IISS Shangri La Dialogue 2019

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

The International Institute for Strategic Studies Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London | wc2r 2pg | UK www.iiss.org

Š September 2019 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Director-General and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

Editor Dr William Choong

utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now

Contributors Henry Boyd, Siow Boon Chia, Nick Childs, Virginia

known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in

Comolli, Michael Elleman, Dr Bastian Giegerich, James Hackett,

any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing

Dr Tim Huxley, Alexander Neill, Meia Nouwens, Sarah Raine

from the Institute.

Editorial Jessica Watson, Jill Lally Production and Design Carolina Vargas

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Hobbs the Printers Ltd, Hampshire.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies is an independent centre for research, information and debate on the problems of conflict, however caused, that have, or potentially have, an important military content. The Council and Staff of the Institute are international and its membership is drawn from over 90 countries. The Institute is independent and it alone decides what activities to conduct. It owes no allegiance to any government, any group of governments or any political or other organisation.

The IISS stresses rigorous research with a forward-looking policy orientation and places particular emphasis on bringing new perspectives to the strategic debate.

Contents Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Chapter 1 Keynote address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Chapter 2 First plenary session The US vision for Indo-Pacific security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Chapter 3 Second plenary session Korean security: the next steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Chapter 4 Third plenary session Asia’s evolving security order and its challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Chapter 5 Simultaneous special sessions Session 1 Security implications of regional infrastructural development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Session 2 Strategic interests and competition in the South Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Session 3 Defence-industrial development: balancing self-reliance and collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Session 4 Cyber-capability development: defence implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Session 5 Mechanisms for enhancing maritime security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Session 6 New patterns of defence cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38 40 42 44 46 48

Chapter 6 Istana Reception and Dinner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Chapter 7 Fourth plenary session China and international security cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Chapter 8 Fifth plenary session Preventing conflict in contested domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Chapter 9 Sixth plenary session Ensuring a stable and resilient region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Chapter 10 The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Appendices I. Selected press coverage of the 2019 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 II. Selected IISS publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

FOREWORD

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) held

with Canada’s defence minister and the commander of the

its 18th annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore from

US Indo-Pacific Command.

31 May to 2 June 2019. We are delighted to present this

As ever, discussions and debate at the Dialogue

report, which summarises the Dialogue’s open proceed-

reflected the regional security issues at the forefront of con-

ings, including all plenary and special sessions. The full

cern for defence establishments and the non-government

transcripts of these sessions are available on the IISS web-

expert community alike. The key topics discussed included

site. This report also includes a section on the Dialogue’s

the security roles of the United States and China; the next

Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme (SEAYLP).

steps for Korean security; the challenges for Asia’s evolv-

The 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue – which opened with

ing security order; the prevention of conflict in contested

a keynote address from Singaporean Prime Minister Lee

domains; the security implications of regional infrastruc-

Hsien Loong – provided defence ministers, senior defence

tural development; and strategic interests and competition

officials, high-ranking military staff and other distin-

in the South Pacific.

guished delegates from Asia-Pacific national-security

The IISS is grateful to the government of Singapore for

establishments with an invaluable opportunity to examine

its continuing support for the Shangri-La Dialogue process

and discuss current and developing security issues affect-

in 2019. Under the terms of the memorandum of under-

ing the region. The 2019 Dialogue involved 599 delegates,

standing agreed by the IISS and Singapore’s Ministry of

approximately half of whom represented governments

Defence in 2018, Singapore’s support for the Shangri-La

and armed forces. A total of 41 countries sent delegates,

Dialogue will be extended to 2024. As part of this process,

27 of which have been regular annual participants in the

the seventh IISS Fullerton Forum: Shangri-La Dialogue

Dialogue. Fourteen governments that are not regular

Sherpa Meeting was convened successfully in January 2019

participants were also represented. The Comprehensive

and provided valuable input for the IISS as we devised the

Test-Ban Treaty Organisation, the European Union, the

agenda for the 2019 Dialogue.

International Committee of the Red Cross, NATO and the

We also thank the following commercial lead spon-

Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat also sent high-level del-

sors for their additional, vital financial support for the

egations. In 2019, there was again a strong United States

Shangri-La Dialogue: Airbus Group, BAE Systems, Boeing,

congressional delegation including four senators and five

Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. We also extend our

members of the House.

thanks to principal sponsors General Atomics Aeronautical

The 2019 Dialogue provided a venue for more than 200

Systems and Rolls-Royce, as well as main sponsors Asahi

bilateral, trilateral, mini-lateral and multilateral meetings

Shimbun, Booz Allen Hamilton, Maxar Technologies and ST

among government delegations. Acting US Secretary of

Engineering. The Shangri-La Hotel generously sponsored

Defense Patrick Shanahan hosted an informal meeting with

the Dialogue’s opening dinner. The IISS looks forward to

his Southeast Asian counterparts. Singapore’s Minister for

developing these partnerships, and making new ones, with

Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen convened two roundtables for par-

the shared aspiration of advancing regional security dia-

ticipating ministers. The IISS hosted an opening ministerial

logue and cooperation through the Shangri-La Dialogue

reception for national delegation leaders, and also organ-

process over the years to come.

ised the fourth annual SEAYLP, which again provided an opportunity for a new generation of strategists to discuss

Dr John Chipman CMG,

some of the most important security questions of the day.

IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

SEAYLP 2019 involved 39 Young Leaders, who benefited

Dr Tim Huxley,

from events on the Dialogue’s sidelines including meetings

Executive Director, IISS–Asia

Foreword

5

INTRODUCTION

The IISS convened the first Shangri-La Dialogue

Shangri-La Dialogue has come to be seen interna-

in 2002 to fulfil the evident need for a forum where

tionally as a vital Asia-Pacific security institution,

the principals of the region’s national defence estab-

providing governments with the opportunity not only

lishments – together with their counterparts from

to explain their defence and security concerns, and to

the United States and other Western countries with

publicise their defence policies, but also to develop

important security interests in the Asia-Pacific –

their bilateral and other contacts with each other. The

could engage in dialogue aimed at building mutual

Shangri-La Dialogue has helped to cultivate a sense

confidence and fostering practical cooperation. Since

of community among the security establishments of

then it has become, as US secretary of defense James

regional countries and of other powers with significant

Mattis said at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, ‘the

stakes in the Asia-Pacific. Governments, the expert

best opportunity for senior officials to meet’ and

community and the media have increasingly viewed

‘share perspectives’. Speaking at the 2019 Shangri-La

the substance and tone of exchanges at the Dialogue

Dialogue, Australia’s minister of defence, Senator

as important indicators of the state of the region’s

Linda Reynolds, said that the summit provided an

security.

‘invaluable opportunity’ for countries to ‘renew existing connections and to develop new ones’. a key participant state to deliver a keynote address at

THE NEED TO PRESERVE STRATEGIC STABILITY

the opening dinner of the Shangri-La Dialogue. This

The IISS has always sought to ensure that the

year, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong

Shangri-La Dialogue’s agenda is comprehensive

delivered the address, which focused on the impor-

given the vast geographical extent of the region with

tance of the bilateral relationship between China

which it is concerned, the diversity of participant

and the US for regional and international security,

states and the broad spectrum of security challenges

and the need for both of them to cooperate on global

in the region. There is no predetermined overarching

challenges and issues of mutual interest. He also

theme for each year’s Dialogue. Instead, the agenda

put the dangers of Sino-US competition into sharp

consistently reflects what the Institute sees as the most

relief, and emphasised the need for small states to

important contemporary and emerging security con-

retain agency amid such competition by promoting

cerns in the region. There is always some thematic

regional integration and strengthening multilateral

continuity from one year’s Shangri-La Dialogue to the

institutions.

next, but in 2019 two major themes were pre-eminent:

It has become a tradition for a political leader from

Originally known as the Asia Security Summit, the

the need to manage Sino-US competition in the inter-

Shangri-La Dialogue remains the only annual meet-

ests of strategic stability, and the related debate about

ing for Asia-Pacific defence ministers together with

the rules-based regional and global order, including a

permanent heads of defence ministries and military

‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy.

chiefs. A parallel meeting convenes intelligence chiefs

The issue of Sino-US rivalry and competition was

from selected regional and extra-regional states. The

the subject of Prime Minister Lee’s keynote address.

Introduction

7

Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, Singapore; Harjit Singh Sajjan, Minister of National Defence, Canada; and Senator Linda Reynolds, Minister of Defence, Australia

Tea Banh, Minister of National Defence, Cambodia; General Wei Fenghe, Minister of National Defence and State Councilor, China; and Patrick M. Shanahan, Acting Secretary of Defense, United States

His masterful exposition at a time of ructions in the

ister of national defence and state councilor, General

Sino-US relationship was timely, particularly given

Wei Fenghe, assured regional countries that Beijing is

Singapore’s status as both a strategic partner of the

not seeking an all-out conflict with the US over trade.

US and a close economic partner of China. Noting that

Using rhetoric reminiscent of Mao Zedong, he stressed

the Washington–Beijing bilateral relationship is cur-

that China ‘will keep the door open’ to negotiations

rently the ‘most important’ in the world, Lee pinned

with Washington – but if the US wanted to fight, China

the fundamental problem between the two powers

‘will fight till the end’.

on a ‘mutual lack of strategic trust’, while issues such

The issue of Sino-US competition spilled over

as trade and cyber security could be resolved if dealt

into the debate about the character and nature of

with on ‘their own merits’. China, as well as the rest of

regional order. At the 2018 Dialogue, the FOIP concept

the world, needs to adapt to the reality that Beijing has

emerged as a significant focus for discussion. In 2019,

‘shifted the strategic balance and the economic centre

this debate intensified. The US Department of Defense

of gravity of the world’, he said. The prime minister

timed the release of its Indo-Pacific Strategy Report to

recommended that the US forge a ‘new understanding

coincide with Shanahan’s speech on the opening day

that will integrate China’s aspirations within the cur-

of the Dialogue. Echoing the points made by his pre-

rent system of rules and norms’. For its part, Beijing

decessor, James Mattis, at the 2018 Dialogue, Shanahan

should adopt an ‘enlightened and inclusive view’ of its

said that Washington’s blueprint for the Indo-Pacific is

national interests, he said.

based on ‘respect for sovereignty and independence

Sino-US tensions were on display in subsequent

of all nations’; the ‘peaceful resolution of disputes’;

sessions at the Dialogue. Speaking during the first ple-

‘free, fair and reciprocal trade’; and ‘adherence to

nary session, Acting US Secretary of Defense Patrick

international rules and norms, including freedom of

Shanahan suggested that the ‘greatest long-term

navigation and overflight’.

threat’ to the rules-based global order comes from

Other countries’ defence ministers echoed this

actors who seek to undermine it, such as by deploying

approach to the Indo-Pacific. Japanese Minister of

advanced weapons to disputed areas, using influence

Defense Takeshi Iwaya argued that the main pur-

operations and exploiting weak economies for their

pose of the FOIP strategy is to ‘consolidate the rule

own benefit. Speaking the following day, China’s min-

of law in order to foster peace and stability, as well

8

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

as economic prosperity, among regional countries’.

Australian Minister of Defence Reynolds said that the ‘similar principles’ underlying various countries’ visions and concepts for the Indo-Pacific should be ‘a cause for optimism’. Florence Parly, French minister of the armed forces, noted that the assessment of the dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region set out in her ministry’s May 2019 Indo-Pacific strategy paper is ‘not particularly uplifting’. There is growing strategic competition, she said, and multilateralism and its core values, such as sovereign equality, non-interference and the respect of borders, are receding. Parly echoed the call made by President Emmanuel Macron in 2018 for an ‘Indo-Pacific axis with France, India and Australia as its backbone’.

China, however, presented an alternative vision of regional security. Noting the US perspective on

Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS; Penny Mordaunt, Secretary of State for Defence, UK; and Ron Mark, Minister of Defence, New Zealand

the Indo-Pacific, General Wei cautioned that any such perspective needs to ‘take into account the common

Pacific’; ‘Defence-industrial development: balanc-

security and interests of regional countries’. He

ing self-reliance and collaboration’; ‘Cyber-capability

stressed that no approach to regional security should

development: defence implications’; ‘Mechanisms

be based on military blocs, or ‘undermine the interests

for enhancing maritime security’; and ‘New pat-

of others’. He expressed ‘firm opposition’ to ‘the wrong

terns of defence cooperation’. A total of 28 panellists,

words and actions of the US on Taiwan and the South

including

China Sea’.

Mongolia’s minister of defense; the secretary-general

Myanmar’s

national

security

adviser;

On the Dialogue’s opening day, Acting US

of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat; the deputy

Secretary of Defense Shanahan spoke on ‘The US

defence ministers of Malaysia and Russia; and the

vision for Indo-Pacific security’. The second plenary

commanders of US Indo-Pacific and US Cyber com-

session, ‘Korean security: the next steps’, featured

mands, all made opening remarks which were

Republic of Korea (ROK) Minister of National

followed by candid discussions with participating

Defense Jeong Kyeong-Doo; Japanese Minister of

delegates.

Defense Takeshi Iwaya; and Federica Mogherini, the

On the Sunday morning of the Dialogue, China’s

European Union’s High Representative for Foreign

General Wei spoke in the fourth plenary session on

Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the

‘China and international security cooperation’. General

European Commission. The third plenary session,

Ngô Xuân Lich, Vietnam’s minister of national defence;

‘Asia’s evolving security order and its challenges’, fea-

Major-General (Retd) Delfin Lorenzana, Philippine

tured Malaysian Minister of Defence Haji Mohamad

secretary of national defense; and Australian Minister

Sabu; United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence

of Defence Reynolds took the floor in the fifth plenary

Penny Mordaunt; and French Minister of the Armed

session on ‘Preventing conflict in contested domains’.

Forces Parly.

In the sixth and final plenary, ‘Ensuring a resilient

That afternoon, IISS directing and senior staff

and stable region’, the speakers included Indonesian

chaired six special sessions delving into more specific

Minister

contemporary security challenges: ‘Security impli-

Ryacudu; New Zealand’s Minister of Defence Ron

cations of regional infrastructural development’;

Mark; and Singaporean Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng

‘Strategic interests and competition in the South

Hen.

of

Defense

General

(Retd)

Introduction

Ryamizard

9

HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATIONS Since the IISS established the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002, the pressures on the time and attention of defence ministers, military chiefs and the most senior national-security officials in the Asia-Pacific region have increased unrelentingly as the substantive challenges

to

national

and

regional

security

have become more complex and unyielding. The inauguration of other high-level regional defence forums has also put additional pressure on their time and attention. These forums include the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and its offshoot, the ADMM–Plus – an annual event involving the defence establishments of eight ASEAN dialogue partners as well as those of the ASEAN member states. Other security conferences have also been established to serve essentially national objectives;

General Wei Fenghe, Minister of National Defence and State Councilor, China; and Major-General (Retd) Delfin Lorenzana, Secretary of National Defense, Philippines

these include the Xiangshan Forum organised by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Seoul

Even at the first Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002,

Defense Dialogue and India’s Raisina Dialogue. It is

the defence establishments of many Asia-Pacific

striking, though, that governments have consistently

countries were represented at a high level, with

maintained – and in many cases strengthened – their

defence

involvement in the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, which

equivalents from 14 countries participating. In 2019,

has become a recurrent fixture in the calendars of

of the 27 regular participant countries represented at

defence ministers and other military principals across

the Dialogue, 20 sent delegations led by full ministers:

the Asia-Pacific and beyond.

Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, France,

ministers,

deputy

ministers

or

close

Such has been the regional and international

Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar,

appeal of the Shangri-La Dialogue that total delegate

New Zealand, the Philippines, the ROK, Singapore,

numbers have increased since its inception in 2002,

Thailand, Timor-Leste, the UK, the US and Vietnam.

when there were about 160 delegates. This number

Other high-ranking officials, including defence chiefs

increased to 250 in 2006, 330 in 2010, 451 in 2014

and military personnel, led the delegations from

and 602 in 2016. These rising delegate numbers

Bangladesh, Fiji, Germany, Sri Lanka, Sweden and

resulted from sustained efforts by the IISS to increase

Switzerland. Government representatives from 14

participation by senior officials concerned with

other countries in Europe, the Middle East, Latin

security matters in foreign ministries and national-

America and the South Pacific also participated. The

security secretariats, and to expand the representation

EU, the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organisation,

of women, media and businesses among delegates.

the International Committee of the Red Cross, NATO

In 2017, the IISS decided to invite fewer delegates

and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat also sent

and to further strengthen the selection criteria –

high-level delegations.

subsequently, 487 participated. However, demand

Certain key participant countries, including

for delegate places was such that numbers soon rose

Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand,

again: in 2018, 565 delegates attended. In this year’s

the ROK, the UK, the US and, of course, host-nation

2019 Dialogue, participation increased to almost 600

Singapore have, since the Dialogue’s early years,

delegates, bringing numbers close to the peak seen

sent strong delegations almost always led by full

in 2016.

ministers or their equivalents. Other governments

10

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

have strengthened their contingents over time, and

benefit from the opportunity to explain and clarify its

it was notable in 2019 that Vietnam’s delegation

defence posture to a wide audience at a time when

included its minister of national defence, deputy

many in the US and the Asia-Pacific are expressing

minister of national defence and deputy minister of

concerns about Chinese policies.

public security. European interest in the Dialogue

The Shangri-La Dialogue has consistently provided

has grown. In 2018, the UK’s secretary of state for

a platform from which participant countries’ defence

defence, Gavin Williamson, emphasised Britain’s

ministers and other principals can clarify and

commitment to regional security cooperation and

elaborate on their countries’ positions on the most

its robust support for the rules-based international

important regional security topics of the day. This, in

order. In 2019, his successor, Penny Mordaunt, led

turn, has led to the development of a unique culture

the British delegation after taking office only four

of frank and open debate. The Dialogue has also

weeks beforehand. In 2018, French Minister of the

been a unique venue for proposing and advancing

Armed Forces Parly called for countries to uphold

defence initiatives in spheres as diverse as maritime-

international law in the South China Sea. In 2019,

security cooperation against piracy in the Malacca

she stressed her country’s commitment to the Indo-

Strait; the strategic and safety implications of regional

Pacific region and its determination to contribute to

states’ growing submarine capabilities; the regional

regional security.

proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and

As is always the case, there was intense interest

the regional security architecture. In 2018, Singapore’s

among other participating governments, the expert

defence minister, Dr Ng Eng Hen, unveiled a series

community and the media regarding the level of

of initiatives that the city state planned to pursue

participation by China. China first sent official

during its chairmanship of the ADMM. In 2019, the

representation to the Dialogue in 2007. In 2011, General

tradition of countries clarifying their positions and

Liang Guanglie, then-minister of national defence,

advancing defence initiatives continued. Admiral

led the PLA delegation and spoke in a ‘solo’ plenary

Philip Davidson, commander of the US Indo-

session. From 2012–18, China was not represented

Pacific Command, announced the US expansion of

at the same high level. While the PLA emphasised

a programme to help South Pacific states to improve

its continuing recognition of the importance of the

their intelligence sharing. All five defence ministers

Dialogue and its wish to continue benefiting from the

from the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)

opportunity to explain China’s defence posture there,

countries reaffirmed their commitment to the FPDA,

from 2014–16 Beijing’s representation was at the level

and agreed to ensure the partnership’s relevance in

of deputy chief of the General Staff Department. In

areas such as counter-terrorism, maritime security and

2017, the PLA was in the midst of an extensive and

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

intense military-reform process. Nevertheless, the

Defence ministers and officials in the region have

Chinese delegation – which was led by Lieutenant-

increasingly found benefit in using the Shangri-La

General (Retd) He Lei, former vice-president of the

Dialogue as a venue for private bilateral, trilat-

PLA Academy of Military Sciences, China – expressed

eral and multilateral meetings. In 2019, the IISS was

China’s positions through speaking roles in special

aware of more than 200 bilateral and multilateral

sessions and interventions in plenary question-and-

meetings in the Shangri-La Hotel, and there were

answer sessions. In 2018, China’s delegation was

almost certainly many others. The detailed content

again led by Lieutenant-General He. However, it

of such meetings is, naturally, usually confidential.

is significant that in 2019 the Chinese delegation

Nevertheless, governments have sometimes divulged

was led by the aforementioned Minister of National

details of their substance in public statements. At

Defence General Wei (concurrently a state councillor).

the 2019 Dialogue, the US and Singapore reaffirmed

This demonstrates Beijing’s willingness to engage at

their bilateral defence ties, saying that they welcomed

the highest level in the Shangri-La Dialogue, and to

the renewal of their bilateral 1990 memorandum of

Introduction

11

understanding, which enables the US armed forces to use facilities in Singapore. The long-standing tradition of the ministerial roundtable – a feature of the Dialogue since its inception in 2002 – continued in 2019, when Singapore’s minister for defence hosted two roundtables for his ministerial counterparts.

