay for a licensed tour guide and provide funds for the country’s infrastructure and Bhutan’s free health care and education system. In Fiji, a solar powered resort aims to be as low-waste as possible through various green technologies, and all artwork at the hotel has been produced
by local villagers (Team 2025). These initiatives both address the environmental impacts of tourism and aim to guarantee rights and benefits for the host communities.
Tourism is still largely dependent on fossil fuels for transportation (such as air travel), operations (such as energy-intensive hotels), and activities, making it deeply intertwined with the global energy markets. The push for integration of renewable energy could greatly change the dependence of countries on different sources of energy and alter global dynamics. Some critics argue that tourism is inherently unsustainable, and that tourism development worsens inequalities and environmental problems, regardless of the manner in which it is conducted. After all, “sustainability” is a concept shaped by power imbalances, and competition for sustainable tourism markets is influenced by power dynamics. Access to green technologies and capital to finance new ventures is also shaped by geopolitics. For example, small island developing states are heavily reliant on tourism, while also especially vulnerable to climate change. Pursuing a transition to sustainable tourism is critical to their survival. However, these nations may become reliant on developed nations or international organizations in order to undertake this transition. In order to transfer technology, finance their projects, they must work inside the pre-existing web of power
relations (Sustainability Directory 2025).
In addition, visitor to resident ratios in the most popular global cities are expected to rise greatly, from 1.2 up to more than two, intensifying friction between visitors and residents (“Reimagining Travel and Tourism”). Serving the estimated twenty-eight billion tourists in the future will require investments in infrastructure and assets, with increased energy consumption. It may also require changes in regulation to fast-track development. All of this can cause significant, often negative, changes for residents, exacerbating existing tensions between visitors and residents. The World Economic Forum stresses the importance of equity between residents and visitors in terms of opportunities, recreation, and essential services, and emphasizes that local communities will “actively participate in and benefit from the sector, empowered by education, fair economic opportunities, and improved quality of life” (“Reimagining Travel and Tourism”). As the World Economic Forum lays out, a goal for countries is that “travel and tourism serve as a transformative force for good.”
Despite its potential, tourism development in many regions faces significant barriers that constrain growth and sustainability. Increased sensitivity to global disruptors such as geopolitical tensions, climate change, demographics shifts, could culminate in
losses of one trillion dollars by 2030 (“Reimagining Travel and Tourism”).
Political instability is a major challenge, as uncertainties related to governance, policy changes, or regional conflicts can deter both domestic and international travelers due to safety concerns. Tourist destinations are highly visible, making them targets for terrorism or political unrest. Attacks on tourist sites erode confidence in the country’s security and generate widespread media coverage. One safety incident can have a huge impact on tourism in the whole country. If a destination is deemed unsafe, there can be sharp declines in tourism and significant economic losses. As a result, security is a hugely important issue for countries when expanding their tourism industry (Sustainability Directory 2025).
Related to the issue of political instability is the management of tourist flows. Rooted in geopolitics, nations have varying policies about granting visas to people of different countries. Liberal visa regimes can boost tourism revenue and facilitate cultural exchange. They often reflect stronger diplomatic ties. On the other hand, restrictive policies often signal strained relationships or security concerns (Sustainability Directory).
Furthermore, many areas suffer from limited infrastructure, including inadequate transportation networks, poor quality accom-
modations, and insufficient communication systems, which reduce accessibility and impact the overall visitor experience. Without reliable roads, airports, or public transit, reaching tourist destinations becomes difficult, especially in rural or less-developed regions. Additionally, a lack of diverse and authentic local tourism products restricts the ability to attract and retain visitors. Many destinations struggle to develop cultural, natural, or recreational offerings that meet tourist expectations, limiting their competitiveness in the global market. This is often compounded by insufficient marketing, training, and investment in tourism services. Together, these barriers create a complex environment that requires significant coordination between governments, businesses, and communities to overcome if tourism is to become a sustainable driver of economic and social development (Vachhani 2024).
Tourism in China
After the reform and opening up of China in 1978, the Chinese government began to recognize tourism as an engine for economic development and modernization. In 1979, China established its first Tourism Bureau. By the 1980s, inbound tourism had increased steadily, although it was still limited by visa restrictions and negative global perceptions (Zhou 2017). By 2003, China
had become the fifth largest international tourism destination in terms of tourist arrivals (Lim and Wang 2008). China is one of the world’s most dynamic travel and tourism markets; it is now forecast to contribute a record 13.7 trillion yuan (1.9 trillion dollars) to the national economy in 2025 (World Travel & Tourism Council 2025). This will be the highest level in history, at 10.3% above pre-pandemic levels. It is also forecast to support more than 83 million jobs, about one in every nine across the country, with an additional 1.3 million jobs created in 2025 alone (World Travel & Tourism Council).
Historically, China’s consumption as a percentage of GDP has been very low compared to other major economies. In recent years, this has coincided with a host of economic problems that have raised concerns about the growth potential of the economy.
First, the declining birth rate and a rapidly aging population have stoked fears about slowing GDP growth and economic stagnation. The property sector has become shaky with a slowdown in housing sales. Local government debt has increased, along with persistent youth unemployment. There is also a continual gap between the rural and urban regions in China (Lait and Vaitilingam 2025).
Tourism can drive growth in China by increasing domestic consumption to counter these faltering portions of the economy.
Due to the multiplier effect, tourism brings broader business opportunities across the entire economy, including the transportation, hospitality, food services, retail, and entertainment sectors. It also increases service industry employment, which can help mitigate youth unemployment. Lastly, tourism can help promote regional development in rural areas, helping to reduce the urban-rural gap in technology and wealth in China (“How Tourism Could Help Boost China’s Growth” 2024).
Domestic travel dominates the tourism industry in China and accounts for more than 85% of all tourism spending. China’s domestic tourism industry has boomed, and is forecast to increase by over 1.1 trillion yuan, reaching 7 trillion yuan. Over the 2024 five day public holiday to mark Labor Day in 2024, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism logged over 295 million trips, 28% higher than prepandemic figures from 2019. The Transport Ministry reported 92 million rail trips, almost 10 million air trips, and 1.25 billion highway journeys. Schubert Lou, the COO of travel agency
Trip.com noted, “We’ve seen very strong domestic travel demand with search volumes in hotels up 67% compared to last year, and flight volumes up 80%” (McDonell 2024). This data shows promising signs of growth in the domestic tourism industry. On the other hand, per capita consumption still remains low, as domestic
tourists are often very frugal. In 2023, consumption accounted for about 53% of the GDP (Pettis 2024).
For this reason, the government is trying to encourage high-spending foreign tourists to enter China. Following one of the longest border closures from March 2020 to January 2023, China fully reopened its borders and ended mandatory quarantine for inbound travelers. In the beginning of 2024, foreigners were entering China at a fraction of 2019 levels, a drop from 98 million to 35 million (McDonell 2024). However, international visitor spending in China surged to 1 trillion yuan in 2025, marking a 66% increase and almost 10% above 2019 levels (World Travel & Tourism Council 2025).
Domestic Impacts of Tourism
The domestic impacts of China’s tourism sector have been significant. Conducted through targeted state policies and development strategies, one major initiative has been the use of tourism to drive rural revitalization. Under the broader “Rural Revitalization Strategy,” local governments have promoted village-based tourism to boost incomes, create jobs, and diversify local economies by linking traditional agriculture with other activities. This has led to
improvements in rural infrastructure such as roads, digital connectivity, and sanitation, while also encouraging the preservation of local cultures (Huld 2025). For example, successful tourism development in provinces like Guizhou and Yunnan use programs that combine cultural experiences with environmental sustainability (“China Sees Explosive Growth…” 2025). However, many challenges remain. Seasonal or low-wage tourism jobs often lead to unstable livelihoods and inequality. There is often a lack of management expertise among villagers, and the dominance of outside investors often limits the long-term benefits for local residents (Huld 2025).
At the same time, tourism-driven urbanization and gentrification have become prominent in many historic cities and scenic districts. Government-led redevelopment has transformed historical areas, such as Lijiang Old Town, Yunnan, into polished, tourist-friendly zones. This enhances the visitor experience and has boosted local economies. However, it also leads to the displacement of long-term residents, inflated real estate prices, and the erosion of authentic local culture. In many cases, these areas become dominated by commercial interests and chain stores, diminishing their original social and cultural value. Much of the revenue generated by tourism may go to large corporations or foreign investors
rather than local communities (Chen et al. 2022). For example, Hainan’s rapid rise as a duty-free shopping and resort destination has attracted many international luxury brands and large hotel chains. However, much of the profits are repatriated to these companies’ headquarters rather than reinvested locally. Small local businesses often struggle to compete, leading to uneven economic benefits (Stettner 2023). Over time, the influx of tourists may alienate the very communities that define the area’s unique identity. Also, crowding in tourist hotspots reduces quality of life for local people and can cause conflicts.
As tourism expands, sustainability challenges have emerged, especially in popular destinations experiencing over-tourism and environmental strain. The Badaling section of the Great Wall near Beijing is one of the most visited heritage sites in the world, and recorded a maximum of 100,000 visitors in one day in 2019. Such heavy foot traffic causes physical wear and tear, littering, and congestion (Wong 2019). Public transport and parking facilities often struggle to accommodate crowds, reducing visitor experience and putting pressure on local infrastructure (“Too Much Love…” 2019). Resource strain has also become a concern in other parts of the country. In response, the Chinese government has introduced “smart tourism” systems to manage crowd flows, im-
posed visitor caps, and promoted green tourism certifications. Still, ensuring long-term sustainability remains difficult with rapid tourist growth, especially during peak travel seasons (Romão 2021).
Finally, income inequality between popular and remote tourist regions highlights the uneven benefits of tourism development. Coastal cities and major cultural centers such as Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Chengdu have reaped the majority of tourism revenue due to better infrastructure, branding, and access. In contrast, many inland or western provinces such as Gansu, Ningxia, and Inner Mongolia struggle to attract visitors due to poor transportation, language barriers, and limited international recognition. This disparity risks reinforcing regional inequality and driving youth migration from underdeveloped areas. To address this, the central government has supported strategies and regional partnerships aimed at distributing tourism flows more equitably across the country, including along the historic Silk Road corridor (Wang and Bai 2023, 1546).
Challenges Facing Tourism in China
There are a wide range of challenges facing tourists in China. First, the effect of the Covid-19 pandemic was devastating
for the Chinese international tourism industry, both inbound and outbound. Foreign tourist arrivals dropped 52.1% from 2019 to 2020, and travel bans and visa restrictions shut the country off to non-residents. Before the pandemic, China was the world’s largest source of outbound tourists but, during Covid, outbound travel stopped, and countries dependent on Chinese tourists saw major tourism declines. During this time, there was a focus on local and regional tourism, but recurring lockdowns disrupted the recovery of domestic tourism (Chen 2024, 453).
Second, the geopolitical landscape has turned off many foreign travelers. The Pew Research center shows that many Western individuals hold unfavorable views toward China. This could be the result of both portrayals of China in the media and official governmental advice. For example, the United States warns travelers to “reconsider travel to Mainland China due to the arbitrary enforcement of local laws, including in relation to exit bans, and the risk of wrongful detentions.” Similarly, Australia advises “a high degree of caution” warning that “Australians may be at risk of arbitrary detention or harsh enforcement of local laws, including broadly defined National Security Laws.” In both countries, potential tourists are concerned about the Chinese government’s tight social regulations.
