BRIG GEN JAMES R. McCARTHY and LT COL GEORGE B. ALLISON
A VIEW FROM THE ROCK
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I
PRELUDE PEACE IS AT HAND? It was December 18th, 1972 and a new milestone in air power was approaching. The stage had been set for the longest ranged bombardmemt missions in the annals of aerial warfare. Darkness had settled over the countryside of North Vietnam as the first aircraft in a night-long force of 129 B-52 Stratofortress heavy bombers made its turn over the Initial Point (IP) and was in-bound to the target. At 1943 (7:43 PM) Hanoi time, bombs would start impacting Hoa Lac Airfield, 15 miles west of the capital city.1 Within the next few hours, and subsequent days, the theory and viability of high altitude strategic bombardment was going to be put to the test once more. SAC’s flight crews and aircraft, while attacking some of the most heavily defended targets in the history of aerial warfare,2 would be answering the essential question: Could high altitude bombers penetrate to and ~uccessfully attack targets defended by modern surface-to-air missiles and high performance jet fighters? We had bet a lot of irreplaceable aircraft and lives that they could. If we were wrong, then the United States would lose a significant part of its long-range bomber fleet. Along with that loss would be an incalculable loss in credibility and military stature. We had been brought to so dire a showdown by an apparent inability to communicate via any other medium. The last argument of kings was being employed to bring home to the vacillating North Vietnamese (NVN) that our national intent was to bring an end to the conflict under the terms which had been painstakingly developed at the negotiating table. Heavy bombardment on a concentrated, massive scale against the North Vietnamese ability to make war was the method selected to bring the point home.3 This test of strategic capability, which systematically vindicated itself with each new day,4 need not have come to pass. In fact, it came as a shock. Less than two months before, Presidential Advisor Dr. Henry A. Kissinger had, in full coordination with the North Vietnamese, announced that” ... peac(: is at hand.”5 Considering the frustrations and complexities of the peace negotiations up to that point, his straightforward comments were packed with deep diplomatic significance. Moreover, there was a splendid aura to the phrase which captured the imagination of the world. It stuck in the minds
CHAPTER
I
PRELUDE
PEACE IS AT HAND? It was December 18th, 1972 and a new milestone in air power was approaching. The stage had been set for the longest ranged bombardmfmt missions in the annals of aerial warfare. Darkness had settled over the countryside of North Vietnam as the first aircraft in a night-long force of 129 B-52 Stratofortress heavy bombers made its turn over the Initial Point (IP) and was in-bound to the target. At 1943 (7:43 PM) Hanoi time, bombs would start impacting Hoa Lac Airfield, 15 miles west of the capital city.1 Within the next few hours, and subsequent days, the theory and viability of high altitude strategic bombardment was going to be put to the test once more. SAC's flight crews and aircraft, while attacking some of the most heavily defended targets in the history of aerial warfare,2 would be answering the essential question: Could high altitude bombers penetrate to and �uccessfully attack targets defended by modern surface-to-air missiles and high performance jet fighters? We had bet a lot of irreplaceable aircraft and lives that they could. If we were wrong, then the United States would lose a significant part of its long-range bomber fleet. Along with that loss would be an incalculable loss in credibility and military stature. We had been brought to so dire a showdown by an apparent inability to communicate via any other medium. The last argument of kings was being employed to bring home to the vacillating North Vietnamese (NVN) that our national intent was to bring an end to the conflict under the terms which had been painstakingly developed at the negotiating table. Heavy bombardment on a concentrated, massive scale against the North Vietnamese ability to make war was the method selected to bring the point home.3 This test of strategic capability, which systematically vindicated itself with each new day,4 need not have come to pass. In fact, it came as a shock.Less than two months before, Presidential Advisor Dr.Henry A.Kissinger had, in full coordination with the North Vietnamese, announced that"...peac(: is at hand."5 Considering the frustrations and complexities of the peace negotiations up to that point, his straightforward comments were packed with deep diplomatic significance. Moreover, there was a splendid aura to the phrase which captured the imagination of the world. It stuck in the minds