Discussions included the US–China relationship, the challenges of instability on the Korean Peninsula, and the danger of terrorism and returning foreign fighters.

In 2019, Singapore facilitated an informal meeting that included Acting US Secretary of Defense Shanahan, Singaporean Minister for Defence Dr Ng and his Southeast Asian counterparts.

ENRICHING DISCUSSIONS AT THE DIALOGUE The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue has remained above all a

Teo Chee Hean, Senior Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security, Singapore; and General (Retd) Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, Indonesia

Track One intergovernmental meeting. Nevertheless, from the first Dialogue onward participation by non-

participation by legislators with strong defence,

governmental delegates has animated and enriched

security and foreign-affairs interests and expertise. In

the proceedings, particularly through the questions

2019, a particularly strong US congressional delegation

that such delegates pose to ministers and other speak-

comprised four senators and five members of the

ers in plenary and special sessions. In 2019, the IISS

House of Representatives. Senator Cory Gardner,

continued efforts to ensure a strong and diverse cohort

chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific

of non-government delegates. The Southeast Asian

and International Cybersecurity Policy of the US

Young Leaders’ Programme (SEAYLP), which the IISS

Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations, spoke in a

established in 2016, again helped to ensure that there

special session.

were many new faces among that cohort. A separate section in this report provides details of the highly successful 2019 SEAYLP.

LOOKING FORWARD

In 2019, the IISS again ensured that the media

Answering a question at the end of the sixth and

was well represented among the delegates, includ-

final plenary, ‘Ensuring a resilient and stable region’,

ing widely followed bloggers on regional defence and

Singapore’s Minister for Defence Dr Ng stressed the

security, as well as respected newspaper columnists.

importance of adopting a position of realism while

In addition, the press corps at the 2019 Dialogue com-

working optimistically in making efforts to preserve

prised more than 500 journalists. There was again a

the current global order. Appreciating Dr Ng’s com-

diverse selection of private-sector delegates from the

ments, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

region and beyond. The IISS will continue to replen-

Dr John Chipman said that this could be a ‘mantra

ish the ranks of non-governmental delegates, and

that many of us can apply to our own strategic atti-

to increase their diversity, with the aim of further

tudes’. Dr Chipman also noted that there was a risk

expanding awareness of the Shangri-La Dialogue in

of the existing order breaking down into ‘two or three

the wider expert, media and business communities.

hermetically sealed geopolitical, geo-economic ecosys-

Since the first Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002, at which

tems’. Therefore, he said, delegates at the Shangri-La

then-senator Chuck Hagel led a strong, bipartisan US

Dialogue would need to work to ‘ensure that that risk

congressional delegation, the IISS has encouraged

does not occur’.

12

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Tea Banh, Minister of National Defence, Cambodia; General Wei Fenghe, Minister of National Defence and State Councilor, China; and Patrick M. Shanahan, Acting Secretary of Defense, United States

Marillyn Hewson, Chief Executive Officer, Lockheed Martin; Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS; and Senator Linda Reynolds, Minister of Defence, Australia

The 19th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue will be held

Meeting, which will convene senior defence officials

in Singapore from 5–7 June 2020. In the interim, on

and military officers from participant countries in

19–21 January 2020, the IISS will hold the eighth IISS

Singapore in advance of the next Dialogue.

Fullerton Forum: The Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa

Introduction

13

14

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

CHAPTER 1

18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019

KEYNOTE ADDRESS Friday 31 May 2019, 20:00 SPEAKER Lee Hsien Loong Prime Minister of Singapore

Keynote address

Introducing the keynote address by Singapore’s Prime

that China will continue to ‘grow and strengthen’; that

Minister Lee Hsien Loong, IISS Director-General and

it is ‘neither possible nor wise’ to prevent this; and that

Chief Executive Dr John Chipman noted that, during

the country has its own ‘legitimate interests and ambi-

his 15-year tenure, Lee had strengthened the city

tions’. The US would have the most difficult adjustment

state’s ‘reputation for strategic thinking’.

to make, and this should involve ‘forging a new under-

The prime minister started by saying that the ‘world

standing that will integrate China’s aspirations within

is at a turning point’, with globalisation under siege.

the current system of rules and norms’. Washington

However, he pointed to the historical experience of

and Beijing would need to work both together and with

Southeast Asia as a way of providing perspective on

other countries to revise the global system.

the region’s contemporary strategic plight, and empha-

Lee observed that, in the meantime, there are

sised that the US–China bilateral relationship ‘is the

‘stresses and strains’ between the US and China over

most important in the world today’. China’s economic

multiple issues, notably trade. He argued that it was

growth has ‘shifted the strategic balance and the eco-

important to treat the trade dispute ‘on its own merits’

nomic centre of gravity of the world’, he said. Beijing

and to avoid using trade rules for ulterior purposes,

and the rest of the world need to ‘adapt to this new

which could lead to ‘a more divided and troubled

reality’. China has an important stake in upholding the

world’. However, this is ‘starting to happen’, he said,

present rules-based international system, and should

as attitudes on both sides harden. The ‘fundamental

take ‘an enlightened and inclusive view of its long-term

problem’ is the ‘mutual lack of strategic trust’ between

interests’. Nonetheless, other countries need to accept

the two countries. There is no ‘irreconcilable ideo-

Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore

16

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS

logical divide’ and China has extensive links with the

nearly all that had been negotiated’, resulting in the

rest of the world, so a confrontation between the two

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for

powers would be unlike the Cold War. But, if deterio-

Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which additional

rating relations do result in a conflict, where would

countries are now interested in joining. The prime

this end? The prime minister argued that ‘a prolonged

minister expressed hope that the larger and more

period of tension and uncertainty would be extremely

inclusive Regional Comprehensive Economic Partner-

damaging’, particularly because serious international

ship (RCEP) could be finalised during 2019. He went

challenges such as those from North Korea, nuclear

on to say that regional cooperation is not only about

proliferation and climate change could not be man-

trade and pointed to the way that, ‘despite its limita-

aged

Domestic

tions’, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

pressures will complicate efforts by American and

(ASEAN) has ‘deepened ties and kept the peace’

Chinese leaders to avoid ‘extreme outcomes’; many

among its members.

without

US–China

engagement.

Americans have ‘lost confidence in globalisation and

New concepts and platforms for regional coop-

multilateralism’, while Beijing cannot ‘appear to suc-

eration include China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),

cumb to Western pressure’. Ultimately, however, ‘it is

which ‘Singapore supports’ and sees as ‘a construc-

in the interests of both the US and China to reach an

tive mechanism’ for positive Chinese engagement

accommodation and to persuade their domestic pub-

with Asia and beyond. However, Lee also said that

lics to accept it’.

‘the BRI must be open and inclusive and must not

According to the prime minister, Singapore and

turn the region into a closed bloc centred on a single

other small states ‘can do little to influence the big

major economy’. While deepening their links with

powers, but we are not entirely without agency’. Small

China, Asian countries also need to expand their ties

countries can ‘work together to deepen economic

with the US, Europe and Japan. The prime minister

cooperation, strengthen regional integration and build

similarly noted that while several countries have pro-

up multilateral institutions’. Lee referred specifically

posed forms of Indo-Pacific cooperation, Singapore’s

to the need to construct regional – or ‘pluri-lateral’

‘consistent’ attitude is to ‘support regional cooperation

– agreements. Although the US withdrew from the

initiatives which are open and inclusive’. Such initia-

proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Singapore

tives should not ‘create rival blocs, deepen fault lines

and other remaining members agreed ‘to preserve

or force countries to take sides’.

Keynote address

17

In conclusion, Lee emphasised that US–China

in the security sphere. However, he added, ‘to actively

relations will ‘define the tenor of international

avoid taking sides actually also requires actively not

relations for years to come’. Singapore hopes that the

being pressured to take sides’.

two powers will ‘find a constructive way forward’

Shawn Ho, from Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School

that will allow them to cooperate on issues of mutual

of International Studies, asked whether Singapore

interest and global challenges. Noting that some have

shared Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Moham-

argued that compromise is impossible, and even that

ad’s view that there was no need for concern over

the Beijing–Washington clash is a contest between

Huawei’s potential to use its 5G technology for spying.

different civilisations and ideologies, the prime

He also asked, specifically, whether Singapore would

minister said that it is ‘neither reasonable nor realistic’

use the Chinese company for its own 5G network.

to expect all countries to adopt the same cultural

Replying at some length, Lee said that Singapore

values and political systems. After all, he added,

was ‘in the process of defining and selecting our 5G

‘humankind’s diversity is its strength’.

system’, stressing that a resilient telecommunications system is ‘the backbone of the economy’. However, ‘it is quite unrealistic to expect 100% security from any

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

telecoms system’, and other considerations include

Following Prime Minister Lee’s address, Lieutenant-

cost, reliability, growth potential and vendor diversity.

General (Retd) He Lei, former vice-president of the

In the long term, there need to be ‘established rules’

Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy

and agreements on cyber behaviour; in the mean-

of Military Sciences, asked what the US and China

time, ‘each country will have to weigh the options,

should do to avoid confrontation and conflict, and

the uncertainties, and will have to make its own

how smaller countries could avoid taking sides

choice’.

between the two powers. Lee responded by saying

Dr Chung Min Lee, Chairman of the IISS Advi-

that Beijing and Washington needed to engage ‘at the

sory Council, asked what the prime minister’s

top level’ and to agree that both sides need to ‘adjust’.

advice would be to the Chinese leadership if they

Once that context is established, the two sides could

wish to ‘increase their comfort level’ with Southeast

discuss ‘specific issues’ on their merits, resolving them

and East Asian countries. Lee replied that this ‘is a

‘one by one’. Small countries, he said, should try to

challenge that every big country faces’, and quoted

maintain and develop relations with both sides, even

the first prime minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew’s

Lieutenant-General (Retd) He Lei, former Vice-President of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, China

18

Shawn Ho, Associate Research Fellow, Regional Security Architecture Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Dr Chung Min Lee, Chairman of the Advisory Council, IISS; Senior Fellow, Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

aphorism that ‘when elephants fight, the grass is

peace’. ‘There is something to be learnt from the US

trampled; when elephants make love, the grass

experience in Asia’, the prime minister concluded.

also suffers’. But major powers, he said, cannot rely

Drawing the keynote address to a close, Dr John

on force – they need the legitimacy that only ‘soft

Chipman thanked the prime minister ‘for your sup-

power’ can provide. He pointed to the ways in which

port to the IISS, for the Shangri-La Dialogue process

the US has won friends in Asia through a ‘breadth of

and for the goals that we have set ourselves for seri-

spirit’ and ‘generosity’ in its policies, allowing coun-

ous dialogue here that you have so effortlessly and

tries in the region ‘to grow, prosper and compete in

fluently championed’.

Keynote address

19

20

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019

CHAPTER 2 The US vision for Indo-Pacific security

FIRST PLENARY SESSION Saturday 1 June 2019, 08:35 SPEAKER Patrick M. Shanahan Acting Secretary of Defense, United States

FIRST PLENARY SESSION

The US vision for Indo-Pacific security

Patrick M. Shanahan, Acting Secretary of Defense, United States

Acting US Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan

access much of these technologies and benefit from the

reaffirmed

to

compounding effects of US investments and progress’.

the Indo-Pacific’. He discussed US ties with the

No nation could ‘go it alone’ in this developing ‘shared

region, defence modernisation and Washington’s

security order’, and ‘no nation can or should dominate

regional

the Indo-Pacific’.

the

vision.

United

States’

According

to

‘commitment

Shanahan,

the

Indo-Pacific is the Pentagon’s ‘priority theatre’.

The

US

National

Defense

Strategy

lays

Shanahan described the principles underpin-

out

ning Washington’s blueprint for the ‘Free and Open

Washington’s defence objectives and efforts, and

Indo-Pacific’ as respect for the sovereignty and inde-

the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report – released by the

pendence of all nations; peaceful dispute resolution;

Pentagon concurrently with Shanahan’s address –

free, fair, and reciprocal trade and investment; and

illustrates regional implementation. The region would

adherence to international rules and norms, includ-

benefit, Shanahan said, from the October 2018 Better

ing freedom of navigation and overflight. He said that

Utilization of Investments Leading to Development

while the region has seen significant economic growth,

(BUILD) Act, prioritising low- and middle-income

security and economics are interdependent, and the

states. The Defense Department is modernising,

US does not want any regional state to have to ‘choose

underpinned by innovation and new technology, thus

or forego economic relations with any partner’.

enabling strengthened alliances and new partnerships.

Shanahan said it was important to call out dis-

‘Partners who pursue inter-operability with us as part

ruptive actors and take a stand against challenges,

of a regional security network will’, he said, ‘be able to

including those on the Korean Peninsula; attacks by

22

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Patrick M. Shanahan, Acting Secretary of Defense, United States; and Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS

militants; and the ‘greatest long-term threat’ from

unique challenges in this theatre’. Before outlining US

actors seeking to undermine the rules-based interna-

regional military ties, he said that increased funding

tional order. Examples of the latter include deploying

would enable improved US capabilities and postures,

advanced weapons to militarise disputed areas; using

including accelerating the forward presence of land

influence operations; exploiting weak economies for

forces and stationing ‘some of our highest-end, most

political and economic benefit; and ‘promoting state-

capable assets in the Indo-Pacific’. Shanahan also

sponsored theft of other nations’ military and civilian

noted that the region’s size and complexity neces-

technology’. We cannot, he said, ‘continue to look the

sitated the ‘greatest degree of cooperation’ and that

other way as countries use friendly rhetoric to distract

the US is ‘up to the challenge’. More states are taking

us from unfriendly acts’.

part in combined military exercises with the US; in the

In Washington’s Indo-Pacific vision, partners

last two years, there has been a 17% increase in global

could find security and prosperity as part of a net-

participation in these exercises, which have benefited

work of interconnected peoples, economies and

the region. As an example, he highlighted the May

security relationships. It is, Shanahan said, in China’s

2019 La Pérouse quadrilateral maritime exercise in the

interests to have a cooperative relationship with the

Indian Ocean, involving naval forces from Australia,

US, ‘but behaviour that erodes other nations’ sover-

France, Japan and the United States. Who else, Shana-

eignty and sows distrust of China’s intentions must

han posited, could ‘bring together militaries otherwise

end’. He stressed that the US stood against a ‘myopic,

separated by three oceans and 9,000 kilometres?’

narrow and parochial view of the future’ and supported a ‘free and open order that has benefited us all, including China’.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Shanahan said that the Pentagon is focusing on

Dr Lynn Kuok, IISS associate fellow, asked if the

preparedness, and strengthening partnerships and a

BUILD Act was ‘too little, too late’, given China’s pro-

regional security network. Although the US is not seek-

gress in developing its Belt and Road Initiative. Yoichi

ing conflict, ‘we know that having the capability to win

Kato, senior research fellow at the Asia Pacific Initia-

wars is the best way to deter them’. Many investments

tive, asked whether the US would adjust aspects of its

in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence,

strategy documents to avoid a strategic face-off with

hypersonics and directed energy are ‘aimed at the

China. Dr François Heisbourg, IISS senior adviser

First plenary session

23

Dr Lynn Kuok, Senior Research Fellow, University of Cambridge; Visiting Scholar, Paul Tsai China Center; Associate Fellow, IISS

Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

Major-General Xu Hui, Commandant, International College of Defense Studies, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University

for Europe, asked what Washington could do to build

On the question of trust, he said that it is important

or rebuild trust with Beijing. Bonnie Glaser, senior

to recognise where there are disagreements; ‘trust is

adviser for Asia and director of the China Power Pro-

built by working on projects and being shoulder to

ject at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,

shoulder’. Shanahan described how he presented Chi-

asked how military communications with China should

nese Minister of National Defence and State Councilor

improve. Major-General Xu Hui, commandant of the

General Wei Fenghe with a book detailing ship-to-ship

International College of Defense Studies at the People’s

transfers of oil in the area near China, saying ‘this is

Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University,

an area where you and I can cooperate’. Respond-

asked how Shanahan would use his corporate experi-

ing to Glaser, he said that frequent communication

ence with Boeing to improve the US–China relationship.

could help not only prevent incidents but also identify

Shanahan responded that the BUILD Act comple-

opportunities for cooperation. Finally, Shanahan said

ments many other US measures in the region. The only

that during his experience at Boeing, China ‘was our

adjustment the US would make to its strategy would be

biggest customer and biggest competitor’ – opportu-

‘to do more of it’, and discussions with Chinese coun-

nity exists, but has ‘to be grounded in norms and rules

terparts would include how to enhance cooperation.

and communication’.