Additionally, for tourists who are interested in travelling to China, the visa application process can be complex and time-consuming for some nationalities, involving strict documentation requirements, and sometimes limited visa-free access. Additionally, as a result of the geopolitical landscape, there have been fewer flights between China and the US. In April 2024, there were only 332 scheduled round trip flights between China and the US, contrasting with 1,506 in April 2019. There were 150 weekly flights before the pandemic, but this dropped to only fifty per week in April 2024. One part of this is pressure from unions and US airlines. Chinese airlines are supported by the government and have less regulations to fly into China. Most importantly, they can fly over Russian airspace, so flights are cheaper and shorter. Unions and US airlines maintain that they would be negatively affected if more Chinese airline flights were added (McDonell 2024).
Finally, once travelers are in the country, they face many structural difficulties due to the systems in China. One major obstacle is language barriers, as English proficiency outside major cities and tourist hubs is often limited, making communication to locals difficult when travelling. Infrastructure in less-developed regions can also be difficult to access, with limited English signage and inadequate transportation options outside major cities. Cultural
differences and unfamiliar customs may also lead to misunderstandings and discomfort for travelers who are not accustomed to local norms.
For example, the phone payment apps and booking systems widely used in China present a huge hurdle to non-Chinese speaking tourists. Mobile payments systems via platforms like Alipay and WeChat Pay dominate daily transactions in China, but many foreign tourists may find it difficult to use these without a Chinese bank account, leading to reliance on cash or limited credit card acceptance. In addition, tourists may also need to get a Chinese cell phone number. The internet censorship and restrictions on accessing foreign internet, or the Great Firewall, prevents tourists from accessing many of the websites and apps they normally use without prior preparations to use specialized VPNs or eSIMs (“Social Media and Platforms Banned in China” 2024). These include social network websites, online maps, payment apps, and shopping apps, which tourists usually depend on. The Chinese alternatives to these technologies are often inaccessible due to the language barrier. All of these hurdles make travelling to China more daunting (McDonell 2024).
Professor Chen Yong at Switzerland’s EHL Hospitality Business School is an authority on the economics of tourism in
China. He says, “The key is to establish a culture that puts service providers in the shoes of foreign tourists. They should imagine themselves being a foreigner who can’t speak or read Chinese and who doesn’t have a Chinese mobile number, payments apps and so on” (McDonell). He argues that this cannot be changed overnight, and will take a long time to adjust. Until then, the number of tourists may remain much lower than otherwise. These barriers collectively can deter potential visitors or complicate their travel. Thus, there is a need for continued improvements in service, infrastructure, and international engagement to make the country a more accessible and welcoming destination.
In November 2023, President Xi Jinping spoke at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in San Francisco, saying, “Our two countries will roll out more measures to facilitate travels and promote people-to-people exchanges, including increasing direct passenger flights, holding a high-level dialogue on tourism, and streamlining visa application procedures. We hope that our two peoples will make more visits, contacts and exchanges and write new stories of friendship in the new era” (McDonell).
Tourism cooperation between China and the US has continued to increase in some ways. In June 2025, China expanded its transit visa-free policy, with eligible visitors from fifty-five countries,
including the US, able to stay for up to ten days in certain regions. China is also trying to attract more foreign visitors by increasing the number of countries whose citizens don’t need visas, such as from Southeast Asia. In twenty-three Chinese cities, passengers from more than fifty countries can stay for a few days visa free if they have an onward ticket (“China Extends 240-Hour…” 2025). In addition, multiple local support measures were rolled out, including streamlined visa processing, better signage, multilingual services, “Buy Now, Refund Now” tax refund that allows tourists to receive rebates on the spot, and improved payment and mobile infrastructure (Interesse 2025).
Despite challenges, the Chinese tourism industry is generally optimistic. China has invested greatly in infrastructure, digital transformation, and tourist offerings, positioning it as a leader in modern tourism. Tourism industry consultant Peng Han from Travel Daily comments: “With famous international hotel brands – like Intercontinental, Marriott and Hilton – you just have to look at their growth in China in 2023…Then check the performance goals for these large hotel groups in 2024 which have also been set relatively high. This shows that they are very optimistic about the growth potential of the Chinese market” (McDonell). International visitor spending is projected to rise by nearly 33 billion yuan,
13% above 2019. Looking longer term, WTTC forecasts that the tourism sector will grow at twice the rate of the overall economy by 2035 and add nearly 20 million new roles over the next decade (“Sustainable Travel and Tourism”).
Additionally, outbound Chinese tourists visiting other countries help create people-to-people ties, promoting mutual understanding and softening geopolitical tensions. The potential for growth of outbound tourism is staggering. Since the reform and opening-up of China in the 1970s, there has been huge growth in international travel demand, driven by the expanding middle class in China and rapid improvements in living standards (Lim). Still, the percentage of Chinese people travelling abroad relative to the population is very small and could increase greatly. According to the China Trading Desk, China’s outbound tourism is expected to surpass pre-Covid levels for the first time in 2025, with a rise in first-time outbound travelers (Bhutia).
Developments in the Tourism Industry
The Chinese tourism industry is undergoing a strategic transition from mass tourism to higher-quality, personalized, and sustainable travel. By stimulating domestic consumption, while
attracting foreign visitors, tourism acts as a bridge, supporting economic resilience and innovation. Lastly, in response to growing environmental concerns, China has introduced green tourism standards and carbon-neutral travel goals, aiming to reduce the carbon footprint of tourism activities. These policies promote environmentally-friendly infrastructure, sustainable practices at scenic sites, and green certifications for businesses, aligning China’s tourism development with global climate commitments. China aims for carbon neutrality by 2060, and the tourism industry is part of this goal. For example, the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics were promoted as a carbon-neutral event. In addition, the high-speed rail networks and bike-sharing programs in cities provide sustainable forms of transportation (Romão 2021).
Partly as a result of the pandemic, China began investing heavily in domestic tourism infrastructure, with less reliance on foreign tourists. Now that borders have reopened, tourism continues to evolve to accommodate new inflows of people. Measuring the aforementioned “5 A’s” of tourism—attractions, activities, accessibility, accommodation, and amenities—the Chinese tourism industry is greatly expanding its offerings and changing the tourism industry (O 2023).
First, many tourist sites are now “smart scenic areas,” using
AI chatbots for multilingual service, face recognition for ticketing and security, and QR codes to access digital guides and historical info. Some places have used real-time crowd flow trackers to prevent overcrowding, reflecting an interest in improving the tourist experience at attractions and activities and reducing environmental impact. Virtual and augmented reality tourism experiences are growing at cultural heritage sites. For example, the Forbidden City offers augmented reality tours (Jie 2025).
Accessibility has been a big issue for outside tourists to China, especially with the Great Firewall and language barrier. There have been initiatives to target this issue. For example, Alipay and WeChat Pay are payment apps that are nearly universal in China for transit, hotels, attractions, and even street food. Recent upgrades allow foreigners to link Visa, Mastercard, JCB, Discover cards, enabling them to use digital payment systems without a Chinese bank account (Interesse 2025). Chinese tourism platforms are also integrating real-time translation to help visitors, and AR-based translation tools now work through phone cameras in major cities and museums.
Digital itinerary tools have taken a large role, especially as many now support English-language interfaces and international booking features. These include domestic platforms like Ctrip and
Meituan and foreign travel websites (Rivers 2025). Online travel agencies can help connect travelers with hotels, flights, activities, and provide them with knowledge and insights. They can also greatly help promote the economic growth of regions, especially non-traditional, untapped destinations. Additionally, they can partner with governments and local tourism stakeholders, and provide a platform for local businesses. Lastly, they are agile and respond quickly to market needs (Truyols 2025).
Social media has also played a huge role in Chinese tourism. Viral posts on Xiaohongshu and Douyin have revitalized attractions, and are commonly used resources for travel planning, with personalized reviews and recommendations (Beard 2025).
In accommodation and amenities, there has been an increase in robotics and automation in the hospitality industry. Robot concierges and automated room service are more common in hotels of various price ranges. Features include keyless entry, voice-controlled room systems, and paperless check-in and check-out with facial recognition. All of these improvements reflect a holistic focus on improving the tourism experience in China (Chi).
The Role of the Government
The Chinese government has played an active role in shaping the tourism industry as a regulator and as a strategic planner. Firstly, the government regulates the flow of people in and out of the country, managing the visa system for inbound and outbound travelers (Lim and Wang 2008). During the pandemic, the government enforced travel lockdowns and border closures and provided bailouts and tax relief to tourism companies. The government enforces laws for hotels, tour guides, transport, scenic spots, and tourism agencies. Setting itself apart from other countries, China’s tourism sector is deeply influenced by state policy, which drives infrastructure investment and international diplomacy. Tourism is part of national economic development plans, such as the 14th Five-Year Plan, which emphasizes cultural tourism, digitalization, and rural revitalization. The “Beautiful China” initiative promotes environmentally-friendly tourism and sustainable development (China Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions 2022). Lastly, the government sets annual targets for tourism revenue, visitor numbers, and infrastructure expansion.
The largest role of the government is arguably in state-driven infrastructure investment. The government has provided massive funding for high-speed rail, airports, tourist zones, and rural
roads. These allow ease of transportation for both domestic and foreign tourists. They have also invested heavily in AI, 5G and the mobile payment system which allows connectivity throughout the country, greatly benefitting tourists (Rivers 2025).
There have been major campaigns to boost domestic travel during and after the pandemic. For example, the government provides subsidies for travelers and travel agencies, and discounts and vouchers for scenic spots. In July 2025, China’s ministry of Culture and Tourism kicked off a nationwide summer tourism consumption campaign, spending over 570 million yuan in consumer subsidies. These programs spur summer tourism spending and attract more consumer traffic to tourist destinations, increasing the GDP (Yanran 2025).
The government has greatly promoted tourism in China through heavy state support and management of internal systems and the outward-facing visa system, with the goal of positioning itself as a sustainable and modern tourist destination. China’s government actively supports this strategy by organizing cultural festivals, exhibitions, and tourism forums worldwide. The growth of inbound tourism serves not only economic goals but also diplomatic ones, helping China project a more attractive national image and expand its influence in global affairs (Yanran).
“Tourism remains an unpredictable sector that highly reflects the dynamics of the current global era, and must be approached with a sustainability strategy that has the country’s long-term interests in mind”
Conclusion
As the tourism industry continues to expand throughout the world, it is important for countries to note the diverse benefits of tourism and the potential risks from how it shapes countries internally and on the international stage, while also noting the risks of overdependence on tourism, which makes economies vulnerable to shocks like pandemics, political tensions, and environmental strain. Tourism remains an unpredictable sector that highly reflects the dynamics of the current global era, and must be approached with a sustainability strategy that has the country’s long-term interests in mind. China’s approach to tourism as a tool of sustainable economic revitalization and driver of modern technology has balanced
both growth and resilience. It remains to be seen how tourism will continue to evolve as China faces economic and geopolitical uncertainties.
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Japan’s Green Energy at a Crossroad: Nuclear or Solar as the Way Forward?
By: Henry Davenport
About the Author:
Henry Davenport is a second-year undergraduate student at the University of Virginia majoring in both Foreign Affairs and Economics. A native of Chatham, New Jersey, Henry Davenport is interested in studying international diplomacy and the importance of Intergovernmental Organizations in legal affairs of international law. He is an Echols Scholar, member of the UVA International Relations Organization, and an Executive Board member of the UVA Club Lacrosse team. Henry intends to achieve a M.A. in politics during his four years at UVA before pursuing a law degree.
Abstract:
The 2011 “Triple Disaster” was the climactic moment of Japanese Energy politics, spurring the nation into a cycle of uncertainty around the development of local energy resources, often split between Nuclear Energy redevelopment or conversion to renewable resources. Recent government plans have established initiatives to spur future growth of Nuclear Energy as part of the Green Transformation Agenda to create a clean and energy-independent Japan. This policy direction is widely supported among Japanese politicians within the Liberal Democratic Party and is in the early stages of implementation. In this paper, I evaluate the relative risks of the enlargement of Nuclear Energy dependence from cultural and security perspectives through analysis of media attitudes and energy production levels in comparison to the primary renewable alternative in Japan: solar photovoltaics. I investigate empirical energy and cost benefits of solar energy, describe new advances in the technology, and the possible positive externalities of an energy transformation reoriented around solar energy.