EB-66 ECM F-4 CHAFF F-4 CHAFF ESCORT F-4, B-52 ESCORT F-105 IRON HAND
39 SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
6 9 6 18 9 48
TARGETS
1 HOA LAC AIRFIELD 2 KEP AIRFIELD 3 PHUC YEN AIRFIELD 4 KINH NO COMPLEX 5 YEN VIEN RAILROAD
COLOR
CHINESE BUFFER ZONE APPROXIMATE SAM COVERAGE TARGETS BOMBER ROUTE IN BOMBER ROUTE OUT CALL SIGN OF CELL
LEGEND
ROSE LILAC WHITE
‘D’ GUAM 2001 2003 2005
2007 2009 2011 2014 2016 2018
RUST BLACK BUFF CHARCOAL IVORY EBONY
‘G’ GUAM
B-52 CELLS/TARGET TIMES
18 DECEMBER 1972, WAVE 1
1949 1951 1953 1955 1957
PURPLE WALNUT
1945 1947 MAPLE GOLD GREEN
SNOW BROWN
‘D’ U-TAPAO
EB-66 & EA-6B (NAVY) ECM F-4 CHAFF F-4 CHAFF ESCORT F-4 MIG CAP F -4, B-52 ESCORT F- 105 IRON HAND F-4 HUNTER/KILLER
65 SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
12 18 30
TARGETS
1 HAIPHONG RAILROAD 2 HAIPHONG PPS
COLOR
CHINESE BUFFER ZONE APPROXIMATE SAM COVERAGE TARGETS BOMBER ROUTE IN BOMBER ROUTE OUT CALL SIGN OF CELL
LEGEND ‘G’ GUAM NONE
NONE
B-52 CELLS/TARGET TIMES ‘D’ GUAM
22 DECEMBER 1972
SNOW GOLD YELLOW EBONY RUBY AMBER WALNUT RUST RED IVORY
0450 0452 0456 0459 0501 0503 0508 0510 0514 0516
‘D’ U-TAPAO
24 2 2 2 30
TARGETS
EB-66, EA-6B (NAVY) & EA-6A (MARINE) ECM F-4 CHAFF F-4 CHAFF ESCORT F-4 MIG CAP F-4, B-52 ESCORT F-105 IRON HAND F-4 HUNTER/KILLER
70 SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
1 LANG DANG 2 SAM VN 660 3 SAM VN 537 4 SAM VN 563
COLOR
CHINESE BUFFER ZONE APPROXIMATE SAM COVERAGE TARGETS BOMBER ROUTE IN BOMBER ROUTE OUT CALL SIGN OF CELL
LEGEND
HAZEL GRAPE
BUFF PAINT
‘D’ GUAM
1929 1932
1910 1912
23 DECEMBER 1972
NONE
‘G’ GUAM
B-52 CELLS/TARGET TIMES
1922 1924 1927
SMOKE
1915 1917 1920 PLAID MAPLE
COPPER TOPAZ COBALT
‘D’ U-TAPAO
12 18 30
TARGETS
EB-66 & EA-6B (NAVY) ECM F·4 CHAFF F-4 CHAFF ESCORT F-4 MIG CAP F-4, B-52 ESCORT F-105 IRON HAND F-4 HUNTER/KILLER
69 SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
1 KEP RAILROAD 2 THAI NGUYEN
COLOR
CHINESE BUFFER ZONE APPROXIMATE SAM COVERAGE TARGETS BOMBER ROUTE IN BOMBER ROUTE OUT CALL SIGN OF CELL
LEGEND ‘G’ GUAM NONE
NONE
B-52 CELLS/TARGET TIMES ‘D’ GUAM
24 DECEMBER 1972
1950 1952 1955 1957 1957 1959 2002 2005 2007 2010
SNOW EBONY RED WINE AMBER BLACK RUBY PURPLE CHERRY YELLOW
‘D’ U-TAPAO
TARGETS
18 9 9 9 9 18 3 15 15 15 120
EB-66, EA-3A & EA-6B (NAVY), EA-6A (MARINE) ECM F-4 CHAFF F-4 CHAFF ESCORT F-4 (AF & NAVY) MIG CAP F-4, B-52 ESCORT F-105 & A-7 (NAVY) IRON HAND F-4 HUNTER/KILLER
113 SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
1 THAI NGUYEN 2 KINH NO COMPLEX 3 DUC NOI RAILROAD 4 HANOI RAILROAD 5 HANOI PETROLEUM STORAGE 6 GIAP NHI RAILROAD 7 SAM VN 549 8 VAN DIEN VEHICLE 9 HAIPHONG RAILROAD 10 HAIPHONG TRANSFORMER
COLOR
CHINESE BUFFER ZONE APPROXIMATE SAM COVERAGE TARGETS BOMBER ROUTE IN BOMBER ROUTE OUT CALL SIGN OF CELL
LEGEND
2230 2232 2236 2238 2242 2245 2230 2232 2235 2238 2241
SNOW SLATE CREAM LILAC PINTO COBALT RUST MAROON AMBER SILVER RED
‘D’ GUAM
26 DECEMBER 1972
2230 2233 2236 2239 2242 2230 2233 2236 2239 2242
MAPLE HAZEL AQUA BRONZE VIOLET
2230 2232 2235 2238 2241
PAINT BRICK GRAPE PURPLE COPPER
OPAL LAVENDER WINE SABLE LEMON
‘G’ GUAM
B-52 CELLS/TARGET TIMES
2230 2232 2235 2238 2242 2245 2245 2245
GOLD WALNUT
2230 2232 2235 2237 2240 2244 PINK WHITE IVORY YELLOW EBONY SMOKE
BLACK RUBY RAINBOW INDIGO BROWN ASH
‘D’ U-TAPAO
EB-66 & EA-6B (NAVY) ECM F-4 CHAFF F-4 CHAFF ESCORT F-4 (AF & NAVY) MIG CAP F-4, B-52 ESCORT F-105 & A-7 (NAVY) IRON HAND F-4 HUNTER/KILLER
101 SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
* 2017 Edition Note: The number of aircraft per target does not add up to 60. This error was present in the original draft of the book, and we have not tried to correct it.
