IISS Shangri La Dialogue 2022

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022 THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

The International Institute for Strategic Studies Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London | wc2r 2pg | UK www.iiss.org

© September 2022 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Director-General and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

Editor James Crabtree

utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now

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Gould Davies, Franz-Stefan Gady, Dr Bastian Giegerich, Dr Tim

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Huxley, Yuka Koshino, Dr Lynn Kuok, Ithrana Lawrence, Meia

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Contents Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Chapter 1 Keynote address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Chapter 2 First plenary session Next steps for the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Chapter 3 Second plenary session Managing geopolitical competition in a multipolar region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Chapter 4 Third plenary session Developing new forms of security cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Chapter 5 Fourth plenary session Military modernisation and new defence capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Chapter 6 Special address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Chapter 7 Simultaneous special sessions Session 1 Climate security and green defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Session 2 Myanmar: Finding a way forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Session 3 Maritime security: From codes of conduct to crisis communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Chapter 8 Istana reception and dinner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Chapter 9 Fifth plenary session China’s vision for regional order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Chapter 10 Sixth plenary session Common challenges for Asia-Pacific and European defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Chapter 11 Seventh plenary session New ideas for securing regional security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Chapter 12 The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Appendices I. Selected digital engagement and media coverage of the 2022 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue . . . . . . . 82 II. Selected IISS publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

FOREWORD

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

The SLD agenda also included a plenary session

held its 19th annual Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in

on common challenges facing Asia-Pacific and

Singapore from 10 to 12 June 2022 after a two-year

European defence establishments. Elsewhere, our

hiatus. We are pleased to present this report summa-

agenda focused on the developing security postures

rising the Dialogue’s open proceedings, which include

of both the United States and China; the challenges of

all of this year’s plenary and special sessions, as well

geopolitical competition in a multipolar region; new

as a section detailing the discussions of our Southeast

forms of security cooperation; military modernisation

Asian Young Leaders’ Programme (SEAYLP).

and new defence capabilities; and new ideas for secur-

The strategic dynamic in the Asia-Pacific region

ing regional stability.

has developed over the last year in ways that natu-

As ever, the IISS is grateful to the Singapore gov-

rally shaped the agenda of this year’s Dialogue, which

ernment for its support for the SLD process. This also

opened with a keynote address by Japanese Prime

includes the annual IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa

Minister Kishida Fumio. The proceedings then included

Meeting, which was convened successfully in January

seven plenary sessions, providing defence ministers,

2022, and which will convene once again from 15–17

senior officials, high-ranking military figures and other

January 2023.

distinguished delegates with an opportunity to discuss critical developing security issues.

We would like to thank in particular the following lead commercial sponsors for their financial sup-

The 2022 Dialogue involved 553 delegates, around

port for the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue: Airbus, BAE

half of whom were from governments or armed forces.

Systems, Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon

A total of 37 national delegations attended, with 32

Technologies. We also extend thanks to principal

defence ministers present. On the sidelines of the

sponsors Babcock International Group, Microsoft, and

summit, many hundreds of bilateral, trilateral, mini-

Rolls-Royce, as well as main sponsors Asahi Shimbun,

lateral and multilateral meetings among government

Leonardo, Maxar Technologies and ST Engineering.

delegations took place, with IISS facilitating over 100

The Shangri-La Hotel generously sponsored the

of them.

Dialogue’s opening dinner.

The Institute also hosted an opening ministe-

The IISS looks forward to developing these part-

rial reception for national delegation leaders, while

nerships, and making new ones, with the shared

organising the important SEAYLP. This provided an

aspiration of advancing regional security dialogue and

opportunity for 41 young leaders from around the

cooperation through the SLD process in the years to

region to discuss pressing security questions in specially

come. We look forward to welcoming delegates in-per-

organised sessions, as well as playing a full part in the

son to Singapore for the 20th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Dialogue’s broader debates.

from 2–4 June 2023.

This year’s Dialogue reflected a range of regional and global security concerns, and was set against the

Dr John Chipman CMG,

backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a topic add-

IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

ressed most directly in a special address that Ukrainian

James Crabtree,

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy gave virtually from Kyiv.

IISS–Asia Executive Director

Foreword

5

INTRODUCTION

The 19th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue returned in 2022

powerful special address delivered at the Dialogue

following an enforced two-year absence due to the

by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who

COVID-19 pandemic. The IISS convened the first SLD

spoke virtually from Kyiv.

in 2002, and until 2019 ran the event each year with-

The Shangri-La Dialogue remains the only annual

out interruption. Throughout that time, the Dialogue

meeting that aims to bring together Asia-Pacific

provided a valuable forum where members of defence

defence ministers with permanent heads of defence

establishments throughout the Asia-Pacific could come

ministries and military chiefs. Originally known

together with their peers from nations elsewhere in

as the Asia Security Summit, the event has become

the world with security interests in the region, both to

widely recognised as a valuable meeting place for

discuss pressing regional issues and attempt to solve

regional security leaders, as well as observers of

complex security problems. The fact that the summit

regional security in the business, expert and media

was not convened in the past two years and made its

communities. Concurrent with the Dialogue, a paral-

return this year all the more important. While interna-

lel meeting convenes intelligence chiefs from selected

tional diplomacy continued throughout the pandemic,

regional and extra-regional states. The IISS also ran

many major international meetings moved wholly or

its 5th Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme,

partly online. The IISS has long believed in the central

bringing together more than 40 mid-career profes-

importance of physical meetings to constructive diplo-

sionals from around the region to play a full part in

macy, however. We were therefore pleased that this

the Dialogue programme.

year’s Shangri-La Dialogue returned in its traditional in-person format.

Over its two-decade history, the SLD has become part of the fabric of the Asia-Pacific’s security archi-

The summit’s return was timely too, given a sharp

tecture. It provides regional governments with a

deterioration in the regional security situation driven

public platform to explain their developing defence

largely by rising geopolitical competition between

policies and identify developing issues of security

the US and China. This year’s Dialogue was notable

concern. The Dialogue also allows senior regional

also for the prominence of discussions about Russia’s

defence leaders to develop and enhance coopera-

February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and its potential

tion with one another, notably through the hundreds

impact on the Asia-Pacific region. By convention, the

of bilateral and other meetings which occur on the

Dialogue begins with a keynote address at the Friday

Dialogue’s sidelines. This year saw notable exam-

evening opening dinner, and this year, Japan’s Prime

ples of such meetings, not least the first bilateral

Minister Kishida Fumio was the keynote speaker.

meeting between US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin

In his remarks, Kishida summed up the concerns of

and Chinese Ministry of National Defence Minister

many participants, noting the risks of Russia’s actions

Wei Fenghe. Finally, the Dialogue aims to develop

for the existing international order and also for Asian

a sense of common community and focus among

security. ‘I myself have a strong sense of urgency that

leaders from regional security establishments in the

Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,’ he said.

hope this might also provide space to move towards

The impact of Russia’s actions was also visible in a

solutions to the many challenges the region faces.

Introduction

7

Delfin Lorenzana, then-secretary of national defense, Philippines; and Dr John Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

Dr John Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive; Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary of Defense, US; Richard Marles, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, Australia; and Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, Singapore

Speaking in this year’s closing plenary session,

format more specific regional security issues. Two

Singapore’s Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen

themes were especially prominent during the 19th

reflected on the place of the Dialogue for Asia-Pacific

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, namely rising Sino-US

security and the success of this year’s event. ’Some

geopolitical competition and the regional impact of

of you have been at the Shangri-La Dialogue since

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

its inception in 2002,’ he told his audience. ‘I think it

Russia’s invasion was referenced from the start

would be fair to say that this one will be counted as

of the Dialogue during Prime Minister Kishida’s key-

unforgettable and unique,’ he added.

note address. ’As the world was still recovering from the pandemic, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine occurred,’ he noted. ’No country or region in the

SETTING THE AGENDA

world can shrug this off as someone else’s problem.

The IISS designs the SLD as an open platform for

It is a situation that shakes the very foundations of the

debate and discussion. Each year’s agenda is con-

international order, which every country and indi-

structed to allow a fair reflection of the diversity

vidual gathered here today should regard as their own

of views and priorities of regional security estab-

affair.’ And during Zelenskyy ’s special address, the

lishments. There is no single overarching theme to

Ukrainian president argued that it is ’on the battlefield

the summit. Rather, the SLD agenda is constructed

in Ukraine that the future rules of this world are being

around a series of individually themed plenary ses-

decided along with the boundaries of the possible’.

sions which provide invited defence ministers with

Elsewhere, almost every plenary speech mentioned in

the opportunity to speak to a high-profile audi-

one form or another Russia’s actions, and this under-

ence of fellow security decision-makers, experts,

lines the common concern of sustaining international

business leaders and media commentators. These

rules and order stretching from the Euro-Atlantic

themes reflect the Institute’s view of the most press-

to the Indo-Pacific. The SLD agenda also included a

ing emerging security challenges and themes for

plenary session titled ’Common Challenges For Asia-

the region. This year, the Dialogue’s agenda also

Pacific And European Defence’.

included three special sessions which provided the

Sino-US competition emerged as a clear theme

opportunity to address and discuss in a roundtable

through many plenary speeches, notably including

8

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

those of the ministers from China and the US themselves. Speaking on Saturday morning, Defense Secretary Austin laid out US priorities. ’We seek a region free of aggression and bullying,’ he said. ‘And we seek a world that respects territorial integrity and political independence, a world that expands human rights and human dignity, and a world in which all countries – large and small – are free to thrive and to lawfully pursue their interests, free from coercion and intimidation.’ The following morning, in a session entitled ‘China’s Visions of Regional Order’, Minister Wei responded to Austin: ’China’s development is not a threat to others. On the contrary, it is a big contribution to global peace and development.’

He added: ’No matter what stage of development it reaches, China will never seek hegemony or engage in military expansion.’ Numerous other speakers also

Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary of Defense, US; Lee Jong-Sup, Minister of National Defense, Republic of Korea; and Dr Chung Min Lee, IISS Advisory Council Chairman and IISS Trustee

made reference to the challenges of managing ongoing tensions between China and the US, either openly

examined what might be done to decrease tensions

or obliquely.

and manage potential flashpoints, including the

Elsewhere, the Dialogue covered a range of themes.

prospect of new ’guardrails’ to manage geostrategic

There was a plenary examining ways to manage geo-

competition, including bilateral crisis communication

political competition in a multipolar region. There

channels and cooperation on public goods, such as in

was a following session which noted that ties between

the maritime sphere.

Beijing and Washington are now defined by strate-

On Saturday afternoon, IISS senior staff chaired

gic competition across numerous domains, raising

three special sessions delving into more specific con-

concerns about potential future conflict. The wider

temporary security challenges. The first focused on

region is multipolar in nature, however, with middle

climate security and green defence, noting that climate

and smaller powers playing important roles helping

change will have a substantial impact on Asia-Pacific

to manage and respond to this atmosphere of com-

security, both by exacerbating existing regional ten-

petition. The third plenary covered new forms of

sions and creating new areas of contention, while rising

security cooperation, with a particular focus on new

sea-levels will directly affect defence institutions, in

relationships like the Quad, AUKUS as well as existing

particular by jeopardising military facilities in coastal

regional forums such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers

or island locations. The second special session exam-

Meeting Plus (ADMM+) grouping in Southeast Asia.

ined potential ways forward in the ongoing conflict in

Discussions also focused on military modernisation

Myanmar since the February 2021 coup d’état, noting

and new defence capabilities, noting the significant

that both armed conflict and humanitarian crises have

wave of military modernisation underway across

spread to every corner of Myanmar, while ASEAN has

the Asia-Pacific, as both China and the US invest in

so far struggled to make progress in the implementation

improved military postures and a range of middle

of its Five-Point Consensus. The final special session

powers develop new defence capabilities such as

examined maritime security. It covered major regional

hypersonic missiles and nuclear-powered submarines.

powers maintaining blue-water navies to project power

The Dialogue closed with a plenary examining

and influence. It also noted that cooperation between

new ideas for securing regional stability. Given rising

maritime states remains integral to preserving regional

security competition across the Asia-Pacific, speakers

stability at a time of rising geopolitical competition.

Introduction

9

HIGH-LEVEL PARTICIPATION The 19th Shangri-La Dialogue returned in near-normal conditions, albeit with carefully targeted COVID 19 safe-management measures to ensure the well-being of all delegates. The summit also returned to around the same size as in prior editions, with 553 delegates attending, around half of whom were senior officials and military leaders.

From its earliest days in 2002, the Dialogue has been structured around a core group of regularly participating nations. In 2022, of the 27 regular participant countries represented at the Dialogue, 18 sent delegations led by full ministers: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, the US and Vietnam. Other high-ranking officials, including

General (Retd) Prabowo Subianto, Minister of Defence, Indonesia; and Teo Chee Hean, Senior Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security, Singapore

defence chiefs and military personnel, led delegations from the European Union, Germany, India, Laos,

the highest level in the Shangri-La Dialogue, and

Pakistan, Switzerland, Thailand and the United

to use the event as one of Beijing’s most prominent

Kingdom. Ministers from four other countries also

forums for regional diplomacy.

participated, namely Fiji, Qatar, the Netherlands and

The 19th SLD also notably provided platforms

Solomon Islands. In total, the IISS this year welcomed

for a number of newly appointed ministers. We were

representatives from ten guest governments, on top

pleased to welcome a number of defence ministers

of our regularly participating nations. The Dialogue

attending for the first time, including: Canada’s Anita

is also an important gathering place for international

Anand; France’s Sébastien Lecornu; South Korea’s

institutions, with ASEAN, the EU, the International

Lee Jong-sup; Australia’s Richard Marles; and the

Committee of the Red Cross, NATO, the Pacific Fusion

Netherlands’ Kajsa Ollongren. At a time of rising inter-

Centre, the United Nations

est in the security of the Pacific, the Dialogue this year

and the Five Power

Defence Arrangements represented this year.

was pleased to have especially strong representation

Strong levels of participation from regional

from smaller island nations around the Asia-Pacific,

defence ministers were well received in this year’s

including Maldives’ Defence Minister Mariya Ahmed

Dialogue. The continued participation of both China

Didi; Inia Batikoto Seruiratu, Fiji’s Minister for

and the US was especially welcome. The US defence

Defence, National Security and Policing, as well

secretary has spoken at every SLD since its inception.

as Minister for Rural and Maritime Development

Secretary Austin’s attendance this year demonstrated

and Disaster Management; and Anthony Veke, the

continued US commitment both to the region in gen-

Solomon Islands’ Minister of Police, National Security

eral and the SLD process in particular. Meanwhile,

and Correctional Services.

China first sent official representation to the Dialogue

Defence ministers and senior military leaders

in 2007, and in recent years, including 2019, had

around the region have long used the SLD as a venue

sent a delegation led by Minister of National

for private bilateral, trilateral and multilateral meet-

Defence Wei, who is also state councillor. General

ings. In 2022, the Dialogue hosted many hundreds of

Wei’s role this year leading China’s delegation

such gatherings in the Shangri-La Hotel, more than one

and speaking in the fifth plenary session demon-

hundred of which were directly facilitated by the IISS

strated Beijing’s continued willingness to engage at

itself. The details of these meetings remain confidential.

10

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Nevertheless, many of the meetings do often become

gender balance amongst the experts and researchers

public, like the one between the US and China. Various

we invited as delegates was 45% female and 55% male,

other significant meetings occurred during this year’s

while the delegate composition of SEAYLP was split

Dialogue, including China’s meeting with defence

almost exactly 50/50 between the two genders.

ministers from attending ASEAN nations. Australia’s Marles also met with his French counterpart Lecornu, the first time the two nations had met at that level

LOOKING FORWARD

since disagreements over Australia’s decision to join

Speaking in the final plenary session of this year’s

AUKUS in September 2021. In addition, Marles met

Shangri-La Dialogue, IISS Director-General and Chief

China’s Wei, restarting a defence dialogue at the min-

Executive Dr John Chipman noted another impor-

isterial level between the two nations after a number of

tant theme of the event: ’Throughout this Shangri-La

years of strained ties.

Dialogue I think every single speaker in their own

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue is primarily a Track-

ways has mentioned the importance of adherence

One meeting where speaking roles are given to

to a rules-based order.’ He added: ‘But there remain

government figures and whose focus remains on facil-

questions still about how to deter their breach, how to

itating intergovernmental diplomacy. Nonetheless the

defend against their rupture and how to reverse the

Dialogue also brings together a large number of high-

effect of their sometimes-savage violation?’ The IISS

level non-government participants, including senior

looks forward to discussing these and other ques-

business figures, leading regional experts and select

tions as we move forward rapidly to organise the 20th

media commentators. This year, in particular, we

Shangri-La Dialogue, which will be held in Singapore

welcomed more than 90 expert delegates drawn from

from 2–4 June 2023. In preparation, from 15–17

mostly the academic and think-tank communities, as

January 2023, we will also hold the 11th Shangri-La

well as 22 media delegates. Elsewhere, the SLD played

Dialogue Sherpa Meeting, which will convene in

host to 200 further members of the media represent-

Singapore senior defence officials and military offi-

ing 60 news organisations from across the world.

cers from participant countries to discuss the region’s

Overall, the delegate male-to-female ratio at this year’s

developing security issues and shape the agenda for

Dialogue was around three to one. However, the

the next Dialogue.