Dr François Heisbourg, IISS Senior Adviser for Europe

24

Yoichi Kato, Senior Research Fellow at the Asia Pacific Initiative

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019

CHAPTER 3 Korean security: the next steps

SECOND PLENARY SESSION Saturday 1 June 2019, 09:30 SPEAKERS Jeong Kyeong-Doo Minister of National Defense, Republic of Korea Takeshi Iwaya Minister of Defense, Japan Federica Mogherini High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, European Union; Vice-President, European Commission

SECOND PLENARY SESSION

Korean security: the next steps

Jeong Kyeong-Doo, Minister of National Defense, Republic of Korea

Republic of Korea (ROK) Minister of National Defense

plete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and the

Jeong Kyeong-Doo began on an optimistic note, stat-

creation of a permanent peace regime, the reduction

ing that Seoul has found ‘a ray of hope within the

of military tensions and the mitigation of the risk of

seemingly insurmountable clouds of war’, and that

war. The defence minister did not provide a definition

inter-Korean relations have improved during the

of ‘denuclearisation’. Instead, he cited the implemen-

pursuit of ‘diplomatic solutions aimed at solving the

tation of the Comprehensive Military Agreement

nuclear threat’.

(CMA), which serves as an initial but concrete step

In his view, the three inter-Korean summits and

toward permanent peace. Under the CMA, the two

two US–North Korea summits altered the security

Koreas have ceased military aggression in all domains

dynamics on the Korean Peninsula by ‘boosting con-

including land, air and sea since November 2018. The

fidence and easing tensions between the two Koreas’.

Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) is currently undergoing

The changed security situation provided the necessary

‘actual demilitarisation’, with the withdrawal of ‘all

diplomatic space for the pursuit of a peaceful resolu-

guarded posts installed at key points within the DMZ’.

tion of the nuclear issue.

The ROK government, according to Jeong, will

Jeong focused his remarks on the progress real-

maintain the momentum of ROK–DPRK dialogue

ised during the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration and the

generated by the summit talks ‘within a framework

Pyongyang Joint Declaration, where ROK President

agreed upon by the international community’, and

Moon Jae-in and Democratic People’s Republic of

will adhere to all United Nations Security Council

Korea (DPRK) leader Kim Jong-un agreed on the com-

(UNSC) resolutions. In parallel, Seoul will continue its

26

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Takeshi Iwaya, Minister of Defense, Japan

efforts to create a ‘peace cooperation community’ and

remains unchanged. Tokyo demands the ‘complete,

an ‘economic cooperation community’ to foster a more

verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement’ (CVID) of

vibrant and peaceful peninsula. The defence minister

all Pyongyang’s weapons of mass destruction and bal-

concluded with a plea to ‘hold on to this once-in-a-life-

listic missiles of all ranges in accordance with relevant

time opportunity for denuclearisation’.

UNSC resolutions.

Japanese Minister of Defense Takeshi Iwaya began

Iwaya also emphasised the importance of two

his remarks by welcoming the strong US commitment

mutually enforcing approaches: the reinforcement of

to the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy.

international surveillance and the individual efforts

Japan sees tremendous value in the FOIP concept and

of regional countries to fully implement sanctions.

its role in consolidating ‘the rule of law in the Indo-

He stressed that Japan would continue to work on

Pacific’ that fosters ‘peace and stability, as well as

strengthening Japan–US and Japan–US–ROK coop-

economic prosperity’ in the region.

eration, such as through joint exercises in particular to

While supportive of the diplomatic efforts of the

enhance ballistic-missile early-warning capability. The

ROK and the US, Iwaya offered a different policy

robust deterrent inherent in the presence of the US in

approach, one that emphasises robust deterrence and

Northeast Asia remains vital to regional stability.

enhanced implementation of UN sanctions against

Federica Mogherini, European Union High Repre-

North Korea by all states within the region and

sentative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and

beyond. At the same time, the door would be held

Vice-President of the European Commission, declared

open for the nuclear disarmament of Pyongyang and

that Asian security ‘matters to Europe’. In her view,

peace on the Korean Peninsula.

the EU has made tremendous progress on its commit-

Iwaya reminded everyone that there has been ‘no

ments to work more closely than ever with countries

essential change’ in North Korea’s nuclear and missile

belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian

capabilities. North Korea maintains several hundred

Nations (ASEAN), ‘not only politically and economi-

operational ballistic missiles that have the entire terri-

cally, but also on security, including on the military

tory of Japan within range. The minister went further,

level’. Mogherini cited as examples the EU’s partici-

describing North Korea’s launch of short-range ballis-

pation in a recent multinational naval exercise and

tic missiles the previous month as a clear violation of

security agreements the Union has established with

relevant UNSC resolutions. Japan’s position, he said,

the ROK, New Zealand and Australia.

Second plenary session

27

Federica Mogherini, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, European Union; VicePresident, European Commission

The high representative also said that Europe has

that the inter-Korean talks and the US–North Korea

maintained a consistent policy regarding North Korea,

talks are linked to one another, with both sets of talks

stating her belief that lasting peace on the Korean

only progressing if they ‘advance in parallel’.

Peninsula is possible, even if unlikely. She added that

The high representative closed by promising that

solutions must be peaceful and diplomatic, and that

the EU is ready to contribute more to Asian security,

the denuclearisation of Pyongyang must be complete,

whether by reinforcing tougher sanctions on North

verifiable and irreversible.

Korea; offering European expertise in nuclear nego-

Mogherini praised ROK President Moon for his

tiations; crafting a monitoring and verification system;

leadership and courage in exploring possible ways for-

or providing reassurance and security guarantees to

ward with the DPRK, and applauded the US decision

North Korea if it denuclearises and strives for a lasting

to engage in summitry with Pyongyang. She noted

peace on the peninsula.

Stephen Biegun, Special Representative for North Korea, US Department of State

Ankit Panda, Senior Editor, The Diplomat

28

Tadashi Maeda, Governor of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

William Emmott, Chairman of the IISS Trustees

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

range ballistic missile (SRBM). Ankit Panda from the

Most of the questions focused on the effectiveness of

Diplomat asked whether the SRBM launch was a hostile

sanctions and the difficulties associated with denu-

act under Seoul’s interpretation of the CMA. William

clearisation. Stephen Biegun, special representative

Emmott, chairman of the IISS trustees, echoed the senti-

for North Korea at the US Department of State, noted

ment of scholars of both non-proliferation and of Korea,

that ‘there may be no issue of national security upon

questioning whether the chances of denuclearisation

which the US and the EU are more closely aligned than

were ‘approximately zero’.

the strategic risks that come from nuclear weapons on

Jeong said that across all domains – air, land and sea

the Korean Peninsula’. He credited the contributions

– North Korea is acting ‘within the boundaries of the

made by China and Russia in pursuing the shared

CMA’, and that some policy changes are expected with

goals of peace and stability on the peninsula and the

regard to Pyongyang. Iwaya was more direct, stress-

elimination of nuclear weapons there.

ing that the SRBM launch was ‘in violation’ of relevant

Tadashi Maeda, governor of the Japan Bank for

UNSC resolutions. On the chances of denuclearisation,

International Cooperation, asked why Seoul had taken

Mogherini cited Nelson Mandela: the issue ‘always

days to report the launch of a North Korean short-

looks impossible until it is done’.

Second plenary session

29

30

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019

CHAPTER 4 Asia’s evolving security order and its challenges

THIRD PLENARY SESSION Saturday 1 June 2019, 11:30 SPEAKERS Haji Mohamad Sabu Minister of Defence, Malaysia Penny Mordaunt Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom Florence Parly Minister of the Armed Forces, France

THIRD PLENARY SESSION

Asia’s evolving security order and its challenges Haji Mohamad Sabu, Minister of Defence, Malaysia

Malaysian Minister of Defence Haji Mohamad Sabu

intra-regional lens, with overlapping border claims,

observed that the Asia-Pacific’s geopolitical landscape

the mass movement of refugees and internal conflicts,

has changed tremendously in recent years. Should

such as the plight of the Rohingya in Myanmar – a

smaller states be forced to take sides amid ‘the rea-

conflict that has now taken on security and strategic

lignment and restructuring of middle powers’ foreign

dimensions beyond the country’s borders. Finally, the

and security policies’, he said, this would have ‘det-

third involves risks and emerging trends in the region,

rimental implications on economic development and

including maritime violence, terrorism and cyber

nation-building’. One of the biggest challenges is the

security. In the South China Sea, for example, major-

region’s complex security dynamics, particularly

power rivalry has aggravated tensions which could

given competition over natural resources, overlapping

lead to major conflict, potentially involving member

claims on ‘strategic hotspots’ and competition in the

states belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian

South China Sea.

Nations (ASEAN).

Mohamad placed the Asia-Pacific security order

Mohamad said that countries ‘need to rise above

into three ‘categories of outlook’. The first is geopo-

tighter regional security cooperation’ not by being

litical competition, primarily due to the uncertain

reactive, but by working strategically together. Strong

relationship between the United States and China – a

collaboration would increase inter-operability and

relationship that will shape the stability of the region

capability in facing common threats, and Malaysia, he

and particularly Southeast Asian countries. The

said, will play its part by participating in efforts to find

second sees the future of Southeast Asia through an

solutions to various global issues.

32

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Penny Mordaunt, Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom

UK Secretary of State for Defence Penny Mordaunt

Defence Arrangements (FPDA), and will ‘deploy to

started her address by underscoring Sir Stamford

Thailand for exercise Panther Gold, using the 2,000

Raffles’s decision 200 years ago to create a free port

Gurkhas and Armed Forces personnel based in Brunei

in Singapore – a testament to how ‘lasting success

and the region’.

depends on a win–win approach’. Given the series of

French Minister of the Armed Forces Florence

threats facing the Asia-Pacific, including terrorism,

Parly opened her plenary speech by noting that France,

malicious cyber activity and Norths Korea’s nuclear-

in ‘a bit of competition’ with the UK in 2018, has sent

weapons programme, countries across the region

more assets to the Indo-Pacific. While her predecessor

need to protect and strengthen the rules-based order.

Gavin Williamson had argued about whether it was

To achieve prosperity and stability, she said, all states

two or three naval vessels a year, Parly said that she

should choose a future in which shared standards –

has ‘upped my game’ by coming to Singapore with a

‘whether they are in the maritime environment, in

full carrier strike group, featuring an aircraft carrier,

cyberspace or in human-rights law’ – drive success

destroyers, tankers, 20 Rafale fighter jets, E-2C Hawk-

and growth.

eye airborne early-warning aircraft and helicopters.

Mordaunt stressed that the UK is committed to

She highlighted French President Emmanuel Macron’s

being a reliable partner, and that its engagement

2018 speech in Australia, during which he ‘made a

across the region is underpinned by support for global

case for an Indo-Pacific axis with France, India and

values such as human rights, democracy and respect

Australia’, involving cooperation with other regional

for the rules-based international order. ‘Global Brit-

(and European) countries. The carrier strike group has

ain’, she added, has seen the Royal Navy maintain

participated in the campaign to eradicate the Islamic

‘an almost unbroken presence in the region over the

State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) in Syria, taken part

last 12 months’. This will continue and also feature

in exercises with the Indian Navy and participated

the first operational deployment of the Royal Navy’s

in exercises with the Australian and Japanese navies.

new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, in a couple

Parly described this as ‘policy in action’. In the coming

of years’ time. London will build on its relationship

days, the minister said it would also participate in

with ASEAN, and deepen alliances with regional part-

joint exercises with the Singaporean navy.

ners such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand and India.

Parly said that regional cooperation ‘is more nec-

The UK will continue to exercise with the Five Power

essary than ever, given Asia’s evolving security order

Third plenary session

33

Florence Parly, Minister of the Armed Forces, France

and its challenges’. She said that France has just pub-

of greater European contributions in the Indo-Pacific.

lished its Indo-Pacific strategy document, in which

Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar, research professor at the

Paris has identified five priorities. Firstly, it will pro-

Indonesian Institute of Sciences, asked Parly about the

tect its sovereign interests, nationals and territories.

tensions between ASEAN centrality and the increased

Secondly, it will continue to contribute to regional

involvement of extra-regional powers. Major-General

security through military and security cooperation

(Retd) Zhang Yingli, professor at the People’s Lib-

with countries such as India, Australia and Malay-

eration Army (PLA) National Defense University in

sia, among other key partners. Thirdly, it will seek to

China, asked Parly whether the code of conduct for the

preserve the ‘free and open access to maritime lines

South China Sea, which is currently being negotiated

of communication’, particularly in the South China

between China and ASEAN, will play an endur-

Sea. Fourthly, it will contribute to stability through

ing role in maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific.

multilateral action – sparticularly to combat nuclear

Sophia Yan, China correspondent for the Daily Tel-

proliferation. In reference to countries that have

egraph, asked Mordaunt what assurances the United

sought to solve the North Korean problem by falling

Kingdom can give to assuage concerns about Huawei

‘in love with Kim Jong-un’, Parly said that France will

building 5G networks in the country. Aaron Con-

support ‘love among nations’ and diplomatic efforts in

nelly, IISS research fellow in Southeast Asian political

the hope that they achieve ‘complete, verifiable, irre-

change and foreign policy, asked Mohamad whether

versible nuclear disarmament’. Finally, France will

the US and China ‘really play equal roles in creating

seek to mitigate the risks of climate change and coop-

tensions in the South China Sea’.

erate with as many partners as possible.

Parly responded by stating that France has sought to convince – and has convinced – other European powers that the Indo-Pacific is a key area. The best

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

combination for the region, she said, is to assert

The three speakers answered a variety of questions,

ASEAN centrality while allowing other significant

ranging from Europe’s involvement in the Indo-

powers to play major roles. With regard to the South

Pacific, to freedom of navigation and cyber security. Dr

China Sea code of conduct, the minister said that while

Liselotte Osgaard, senior adviser at the Danish Minis-

France supports it, Paris would not consider any fait

try of Foreign Affairs, asked Parly about the prospects

accompli to be in accordance with the United Nations

34

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Dr Liselotte Osgaard, Senior Adviser, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Research Professor, Indonesian Institute of Sciences

Major-General (Retd) Zhang Yingli, Professor, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University, China

Sophia Yan, China Correspondent, Daily Telegraph

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On the

not become an issue of power competition between

issue of 5G networks and cyber security, Mordaunt

China and the US, but that the imperative is increased

responded that the UK would not compromise on its

diplomacy. Malaysia, he added, cannot fight with

security, nor its security relationships with key part-

ships from the Chinese Coast Guard sent into Malay-

ners. Mohamad said that the South China Sea should

sian waters; engagement and diplomacy are necessary.

Third plenary session

35

36

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

CHAPTER 5

18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019

SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSIONS Saturday 1 June 2019 Session 1 Security implications of regional infrastructural development Session 2 Strategic interests and competition in the South Pacific Session 3 Defence-industrial development: balancing self-reliance and collaboration Session 4 Cyber-capability development: defence implications Session 5 Mechanisms for enhancing maritime security Session 6 New patterns of defence cooperation

SPECIAL SESSION 1

Security implications of regional infrastructural development

CHAIR

This first special session explored regional infrastruc-

Dr Lynn Kuok

ture development in the Asia-Pacific and its potential

Senior Research Fellow, University of Cambridge;

security implications. U Thaung Tun stressed that

Visiting Scholar, Paul Tsai China Center; Associate

infrastructure development is a priority for the region,

Fellow, IISS

considering the rise of emerging markets and economies. Myanmar sees infrastructure projects as part of

OPENING REMARKS

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as fundamental

Enkhbold Nyamaa

to its growth, and will take full advantage of opportu-

Minister of Defense, Mongolia

nities such as the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor while maintaining a flexible security posture to lever-

U Thaung Tun National Security Advisor; Union Minister, Ministry of

age Beijing’s rise. Although Myanmar accepts that the

Investment and Foreign Economic Relations, Myanmar

BRI serves China’s geopolitical and strategic interests, he added that the Marshall Plan did the same for the

Tadashi Maeda Governor, Japan Bank for International Cooperation

US. Enkhbold Nyamaa emphasised that Mongolia’s future largely depends on China, although, due to the

Dr Lanxin Xiang Director, Centre of One Belt and One Road Studies,

country’s geographical location, Russia will also play

China National Institute for SCO International

an important role in developing Mongolia’s infrastruc-

Exchange and Judicial Cooperation

ture. He also said that infrastructure connecting the three countries would be mutually beneficial.

According to Dr Lanxin Xiang, the so-called ‘debttrap diplomacy’ is a conspiracy created by the United States, one which is neither fair nor accurate. While

38

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

U Thaung Tun, National Security Advisor; Union Minister, Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations, Myanmar

Dr Lynn Kuok, Senior Research Fellow, University of Cambridge; Visiting Scholar, Paul Tsai China Center; Associate Fellow, IISS

Tadashi Maeda, Governor of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation

Enkhbold Nyamaa, Minister of Defense, Mongolia

Dr Lanxin Xiang, Director, Centre of One Belt and One Road Studies, China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation

American discourse claims that China traps host coun-

tionship with the US, with which it has also signed

tries in debt, Xiang stated that ‘it might not be China

a memorandum of understanding on the ‘Free and

“trapping other countries”, it could be the other way

Open Indo-Pacific’ vision. According to Maeda, no

around’, whereby China is ensnared by debt that

single country can be a lone actor in the region, and

cannot be repaid. Bad loans, he said, are the result of

thus collaboration and cooperation will be key.