Introduction In 2023, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida an-
nounced the Green Transformation, a series of bills seeking to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 and revive Japan’s slowing economy. Constituting ¥150 trillion, equivalent to $1 trillion, the “GX” would bring Japan to pace with other developed nations in the battle against climate change after spending decades behind.
The GX centered on the shift of Japan’s energy grid away from non-renewable sources, which as of 2023 accounted for about sixty-five percent of Japan’s energy supply (Shinden 2021).
To accomplish the required energy revolution, the GX Decarbonization Power Supply Bill designated that nuclear energy would become the keystone to the transformation of the energy sector—promising safe expansion and revolution (Takehara 2023).
But this choice has proved controversial. With painful memories of the 2011 Fukushima disaster, civic interest groups challenged the government’s decision and called for a stronger incorporation of renewables into the Green Transformation, pointing to solar energy as a potential lead alternative (Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center 2023; Friends of the Earth Japan 2023; Knuepfer 2022, 11).
Both nuclear and solar energy have strong histories in Japanese energy policy. Before the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan was a world leader in nuclear energy production, comprising about twenty-five percent of Japan’s overall energy output (Low-Car-
bon Power 2025). Following mass protests and the suspension of nuclear power generation after the nuclear incident, the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) instituted policies to invigorate clean energy initiatives and investment, specifically targeting solar energy (Aldrich, 2012). These policies achieved marginal success with regard to solar promotion, but progress was mitigated during the administration of Shinzo Abe, which pushed for a return to more traditional energy resources—including nuclear energy (Sofer 2016).
Debates between the role and importance of these two resources in meeting Japan’s energy demands continue. There is plenty of opportunity for Japan’s energy policy to swing towards either one as the GX has yet to formally allocate funds towards specific energy investments. But Japan must set its course now to meet its 2050 deadline, even in the face of political leadership changes.
For the greatest benefits of the Japanese state and its people, the GX must center its energy investments on solar energy rather than nuclear energy as the number one priority in revamping Japan’s economy This paper evaluates the risk and political ramifications of pursuing a nuclear-based energy policy and investigates the absolute and comparative advantages of solar energy to nuclear
energy through analysis of scientific data and the historical performance of solar energy initiatives in Japan. The paper acknowledges the utility of nuclear power as a potential complementary resource but concludes with attempts to rationalize the importance of changes to the initiatives in the GX Power Supply Bill and related legislation.
“Intrinsic” Bias Against Nuclear Energy
The Japanese public has historically appeared to possess an inherent bias against nuclear technology, a phenomenon referred to as a “nuclear allergy” (Loh 2019). The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki played a key role in early discussions about Japanese nuclear power. Amidst post-WWII American occupation, the government limited dialogue on the bombings and potential weapons programs, and occupation authorities banned research for nuclear infrastructure development. Following occupation, mass civil organizations formed to oppose the nuclear energy subject, often relying on the testimonies of bombing survivors to garner support—a tactic that persisted throughout the 20th century (Aldrich 2023). Pop culture demonized nuclear technology: the destructive and menacing Godzilla was conceived as a metaphor for the threat of nuclear weapons in the wake of both the atomic
bombings and the Lucky Dragon 5 incident, where Japanese fisherman were contaminated with radioactive material following an American hydrogen bomb test in the Pacific Ocean (Ryfle 2005).
Local political actors eventually responded to this movement’s demands. Even though there exists no formal law outlawing nuclear weapons in Japan, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato’s “Four-Pillars” nuclear policy of non-proliferation and Japan’s signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the aftermath of the Anpo protests generally satisfied the demands of the antinuclear movement (Sato 1968). Even though the anti-nuclear-weapons movement subsided throughout the remainder of the 20th century, the nuclear issue did not go away.
The anti-nuclear power movement took hold after the weapons debate subsided. In 1963, Japan built its first electricity-generation nuclear reactor. Met without nationwide uproar, a decade passed where only localized grassroots organizers resisted further construction of nuclear plants (Lifton 2011). The movement continued to operate informally until 1974 when the Citizens Nuclear Information Center formed as the first mainstream nuclear power opposition organization. The Center published the anti-nuclear Hangenpatsu Shinbun and conducted its own inspections of nuclear plants, even noticing structural faults in the construction of
Fukushima Reactor 1 as early as 1995 (Aldrich 2012). Emulated and supported by groups like Green Action Japan and No Nukes Plaza Tokyo, a sizable and continuous opposition movement was established, though without substantial initial momentum (Ochs 2012).
The Fukushima Daiichi disaster was the catalyst for a complete mass activation of the “nuclear allergy” in the popular subconscious. Pew Research polls show that the Japanese public has always been either opposed or exactly split on the subject of expanding nuclear power; this opinion soured to overwhelmingly negative in the aftermath of the disaster. Multiple mass protests were organized immediately after Fukushima and continued through 2013, demanding immediate cessation of all nuclear energy production and reinvestment towards renewables.
These protests succeeded for the moment. Between 2013 and 2014, nuclear energy output fell to zero with all plants shut down. When new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced plans to restart production, a petition against the decision achieved over 8 million signatures (United Press International 2013). Even after many reactivations, nuclear production remains below pre-Fukushima levels (Low-Carbon Power).
The GX’s call for additional restarts and further expan-
sion of nuclear energy is a massive liability for Abe and Kishida’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its aligned bureaucracy (Cabinet Secretariat 2023, 9). Even as the energy initiative stresses the importance of nuclear safety, the political consequences of any incident could shake all levels of LDP support and endanger the desired energy and economic transformation of the GX. Having already presented itself as somewhat negligent with its safety policies in the past, there would remain little reason for a concerned Japanese voter to support the LDP in future elections (Incerti & Lipscy 2021). The political fallout from Fukushima was credited as a significant contributing factor to the fall of the DPJ from power (Kushida & Lipscy 2013). Rationally, the LDP must avoid working itself into the same position that the DPJ faced by any means necessary.
Appeal to Solar Photovoltaics
The promise and power of renewable energy offers a way to avoid rehashing the nuclear allergy that has led to so much turmoil. The GX already designates investment into renewable resources as a separate core tenant of its overall plan, so wider investment is not radical nor distant (Cabinet Secretariat 2023, 5-6). Of the renewables currently available, solar energy is the optimal selection of
renewables available to center future growth. It is the most prolific and institutionally supported and actually outcompetes nuclear energy in three main arenas.
The first arena is price. Solar energy is, internationally, priced cheaper than nuclear energy. Pricing for solar-produced electricity sits at around ¥182202.15 per kilowatt hour in Japan, equivalent to $1,300, compared to about ¥981088.50 per kilowatt hour, approximately $7,000, for nuclear-produced electricity (New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization 2022, 11; US Energy Information Administration 2023, 2). The price of solar energy has also been among the fastest declining–around a seventy-five percent drop from 2012–while the price of nuclear energy has remained relatively consistent in the same period (Nuclear Energy Institute 2024). The setup costs for an individual or a firm in building solar panels are less than creating a nuclear power station by a significant margin. More promise in cost-efficiency rests with solar energy.
The second arena is usage rates. Solar energy is more utilized in Japan than nuclear energy today. Visible in Figure 1., at full operating capacity in 2011 nuclear energy accounted for around a quarter of overall energy output, today it sits at only 8.31%. Solar energy, accounting for just 0.3% of total energy
pre-Fukushima, now accounts for 9.98%, even after being neglected in the latter half of the 2010s, replacing hydroelectric as the lead renewable (Low-Carbon Power 2025).
Figure 1: Sources of Electricity Generation in Japan, 1973-2024
Source: Low-Carbon Power, Online, 2025
The third arena is safety. Solar energy is safer than nuclear energy. Per terawatt-hour of electricity produced, solar energy accounts for a death rate of 0.02 from accidents and pollution, thirty-three percent less than that of nuclear power at 0.03. Both are markedly below that of non-renewables like coal (24.62) and oil (18.34), but the difference between nuclear and solar is consequential when considering the widespread fears around nuclear. (Ritchie 2020). The reduced death rate and removal of disaster risks of solar energy, no matter how marginal the difference, should appeal to the millions opposed to nuclear energy.
Clean energy policy debates revolve around these three crucial aspects. On these metrics alone, solar energy already emerges
as the stronger and safer choice for the keystone energy resource. Still, the scientific argument is only a limited view of the complete case for solar energy: also important for this discussion is policy feasibility.
“On these metrics alone, solar energy already emerges as the stronger and safer choice for the keystone energy resource”
Solar energy is well-supported by current and past infrastructure and institutions and the country has proved eager to engage with solar technology. In 2004, Japan pledged to achieve 28 megawatts of solar-produced electricity by 2030, a level it reached in 2015 (Lebedys et al. 2022, 52). In the 2010s, the Feed-In-Tariff (FIT) was the derivative behind the early gains in solar energy. A DPJ policy passed after Fukushima, the FIT was a program where solar energy sold onto the public power grid would be bought by the government at a fixed rate above the regular market price. The FIT was implemented along with an investment subsidy to reduce setup costs and disincentivize speculation around the technology.
The FIT was effective in growing the total solar energy output in Japan, which increased five times over in five years and peaked at nearly 11,000 new solar panel installations in 2015 (Lipscy and Incerti 2021).
The FIT program was heavily reduced under the Abe administration. An estimated additional ten percent of energy output that would have been solar-derived was canceled during his tenure. However, the program’s goal of growing solar output has been re-strengthened with the implementation of a Feed-In-Premium—a fixed difference above the market price, rather than a fixed value— in 2022 under the revised Renewable Energy Act (Ito et al. 2020).
Green Transformation bills have dedicated significant financial and scientific resources to research in renewable technologies, providing institutional support and incentives for research institutions to develop solar resources.
Japan has also been a historical producer of solar panels. In 1994, Japan created new subsidies for solar power generation, and by 2004 the country accounted for 50.4% of global solar panel production (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy 2019, 3). Since the termination of these subsidies in 2005, Japan’s share of global production has steadily declined to only 0.2% in 2022. Regardless, it is evident that industrial economic potential and infrastructure
exist for a potential resurgence, which, as of the past four months, is a pending reality.
New Discoveries in Solar Technologies
Breakthroughs in solar research made possible by GX funds have created more energy-efficient, but commercially infeasible, solar panels. Most notably, a program under the GX studied Perovskite solar cells, a variation in solar cell design that is 20% more efficient than typical silicon solar cells, cheaper to produce, a fifteenth of the weight, and of a more flexible material (Khalaji Assad, 2018, p. 1). However, commercial use has been hindered by technological instabilities (Rong et al. 2018).
This has changed within the last year. According to the Japan-based newspaper Nikkei Asia, on December 26th, Japan-based research and technology firm Sekisui Solar Film (a subsidiary of Sekisui Chemical) announced a breakthrough in the stability of perovskite solar cells that would make them commercially viable for large-scale production (Fujiu 2024). By 2027, the company, which is heavily subsidized by the government, will invest almost two billion dollars into the construction of a perovskite cell plant capable of producing enough panels to power 25,000 households
each year. Sekisui hopes to increase output tenfold by 2030, a level equivalent to twenty nuclear reactors. Although the best perovskite cell models today are more expensive than silicon cells, high prices can be attributed to early manufacturing inefficiencies and costs are expected to lower as production begins (Fujiu 2024).