Introduction

11

12

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

CHAPTER 1

19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

KEYNOTE ADDRESS Friday 10 June 2022, 20:00 SPEAKER Kishida Fumio Prime Minister of Japan

Keynote address

Introducing the keynote address, IISS Director-Gen-

China Sea. Other challenges include maintaining peace

eral and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman noted that

and stability across the Taiwan Strait; North Korea’s

Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida Fumio could speak

nuclear and missile activities in violation of UN Secu-

with ‘unique authority’ on the links between European

rity Council resolutions; and the ‘abductions issue’.

and Asian security given his ‘long period of success’ as

Noting that Japan is the world’s third-largest

foreign minister. As prime minister, Kishida has been

economy and has ‘consistently’ sought to foster peace

‘especially active on questions of international rela-

and prosperity in the region since 1945, Kishida said

tions and strategy’.

that it has a heavy responsibility. Japan should focus

Opening his address, the prime minister said that

on upholding ‘universal values’, and he is committed

he wanted to share his view of ‘the current severe situ-

to ‘realism diplomacy’ based on pragmatism. Japan

ation facing the international community’, which is

would be ‘more proactive than ever’ in the face of

standing ‘at a historic crossroads’, the most important

international challenges. Specifically, the prime min-

since the end of the Cold War. Kishida noted that the

ister said he would ‘advance the Kishida vision for

COVID-19 pandemic has produced a ‘more uncer-

peace’ and strengthen Japan’s regional diplomatic and

tain’ world. Russia’s ‘aggression against Ukraine’, he

security role through five ‘pillars’.

said, is shaking ‘the very foundations’ of international

Addressing the first of these, Kishida said it is

order. In the South China Sea, there is no compliance

imperative to ‘press forward in maintaining and

with international law, while ‘unilateral attempts to

strengthening the rules-based free and open inter-

change the status quo by force’ continue in the East

national order’ based on the rule of law, peaceful

Dr John Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

14

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Kishida Fumio, Prime Minister, Japan

resolution of disputes, non-use of force and respect for

through large-scale infrastructure assistance and

sovereignty. He highlighted freedom of navigation,

investment. Japan is ‘beefing up’ its diplomacy in

free trade, respect for human rights and democratic

support of enhanced FOIP cooperation, notably

political systems as important components of such

through increased official development assistance.

an order. Japan, Kishida stressed, promotes the Free

Kishida said he would set out a FOIP ‘plan for

and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) idea which has gained

peace’ by early 2023, including providing patrol

‘broad support’ internationally. The prime minister

vessels and enhancing maritime law-enforcement

mentioned that the US, Australia, India, the Euro-

capabilities as well as cyber and other initiatives.

pean Union and several European states all share ‘a

Japan, he revealed, is using advanced technologies to

common grand vision’ of FOIP.

strengthen its maritime-security efforts. Over the next

Stressing that collaboration with ASEAN – with its

three years, it would boost the maritime law-enforce-

own Outlook on the Indo-Pacific vision – is ‘absolutely

ment capabilities of ‘at least 20 countries’. This would

essential’, Kishida mentioned his visits since becoming

include providing patrol vessels and developing mari-

prime minister to several Southeast Asian countries

time-transport infrastructure.

and his wish to ‘deepen discussions’ with them on

The second pillar of the prime minister’s vision

ensuring regional peace and prosperity. Pacific Island

focuses on enhancing security. Kishida said that

countries are also important, he said, as parties in real-

‘Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow’. Japan is

ising FOIP. Japan would assist them in addressing the

united with the international community in impos-

‘existential challenge of climate change’ as part of its

ing sanctions on Russia while supporting Ukraine.

contribution to their ‘sustainable and resilient eco-

He said he would seek ‘a stable international order’

nomic development’.

through ‘dialogue, not confrontation’, while enhanc-

Kishida emphasised FOIP cooperation being

ing Japan’s ‘deterrence and response capabilities’.

built on ‘long-standing trust’ and not limited to

Kishida’s government would set out a new national-

infrastructure construction – it also focuses on

security strategy by the end of 2022 with the intention

developing human resources, promoting ‘autono-

of fundamentally reinforcing Japan’s defence capabili-

mous and inclusive development’ and fostering

ties and substantially increasing the defence budget.

inclusivity. The Quad – involving Australia, India,

No defence options, including ‘counter-strike capabili-

the US as well as Japan – is also promoting FOIP

ties’, would be ruled out.

Keynote address

15

Kishida then emphasised the importance of ‘mul-

Ban Treaty and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and to

tilayered security cooperation’. The Japan–US alliance

maintain and strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty

is the ‘linchpin’, said Kishida, adding that when US

(NPT). Japan would work to ensure a substantial out-

President Joe Biden visited Japan in May 2022, Wash-

come to the NPT Review Conference in August 2022. It

ington and Tokyo fully agreed on expanding and

would also establish a Group of Eminent Persons for a

deepening bilateral security and defence coopera-

World without Nuclear Weapons, which would meet

tion. Kishida asserted that the Japan–US alliance has

in Hiroshima during 2022. Regarding North Korea,

become the cornerstone of peace and stability in not

Kishida underscored Japan’s resolve to work closely

only the Indo-Pacific but also ‘the entire world’. Japan

with the US and the Republic of Korea towards com-

would also promote security cooperation with Aus-

plete denuclearisation.

tralia and ‘other like-minded countries’, he revealed.

Kishida asserted that reform of the United

Kishida noted that he is concluding negotiations

Nations is urgent. Although Russia’s ‘outrageous

with Singapore on a defence-equipment-and-technol-

act’ has caused the UN to face ‘a time of trial’, the

ogy transfer agreement and is continuing efforts to

importance that Japan attaches to the international

establish similar arrangements with other Southeast

body remains unchanged. UN reform would not be

Asian countries. Japan has also signed a Reciprocal

easy, but Japan would lead discussions on strength-

Access Agreement with Australia, agreed in principle

ening UN functions including reform of the Security

another such arrangement with the UK, and would

Council, which it would join (as a non-permanent

seek more with counterparts in Europe and Asia. A

member) in 2023.

Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force flotilla led by

Finally, the prime minister discussed international

a destroyer would begin a regional cruise on 13 June

cooperation in new policy areas, including economic

and exercise with other Indo-Pacific navies.

security. The COVID-19 pandemic and the ‘aggression

Moving on to the third pillar of his ‘vision for

against Ukraine’ have highlighted the need for eco-

peace’, Kishida said that Japan would do its ‘utmost’

nomic resilience. Japan has enacted Economic Security

to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. Noting

Promotion legislation, but international cooperation is

the current discussion about Russia’s potential use of

also ‘essential’, notably through ‘frameworks of like-

such arms and speaking as leader of ‘the only country

minded countries’. Japan’s economic status, Kishida

that has suffered the devastation of atomic bomb-

said, confers responsibilities as well as benefits:

ings’, he said that the ‘threat of nuclear weapons, let

economic cooperation and financing must be ‘charac-

alone the use of them’ should ‘never be tolerated’. The

terised by transparency’.

prime minister said that Russia’s threat of nuclear-

Japan would promote economic cooperation based

weapons use may have seriously damaged the

on human security and ‘respecting the ownership of

non-proliferation regime, possibly provoking further

each country’. ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific region

nuclear proliferation. Japan also has ‘great concerns’

‘must remain the growth engine of the world, and

over another North Korean nuclear test. Meanwhile,

Japan would ‘contribute to building resilient nations’.

a ‘return to compliance’ with the Iran nuclear agree-

Concluding, Kishida stressed that the ‘vision of a

ment has not happened.

rules-based free and open international order’ that he

Even as the path to a nuclear-weapons-free world has become ‘even more challenging’, Kishida said

shared is ‘one in which we all work together’ towards the objective of a ‘future of peace and prosperity’.

Japan would present a roadmap on this issue with greater transparency regarding nuclear forces as the first step. Japan would also encourage dialogue

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

between the US and China on nuclear disarmament

Following Prime Minister Kishida’s address, Yuka

and arms control. He noted the importance to bring

Koshino, IISS Research Fellow for Security and Tech-

back discussions on the Nuclear Comprehensive Test

nology Policy, asked what contemporary ‘realism

16

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Yuka Koshino, IISS Research Fellow for Security and Technology Policy

Lieutenant-General (Retd) He Lei, Chinese People’s Liberation Army

diplomacy’ would be involved in relation to China.

Lieutenant-General (Retd) He Lei from the Chi-

Kishida replied that Japan’s relations with China are

nese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) asked about

important for the region and the international com-

Kishida’s ‘major vision’ for the Sino-Japanese rela-

munity. He said that Japan had asked China to ‘act

tionship. The prime minister replied that the two

responsibly and…build a constructive and stable rela-

countries’ bilateral relationship has a ‘major impact’

tionship’. President Xi Jinping agreed with him that

on global peace and prosperity. There are ‘complex

China and Japan need to ‘work mutually’ to create

issues’ involving the two countries, but he and Xi have

such relations. But Kishida also noted there are ‘many

agreed on developing a ‘constructive and stable rela-

issues pending’, and both sides need to enhance mili-

tionship’. Communication and dialogue need to be

tary transparency to foster trust and confidence.

enhanced at all levels to build trust, Kishida observed.

Keynote address

17

18

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

CHAPTER 2 Next steps for the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy

FIRST PLENARY SESSION Saturday 11 June 2022, 08:35 SPEAKER Lloyd J. Austin III Secretary of Defense, United States

FIRST PLENARY SESSION

Next steps for the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary of Defense, US

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III began by

Austin described US commitment to the security

illustrating that the US is ‘deeply committed’ to help-

and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific as ‘the core organis-

ing the world move past the COVID-19 pandemic

ing principle of American national security policy’. He

globally, highlighting US vaccine contributions of

also stressed that the region is at the ‘heart of Ameri-

more than US$19 billion worldwide since March 2020.

can grand strategy’ as visits from senior American

He further highlighted US commitment to help the

officials, including President Biden, in the previous

Indo-Pacific region ‘heal, recover and rebuild’.

month exemplified. Austin observed that the princi-

Austin drew attention to the inaugural US–ASEAN

ple of the Indo-Pacific as America’s ‘centre of strategic

Special Summit held in Washington the previous

gravity’ would be central to the forthcoming National

month, where US and ASEAN partners declared

Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.

commitments to principles of ‘an open, inclusive and

Austin described the Russian invasion of Ukraine as

rules based regional architecture’. Austin added that

a ‘historic crisis’ that has deep implications for the rules-

Quad leaders importantly echoed these principles two

based international order and state sovereignty. He also

weeks later. He underscored that the challenges the

noted that US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific

region faces – from cyber and nuclear proliferation to

understand the importance of the ‘rules-based inter-

attempts to carve up regional spheres of influence –

national order’, and that smaller states have a ‘right to

require ‘shared responsibility and common action’ to

peacefully resolve disputes with their larger neighbors’

‘uphold international law’, ‘defend global norms’ and

given the amount of security assistance and humanitar-

‘oppose unilateral changes to the status quo’.

ian aid that the Indo-Pacific has ‘rushed’ to Ukraine.

20

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary of Defense, US; and Dr John Chipman, IISS DirectorGeneral and Chief Executive

Austin stressed that the US would stand by its

technology research. In addition, the Indo-Pacific

partners to realise this world view in the Indo-

Economic Framework, recently launched by Presi-

Pacific and strengthen security in the region, with

dent Biden with 12 partners from across the region,

more than 300,000 US military members stationed

was referred to as a medium for developing secure

there. President Biden’s Fiscal Year 2023 included

supply chains for critical technologies.

the ‘largest investments in history to preserve the

Secondly, the numerous bilateral and multilat-

region’s security’, such as US$6.1bn for the Pacific

eral military exercises the US conducts with regional

Deterrence Initiative.

allies were emphasised as key means through which

Austin further sought to emphasise that US secu-

common readiness and deeper interoperability are

rity alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific

fostered, helping to deter aggression. In particular,

constitute a ‘profound source of stability’ and that

Austin shared that these exercises would be expanded

Washington would ‘remain unwavering in its mutual-

to include counter-grey zone operations in coopera-

defence commitments’. While integrated deterrents

tion with the US Coast Guard, while acknowledging

in the region would continue to be focused on ‘proud

the presence of US Coast Guard Commandant Admi-

treaty allies’, the US would also seek closer ties with

ral Linda Fagan at the Shangri-La Dialogue for the

India and increase defence cooperation with partners

first time.

such as Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam. In this

Thirdly, US efforts to deepen and develop inno-

vein, Austin highlighted three ways where the US has

vative means of cooperation with allies to enhance

been working with regional states.

regional security were addressed. Austin’s presence

Firstly, the US has been working with allies to

at the ADMM+ and the Indo-Pacific Partnership for

ensure they have the ‘right capabilities’ to protect

Maritime Domain Awareness were named as relevant

their interests and defend against aggression. This

examples of US efforts in driving new forms of secu-

involves linking US and its allied defence-industrial

rity cooperation in the region.

bases, integrating their supply chains and co-pro-

Austin sought to reassure that the US would

ducing some key technologies. Austin illustrated

stand by its allies in the face of aggression. In reac-

that the US seeks to share research-and-development

tion to the North Korea’s ‘persistent threat’, Austin

advances with allies, citing the AUKUS alliance as

noted that the US and the Republic of Korea will con-

an important example for cooperation in emerging

tinue to strengthen their extended deterrence against

First plenary session

21

nuclear arms and ballistic missiles. Austin stressed

now closed as the result of the Ukraine war. Austin

that the US also stands by its allies in upholding their

answered that while the military could add value to

rights in the face of Chinese coercion over territorial

the situation in the Black Sea, he would always seek

disputes, such as in the South China Sea or at the

a diplomatic solution first, where he saw great effort

Sino-Indian border. Expressing alarm at increasingly

already being invested.

aggressive PLA activity in the region that endan-

Dr Chung Min Lee, IISS Advisory Council Chairman

gers both US and allied forces, Austin identified the

and IISS Trustee, asked what Korea, Japan, Australia and

Taiwan Strait as being an area where ‘the stakes are

New Zealand could do to augment European security

especially stark’.

and vice versa. Austin replied that allies in the Indo-

Austin emphasised that US policy on Taiwan,

Pacific have already been very supportive of the effort

guided by the One China policy and the Taiwan Rela-

in Europe and that there are great lessons to be learnt in

tions Act, remains ‘unchanged and unwavering’. While

terms of future commitments in Europe and Asia.

the US will continue to fulfill its self-defence capabil-

Bonnie Glaser, Director of the Asia Program at

ity commitments to Taiwan and opposes unilateral

the German Marshall Fund, asked what steps the US

changes to the status quo, it does not support Taiwan-

would need to take to bolster deterrence to preserve

ese independence. Stating that Washington does not

peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. To this, Austin

seek confrontation in the region, Austin stated that the

reiterated that the US remains committed to providing

US will do its part to ‘manage tensions responsibly’,

Taiwan with the means to defend itself and high-

including by ensuring ‘fully open lines of communica-

lighted that US policy on Taiwan remains unchanged.

tion’ with the PLA to avoid any miscalculations.

Dr Lynn Kuok, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior

Austin concluded by acknowledging that the

Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security and Co-Editor of the

future of the Indo-Pacific is interconnected and inclu-

Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment, asked whether

sive, with states working together in new and existing

the secretary was concerned that East Asia would also

regional institutions without being forced upon binary

experience war as Ukraine and if so, whether such con-

choices. To achieve this goal, Austin called upon Indo-

cern was due to the general sense that war can occur

Pacific states to work together and demonstrate ‘the

anywhere or due to specific concerns about autocra-

power of partnership’.

cies such as China and Russia. Austin responded that ‘anything is possible’ and reiterated the importance of building the ‘right kinds’ of defence capabilities and

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

adherence to the rules-based international order.

Delegates raised a series of questions ranging from

Franz-Stefan Gady, IISS Research Fellow for

US response to the blockade on Ukraine grain and its

Cyber Power and Future Conflict, asked regarding

possible strategies to increase deterrence in the Taiwan

the types of game-changing technologies that Austin

Strait, to its policy on Taiwan and the development of

had referred to and how these will impact the US force

advanced military technologies.

posture in the region in the near to medium term.

Dr John Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief

Austin declined to go into detail on specific emerging

Executive, asked whether the secretary sees a role for

technologies, but emphasised that the US is commit-

the military in supporting the flow of humanitarian

ted to developing these alongside partners and allies

aid and grain in the Black Sea given that the routes are

to support important military operational concepts.

22

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Dr John Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

Dr Lynn Kuok, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security and Co-Editor of the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment

Dr Chung Min Lee, IISS Advisory Council Chairman and IISS Trustee

Bonnie Glaser, Director, Asia Program, German Marshall Fund

Franz-Stefan Gady, IISS Research Fellow for Cyber Power and Future Conflict

First plenary session

23

24

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

CHAPTER 3 Managing geopolitical competition in a multipolar region

SECOND PLENARY SESSION Saturday 11 June 2022, 09:30 SPEAKERS General (Retd) Prabowo Subianto Minister of Defence, Indonesia Sébastien Lecornu Minister of the Armed Forces, France Kishi Nobuo Minister of Defense, Japan

SECOND PLENARY SESSION

Managing geopolitical competition in a multipolar region General (Retd) Prabowo Subianto, Minister of Defence, Indonesia

General (Retd) Prabowo Subianto, Minister of

Prabowo referenced the situation in Ukraine and

Defence of Indonesia, began his remarks by stress-

stated that the Russian war on Ukraine shows that

ing that Southeast Asia is ‘the most affected by

security and independence should not be taken for

big-power competition’ and that the sub-region has

granted. Thus, he declared Indonesia’s determination

developed over the last 40–50 years its own ‘Asian

to strengthen its defence. Prabowo ended his remarks

way of resolving these challenges’ despite differences

with a forward-looking note that that the Indonesians

and confrontations.

are ‘convinced that wisdom, rationalist, common sense

According to Prabowo, such a way ‘respect[s] all

will prevail’.

the big powers and all the powers that need to have

In his de facto inaugural address to the Indo-

their space, their rights respected’. This includes

Pacific, Sébastien Lecornu, Minster of the Armed

China, which he described as a great power that has

Forces of France, began his speech by stressing that

existed for thousands of years in Asia and that has

‘France is a several-times resident nation in the Pacific’

influenced the societies in the sub-region throughout

and that the France’s interests are closely interlinked

history. Prabowo further stressed Indonesia’s his-

with that of the region. Before diving deeper into the

torical position to be non-aligned militarily. He also

details, he also referred to Russia’s aggression against

remained optimistic about the future that the Indo-

Ukraine, and made clear his views that ‘threats against

nesians are ‘convinced that the leaders of China will

the security of Europe are threats for the rest of the

stand up to their responsibility with wisdom and

world’. Consequently, ‘the security threat elsewhere in

benevolence because it is their philosophical teaching’.

the world continues to be a priority for Europe’.

26

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Sébastien Lecornu, Minster of the Armed Forces, France

According to Lecornu, there are ‘three main stakes

acts of aggression against Ukraine’ as ‘nothing but

in the geopolitical rivalries in the Asia-Pacific area’.

a unilateral change of status quo by force’, ‘a clear

Firstly, the competition between powers is increas-

infringement of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial

ingly becoming diverse and tough with various

integrity’, ‘serious violation of international law and

dimensions — economic, technological and military.

the United Nations Charter’ and a ‘grave breach of

He mentioned that a Taiwan Strait crisis could have

international humanitarian law’ for its mass killing

‘devastating consequences for all, even beyond the

of civilians. After that, he characterised the current

region’. Secondly, collective response mechanisms

geopolitical environment as a ‘competition between

have become fragile and multilateral forums have

countries protecting the rules-based international

been challenged. Thirdly, there are other security

order and those attempting to change it by force’.

challenges that accompany great-power competition

Kishi listed three lessons to be learnt from the

such as fishing, mining, climate change, natural dis-

ongoing war. Firstly, he described as ‘real and present’

asters and the fragility of supply chains.

the security challenges posed by countries that disre-

As a response, Lecornu referred to France’s 2018

gard the rules while possessing nuclear weapons or

Indo-Pacific defence strategy and underscored its per-

developing them. Secondly, he observed the ‘steadfast

manent and significant military assets in the region,

resistance’ from the invaded country and international

including in Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates. The

community’s cooperation could curtail the momen-

minister also pledged that France would continue to

tum of the aggressor. Thirdly, Kishi noted distance

reinforce and modernise in the Indo-Pacific, including

does not undermine collective international efforts. He

the Pacific Islands. In addition, Lecornu stressed that

thus called for the international community to main-

French commitment is cooperative and he reempha-

tain solidarity in their efforts to support Ukraine.

sised French interest to join the ADMM+. He concluded

He further raised several points on the applica-

his speech by reaffirming French position that ‘the

tions of these lessons for the Indo-Pacific region. One

challenges induced by the geopolitical rivalries in a

is the intensifying military activities in East Asia and

multipolar region require an inclusive and multilateral

the western Pacific driven by deepening Sino-Russian

response based first of all on the respect of the law’.

relations. Another is challenges in maritime domain

Kishi Nobuo, Minister of Defense of Japan, started

through use of force, especially in the East and South

his remarks by condemning Russia’s ‘outrageous

China Seas. Kishi also underscored the importance of

Second plenary session

27

Kishi Nobuo, Minister of Defense, Japan

peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait to the stabil-

the Indo-Pacific and the world’. Aaron Connelly, IISS

ity of Japan and the international community. Finally,

Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian Politics and Foreign

he stated that the North Korea’s missile launches are

Policy, asked what Indonesia’s ‘free and active foreign

‘totally unacceptable’.

policy’ looks like at present. Sofie Syarief, a journalist

Kishi raised several ways on how Japan is trying to

and news producer from Kompas TV, asked how Indo-

tackle these challenges as a ‘frontline’ country. One is

nesia will navigate security issues concerning China

to ‘accelerate the fundamental reinforcement of defence

in the South China Sea and in East Asia in light of

capabilities’. Another is to promote the free and open

Jakarta’s growing economic cooperation with Beijing.