Chinese state-owned enterprises still lacking the nec-

The audience questioned the panel about China’s

essary skills and discipline to pursue international

level of policy coordination for the BRI and whether

projects. The real challenge, he added, is for China to

China could multilateralise the project in terms of

work with foreign partners on benchmark projects.

pooling capital and evaluation. Xiang responded by

This would help Beijing to discipline its own financial

saying that the BRI has the involvement of China’s

system. Tadashi Maeda said that Japan was initially

‘highest level’ of leadership above that of the State

sceptical of the BRI; now, Tokyo will cooperate with

Council. He added that while Beijing ‘never liked mul-

China in certain projects and is hopeful that it will

tilateralism for a long time’, since then the country has

become a multilateral effort. Nevertheless, Japan will

‘discovered’ multilateralism, which is now ‘consid-

continue to be careful to maintain a balanced rela-

ered an important asset for China’s external relations’.

Special session 1

39

SPECIAL SESSION 2

Strategic interests and competition in the South Pacific

CHAIR

The panellists in the second special session all agreed

Sarah Raine

that countering the effects of climate change is the key

Consulting Senior Fellow for Geopolitics and Strategy,

priority for the South Pacific. United States Indo-Pacific

IISS

Commander Admiral Philip Davidson highlighted the close cooperation between the US and many of

OPENING REMARKS

its regional and international partners, and said that

Dame Meg Taylor

combatting illegal and unreported fishing, environ-

Secretary-General, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat Admiral Philip Davidson Commander, US Indo-Pacific Command

mental degradation, human trafficking and economic development is Washington’s top priority. To address those challenges, he said, Washington has increased its regional presence; strengthened its capacity-building

Frances Adamson Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,

efforts; offered military, scientific and technological

Australia

support to local partners; promoted private US invest-

Alice Guitton

ments and trade deals; and delivered development

Director-General, International Relations and

aid to Pacific Islands. Representing the latter, Dame

Strategy, Ministry of the Armed Forces, France

Meg Taylor welcomed the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue as an opportunity for Pacific Islands states to have their voices heard. Too often, she said, while a growing number of traditional and non-traditional actors turn their attention to the South Pacific, members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) are left out of strategic dis-

40

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Dame Meg Taylor, Secretary-General, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat

Alice Guitton, Director-General, International Relations and Strategy, Ministry of the Armed Forces, France

Frances Adamson, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia

Admiral Philip Davidson, Commander, US IndoPacific Command

Sarah Raine, Consulting Senior Fellow for Geopolitics and Strategy, IISS

cussions regarding the region. Taylor also stressed that

the needs of local countries. Guitton also stressed that

climate change was the single greatest threat to security

France is a nation of the South Pacific, as illustrated

and development in the region, and lamented that not

by its permanent military presence in New Caledonia

enough was being done to reduce carbon emissions.

and French Polynesia, and its EEZs in the region; it is

In response to the demand for support by Pacific

also committed to addressing illegal fishing, illegal

Islands states, Frances Adamson stressed that Aus-

trafficking at sea, natural disasters and climate change.

tralia has increased its efforts. The recent establishment

During

the

ensuing

discussion,

participants

of the Office of the Pacific within Australia’s Depart-

debated questions on the possible pitfalls of securitis-

ment of Foreign Affairs and Trade is just one indicator

ing climate risks, as well as the role of China as a key

of Canberra’s commitment. The desire to tackle cli-

partner and lender to many Pacific Islands states, and

mate change, protect exclusive economic zones (EEZs)

speculated as to whether China is building a military

and deliver prosperity – rather than geostrategic com-

base in Vanuatu. Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo,

petition among nations – drives Canberra’s efforts,

research fellow at the Institute of War Studies, Acad-

she added. Competition, however, can produce posi-

emy of Military Science of the People’s Liberation

tive outcomes, argued Alice Guitton, provided that

Army (PLA), dismissed such speculation, saying that

it occurs within a context of transparency, non-inter-

Beijing has only one overseas military base in Djibouti

ference and respect for sovereignty, and in line with

and none in the Pacific.

Special session 2

41

SPECIAL SESSION 3

Defence-industrial development: balancing self-reliance and collaboration

CHAIR

The third special session focused on emerging

Dr Tim Huxley

defence-industrial capability in the Asia-Pacific and

Executive Director, IISS–Asia

the associated challenges of balancing domestic industry and international collaboration. Senator

OPENING REMARKS

Liew Chin Tong started by outlining the current

Senator Liew Chin Tong

Malaysian government’s development of a Defence

Deputy Minister of Defence, Malaysia

White Paper, which describes the defence industry as ‘a catalyst for the economy’. Realistically, he said,

Greg Moriarty Secretary of the Department of Defence, Australia Lieutenant-General (Retd) Agus Widjojo Governor, National Resilience Institute, Indonesia

self-reliance will be limited and selective, focusing, for example, on producing parts of aircraft rather than full aircraft. Greg Moriarty described Australia’s focus on industry as a fundamental part of defence

Andrea Thompson Under Secretary for Arms Control and International

capability and highlighted the importance of keeping

Security, United States Department of State

public opinion onside. He stressed that while paying a premium for a first-rate domestic product is seen

Jan-Olof Lind State Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Sweden

as acceptable, settling for second best in order to procure locally is not.

Lieutenant-General (Retd) Agus Widjojo noted that although self-reliance is an ideal for many states, it requires time, proper planning and copious research and development (R&D) funding for implementation.

He observed that the question of self-reliance versus

42

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Senator Liew Chin Tong, Deputy Minister of Defence, Malaysia

Greg Moriarty, Secretary of the Department of Defence, Australia

Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS–Asia

Lieutenant-General (Retd) Agus Widjojo, Governor, National Resilience Institute, Indonesia

Andrea Thompson, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, United States Department of State

Jan-Olof Lind, State Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Sweden

collaboration was not zero-sum, but that geopolitics

ventures between the government and industry in

should be kept in mind when assessing potential col-

major defence programmes. Nonetheless, he noted

laborative partners. From the supplier perspective,

the continuing dependency on international partners

Andrea Thompson explained the role of US arms

for technology, the importance of innovation and

sales as part of a wider pattern of collaboration with

the danger of stagnation inherent in the pursuit of

allies and partners, including long-term relationships

national champions.

that feature training exercises and the compatibility

The question-and-answer session built on the

of systems. She highlighted that the speed of tech-

issues raised by the speakers and highlighted addi-

nological change often outpaces the acquisition and

tional challenges for defence-industrial policy. Key

policy process, noting the 2018 reform of the US Con-

concerns raised were the need to develop absorption

ventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy. Jan-Olof Lind

capacity for new technology, tensions between threat-

explained the Swedish experience of moving into the

driven procurement and industrial-base sustainment,

international market following the end of the Cold

and the dangers of corruption in the procurement

War, retaining capability in key sectors with joint

process.

Special session 3

43

SPECIAL SESSION 4

Cyber-capability development: defence implications

CHAIR

Discussion during this session ranged from the poten-

Dr Kori Schake

tial benefits and risks of cyberspace to national and

Deputy Director-General, IISS

international responses. For the United States, General Paul Nakasone said achieving a secure and free inter-

OPENING REMARKS

net requires international effort. The US achieves this by

General Paul Nakasone

‘defending forward’, for example growing partner capa-

Commander, US Cyber Command; Director, National

bilities to defend electoral processes. New technologies,

Security Agency; Chief, Central Security Service

he said, ‘distinguish today’s great-power competition from decades ago’ and empower malign actors, there-

Agung Nugraha Acting Deputy for Protection, National Cyber and

fore offering both potential and risk. Dependence on

Encryption Agency, Indonesia

technology demands responsible behaviour, General

David Koh Tee Hian

Nakasone concluded, and the US aims to promote an

Deputy Secretary, Special Projects; Defence Cyber

internet based on the rule of law and internationally

Chief, Ministry of Defence, Singapore

accepted norms. Agung Nugraha also highlighted

Air Commodore John Maas

the opportunities and risks from new technology,

Senior Military Advisor, Common Security and

saying that social-media platforms could be misused

Defence Policy, European External Action Service

to threaten national security ‘by means of terrorism’. A

Senior Colonel Xu Manshu

new challenge is to promote the positive use of social

Professor, Research Center for Crisis Management,

media while building resilience, he said, while interna-

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense

tional cooperation is vital in building cyber capability.

David Koh Tee Hian said that commercial and

University, China

security interests are converging, particularly in

44

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

General Paul Nakasone, Commander, US Cyber Command; Director, National Security Agency; Chief, Central Security Service

Air Commodore John Maas, Senior Military Advisor, Common Security and Defence Policy, European External Action Service

David Koh Tee Hian, Deputy Secretary, Special Projects; Defence Cyber Chief, Ministry of Defence, Singapore

Dr Kori Schake, Deputy Director-General, IISS

Agung Nugraha, Acting Deputy for Protection, National Cyber and Encryption Agency, Indonesia

Senior Colonel Xu Manshu, Professor, Research Center for Crisis Management, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) National Defense University, China

cyber capability. Meanwhile, malicious cyber actors

to maintain strategic restraint. She proposed four

are more likely to strike civilian rather than military

confidence-building measures: a notification mechanism

infrastructure. Partnerships are vital across government;

on cyber policies so as to ‘better understand’ strategic

with industry and the civil sector; and with technologists

intentions; establishing diversified communications

and academia. Air Commodore John Maas said that the

links; joint academic research ‘to deeply understand the

European Union promotes the view that international

concerns and common ground’; and preventing new

law – and in particular, the UN Charter – also applies

risks from emerging technology.

in cyberspace, and supports non-binding voluntary

Issues raised during the question-and-answer

norms of responsible behaviour and cyber confidence-

session included technical points about national per-

building measures. While the traditional approach

ceptions, policies and capabilities, and international

to the challenge of cyber security focuses on defence

norms of behaviour. Cyber capability enables competi-

capabilities, the EU seeks to craft an ‘effective response’

tion and conflict below the threshold of war, said David

from ‘a regulatory point of view’. Senior Colonel

Koh, while Senior Colonel Xu said that it is hard to dis-

Xu Manshu said that cyber capability acts as a force

tinguish offence and defence in cyberspace – but, when

multiplier, and the arms race in cyberspace has now

two sides have enough capabilities to launch a cyber

begun. Cyber capabilities complicate conflict, and, with a

attack, ‘the one who has a strong resilience will survive

risk of kinetic retaliation, militaries have a responsibility

or succeed’.

Special session 4

45

SPECIAL SESSION 5

Mechanisms for enhancing maritime security

CHAIR

From the outset, there was consensus between pan-

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury

ellists on the significance of the maritime space for

Senior Fellow for South Asia, IISS

the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Major-General Dang Quang Minh argued that cooperation on mari-

OPENING REMARKS

time security requires a combination of bilateral and

Major-General Dang Quang Minh

multilateral efforts, with the Association of Southeast

Director-General, Institute for Defence

Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers’ Meeting

Strategy, Ministry of National Defence, Vietnam

(ADMM) and ADMM–Plus playing important roles.

Rear Admiral Alan Goh

Rear Admiral Alan Goh emphasised the need to invest

Group Chief (Policy and Strategy), Ministry of

in practical confidence-building measures, including

Defence, Singapore

the ASEAN–China maritime exercise in October 2018

Senior Colonel Zhou Bo

and the planned ASEAN–United States maritime exer-

Director, Security Cooperation Center, Office for

cises. For Beijing, Senior Colonel Zhou Bo suggested

International Military Cooperation, Ministry of

that the overall situation in the Asia-Pacific is secure,

National Defense, China

but that some external powers have persisted in their

Admiral Tim Fraser Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, United Kingdom

conduct of military activities at sea and in the air, while ‘differences in the interpretation of international law by states and in domestic law increase the risk of accidents and conflicts’. He also said that China and the US should cooperate on the issue of freedom of navigation. Neither wants a conflict at sea and one side should not impose its own interpretation of international law

46

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Major-General Dang Quang Minh, DirectorGeneral, Institute for Defence Strategy, Ministry of National Defence, Vietnam

Rear Admiral Alan Goh, Group Chief (Policy and Strategy), Ministry of Defence, Singapore

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Senior Fellow for South Asia, IISS

Admiral Tim Fraser, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, United Kingdom

Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, Director, Security Cooperation Center, Office for International Military Cooperation, Ministry of National Defence, China

on the other. Admiral Tim Fraser said that the United

to include coastguard and civilian ships, but Admi-

Kingdom sees the region as one of tremendous oppor-

ral Fraser called for a comprehensive approach. In

tunity but also one facing challenges, and that there

response to a question on how sincere the negotiating

needs to be better information sharing and more done

parties are about agreeing a new code of conduct in

to build trust. ‘We can also learn from other areas

the South China Sea, Admiral Goh argued that three

within the region’ and beyond, he said, citing efforts

years was a realistic time frame for such an agreement.

by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to organ-

In response to a challenge to China’s position on the

ise their maritime patrols, and the Combined Maritime

interpretation of the international law at sea, Senior

Forces (CMF) in the Middle East, as examples.

Colonel Zhou said that many countries have different

In the subsequent question-and-answer session,

interpretations. It was argued that Beijing’s efforts to

the issue of maritime-domain awareness was raised.

prevent the internationalisation of the South China Sea

Admiral Fraser suggested that in the Asia-Pacific, as

have failed, while the significance of the Indian Ocean

a vast region that probably needs more than one set

was also raised. Senior Colonel Zhou responded by

of arrangements, information proliferation is a good

saying that the Indian Ocean is very important to

thing and arrangements will probably evolve over

China, not least because of energy imports, and that

time. Senior Colonel Zhou rejected the idea of extend-

any efforts to restrict China to within the first island

ing the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES)

chain would not work.

Special session 5

47

SPECIAL SESSION 6

New patterns of defence cooperation

CHAIR

This session explored how various types of defence

Dr Bastian Giegerich

cooperation evident in the region are developing, and

Director of Defence and Military Analysis, IISS

whether inclusive and exclusive modes of cooperation are ultimately compatible. Colonel-General Alexan-

OPENING REMARKS

der Vasilyevich Fomin stressed Russia’s emphasis on

Colonel-General Alexander Vasilyevich Fomin

inclusive multilateral security cooperation, which he

Deputy Minister of Defence, Russia Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach Chairman, NATO Military Committee General Angus Campbell Chief of the Defence Force, Australia General Koji Yamazaki Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Japan Self-Defense Forces Major-General Ci Guowei

contrasted with what he referred to as the promotion of ‘military political blocs’ by multiple international actors through ‘Indo-Pacific strategies’. He also gave credit to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as ‘the cornerstone of security systems in the Asia-Pacific’.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach said that NATO, ‘the strongest military alliance in history’, has created partnerships with countries that ‘share the same values’

Chief, Office for International Military Cooperation,

not only in the Euro-Atlantic area but also in the Asia-

Central Military Commission, China

Pacific, including Australia, Japan, Mongolia, New

Senator Cory Gardner

Zealand and South Korea. General Angus Campbell

Chairman, Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific

noted that Australia seeks ‘an Indo-Pacific with ASEAN

and International Cybersecurity Policy, Committee on

at its heart’ and does not want ‘states undermining the

Foreign Relations, United States Senate

rules-based order’. To these ends, he said, Australia is deepening its engagement and partnerships with its neighbours.

48

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Colonel-General Alexander Vasilyevich Fomin, Deputy Minister of Defence, Russia

Major-General Ci Guowei, Chief, Office for International Military Cooperation, Central Military Commission, China

Dr Bastian Giegerich, Director of Defence and Military Analysis, IISS

General Koji Yamazaki, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Japan Self-Defense Forces

Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, Chairman, NATO Military Committee

General Angus Campbell, Chief of the Defence Force, Australia

Senator Cory Gardner, Chairman, Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific and International Cybersecurity Policy, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate

General Koji Yamazaki spoke about Japan’s active

tion between major countries for defence cooperation’,

contributions to regional and international security. In

‘an open, inclusive architecture’ for such cooperation

practical terms, Japan contributes to the UN Project for

and ‘practical cooperation in non-traditional security’.

Rapid Deployment of Enabling Capabilities (RDEC);

Senator Cory Gardner emphasised the significance of

provides capacity-building assistance to Southeast Asian

the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), which he

countries; takes ‘concrete measures’ to operationalise

described as ‘a blueprint for the future US policy in the

the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ vision; and has joined

Indo-Pacific’, and said that the US ‘has always been and

multilateral efforts to monitor ship-to-ship transfers by

will always remain a Pacific nation and power’ which

North Korea. Major-General Ci Guowei pointed out

will ‘never hesitate to protect our allies’.

that defence cooperation in the region included not only

The question-and-answer session focused on the

‘US-led major alliances’, but also organisations such

significance and acceptability of the ‘Free and Open

as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) that

Indo-Pacific’ concept. Another important question

‘adhere to the principle of non-alignment with open

raised was whether ‘ASEAN centrality’ could be used

membership and multilateral mechanisms’, including

as the basis for building a regional security architecture

the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM–

that could more effectively bridge the divide between

Plus), the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) and the Beijing

the US alliance system on the one hand, and the Chi-

Xiangshan Forum (BXF). He proposed ‘positive interac-

nese and Russian perspectives on the other.