The perovskite revolution in solar cells would be instrumental to the large-scale expansion of solar energy in Japan, and could successfully address some of the most significant critiques that the pro-solar movement faces in Japan. Geographically, Japan has a low theoretical potential in total solar output, only 3.6 kilowatts per square meter, a result of its high latitude and small land area, requiring larger solar farms for necessary output levels (EnergyDataInfo n.d.). Under current location selection criteria, these farms would likely be constructed on natural preserves and agricultural land, contributing to biodiversity loss in the long term while also being physically unattractive (Kim et al. 2021). Floating solar farms have emerged as a potential resolution for this issue, but have been expensive to implement and create environmental challenges (Pouran et al., 2022). The mass proliferation of perovskite technology may resolve these challenges as the higher efficiency would reduce the necessary size of solar farms while maintaining equivalent outputs. The lightweight, flexible structure of the cells
will enable them to be added to a greater proportion of buildings in urban spaces, reducing the need to build farms in rural areas. Increased urban and suburban usage also opens the opportunity for microgrid constructions in these neighborhoods, reducing energy transportation costs for electrical firms. Moreover, there are more opportunities for the integration of cells into other structures in an attractive manner thanks to their light and bendable frames.
Positive Externalities of Solar Energy
Solar energy has notable political-economic benefits. From a geopolitical perspective, the expansion of the domestic solar industry can be central to the development of Japanese energy independence. Historically, Japan has relied heavily on the foreign importation of fossil fuels to sustain its energy supply due to low domestic reserves. Despite its history of strong investment in locally-supplied energy like nuclear and renewables, Japan is still reliant on imports for 87.4% of its energy supply (International Energy Agency 2024). Today, Japan remains the fifth largest importer of oil, the third largest importer of coal, and the largest importer of liquified natural gases (LNG), self-supplying only around twelve percent of its total energy (US Energy Information Administration 2023). Foreign dependence at high levels is an internationally risky
endeavor: in 2009, a Russian-Ukrainian gas trade dispute left 11 Europeans dead after home heating resources were cut (Krane & Idel 2021, 2). In Japan, past conflicts have demonstrated this vulnerability: the 1973 oil crisis drove domestic inflation to a record high of twenty-three percent, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine shocked Japanese natural gas supply, as Russia accounted for nine percent of overall natural gas imports at the advent of the war (Mihut and Daniel 2012, 1045; Golubkova and Obayashi 2024). Further, as major East Asian sea routes go through waters claimed by China, a country that has been both an economic and military competitor for Japan, China may restrict trade in the event of international conflict. Beyond meeting Japanese energy demands, solar energy is a tool for international security and domestic safety.
Japanese political efforts have been directed toward alleviating the risks associated with these energy networks. The 2022 Economic Security Promotion Law acknowledged the nation’s vulnerability to economic coercion due to its international dependence, creating the Economic Security Ministry to coordinate the utilization of domestic resources to limit foreign threats (Heginbotham et al. 2023, 53). While a progressive step in energy defense, the Ministry has placed significant attention on nuclear energy as the cornerstone of this security policy, which comes with
its own risks. Japan produces almost no uranium and holds only an estimated six years in natural reserves, so a majority of its yearly supply is imported from Australia, Kazakhstan, and Canada (World Nuclear Association 2021). Though these nations are unlikely to become enemies of Japan, this remains a potential liability if worsening international relations disrupt the Japan-supplier trade routes.
Solar energy, like most renewables, circumvents this issue through a supply chain that is significantly more vertical and self-dependent. Renewable energy resources do not require continuous replenishing to sustain their production, and thus after the initial construction the source becomes independent from the international trading system. Japan has already fully utilized its local hydroelectric potential, is expanding wind and solar farms, and has high geothermal potential (IRENA 2018). Each of these sources is more independent and secure than its alternatives and requires no replenishing. The advent of perovskite solar cells compounds this benefit in favor of solar energy; central to the production of these cells is the chemical iodide, of which Japan is the world’s largest exporter (World Integrated Trade Solution 2021). The forthcoming wide-scale introduction of these cells will simultaneously aid in securing Japan’s solar cell supply and help give Japan economic leverage in their respective global market.
The Future of Energy Policy in Japan
The justifications for increased usage of solar energy are comprehensive: it is cheaper, more efficient, safer, and will provide positive externalities across Japanese industry and security. It is clearly the future for the Green Transformation. However, this paper does not advocate for the immediate dismantling of all nuclear reactors in Japan. Complete nuclear abandonment would be impractical, costly, and infeasible due to the entrenchment that the electric and nuclear industries currently benefit from in the Japanese clientelistic political system (Lipscy and Incerti 2021, 448). Such radical action would come to the detriment of Japanese consumers and industry: nuclear is still much less dangerous and cheaper than fossil-fuel-based alternatives and is strongly supported institutionally and in infrastructure (Ritchie 2020). Anti-nuclear protests post-Fukushima successfully materialized into increased regulatory pressure toward nuclear plants and firms, in addition to a concurrent shift toward renewable energies (Kushida and Lipscy 2013, 26). Despite the large financial cost and social impact, only one death has been credited to direct radiation from the Fukushima disaster (World Nuclear Association 2024). An immediate stoppage of nuclear reactors would only drive energy prices higher and force
increased consumption of more dangerous fossil fuels, just as it did after Fukushima.
Even though nuclear energy is certainly a preferable energy generation source to other, more commonly utilized ones, that does not mean that it can be viewed as the future of Japan’s clean energy generation. Nuclear energy poses too much of a political risk, especially with regards to the criticisms the LDP has received with regard to post-Fukushima safety reform. LDP administrations have criticized the Nuclear Regulatory Agency, a government agency created by the DPJ post-Fukushima to act as an independent authority on the safety of nuclear plants. The agency’s leadership has appeared to be lenient regarding the restarts of some nuclear reactors and has professed an “explicit discounting of public values” in decision-making (Andrews-Speed 2023, 176). The GX Decarbonization Power Supply Bill designated nuclear energy as the key to future energy transformation with a focus on making “self-motivated safety improvements,” but this has also been viewed with skepticism by public interest groups (Cabinet Secretariat 2023, 9).
As written in a statement by the Friends of the Earth Japan, the emphasis on stricter nuclear regulations is “deceptive” to the Japanese population, when past performance on safety evaluations has been below certain standards even after Fukushima (Friends of the Earth
Japan 2023).
“Even though nuclear energy is certainly a preferable energy generation source to other, more commonly utilized ones, that does not mean that it can be viewed as the future of Japan’s clean energy generation”
This is a dangerous attitude for the sitting administration.
Opting for less than extreme precaution given the social perception of nuclear energy and the legacies of the recent anti-nuclear movements appears politically irrational. Certain groups have suspected that clientelistic interests are at play toward government-supported energy firms, which is only an additional reason to renounce the administration if a disaster takes place.
Nuclear energy can still complement solar energy within the GX. Solar energy is certainly stronger on average, but energy production fluctuates with the cycle of the sun, so a supplemental
resource is a necessity; nuclear and other renewables can be appropriate supplements. A solar-oriented future can occur simultaneously with the maintenance of current nuclear reactors, but should be planned with the eventual, and hopefully imminent, obsolescence of these reactors. Decommissioning in the future, rather than restarting and expanding in the short-term, is the best course of policy for the government in its pursuit of clean energy.
Japanese leaders must understand the best course of action for the GX is to amend the GX Decarbonization Power Supply Bill to reframe solar energy as the keystone of the next generation of energy in Japan. Sooner than later, the moment will come when solar energy makes nuclear energy irrelevant, and Japan, if it holds a steady course, will lag in the clean revolution because of it. The societal buy-in is already there for solar.. With lower costs, fewer hazards, better externalities, and more promise, solar energy can be used to successfully transform Japan into the clean, carbon-neutral nation it aspires to be.
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Climate Change and International Security: How Environmental Stress Fuels
Conflict and Cooperation
By: Nora Fotuhi
About the Author:
Nora Fotuhi is a third-year student at the University of Virginia, originally from McLean, Virginia. She is pursuing a double major in Neuroscience and Global Public Health with the goal of becoming a physician specializing in neurology. Her policy interests focus on health equity, concussion awareness, and the intersection of neuroscience and public health. Beyond the classroom, Nora leads Concussion Superstars, a nonprofit she founded to promote concussion education and recovery, and conducts independent
research on concussion awareness among young adults.
Abstract:
Climate change has emerged as one of the defining challenges of the twenty-first century. Far more than an environmental issue, it has become a central concern for international relations and global security. Rising global temperatures, sea-level rise, droughts, and extreme weather events destabilize economies and societies, pushing fragile states closer to collapse. They multiply risks of armed conflict, intensify migration pressures, and create new theaters of great-power rivalry. Yet climate change also compels unprecedented cooperation. Because its impacts transcend borders, no state can confront the crisis alone. The Paris Agreement, renewable energy partnerships, and disaster-response frameworks demonstrate that shared threats can create shared commitments. This paper argues that climate change is both a destabilizing force and a catalyst for collective action. It explores how environmental stress fuels conflict over water, migration, and resources while also driving cooperative agreements and partnerships. Drawing on cases from the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and the Arctic, as well as multilateral institutions such as NATO, the UN, and the EU, the paper situates climate change as a “threat multiplier” that tests the
international system’s resilience. The conclusion emphasizes that whether climate change produces conflict or cooperation will depend on political will, institutional reform, and the recognition that environmental security is inseparable from human security.
Introduction
In the history of international relations, few phenomena have redefined the concept of security as radically as climate change. The traditional security paradigm was rooted in the protection of state sovereignty, the balance of military power, and the threat of armed conflict. During the Cold War, the specter of nuclear war dominated the global agenda; even after the fall of the Soviet Union, geopolitics continued to be framed in terms of military capabilities and territorial disputes. Yet the twenty-first century has forced scholars and policymakers alike to reconsider what it means to be secure. Climate change has introduced a new type of threat: diffuse, transboundary, and unavoidable. It cannot be deterred with nuclear arsenals, nor contained within national borders. It affects almost every domain of life, including agriculture, migration, trade, and public health.
Various world organizations have acknowledged this shift.
The United Nations held debates in the Security Council on whether climate change should be treated as a direct security issue (United Nations Security Council 2021). NATO declared climate change a destabilizing force in its 2022 Strategic Concept (NATO 2023). The World Bank warns that hundreds of millions may be displaced within decades due to climate change as not just an environmental challenge but as a matter of war, peace, and survival (Clement et al. 2021).
What makes climate change unique is its dual nature. On one hand, it is a driver of instability, pushing fragile regions into conflict and amplifying grievances. On the other, it compels cooperation, forcing states to recognize that no actor can insulate itself from climate disruptions. This duality raises urgent questions: How does climate stress drive instability? In what ways does it compel cooperation? What policy responses are needed to tilt the balance toward peace rather than conflict? This paper addresses these questions through three analytical lenses. The first examines climate change as a driver of conflict, focusing on water scarcity, migration, and Arctic competition. The second highlights its role as a catalyst for cooperation, through multilateral agreements, renewable energy partnerships, and humanitarian relief. The third considers policy challenges and the future of climate-security gov-
ernance. Together, these sections demonstrate that climate change will be the ultimate test of whether the international system can evolve beyond zero-sum politics to embrace genuine collective security.
Part I: Climate Change as a Driver of Conflict
Resource Scarcity and Water Disputes
Water scarcity is one of the clearest ways in which climate change threatens international security. As global warming accelerates glacial melt and alters rainfall patterns, regions that rely on transboundary rivers face heightened risks of tension. The Nile Basin illustrates these dynamics. Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is framed as a development project, providing electricity to millions. Egypt, however, perceives it as an existential threat: ninety-five percent of its population lives along the Nile, rendering any perceived reduction in water flow intolerable. Negotiations have dragged on for years without resolution, and Egyptian leaders have periodically threatened the use of force (Verhoeven 2021, 165–170). Climate variability amplifies these fears: declining rainfall in the Ethiopian highlands may reduce the dam’s water yield, intensifying zero-sum thinking and mistrust (Ayana
and Srinivasan 2019).