Indo-Pacific vision to protect the rules-based order. He

There were also several questions on Europe’s rela-

also underscored the importance of cooperating with

tionship with the Indo-Pacific region. Cui Tiankai,

ASEAN and reminded these countries that ‘collaborat-

former Chinese ambassador to the US, asked if the

ing with countries that ignore the rules can never be

European countries will ‘respect and appreciate the

mutually beneficial’. Kishi ended his remarks by call-

Asian way of solving problems’ rather than imposing

ing for countries to ‘strategically convey the message

‘the NATO way or the European way’. Mentioning the

that they will be working together in solidarity’ and to

absence of the defence ministers from the UK and Ger-

strengthen their defence capabilities against any viola-

many, Rym Momtaz, Senior Correspondent of Politico,

tors of the rules-based international order.

questioned the credibility of Europe’s commitment in the region. Darshana Baruah, Fellow of the South Asia Program of the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

national Peace, asked about the potential return of the

Several delegates asked about Japan’s security per-

trilateral partnership involving India, Australia and

ceptions and plans to ‘drastically reinforce’ Japan’s

France. James Crabtree, IISS–Asia Executive Director,

defense capabilities. More specifically on nuclear chal-

posed a query about the prospects of a rapproche-

lenges, Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow from the

ment between France and Australia. Finally, Natalie

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, asked

Sambhi, Executive Director of Verve Research, asked

Kishi why China would build up its nuclear capability

Prabowo whether he thinks AUKUS and the Quad are

and ‘what the implications are for peace and security in

compatible with the ‘Asian way’.

28

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Rym Momtaz, Senior Correspondent, Politico

Darshana Baruah, IISS Young Leader and Fellow, South Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Kishi made clear his views that countries with nuclear weapons, be it Russia or others, are now

James Crabtree, IISS–Asia Executive Director

Natalie Sambhi, IISS Young Leader and Executive Director, Verve Research

friendly cooperation to resolve differences with neighbouring countries.

‘using them as a form of threat’ and that solid

Lecornu pushed back on Cui’s comment by empha-

coordination among each other to ‘deliver a uni-

sising that France’s regional approaches and interests are

fied message’ is critical. He further highlighted

driven by its own populations in the South Pacific and it

the ‘need to reaffirm the ability to deter the use of

is interested to work with ASEAN’s multilateral forum.

nuclear weapons’. By quoting Nelson Mandela’s

He stressed that challenges in Ukraine will not take

words that ‘your enemy does not necessarily be

Pairs away from important commitments in the region.

my enemy’, Prabowo underscored the importance

Lecornu also asserted France and Australia are long-

of maintaining good relations with neighbouring

time partners and neighbours of the Indo-Pacific region.

counties and ‘all the great powers of the world’

Meanwhile, Prabowo reiterated that countries should

despite differences. He also emphasised the impor-

have their own right to decide their security priorities,

tance of respecting ‘national interests and the

but any alliances should respect the opinions and not

rightful interests’ of China’ as well as the value of

threaten the interests of other countries, such as China.

Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Sofie Syarief, journalist and news producer, Kompas TV

Aaron Connelly, IISS Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian Politics and Foreign Policy

Cui Tiankai, former Chinese ambassador to the US

Second plenary session

29

30

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

CHAPTER 4 Developing new forms of security cooperation

THIRD PLENARY SESSION Saturday 11 June 2022, 11:30 SPEAKERS Dato’ Sri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein Senior Minister of Defence, Malaysia Richard Marles Deputy Prime Minister; Minister for Defence, Australia Dr Khalid bin Mohammad Al Attiyah Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of State for Defence Affairs, Qatar

THIRD PLENARY SESSION

Developing new forms of security cooperation Dato´ Sri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, Senior Minister of Defence, Malaysia

Dato´ Sri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, Malaysia´s

For Hishammuddin, new collective solutions

Senior Minister of Defence, opened the plenary ses-

are required to strengthen the regional architec-

sion by noting that the global COVID-19 pandemic

ture in the face of these challenges. He highlighted

and Russia´s invasion of Ukraine have pushed ´exist-

two main instruments: ´strengthening sub-regional

ing arrangements and partnerships to the limit’,

approaches´ and ´enhancing confidence and trust-

´revealing gaps and vulnerabilities´ that require a

building measures’. In this context, the minister

collective response.

observed that ´as groupings get too large, consensus

In his view, the region faces four common secu-

making to solve real-time issues has been impeded’.

rity challenges: ´an increase in transboundary crime

There is thus value in ´engaging smaller, more tar-

from border re-openings; an upsurge in online disin-

geted groups that share a common threat as well as

formation arising from terror groups and extremists;

a common understanding of the ways and means to

the continued threat of biological warfare; and food

mitigate those challenges’. In his view, these sub-

security that is giving rise to instability worldwide’. In

regional cooperation initiatives laid the foundations

particular, food security is emerging as a major security

of wider security cooperation.

challenge, and it is exacerbated by the Ukraine–Russia

The minister referred to the Trilateral Cooperation

war. The minister warned that a ´combination of

Arrangement Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philip-

unhappiness from two years of the pandemic and

pines forged in 2016, and noted that these nations

rising food prices´ may generate a ´wave of political

have agreed to incorporate Brunei into this group,

instability´ in Southeast Asian countries.

forming a ´sub-regional quad´. Hishammuddin also

32

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Richard Marles, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, Australia

mentioned that the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP)

for ASEAN´s outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Marles prom-

between Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thai-

ised a ´renewed focus on climate change’, pointing out

land to secure the strategic and economically crucial

that the ocean is being transformed into ´a source of

waterway is a good example for such arrangements.

anxiety and threat’.

He announced that these four nations have agreed to

Turning to Australia´s complex relations with

elevate the MSP to a ministerial dialogue to further

China, Marles stated that Canberra values a ´produc-

strengthen cooperation.

tive relationship´ with Beijing. But he also noted that

Richard Marles, Australia´s Deputy Prime Min-

Australia wants to see a region ´where the sover-

ister and Minister for Defence, opened his remarks

eignty of all nations, large and small, is preserved, and

by outlining the contours of his new government´s

where the rule of law, not the rule of power, governs

regional security and defence policy. Stressing that

conduct between states’. He further emphasised the

Australia would take its place in the world ´with con-

responsibility for China to manage its rise, includ-

fidence’, he announced that under the leadership of

ing alleviating regional concerns regarding Beijing’s

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Australia would

military build-up which could trigger neighbouring

become a ´more engaged and responsive partner´ to

countries to seek to upgrade their defence capabili-

its Pacific neighbours. A ´new era of engagement with

ties. Moreover, the minister pointed out that the fact

the Pacific´ would be based on the notion that ´Pacific

that China has not made clear that it does not support

security challenges need Pacific security solutions´. In

Russia´s invasion of Ukraine should ´give us cause for

this context, Marles announced the establishment of an

concern, especially given the investments it is making

‘Australian Pacific Defence School´ to train the Pacific

now in its military power’.

Island defence and security forces, fulfilling a pledge

Marles called for ´reassuring statecraft´ as an

made during the election campaign. In his speech, he

essential ingredient to instil confidence that global

also promised increased support for Canberra´s Pacific

rules apply everywhere, including in the South China

Maritime Security Programme.

Sea. Reassuring statecraft is also needed to ensure

In addition, Marles pledged to ´revitalise´ Australia´s

peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, as well as

engagement with Southeast Asia. This would include

bringing about better relations between Australia and

even closer military ties with countries in the region, the

China. Marles pointed out that Australia´s military

appointment of an ASEAN special envoy and support

alliance with the US has ´never been more important´

Third plenary session

33

Dr Khalid Bin Mohammad Al Attiyah, Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of State for Defence Affairs, Qatar

for his country and that US engagement has ´never

border with a ´360-degree´ focus on security, coupled

been more important to the stability and prosperity of

with advancing traditional forms of security coop-

the Indo-Pacific’.

eration with allies and partners. The minister cited

Finally, the minister used his remarks to confirm

intelligence sharing, interoperability, peacekeeping

that there would be no cuts to Australia’s defence

initiatives, on top of training and education as areas for

spending, but that the Albanese government would

such cooperation. Internationally, Dr Attiyah stressed

continue the course to enhancing the Australian

the need to expand and fortify global platforms that

Defence Force with capabilities such as long-range

are designed to lead to global economic, political and

and precision-strike weapons, offensive and defen-

social reform and advancement. He ended his remarks

sive cyber as well as area-denial systems. Marles also

by pointing out that for ´security to be sustainable and

stressed that the AUKUS agreement would be ´central´

resilient, it must be inclusive’.

to deliver Australia´s nuclear-powered submarines and other advanced capabilities. Moreover, Australia would further seek to strengthen defence cooperation

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

with Japan and India.

Delegates asked a variety of questions ranging from

Dr Khalid Bin Mohammad Al Attiyah, Qatar’s

the potential for security minilateralism, the role of

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for

AUKUS in regional security, to greater security inte-

Defence Affairs, welcomed this year´s Shangri-La

gration between the Middle East and Asia. Anton

Dialogue as a significant opportunity to promote

La Guardia, Diplomatic Editor at The Economist,

face-to-face diplomacy as a means to resolve pressing

asked Hishammuddin whether his promotion of

security challenges. In his view, the search for new

minilateralism is compatible with other minilateral

forms of security cooperation has to be driven by the

arrangements in Asia. Major-General (Retd) Zhao

objective ´to unite and a protective approach to secu-

Wenhua, Dean of China’s National Defense Univer-

rity through collective strength building, aimed at

sity, asked Marles if AUKUS is a ´mini-NATO or an

bettering and advancing security rather than limiting

Asia-Pacific version of NATO’. Sebastien Falletti,

and deterring others’ security’.

China Correspondent at Le Figaro asked about the

Qatar´s approach to security focuses on building

potential for resuming Australia´s cooperation with

well-trained and equipped forces ready to protect its

France in the Pacific and in the security field. Camille

34

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Anton La Guardia, Diplomatic Editor, The Economist

Major-General (Retd) Zhao Wenhua, Dean, China’s National Defense University

Sebastien Falletti, China Correspondent, Le Figaro

Lons, Research Associate at IISS–Middle East, asked

alism and minilateralism are not exclusive and that

Dr Attiyah whether energy interdependence would

one could have both. He also urged countries to be

lead to greater political and security integration

´creative enough to be able to look at a situation where

between the Middle East and Asia.

there’s a common threat, of sharing of a common

In his response, Marles stated that AUKUS is not

sea, with a common aim to establish something more

a mini-NATO nor an alliance, but it is principally

constructive without disturbing what we have

about developing joint capability between Australia,

inherited’. On the issue of greater security coopera-

the UK and the US. He also confirmed that Austra-

tion between Asia and the Middle East, Dr Attiyah

lia is seeking to ´revitalise, reset, reinvigorate´ its

stated that Qatar is open to being used as a ´bridge´

relationship with France to meet common security

to close the gap in perceptions between countries of

challenges. Hishammuddin argued that multilater-

these two regions.

Third plenary session

35

36

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

CHAPTER 5 Military modernisation and new defence capabilities

FOURTH PLENARY SESSION Saturday 11 June 2022, 14:45 SPEAKERS Delfin Lorenzana Secretary of National Defense, Philippines General Tea Banh

Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of National Defence, Cambodia General Phan Văn Giang Minister of National Defence, Vietnam

FOURTH PLENARY SESSION

Military modernisation and new defence capabilities Delfin Lorenzana, thensecretary of national defense, Philippines

Delfin Lorenzana, then-secretary of national defense

He reminded the audience that defence mod-

of the Philippines, opened the session by arguing that

ernisation will likely divert resources from other

Asia-Pacific countries are operating in the context of

government priorities such as social welfare or

major-power geopolitical competition. He suggested

economic development, but also pointed out that

defence modernisation is a response to changes in

technological advancement could reduce the cost of

the international security environment. While sin-

defence modernisation. As such, the Philippines is

gling out deterrence as the primary goal for defence

seeking to encourage technology transfer through co-

modernisation, Lorenzana stressed that for the Phil-

production or counter-trade. Lorenzana encouraged

ippines, improved military capabilities could also

delegates to consider defence modernisation not just

contribute to humanitarian-assistance and disaster-

in terms of equipment and acquisitions, but to also to

response tasks.

focus on personnel and leadership, as well as on doc-

He pointed to technologies like artificial intelligence,

trine and organisational reform.

fifth-generation telecommunication technologies and

General Tea Banh, Deputy Prime Minister and

quantum computing as changing the character of

Minister of National Defence of Cambodia, began his

warfare, for example by enabling grey-zone strate-

remarks by cautioning that in the context of major-

gies. Given the potential impact of some of these

power rivalries and changes in global and regional

technologies on armed conflict, Lorenzana underlined

order, the formation of new regional alliances should

the importance of international efforts to regulate

not be directed at undermining the interests of others.

their application.

He nevertheless stressed that defence modernisation

38

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

General Tea Banh, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence, Cambodia

and defence capacity building are requirements for

been emerging, traditional issues are still present and

every nation seeking to adapt and prepare for a chang-

have become ‘more complicated’. He thus deemed

ing international security environment.

that bolstering national defence capabilities is ‘truly

Tea Banh argued that while the ability to defend sov-

an indispensable, objective demand’ for all countries.

ereignty and territorial integrity is most important, the

The minister encouraged delegates to look beyond the

capability to support counter-terrorism, maritime secu-

purchase and production of platforms when debating

rity, disaster relief and UN peacekeeping operations

defence modernisation and pointed out five themes

matters too. Clarifying that Cambodia does not support

which are guiding Vietnam’s effort in this regard.

the application of sanctions as ‘it is not the right option

Firstly, General Phang emphasised the principle

to solve the problem’, the minister suggested Cambodia

of ‘men before arms’ and suggested the need to build

would use its 2022 chairmanship of the ASEAN Defence

armed forces around loyal and capable personnel. Sec-

Ministers’ Meeting to focus on dialogue and practical

ondly, he noted the importance of organisational reform

cooperation on regional security challenges.

to create defence structures across permanent forces

Referencing Cambodia’s Defence White Paper

and reserve forces that are ‘lean, neat and strong’. The

released in May 2022, Tea Banh stressed the expansion

third element in Vietnam’s military modernisation is a

of peacekeeping capability and defence modernisation

focus on developing doctrine suitable for contemporary

as military-reform priorities. In this context, the minis-

warfare accounting for technological developments.

ter spoke about the modernisation of Ream Naval Base,

The fourth factor, General Phang said, is the devel-

arguing that it does not pose a threat to the security of

opment of a more self-reliant defence industry, and

any nation. Tea Banh also stressed that the constitution

this is a goal dependent on international cooperation

of the Kingdom of Cambodia does not allow for foreign

with partners. Defence industrial development would

bases on its territory. However, he noted that Cambodia

not only support defence modernisation but also socio-

‘reserves the right to receive foreign assistance in vari-

economic development. Finally, the minister noted

ous forms’ to ‘self-defend and ensure public order and

‘modernising weapons and military equipment’ as the

security within its territories’.

fifth element. He concluded by arguing that transpar-

General Phan Văn Giang, Minister of National

ency surrounding defence modernisation plans in the

Defence of Vietnam, began by pointing out that while

region is important to avoid misunderstanding and

numerous non-traditional security challenges have

the loss of trust among nations.

Fourth plenary session

39

General Phan Văn Giang, Minister of National Defence, Vietnam

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

latter’s invasion of Ukraine. Greg Austin, IISS Senior

The session sparked wide-ranging questions from the

Fellow for Cyber Power and Future Conflict, asked for

delegates centred most around Vietnam and Cambo-

Vietnam’s view of the global landscape in cyberspace

dia. Aaron Connelly, IISS Senior Fellow for Southeast

and where Vietnam would be looking to build part-

Asian Politics and Foreign Policy, asked General

nerships in cyberspace policy for the armed forces.