Special session 6

49

50

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019

CHAPTER 6 Istana Reception and Dinner

52

The Shangri-La Dialogue

53

54

The Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019

CHAPTER 7 China and international security cooperation

FOURTH PLENARY SESSION Sunday 2 June 2019, 08:40 SPEAKER General Wei Fenghe Minister of National Defence and State Councilor, China

FOURTH PLENARY SESSION

China and international security cooperation General Wei Fenghe, Minister of National Defence and State Councilor, China

Chinese Minister of National Defence and State

a ‘narrow and exclusive’ view of the world turns one

Councilor General Wei Fenghe opened his speech by

blind to potential partners, where only enemies can

describing humanity as at a crossroads, and President

be seen – a self-fulfilling prophecy. As an example of

Xi Jinping’s vision for peace and cooperation toward

‘win–win cooperation’, General Wei highlighted the

building a shared future for mankind as ‘the right

recent second Belt and Road Forum for International

path’. He warned that there are many destabilising

Cooperation in Beijing, in which more than 150 coun-

factors challenging this vision, and at the outset of his

tries had participated.

speech expressed firm opposition to the formation of

Referring to China’s recent Conference on Dia-

military blocs and US comments on Taiwan and the

logue of Asian Civilizations, General Wei dismissed

South China Sea. Calling for an inclusive approach

any theory of a clash of civilisations, lamenting past

to regional security, General Wei cited a number of

tragedies such as slavery, colonisation and the Holo-

global hotspots including the persistent threat from

caust. The Chinese people, the minister observed, had

terrorism, instability in the Middle East and the ref-

experienced the cruelty of war and Beijing remains

ugee crisis in Europe, questioning the root cause of

committed to peace and global security. General Wei

such problems.

rejected the ‘China threat theory’ as hype, which, he

Rejecting confrontation, exclusiveness, zero-sum behaviours and prejudice, General Wei criticised what

suggested, comes from misunderstanding, prejudice ‘or even a hidden agenda’.

he interpreted as US unilateralism and protectionism

On the 70th anniversary of the founding of the

amid the backlash against globalisation, warning that

People’s Republic of China (PRC), General Wei said

56

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Pehin Datu Lailaraja Major-General (Retd) Dato Paduka Seri Haji Awang Halbi bin Haji Mohd Yussof, Minister of Defence II, Brunei; and General Wei Fenghe, Minister of National Defence and State Councilor, China

that China has never ‘invaded any other country’ and

Nations (ASEAN) and deepened friendships with its

would not ‘seek hegemony or establish spheres of influ-

neighbours, including India.

ence’. The PRC, he said, was committed to peaceful

On the question of Taiwan, General Wei compared

development, as enshrined in the constitution of both

it to Abraham Lincoln’s safeguarding of the integrity

the Communist Party of China (CCP) and the state.

of the United States: like the US, China is indivisible as

and ‘will be reunified’. He warned Taiwan’s ruling

entirely for self-defence purposes, General Wei said

Describing

China’s

military

development

Democratic Progressive Party that no attempt to split

that the country’s ‘active defence’ strategy incorpo-

China would succeed, and that foreign intervention

rates ‘defence, self-defence and post-strike response’.

would be doomed to failure, while condemning US

China’s defence expenditure, he said, is ‘reasonable

interference in Taiwan through the former’s domes-

and appropriate’, while the People’s Liberation Army

tic law. He warned that underestimation of the PLA’s

(PLA), as ‘the people’s force’ led by the CCP, is dedi-

resolve would be ‘extremely dangerous’. China, the

cated to safeguarding China’s national sovereignty

minister stated, makes ‘no promise to renounce the

and would not yield one inch of the country’s ‘sacred

use of force’ in safeguarding national unity.

land’. The PLA, the minister stated, would not seize

Depicting an improved security situation in the

anything from others but is not afraid to confront and

South China Sea, General Wei questioned who is

defeat any enemy that risks ‘crossing the bottom line’.

threatening stability there, and who would benefit

The commitment of the PLA to safeguarding

from such a deterioration of security? He also asked

regional and global security, said General Wei, is dem-

whether extra-regional countries should have a role

onstrated by its active support of UN peacekeeping

in the security of the region and whether Chinese

operations, for which it provides the largest troop con-

construction on South China Sea islands could be

tribution among the permanent members of the United

characterised as militarisation.

Nations Security Council. In promoting bilateral and

On North Korea, General Wei affirmed China’s

multilateral security cooperation, the China–Russia

commitment to denuclearisation and constructive

‘comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination

role in promoting peace talks. The minister pressed

has been running at a high level’, he noted. Beijing has

for the early resumption of Washington–Pyong-

also strengthened a sense of shared destiny with coun-

yang dialogue, advocating a dual-track approach to

tries belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian

denuclearisation.

Fourth plenary session

57

On the 40th anniversary of the establishment of

the South China Sea. He also tackled some controver-

Sino-US diplomatic ties, General Wei said that, despite

sial questions, defending China’s handling of the 1989

setbacks, the relationship has been growing steadily.

Tiananmen Square incident as ‘correct policy’ to pre-

The minister described military relations between

vent political turbulence. The minister also applauded

China and the US as ‘generally stable’, and, while Bei-

his government’s counter-terrorism policies in Xin-

jing’s door was open for discussion on the trade war,

jiang when asked about the presence of re-education

China was nevertheless prepared to ‘fight till the end’.

camps there. Furthermore, he denied links between

He affirmed the importance of communication in the

telecommunications company Huawei and the Chi-

military-to-military relationship, insisting that the US

nese military.

follow ‘the principles of non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect and win–win cooperation’.

Dr Lynn Kuok, IISS associate fellow, questioned the sincerity of the minister’s dismissal of Chinese

Finally, General Wei asserted that China’s achieve-

expansionism in the light of reclamation activities

ments over the last 70 years are not a windfall, but

within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

due to the Chinese people’s ‘hard work, wisdom and

Rufino Lopez, deputy director-general of the Philip-

bravery’. According to him, President Xi’s leadership

pines’ National Security Council, asked how China

at the core of the CCP has brought political stability,

could permit the destruction of the marine environ-

social cohesion and steady economic growth toward

ment and the endangerment of food security.

realising the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation.

In response, General Wei insisted that limited

The PLA, concluded the minister, was ‘ready to work

defence deployments on the reclaimed islands in the

with the armed forces of other Asia-Pacific countries’

South China Sea are legitimate since they are part of

to safeguard regional stability.

Chinese territory. Again, the minister questioned the nature of militarisation, stressing that Beijing has built these facilities in response to an increased threat and

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

to improve the living conditions of those stationed on

General Wei answered a broad range of questions on

the islands. He declared that China could not respond

issues such as China’s active-defence strategy, its bilat-

to such muscle-flexing demonstrated by others in the

eral relationship with India and its approach to arms

region using ‘handguns’, and therefore it is ‘legiti-

control. His lengthiest responses, however, focused on

mate’ for China to deploy military assets there.

Dr Lynn Kuok, Senior Research Fellow, University of Cambridge; Visiting Scholar, Paul Tsai China Center; Associate Fellow, IISS

58

Rufino Lopez, Deputy Director-General of the Philippines’ National Security Council

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019

CHAPTER 8 Preventing conflict in contested domains

FIFTH PLENARY SESSION Sunday 2 June 2019, 09:30 SPEAKERS General Ngô Xuân Lich Minister of National Defence, Vietnam Major-General (Retd) Delfin Lorenzana Secretary of National Defense, Philippines Senator Linda Reynolds Minister of Defence, Australia

FIFTH PLENARY SESSION

Preventing conflict in contested domains

General Ngô Xuân Lich, Minister of National Defence, Vietnam

Vietnamese Minister of National Defence General Ngô

for a code of conduct in the South China Sea – the key

Xuân Lich acknowledged that the increasing geopo-

focus of which should remain the prevention of risk

litical significance of the Asia-Pacific has intensified

and conflict. He also highlighted the role of the Asso-

strategic rivalry among major powers, a rivalry that

ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence

reaches across different fields of activity. The causes

Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM–Plus) platform in

of this are primarily rooted in changing balances of

encouraging defence cooperation between ASEAN

power and a tendency to ignore the legitimate inter-

countries and external partners. If additional countries

ests of lesser powers. It is therefore important, he

express their wish to join the platform, Vietnam would

said, to define ‘ways to handle’ strategic competition,

support ADMM–Plus expansion, the minister said.

including adherence to international law, respect for

Philippine Secretary of National Defense Major-

national independence and sovereignty, and peaceful

General (Retd) Delfin Lorenzana stated that a ‘seismic

attempts at confidence building and conflict resolution.

geopolitical shift’ is under way, not only in the ‘mate-

The minister suggested that great powers bear bigger

rial balance of forces’ in the Indo-Pacific but also in

responsibility in this respect, for ‘setting a good exam-

the ‘conception of the emerging regional order’, some-

ple in international relations’, than do lesser powers.

thing which has been driven by China’s re-emergence

General Lich observed that the South China Sea

as a major global player. There is a danger, he said,

holds both the latent potential for conflict as well as

that countries may untether their ‘networks of eco-

huge potential economic benefits. Vietnam, he said,

nomic interdependence’ and sleepwalk into conflict.

values the progress made by parties in the negotiations

Therefore, it is vital to further strengthen and institu-

60

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Senator Linda Reynolds, Minister of Defence, Australia

tionalise confidence-building measures, particularly in

building infrastructure in partnership. Reynolds high-

the South and East China seas. The minister noted that

lighted Australia’s capacity-building initiatives for Fiji,

ASEAN plays a very helpful role in promoting such

Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu as examples, and

confidence-building measures, citing as examples the

observed that the country’s multinational exercises are

multilateral Malacca Straits Sea Patrols and efforts

growing in sophistication and complexity, presenting

between the Philippines and Indonesia to settle their

an important opportunity to deepen defence coopera-

maritime-border disputes. From the perspective of the

tion in the region.

Philippines, no single power should exercise ‘unilateral control over vital arteries of global trade’.

Senator

Linda

Reynolds,

Australian

minis-

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

ter of defence, opened by arguing that trust and

Dr Masashi Nishihara, president of the Research

transparency are both assets at times of ‘profound

Institute for Peace and Security, asked whether

transformation of global economic and political influ-

ASEAN countries are doing enough to promote the

ence’ in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. It is worrying,

freedom of navigation, and whether ASEAN govern-

she said, that trade and investment are being used as

ments should voice a stronger statement of support

tools to build strategic influence. Hard-won rules and

for freedom-of-navigation operations conducted by

norms, underpinning security and prosperity in the

the US, UK, France, Australia and others. Dr Pang

region, are being eroded. However, the emergence of

Zhongying, distinguished professor of international

Indo-Pacific visions and concepts are a cause for opti-

relations at the Ocean University of China and Macau

mism, creating opportunities to build an open and

University of Science and Technology, asked Reyn-

peaceful region ‘where economic and security ties

olds whether there was a road map to include China

are being continually strengthened’. From Australia’s

in the Indo-Pacific strategies and concepts that are

point of view, such a vision should have ASEAN ‘at

emerging in Australia and the US. Dr Rommel Ban-

heart’ and include ‘a fully engaged United States’.

laoi, chairman of the Philippine Institute for Peace,

However, the minister said that to deal with chal-

Violence and Terrorism Research, enquired whether

lenges facing the region, deliberate collective action by

the panellists felt that there has been significant pro-

all countries is required; examples include military-to-

gress in the negotiations for a code of conduct in the

military activities, military training and education, and

South China Sea. Dr Kori Schake, deputy director-

Fifth plenary session

61

Dr Masashi Nishihara, President, Research Institute for Peace and Security

Dr Pang Zhongying, Distinguished Professor of International Relations at the Ocean University of China and Macau University of Science and Technology

Dr Rommel Banlaoi, Chairman, Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research

Dr Kori Schake, Deputy DirectorGeneral, IISS

general of the IISS, asked whether the three speakers

long run, and the Philippines’ position remains that a

could think of any international norms that they felt

code of conduct would be to the advantage of every-

needed to be changed or adjusted, perhaps to accom-

body. Lorenzana suggested that China should show

modate China. Dr Lynn Kuok, IISS associate fellow,

its ‘responsibility as a major power’ by not using its

asked Lorenzana if a Philippine initiative to conduct

might to force decisions in the South China Sea. On

joint exploration with China in a certain area would

joint exploration, he responded that the agreement

be tantamount to a concession that China has legiti-

with China is that any joint exploration would not

mate claims to the area involved.

give Beijing jurisdiction over the area. In fact, he said,

General Lich responded by explaining that the

the prevailing sentiment of Philippine negotiators for

most important issue regarding freedom of naviga-

this proposal is that issues of sovereignty or jurisdic-

tion was to uphold international law, and that ASEAN

tion should not be discussed. Reynolds suggested that

countries and China are exerting ‘maximum effort’

the peaceful settlement of disputes, in accordance with

to bring negotiations on a code of conduct for the

international law and without coercion, are important

South China Sea to a successful conclusion. He noted

elements of Australia’s vision for an open, inclusive

that the agreed timeline for that conclusion would be

and stable Indo-Pacific, as are open markets that facili-

within three years, or even less. Lorenzana argued

tate greater economic integration. In addition, she said,

that freedom-of-navigation operations were impor-

a crucial building block of such a vision is a sustained

tant, but not enough to keep the South China Sea free

US regional presence, as well as China’s ‘leading role’

and open – cooperation from Beijing is required in the

in the way such principles are strengthened.

62

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019

CHAPTER 9 Ensuring a stable and resilient region

SIXTH PLENARY SESSION Sunday 2 June 2019, 11:30 SPEAKERS General (Retd) Ryamizard Ryacudu Minister of Defense, Indonesia Ron Mark Minister of Defence, New Zealand Dr Ng Eng Hen Minister for Defence, Singapore

SIXTH PLENARY SESSION

Ensuring a stable and resilient region

General (Retd) Ryamizard Ryacudu, Minister of Defense, Indonesia

The final plenary session focused on the necessary

Indonesia. The minister calculated that, with Indone-

steps to ensure a stable and resilient region, with

sia as host to the world’s largest Muslim population,

regard to the threats and challenges highlighted during

even if only 0.5% of the country’s 200 million Muslims

previous sessions. Indonesian Defence Minister Gen-

became ISIS supporters and sympathisers, this would

eral (Retd) Ryamizard Ryacudu started his remarks

still translate to approximately one million people.

by describing the critical role of the Association of

The mismanagement of the Rohingya refugee prob-

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in regional stability

lem would create an obvious opportunity for ISIS, he

and security, which he said has laid the foundations

said, and therefore cooperation to resolve it is vital.

for realising regional prosperity. Outlining notable

General Ryacudu said that all elements of Indonesian

threats facing the region, the minister also highlighted

society are being mobilised in the fight against ter-

the spread of terrorism and separatism, natural disas-

rorism through Indonesia’s concept of ‘state defence’

ters, climate change and disease outbreaks, as well as

(bela negara).

cyber crime and drug trafficking.

Emphasising the importance of close cooperation

However, General Ryacudu noted that the region

within ASEAN, the defence minister also presented

also faces the ‘non-physical threat’ of a ‘mindset of

examples of Indonesia’s joint operations, such as tri-

radicalism’, encouraged by Islamic State (also known

lateral cooperation with Malaysia and the Philippines.

as ISIS or ISIL) fighters returning from the Middle East

For example, maritime patrols in the Sulu waters have

to the region. The consequences of this have already

been successful in significantly decreasing incidents of

been seen in terrorist attacks across several regions of

piracy there.

64

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Ron Mark, Minister of Defence, New Zealand

New Zealand’s Minister of Defence Ron Mark

between the two leading economies and militaries of

explained his country’s perspectives on achieving a

the world’. Nevertheless, this is what is coming to pass.

strong and resilient region across four key themes.

The challenge for both the US and China, Dr Ng

The first is the importance of tackling global chal-

argued, is to offer an ‘inclusive and overarching moral

lenges, such as climate change, through collective

justification for acceptance by all countries, big and

action. The second is understanding the motivations

small, of their dominance beyond military might’.

and outlooks of individual nations, and the transpar-

Regional acceptance of American or Chinese domi-

ent communication of these in order to reduce the risk

nance would diminish if ‘America First’ or China’s rise

of misunderstanding and miscalculation. The third is

were perceived to be against the national interests of

building people-to-people links, including the devel-

other countries or the collective good, said the minis-

opment of ‘more mature political partnerships with

ter. Even if the existing global order is imperfect, it has

Pacific Island countries and institutions’. Alongside

nonetheless ‘ensured peace and progress these past

the Pacific Islands Forum, the minister cited as exam-

70 years’. It would be ‘an egregious folly to throw this

ples the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting

baby out with the bath water’.

(SPDMM) as well as an agreement between France,

Dr Ng also highlighted the potential of the Belt

Australia and New Zealand to coordinate disaster

and Road Initiative – with at least US$700 billion com-

reconnaissance and relief assistance in the Pacific. The

mitted, it is now seven times the size of the Marshall

fourth and final theme is the importance of an agile

Plan – and warned against the shift to adopt tariff and

and relevant contemporary global security architec-

technological barriers, and their potential impact on

ture, and the collective rules underpinning it.

the multilateral trading system, especially in the face

Singaporean Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen,

of slower economic growth.

mirroring the strategic overview offered by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong during his keynote address two days earlier, began by reflecting on developments

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

in Asia since the inception of the IISS Shangri-La Dia-

Many questions focused on ASEAN and the role of

logue (SLD) back in 2002. With reference to the United

smaller countries in managing rising US–China ten-

States and China, year after year, said Dr Ng, speakers

sions. Dr Tim Huxley from IISS–Asia challenged the

at the SLD ‘had cautioned against this outright rivalry

narrative of ASEAN unity as presented by Indone-

Sixth plenary session

65

sia’s defence minister; noting ASEAN differences over

the Indonesia Institute of Deliverology highlighted the

the South China Sea and the management of Roh-

plight of the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang and asked

ingya refugees, he asked what more could be done to

about the responses of governments in the region.

improve ASEAN effectiveness. Dr Nick Bisley from

In response, General Ryacudu again highlighted

La Trobe University asked what lesser powers in the

the link between the handling of Rohingya refugees

region could do to support economic openness in

and ISIS’s campaign to recruit new members in the

the face of Washington–Beijing trade tensions, while

region, emphasising his support for the UN in man-

Reinhard Bütikofer, co-chair of the European Green

aging this. Mark reiterated his concerns about rising

Party in the European Parliament, asked what lesser

tensions, including in the South China Sea, and the

powers could do to rein in the damaging effects of

dangers of miscalculation; he also gave a sneak pre-

hegemonic competition.

view of New Zealand’s Defence Capability Plan, to be

Other questions focused on exploring national

published on 11 June 2019. Dr Ng reminded delegates

policies in more detail. Aaron Connelly, IISS research

about what is at stake and emphasised Singapore’s

fellow in Southeast Asian political change and foreign

commitment to maintaining the current system; multi-

policy, asked about the impact of Indonesia’s bela negara

lateral trade arrangements, for example, are important

programme in fighting Islamist radicalisation, and

not only for economic health but for security too. Small

questioned the wisdom of a defence ministry running a

states need to continue to persuade bigger states that

political-indoctrination programme. Fika Fawzia from

there is a reason to preserve the global order.

Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS–Asia

Aaron Connelly, IISS Research Fellow, Fika Fawzia, Indonesia Institute of Southeast Asian Political Change Deliverology and Foreign Policy

66

Dr Nick Bisley, La Trobe University

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019

CHAPTER 10 The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme

The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme Menna Rawlings, Director-General, Economic and Global Issues, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom, with the Young Leaders

The fourth Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme

Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the United

(SEAYLP) convened its largest and most diverse cohort

States Embassy in Singapore. The programme was

of strategic thinkers and policymakers at the 18th IISS

also supported by two corporate sponsors: Google and

Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD). The 39 Young Leaders rep-

OUE Limited.

resented 21 nationalities, and featured for the first time

The Young Leaders were actively engaged in dis-

an increased extra-regional presence including China

cussions during the SLD, offering sharp and critical

and India. They were drawn from the expert commu-

interventions during question-and-answer sessions.

nity, government, business and the media, and almost

Following Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s keynote

half were female. The SEAYLP delegates participated in

address, Shawn Ho, associate research fellow at the S.

a special agenda of exclusive meetings with ministers

Rajaratnam School of International Studies, asked the

and senior officials in addition to the main SLD, and

prime minister for Singapore’s view on the issues sur-

were hosted by the French Navy on board the flagship

rounding 5G technology and the considerations for

aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. The 2019 programme

the selection of network-infrastructure providers.

was funded by the Australian Department of Foreign

In the second plenary session, Andrea Berger, a

Affairs and Trade; the British High Commission

senior analyst at the Canadian Privy Council Office,

in Singapore; the High Commission of Canada to

questioned the panel on greater multilateral coop-

Singapore; the European Union; the Embassy of Japan

eration for engagement with the Democratic People’s

in Singapore; Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the

Republic of Korea (DPRK), particularly on cyber issues.

Republic of Korea’s (ROK) Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Ankit Panda, senior editor at the Diplomat, asked ROK

68

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Andrea Berger (centre) and other Young Leaders speaking with Menna Rawlings

Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-Doo about recent

The Young Leaders also made their presence felt

North Korean short-range ballistic-missile launches

during the Dialogue’s special sessions. Dr Merve

and whether they contravened the September 2018

Seren, assistant professor of international relations at

Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA). Dr Jeffrey

Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, asked US Under

Ordaniel, assistant professor of international security

Secretary of State for Arms Control and International

studies at Tokyo International University, questioned

Security Andrea Thompson about the challenges

Malaysian Defence Minister Haji Mohamad Sabu on

faced by Washington in improving countermea-

Malaysia’s stance on freedom-of-navigation opera-

sures against the increasing capabilities of non-state

tions in the third plenary session.

armed groups. Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, from the

SEAYLP delegates also asked General Wei Fenghe,

Australian National University, asked special-session

China’s minister of national defence and state coun-

panellists for their opinions on the utility of the Code

cilor, several questions during the fourth plenary

for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) for coast-

session. Dr Saira Basit, vice dean of the Norwegian

guard and civilian maritime vessels in the South and

Defence University College, asked him about China’s

East China seas.

regional role. Pham Anh Khoa, chief executive officer of Yola, raised the question of China’s commitment to a legally binding code of conduct between the

EXCLUSIVE EVENTS

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and

The programme commenced with a meeting between

China in the South China Sea.

the Young Leaders and Menna Rawlings, director-

During the fifth plenary session, Marvin Salazar,

general of economic and global issues at the British

Philippines’

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Rawlings reflected

National Security Council, asked Australian Minister

on her experience as the UK’s high commissioner to

of Defence Senator Linda Reynolds how she intended

Australia in forming her views on opportunity and

to advance Australia’s interests in the South China

growth in the Asia-Pacific. She emphasised the United

Sea. In the sixth plenary session, Fika Fawzia of the

Kingdom’s increased regional diplomatic engagement,

Indonesia Institute of Deliverology asked how gov-

including

ernments in the region should respond to the plight of

ambassador to ASEAN and the appointment of a UK

the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang.

trade commissioner in Singapore.

national-security

specialist

at

the

the

appointment

of

The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme

the

first

British

69

Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ discussion with Admiral Philip Davidson, Commander, US Indo-Pacific Command

IISS Director-General Dr John Chipman welcomed the Young Leaders to the summit and described how

of Foreign Affairs and Trade, who encouraged them to foster peace and security in their careers.

strategic interest in the Asia-Pacific drove the estab-

On the SLD’s third day, the Young Leaders

lishment of the SLD. Urging the group to engage in

met Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of the

discussions with ministers during the plenary ses-

US

sions, he emphasised that the SEAYLP is an integral

Recalling his engagement with SEAYLP 2018 dele-

part of the SLD and its core mission is to nurture young

gates during his first days in command, he remarked

strategists.

that regional peace and prosperity required the com-

Indo-Pacific

Command

(USINDOPACOM).

Subsequently, IISS Deputy Director-General Dr

mitment of countries in the region to a rules-based

Kori Schake led a discussion for SEAYLP delegates

international order, reflected in Washington’s ‘Free

with Canadian Minister of National Defence Harjit

and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) concept. The admiral

Singh Sajjan. Drawing upon his experience in the

emphasised high levels of US foreign direct invest-

military, the minister encouraged the Young Leaders

ment in the region and expanding US–ASEAN ties,

to be mindful of their ‘ripple effect’ and to develop

and commended the Young Leaders in serving their

their situational awareness. He further outlined

respective nations.

Canada’s defence priorities, emphasising adherence to a rules-based global order.

The third day of the programme included an exclusive breakfast discussion with Dr Vivian

In addition to the SLD’s main agenda, the Young

Balakrishnan, Singapore’s minister for foreign affairs,

Leaders were offered several more exclusive engage-

who highlighted the agency of small countries within

ments. They met Federica Mogherini, the European

the context of great-power rivalry and the challenges

Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and

of the new technological revolution. He also stressed

Security Policy and Vice-President of the European

the need to invest in educational systems, digital

Commission, who emphasised closer cooperation

infrastructure, and research and development. The

between Europe and Asia on security and defence.

subsequent question-and-answer session focused on

High Commissioner of Australia to Singapore Bruce

an increasingly fractured world order caused by digi-

Gosper hosted the Young Leaders at an evening recep-

tal disruption, increased political polarisation, and

tion at his residence, and introduced the group to

the importance of the agency of smaller nations and

Frances Adamson, secretary of Australia’s Department

multilateral organisations.

70

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ discussion with Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; and Vice-President, European Commission

SEAYLP LUNCHEON AND SEMINAR

Klykoom, senior associate at Vriens & Partners; Ross

Following the conclusion of the summit, the Young

Young, Google’s head of government affairs and public

Leaders attended a luncheon where Deputy Minister

policy in New Zealand; and Seng Pan, senior vice-

for Political Affairs Yoon Soon-gu, of the Foreign

president and head of government relations at Telenor

Ministry of the ROK, discussed ASEAN–ROK rela-

Myanmar. The session was chaired by Dr Lynn Kuok,

tions. Yoon stressed the ROK’s legal obligation not

IISS associate fellow and SEAYLP alumnus.

to develop nuclear weapons and the need to balance security with other national interests. He also elaborated on the ROK’s experience as the first country to

VISIT TO FRENCH AIRCRAFT CARRIER

commercialise 5G technology. In his closing remarks,

A highlight of the programme this year was the visit to

the deputy minister underscored ASEAN’s value as a

the French Navy’s flagship aircraft carrier, Charles de

mediator among competing powers and its important

Gaulle, at Changi Naval Base on Sunday 2 June 2019,

role in upholding a rules-based order.

where the French Ministry of the Armed Forces hosted

The fourth and final day of the programme featured

the SEAYLP delegation for a tour. The Young Leaders

the 2019 SEAYLP seminar on social-media responsi-

gained a better understanding of the operations of a

bility and human security. Conducted off the record,

carrier strike group and were familiarised with the

the seminar comprised three speakers: Punyaphan

French Navy’s formidable capabilities.

The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme luncheon with Yoon Soon-gu, Deputy Minister for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea

The Southeast Asian Young Leaders’ Programme

71

Dr Kori Schake, Deputy Director-General, IISS; Harjit Singh Sajjan, Minister of National Defence, Canada; and N. Lynn McDonald, High Commissioner of Canada to Singapore

Following the tour of the ship, Commander of

and that maritime security requires nations’ concerted

Task Force 473 Rear Admiral Olivier Lebas hosted

efforts to prevent the erosion of freedom of access and

a special discussion with Alice Guitton, the direc-

transit. Young Leaders asked her about ways to main-

tor-general for international relations and strategy

tain the rules-based international order in the region,

at the French Ministry of the Armed Forces. Guitton

the future of the Sino-European relationship and the

stressed France’s commitment as a resident power

bifurcation of the technological sphere, particularly

to the security of the Asia-Pacific and to upholding a

regarding 5G mobile networks. In the evening, the

rules-based international order. She underscored the

SEAYLP participants were invited to join a reception

need for confidence-building measures in the region,

on board.

72

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

APPENDICES

18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT SINGAPORE, 31 MAY–2 JUNE 2019

I. Selected press coverage of the 2019 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue II. Selected IISS publications

APPENDIX I

Selected press coverage of the 2019 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Washington Post 4 June 2019

The United States is talking a big game in Asia, but China is moving fast This past weekend, as Asia’s top national security leaders convened in a Singapore hotel to discuss how to manage the region’s delicate national security dynamics and avoid conflict, Chinese officials nodded along with the rest.

Simultaneously, across the region, the People’s Liberation Army took a huge step to advance its military expansion.

The contradiction perfectly illustrates how the United States is talking big in Asia while Beijing is moving quickly to change the facts on the ground.

The Shangri-La Dialogue, run by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, is the highest profile security-themed conference in Asia each year. The plenary sessions feature top defense officials and leaders from more than 20 Asian countries. The hallways are filled with generals, admirals, government officials, lawmakers, think tank experts – and even a few journalists.

While the conference was under way, a U.S. defense official confirmed to me, the PLA tested a new submarinelaunched ballistic missile that drastically expands China’s worldwide nuclear deterrence capability. The message was clear: Beijing is not just talking – it’s acting to change the status quo.

Acting defense secretary Patrick Shanahan, a keynote speaker at the conference, delivered a nuanced speech that called out China for some of its bad behavior but offered a constructive tone overall.

‘I say now that China could still have a cooperative relationship with the U.S. It is in China’s interests to do so,’ he said. ‘China can and should have a cooperative relationship with the rest of the region too, but behavior that erodes other nations’ sovereignty and sows distrust of China’s intentions must end.’

74

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Shanahan preached fair competition and promised enduring U.S. commitment to a rules-based order in the region. The United States and China are not in a ‘face-off,’ and the two big countries can work together to solve their issues, he said during a Q-and-A. He also called out China for its military coercion, predatory economics and malign influence operations abroad. Democratic senators at the conference praised Shanahan for his even-handedness, which will surely help him in his bid for confirmation.

But several regional officials told me they had heard a similar message from U.S. defense secretaries in the past. So why, I asked Shanahan, should the region believe the United States’ commitment this time around? His response: The Trump administration is finally resourcing an aggressive ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ and calling out Beijing’s bad behavior.

Experts said Shanahan did a reasonably good job of projecting a balanced message. But he fumbled at times, such as during his Q-and-A when he said there is no U.S.– China ‘trade war.’ Also, there was nothing really new in his speech or the 64-page ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Report’ he released to go along with it.

Chinese Minister of National Defense and State Councilor Gen. Wei Fenghe made no attempt at balance or nuance when he gave his own keynote speech at the conference. He launched a full-on assault on U.S. policy and defended everything the Chinese government has ever done, including the Tiananmen Square massacre, the mass internment of Uighur Muslims and China’s militarization of the South China Sea. Wei claimed China has never sent troops into another country (Vietnam?) never bullied other countries (Taiwan?) and called the United States the aggressor in the region.

‘If the U.S. wants to talk, we will keep the door open,’ he said. ‘If they want a fight, we will fight till the end.’

Wei’s speech showed China feels strong and comfortable enough to openly say obviously false things and defend even its worst actions without shame or hesitation, said François Heisbourg, senior advisor for Europe at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. ‘Wei does not give a fig for what anybody outside China thinks about

what he says and what China does,’ Heisbourg said. ‘That is our new normal.’

The most interesting speech of the conference was given

by Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. He took a neutral stance, calling on both Beijing and Washington to avoid a conflict that would impact the region’s smaller nations. ‘When elephants fight, the grass is trampled; when elephants make love, the grass also suffers,’ he quoted his father Lee Kuan Yew as saying.

Several U.S. officials and experts told me they were dismayed by Lee’s ‘false equivalence’ of U.S. and Chinese actions in the region. Lee seemed to implicitly criticize the Trump administration’s more confrontational approach to China. That reinforced the sense that the region was more afraid of Chinese actions than reassured by U.S. rhetoric.

‘Countries have to accept that China will continue to grow and strengthen and that it is neither possible nor wise for them to prevent this from happening,’ Lee said. ‘The U.S., being the preeminent power, has the most difficult adjustment to make.’

In past years, Southeast Asian countries stood with the United States in defense of the international order that China is threatening, but this year those countries just wanted to stay out of it, said Gordon Flake, chief executive of the Perth USAsia Centre at the University of Western Australia. ‘In other years, we were talking about the region as a whole and this time we are just back to a pissing match between the two giants,’ he said. ‘That’s understandable, but it’s unfortunate.’

Regional allies see a Trump administration that withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a U.S. president that didn’t attend major Asian diplomatic summits last year, and a State Department with no assistant secretary for East Asia. In Singapore, the administration hasn’t even nominated anyone to be the U.S. ambassador.

In reality, there is still a gap between the U.S. strategy in Asia and the resources needed to make it work. The Trump administration must do more to bring allies and partners along. Smaller countries are not yet sold on confronting Beijing, while Chinese government engagement and pressure is felt everywhere.

Asian countries must not be forced to choose between the United States and China. But it’s China that is pushing them to make that choice. The United States’ job is to help small nations preserve their freedom and sovereignty so they don’t see siding with Beijing as their only option. The Trump administration must step up its engagement in Asia – and not just when it’s time for a big conference. ©Washington Post Reprinted with permission

Wall Street Journal 1 June 2019

U.S. Will Face China’s Behavior in Asia Directly, Defense Secretary Says ‘It’s not about being confrontational. It’s about being open and having a dialogue.’

SINGAPORE – In his first major public appearance in Asia, acting Defense Secretary Pat Shanahan said the U.S. would no longer ‘ignore Chinese behavior’ in the Asia-Pacific region, calling its activity a ‘tool kit of coercion.’

Speaking at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue security summit in Singapore, Mr. Shanahan also said that, despite China’s militarization of disputed islands in the South China Sea, its alleged attempts to conduct cyberattacks on other nations and its engagement in ‘predatory economics and debt-for-sovereignty deals,’ he wanted a better military-to-military relationship.

‘I think in the past people have tiptoed around’ Chinese activity in the region, the acting defense secretary told the audience during the question-and-answer period after his remarks. ‘It’s not about being confrontational. It’s about being open and having a dialogue.’

In describing China during his address before defense leaders in Asia, Mr. Shanahan said that ‘perhaps the greatest long-term threat to the vital interests of states across this region comes from actors who seek to undermine, rather than uphold, the rules-based international order.’

But later on in his 45-minute speech, Mr. Shanahan said there were areas where China ‘could still have a cooperative relationship with the United States,’ such as counter-piracy and enforcing United Nations sanctions on North Korea.

A day earlier Mr. Shanahan held a 20-minute meeting with his Chinese counterpart on the sidelines of the conference. He said he gave the Chinese defense minister a book of images of ship-to-ship transfers of oil near China, a common way that North Korea has allegedly skirted sanctions.

‘China can and should have a cooperative relationship with the rest of the region, too. But behavior that erodes other nations’ sovereignty and sows distrust of China’s intentions must end,’ Mr. Shanahan said. ‘Until it does, we stand against a myopic, narrow and parochial vision of the future, and we stand for the free and open order that has benefited us all – including China.’

Historically, China has defended its activities in the region, saying it is providing economic support to other Asian nations through infrastructure projects. It has also denied involvement in cyberattacks and said it is a victim of such activity.

Later on Saturday, one of the most senior military officers in China’s delegation at the summit said Beijing

Selected press coverage

75

welcomed Mr. Shanahan’s commitment to stabilizing military relations but strongly objected to his ‘mistaken’ remarks on the South China Sea and on Taiwan.

In his speech, Mr. Shanahan had reasserted a U.S. commitment to provide Taiwan – a democratic island that Beijing sees as part of its territory – with weaponry to defend itself. He also said that any resolution of the issue should occur ‘in the absence of coercion.’

Maj. Gen. Shao Yuanming, deputy chief of the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission, reiterated Beijing’s longstanding position that Taiwan is an ‘inseparable’ part of China, which he said ‘must be unified.’

‘If anyone tries to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military will pay any price to resolutely defend the motherland’s integrity,’ he told a news briefing.

He also restated China’s longstanding position that it has indisputable sovereignty over all South China Sea islands and their adjacent waters, and that the U.S. is destabilizing the region with its naval patrols in the area.

‘Freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea is absolutely not a problem,’ he added.

Still, he ended the briefing on a more upbeat note, saying that Mr. Shanahan’s meeting on Friday with his counterpart, Gen. Wei Fenghe, had been ‘positive and constructive’ and that the Chinese side would work to improve military ties.

Mr. Shanahan said in his morning presentation that while the U.S. enjoys strong relationships in the region, allies need to share more of the burden. The Trump administration has long pushed for European nations to invest 2% of their gross domestic product in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, calling the U.S. contributions to the alliance unfair.

‘We are investing in you, and with you. And we need you to invest further in yourselves,’ Mr. Shanahan said.

‘We need you to invest in ways that take more control over your sovereignty and your own ability to exercise sovereign choices.’

In response to his meeting with Gen. Wei Mr. Shanahan said he saw ‘a lot of potential’ in the military relationship between the two countries. Yet he also described China’s buildup on disputed islands in the South China Sea as ‘overkill’ if intended as a defensive measure.

A speech by Gen. Wei scheduled for Sunday could overshadow the U.S. acting defense chief, who has been in the job since Jan 1. Gen. Wei hasn’t attended the conference since 2011.

Mr. Shanahan made only a passing reference to North Korea in his prepared remarks, as talks between the two nations have stalled.