Similar tensions exist in South Asia. The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan is often lauded as a rare example of enduring cooperation (World Bank Group 2018). Yet climate change threatens this fragile equilibrium. Himalayan glaciers, the source of the Indus, are melting at alarming rates, threatening longterm water availability (Molden 2019). Population growth and agricultural demand only heighten pressure. Considering that India and Pakistan have fought multiple wars and remain nuclear rivals, any disruption in water flow risks fueling instability. Here again, climate change does not invent conflict but deepens vulnerabilities in already volatile relationships.
The Mekong River Basin provides another case. Shared by China, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand, the Mekong supports the livelihoods of over fifty million people (Mekong River Commission n.d.). Climate-driven changes in precipitation and upstream dam construction by China have caused sharp declines in downstream fish stocks and water availability (Campbell et al. 2020). Vietnam, which relies on the Mekong Delta for its rice production, thus faces severe economic consequences. Competition for water in the Mekong is increasingly framed not only as an environmental issue, but as a matter of sovereignty and national
survival (Mekong River Commission 2023).
Climate Migration and State Fragility
Forced migration represents another pathway from climate stress to conflict. Rising seas, desertification, and agricultural collapse are expected to displace up to 216 million people by mid-century (Clement et al., xv). Such movements rarely occur in isolation; they often intersect with political, ethnic, and economic tensions in host communities.
“In each case, climate change acts as a destabilizer, compounding economic hardship, overburdening governance systems, and inflaming social tensions”
The Syrian civil war is a frequently cited case. Between 2006 and 2010, Syria experienced its worst drought on record. Crop yields collapsed, forcing over one million people—mainly
farmers and pastoralists—into urban areas. These sudden migrations strained already underfunded infrastructure and exacerbated grievances against the Assad regime. While there is no direct causal relationship between the drought and the war, it contributed to the conditions that caused protests to escalate into armed conflict (Kelley et al. 2015, 3241-3245).
“Unlike traditional security threats, which are often tied to specific adversaries or regional disputes, climate change spares no country. It manifests in floods in South Asia, wildfires in Australia, hurricanes in the Caribbean, and droughts in Africa. Its impacts are manifold but shared, making collective action quintessential”
Looking forward, projections are stark. In Bangladesh, sea-level rise will force millions to migrate to neighboring India, risking future instability (Clement et al 2021, 9). In Central America, recurrent drought has contributed to northward migration, fueling political debates within the United States. In each case, climate change acts as a destabilizer, compounding economic hardship, overburdening governance systems, and inflaming social tensions.
Arctic Competition
The Arctic is perhaps the most striking example of how climate change can create new geopolitical theaters. The region is warming at a rate more than twice the global average, leading to rapid sea-ice melt (Rantanen et al. 2022). As previously inaccessible waters open, new shipping routes and resource deposits are up for grabs. Russia has been the most aggressive actor, expanding military bases, deploying icebreakers, and asserting sovereignty over vast stretches of the Arctic seabed (Conley, Melino, and Alterman 2020; Paul et al. 2022; Tingstad et al. 2023). Wary of Moscow’s ambitions, the United States, Canada, and Nordic states have responded with their own patrols and investments. The Arctic Council has long promoted cooperative governance, but its authority is limited, and tensions are rising (Paul et al. 2022). Climate
change has therefore transformed the Arctic from a frozen frontier into a potential flashpoint for great-power rivalry. Unlike water disputes or migration crises, in this case environmental change directly creates new opportunities for conflict, thereby altering the contours of global geopolitics.
Part II: Climate Change as a Catalyst for Cooperation
While climate change has the power to destabilize regions and intensify conflict, it also contains the potential to unify states in pursuit of common solutions. The transnational character of environmental stress is central to this discussion. Unlike traditional security threats, which are often tied to specific adversaries or regional disputes, climate change spares no country. It manifests in floods in South Asia, wildfires in Australia, hurricanes in the Caribbean, and droughts in Africa. Its impacts are manifold but shared, making collective action quintessential. Such problems can either result in paralysis, where states pursue narrow interests, or in breakthroughs, where shared vulnerability leads to cooperation (Keohane & Victor 2011; Falkner 2016). The history of climate diplomacy, renewable energy partnerships, and humanitarian relief efforts provides evidence of both tendencies.
Multilateral Frameworks and Climate Diplomacy
The most visible expression of cooperation in response to climate change is multilateral diplomacy. The Paris Agreement of 2015 stands as the most ambitious climate treaty to date, uniting nearly every country in a common pledge to limit global warming to below two degrees Celsius. The agreement represents a departure from earlier efforts such as the Kyoto Protocol, which placed binding obligations primarily on industrialized nations. This approach led to resistance and withdrawal by key states like the United States (Depledge 2005; Bodansky 2016). In contrast, Paris adopted a more flexible model of nationally determined contributions, allowing each country to set its own targets within a shared framework. While critics argue that this flexibility undermines enforcement, the achievement of near-universal participation should not be understated. It reflects a recognition that climate change is an existential issue that transcends ideological, cultural, and economic divides (UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, Art. 2(1)(a)).
The Paris Agreement is not an endpoint but part of a longer arc of environmental diplomacy. The 1987 Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances provides a precedent for successful international cooperation against atmospheric threats. Unlike climate negotiations, the Montreal Protocol benefited from the availability
of affordable substitutes for harmful chemicals, as well as from a clear causal relationship between chemicals and the ozone layer (Parson 2003). It demonstrates that when scientific consensus is combined with political will, global treaties can succeed. The Paris Agreement aspires to replicate this model, albeit under far more complex circumstances.
“It demonstrates that when scientific consensus is combined with political will, global treaties can succeed”
Regional frameworks also reveal climate-driven cooperation. The European Union has been a global leader in integrating environmental policy into broader governance. The European Green Deal, adopted in 2019, commits the bloc to achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 (European Commission, 2019). Beyond reducing emissions, it links climate policy to trade, finance, and development assistance. For example, the EU has approved a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), which will apply tariffs on imports from countries with weaker climate policies
(“Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism” 2025). With full implementation beginning in 2026, CBAM has the opportunity to shape the future of climate policy. Such measures demonstrate how climate concerns are becoming inseparable from economic and foreign policy. They also illustrate how regional institutions can pioneer approaches that might later shape global governance.
Africa provides another example. The Great Green Wall Initiative, launched in 2007, aims to combat desertification in the Sahel through coordinated efforts in reforestation and sustainable land management (UNCCD 2020). More than twenty countries participate with the support of international donors. While progress has been uneven, the initiative demonstrates that ecological crises can foster cross-border solidarity in one of the world’s most fragile regions (Jessop and Prentice 2024). By addressing environmental degradation collectively, Sahelian states aim not only to mitigate climate impacts but also to limit the appeal of extremist groups, who often exploit resource scarcity, unemployment, and displacement to recruit vulnerable populations.
“Paris
adopted a more flexible model of nationally determined contributions, allowing each country to set its own targets within a shared framework. While critics argue that this flexibility undermines enforcement, the achievement of near-universal participation should not be understated. It reflects a recognition
that climate change is an existential issue that transcends ideological, cultural, and economic divides”
Renewable Energy Partnerships
Beyond treaties, climate change is transforming the global energy landscape in ways that encourage cooperation. The transition from fossil fuels to renewable sources creates new forms of
interdependence. Whereas oil and gas have historically been sources of rivalry, renewable energy projects often require cross-border collaboration. Shared electricity grids, joint financing mechanisms, and technology transfer all demand cooperative arrangements.
The International Solar Alliance (ISA) is one such initiative. Launched in 2015 by India and France, the ISA brings together more than one hundred countries located between the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn to accelerate the deployment of solar technology. The alliance focuses on capacity building, investment, and research collaboration, seeking to mobilize $1 trillion by 2030 (International Solar Alliance 2021; Sharma 2025). While the organization’s fund sits at less than $100 million and it has not yet seized on economies of scale, its continually growing membership demonstrates that climate imperatives can inspire new institutions that bridge the divide between developed and developing nations (Sharma).
In Europe, cross-border electricity markets have been expanding to facilitate the integration of renewable energy (Bahar and Sauvage 2013; Wehrmann 2025). Countries with surplus wind or solar power export to neighbors, while those facing shortages import. This model reduces overall costs and enhances resilience. Similar initiatives are being explored in Asia, including proposals
for a regional grid linking India, Bhutan, Nepal, and Bangladesh (NREL 2025). Such arrangements reflect how climate change encourages states to rethink sovereignty in favor of interdependence.
“Whereas oil and gas have historically been sources of rivalry, renewable energy projects often require cross-border collaboration. Shared electricity grids, joint financing mechanisms, and technology transfer all demand cooperative arrangements”
The Middle East, long associated with oil rivalries, is also witnessing new forms of energy cooperation. The Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states, have been complemented by renewable energy partnerships. In 2021, Israel, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates signed a deal
for Jordan to build solar plants exporting electricity to Israel, while Israel would provide desalinated water to Jordan (Reuters 2021). This arrangement not only addresses climate stress but also reinforces diplomatic normalization. While the region has been shaken by the October 7th attacks on Israel and the subsequent war, Jordan and the UAE have steered clear of inflaming tensions. It shows that environmental cooperation can reinforce peace-building, even in historically divided regions.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) further illustrates the dual nature of climate cooperation. On one hand, BRI projects have been criticized for financing coal plants in developing countries, which undermines global climate goals (Zhang 2021). On the other hand, China has increasingly emphasized green finance and renewable projects within the BRI framework (Wang 2024). China appears eager to claim the mantle of the world’s primary producer of solar and wind infrastructure, increasing prospects for further greening of the initiative. Its sheer scale underscores how climate policy is now intertwined with the geopolitics of infrastructure and investment.
Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Response
Another important form of climate cooperation arises in the aftermath of disasters. Hurricanes, floods, wildfires, and heatwaves are becoming more frequent and intense as a result of global warming. Such disasters often overwhelm national capacities, creating a need for international relief efforts (IPCC 2022).
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has institutionalized regional disaster management through its Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance, which facilitates rapid responses to typhoons, floods, and tsunamis (AHA Centre 2024). While ASEAN has often struggled with deeper forms of political integration, disaster relief has emerged as a relatively noncontroversial area of cooperation. For instance, during the 2018 Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia, the AHA Centre facilitated international disaster management cooperation and managed information around the disaster (Awan et al. 2019, 20). 46% of assistance was channeled through the Indonesian government, AHA Centre, or NGOs that worked with the AHA Centre, demonstrating the value of regional preparedness and information-sharing (AHA Centre 2018, 2-3). It illustrates how shared vulnerabilities can create practical pathways for building trust.
NATO, traditionally focused on collective defense, has also
incorporated disaster response into its operations. In recent years, NATO has deployed over 1,500 personnel and 15 airlift assets through its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre to assist with wildfire suppression in Greece (2021), earthquake recovery in Türkiye (2023), and flood relief in Slovenia (2023) (“Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre” n.d.). These efforts highlight how traditional military alliances are adapting to non-traditional threats. While some critics argue that such efforts dilute NATO’s core mission, the 2022 Munich Security Conference’s report affirms that joint climate resilience demonstrates NATO’s relevance in an era of climate-driven instability (Werrell and Femia 2018; Bunde et al. 2022, 29).
Even adversarial relationships can yield cooperation during climate-related crises. The United States and China, despite deep-seated rivalry, have coordinated on several occasions in areas such as disaster relief and climate policy. During the Obama administration, the two countries announced a joint climate action plan in 2014 that helped pave the way for the Paris Agreement. More recently, in 2023, the Biden administration and China’s climate envoy agreed at the Sunnylands summit to resume formal climate talks and expand collaboration on renewable energy and methane reduction (Stanway and Volcovici 2023). Although ten-
sions remain high, these instances show that even the most competitive great powers can find common ground when facing shared environmental threats.