Phang about the lessons he learnt from his service on

Sui-Lee Wee, Southeast Asia Bureau Chief for

Vietnam’s northern border with China. Bich Tran,

the New York Times, asked Tea Banh to elaborate on

Adjunct Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and Interna-

the arrangements Cambodia has with China for the

tional Studies (CSIS) and PhD scholar at the University

development of Ream Naval Base. Blake Herzinger,

of Antwerp, asked General Phang whether there is a

Non-Resident Fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, sought

more urgent need for Vietnam to diversify its arms-

to clarify on the kinds of operations the People’s

supply relationships away from Russia given the

Liberation Army Navy would conduct from Ream

Aaron Connelly, IISS Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian Politics and Foreign Policy

Greg Austin, IISS Senior Fellow for Cyber Power and Future Conflict

40

Bich Tran, IISS Young Leader; Adjunct Fellow, CSIS; and PhD scholar, University of Antwerp

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Sui-Lee Wee, Southeast Asia Bureau Chief, New York Times

Blake Herzinger, Non-Resident Fellow, Pacific Forum CSIS

May-Britt Stumbaum, Team Leader of Asia-Pacific Security, Bundeswehr University Munich

Chansambath Bong, IISS Young James Hackett, Editor of The Military Leader and Deputy Director, the Balance and IISS Senior Fellow for Centre for Inclusive Digital Economy Defence and Military Analysis of the Asian Vision Institute

Naval Base. In the same vein, May-Britt Stumbaum,

General Tea Banh addressed questions by stress-

Team Leader of Asia-Pacific Security at Bundeswehr

ing that Cambodia needs the capability to protect

University Munich, wondered whether foreign

its maritime sovereignty and that the modernisation

investments in port facilities would create tensions or

of Ream Naval Base seeks to support this goal. Spe-

improve security, given the likely dual-use nature of

cifically, the pier, dry dock and repair facilities will

the port.

be upgraded and there will be work undertaken to

Continuing the focus on Cambodia, Chans-

enable the base to receive larger vessels. For these

ambath Bong, Deputy Director at the Centre for

purposes, the minister said, Cambodia has received

Inclusive Digital Economy of the Asian Vision Insti-

grant aid from China. Tea Banh also suggested that

tute, asked General Tea Banh whether Cambodia’s

ships from any country would be able to access Cam-

recent efforts to recruit personnel to strengthen mis-

bodian facilities for emergency repairs. The minister

sile-defence capabilities were a response to regional

denied that China would have exclusive access to

developments or part of a long-term defence mod-

the base. As for recruitment activities, Tea Banh

ernisation agenda. James Hackett, Editor of The

suggested they are driven by the requirements of

Military Balance and IISS Senior Fellow for Defence

Cambodia’s defence ministry.

and Military Analysis, asked General Tea Banh to

Lorenzana, in his response, said that for regional

outline other measures for defence transparency and

countries, dealing with the increasing competi-

confidence building, beyond the release of defence

tion between major powers is like ‘walking on a

white papers.

tightrope’, and dialogue is a key ingredient to find-

General Phang responded by arguing that Viet-

ing a modus vivendi. On the issue of diversifying

nam’s efforts to strengthen its own defence industrial

arms-supply

relationships,

Lorenzana

capacities would reduce the country’s dependency on

out that there is now a greater number of poten-

international suppliers in the long run. He also under-

tial suppliers to choose from, which could lead

lined the need for dialogue to resolve disputes with

to better value for money for importers. He consid-

near neighbours and suggested that Vietnam is look-

ered the interoperability challenges that might arise

ing at cyberspace as both a defence issue and one of

from buying equipment from a variety of sources

economic development.

as manageable.

Fourth plenary session

pointed

41

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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

CHAPTER 6

19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

SPECIAL ADDRESS Saturday 11 June 2022, 16:00 SPEAKER Volodymyr Zelenskyy President of Ukraine

Special address

The IISS broke from its longstanding rule of no virtual

the world need, and the impossible for which Russia

presentations at its in-person dialogues for a special

is so desperately fighting’.

address by Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelen-

Zelenskyy said that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine’s

skyy. Introducing the speaker, IISS Director-General

territory has undermined confidence in ‘basic free-

and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman noted that

dom for peace and prosperity in every corner of our

‘a hot head and cold heart lead to bad strategy’,

planet’. He also noted that Russia’s blockade has

and in turn described Zelenskyy’s brand of stra-

transformed the Black Sea into ‘the most perilous sea

tegic leadership as a combination of a ‘cool head

in the world’, making freedom of navigation impossi-

and warm heart’. Though the war in Ukraine might

ble. He expressed confidence that the global audience

appear distant from the Indo-Pacific region, ‘its

has the same interests in preserving freedom and inde-

effects are now global’.

pendence in their respective countries as Ukrainians

Zelenskyy opened his address by highlighting

are currently defending theirs.

the story of a young Singaporean designer who

Zelenskyy dismissed Russia’s framing of the

sent him a t-shirt as part of her initiative to support

war with regard to NATO and the United States as

Ukraine. Zelenskyy used the shirt to demonstrate

‘assiduous’ propaganda. He said that ‘Russian lead-

both the support Ukraine has received globally

ership strives to discard all the achievements of the

and Ukraine’s positive response to this support. He

historical development of humankind’. He warned

described the present conflict as ‘the confrontation

of the erosion of international law, quoting Singa-

between the possible, which we and many people in

pore’s first prime minister Lee Kuan Yew, who once

Dr John Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

44

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President, Ukraine

said that ‘if big fish ate small fish and small fish ate

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

shrimp, we would not exist’. Zelenskyy stressed that

Dr Maria Shagina, IISS Diamond-Brown Research

‘we must value what has become possible, thanks

Fellow for Economic Sanctions, Standards and Strategy,

to wise leadership in the past, thanks to the strug-

opened by thanking the president in the Ukrainian lan-

gle of many generations’. He characterised Russia

guage. She then asked regarding the best strategy for an

as ‘trying to bring the world back to the old times’

international response to the global food-security crisis,

before international law.

and the kind of security guarantees Ukraine would wel-

Zelenskyy called for further measures to ‘break

come. Zelenskyy replied that Russia’s blockade of the

the ability of Russia’ to carry out the maritime block-

Black and Azov Seas violates international law as it is

ade so that Moscow will understand ‘its belligerent

obstructing food exports to vital destinations. Ukraine

policies will have consequences’. He warned that

is ‘ready to communicate with the civilised world’ and

without further action, the world would face food

supports ‘a safe transport corridor’ to export grain,

shortages and famine, which could lead to politi-

comprising ships from Ukraine’s partners.

cal chaos in many countries. Zelenskyy also called

In relation to a Russian sea corridor, he said that

for ‘concerted’ action to hold Russia accountable

‘we do not believe Russia’, and noted options for rail

for its killings, torture, deportations, destruction of

transportation through the Baltic states and Poland.

cities, use of prohibited weapons, as well as threats

Zelenskyy said that Russia is repeating its playbook of

of using chemical and nuclear weapons. As the UN

blocking a key resource to cause prices to skyrocket,

system in its current form ‘does not give equitable

and then positioning itself as ‘a saviour’.

representation’, Zelenskyy urged reforms that would

Regarding security guarantees, Zelenskyy said that

strengthen the international body’s ability to respond

Ukraine is in negotiations with partner countries and

to violations of international law.

the G7. He said that the agreement under discussion

In closing, Zelenskyy expressed gratitude for sup-

‘will set out the details to make sure that our people are

port to Ukraine, but noted that ‘our and your future(s)’

not afraid of living in Ukraine, and to ensure that we are

are linked. Rejecting ‘right of might’, he concluded

able to build a progressive system of security’. He added

that ‘it is on the battlefield in Ukraine that the future

that this system could be a model for other countries.

rules of this world are being decided along with the boundaries of the possible’.

Josh Rogin, a Washington Post columnist, referred to Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s statement

Special address

45

Dr Maria Shagina, IISS Diamond-Brown Research Fellow for Economic Sanctions, Standards and Strategy

Josh Rogin, Columnist, Washington Post

Matthias Gebauer, Chief Reporter, Der Spiegel

in the keynote address that ‘Ukraine today could be

Matthias Gebauer, Chief Reporter at Der Spiegel,

East Asia tomorrow’. He asked how Taiwan might

asked about the risks of overly provoking Russia, as

stand up to China as it pursues control ‘in the Rus-

raised by French President Emmanuel Macron, and

sian mould’. Zelenskyy replied that ‘today’s example

whether this has affected the resolve of Zelenskyy and

of Ukraine is the example for the whole world’. He

Ukraine’s fighting forces. Zelenskyy responded that

said he supports ‘any action’ that forestalls war, stat-

going too far would mean an incursion into Russian

ing that war does not benefit anyone, except for certain

territory, which Ukraine has no intentions to do, since

political leaders who ‘keep growing their appetites

it respects sovereignty and territorial integrity.

and their ambitions’. According to him, the world currently ‘enables’ such leaders.

He also urged the audience to remember that Ukraine is pressuring Russia because ‘this is the war

Zelenskyy also called for a diplomatic resolution

on our soil’. Sanctions and deliberations had been

so that countries in need of help would not be left ‘at

needed ‘before the full-blown war started’ and ‘now,

the mercy’ of another, more powerful country. He

there is no grey zone’. He said that ‘Russian leadership

encouraged diplomatic measures to come pre-emp-

cannot be comforted any longer. It is too late.’ Con-

tively, before hostilities break out and lives are lost,

cluding his speech, Zelenskyy argued that ‘the whole

and reminded the audience of the broad impacts of a

world must put the Russian leadership in place, and

refugee crisis.

their place is on their territory’.

46

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

CHAPTER 7

19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSIONS Saturday 11 June 2022 SPECIAL SESSION 1 Climate security and green defence SPECIAL SESSION 2 Myanmar: Finding a way forward SPECIAL SESSION 3 Maritime security: From codes of conduct to crisis communication

SPECIAL SESSION 1

Climate security and green defence

IISS CHAIR

Opening the special session, Mariya Ahmed Didi

Dr Lynn Kuok

explained that there is undeniable evidence from global

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-

conflict zones indicating that climate change is a major

Pacific Security and Co-Editor of the Asia-Pacific

driver of violence and conflict. Climate security is an

Regional Security Assessment

area where the stakes for Maldives are high: 99.7% of the country is the sea and most of its islands rise barely

OPENING REMARKS

three feet above the sea level. Didi added that a closer

Mariya Ahmed Didi

alignment of climate advocacy and defence diplomacy

Minister of Defence, Republic of the Maldives

is needed. She recommended nations that are increasing defence expenditure to ensure their new investments

Peeni Henare Minister of Defence, New Zealand

reduce carbon emissions.

Peeni Henare noted that the effects of climate change

Dr Tobias Lindner Minister of State, Federal Foreign Office, Germany, Admiral Sir Ben Kay First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Navy, UK

are being felt both in New Zealand and its southwest Pacific neighbours. He referenced the New Zealand Defence Force’s (NZDF) valuable role in disaster response and recovery, including in aerial-surveillance and engineering capabilities. The NZDF’s four-pillar approach to climate security involves: respond, adapt, mitigate and engage. Carbon neutrality, Henare stated, is a goal the NZDF is working towards. This will involve reducing emissions of military vehicles, ships

48

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Mariya Ahmed Didi, Minister of Defence, Republic of the Maldives

Peeni Henare, Minister of Defence, New Zealand

Dr Tobias Lindner, Minister of State, Federal Foreign Office, Germany,

Admiral Sir Ben Kay, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Navy, UK

and aircraft. The minister also stressed the importance

a business case for armed forces to move towards low-

of partnerships with other militaries and countries.

carbon technologies in line with commercial trends.

Dr Tobias Lindner shared that Germany and the EU

Finally, Admiral Kay argued for an operational case

have been intensifying political cooperation with Indo-

for green technology that reduces logistic require-

Pacific countries to help mitigate the effects of climate

ments and dependencies, thus increasing operational

change and increase regional resilience. He also under-

range and security.

scored that support and cooperation must not create

There was a wide-ranging discussion between

political or economic dependencies. Referencing ‘hard

panellists and audience. Topics raised included the

lessons’ learnt from the Ukraine war due to dependency

potential role of the UN Security Council and EU, incor-

on Russian oil and gas, Lindner stated that energy transi-

porating climate security in national security policies,

tion to fossil-free energy has become a ‘cornerstone’ of

the need for more transparency of carbon emissions

Germany’s security policy.

and for better articulation of the business case for green

Admiral Sir Ben Kay saw climate change as an

transition by the military. Some panellists felt that the

’existential threat to all of mankind’ that exceeds

requirement to incorporate new technologies should

the gravity of any conflicts or crises we are facing.

see equipment having shorter life cycles, but the major-

He deemed the legally binding goal set by the UK

ity opinion was that major platforms should have longer

military to achieve net zero by 2050 not only a moral

length of service, providing opportunities to apply new

requirement, but also a reputational one. There is also

technology during major updates.

Special session 1

49

SPECIAL SESSION 2

Myanmar: Finding a way forward

CHAIR

Dr Noeleen Heyzer described the worsening situation

Aaron Connelly

in Myanmar as a combination of political crisis with a

IISS Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian Politics and

‘multidimensional crisis of collapsing state institutions’

Foreign Policy

and highlighted the dire need for humanitarian aid.

She observed that the positions of conflicting parties

OPENING REMARKS

have ‘hardened’ and highlighted the lack of a ‘miss-

Dr Noeleen Heyzer

ing middle’ to resolve the crisis. Besides calling for a

Special Envoy of the Secretary General on Myanmar,

regional solution including and beyond ASEAN mem-

United Nations

bers and more strategic support from the international

Dato’ Sri Saifuddin Abdullah Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia Pornpimol Kanchanalak Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Special

community, she emphasised the need for a Myanmarled process reflecting the will of its people and for building resilience at the local level.

Dato’ Sri Saifuddin Abdullah echoed Dr Heyzer’s

Representative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on

observation of the worsening crisis in Myanmar. He

Myanmar, Thailand

stressed that Malaysia does not recognise the junta government, but would engage them as needed. He

Derek Chollet Counselor, US Department of State

also noted the National Unity Government (NUG) and other resistance groups are important stakeholders to be engaged with informally. Acknowledging that the Five-Point Consensus have not achieved much progress, Saifuddin called for a more detailed roadmap of

50

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Dr Noeleen Heyzer, Special Envoy of the Secretary General on Myanmar, United Nations

Dato’ Sri Saifuddin Abdullah, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia

Pornpimol Kanchanalak, Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Special Representative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on Myanmar, Thailand

Derek Chollet, Counselor, US Department of State

the consensus that includes listing the timeframe and

movement and delivering humanitarian assistance

specific stakeholders.

directly to the local civilians in coordination with allies

Pornpimol Kanchanalak noted that ‘condem-

and partners. Unlike Pornpimol, Chollet opined that

nations, sanction, ostracisation as well as punitive

the 2023 elections should be not endorsed given the

measures have reached diminishing return’ and

unlikelihood of the election being free and fair.

emphasised that roadmap and modus operandi must

In response to the question posed regarding pos-

be set out for Myanmar to return to normalcy. Hence,

sible ways to increase pressure on the junta regime,

she opined that the new election slated by the Five-

Chollet responded that the US has called for an arms

Point Road Map to be held in August 2023 should

embargo but is not considering supplying weapons

be taken at ‘face value’ to move the peace process

to the NUG. Saifuddin proposed that another way is

forward, despite concerns about its validity and prac-

to talk to parties that the junta would want to listen,

ticality. Pornpimol also stressed the importance of the

including dialogue partners of ASEAN. The panellists

international community to bring all stakeholders to

also discussed the future role of the military, given that

the dialogue table.

it has lost most of the popular support in the country.

Derek Chollet stated that the US’ overall goal is

While both Heyzer and Pornpimol acknowledged the

to foster the conditions that would end the crisis and

need to engage the military, Heyzer noted signs of

help Myanmar move towards an inclusive, multiparty

local democracies forming on the ground. Moe Thuzar

democracy. He noted that US efforts include intensify-

from the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute also provided a

ing economic and political pressure on the junta regime

Myanmar perspective of crisis, including the role and

through sanctions, supporting the pro-democracy

reach of the military.

Special session 2

51

SPECIAL SESSION 3

Maritime security: From codes of conduct to crisis communication

CHAIR

Vice Admiral Biswajit Dasgupta kicked off the discus-

Dr Euan Graham

sion by observing that the UN Convention on the Law of

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-

the Sea is the foundation of the rules-based international

Pacific Security

order at sea. However, he said disputes, differences of interpretation and miscalculation can lead to crisis. While

OPENING REMARKS

multiple channels of communication exist, the onus is on

Vice Admiral Biswajit Dasgupta

the parties to disputes themselves to identify the best and

Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Naval

quickest means to reduce risk. Governments also need to

Command, India

work out crisis-communications strategies.

Alice Guitton

Alice Guitton underscored the fact that the issues at

Director General, International Relations and

sea are global because the maritime domain is intercon-

Strategy, Ministry of the Armed Forces, France

nected but also fragile, in part due to climate change.

Rear Admiral Aaron Beng,

Hybrid and proxy threats are on the rise, she said, and

Chief of Navy, Singapore

these challenges affect the entire water column includ-

Admiral John Aquilino Commander, Indo-Pacific Command, US

ing the seabed. National, bilateral and multilateral approaches to protecting the maritime domain are all applicable, she argued. In particular, codes of conduct in waters like the South China Sea need to accord with international law to reduce tensions.

Rear Admiral Aaron Beng pointed to some of the regional successes in promoting good order at

52

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Vice Admiral Biswajit Dasgupta, Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Naval Command, India

Alice Guitton, Director General, International Relations and Strategy, Ministry of the Armed Forces, France

Rear Admiral Aaron Beng, Chief of Navy, Singapore

Admiral John Aquilino, Commander, Indo-Pacific Command, US

sea, including joint patrols, information sharing

noted challenges that navies face in engaging with

and crisis response such as in the search for Flight

paramilitary organisations. Guitton viewed presence,

MH370. Underlying relationships and interoper-

information sharing and attribution as keys to coun-

ability are key, he argued. Admiral John Aquilino

tering illegal activities by paramilitary groups and

highlighted the high-level relationships between like-

non-state actors. There was also discussion of ways to

minded nations, but pointed to the aggressive actions

improve submarine operational safety in the region.

of China, Russia and North Korea creating, he said,

Among the major trends, there was acknowledgement

potentially the most dangerous security situation

of the increased number of minilateral and multilat-

since the Second World War. However, he said the US

eral exercises and activities as well as initiatives to

continues to reach out to encourage communication.

improve maritime situational awareness. The prolif-

In response to questions, Admiral Aquilino pointed

eration of maritime information fusion centres was

to the mechanisms that exist for communicating with

noted, and Rear Admiral Beng said there is room for

the Chinese military leadership. Other panellists

further development in this area.

Special session 3

53

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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

CHAPTER 8 Istana reception and dinner

56

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57

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IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

CHAPTER 9 China’s vision for regional order

FIFTH PLENARY SESSION Sunday 12 June 2022, 08:35 SPEAKERS General Wei Fenghe Minister of National Defense and State Councilor, China

FIFTH PLENARY SESSION

China’s vision for regional order

General Wei Fenghe, Minister of National Defense and State Councilor, China

China’s Minister of National Defense and State Coun-

emphasised that ‘the right path for a country must

cilor General Wei Fenghe opened his speech with a

fit its realities’ of culture, history, ethnicity, religion

stated purpose of fostering peace and stability in the

and development models and none should be char-

Asia-Pacific region and building friendship and coop-

acterised as superior or inferior. General Wei also

eration. The world, he said, is currently facing multiple

emphasised that not allowing countries to choose their

crises rarely seen in history: from the COVID-19 pan-

own paths equates to ‘turn[ing] away from common

demic to economic challenges and the Ukraine ‘crisis’.

values of democracy and freedom’.

To tackle these challenges, China believes that coun-

General Wei then proposed how China would

tries should: 1) strengthen solidarity and coordination

play a positive role within the region and wider

while opposing ‘exclusive blocs’; 2) uphold fairness and

global system. In particular, the Chinese government

justice and ‘oppose hegemony under the guise of mul-

and military would contribute to world peace and

tilateralism’; and 3) uphold the rule of law and ‘oppose

safeguarding the international order. General Wei

acting on one’s own’. These three points were directed

raised examples of such contributions by referencing

at the United States, whose Indo-Pacific strategy was

China’s ‘strategic outcome’ in its COVID-19 response

called ‘an attempt to build an exclusive small group in

at home and across 170 countries, including through

the name of a free and open Indo-Pacific, to hijack coun-

defence diplomacy.

tries in our region and target one specific country’.