21 3 9 12 3 6 3 60*
TARGETS
1 LANG DANG 2 SAM VN 234 3 DUC NOI 4 TRUNG QUANG RAILROAD 5 SAM VN 243 6 VAN DIEN SUPPLY 7 SAM VN 549
COLOR
CHINESE BUFFER ZONE APPROXIMATE SAM COVERAGE TARGETS BOMBER ROUTE IN BOMBER ROUTE OUT CALL SIGN OF CELL
LEGEND
GREEN COBALT TOPAZ
‘D’ GUAM 2300 2303 2305
27 DECEMBER 1972
BEIGE CHERRY CHROME CHESTNUT OPAL GRAY CINNAMON
‘G’ GUAM 2300 2302 2304 2306 2308 2310 2312
B-52 CELLS/TARGET TIMES
2259 2303 2305 2309 2300 2300 2302 2306 2309 2309
RUBY WINE AMBER BLACK LEMON ASH PAINT RAINBOW SILVER IVORY
‘D’ U-TAPAO
EB-66 & EA-6B (NAVY) ECM F-4 CHAFF F-4 CHAFF ESCORT F-4 (AF & NAVY) MIG CAP F-4, B-52 ESCORT F-105 & A-7E (NAVY) IRON HAND F-4 HUNTER/KILLER
99 SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
24 18 12 3 3 60
TARGETS
1 LANG DANG RAILROAD 2 SAM SUPPORT FAC 58 3 DUC NOI 4 SAM VN 266 5 SAM VN 158
COLOR
CHINESE BUFFER ZONE APPROXIMATE SAM COVERAGE TARGETS BOMBER ROUTE IN BOMBER ROUTE OUT CALL SIGN OF CELL
LEGEND
2215 2218 2223 2219 2223
PLAID SABLE BRASS GOLD INDIGO
‘D’ GUAM
28 DECEMBER 1972
VIOLET
SNOW BROWN LILAC BRONZE
‘G’ GUAM
2239
2215 2217 2219 2221
B-52 CELLS/TARGET TIMES
2215 2218 2223 2231 2233 2236
SMOKE ORANGE QUILT
2215 2219 2223
HAZEL PEACH YELLOW WHITE RED RUST
2215
PINTO
‘D’ U-TAPAO
EB-66 & EA-6B (NAVY) ECM F-4 CHAFF F-4 CHAFF ESCORT F-4 (AF & NAVY) MIG CAP F-4, B-52 ESCORT F-105 & A-7 (NAVY) IRON HAND F-4 HUNTER/KILLER
102 SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
27 18 15 60
TARGETS
1 PHUC YEN SAM SUPPORT 2 LANG DANG RAILROAD 3 TRAI CA SAM STORAGE
COLOR
CHINESE BUFFER ZONE APPROXIMATE SAM COVERAGE TARGETS BOMBER ROUTE IN BOMBER ROUTE OUT CALL SIGN OF CELL
LEGEND
2320 2323 2326 2320 2323 2326
AQUA WALNUT WINE RED RAINBOW GREEN
‘D’ GUAM
29 DECEMBER 1972
CHERRY
PAINT BLACK LEMON
‘G’ GUAM
2338
2320 2322 2324
B-52 CELLS/TARGET TIMES
2336 2338 2340 2342 2344 2334 2336
CHROME CINNAMON
2320 2323 2326 OPAL BEIGE IVORY TOPAZ GRAY
GRAPE MAPLE CHESTNUT
‘D’ U-TAPAO