Constructivist Perspectives: Norms and Identities
While realism and liberalism provide valuable insights into climate cooperation, constructivist theory adds another dimension by emphasizing the role of norms and identities. Constructivism holds that state behavior is shaped not only by material power but by shared ideas, values, and social expectations. Climate diplomacy has been shaped not only by material interests but also by evolving ideas about responsibility and justice. The principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR), enshrined in the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, reflects a normative consensus that wealthy countries should bear a greater share of the burden. This principle has influenced negotiations and underpinned the legitimacy of agreements (United Nations 1992, 4).
Constructivism also helps explain the growing role of youth movements, civil society, and transnational advocacy networks in shaping climate politics. Movements such as Fridays for Future,
spearheaded by Greta Thunberg, have reframed climate change as a moral and generational issue rather than a purely technical one. Through global strikes and social media mobilization, the movement pressured governments to adopt more ambitious targets. For instance, the 2019 youth protests were followed by the European Parliament’s declaration of a “climate emergency” and new national pledges in countries such as Germany and Spain (Rankin 2019). These actors lack material power but exert influence through norm entrepreneurship, reshaping public discourse and expectations of state responsibility (Han and Ahn 2020). The rise of green political parties in Europe further underscores this trend. By framing climate change as a question of identity and moral duty, these parties have integrated environmental action into mainstream political agendas. Climate cooperation, therefore, is not merely the outcome of rational self-interest but also a reflection of evolving global norms and shared values.
Part III: Policy Challenges and Future Outlook
While case studies of both conflict and cooperation demonstrate the profound impact of climate change on international security, the long-term trajectory will depend on how policymakers and institutions confront a series of enduring challenges. These
challenges are not only material, but also political and normative. They involve reconciling sovereignty with collective responsibility, integrating climate change into traditional security institutions, and constructing governance frameworks that are both inclusive and effective. The following sections examine these challenges and outline possible pathways forward.
Sovereignty, Equity, and the North-South Divide
One of the most persistent obstacles in climate negotiations is the divide between developed and developing nations. Industrialized states are responsible for the majority of historical emissions, yet developing countries are disproportionately affected by climate impacts. Small island states, for example, face existential threats from rising seas despite contributing minimally to global emissions. Similarly, countries in Africa and South Asia bear the brunt of droughts, floods, and desertification.
The principle of CBDR is meant to address this inequity, asserting that wealthier nations should bear a greater burden of climate action due to their historical contributions and greater capacity to act. CBDR has been central to climate diplomacy ever since, yet disagreements over how to apply it persist (Leclerc 2021,
pp. 76–85). The creation of a “Loss and Damage Fund” at COP27 in 2022 exemplifies both progress and difficulty. Developing countries had long demanded compensation for irreversible harms caused by climate change, such as destroyed infrastructure and displaced communities. The establishment of the fund was hailed as a victory for climate justice. Yet questions about how much money will be contributed, who will manage it, and which countries will qualify remain unresolved—as of late 2024, large countries had raised only .1% of estimated required funds (Inglis 2024). Unless these equity issues are addressed, trust between North and South will remain fragile, undermining broader cooperation and delaying the implementation of promising initiatives like the Loss and Damage Fund.
Integrating Climate into National and Collective Security
Another climate challenge is institutional. While recognition of climate change as a security issue has grown, attempts to translate that recognition into action remain uneven. Many countries continue to prioritize traditional military threats, relegating climate risks to environmental ministries with limited influence over strategic decision-making. This institutional compartmentalization prevents comprehensive planning (Burnett and Mach
2021).
“Industrialized states are responsible for the majority of historical emissions, yet developing countries are disproportionately affected by climate impacts.
Small island states, for example, face existential threats from rising seas despite contributing minimally to global emissions.
Similarly, countries in Africa and South Asia bear the brunt of droughts, floods, and desertification”
Some progress is visible. As noted above, NATO, the World Bank, and others have acknowledged climate change as a threat multiplier. Yet such acknowledgments are not sufficient. Climate resilience must be incorporated into every aspect of security
planning, from military infrastructure to disaster preparedness to intelligence assessments. States must fortify bases vulnerable to flooding, diversify supply chains disrupted by extreme weather, and account for military operations in increasingly hostile environments. Regional organizations must also play a role. The African Union, ASEAN, and the Organization of American States all face member states affected by climate stress. These organizations could develop joint climate-security initiatives, pooling resources for disaster response, migration management, and conflict prevention. However, limited funding and competing priorities often constrain their capacity. Without stronger political will and external support, regional organizations will struggle to meet the scale of the challenge.
Governance Frameworks for Climate Security
The third major challenge is designing effective governance frameworks at the global level. Current institutions are fragmented, with responsibilities scattered across environmental agencies, humanitarian organizations, and security institutions, hampering coordination. Some analysts advocate for making climate change a
standing agenda item in the UN Security Council (Scott & Ku 2018, 18). Supporters argue that because climate change is a driver of conflict, it belongs in the Council’s mandate to maintain international peace and security (17). Critics counter that securitizing climate risks may exacerbate divisions, especially if permanent members use their veto power to block action (von Lucke, Wellmann, & Diez 2014). Moreover, climate change is not an immediate, discrete threat like armed aggression; it is a decentralized process that challenges the Council’s traditional approach (Conca 2006).
Alternative proposals include creating a dedicated Climate Security Council under the UN or establishing regional climate-security task forces. Others suggest strengthening the role of the UN Environment Programme and linking it more directly to security institutions (Conca). Still others emphasize the need for flexible, multi-actor governance, involving not only states but also non-governmental organizations, private firms, and local communities (Betsill & Bulkeley 2006). Whatever the model, the key requirement is to create mechanisms capable of addressing the cross-cutting nature of climate risks.
Future Trajectories
Looking ahead, the trajectory of climate security will likely involve both heightened tensions and expanded cooperation. On the conflict side, resource disputes may intensify as glaciers recede, sea levels rise, and agricultural zones shift. Migration pressures will likely grow, particularly in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America. Great-power rivalry may increasingly extend into the Arctic and other regions transformed by climate change. On the cooperative side, the urgency of the threat may catalyze deeper integration. The expansion of renewable energy networks, the institutionalization of climate finance, and the mainstreaming of climate resilience into national security planning could create new pathways for collaboration. Transnational advocacy networks, youth movements, and civil society will continue to shape norms and push governments toward more ambitious action.
From a theoretical perspective, realism predicts that states will prioritize their own survival, leading to resource competition and militarized responses. Liberalism, by contrast, emphasizes the potential for institutions, interdependence, and shared interests to foster cooperation. Constructivism focuses on the influence of norms and identities, suggesting that the framing of climate change as either a zero-sum struggle or a common human challenge will
be decisive for whether future international relations evolve toward rivalry or cooperation. In practice, elements of all three theories are likely to coexist, producing a complex mix of competition and collaboration in the global response to climate change.
Conclusion
Climate change is the quintessential threat multiplier of the twenty-first century. It destabilizes regions by exacerbating resource scarcity, fueling migration, and opening new theaters of rivalry. At the same time, it compels cooperation by forcing states to confront a threat that transcends borders. The dual nature of climate change makes it both a driver of instability and a catalyst for collective action.
The case studies examined in this paper—water disputes in the Nile, Indus, and Mekong basins; migration crises in Syria, Bangladesh, and Central America; Arctic competition; the Paris Agreement; the European Green Deal; renewable energy partnerships; and humanitarian disaster responses—demonstrate the breadth of climate change’s impact on international security. They reveal both the risks of fragmentation and the potential for solidarity.
The policy challenges ahead are formidable. They include
reconciling sovereignty with equity in North-South relations, mainstreaming climate resilience into security institutions, and designing governance frameworks that are both inclusive and effective. Whether climate change leads to more conflict or more cooperation will depend on political will, institutional reform, and the evolution of global norms. If leaders frame climate change in militarized, zero-sum terms, the result will be instability and division. If they recognize it as a shared challenge, it could become the foundation for a new conception of collective security, one in which the survival of humanity is understood as inseparable from the survival of the planet. The choice is not predetermined. It is a test of vision, leadership, and the capacity of the international system to evolve. In this sense, climate change is not only an environmental crisis but also a defining test of the resilience and adaptability of the global order.
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The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism in India and Pakistan: A Comparative Analysis
By: Ann Leslie Riley
About the Author:
Ann Leslie Riley is a third-year at the University of Virginia from Arlington, Virginia, majoring in Foreign Affairs and Global Security & Justice. She is passionate about researching how religion intertwines with domestic and foreign policy, as well as how religious extremism relates to conflict alongside social and institutional radicalization. Beyond academics, she is the Managing Editor for Humanitas, UVA’s undergraduate journal of human rights.
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the differing trajectories of religious fundamentalism in India and Pakistan, beginning with the development of their divergent political attitudes after partition and examining how their respective institutions later employed distinct strategies to consolidate power. In Pakistan, religious fundamentalism was largely a result of the incorporation of Islam into a military-run state whose political bodies carried out a top-down impression of religious ideology onto broader society. Conversely, India saw religious fundamentalism born from grass-roots movements led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), who used Hindu nationalism to gain a foothold within Indian democratic electoral rules. Further, this paper highlights that both countries have enacted deeply discriminatory policies towards religious minorities that have coincided with religious-based violence. However, the violence in Pakistan has stemmed from alliances between the state and extremist groups, whereas it has largely taken the form of inter-community mob violence in India—legitimized by the BJP administration. Broadly, this paper offers a comparative analysis that emphasizes how religious fundamentalism is often intertwined with regime and raises relevant concerns about the future of minority rights under rapidly changing levels of political stability in both countries.
Introduction
In 2020, the Pew Research Center reported that India and Pakistan both scored “very high” on the Social Hostilities Index, a publication measuring “concrete, hostile actions that effectively hinder the religious activities of the targeted individuals or groups” (Pew Research Center 2020, 65). With both states grappling with religious tensions, it is important to consider how the development of religious fundamentalism has contributed to the current geopolitical environment. H.A. Shboul defines religious fundamentalism as the belief “in the absolute authority of a sacred religious text or teachings of a particular religious leader, prophet, and/or God” (Shboul 2020, 1). Fundamentalists “attempt to involve the entire society into their own belief system, often by the use of force” (2). When analyzing Pakistan, Shboul notes that Islamic fundamentalism is characterized by strict adherence to and imposition of the rules and values of the Quran, known as Sharia law. In India, Hindu fundamentalism can be understood as the idea that “India must be freed from Christian and Muslim cultural contaminations to restore authentic Indian culture” by creating “a single, pure, political, cultural and religious identity” (Bulian 2018, 2). While both India and Pakistan have experienced a steady rise in religious fundamentalism, their divergent political systems have caused this
trend to develop differently. In Pakistan, military control and a lack of civilian government have contributed to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism both socially and politically. Conversely, the rise of Hindutva ideology in India has occurred due to political mobilization under existing democratic institutions. To support this comparison, this paper will first discuss how partition contributed to the development of India and Pakistan’s political institutions, as well as their respective ideological framework on religion. This paper will then discuss the differences between Zia ul-Haq and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s consolidation of religious ideologies into politics, as well as how they use religion differently to entrench power. Finally, this paper explores how violence has resulted from this consolidation, and how religious violence has taken different forms in both India and Pakistan.