Secondly, General Wei highlighted that China’s

Next, General Wei proposed that all countries

economic growth has benefited Chinese citizens by

should promote mutual learning and exchange. He

lifting them out of poverty, while also contributing

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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

roughly 30% of global economic growth. Lastly, Gen-

internal affairs. He noted that both militaries should

eral Wei described the military as a ‘force for peace’

endeavour to achieve a ‘stable bilateral relationship’

and one that is defensive in nature. China, he stated,

through ‘enhanc[ing] strategic trust, avoid[ing] misun-

will ‘never seek hegemony or engage in military

derstanding and miscalculation, manag[ing] risks and

expansion’. General Wei pointed to the PLA’s positive

crisis and prevent[ing] frictions and conflicts’.

contribution to world peace through its participation

Referring to the Ukraine war as a ‘crisis’, Gen-

in UN peacekeeping efforts and anti-piracy missions.

eral Wei questioned the real root of the crisis and its

As the PLA grows, so too does its ability to add to the

‘mastermind’. He affirmed that China supports the

‘growth of the global force for peace’.

UN Charter and while respecting sovereignty and

Within the context of Chinese President Xi Jin-

territorial integrity of all countries, the general also

ping’s Global Security Initiative, where each country

stressed the legitimate security concerns of all parties.

should accommodate the core interests and major

He stated that China does not support maximum pres-

concerns of each other, General Wei outlined China’s

sure or sanctions, which it thinks will exacerbate the

non-negotiable position on reunification with Taiwan.

situation. General Wei also conveyed that China is

He emphasised that ‘Taiwan is first and foremost

committed to supporting talks between Russia and

China’s Taiwan’ and Taiwan is ‘an internal affair of

Ukraine and expressed hope that the US and NATO

China’s’. He also asserted that ‘China will definitely

will have talks with Russia to create conditions neces-

realise its reunification’ which is ‘a historical trend that

sary for an early ceasefire.

no one and no force can stop’. While China prefers to achieve reunification through peaceful means, it will also resort to force if necessary.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

In connection, General Wei warned against sup-

General Wei’s speech prompted 11 questions from the

port for Taiwan independence, predominantly by the

delegates, ranging from China’s military-modernisa-

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) that is ‘attempt-

tion goals and recent capability-related developments

ing to change the status quo that both the mainland

to its policy on Taiwan and its bilateral relationship

and Taiwan belong to one China’. He also referred to

with Russia. Meia Nouwens, IISS Senior Fellow for

the DPP authorities as a ‘prong of anti-China foreign

Chinese Defence Policy and Military Modernisation,

groups that would be used and ultimately abandoned

asked whether General Wei could provide greater

by their masters’. If there is any attempt to secede

clarity on the PLA’s 2027 benchmark, which some

Taiwan from China, General Wei avowed that China

analysts think is an indication of sped-up modernisa-

will ‘fight at all costs’ and ‘fight to the very end’. In an

tion efforts. While General Wei did not clarify the 2027

attempt to draw parallels, General Wei also referred to

goal, he did provide some new details in his answers

the US’ own civil war for its unity. He then referred to

to questions about China’s nuclear- and missile-devel-

the broader ‘foreign interference’, which he deemed is

opment programmes.

‘doomed to failure’.

Alastair Gale, Asia Security Correspondent and

On the South China Sea, General Wei remarked

Japan Editor of the Wall Street Journal, asked what the

that China calls for turning it into a ‘sea of peace,

purpose of the roughly 300 alleged missile silos in

friendship and cooperation’. He claimed China and

Western China is, and whether these are intended to

ASEAN’s cooperation has ensured stability in the

be used to deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles.

area, and freedom of navigation is not under threat,

General Wei responded that China’s nuclear capability

apart from ‘some’ foreign countries meddling. On

is for self-defence and that Beijing’s no first-use policy

China–US relations, General Wei acknowledged that

remains in place. In addition, he noted that China has

bilateral relationships are at a ‘critical and crucial

equipped the PLA with the nuclear arms displayed in

juncture’. He called on the US to stop smearing and

the 2019 military parade. China will maintain a nuclear

containing China, and to stop interfering in China’s

force size that ensures its ability to prevent nuclear war.

Fifth plenary session

61

Alastair Gale, Asia Security Correspondent and Japan Editor, Wall Street Journal

Demetri Sevastopulo, US–China Correspondent, Financial Times

Taketsugu Sato, Senior National Security Correspondent, Asahi Shimbun

Hiroyuki Akita, Commentator, Nikkei Asian Review

Demetri Sevastopulo, US–China Correspondent

help Pyongyang solve its problems. On Sino-Viet-

for the Financial Times, asked General Wei to clarify

nam ties, General Wei suggested that both countries

what the weapon China tested on 27 July was and its

enjoy a ‘very good’ relationship.

purpose. To this, General Wei confirmed that this was

Lastly, on the Ukraine war, General Wei was asked

indeed one of China’s ‘new weapons’ and asserted

various questions about China’s bilateral relationship

that they are for ‘protecting peace and national inter-

with Russia. Taketsugu Sato, Senior National Secu-

ests of China’.

rity Correspondent from Asahi Shimbun, asked about

When asked about regional disputes involving

whether or not it would denounce Russia’s illegal inva-

Taiwan, the South China Sea, North Korea, Vietnam

sion of Ukraine. Hiroyuki Akita, Commentator for

and India, General Wei again presented China as

Nikkei Asian Review, asked whether China has provided

adhering consistently to its policies and promoting

support to Russia since the start of the conflict. On the

stability in the region. On Taiwan, he maintained

first point, General Wei pointed out that China, too, has

that ‘Taiwan is China’s Taiwan’. On the South

suffered food and energy crises because of the war. He

China Sea, he responded that a resolution should

affirmed that China has ‘never’ provided any material

be found only between countries in the region. On

support to Russia since the start of the Ukraine ‘crisis’.

the China–India border dispute, he noted that both

The general characterised China–Russia relationship

countries have had 15 rounds of corps commander-

as one of partnership, not an alliance, and noted it will

level negotiations and would continue to work

continue to grow. While General Wei referred to Rus-

together for peace. Regarding North Korea, General

sia’s invasion of Ukraine as a crisis in his speech and

Wei viewed that the security concerns of all parties

the first half of his question-and-answer question, he

should be accommodated and urged countries to

referred to it as a ‘war’ in the second half.

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IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

CHAPTER 10 Common challenges for Asia-Pacific and European defence

SIXTH PLENARY SESSION Sunday 12 June 2022, 09:30 SPEAKERS Lee Jong-sup Minister of National Defense, Republic of Korea Kajsa Ollongren Minster of Defence, Netherlands Lord Mark Sedwill Former Cabinet Secretary and National Security Adviser, Cabinet Office, UK

SIXTH PLENARY SESSION

Common challenges for AsiaPacific and European defence Lee Jong-sup, Defense Minister, Republic of Korea

Republic of Korea (ROK) Defense Minister Lee Jong-

Lee mentioned several initiatives to showcase

sup focused his remarks on the denuclearisation of

the ROK’s commitment to play a global role. These

North Korea and the intentions of the newly formed

include expanding security cooperation with ASEAN

South Korean government to play a responsible role

member states, including on non-traditional security

for freedom, peace and prosperity beyond the Korean

threats and on defence–industry cooperation with a

peninsula as a ‘global pivotal state’. Lee highlighted

view towards strengthening regional maritime-secu-

Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programmes as one of

rity capabilities. The ROK would expand security

the major risks threatening stability in the Indo-Pacific.

cooperation with other nations, including European

He also outlined his government’s approach to

ones, on traditional and non-traditional security, as

securing peace on the Korean peninsula through the

well as expanding cooperation with security consul-

North’s denuclearisation. Should Pyongyang make

tative bodies such as the Quad. Finally, the minister

substantial progress in denuclearisation, the South

noted that the invasion of Ukraine is not justified

Korean government under President Yoon Suk-yeol

under any circumstances.

would pursue a ‘bold plan’ that would yield ‘ground-

Kajsa Ollongren, the Minister of Defence of the

breaking improvements’ for North Korea’s economy

Netherlands, began by passing on the regrets of

and standard of living. In order to pursue these objec-

EU High Representative Josep Borrell that COVID-

tives from a position of strength, Seoul would also

19 had forced him to cancel his appearance, noting

strengthen its own capabilities as well as its security

that she would also be delivering his key messages

cooperation with allies and partners.

in her speech. Condemning Vladimir Putin’s war

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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Kajsa Ollongren, Minister of Defence, Netherlands

against Ukraine, Ollongren set out how the war has

Lord Mark Sedwill, former cabinet secretary and

connected Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Russian

national security adviser of the UK, used his remarks to

aggression poses a ‘global challenge with global

outline how the challenges Europe and the Indo-Pacific

ramifications’, she said. She also stated that the way

face are connected and therefore require collective

the international community responded would affect

action. As examples, he cited the threats posed by North

‘not just the stability and security of Europe’, but also

Korea’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes, as

the ‘future of the rules-based international order’.

well as the geopolitical crises being caused by Russian

Ollongren observed ‘a paradigmic shift’ has occurred in Europe, where countries are ‘recognising global

aggression in Ukraine through the transmission mechanism of food and energy insecurity.

threats using a 360-degrees approach’. The defence min-

He argued that whilst one response to the chal-

ister also argued that the lessons European countries are

lenges of interconnectivity could be to reverse course

drawing from the war against Ukraine would ultimately

and reduce interdependencies, a better option would

‘strengthen European armed forces’ and make them

be to improve resilience by focusing on sound poli-

‘better partners’ for security cooperation with ASEAN.

cymaking at home while strengthening national

Ollongren noted that Putin’s actions have ‘woken up’ the

capabilities to act collectively and effectively with

EU to its geopolitical role and the importance of defence

partners. Lord Sedwill explained how the UK’s Fusion

cooperation. European nations are increasing defence

Doctrine sought to do this by applying ‘defence, dip-

budgets and have adopted the EU Strategic Compass as

lomatic, development and economic capabilities,

their operational guide to develop the EU into a stronger

national capabilities’ to contribute to London’s defence

and more capable security provider.

and foreign policies. He also highlighted the shift to

The EU Indo-Pacific security strategy also provides

an ‘Allied-by-design’ concept that assumes from the

a foundation for the body to develop cooperation with

outset deployments alongside allies, as showcased in

Indo-Pacific partners. Ollongren highlighted the par-

the CSG21 tour.

ticipation of a Dutch frigate as part of the UK Carrier

Condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Lord

Strike Group 2021 (CSG21) deployment to the region.

Sedwill argued that the important dividing line is

In addition, she revealed that the Netherlands has

‘not between authoritarian and democratic states’, but

planned to send a warship to the Indo-Pacific once

between those who accept the global rule of law, respect

every two years.

the sovereignty of nations and those who do not.

Sixth plenary session

65

Lord Mark Sedwill, former cabinet secretary and national security adviser, UK

He underlined the UK’s ‘persistent’ and ‘genuine’

cooperation would deliver. Similarly, Mariko Togashi,

commitment to the Indo-Pacific region because it is in

IISS Research Fellow for Japanese Security and Defence,

its national interest.

asked how ROK–Japan bilateral issues could be put aside

He also outlined the UK’s diplomatic, military and

and how relations can be improved.

economic engagements in the region, alongside its

Several questions focused on the role of NATO in

institutional engagements including the Five Powers

the Indo-Pacific. Dr Bastian Giegerich, IISS Director of

Defence Agreement, AUKUS and the UK’s new struc-

Defence and Military Analysis, asked what NATO’s new

tured dialogue with ASEAN. Lord Sedwell highlighted

Strategic Concept should credibly say on the Indo-Pacific.

technical cooperation as a new approach to indus-

Senior Colonel Zhang Chi, an associate professor from

trial and defence, where the UK is moving to a new

China’s National Defense University, enquired about the

approach of ‘genuine co-design and co-production’

ROK’s cooperation with NATO and whether the Alli-

that includes allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.

ance’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific risked bringing

Finally, he underscored the importance of alliances

conflict to Asia or undermining ASEAN centrality.

and partnerships, which he identified as something which their adversaries do not enjoy.

On the Russia–Ukraine war, John Raine, IISS Senior Adviser for Geopolitical Due Diligence, queried what deterrence constitutes at present given the failure to deter Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Others questioned

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS The

subsequent

discussion largely

the future engagement of European partners in the focused

on

Indo-Pacific. Marianne Péron-Doise, Senior Research

exploring further the co-dependencies between the

Fellow from France’s Institute for Strategic Research at

Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres.

Military School, asked whether the EU would be able

Dr Benjamin Schreer, IISS–Europe Executive Direc-

to sustain its level of naval presence in the region

tor, questioned whether European powers needed to

Regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile pro-

reassess their responses to the China challenge. Dr

grammes, Sebastien Falletti, China Correspondent

Chikako Ueki, Professor of International Relations at

of France’s Le Figaro, asked whether Lee’s support

Waseda University, picked up Minister Lee’s reference

for US extended nuclear deterrence includes the

to improving ROK–Japan relations and asked regard-

possibility of the return of some US nuclear assets to

ing the kind of military capability that better bilateral

the Korean Peninsula.

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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Dr Benjamin Schreer, IISS–Europe Executive Director

Dr Chikako Ueki, Professor of International Relations, Waseda University

Dr Bastian Giegerich, IISS Director of Senior Colonel Zhang Chi, Defence and Military Analysis Associate Professor, China’s National Defense University

In their responses, Ollongren and Lord Sedwill

Minister Lee noted North Korean preparations for

both addressed questions on NATO. Lord Sedwill

their seventh nuclear test and ongoing efforts to deter

noted how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shifted

this. He emphasised Seoul’s commitment to denuclearis-

the strategic picture in Europe to greater consider-

ing the Korean peninsula by ensuring that the costs of

ation of not just deterrence but defence. Both speakers

possessing these weapon systems are far outweighed

concluded that, even as NATO remains a defensive

by the benefits North Korea can achieve by denuclearis-

alliance focused on the North Atlantic theatre, Alliance

ing. It is in this spirit, he said, that ROK–Japan security

members have a global outlook that means consider-

cooperation would be further developed. Lee noted that

ing global threats, and that involved working with

nobody wants to see any nuclear weapons on the Korean

partners around the globe. Ollongren insisted that

peninsula from any country. Looking forward to the

European engagement in the Indo-Pacific is sustain-

Indo-Pacific strategy of the new ROK government, he

able precisely because the issue at hand is the future

said that it would focus on upholding the rules-based

of the international rules-based order, and so the

international order, as well as peace, freedom and pros-

dynamic is to do more, not less.

perity in the Indo-Pacific.

John Raine, IISS Senior Adviser for Geopolitical Due Diligence

Marianne Péron-Doise, Senior Research Fellow, France’s Institute for Strategic Research at Military School

Sebastien Falletti, China Correspondent, Le Figaro

Sixth plenary session

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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

CHAPTER 11 New ideas for securing regional security

SEVENTH PLENARY SESSION Sunday 12 June 2022, 11:30 SPEAKERS Anita Anand Minister of National Defence, Canada Inia Batikoto Seruiratu Minister for Defence, National Security and Policing, Fiji Dr Ng Eng Hen Minister for Defence, Singapore

SIXTH PLENARY SESSION

New ideas for securing regional security

Anita Anand, Minister of National Defence, Canada

The final session focused on policy responses to a

their embarked helicopter detachments participating

wide range of regional security challenges – both

in RIMPAC 2022.

traditional geopolitical threats made more urgent by

Secondly, Anand characterised multilateralism as a

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and non-traditional ones

‘cornerstone’ of Canada’s approach to the Indo-Pacific.

like climate change.

The minister noted that Ottawa is deepening its mul-

Canadian Minister of National Defence Anita

tilateral engagement with the Indo-Pacific region to

Anand reaffirmed the centrality of responsible

maintain the rules-based order against Chinese actions

engagement – underpinned by the principles of trans-

involving coercive diplomacy, cyber activity and intel-

parency, open communication and adherence to rules

lectual-property theft. Expressing Canada’s belief in

and norms – to Canada’s foreign policy. She set out

the centrality of ASEAN as a ‘vital forum for address-

three ways that Canada’s Indo-Pacific policy reflects

ing regional challenges’, Anand stated that Canada has

this approach.

applied to become a full Strategic Partner of ASEAN.

Firstly, Anand described Canada’s significant and

It has also sought membership of ADMM+, where it

growing military presence in the region. This includes

could contribute, in particular, expertise in combating

Operation Neon which monitors UN sanctions against

climate change.

North Korea, and Operation Projection which deploys

Thirdly, Anand revealed that Canada is devel-

warships to conduct joint missions with allies and

oping an Indo-Pacific strategy to integrate its

partners. Operation Projection is set to return in late

diplomatic, military and economic activities and

2022, with HMCS Winnipeg, HMCS Vancouver and

advance responsible engagement. A new Indo-Pacific

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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Inia Batikoto Seruiratu, Minister of Defence, National Security and Policing, Fiji

Advisory Committee of private sector, civil society

earthquake’ that raises risks to peace and stability eve-

and former members of government would support

rywhere. He noted that the impact on wheat, fuel and

preparation of the strategy. The minister concluded

metals markets is deepening existing divisions. Coun-

by underscoring Canada’s openness to new and inno-

tries are shutting down food exports to protect their

vative approaches to work with Indo-Pacific partners

domestic supply. Consequently, inflation and supply

to enhance the region’s security.

shocks are jeopardising affordability of basic commod-

Inia Batikoto Seruiratu, the Minister of Defence,

ities for the world’s poor. Dr Ng also cautioned that

National Security and Policing of Fiji, drew attention

this inward turn risks undermining responses to global

to non-traditional security threats. He noted, in par-

challenges such as climate change, human trafficking

ticular, that a series of devastating tropical cyclones

and terrorism. He observed that security alliances are

and storms have driven home the existential threat

hardening and defence spending is rising in Europe

of climate change. The minister also stated that the

and the Asia-Pacific.

COVID-19 pandemic has not only shown the centrality

Dr Ng asserted that the world is standing at a ‘poten-

of health to national and regional security, but has also

tially dangerous point in our history’. He proposed two

prompted the need for new partnerships and new ways

ways to avert the disaster. Firstly, he stated that it is

of working to counter the spread of misinformation.

important to end the war in Ukraine. A protracted war

Seruiratu revealed that Fiji is drafting a national

would impose severe costs on Russia and test interna-

security strategy to develop a whole-of-government

tional support for Ukraine. Secondly, the minister also

approach to protect its people against a broad range

called upon Asian countries to follow Ukrainian Presi-

of security threats. He also stated that the country is

dent Zelenskyy’s advice of pre-emption and prevention

exploring the use of cross-agency and community

of conflict by ensuring that regional tensions do not

partnerships to develop new surveillance and early-

break out into open conflict. Dr Ng emphasised that

warning mechanisms. He concluded by exhorting

tensions should not be framed as part of an ideological

other countries and institutions in the region to assist

struggle between autocracies and democracies.