‘We acknowledge that North Korea has neared a point where it could credibly strike regional allies, U.S. territory and our forward-deployed forces. North Korea

76

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

remains an extraordinary threat and requires continued vigilance,’ he said. ©Wall Street Journal Reprinted with permission

Financial Times 2 June 2019

Asian ministers warn US–China tensions raise risk of war Lessons of past recalled as Beijing and Washington talk tough at security forum The growing dispute between the US and China on trade and technology is increasing the risk of military conflict or outright war in Asia, a region that hosts some of the world’s most dangerous geopolitical flashpoints, south-east Asian defence ministers cautioned at a security forum on Sunday.

The warnings at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the annual Asian defence summit, came as China at the weekend stepped up its counter-offensive against the US in their trade war, announcing an investigation of delivery group FedEx and a potential blacklist of foreign companies or individuals considered ‘unreliable’.

‘With the untethering of our networks of economic interdependence comes growing risk of confrontation that could lead to war,’ Delfin Lorenzana, defence minister of the Philippines, said on Sunday at the Shangri-La Dialogue, the annual security conference in Singapore. ‘Our greatest fear, therefore, is the possibility of sleepwalking into another international conflict like world war one.’

Ng Eng Hen, Singapore’s defence minister, echoed concerns that the heightened divisions could erupt into war.

‘I don’t think that scenario is so minuscule that it won’t happen,’ he said.

‘When [the] US imposed restrictions on the sale of parts

by US companies to Huawei, they subsequently found out that there were many, many companies in the US that were affected,’ he told the Financial Times. ‘To us, that interdependency is not only good economically but good for security. Because if we’re so economically interdependent, then the price of conflict is very high.’

China hawks in the administration of US president Donald Trump are increasingly pushing for a full ‘decoupling’ of the country’s technology supply chain from China, last month placing telecoms equipment maker Huawei on a blacklist restricting it from doing business with US companies.

Asia is riddled with unresolved geopolitical disputes ranging from Beijing’s claims on Taiwan and the standoff between North Korea and South Korea, which remain technically at war, to the South China Sea, where China

has built up a number of reefs and shoals in international waters into artificial islands and has installed missiles.

Beijing has also used its coast guard and maritime militia, backed up by navy vessels, to deny Philippine fishing boats access to contested land features in the region traditionally controlled by Manila.

In Singapore, Patrick Shanahan, acting US secretary of defence, described China – without naming it – as ‘the greatest long-term threat to the vital interests of states across this region’, arguing that Beijing was destabilising Asia with a ‘toolkit of coercion’. But he also sounded a conciliatory note, saying: ‘China could still have a co-operative relationship with the United States.’

The attendance of General Wei Fenghe, the first Chinese defence minister to attend the conference since 2011, had raised expectations that Beijing might try to counter anxiety among its neighbours over its rapidly growing naval and air might and its sometimes aggressive use of those capabilities.

But while Gen Wei appealed at the forum for peace, openness and ‘win–win co-operation’ and claimed that China was not threatening anyone, his speech was generally hawkish. ‘As for the recent trade friction started by the US, if the US wants to talk, we will keep the door open. If they want a fight, we will fight, we will fight till the end,’ Gen Wei said.

Gen Wei reiterated China’s longstanding threat of invading Taiwan and refused to acknowledge neighbours’ concerns over the military build-up in the South China Sea. Several Asian countries, including some US allies such as the Philippines or nations that have more limited security co-operation with the US such as Singapore, have long fretted that the increasingly open rivalry between Washington and Beijing might force them to choose sides. Those fears took on much greater urgency this year.

Mohamad Sabu, Malaysia’s defence minister, said there would be ‘regional anxiety if smaller nations would be forced to take sides – one that has detrimental implications on economic development and nation-building’. ©Financial Times Reprinted with permission

The Economist 6 June 2019

Asian countries fear China but many won’t side with America Asian countries may not like China’s hectoring, but they have their qualms about America, too What do you buy the Asian defence minister who has everything? How about a ‘beautiful’ photo-book of North Korean ships illegally transferring oil at sea? Patrick

Shanahan, America’s acting defence secretary, presented the collection of grainy aerial shots to his Chinese counterpart, General Wei Fenghe, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual gathering of military bigwigs in Singapore from May 31st to June 2nd.

It was an emollient gesture in fractious times. When Banyan asked Mr Shanahan what he planned to say to General Wei in private, the answer was not a tirade about Huawei or the South China Sea. Instead Mr Shanahan said he was ‘excited’ to explore areas of cooperation. North Korean sanctions-busting – which often occurs in Chinese waters – was top of the list. Such collaboration would show that America and China could ‘compete in a constructive way’.

On June 1st the Pentagon published its plans for that competition in an Indo-Pacific strategy. At its heart was the idea of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP), a nebulous concept conceived by Japan and enthusiastically taken up by the Trump administration. In essence, FOIP is a rulesbased rejoinder to China’s vision of spheres of influence, gunboat diplomacy and murky loans. ‘No one nation can or should dominate the Indo-Pacific,’ said the Pentagon in its report.

Mr Shanahan’s notion of responsible competition – in contrast to the no-holds-barred clash of civilisations favoured by some of his head-banging colleagues – is laudable. It is also savvy. Asian states are likelier to sign up to FOIP if they are persuaded that America is not spoiling for a fight. But on both counts – stabilising the relationship with China, while rallying partners to push back against it – America has an uphill task.

Start with the olive branches. General Wei did not so much ignore them as snap them into pieces. ‘Arise, all those who do not want be enslaved,’ he thundered in his speech on June 2nd, quoting China’s national anthem. ‘Let us build the new Great Wall with our flesh and blood.’ He warned that China’s army was ‘not afraid of sacrifice’ and that ‘we make no promise to renounce the use of force’ against Taiwan.

One might think that such bluster would send Asians rushing to sign up to FOIP and into America’s arms. In some cases, it has. Narendra Modi will deepen defence ties with America in his second term. Japan is beefing up its armed forces and sending its navy into the South China Sea. Officials from America, Australia, India and Japan – the ‘Quad’ – now confer routinely, most recently on May 31st.

All pay lip service to the idea that the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), a club of ten mostly smaller powers, should be at the core of FOIP. The problem is that not all in ASEAN are sold on the idea. For one thing, many are unconvinced that America will truly stick around, as the costs of any war with China grow over time.

So why risk China’s ire? ‘The Chinese coast guard is bigger

Selected press coverage

77

than Malaysia’s warships,’ lamented Malaysia’s defence minister.

Mr Shanahan did his best to assuage these concerns. He pointed out that the Indo-Pacific was America’s ‘priority theatre’, with four times as many American forces as any other American military command. America’s freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea were also growing more routine: unusually, there were two in May alone.

But muscle is only half of it. The larger issue is that Donald Trump’s unpredictably incendiary foreign policy sits uneasily with the principles of FOIP. Tensions with Iran are pulling America’s attention back to the Middle East.

The compulsive resort to tariffs undercuts a rules-based trading order. Mr Trump’s lack of interest in human rights hardly furthers freedom. And to many in Asia, America’s war on Huawei or its sanctions against buyers of Russian arms or Iranian oil look an awful lot like China’s ‘toolkit of coercion’, as Mr Shanahan put it.

That is unfair. An Asian order sculpted by China would be more capricious and suffocating than anything Mr Trump could devise. General Wei’s defence of the crushing of the Tiananmen Square protests – he called it a ‘correct policy’ that gave China the stability to grow richer – was a reminder of the ideological stakes. Australia, India and Japan are on board. Singapore and Vietnam’s sympathies are clear. But most ASEAN countries hate the idea of taking sides, despite widespread misgivings about China’s intentions. Mr Shanahan reckons they will eventually come round: ‘I think they’re building up their confidence.’ ©The Economist Reprinted with permission

Straits Times 22 June 2019

The US and its Shangri-La myths PM Lee’s keynote speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue is a timely and important message to America as the US grows increasingly hostile to China’s rise For many years, ever since they first started to think of China as a potential future strategic rival, America’s foreign policy community members have taken the support of the rest of Asia for granted.

They have unquestioningly expected that if China ever did challenge the United States’ position as the primary power in Asia, then its allies and friends in Asia would be only too eager to encourage and support the US in pushing back.

They have assumed, indeed, that the more overtly China challenged US strategic leadership, the more eagerly its Asian

78

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

neighbours would support America in resisting Chinese ambitions and preserving the old US-led regional order.

And every year this assumption has been fortified and further entrenched at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.

For almost 20 years, this annual mid-year talk fest is where Washington’s movers and shakers have come to mix with their Asian counterparts, and to have their assumptions confirmed.

Year after year, the message they have taken back to Washington has been that America’s many friends and allies in Asia are just as fully committed to preserving US leadership and supporting American values and objectives in Asia as Americans themselves are.

But this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, held earlier this month, was different. One of the region’s most respected voices used the occasion to warn Washington that it could not take regional support for granted in the swiftly escalating confrontation with China that is now unfolding.

On the contrary, Washington was told in the plainest terms that its assumptions about Asia are wrong. Now that strategic rivalry with China is no longer a future possibility but a current and urgent reality, Washington was put on notice that Asian countries would not back America in recklessly stoking that rivalry into a new Cold War with China.

The authority of this warning was all the greater because it came from none other than the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr Lee Hsien Loong. His keynote speech to the opening dinner offered a brutally frank critique of current trends in America’s policy towards China.

Message to the US from a Friend Singapore is not just the Shangri-La Dialogue’s host nation, but one of America’s key friends in Asia. Mr Lee is much admired by US policy elites, and they have long seen his country as not just a close friend but also a de facto ally.

Not surprisingly, then, his speech was met with shock, dismay and even, I understand, a measure of incredulity by some US delegates, and it continues to reverberate in Washington policy circles. It remains to be seen whether it will prompt a major rethink among policymakers and analysts there about the wisdom of their current approach to managing what everyone now understands to be the most important bilateral relationship in the world.

Ms Bonnie Glaser’s comments on the speech in these pages recently suggest they will not. Ms Glaser, one of America’s most distinguished and influential Asiawatchers, concluded that Mr Lee had drawn a false moral equivalence between Washington and Beijing. She did not address the sustained and tightly argued case made in his speech for a major shift in US policy. Mr Lee’s nuanced and balanced presentation did not spare Beijing, but it raised real and urgent concerns about America’s response. His

key argument was very simple. China’s conduct raises deep anxieties among its neighbours, but that does not absolve the US of responsibility to react prudently and realistically in a way that does not make a bad situation even worse, which is what it is doing now.

The talk of a ‘new Cold War’ is no longer just a metaphor but an increasingly accurate description of how America understands its future relations with China. It explains the clear reality that Washington is now set on trying to contain China just as it contained the Soviets – and to contain it not just globally but by denying it any wider regional influence in Asia.

What is lacking in Washington is any clear idea of how this can be achieved, and at what cost.

He explained that America’s attempt to deny China a bigger role in regional affairs commensurate with its growing wealth and power will not succeed, and risks plunging Asia back into a nightmare of strategic rivalry.

The only sensible course is for America to accept China’s rise and learn to live with it. Asians will welcome America remaining a major strategic player in Asia but will not support America in trying to contain China’s legitimate aspirations for wider regional influence.

‘Countries have to accept that China will continue to grow and strengthen, and that it is neither possible nor wise for them to prevent this from happening,’ said Mr Lee in his Shangri-La address. ‘Americans now talk openly of containing China, and to do so soon before it is too late, the way they used to talk about the USSR and the Soviet bloc. This negative view of China has permeated the US establishment.’

But, he warned: ‘In a new Cold War, there can be no clear division between friend and foe. Nor is it possible to create Nato or Warsaw Pact equivalents with a hard line drawn through Asia.’

This is not the first time Mr Lee has sounded a warning to Washington about its approach to China, but it is by far the strongest critique yet offered not just by Mr Lee himself but by any regional leader. And it is clear that he is not alone. His speech has been endorsed even by US allies like Australia, whose Prime Minister, Mr Scott Morrison, said the speech contained ‘many insights that Australia would share’.

It is not hard to understand why this is happening now.

In the past 18 months, ever since the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy appeared, Washington’s rhetoric about China has become markedly more strident.

Much attention has naturally focused on the very worrying trade dimensions of Washington’s growing animosity towards Beijing, but the strategic dimension has been just as striking and may well in the long run prove more serious – because it carries the risk of war – not a trade war, but a real war, and quite possibly a nuclear war.

Tough Talk But No Clear Plan Just how far US fear and hostility towards China have grown was vividly shown by a major Pentagon report released to coincide with the Shangri-La Dialogue. The Indo-Pacific Strategy Report went much further even than the National Security Strategy in its assessment of China’s ambitions, saying that China ‘seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near term and, ultimately global pre-eminence in the long term’.

The claim that China aims not just for regional but for global pre-eminence is extraordinarily important because it directly implies that China does not just threaten America’s leadership position in Asia – it threatens America itself, just as the Soviet Union did.

It means the talk of a ‘new Cold War’ is no longer just a metaphor but an increasingly accurate description of how America understands its future relations with China.

It explains the clear reality that Washington is now set on trying to contain China just as it contained the Soviets – and to contain it not just globally but by denying it any wider regional influence in Asia.

What is lacking in Washington is any clear idea of how this can be achieved, and at what cost. US policymakers and analysts seem to continue to assume, as they have done for so long, that tough talk from the White House and the Pentagon will be enough by itself to make China back off.

This kind of thinking lay behind then US Acting Defence Secretary Patrick Shanahan’s tough talk in his address at the Shangri-La Dialogue this year, when he boldly said that Chinese bad behaviour ‘must end’.

If only it was that easy. Wiser folk like Singapore’s Prime Minister understand that China’s weight and power in Asia are real and still growing, and cannot simply be brushed aside. They understand that China’s global ambitions and reach are not as broad as Washington now fears, but that its strength and resolve in Asia are much greater than Washington understands.

They worry that Americans too readily assume that they can win a new Cold War with China just as they did the old one with the Soviets without understanding all the myriad ways that China is not the Soviet Union. And they fear that these misunderstandings will lead America stumblingly into a confrontation with China which it cannot win and which could easily degenerate into a major war.

America needs Asia’s help to avoid that. It needs to be brought to understand that if it wishes to remain strategically significant in Asia at all, it must either engage with China as an equal partner or confront it as a bitter and very powerful rival, and that America’s interests, as well as Asia’s, are much better served by the first of these options.

There is a challenge here for other Asian leaders. They need to follow Mr Lee’s example and explain clearly – and publicly – to Washington how they see the future of US–

Selected press coverage

79

China relations and what they would like to see America do.

There is also a challenge to the Shangri-La Dialogue and its organiser, the International Institute of Strategic Studies. The institute may have its headquarters in London and a branch office in Singapore, but for some time now, its head and its heart have been firmly set in Washington.

Consequently, the Shangri-La Dialogue has become an amplifying echo chamber for complacent American misperceptions about Asia rather than an opportunity to challenge and correct them. Time for Shangri-La to leave the world of make-believe. ©Straits Times Reprinted with permission

Japan Times 2 June 2019

How Japan’s clout is rising in age of U.S.–China tensions As the West’s concerns about China’s dominance on the global stage continue to grow, Japan is increasingly regarded as a balancing force in the region.

Perhaps reflecting this geopolitical shift, London-based think tank The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), known for hosting the annual Shangri-La Dialogue security forum in Singapore, earlier this month announced the establishment of a ‘Japan Chair,’ a senior position dedicated to researching Japanese defense and foreign policy issues.

IISS Director-General John Chipman recently sat down with The Japan Times to discuss Asia’s security situation as the U.S.–China trade war escalates and Japan increases it presence and importance on the geopolitical scene.

Below are edited excerpts from the conversation.

What are some of the takeaways from this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue?

Many were impressed by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsieng Loong’s keynote speech, where he made a great effort to navigate the geopolitical landscape and explained the particular position of small states in the Asia-Pacific – particularly those who do not want to be put in a position of choosing between the United States and China.

I think it was interesting that he said that for China’s rising power to be effective, it needs to exert that power with restraint and legitimacy.

At the same time, he also pointed out the dangers of finding ourselves in two ecosystems: one led by the U.S. and the other led by China. It was in that context that he said it was important for the stability of the region that other powers were able to operate effectively.

80

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

So I think that set the right tone for the meeting. Also, although acting U.S. Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan listed a number of things that disturb the United States in the region, it helped he didn’t conduct a full-frontal attack on China.

Both the U.S. and China showed a degree of restraint.

Would you say the escalating trade war is the reason for this?

I think a lot of defense ministers – even if it’s not their mandate – did worry about the U.S.–China trade dispute extending for a long period of time. I don’t think anyone felt that trade frictions would materially spill over in geopolitical terms and increase the possibility of conflict.

But what the Shangri-La Dialogue did offer was the opportunity for a lot of quiet diplomacy to take place.

In particular, the trilateral defense meeting between the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan was important.

I felt in watching the informal exchanges between the defense ministers, that a lot of the positive features of Asian diplomacy were in evidence. Once the personal contact became more evident, there was a warming up of relations between the defense ministers that was quite striking.

Would you say the Shangri-La Dialogue provided a forum to help build confidence among nations?

I think so. There is a lot of work to do, in practical confidence-building measures. For example in the South China Sea, there were numerous references to the efforts to finalize a code of conduct between China and ASEAN. By all assessments, though, we are far away from seeing such an agreed to code that is balanced. There is still an effort on the Chinese side to ensure that there is zero external influence on the way this code of conduct will be carried out in practice.

And a couple of the claimant states who have decent relations with the United States don’t want to sign an agreement that makes it impossible for the Americans to have a presence in the South China Sea. So I think the gap has widened.

However, it was good that there was a 20-minute bilateral meeting between Shanahan and China’s defense minister, Gen. Wei Fenghe. Both sides expressed a desire to have better military-to-military contacts.

My impression was that the U.S. military felt that there had been an appreciable decline in provocative encounters at sea and more professional communication between the Chinese and the American navies.

So that has diminished the risks of potentially dangerous incidents happening at sea.

That seems to be one of the major differences compared to last year.

Yes, I think that’s right.

Twelve months ago, at least the U.S. perception was that the Chinese were deploying near American naval vessels in a way that was not just too close for comfort, but too close for safety. That has now changed.

What would you attribute the change to?

I would imagine that the cause – of course this is only speculation – is that the Chinese saw there were risks that an accident could occur, and that they could send the political messages they wanted to without maintaining such a close proximity to U.S. ships.