Historical Background
The partition of Pakistan from India in 1947 shaped the development of religious perspectives and early statecraft of both countries. Despite early goals to unite Hindu and Muslim populations under an independent India, debates about Muslim representation between the Muslim League and the Congress party eventually became extremely divisive. Muslim League ideology
came to be shaped by Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Two Nation Theory, arguing that “Hindus and Muslims formed two nations that could not cohabit because they belonged to two different civilizations,” and the sentiment that India’s democratization had made Hindus “masters of the country ” (Jaffrelot 2024, 80-81). Therefore, Muslims required a separate state to achieve political representation and protection as the minority religion in India. In addition to the use of divisive rhetoric, when it came to light in 1946 that the Congress recanted its support for the 1946 Cabinet Mission that would grant parity and the grouping of majority Muslim and majority Hindu provinces, Jinnah called on Muslims to take “direct action.”
This culminated in violence across Calcutta where a majority of the casualties were Hindu civilians, ruining any previous cooperation between the two parties. At that time, partition seemed to be the only way forward. Because the formation of both states is rooted in religious divides and animosity, Hindus in Pakistan and Muslims in India are often broadly viewed as fifth columnists who pose a threat to the stability of the state and the privileges of the dominant religious group. These types of judgments played a critical role in the formation of India and Pakistan’s respective political institutions.
For India, in “response to intra-religious violence…during
the years the constitution was being worked out” and the communal violence that came to a head during partition, Indian constitutional development prioritized secularism—interpreted as the “coexistence of different religious communities within a single state” (Sarkar 2001, 32). India attempted to find stability as a new nation by enshrining the “equal rights to profess, pursue, and propagate religion ” in Article 25 of the Constitution (40). The protection of civil liberties like religious freedom was one of the many aspects of the constitution that allowed for the successful establishment of democracy in India, which was cemented between 1947 and 1952 when the first two election cycles were completed. In Pakistan, Jinnah attempted to lay a similar ideology of acceptance, stating: “[w]e are starting with this fundamental principle: that we are all citizens, and equal citizens, of one State ” (Salim and Saeed 2021, 185). However, the Objectives Resolution, which ensured that “Pakistan’s Constitution would be Islamic in nature and should be devised in the light of the sacred books of Muslims,” was passed in 1949 under Liaquat Ali Khan and incorporated Islam into Pakistan’s political institutions (185). Due to the tensions of partition, Pakistan’s focus while forming their political institutions has been on what expert T.V. Paul describes as “external security threats”— particularly from India as its main adversary (Paul 2014, 11). This obsession with security threats and the subsequent proliferation of
military power to combat them has “generated continuous military rule” and “destroyed the chances of democracy and civilian institutions taking root,” making Pakistan a garrison state (13).
Religious fundamentalism in Pakistan has developed through the top-down imposition of religion onto broader society through the authoritarian mechanization of military rule, largely through the process of Islamization under General Zia ul-Haq’s regime between 1978 and 1979. However, in India, the rise of Hindu nationalist rhetoric grew more organically on a grassroots level that worked within existing democratic structures. In Pakistan, Zia’s rule was characterized largely by the Afghan War. During this era, religion was used to mobilize support for the war against the USSR in Afghanistan by labeling it a jihad. Zia allied himself with the religious political party Jamaat e Islami (JI), which held power in the education ministry within his cabinet and introduced a curriculum that promoted jihad (Salim and Saeed 2021, 188). Additionally, he changed the zakat tax system to support the growth of madrassas (Islamic educational institutions) to promote religious education across the country. Both madrassas and training camps for the mujahideen—militants who fought against the Soviets— created an environment of religious radicalization. Further encouraging this, “the U.S.…granted Pakistan wide discretion in channeling
some U.S. $2-3 billion worth of covert assistance to the mujahidin, training over 80,000 of them,” fostering ties between the military and Afghan militants (Human Rights Watch n.d). This also encouraged the top-down control of the military government not only due to the prioritization of war making efforts, but through the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistani military, and mujahideen taking “between 30-50 percent of the $640 million annual military assistance arriving from the US.” Zia’s policies during the Afghan War institutionalized a network between religious political parties, the military, and militants, thus supporting an environment where religious militancy and extremism could thrive. Eventually, this network culminated in the development of fundamentalist groups like the Taliban.
“Despite its secular constitution, Hindu nationalism has been able to permeate into electoral politics on the grassroots level, where a vote for a political party has become a vote for one’s religious identity”
In India, the growth of religious fundamentalism was not spurred by the larger government, but rather Hindu nationalist interests working within the parliamentary democracy. For example, the first-past-the-post system “veers towards ethnic majoritarianism ” and the Bharatiya Janata Party was able to successfully exploit this by “its ability to weave a pan-India Hindu identity and a gradual transformation of India into an ethno-democracy” (Farooqui 2020, 155, 159). By using Hindu nationalism as a great equalizer transcending the lines of caste and class, the BJP was able to cater to the interests of the dominant religious population and expand its political success in the late 1980s and 1990s. Unfortunately, the strategy that the BJP used to achieve such a unified voter base simultaneously stoked the fire of anti-Muslim sentiments. Specifically, the BJP catalyzed this period of radicalization by campaigning for the building of a Hindu temple in Ayodhya where the Babri Masjid mosque was located, culminating in its demolition by Hindu extremists in 1992 (Jaffrelot 2024, 181). By 2014, the BJP’s rise was cemented into parliament where “for the first time in three decades, a single party was able to win a majority on its own” and the BJP was not forced to compromise its Hindutva interests within a coalition government (Farooqui 2020, 159). Despite its secular constitution, Hindu nationalism has been able to permeate into electoral politics on the grassroots level, where a vote for a politi-
cal party has become a vote for one’s religious identity.
Religious Fundamentalism: The Similarities Between Pakistan and India
Despite introducing religious fundamentalism through different pathways, both India and Pakistan have passed discriminatory policies against religious minorities that validate its rise socially and politically. In Pakistan, Zia amended the blasphemy laws criminalizing the defilement of the Quran and the act of wishing death on the prophet while also adding a section into the constitution that criminalized defiling anyone sacred in Islam (Salim and Saeed 2021, 187-188). These changes attacked religious minorities who were disproportionately targeted by blasphemy charges: “At the time in Pakistan, less than 4 percent of the population belonged to minorities; however they faced 45 percent of the blasphemy accusations ” (188). Ahmadis were further singled out in 1984 when they were “barred from reciting Azan and calling their prayer houses Masjid” after having been legally declared non-Muslims ten years prior (188). Legal discrimination legitimized social prejudices and violence towards religious minorities like the Ahmadis. This can be seen in cases today: in 2016 the governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, was shot by his own security detail for opposing
blasphemy laws. After the fact, the assassin was “declared a hero by many religious elements” (190). The outpouring of support he received for an act of violence is symptomatic of religious intolerance in Pakistan.
Similarly, India’s passage of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in 2019 allows religious minorities—except for Muslims from Pakistan, Afghanistan, or Bangladesh—to have “an accelerated path to citizenship ” (Basu 2021, 292). Alongside the CAA is the creation of a National Population Register that asks about parental lineage, forcing those “whose citizenship the government questions…to establish their Indian lineage ” (Basu 2021, 292). Both of these pieces of legislation target Muslim minorities because they qualify religion as a basis for citizenship, excluding Islam. There have also been growing restrictions on interfaith marriage due to the “Love Jihad” campaign, which claims that Muslim men are marrying Hindu women to convert them to Islam and subjecting them to domestic abuse. An example of these restrictions is the Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance passed in Uttar Pradesh that “requires interfaith couples to inform district magistrates of their plans to marry; these officials can sentence men who they believe are forcibly converting women for up to ten years” (288). Similar to the blasphemy laws in Pakistan, this
ordinance has been used to disproportionately target the religious minority, often criminalizing Muslim men with false charges or allegations. Policies passed in both Pakistan and India that target vulnerable groups have aided the development of religious fundamentalism and sanctioned cruelty between fellow citizens and within the political sphere.
“Policies passed in both Pakistan and India that target vulnerable groups have aided the development of religious fundamentalism and sanctioned cruelty between fellow citizens and within the political sphere”
Violence in Pakistan and India
Finally, the development of religious fundamentalism in both India and Pakistan has coincided with the rise of religious-based violence in both countries. However, violence in Paki-
stan can be traced back to the military’s contradictory relationship with Islamist militant extremist organizations, whereas attacks in India have taken the form of communal violence. Since Pakistan’s allyship with the U.S. in the War on Terror after 9/11, “terrorists who claimed to be religious fundamentalists increased attacks targeting security forces, civilian populations and minorities ” (Salim and Saeed 2021, 190). However, while the Pakistani government has targeted organizations like Al-Qaeda, they have also accommodated certain militant groups, like the Haqqani Network, if they prove to be politically useful and do not threaten the salience of the military state (Staniland 2021). This governmental allyship has essentially allowed for religious violence by treating fundamentalist religious militants as legitimate actors. Paul recognizes that the ISI “has been a major player in the radicalization of the country” by supporting “terrorists in neighboring countries, especially Indian-controlled Kashmir and Afghanistan,” thereby allowing “Islamist forces a huge space in the country to operate without opposition” (147). Examples of attacks from religious fundamentalists in Pakistan include the bombing of two churches in Lahore in 2015 and the destruction of a 100-year-old prayer facility of the Ahmadiyya community in Sialkot in 2015 (Salim & Saeed 2021, 190, 200). Pakistan’s structure as a garrison state is largely responsible for its close relationships with terrorist groups because these
strategic partnerships are viewed as essential to maintaining security against adversaries and achieving political goals abroad. Therefore, religious violence, even when perpetrated by these groups, and polarizing fundamentalist ideology are not often seen as deal breakers as long as military control over the state is not contested.
Comparatively, the rise in communal violence in India has coincided with the political rise of the BJP, often as a response to polarizing policies. For example, after the passage of the CAA in 2020, citizens took to the streets of New Delhi to protest. What began as a peaceful protest accelerated into violence between Hindu nationalists and protesters leading to the death of around 53 people, mostly Muslims, and the destruction of numerous mosques, homes, and businesses (Foundation the London Story 2020). The New Delhi violence was also marked by the complicity of the police in the targeting of Muslims; some were even seen aiding the mob violence. Protests against the CAA also occurred in Uttar Pradesh, where police “attacked Muslim neighborhoods, detained hundreds of protesters, and threatened independent reporters and news media ” (Hansen 2024, 292). In addition to eruptions of riots against the CAA, there has also been a rise in “cow-related hate crimes” where people suspected of killing cattle or transporting beef have been the victims of lynchings by Hindu extremists set on enforcing the
controversial cow protection laws passed in many regions across India (Farooqui 2020, 171). These attacks have hurt Muslim communities the most, as their religious traditions don’t revere cows as sacred in the same way Hinduism does. Indeed, the rise of the BJP and its centralization of Hindutva ideology in the national political sphere has emboldened its supporters on the ground to resort to religious violence for empowerment, raising levels of religious fundamentalism in government and everyday civilian life. While the roots and typology of religious violence in India and Pakistan are very different, both countries have a managerial dilemma concerning state stability in light of these attacks. It will be important to acknowledge how the normalization and tolerance of religious fundamentalism have led to this result.
Conclusion
The development of religious fundamentalism in Pakistan and India offers valuable insights into their political systems and underlying shifts in governmental processes regarding religious ideology. Indeed, while similarities can be drawn in how Pakistan and India have targeted religious minorities, it will be their differences that matter most when investigating how religious fundamentalism has developed and how it will change moving forward.
While the BJP has bolstered Hindu fundamentalist policy over the past few decades by using Hindutva ideology as voter base mobilization and parliamentary strategy, the erosion of democratic institutions and an increasingly politicized judiciary under Modi reflect that while the BJP utilized democracy to put Hindu nationalist interests into power, it may rely on more authoritarian measures to maintain political strength. Further, this development is alarmingly pertinent due to the parallel rise in communal violence between citizen groups accompanying the rise of the BJP. In Pakistan, religious ideology is more baked into political institutions due to the Islamic foundation of its constitution. While military rule and Islamization under Zia ul-Haq contributed to a highly structured imposition of religion, particularly during the Afghan war, the development of religious fundamentalism moving forward may change as civilian leaders take more power within attempts at hosting elections. However, religious fundamentalism in Pakistan is marked by relationships with militant groups. Military control, whether direct or indirect, and its allowances for hotbeds of extremist activity remain a threat to citizens and are an important part of fundamentalism taking root.