Fiji in its challenges, especially in information sharing and capability development.

Dr Ng further noted that the Asian consensus on the respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity

Dr Ng Eng Hen, Singapore’s Defence Minister,

alone is not sufficient. The core issue is the interde-

noted that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a ‘geopolitical

pendence within the region, which he noted is far

Seventh plenary session

71

Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, Singapore

more ‘developed, productive and mutually benefi-

Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Secu-

cial’ than between Russia and Europe. To this, Dr Ng

rity, asked how Canada would balance its Pacific,

highlighted the importance of strengthening exist-

Atlantic and Arctic commitments.

ing establishments such as the ADMM+ and enhance

Several

other

questions

were

addressed

to

engagements within and with extra-regional powers.

Seruiratu. Josh Rogin, Columnist of the Washington

He noted that building confidence and strategic trust

Post, asked how Fiji views US–China rivalry. Dr Euan

in one another through inclusivity and multilateralism

Graham, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for

is ‘the call of pre-emption’. Furthermore, Dr Ng sug-

Asia-Pacific Security, asked what threats geopolitics

gested that ADMM+ could continue to build norms

poses to Fiji. Darshana Baruah, Fellow of the South

and mechanisms to de-escalate and avert conflict,

Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-

including confidence-building initiatives such as the

national Peace, asked how Fiji manages the differing

Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea and the Guide-

security perspectives of large and small states.

lines for Air Military Encounters.

Other questions explored Singapore’s policy thinking. Dr Chong Ja Ian, Associate Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore, asked

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

how Singapore is addressing disinformation. Dr Tim

Many questions addressed the role of external

Huxley, IISS–Asia Senior Adviser and its former execu-

powers in the Indo-Pacific region. Boris Ruge, Vice-

tive director, asked what implications Russia’s war in

Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, asked

Ukraine hold for Singapore’s security doctrine and plan-

what European states could do to help prevent con-

ning. Sofie Syarief, a journalist and news producer from

flict in Asia. Dr Lynn Kuok, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Kompas TV, asked how Singapore could help ASEAN

Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security and Co-Editor

address problems relating to the South China Sea. Senior

of the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment, asked

Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo of the Chinese Academy of

how the Russia–China joint statement of 4 February

Military Sciences asked Dr Ng to assess the role that the

has impacted Beijing’s influence in the region. James

Shangri-La Dialogue plays in Asia-Pacific security.

Crabtree, IISS–Asia Executive Director, asked how

In response, Anand emphasised that Canada pri-

Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy would be distinc-

oritises the combating of climate change, and that

tive from those of other states. Nicholas Childs, IISS

its armed forces have already addressed disasters

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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Josh Rogin, Columnist, Washington Post

Dr Euan Graham, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for AsiaPacific Security

Dr Chong Ja Ian, Associate Professor Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo, of Political Science, National Research Fellow, Chinese Academy University of Singapore of Military Sciences

emanating from this problem. The significance of Can-

Dr Ng responded that the most important thing

ada’s Pacific trade, and of Asian diasporas in Canada,

European states could do for Indo-Pacific stability is

would also shape its forthcoming Indo-Pacific strat-

to establish a security presence. The open policy of

egy. She noted the growing importance of defending

Singapore’s Changi Naval Base to port visits facilitates

Arctic sovereignty, including through close coopera-

this. He noted that the crisis in the Black Sea could be

tion with the US.

replicated in the South China Sea and called for the

Seruiratu emphasised the challenges facing a small

South China Seas Code of Conduct to be finalised

state manoeuvring a changing geopolitical climate. He

quickly to avert disaster. Dr Ng also mentioned that

noted that a US–China clash would be disastrous, and

the Singapore Armed Forces are setting up a digital

that Fiji has an interest in the development of good

intelligence service to tackle disinformation. He drew

relations between the two great powers. He asked

attention to both the extent and limits of the Sino-

whether China’s growing influence is the result of a

Russian relations, while observing that strategic allies

vacuum created by the US, and noted that China is

could become strategic burdens. Lastly, he pointed

now a key development partner of Fiji. Seruiratu also

out that it is for China to decide whether it is better to

emphasised that Fiji seeks long-term relationships

participate in an open, unscripted platform that posed

based on trust with all its traditional partners.

many questions, or to retreat from engagement.

Boris Ruge, Vice-Chairman, Munich Security Conference

James Crabtree, IISS–Asia Executive Director

Dr Lynn Kuok, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security and Co-Editor of the AsiaPacific Regional Security Assessment

Nicholas Childs, IISS Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security

Seventh plenary Session

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IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

CHAPTER 12 The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme

The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme The first roundtable at the fifth Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme

The fifth Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme

Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive.

(SEAYLP) returned with its strongest cohort yet of aca-

He discussed how the SLD came about and what the

demics, analysts, politicians, officials and journalists. The

IISS has hoped to achieve in convening the Dialogue

27 delegates hailed from all ten ASEAN member states.

over the past 20 years, later taking questions from

Ten additional delegates from the Australia, China, India,

young leaders on these issues.

Japan, Norway, the UK and the US joined the programme

Over the next several hours, as the common areas

as guests; and for the first time, SEAYLP featured represen-

in the hotel began to hum with anticipation of the first

tation from four island nations: Fiji, Papua New Guinea,

Dialogue since 2019, the young leaders participated

the Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste. In line with the pro-

in three roundtable discussions on regional security

gramme’s longstanding commitment to gender diversity,

issues. IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for

20 of the 41 young leaders were women. SEAYLP 2022

Asia-Pacific Security and Co-Editor of the Asia-Pacific

was funded by the Australian government, the Special

Regional Security Assessment, Dr Lynn Kuok, mod-

Competitive Studies Project, Google Asia-Pacific and the

erated the first discussion on the South China Sea

Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(SCS) disputes. Panellists from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam each spoke about their respective countries’ approaches to Chinese SCS

ROUNDTABLES ON REGIONAL SECURITY

expansion, emphasising their political and economic

The Southeast Asian Young Leaders Programme

security imperatives.

began on the morning of Friday, 10 June with an intro-

Captain Dianne Despi noted that the Philippines

duction to the Shangri-La Dialogue given by Dr John

has sought to diversify its partnerships and pursue

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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

A SEAYLP discussion moderated by IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security and Co-Editor of the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment, Dr Lynn Kuok

more consistent naval modernisation. Vietnam’s Dr

he argued, other institutions would fill the strategic

Phan Hao Duy raised the possibility of ASEAN states

vacuum left by its shortcomings. Fuadi Pitsuwan of

coming to a common legal position on issues of agree-

Thailand defended the relevance of ASEAN central-

ment. Thomas Benjamin Daniel explained how

ity in today’s geopolitical environment and discussed

Malaysia has compartmentalised the SCS dispute from

internal and external challenges. He proposed that

the rest of its relations with China out of necessity. Dr

ASEAN nations show more ambition rather than

Evan Laksmana argued that Indonesia has failed to

accepting middle-power status. Interventions from the

respond to Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea as a

floor focused on the challenges of the South China Sea,

non-claimant state without a framework for integrating

Myanmar, and great-power rivalry.

responses across its institutions. In the open discus-

A final panel, moderated by IISS Research Fellow

sion that followed, delegates focused on questions of

for Security and Technology Yuka Koshino, consid-

international law, the role of maritime-domain aware-

ered the role of governments, businesses and other

ness, and the possibility of settling disputes amongst

stakeholders in managing technological competi-

ASEAN member states before negotiating with China.

tion and security standards for regional prosperity,

The second SEAYLP roundtable discussion, mod-

highlighting Southeast Asian, American and Chinese

erated by IISS Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian

perspectives. Tiana Desker of Singapore outlined the

Politics and Foreign Policy Aaron Connelly, focused

perspective of small states in using existing multilat-

on challenges to ASEAN centrality. Pich Charadine

eral platforms to strengthen norms and national-level

of Cambodia outlined the political, strategic and

governance to build norms where they do not yet exist

economic goals of ASEAN. She also raised its non-

and noted the key role of great powers in arms control

interference dilemma and whether it can remain

and strategic stability.

relevant amidst the new regional frameworks which

Brandon McKee of the United States discussed tech-

do not have ASEAN at their centre, like the Quad and

nological competition in terms of ideological rivalry

the Belt and Road Initiative.

between the US and China. Dr Yu Jie of China framed

Julio Amador III of the Philippines argued that

technological competition in terms of opposing narra-

ASEAN has not lived up to its claims to centrality, sug-

tives on international standards-setting and encouraged

gesting that member states review the ASEAN Charter.

countries to come together harmoniously. She pointed

If the grouping does not strengthen its institutions,

out China’s own challenges in grappling with new

The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme

77

Tiana Desker, Director (Strategic Futures and Emerging Technology), Ministry of Defence, Singapore

technologies and the impact of China’s domestic policy

Armed Forces’ new missile corps, a development which

on its foreign economic and technological policy.

otherwise might have passed notice in the discourse.

Ryan Rahardjo of Indonesia offered a private-

SEAYLP delegates made important contributions to

sector perspective, explaining Google’s approach of

the discussions during special sessions on the afternoon

‘responsible development’ to artificial intelligence,

of Saturday, 11 June. In the special session on climate

including principles of social benefit, risk manage-

change and green defence, Pia Ranada of the Philippines

ment, elimination of bias, privacy and company

asked how the defence sector could prepare for an increas-

redlines. In the discussion that followed, delegates

ing number of climate refugees. In the special session on

focused on the question of whether Southeast Asian

Myanmar, Pongkwan Sawasdipakdi asked panellists to

states needed to make a choice between American and

address the ‘elephant in the room’ – the close relationship

Chinese technology, or if they could hedge by taking

between the Royal Thai Army and the Myanmar armed

advantage of the competition between the two.

forces – and whether Thailand could be doing more to persuade the Myanmar’s junta to end the crisis.

PARTICIPATION IN PLENARY AND SPECIAL SESSIONS

their presence known as well. Darshana Baruah of

SEAYLP delegates asked some of the most impor-

India raised Franco-Australian tensions with French

tant questions fielded in the SLD plenary sessions.

Minister of the Armed Forces Sébastian Lecornu. In

Bich Tran of Vietnam asked Vietnamese Minister of

the final plenary featuring Fijian Minister of Defence

National Defence Phan Van Giang how Vietnam plans

Inia Seruiratu, Baruah noted the difference in pri-

to diversify its defence supply chain given an increas-

orities between small island states focused on climate

ing recognition amid the Ukraine war that it has relied

change and great powers focused on geopolitics. She

too heavily on Russia. She also asked Chinese Minister

also raised the increased presence of the Chinese

of National Defense Wei Fenghe whether the People’s

navy in the Indian Ocean in the special session on

Republic would commit to respecting the territorial

maritime security. Natalie Sambhi of Australia asked

integrity of neighbours like Vietnam, noting that it did

Indonesian Minister of Defence Prabowo Subianto

not do so in the past. Chansambath Bong of Cambodia

about the AUKUS partnership in light of his com-

asked Cambodian Minister of National Defence Tea

ments about an ‘Asian Way’ of security; while Daisuke

Banh about the purpose of the Royal Cambodian

Kawai of Japan asked Japanese Minister of Defense

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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

SEAYLP delegates from guest countries made

The final roundtable moderated by IISS Research Fellow for Security and Technology Yuka Koshino

Kishi Nobuo about changes to Japanese defence policy under the new Kishida government.

Delegates also enjoyed off-the-record discussions with Admiral John Aquilino, the Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, over breakfast on the morn-

ENGAGEMENTS WITH SENIOR DEFENCE LEADERS

ing of Saturday, 11 June and with Singapore’s Foreign

Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme delegates

the afternoon of Sunday, 12 June. Despite coming at

also had the opportunity for exclusive engagements

the end of a full three days of activities, interest in the

with senior defence leaders over meals during the

discussion with Minister Balakrishnan was high, with

Dialogue. Australian Deputy Prime Minister and

nearly all delegates raising their hands when the floor

Defence Minister Richard Marles, on his first day

was opened to questions.

Affairs Minister Vivian Balakrishnan over lunch on

abroad since being sworn in three weeks earlier, joined he spoke about the new Australian government’s

SOCIAL ENGAGEMENTS AND NETWORKING OPPORTUNITIES

approach to the region. In the candid yet thoughtful

After a full day of discussions on weighty issues, on the

exchange that followed, Marles answered questions

evening of Saturday, 11 June, SEAYLP delegates visited

about the Quad, the crisis in Myanmar, Australia–

the residence of the Australian High Commissioner to

Indonesia relations and Australia’s ‘redlines’ in its

Singapore, Will Hodgman, for dinner and an oppor-

relationship with China.

tunity to carry on the day’s discussions in an informal

the delegates for lunch on Friday, 10 June, where

Lunch with Vivian Balakrishnan, Singapore’s Foreign Affairs Minister

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79

Vivian Balakrishnan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Singapore

setting. Briefly interrupting the festivities, the then-

of the Royal Norwegian Ambassador to Singapore,

secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign

Eivind Homme, for a closing reception following the

Affairs and Trade, Kathryn Campbell, congratu-

conclusion of the Dialogue. Over the course of a beau-

lated the delegates on their selection and noted that

tiful afternoon, the young leaders enjoyed Norwegian

she was particularly pleased, as a retired brigadier in

food, drinks and hospitality as well as each other’s

the Australian Army, to see so many young women

company before beginning their journeys home—

among them.

taking with them new relationships from across the

The bonhomie continued the following afternoon when the delegates travelled to the residence

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region, and new ideas for collaboration on issues of common concern.

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

APPENDICES

19TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 10–12 JUNE 2022

I. Selected digital engagement and media coverage of the 2022 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue II. Selected IISS publications

APPENDIX I

Selected digital engagement and media coverage of the 2022 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Special Address from Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy

The 19th Shangri-La Dialogue returned to a global audience following a two-year hiatus. Convened by the IISS, the world’s media and key opinion formers on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region gathered at the Dialogue in Singapore. Together, they led the news and drove key conversations online, communicating to their readers, viewers and followers the complexities, subtleties and advantages that in-person diplomacy can provide to an increasingly insecure region.

Digital engagement highlights The SLD was much talked about online. Speeches and coverage from the plenary and special sessions – and all the events which have happened behind the scenes in Singapore – generated over 22,000 unique mentions on social media over the weekend the event was held. These social conversations reached nearly one billion people, with most of the online dialogue happening in the US, Australia, Japan and the rest of Asia. Plenary speakers and delegates tweeted and retweeted SLD-related content.

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We leveraged our IISS YouTube channel to ensure global audiences could watch the plenary sessions live online. In addition, the plenary recordings have so far generated over 100,000 views. Our YouTube playlists also include expert opinions to engage our audiences with prime IISS analysis preceding the Shangri-La Dialogue as well as after day one in Singapore. The most viewed videos include: • ‘IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2022: Managing Geopolitical Competition in a Multipolar Region’ (nearly 50,000 views) • ‘IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2022: China’s vision for regional order’ (almost 24,000 views) • ‘Special Address from Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President, Ukraine’ (over 13,000 views) The IISS website is a key communication channel and provided information such as speaker agendas and content related to themes and topics of the Shangri-La Dialogue 2022. It also offers customised landing pages for both the special sessions and the Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme. Throughout the event, the website was

IISS Flickr account

updated with live streams and additional information.

Transcript downloads and recordings were added on a rolling basis and promoted via our social media channels.

The bespoke web pages were viewed over 60,000 times during the week of SLD 2022.

The IISS website also included a link to our IISS Flickr account with highlights from the event.

Flickr Images were updated on a rolling basis and used by regional and international media outlets such as Nikkei Asia.

Our social media and website activities were complemented by a special pre-event podcast episode ‘It’s Back: IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2022’, which has been downloaded over 2,000 times globally. Guest host James Crabtree, IISS–Asia Executive Director, was joined by colleagues Meia Nouwens, Senior Fellow for Chinese Defence Policy and Military Modernisation; and Aaron Connelly, Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian Politics and Foreign Policy, to discuss themes and topics of the upcoming event.

• The focus of the episode’s discussion includes: • US–China relations • Southeast Asia and regional security • The impact of the war in Ukraine • Europe and the Indo-Pacific IISS blog posts published before SLD 2022 highlighted themes and topics of the event, and they have been viewed over 3,000 times across regions. Some of the more popular posts include: US–China tensions to centre stage at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2022 by James Crabtree Delegates are gathering in Singapore to attend the region’s premier defence summit, which will serve as a rare

opportunity for the United States and China to discuss a long list of disagreements and topics of common concern.

Divisions in the Indo-Pacific over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by Samir Puri Indo-Pacific governments reacted to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in three ways – quickly offering opposition, ambivalence or support – and have held fast to these positions as the war has evolved. This issue will be central to the debates held at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, beginning 10 June, about how the Ukraine war will affect regional economic relations and security and defence affairs.

The Ukraine war and the new meaning of security guarantees for the Indo-Pacific by John Raine The 2022 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue will convene on 10 June against the backdrop of a war in Europe. The consequences of the war for Euro-Atlantic security have been profound, but how – if at all – will they affect the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific?

Media coverage highlights The International Institute for Strategic Studies welcomed over 200 members of the media to the Shangri-La Dialogue this year, representing 60 news organisations from across the world. Their coverage appeared in Asian, North American and European publications, reaching hundreds of millions here in this region and the world.

Bloomberg, the Financial Times, BBC, CNBC, CNN, NHK, Channel News Asia, Associated Press, Reuters and many more have reacquainted the world with this vital process of defence diplomacy. What follows is a selection of key news articles and opinion pieces relating to events at the Dialogue:

Selected press coverage

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Washington Post 11 June 2022

Opinion: Zelensky calls for international support for Taiwan before China attacks SINGAPORE — While appealing to Asian nations for support to fend off Russia’s invasion on Saturday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said the international community should help Taiwan resist China’s aggression now, before Beijing attacks the island democracy it claims as its own province.

The comments risk upsetting Ukraine’s delicate balancing act with China; nevertheless, Zelensky insisted that aggressors must be confronted wherever they emerge.

Asian countries must not wait for the crisis to act on Taiwan’s behalf, which would be repeating the mistake Europe made before Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine.

Zelensky’s remarks followed a video address he made to the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual conference of Asian and Pacific defense and diplomatic officials organized by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Zelensky told the assembled dignitaries that the Ukraine crisis was an urgent issue not just for Europe, but for Asia as well. He warned countries sitting on the sidelines they would soon face food, energy and economic crises unless Putin was quickly defeated.

Following his prepared remarks, I asked Zelensky what advice he had regarding Taiwan, which is facing a similar (although not yet violent) campaign of economic and military coercion from its neighbor, China. He responded that Ukraine provides a lesson for the international community: that it should come to the aid of countries facing aggression before war breaks out.