Bibliography
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OP-ED: Boat Strikes Make Everyone Less Safe
By Saira Uttamchandani
Since September, the United States has attacked several boats off the coast of Venezuela that were allegedly carrying illegal drugs into the United States, killing tens of people in the process. The Trump administration has defended these actions, asserting that “[e]ach boat that we sink carries drugs that would kill more than twenty-five thousand Americans,” and that they will “blow [drug smugglers] out of existence.”
These attacks reflect a dubious interpretation of international law with possible significant geopolitical and legal consequences.
While the first strike was carried out in early September, the administration has laid the foundation for these attacks since the President assumed office in January.
On Inauguration Day, President Trump signed an executive order that allowed for drug cartels and criminal organizations to be classified as “foreign terrorist organizations.” This classification has historically been reserved for politically violent organizations such as ISIS and al-Qa’ida. Drugs and border security were critical issues in President Trump’s campaign, and are at the forefront in the minds of Americans. Still, the actions being taken by this administration to address these issues are irresponsible.
In February, eight cartels in Latin America were classified as “foreign terrorist organizations,” including Tren de Aragua (TDA), a Venezuelan street gang, and in August, the United States deployed missile destroyers off the coast of Venezuela in a more concerted effort to deter Latin American drug cartels.
The White House has also asserted that President Maduro of Venezuela is working with Tren de Aragua members to spread drugs and crime in the United States, even though an April 2025 memorandum from the National Intelligence Council asserts that “the Maduro regime probably does not have a policy of cooperating with TDA and is not directing TDA movement to and operations in the United States.”
As a result, the White House has deported several reported Tren de Aragua members, arguably without due process, and increased the bounty that was on Maduro for previous narcoterrorism charges.
Several possible international law violations may be associated with these attacks.
One example is that engaging in these activities in Venezuela’s territory is a violation of its sovereignty, which deems the United States’ actions “internationally wrongful,” according to the United Nations’ Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
These attacks could also be considered an interference with a nation’s sovereignty, because they interfere with Venezuela’s “inherently sovereign functions,” such as law enforcement. The United States’ destruction of evidence of drugs and related evidence directly interferes with Venezuela’s ability to serve as law enforcement in these cases. Ultimately, this may harm America’s interests by inhibiting or disincentivizing the local prosecution of drug smugglers in their country of origin.
Another potentially applicable international law violation is wrongful intervention in Venezuela’s internal affairs. To be con-
sidered wrongful intervention, the operation(s) in question must involve coercive interference with the domaine réservé, which is essentially the “internal or domestic affairs of a State.”
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in Nicaragua v. United States in 1986 that “the element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force,” which is the case here. Regarding the domaine réservé interference, serving as a law enforcement force via deadly attacks, the United States interferes with Venezuela’s internal or domestic affairs.
For such attacks to be considered self-defense, which is what the Trump administration has asserted that they are, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter specifies that a state has the right to defend itself in the case of an “armed attack.”
This raises several concerns. First, there are many steps involved in producing and smuggling drugs. This longer causal chain and period of time between actions weaken the case that this can be considered an armed attack.
Second, the ICJ implied in the majority view of Nicaragua that armed attacks are only “the most grave forms of the use of
force.” While drug trafficking is terrible, it is hard to imagine that it reaches this high threshold.
This weakening of international law has several implications. For one, it raises questions about the actions of other nations. The United States plays a significant role in global affairs, and its disregard for international law may send a message to other countries that it is acceptable for them to do the same, making the world less safe.
Additionally, the buildup to these attacks, including the reclassification of TDA, deportations, and an increased bounty on President Maduro, raises concerns that the US could be perceived as trying to justify a political war under the guise of an invasion.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio added to this perception by saying the President “wants to wage war on these groups” and previously claiming that “Venezuela and the Maduro regime has become a threat to the region and even to the United States.”
These extrajudicial attacks by the US open the door to greater future possibilities of lawlessness in other Latin American countries, if Latin American countries follow this American example.
There are also domestic concerns that the US is using Venezuela to justify actions within the United States, like deportations without due process. More broadly, it can be seen as part of a pattern of actions that stretches the perimeter of executive action well beyond what is considered acceptable by most legal scholars. These actions include the recent deployment of the National Guard in Los Angeles. There are similar themes of violated sovereignty, and the actions taken with Venezuela do not inspire confidence that the current administration will honor this sovereignty. It could continue deploying the National Guard in cities across the United States.
The administration’s actions, at best, stretch the boundaries of several aspects of international law, and at worst, are a flagrant violation. This disregard for international law spells out dangerous consequences for Americans and foreigners alike.
Bibliography
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“US Destroyers Head toward Waters off Venezuela as Trump Aims to Pressure Drug Cartels.” AP News. August 19, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/trump-venezuela-destroyers-maduro-drug-cartels-e33794ebc24d9031e536d132ce205b4c.
“A U.S. Attack on Maduro’s Venezuela Would Be a Mistake.” Cato Institute. September 9, 2018. https://www.cato.org/commentary/us-attack-maduros-venezuela-would-be-mistake.
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Levin, Sam. “Trump Administration Doubles Reward for Arrest of Venezuela’s President to $50m.” US News. The Guardian. August 8, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2025/aug/07/trump-venezuela-maduro-arrest-bounty.
Mégret, Frédéric. “Are There ‘Inherently Sovereign Functions’ in International Law?” American Journal of International Law 115, no. 3 (2021): 452–92. https://doi.org/10.1017/ ajil.2021.23.
Milanovic, Marko. “Revisiting Coercion as an Element of Prohibited Intervention in International Law.” American Journal of International Law 117, no. 4 (2023): 601–50. https://doi. org/10.1017/ajil.2023.40.
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PBS News. “Trump Administration Designates 8 Latin American Cartels as ‘Foreign Terrorist Organizations.’” February 19, 2025. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-administration-designates-8-latin-american-cartels-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations.
“Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs — Codification Division Publications.” Accessed November 6, 2025. https://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml.
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001). n.d. https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_ articles/9_6_2001.pdf
Reuters. “Legal Battles Mount over Trump’s National Guard Deployments to U.S. Cities.” United States. October 29, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/legal-battles-
Savage, Charlie. “U.S. Military Kills Another 6 People in 5th
Caribbean Strike, Trump Says.” U.S. The New York Times, October 14, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/14/ us/politics/trump-drugs-boat-attack.html.
The 80th Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA 80) - Day
1 | Digital Watch Observatory. n.d. Accessed November 6, 2025. https://dig.watch/event/80th-session-of-the-un-general-assembly-unga-80/80th-session-of-the-un-general-assembly-unga-80-day-1.
“These Men Were Deported to El Salvador With No Due Process. Their Stories Show Why an Investigation Is Necessary.”
American Immigration Council, n.d. Accessed November 6, 2025. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/ men-deported-el-salvador-stories-investigation/.
OP-ED: The Cost of Exclusion: How H-1B Visa Policy Changes Threaten U.S.
Innovation and Security
By: Celeste Wetmore
The United States is no stranger to a competition.
Throughout the second half of the 20th century, Americans faced a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union. Today, the U.S. competes neck-to-neck with China in a technology race equally essential to national security. In this race, the U.S. federal government relies on the private sector’s success, investing billions to integrate private sector tech solutions into intelligence and national security efforts, therefore developing a dependence on private sector strategies (“How Artificial Intelligence,” 2022”).
However, the Trump administration’s recent changes to the H-1B visa acquisition process could jeopardize the very individuals needed to protect our national security.
The H-1B visa program connects specially skilled foreign applicants with American employers “who cannot otherwise obtain needed abilities from the U.S. workforce” by authorizing the temporary employment of qualified individuals not otherwise authorized to work in the United States (“H-1B Program,” n.d.).
The program is heavily used, particularly in the science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) fields. In fiscal year (FY) 2024, 65 percent of the 400,000 approved applications were renewals, illustrating the private sector’s continuous reliance on individuals working under an H-1B visa (Im, Cahn, Mukherjee, 2025).
Throwing a wedge into this process, President Trump recently announced a new $100,000 fee on H-1B visa petitions (“Restriction on Entry,” 2025; “The H-1B Visa Program,” 2025).
Following the policy’s effective date on September 21, 2025, employers looking to hire new H-1B applicants are now required to pay this amount before continuing the petition process (Vogel and Butley, 2025). The Trump administration hopes this move will incentivize private companies to hire out of the American applicant pool. However, the Trump administration has failed to consider the
policy’s troubling implications given the current context.
The Trump administration’s actions disrupt a private sector that is paramount to national security efforts and built with contribution from foreign talent accessed through the H-1B visa. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the critical importance of H-1B workers in responding to national emergencies. For instance, between FY 2010 and FY 2019, eight U.S. companies that helped develop the COVID-19 vaccine received H-1B approvals for 3,310 biochemists, biophysicists, chemists, and other scientists (Lau, 2024).
At this moment, the Trump administration should be attracting talent, not chasing it away. Where the COVID-19 pandemic was unexpected, the global technology race is publicly and rapidly gaining momentum, especially with the Artificial Intelligence movement. While both nations are superpowers, the U.S. holds a unique edge: massive private investment in a variety of industries, including recent AI development, an amount nearly 12 times that of China in 2024 (“The 2025 AI,” n.d.). In FY 2025, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon were top employers of H-1B visa holders, companies projected to invest 240 billion into AI development by the end of 2025 (“Amazon, Microsoft,” n.d. and “Tech Giants,” 2025). Historically, the US has excelled at attracting top STEM
talent from abroad, while China has struggled to do so (Singer, 2024). However, his policy change could push international talent back to the East. In FY 2023, Indian nationals accounted for 73 percent of approved H-1B visas, with Chinese nationals a distant second at 11.7 percent (Im, 2025). China produced 47 percent of the top AI talent in 2022, far surpassing the United States at second place with 18 percent (Ma, 2024) . With an increasingly competitive American visa process, however, Indian and Chinese talent is likely to deflect into Chinese research and development (R&D) efforts, giving critical advantage to a major U.S. adversary.
Republicans argue that companies take advantage of H-1B visa workers: paying foreigners less than Americans to save profits, therefore disadvantaging American applicants and the national economy (Shapero, 2025). Following this logic, targeting companies with extra costs should force executives to reevaluate the benefits of supporting H-1B recipients and refocus on American talent. While this argument for the administration’s new policy holds a legal basis, the U.S. government is responsible for holistically evaluating the effects of their policies (Najm, 2024). This responsibility is further augmented when federal national security efforts are in danger of extensive indirect impact.
Whether the static dynamic aligns with the Trump administration’s political agenda or not, the reality is that the private sector operates with a dependence on foreign workers. The $100,000 fee is a crude fix—forcing key R&D companies to drastically shift their workforce over the next year will take funding and focus away from crucial R&D initiatives. Projects will be disrupted, potentially exposing vulnerabilities within U.S. national security. Even worse, the foreign talent driving America’s tech edge will funnel to other countries. The U.S. currently leads private enterprise in AI innovation, but China is undoubtedly its primary technological rival. With Indian and Chinese nationals accounting for over 80% of H-1B visa holders, restricting their entry risks diverting world-class talent toward Beijing instead.
Now is hardly the time to clog the international talent pipeline and disturb the delicate private-public exchange that keeps the U.S. ahead of China. If the Trump administration is desperate to address abuse of the H-1B visa, it must conduct triage: employ a delicate, calculated approach to extend support to impacted companies currently reckoning with these workforce changes.
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