“No one benefits from [war], apart from certain political leaders who are not content with the present level of their ambitions. Therefore, they keep growing their appetites, their ambitions,” Zelensky said, without mentioning Chinese President Xi Jinping by name. “The world enables these leaders to grow their appetites for now, therefore we need a diplomatic resolution to support countries that are in need of help.”

The Ukraine example shows that once violence breaks out, the human costs are staggering, Zelensky said, so every effort must be made to find a diplomatic solution to avoid outright conflict, if possible. But at the same time, he said, the international community must intervene before tensions spill over into violence to ensure a smaller country can stand up to an aggressor.

“We must not leave them behind at the mercy of another country which is more powerful in financial

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terms, in territorial terms and in terms of equipment,” Zelensky said. “And therefore, if there is a way out diplomatically, we need to use the diplomatic way. But it must be a preemptive way, not the one that comes after the war has started.”

Zelensky’s remarks represented the most assertive defense of Taiwan and its right to exist that he or any member of his government has made to date. Since the Russian invasion began, the Ukrainian government has been careful not to run afoul of Beijing, which Ukraine sees as potentially both a helpful or harmful actor. China has not condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has parroted Russia’s propaganda blaming the West. But Beijing has stopped short of actively supporting the Russian invasion.

The Taiwanese government has been eager to draw similarities between its situation vis-a-vis China and Ukraine’s suffering at the hands of Russia. But the Chinese government angrily rejects any such comparison, claiming that Taiwan is already part of China and therefore represents an internal matter not subject to any international scrutiny.

Beijing’s sensitivity over the Taiwan issue was on full display at the conference, where U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met with China’s minister of national defense, Gen. Wei Fenghe on Friday. According to a U.S. official, Austin confronted Wei about China’s increasing intimidation of Taiwan, which threatens to upset a long-standing but fragile status quo, and rejected China’s contention that the Taiwan Strait is wholly owned by China.

“We’ve witnessed a steady increase in provocative and destabilizing military activity near Taiwan. And that includes PLA [People’s Liberation Army] aircraft flying near Taiwan in record numbers in recent months — and on a nearly daily basis,” Austin said in a speech Saturday. “Maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait isn’t just a U.S. interest. It’s a matter of international concern.”

After Austin’s meeting with Wei, China’s defense ministry blamed the United States and “Taiwan independence forces” for upsetting the status quo. Beijing also claimed that Wei had told Austin China would not hesitate to start a war over the issue if necessary and “smash to smithereens any Taiwan independence plot.” U.S. sources told me that Wei never said those things inside his meeting with Austin.

Despite China’s determined efforts to deny that the Ukraine and Taiwan situations are linked, several Asian leaders at the Singapore conference said Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call for the region in terms of a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan. As Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said while addressing the conference Friday evening, “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.” ©Washington Post Reprinted with permission

New York Times 15 June 2022

Opinion: The U.S. Is Losing Its Military Edge in Asia, and China Knows It A Chinese fighter jet veered in front of an Australian military surveillance aircraft over international waters in the South China Sea last month and released metallic debris that was sucked into the Australian plane’s engines.

No one was reported hurt in the encounter, which Australia’s defense minister called “very dangerous,” but it added to a string of recent incidents that demonstrate China’s growing willingness to test the United States and its partners in Asia militarily.

China has systematically tracked U.S. warships in the region, its air force has staged intensifying incursions into Taiwanese and Japanese airspace, and its coast guard routinely harasses Philippine, Malaysian and Indonesian vessels. In recent weeks, Chinese fighter pilots have repeatedly buzzed Canadian military aircraft on a U.N.sanctioned operation — sometimes raising their middle fingers at the Canadians.

As China’s armed forces grow in strength, sophistication and confidence, U.S.-led military deterrence in the IndoPacific is losing its bite.

Take the United States’ military presence in the region.

It has about 55,000 military personnel in Japan and 28,000 in South Korea. Several thousand more are deployed across Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Guam. This posture has barely changed since the 1950s. But plans to reinvigorate the U.S. presence have been stymied by inadequate budgets, competing priorities and a lack of consensus in Washington on how to deal with China.

The Pentagon has increased investments in cuttingedge technologies like artificial intelligence, and cyber- and space-based systems to prepare for a possible high-tech conflict with China in the 2030s. But the balance of power is likely to shift decidedly in China’s favor by the time they are deployed unless the United States brings new resources to the table soon.

President Biden this year submitted the largest defense budget ever in dollar terms, but much of the increase will be swallowed up by skyrocketing inflation. Mr. Biden, like former President Donald Trump, is thus falling short of a target of 3 percent to 5 percent real annual budget growth, a bipartisan goal set even before the Ukraine war and often cited as the minimum the Pentagon needs in today’s era of great-power competition.

While the U.S. military is globally dispersed, China can concentrate its forces on winning a future conflict in its own neighborhood. It now has the capability. China has

the world’s largest navy and Asia’s biggest air force and an imposing arsenal of missiles designed to deter the United States from projecting military power into the Western Pacific in a crisis. China’s third and most advanced aircraft carrier is nearing completion, and other new hardware is being developed or is already in service.

While much attention is focused on its behavior toward Taiwan, China is building and militarizing artificial islands in the South China Sea. It also broke ground on an expanded naval port in Cambodia last week, which may one day provide its first military foothold in another Asian country. A security agreement with the Solomon Islands could lead to something similar, and Beijing is aggressively courting other Pacific nations.

America’s military position in Asia, by contrast, has been hampered by decades of preoccupation with Middle East conflicts. The war in Ukraine has morphed into a long-term $54 billion commitment and forced Mr. Biden to delay and redraft his administration’s National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy — critical documents that lay out global priorities and resource needs — as officials grapple with how to manage China and Russia at the same time.

Mr. Biden’s team ended the lengthy and costly U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, but that has not freed up many resources for the Indo-Pacific. Washington must not lose sight of the fact that China is a far greater security threat than Russia, now and in the long term.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said “the IndoPacific is at the heart of American grand strategy” during a speech last week at the Shangri-La Dialogue defense summit in Singapore, but he offered little in the way of new resources or commitments.

To turn things around, the United States must prioritize the threat from China, reinforce its military strength in Asia and provide Australia, Japan and India more sophisticated military and technological capabilities to bolster a strategy of collective defense.

It should urgently expand the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which would direct additional spending toward strengthening the U.S. military presence west of Hawaii by distributing forces more widely through the region, improving logistics and air defenses, and other measures. These are necessary to reduce exposure of U.S. forces to China’s longrange missiles and increase the locations from which they could operate in a crisis. But this initiative has suffered from insufficient funding and criticism that its top priorities were not being met.

The United States could also strengthen its military posture in the region by increasing from five to six the number of attack submarines home-ported in Guam, expanding maritime operations in the Pacific and deploying more advanced fighters, warships, drones and long-range missiles to the region.

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But all of that may still not be enough. The challenge posed by China is becoming so great that the United States can no longer maintain a balance of military power in Asia by itself.

Washington took a bold first step toward sharing more of the burden through the AUKUS agreement announced last year, under which it will work with Britain to supply Australia with nuclear-powered submarines and codevelop other advanced military technologies in the interim. But the submarines won’t enter service until the late 2030s, and AUKUS’s other collaborative efforts will require difficult reforms to longstanding U.S. restrictions on sharing sensitive national security technology.

Washington should support Australian and Japanese aims to build long-range missiles on home soil by sharing intellectual property, provide more U.S. weaponry to India and beef up foreign military financing in the region, starting with a dedicated fund to boost Taiwan’s deterrence capabilities.

America has long neglected its defense strategy in Asia, viewing China’s challenge as important but not urgent. The scenes now playing out in Europe are a stark reminder of what can happen when deterrence fails. ©New York Times Reprinted with permission

The Economist 16 June 2022

How America tries to grapple with China while confronting Russia Travels with the defence secretary in quest of stronger ties Ramrod-straight in a crisp green uniform, General Wei Fenghe, China’s defence minister, saluted the audience before letting rip. “We require the us side to stop smearing and containing China. Stop interfering in China’s internal affairs…If you want confrontation, we will fight to the end.” His fire was aimed at the lumbering figure of Lloyd Austin, America’s defence secretary and a former general.

Mr Austin had warned the same gathering that China was becoming “more coercive and aggressive”—militarising disputed islets in the South China Sea and provocatively probing Taiwan’s defences. “We will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows,” Mr Austin insisted.

America would continue to sell arms to Taiwan, while “maintaining our own capacity to resist any use of force or other forms of coercion”.

The finger-jabbing worried many of those attending the Shangri-La Dialogue on June 10th-12th, an annual talkfest of ministers, generals and security experts in Singapore held by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a

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British think-tank. “I have a strong sense of urgency that Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,” fretted Kishida Fumio, Japan’s prime minister. The fact that Generals Wei and Austin met to discuss “guardrails”—rules for encounters at sea and in the air, and hotlines—was reassuring. But it was also evidence of how fast the rivalry is deepening.

Mr Austin regards the Indo-Pacific, from Hawaii to the Maldives, as “the heart of American grand strategy”. It is where the country deploys the most forces (see chart 1). But can America credibly grapple with a rising China while also striving to repel Russia’s aggression in Ukraine? Yes, avers Mr Austin. “We are walking and chewing gum. We’re able to do that because of the strong network of alliances and partnerships that we have around the globe.” America’s ability to attract friends is a force multiplier (see chart 2), and ever more important as the challenges grow.

To travel with Mr Austin to Asia and Europe this month is to glimpse America’s military might, and how it seeks to harness the “power of partnerships”. He flew on an e4-b, “the Doomsday plane” from which American leaders can wage nuclear war, trailed by a c-17 transporter. Every few hours it was refuelled in mid-air by a daisy-chain of tanker aircraft lurking off the coasts of Alaska, Japan, Arabia and Italy. On the ground Mr Austin met Justin Trudeau, Canada’s prime minister, at an American-Canadian nuclear bunker in Colorado; 20-odd ministers in Singapore; the Thai prime minister in Bangkok; and the defence ministers of 29 NATO allies in Brussels.

Yet not all allies are equal. In Europe America can rely on NATO, whose members are committed to defending each other under Article 5 of the Washington treaty. In Asia China accuses America of trying to recreate NATO—a contention Mr Austin denies. “We do not seek a new cold war, an Asian NATO or a region split into hostile blocs,” he insisted. Rather, America operates with a patchwork of security accords.

America thinks only China can challenge its global supremacy. Yet Russia is consuming much of the country’s attention, and billions of dollars, as America seeks to help Ukraine and strengthen NATO. Despite Europe’s wealth, says Eric Edelman, a former senior Pentagon official, “without the us to organise them, Europeans cannot defend themselves”.

Defence officials justify the priority given to Ukraine by arguing that, were Russia to succeed in taking land by force, it would encourage other autocrats to do the same elsewhere (eg, Taiwan). Many foreign-policy experts think the war in Ukraine, if it results in a defeat for Russia, would strengthen the West’s hand against China.

“Ukraine is facing a pivotal moment on the battlefield,” said Mr Austin, announcing another $1bn in American aid, including more artillery and longer-range missiles—though well short of the amounts requested by Ukraine. He has stopped talking about helping Ukraine “win”. The blurry

aim is something less—giving it “the means to deter and to defend” itself.

American officials boast that Mr Putin’s war is strengthening NATO: Sweden and Finland want to join. Yet all is not well. Turkey is blocking their accession. And allies are drifting apart over the endgame in Ukraine.

NATO’s summit in Madrid on June 29th-30th will focus on the threat from Russia but will keep an eye on Asia. It will probably be attended by the leaders of Japan, South Korea and Australia. This is not yet the “league of democracies” that some have dreamed of. But as a Japanese official puts it: “The message is that security in Europe and Asia cannot be separated.”

Despite Mr Austin’s denial, many in America see benefits in trying to recreate something like NATO in Asia (one such body, the eight-member Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation, was dissolved in 1977). For now, America gets by with what might be called a “non-treaty organisation”: a hub-and-spokes system of bilateral defence agreements with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand, which do not have obligations towards each other. Japan, the weightiest of these, is hamstrung by its tradition of pacifism. Taiwan, the most dangerous flashpoint, has no formal diplomatic relations with most countries, and is excluded from America’s many regional military exercises. “Strategic ambiguity” prevents America from saying clearly whether it would intervene to stop a Chinese invasion.

For want of a more coherent system, America is building a fast-expanding set of ad hoc projects—a “networked security architecture”, as one official puts it. The “Five Eyes” (with Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand) share intelligence; AUKUS (with Australia and Britain) is developing nuclear-powered submarines and other weapons; and the Quad (with Australia, India and Japan) discusses everything from vaccines to maritime security.

In Singapore Mr Austin prodded Japan and South Korea to hold three-way exercises on missile defence, spurred by North Korea’s missile tests. With Japan and Australia, he pushed for more complex war-games and co-operation on defence technology. The result, says Tanvi Madan of the Brookings Institution, a think-tank in Washington, is unusual: “It’s not hub-and-spokes. It’s not NATO. It’s a spider’s web.”

This web may not be strong enough to contain China.

Much depends on Japan. Mr Kishida promised a “substantial” rise in defence spending, though he did not commit himself to reaching 2% of GDP, NATO’s benchmark. A law from 2015 provides more leeway to help allies. Japan and Australia have signed a deal allowing them to station troops in each other’s countries. A new national-security strategy later this year may push things further.

India, the world’s largest democracy, is the trophy in America’s quest for stronger alliances. It is increasingly

at odds with China. Its help in controlling the Strait of Malacca would be invaluable in any war with China. The Quad, which has started meeting at the level of leaders, seeks gradually to draw India in. Yet India is wary of an alliance, and remains close to Russia, which supplies a lot of its weapons.

Another prize is ASEAN, the ten-country South-East Asian club. It includes fence-sitters such as Indonesia. “We do not believe in alliances that could in the end threaten other countries,” said Prabowo Subianto, its defence minister. Indonesia holds drills with America but does not want to upset a “benevolent” China.

America has pursued softer forms of collaboration, such as helping Asian governments to police their waters, not least against Chinese illegal fishing. An American coastguard cutter will be deployed to the region. A Quad summit last month promised to help Indo-Pacific countries improve “maritime domain awareness” by sharing information on ships at sea. A Chinese military source was scathing: “Monitoring fishing vessels means also monitoring military ships,” he said.

Ashley Townshend, of the Carnegie Endowment, an American think-tank, argues that America is still not doing enough in Asia. A mutual-defence treaty between the closest allies—America, Australia and Japan—could antagonise South-East Asian countries. Better to create a joint military command between them, Mr Townshend argues: instead of a NATO-like treaty in Asia, a small NATO-like military structure.

The great game in Asia is in full swing. Many in America are only dimly aware of it. On Mr Austin’s e4-b, the screens streaming American news channels barely noticed his globe-spanning defence diplomacy. They were offering competing views of the Capitol-riot hearings, guns and more. Which raises a nagging question: does an America so polarised at home have the will to sustain its dominance abroad? ©The Economist Reprinted with permission

Nikkei Asia 11 June 2022

Ukraine spillover dominates discussion at Singapore security summit After 2-year hiatus, Shangri-La Dialogue returns with a bang SINGAPORE -- Bearing stars and crests on shoulders, high-ranking military personnel decked in a spectrum of colors -- green, gray, brown and white -- paced hurriedly across the hallways of the sprawling Shangri-La Hotel in

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Singapore on Saturday, skillfully navigating cordons and checks by security personnel.

The last time the Shangri-La Dialogue took place in person in 2019, the Quad leaders had never held a summit, and frameworks such as AUKUS -- the new U.S., U.K. and Australia grouping -- and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework -- U.S. President Joe Biden’s attempt to deepen economic engagement in the region -- did not exist.

Hosted by the U.K.’s International Institute for Strategic Studies, the dialogue has traditionally been a forum to discuss regional security issues in the Asia Pacific -- and an annual platform for U.S. and China to project their views.

But the event took a new turn this year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The single biggest topic on participants’ minds, whether they were from the East or the West, was just how the Ukraine war will impact the Indo-Pacific region. Perhaps the sense of urgency was the reason for all the fast walking.

On Saturday, over 570 delegates including top defense officials attended the highlight of the three-day summit: a virtual appearance by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. From the capital Kyiv, the leader warned of the spillover effects of the invasion to other regions.

“We must break the ability of Russia, and any other country in the world, to block seas and destroy the freedom of navigation,” Zelenskyy said in the special address.

He explained that Russia’s control of the Black and Azov seas has blocked the ability of Ukraine, dubbed “the breadbasket of Europe,” to export wheat supplies, and thus contributed to a global food shortage.

Russia must know that its “belligerent policies will have consequences for itself,” Zelenskyy said.

“If there are no such consequences ... and we are unable to export our foodstuffs ... the world will face an acute and severe food crisis and famine in many countries of Asia and Africa.” He added that the war is “not only about Europe,” but affecting everyone, “globally.”

Zelenskyy’s dire comments likely won the sympathy of most participants. But when it comes to Russia’s invasion itself, countries in the Indo-Pacific have been divided in their responses. U.S. allies such as Japan were quick to support various sanctions. Voices from Southeast Asian countries, however, have been a mixed bag.

Singapore imposed its own economic sanctions on Russia, the only country among the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations to go in tandem with the West.

Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines have condemned the attack on Ukraine without naming Russia as the aggressor.

Vietnam opposed an April United Nations motion to boot Russia from the Human Rights Council.

On Saturday, many regional defense chiefs touched on the Ukraine war but some treaded carefully. Indonesia’s Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto said the “situation in

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Ukraine” has shown the Southeast Asia country cannot take its “security and independence for granted” -- without mentioning Russia by name.

For the U.S. and China, the two heavyweights at the dialogue, the focus was Taiwan. U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said in his speech Saturday morning that the U.S. policy on Taiwan has not changed. “Unfortunately, that doesn’t seem to be true for the PRC,” he said, referring to the People’s Republic of China. Austin pointed to Chinese aircraft flying near Taiwan in record numbers.

China, for its part, attended with a huge delegation.

The Global Times, the hawkish tabloid under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship newspaper the People’s Daily, noted that the participation in the dialogue reflected China’s confidence.

“China’s choice to send its top defense official this year at this sensitive time shows China’s confidence and strategic focus, as well as China’s strategic sincerity of pushing the Asia-Pacific to integration and cooperation standing at the crossroads,” the paper quoted Yang Xiyu, a senior research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies, as saying.

The paper also noted that China’s message to the dialogue was that there are several “red lines” that the U.S. should not cross. “It is important to note that the risks in the Asia-Pacific region have reached a point where they must be managed. But this can never be achieved by forcing China to give up its core interests,” such as Taiwan, it said in an editorial Saturday.

Security was tight at the gathering, the first in person meeting after a two-year hiatus due to COVID-19. Outside the hotel, steel barricades that could be raised or lowered to manage vehicles were set up.

The hotel is a 10-minute walk up a hill from the Orchard Road, which is a popular shopping street for tourists. It was also the venue for the meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou in 2015.

Analysts and defense officials actively exchanged views over breakfast and lunch at the hotel restaurant just outside the main hall. Topics included whether Xi would order an invasion of Taiwan, what China’s takeaways from the Ukraine war were, and just how deep China-Russia relations are.

On Sunday, the closing day of the dialogue, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe will deliver an address. In his meeting with Austin on Friday, Wei said “if anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military will not hesitate to fight, and will resolutely crush any ‘Taiwan independence’ attempts to firmly safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity at any cost,” according to the Global Times.

All eyes will be on whether he uses similar vocabulary in his public speech. ©Nikkei Asia Reprinted with permission

CGTN 9 June 2022

Opinion: Shangri-La Dialogue sets up battle of competing security visions for Asia-Pacific The growing geopolitical rivalry between China and the U.S. and their competing and diametrically opposite visions for regional security in the Asia-Pacific will be at the center stage over the next few days as Singapore hosts the Shangri-La Dialogue on June 10-12.

The 19th edition of Asia’s high-profile defense and security conference is returning this year as “a fully in-person event,” after a two-year hiatus due to the COVID-19 pandemic, at a time when the world is facing enormous security challenges.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has thrown Europe at the center of its biggest military crisis since World War II, with its impact felt globally, and also ending the notion that Europe was somehow insulated from such turmoil. Meanwhile, sporadic political and civil unrests have persisted in Africa and South Asia while regional conflicts continue to simmer in the Middle East.

In this backdrop, in a world gripped with many turbulence, the Asia-Pacific is one region that has successfully maintained peace and stability, despite, as one must add, constant provocations from certain global powers that pursue a single-minded agenda – containment of China’s rise and growing influence in the region that they describe as the Indo-Pacific. The rising tensions between China and the U.S. have had many worried about this relative harmony in the long run.

The three-day conference, focused on maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific, will be attended by defense ministers, military chiefs, and top-ranking military officials from more than 40 countries across Asia, Australia, North America, and Europe.

Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio will be delivering the keynote address on the inaugural day, which is expected to offer an important statement on Tokyo’s changing strategic outlook, the regional repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the best way to manage the Asia-Pacific’s many pressing security challenges.

However, amid heightened interest in the China-U.S. dynamics, all eyes this year will be on the two high-voltage speeches by the U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on June 11 and China’s State Councilor and Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe on June 12, in which they are each expected to outline their nation’s respective visions for the security of the Asia-Pacific region.

While Washington’s confrontationist Indo-Pacific strategy has become the cornerstone of its security framework in the region, China’s recently unveiled Global Security

Initiative offers a peek into Beijing’s security vision rooted in win-win cooperation and dialogue.

In recent weeks, the U.S. has taken several measures to signal that Washington’s long-term foreign policy goals are focused on Asia, despite other geopolitical distractions. U.S. President Joe Biden’s summit with Southeast Asian leaders at the White House followed by a visit to South Korea and Japan – his first presidential trip to Asia – last month could be seen in this light.

Soon after, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a vociferous speech laid out the administration’s “anti-China” strategy, accusing Beijing of posing “the most serious longterm challenge to the international order.”

While in Tokyo, Biden participated in the summit meeting of Quad, or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – an informal grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. – that is widely viewed as a bloc aimed at containing China’s power.

Beijing sees Quad as a ploy to create an “Asian NATO” and has described the bloc as a “small clique” that is “bent on provoking confrontation.” China has also criticized Quad’s divisive diplomacy suggesting it represents a “Cold War mentality.”

In Tokyo, Biden also launched an economic initiative called the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in partnership with a dozen other countries from the region including South Korea, Japan, India, and Indonesia, but predictably excludes China. Analysts say IPEF is Biden’s bid to reconstruct the global supply chain without China.

All this is part of Washington’s larger Indo-Pacific strategy that is hinged at creating exclusive strategic geopolitical and geoeconomic alliances with an unsaid objective of curbing China’s rise and influence in the region while perpetuating the hegemonic interests of the U.S. and its allies.

It is important to note that the U.S. has also formed a military alliance with Australia and the UK, dubbed AUKUS, as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy.

Seen in conjunction with all the related developments, this is certainly not the best way of promoting peace and security in the region. Exclusive military alliances, by definition and tacit understanding, target a third party, triggering needless rivalry and an arms race that could lead to confrontation and even conflict.

In contrast to the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy that reeks of archaic Cold War mentality, China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) derives its inspiration from ancient Chinese wisdom for solving security challenges facing humanity. It has been conceived as an initiative for the public good as part of China’s long-stated vision of building a “community with a shared future for mankind” The GSI outlines six commitments: to the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security; to respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; to abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; to taking the legitimate security concerns

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of all countries seriously; to peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation; and to maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains.

The initiative also upholds true multilateralism as it is inclusive and open to the world, welcoming the participation of all countries. The GSI has the potential to shape an international order based on mutual respect, equality, and mutual trust.

In many ways, the GSI could be seen as an extension, from a security perspective, of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which is focused on greater global connectivity and guided by the principles of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits.

On the economic collaboration front, China is already part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s largest free trade agreement which includes the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. India, which took part in the initial negotiations but later decided to opt out, still has the invitation to join the bloc at any time.

China has also applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) which currently has 11 Pacific Rim countries as its members.

The U.S. was a signatory to CPTPP’s predecessor the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) but former President Donald Trump pulled out of the pact within days of taking office in 2017.

China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner for 13 consecutive years since 2009, while the Southeast Asian nations’ bloc became China’s largest trading partner in 2020 and has remained so ever since.

It is clear that China is well-entrenched as a reliable economic and security partner in the Asia-Pacific while the recent U.S. policies are likely to foment trouble and security challenges in the region. Between the two competing visions for maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific, the choice couldn’t be more obvious. ©CGTN Reprinted with permission

the two countries on Sunday, saying Beijing must first lift sanctions on a wide-range of Australian exports.

Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles met with China’s Defence Minister Wei Fenghe in Singapore, where both were attending the annual IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. It was the first public meeting between Australian and Chinese government officials in more than two years, following a diplomatic freeze amid rapidly deteriorating relations.

Marles said the meeting had been a “very frank and full exchange” but also a “critical first step” in restoring relations with Beijing.

At a press conference in Brisbane on Tuesday, Albanese said it was “always a good thing that people have dialogue and have discussions,” something which he said had been “missing” under the previous Australian government.

But the new Australian leader, who was sworn into office after winning an election on May 21, said any further warming of relations with the Chinese government would depend on whether or not they agreed to remove trade sanctions and barriers on Australian exports.

Following a call by then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison in April 2020 for an international investigation into the origins of Covid-19, Australian exports including timber, coal, meat and wine began to face difficulties entering Chinese ports, including tariffs and long customs delays.

“They need to remove those sanctions in order to improve relations between Australia and China,” said Albanese. “It is China that have imposed sanctions, it is China that has changed, and it’s China that needs to remove those sanctions.” ©Bloomberg Reprinted with permission

BBC 12 June

Climate change a bigger threat than war, Fiji tells security summit Fiji has told an Asian security summit that climate change is a bigger threat to the Pacific than military tensions.

Bloomberg 14 June 2022

Australia PM Plays Down China Reset After Diplomatic Meeting Albanese calls for Beijing to lift trade sanctions on imports.

Australia’s deputy PM met with Chinese minister in Singapore Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has downplayed the possibility of a reset in relations with the Chinese government after a high-profile meeting between

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”Machine guns, fighter jets... are not our primary security concern. The single greatest threat to our very existence is climate change,” Fiji Defence Minister Inia Seruiratu said.

He was addressing a summit in Singapore which has focused on China-US tensions and the Ukraine war.

Cyclones have repeatedly battered Fiji and other lowlying Pacific countries.

“It threatens our very hopes and dreams of prosperity.

Human-induced, devastating climate change,” Mr Seruiratu told the forum, called the Shangri-La Dialogue.

Floods in Fiji caused by tropic cyclones have displaced thousands of people in recent years and wrought economic havoc.

Pacific states have urged advanced industrialised nations to do more to combat climate change. ”Waves are crashing at our doorsteps, winds are battering our homes, we are being assaulted by this enemy from many angles,” Mr Seruiratu told delegates.

The world is now about 1.2C warmer than it was in the 19th Century - the result of humans burning fossil fuels, which release greenhouse gases, mostly carbon dioxide (CO2).

But much attention has focused on China’s growing challenge to Western strategic interests in the AsiaPacific region.

In April China signed a security pact with the Solomon Islands, causing concern in Australia, New Zealand and the US. The details of it were not disclosed. Besides the Solomons, Pacific island nations have not so far reached consensus on China’s proposal for a new regional trade and security pact. ©BBC Reprinted with permission

Asahi Shimbun 11 June 2022

Kishida blasts changing status quo through use of military force SINGAPORE--Prime Minister Fumio Kishida pledged in a keynote speech to bolster Japan’s defense spending due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, saying he feared a similar scenario could easily flare in East Asia in the nottoo-distant future.

Kishida delivered his address June 10 to open the Asia Security Summit, also known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, organized by Britain’s International Institute for Strategic Studies and supported by The Asahi Shimbun among other international organizations.

Shinzo Abe in 2014 was the last Japanese prime minister to attend the conference.

While Kishida never outright named Russia and China as the targets of his criticism, he touched upon the Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine as well as military advances in the East China and South China seas as “attempts to unilaterally change the status quo through force and ignoring international law.”

Turning to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and recent salvo of ballistic missile launches, he labeled the reclusive country as a “clear and serious threat” to the international community.

Kishida said the world was at a crossroads of having to choose between protecting a rules-based international order or returning to a world of survival of the fittest in which forceful changing of the status quo becomes the norm.

He laid out his vision for peace consisting of five main pillars: maintaining and strengthening a free and open international order based on rules; strengthening national security; working toward a world without nuclear weapons; strengthening the functioning of the United Nations; and strengthening international cooperation in such areas as economic security.

Kishida said Japan would strengthen its ties with ASEAN to help bring about a free and open Indo-Pacific region, calling it a major goal of Japanese diplomacy. He added that he would release a plan by spring 2023 that he hopes would provide specifics for achieving that goal.

He also pledged about $2 billion (269 billion yen) over a three-year period to nations in the Indo-Pacific region to strengthen their Coast Guard activities.

Saying he harbored a strong sense of crisis that “Ukraine might represent the East Asia of tomorrow,” Kishida pledged to dramatically bolster defense spending over the next five years to shore up Japan’s defense capabilities.

Kishida added that Japan would strengthen the deterrence and response capability of the alliance with the United States as well as promote security cooperation with allies such as Australia.

Excerpts from Kishida’s speech: “Since the pandemic broke out, the world has become even more uncertain. Amidst continuing economic disruption, we have come to recognize the importance of reliable and secure supply chains.

“Then, as the world was still recovering from the pandemic, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine occurred. No country or region in the world can shrug this off as ‘someone else’s problem.’

“It is a situation that shakes the very foundations of the international order, which every country and individual gathered here today should regard as their own affair.

“Can the rules-based international order we have built through hard work, dialogue, and consensus be upheld and the march of peace and prosperity continue? Or will we return to a lawless world where rules are ignored and broken, where unilateral changes to the status quo by force are unchallenged and accepted, and where the strong coerce the weak militarily or economically? That is the choice we have to make today.

“Rules must be respected. Even if they become inconvenient, one cannot be allowed to act as if they did not exist, nor can one be allowed to unilaterally change them. If one wants to change them, a new consensus must be made.

“The ramifications of Russia’s threat to use nuclear weapons are not limited to the threat itself. The threat may have already caused serious damage to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It may have already made it even more difficult for countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons to abandon their plans.

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“Moves to develop and possess nuclear weapons might even spread further to other countries. These are among the various concerns that have been voiced. Even before the Ukraine crisis, North Korea frequently and repeatedly

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launched ballistic missiles, including ICBM-class ones, and we have grave concerns that yet another nuclear test is imminent.” ©Asahi Shimbun Reprinted with permission

APPENDIX II

Selected IISS publications

The Strategic Dossier series harnesses the Institute’s technical expertise to present detailed information on key strategic issues. Recent publications include:

Pierre Haroche and Martin Quencez, ‘NATO Facing China: Responses and Adaptations’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 3, June– July 2022, pp. 73–86.

IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2022 (London: IISS, 2022).

Sharinee L. Jagtiani and Sophia Wellek, ‘In the Shadow of Ukraine: India’s Choices and Challenges’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 3, June–July 2022, pp. 29–48.

IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2021 (London: IISS, 2021).

IISS, Russia’s Military Modernisation: An Assessment (London: IISS, 2020).

IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2020 (London: IISS, 2020).

IISS, ISR & The Gulf: An Assessment (London: IISS, 2019).

IISS, Iran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East (London: IISS, 2019).

Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, the Institute’s bimonthly journal, is a leading forum for analysis and debate of international and strategic affairs.

Recent articles of interest include: Nicolas Lippolis and Harry Verhoeven, ‘Politics by Default: China and the Global Governance of Afri-can Debt’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 3, June–July 2022, pp. 153–78.

David C. Gompert, ‘Four Circles: Comprehending the China Challenge’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 2, April–May 2022, pp. 95–110.

Jeongseok Lee, ‘South Korea’s Aircraft Carrier Debate’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 2, April–May 2022, pp. 35–44.

Samir Puri, ‘Land and Sea: The Evolving Great-power Contest in Asia’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 1, February–March 2022, pp. 227–36.

Nien-chung Chang-Liao, ‘Why Have Chinese Diplomats Become So Aggressive?’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 1, February– March 2022, pp. 179–90.

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, ‘India and US FONOPS: Oceans Apart’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 1, February–March 2022, pp. 131–56.

Barnett R. Rubin, ‘Geography Lessons: American Decline and the Challenge of Asia’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 1, February– March 2022, pp. 121–30.

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Stacie L. Pettyjohn, ‘War With China: Five Scenarios’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 1, February–March 2022, pp. 57–66.

Robert S. Ross, ‘China Looks at the Korean Peninsula: The “Two Transitions”’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 6, December 2021–January 2022, pp. 129–58.

‘Forum: Back to North Korea’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 6, December 2021–January 2022, pp. 101–25.

François Heisbourg, ‘Euro-Atlantic Security and the China Nexus’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 6, December 2021–January 2022, pp. 45–62.

The Adelphi series is the Institute’s principal contribution to policy-relevant, original academic research. Books published since 2021 include: Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward, Japan’s Effectiveness as a GeoEconomic Actor: Navigating Great-Power Competition, Adelphi 481–483 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022).

Desmond Ball, Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Tim Huxley, C. Raja Mohan and Brendan Taylor, Asia’s New Geopolitics: Military Power and Regional Order, Adelphi 478–480 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022).

Bastian Giegerich and Maximilian Terhalle, The Responsibility to Defend: Rethinking Germany’s Strategic Culture, Adelphi 477 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2021).

Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, French Arms Exports: The Business of Sovereignty, Adelphi 475–-476 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2020).

Brendan Taylor, Dangerous Decade: Taiwan’s Security and Crisis Management, Adelphi 470 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2019).

The Military Balance is the Institute’s annual assessment of military capabilities and defence economics worldwide. Region-by-region analyses cover the major military and economic trends and developments affecting security policy and the trade in weapons and other military equipment. Comprehensive tables portray key data on weapons and defence economics. Defence expenditure trends over a ten-year period are also shown.

IISS, The Military Balance 2022 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022).

The Armed Conflict Survey is the Institute’s annual review of political, military and humanitarian trends in current conflicts.

IISS, Armed Conflict Survey 2022 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022).

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Strategic Comments is the Institute’s online source of analysis of international security and politico­ military issues. Articles on South, Southeast and Northeast Asia published in 2021-22 include: ‘The effect of AUKUS on India’s foreign and defence policies’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 28, no. 6, March 2022.

‘China’s 2021 orbital-weapon tests’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 28 no. 3, February 2022.

‘Relations between China and the Arab Gulf States’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 38, December 2021.

‘China and strategic competition in a divided Pacific Islands region’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 37, December 2021.

‘Rising international support for Taiwan’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol., 27, no. 35, December 2021.

‘The economic and security implications of China’s activities in the South China Sea’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 34, November 2021.

‘The arms race on the Korean Peninsula’, vol. 27, no. 30, IISS Strategic Comments, October 2021.

‘Pakistan’s relations with the US after the fall of Kabul’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 25, September 2021.

‘The fraught relationship between Canada and China’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 26, September 2021.

‘The centenary of the Chinese Communist Party’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 20, August 2021.

‘China’s place on the NATO agenda’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol, 27, no. 17, July 2021 ‘Asia’s new generation on pro-democracy protestors’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 15, July 2021.

‘Trans-Tasman tensions over China’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 11. May 2021

Strategic Survey is the Institute’s annual review of strategic developments throughout the world.

Recent sections of interest include: ‘Taiwan: a front line in the new cold war?’, Strategic Survey 2021 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2021).

‘South Korea’s foreign policy: local or global?’, Strategic Survey 2021 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2021).

‘India-China border tensions: what are the strategic implications for the Indo-Pacific?’, Strategic Survey 2021 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2021).

‘The Biden Administration’s South Asia Policy: Change or continuity?’, Strategic Survey 2021 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2021).

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The IISS wishes to thank these sponsors of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2022 LEAD SPONSORS

PRINCIPAL SPONSORS

MAIN SPONSORS

19TH IISS ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Since the inception of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in 2002, this unique experiment in multilateral defence diplomacy has involved defence ministers, deputy ministers, chiefs of defence staff, nationalsecurity advisers, permanent under-secretaries, intelligence chiefs and other national-security and defence officials from a range of participating and guest nations The result has been the growth of the Shangri-La Dialogue into the richest gathering of defence professionals in the Asia-Pacific. The goal of the IISS is to ensure that the Shangri-La Dialogue will continue to serve as the best available vehicle in the Asia-Pacific for developing and channelling astute and effective public policy on defence and security.

The IISS, a registered charity with offices in London, Berlin, Manama, Singapore and Washington is the world’s leading authority on political–military conflict. It is the primary independent source of accurate, objective information on international strategic issues. Publications include the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment, an annual review of key strategic, geopolitical, economic, military and security trends in the Asia-Pacific; The Military Balance, an annual reference work on each nation’s defence capabilities; Strategic Survey, an annual review of world affairs; Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, a bimonthly journal on international affairs; Strategic Comments, offering online analysis of topical issues in international affairs; and the Adelphi book series, the Institute’s principal contribution to policy-relevant, original academic research.

The range of IISS publications, the Institute’s convening power, and its strong international policy perspective make the IISS a key actor in the global strategic and economic debate.

‘The SLD has provided an open, neutral and regular platform for countries to exchange views on regional security issues, challenges and opportunities, as well as differences.’

Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, Singapore ‘In times of upheaval and tensions, it is precisely forums of this kind that not only serve as a chief register of regional geopolitical temperature, but also spell the difference between collectively espousing a path of diplomacy and peace instead of conflict and confrontation.’

Major-General (Retd) Delfin Lorenzana, former secretary of national defense, the Philippines

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