The fact that the Chinese sent their defense minister, and that he was confident in asking an array of questions, meant that it sort of settled the mood of the Shangri-La Dialogue a bit. I think that the Chinese side saw that by deploying such a high level official, they were able to get their message across more effectively, which in turn meant that everyone else didn’t have to shout so loud to be heard as well.

How did the idea for the IISS Japan Chair come about?

We’ve been working on establishing the Japan Chair for a few years. Our efforts accelerated after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe gave the keynote address in 2014 at the Shangri-La Dialogue. One of the purposes of having the Japan Chair in London is to help give Europeans a better understanding of the Japanese perspective, not only on regional affairs, but global affairs as well.

A second goal would be that while the Japan Chair will of course focus on Japanese strategy and security policies, we also want to regularly share IISS expertise with Japan on other themes and regions that may be of interest to that nation’s government, private sector and experts.

The creation of the Japan Chair was funded by the Japanese government. How do you ensure research independence?

We are very assertive about our independence. To be transparent, we have a memorandum of understanding with the government of Japan that gives IISS full independence in deciding such things as who will head the Japan Chair, the content of the program, the nature of the analysis, the methodology in which it will be collected and presented and the choices we make about our publications.

The trustees of the IISS would not allow us to take money from any government that in any way that constrained our intellectual freedom of action.

The point I’ve always made in discussions with all governments is that if you don’t trust us to present objective facts and independent assessments, then you shouldn’t

provide us with your funds. But if you do trust us, then you have to trust our independence.

Did Japan’s changing role on the global stage have an impact on the decision to establish the Japan Chair?

As Foreign Minister Taro Kono said, when he goes to Europe, he realizes that Russia and China are seen a bit differently there.

So it’s also important for Europeans to understand the way Japan looks at Russia and China – which is a bit different, given the economic and geopolitical realities and the territorial questions that continue to persist.

Also, ensuring that the European countries, with their four G7 members, are better informed about the Japanese perspective as a G7 nation was also important.

On the flip side, how would you describe the European perspective on Japan?

Up until six months ago, Europe focused a large portion of its relationship effort on China. On its economic engagement with China, many European countries, including Germany, saw China as a lucrative export destination. The economic relationship with Japan, and the political one that went with it, might not have been so regularly discussed. Recently, though, the EU released a quite strong strategy paper on China that begins to recognize some of the challenges that the union has in dealing with the Asian giant, especially in the wake of the efforts Beijing has made in promoting the Belt and Road Initiative and the so-called ‘16 plus one’ talks with EU countries that some in Brussels viewed as a possible attempt to split the Europeans up.

In that broader context, I would remind people Japan is a big economic player that broadly shares the political values of European Union countries.

Now, how do we show the Japanese perspective? What we intend to do is to present fact-based analysis of Japanese security policies and make evidence-based assessments of what Japan is seeking to do in developing its strategic personality.

We are not intending to be a voice of the Japanese government. The Japanese government can do that for itself very well.

But what we want to do is to create more debate about Japan in Europe.

Japan used to be criticized for punching below its weight on the international stage. Now it’s being recognized as a player. How do you see the trajectory of Japan’s global role?

I would start from the proposition that Japan is still the third-biggest economy in the world. And people sometimes forget that, holding on to a fascination with China’s

Selected press coverage

81

rise. And Japan, especially in the last few years, has maintained a steady state and enjoyed small, but well-managed growth.

I do think that Europeans will become more interested in Japan as concerns over China grow.

And this is not to incite competition.

There’s a growing appreciation that China – though it says it wants a multipolar world system – appears to be working toward a unipolar system in Asia.

And what the Europeans will see is Japan helping to guarantee the maintaining of a multipolar Asia.

I think that’s the correct way to think about the geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific and the Asia-Pacific.

It’s not a question of stopping the rise of China or containing China – it’s about preserving a multipolar system in a multipolar Asia-Pacific region.

Europeans are becoming more conscious that multipolarity cannot just be a European thing; It also has to be an Asian thing too.

That’s where Japan really fits in and why we always have to remind people of the place that Japan has in that multipolar world.

It’s an argument that, in principle, shouldn’t be too difficult for the Chinese, because they like talking about multipolarity as well. ©Japan Times Reprinted with permission

Channel News Asia 5 June 2019

Commentary: The US, China, a security dilemma and a way out in Singapore If there is any bright spot from this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, it’s the realisation that a small country like Singapore can play a useful mediating role with rich insights to give the US and China perspective to their relationship, says China commentator Tom McGregor BEIJING: When two elephants fight, an impasse at some point is bound to happen in the ensuring [sic] struggle.

This weekend, defence officials from around the world descended upon Singapore to discuss regional security challenges and geopolitics at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an apt time seeing how frictions over the brewing bilateral tussle between the US and China over trade and technology have risen to a fever pitch.

The world’s two richest and most powerful countries were headed for diplomatic confrontation, after the trade truce collapsed last month when Washington raised tariffs

82

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

from 10 per cent to 25 per cent on listed Chinese imports valued at US$200 billion.

[The] US President doubled down on the pressure on China when he signed an executive order that indirectly labeled the Shenzhen-based telecommunication equipment manufacturer and smartphone maker Huawei and its affiliates a ‘foreign adversary’, clearing the way for barring the company from US networks and manufacturers.

China’s Commerce Ministry responded by raising tariffs on US$60 billion of US imports, blocking US deliveries of LNG and soybeans.

Huawei has repatriated US employees working in Shenzhen and pressed on with a lawsuit against the US government, over earlier charges that the National Defence Authorisation Act passed by Congress in 2018, was unconstitutional.

There are also threats that China will ban certain US companies from operating in the country.

Fireworks in Singapore These tensions set the stage for geopolitical fireworks at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.

US Acting Secretary of Defence Patrick Shanahan and China Defence Minister General Wei Fenghe gave rousing speeches at the conference that raised the temperature, leaving many members in the audience feeling anxious about the growing split between Washington and Beijing.

Although Shanahan shied away from singling out China in most of his speech, he had earlier said before the summit started that he would use his speech to call out China specifically.

So his reference to actors who sought to undermine the rules-based order through militarising disputed areas, predatory economics and influence operations seemed targeted at China.

Wei meanwhile highlighted that China will fight until the end, if the US wanted a fight. ‘Bully us? No way.’

Wei had also send [sic] a clear and unequivocal signal regarding Taiwan as a red line in the sand for China. ‘No attempts to split China will succeed,’ he added.

‘Any interference in the Taiwan question is doomed to failure. If anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military has no choice but to fight at all costs.’

‘The US is indivisible and so is China. China must be and will be reunified.’

A Commitment to Peace Despite the strong words used by both sides, what went under the radar were the conciliatory remarks in each of their speeches.

China is at an inflection point where its focus is to maintain sustainable and inclusive growth, as it begins to grapple with the challenges of being the world’s fastest

ageing country.

While it seeks to defend its interests of preserving a conducive international environment for continued development, it also has to be wary about unnecessarily giving into US demands and setting a precedence [sic] inimical to its interests.

There are many in China who believe that the US is out to encircle China through a string of alliances and partnerships with countries around China’s periphery and dampen its rise.

Despite Wei’s pugnacious speech, he also reaffirmed Beijing’s longheld commitment to peace by saying: ‘China will not attack, unless we are attacked.’ He also highlighted how both sides should ‘promote a China–US relationship featuring coordination, cooperation and stability’.

He added: ‘The two sides realise that conflict, or war between them, would bring disaster to both countries and the world.’

Shanahan too highlighted that China has stood with the US as a cooperative partner in pursuit of shared goals in decades past, and both sides have an alignment of interests, ‘from military-to-military dialogues to develop risk-reduction measures, to tackling transnational threats’.

Both sides also met bilaterally on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue.

Worries Remain Still, Taiwan poses a significant flashpoint for both sides, given Chinese sensitivities over what they perceive as Washington’s meddling in its internal affairs and using Taipei to destabilise peace on the Asian continent, following US National Security Advisor John Bolton’s recent meeting with his Taiwanese counterpart David Lee last week.

A security dilemma is brewing, in which both the US and China take actions and use words to bolster their position, which inevitably ends up making the other feel less secure.

Some Chinese government officials believe the hawkish Bolton best represents US President Donald J Trump’s stance on foreign policy, while Westerners worry hawks in China hold the most influence in Beijing. Both sides are clutching onto misguided viewpoints.

US Defence Secretary Shanahan’s subsequent strong words during his Q&A where he mentioned that China had built artificial island [sic] in disputed waters in the South China Sea was also seen as provocative by the Chinese delegation.

The Search for Solutions Even when elephants fight, sometimes the grass can make a difference.

Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was spot on when delivering the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue. He said the ‘fundamental problem between the

US and China … is a mutual lack of trust’ that ‘bodes ill for compromise or peaceful accommodation’.

‘China’s growth has shifted the strategic balance and the economic centre of gravity of the world … China has to recognise that it is in a totally new situation created by its own success. It can no longer expect to be treated the same way as in the past when it was much smaller and weaker,’ he said.

At the same time, he highlighted that ‘the rest of the world too has to adjust to a larger role for China. Countries have to accept that China will continue to grow and strengthen, and that it is neither possible nor wise for them to prevent this from happening’.

President Trump needs to restore trade talks with China, recognise that both sides have got to work together to rebuild trust and strengthen the international global economy, and rein in elements that might wish to take a harsh stance on China for ideological reasons.

Meanwhile, Beijing has to demonstrate it can uphold the principles and standards on trade, technology and intellectual property if President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping do sign a US–China trade agreement in Osaka on the sidelines of the G20 and demonstrate good faith in the lead-up to that meeting.

The trade deal can only succeed if both countries follow the rules and guidelines that will be stated in the agreement.

If there is any bright spot from this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, it’s the realisation that a small country like Singapore can play a useful mediating role between both sides as a neutral observer that has deep and close ties with both the US and China, and rich insights that gives [sic] both perspective to their relationship.

The words used by Prime Minister Lee in Singapore has [sic] provided a face-saving cover for both sides to step back from the brink and break the impasse. What is needed next is for both to accept compromise and allow for concessions in any upcoming trade negotiations. ©Channel News Asia Reprinted with permission

South China Morning Post 4 June 2019

Shangri-La Dialogue shows China and US can get priorities right Talks in Singapore between the two sides as trade and tech wars rage were deemed to be ‘constructive’.

Such meetings are necessary to help manage risks and avoid escalation to open conflict American arms sales to Taiwan and the alleged Chinese militarisation of the South China Sea have been ever-

Selected press coverage

83

green issues for China and the United States at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue security forum in Singapore. This year, though, tensions between the sides were raised to new heights by tariff increases and the battle over the Chinese technology giant Huawei. But while defence ministers from the nations were only too aware of the contentious new matters and again raised the old ones, they made a conscious effort to calm hostilities. This is what the two governments and region need; a tacit understanding by their militaries that such talks and meetings are necessary to help manage risks and avoid escalation to open conflict.

China’s sending of its highest delegation in eight years, led by Defence Minister General Wei Fenghe, showed the level of concern over the actions of US President Donald Trump’s administration. In contrast, the US presence was somewhat diluted, with Patrick Shanahan still to be confirmed in his position as defence secretary. Still, both took a strong stand on protection of interests, although direct mention of one another was kept to a minimum. For Wei, that meant issuing a warning to ‘external forces’ fostering the idea of independence for Taiwan. China, he said on Sunday, had a ‘legitimate right’ to construct man-made islands in the South China Sea; Shanahan the previous day gave notice to Beijing that ‘behaviour that erodes other nations’ sovereignty and sows distrust of China’s intentions’ should end.

Talks between Wei and Shanahan were determined by the sides to be ‘constructive’ and a commitment to positive engagement was reiterated. In his speech to security officials, the acting US defence secretary said that while his country would remain a competitor of China’s, it would cooperate when interests aligned on issues including enforcing United Nations sanctions against North Korea and fighting transnational incidents such as piracy. But as he spoke, a Pentagon strategy report on the Indo-Pacific region was released that hit out at China for ‘eroding the values and principles of the rules-based order’.

The US has a challenging task convincing governments in Asia and the Pacific to side with it rather than China given Trump’s erratic actions. Less uncertain, though, is the desire by the nations’ militaries to keep politics from their dialogue and ensure relations remain cordial. Priorities were right in Singapore; although there was posturing, the trade and tech wars were set aside by China and the US so that they could work for a better communications channel to raise issues and improve understanding. ©South China Morning Post Reprinted with permission

84

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

China Military 3 June 2019

China’s wisdom on security cooperation contributes to regional peace, stability SINGAPORE, June 2 (Xinhua) – ‘While striving for common prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, we must respect the core interests and accommodate the security concerns of all,’ said Chinese State Councilor and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe during his speech at the 18th Shangri-La Dialogue on Sunday.

‘We in China do not covet the interests, nor envy the development, of others. However, we shall never give up our legitimate rights and interests,’ Wei added. ‘No country should ever expect China to allow its sovereignty, security and development interests to be infringed upon.’

This was the first time for a Chinese defense minister to attend the Shangri-La Dialogue after eight years. Wei’s honesty, frankness and not shying away from harsh questions gave delegates a good impression, said Li Mingjiang, an associate professor at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

Cooperation Benefits China, U.S. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and the United States, and the bilateral relationship has been steadily growing in the past 40 years, despite all the ups and downs, Wei said.

‘The most valuable lesson we have learned from the four-decade-long relationship is that cooperation benefits the two sides while confrontation hurts both,’ the defense minister said.

Wei’s speech mentioned the essential part of China’s policy on the United States, that is ‘fighting but not breaking,’ said Li. ‘We’ve seen the fighting, but Wei also emphasized cooperation, which is very important to all, so that regional countries don’t have to choose sides.’

During his speech, Wei noted that the two militaries have agreed on building their relationship into a stabilizer for the overall relations, maintaining regular communication on the strategic level, and managing risks and preventing conflicts.

‘The two sides recognize that military conflicts or even a war between them would bring disasters to both countries and the world,’ he said. ‘It takes two to cooperate, but only one to start a fight.’

Wei’s speech echoed U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan’s remarks a day ealier on building a bilateral military relationship as a stabilizer for the overall relations, said Francois Heisbourg, a senior adviser for

Europe of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

‘So I think maybe the two militaries have some scope for a degree of maintaining normality in relations. But that will depend on the political development,’ he added.

All participating defense ministers and other delegates to the dialogue were glad to hear from Wei that the Chinese military will interact more with the U.S. military and develop a better relationship, said Singaporean Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen. ‘This is good news for all of us,’ Ng said. ‘From the Singaporean perspective, both sides strengthening interaction will help lower risks and reduce misjudgement for either party.’

Asia-Pacific Security At the event this year, over 600 defense ministers, policymakers and experts from about 40 countries gathered from Friday to Sunday to discuss security issues in the Asia-Pacific.

‘We should respect and accommodate the legitimate security concerns of one another,’ Wei said. ‘China understands and respects the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries, and supports the social systems and development paths they independently choose.’

‘The minister has systematically elaborated China’s concept on international security order, world peace and stability, regional security and safety, and explained some of China’s specific actions, these have yielded positive results,’ said Li. For one, Wei refuted the allegation that China is militarizing the South China Sea islands and reefs.

‘It is the legitimate rights of a sovereign state to carry out construction on its own territory. China built limited defense facilities on the islands and reefs for self-defense,’ he said. ‘Where there are threats, there are defenses.’

The current situation in the South China Sea is improving towards greater stability, Wei said. Over 100,000 ships sail through the South China Sea each year and ‘none has been threatened.’

Wei talked about progress being made between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries in negotiating the Code of Conduct and ‘we look forward to the outcome of that,’ said Rommel Banlaoi, chairman of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research.

However, ‘there are always people trying to rake in profits by stirring up troubles in the region,’ Wei said, adding that in recent years, some countries outside the region have come to the South China Sea to flex muscles, in the name of freedom of navigation.

‘The large-scale force projection and offensive operations in the region are the most serious destabilizing and

uncertain factors in the South China Sea,’ he said.

Wei also talked about China’s choices of peace and development, openness and inclusiveness, win–win cooperation, and mutual understanding among civilizations, as well as its commitment to regional and world prosperity and stability.

China has been playing an increasingly important role in the Asia-Pacific’s security, and there are different kinds of security mechanisms in the region, said Zhou Bo, director of the Center for Security Cooperation at the Office for International Military Cooperation of the Chinese Defense Ministry. ‘That’s why Wei reiterated that every security mechanism needs to be open, inclusive and transparent.’

‘We want China to have military capability in order to contribute to the maintenance of world peace. And we also want a strong Chinese military in order to enhance China’s role in peacekeeping efforts worldwide and we want that to happen,’ Banlaoi said.

Asanga Abeyagoonasekera, director general of the Institute of National Security Studies of Sri Lanka, said: ‘China’s strategy is an inclusive strategy, trying to bring all nations together and trying to create a shared value.’

Taiwan Question On China’s core Taiwan-related issues, Wei reiterated China’s firm position and warned against any forces’ attempt to split the island from the country.

The Taiwan question bears on China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and China must be and will be reunified, Wei said, adding that ‘if anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military has no choice but to fight at all costs for national unity.’

The defense minister said no attempts to split China shall succeed, and that foreign intervention in the Taiwan issue is doomed to fail.

As for Shanahan’s remarks on Saturday, in which he said the United States will offer necessary support to Taiwan according to the ‘Taiwan Relations Act,’ Wei said, ‘We can find no justifiable reasons for the U.S. to interfere in the Taiwan question by its domestic law.’

Li said Wei’s remarks on Taiwan were firm and tough, and reflected China’s determination that there is no room for compromise on the issue. Wei also made it clear to the United States not to go too far on Taiwan, Li added.

Heisbourg noted Wei’s speech was ‘very impressive,’ adding that Wei ‘said twice “at all costs” for national unity.

This will be taken seriously by the audience.’

Officially known as the Asia Security Summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue has been organized and convened annually by the British think tank IISS and the Singaporean government since 2002. ©China Military Reprinted with permission

Selected press coverage

85

APPENDIX II

Selected IISS publications

The Adelphi series is the Institute’s principal contribution to policy-relevant, original academic research. Books published since 2013 include:

Samuel Charap and Timothy J. Colton, Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia, Adelphi 460 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2017).

Brendan Taylor, Dangerous Decade: Taiwan’s Security and Crisis Management, Adelphi 470–471 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2019).

Samir Puri, Fighting and Negotiating with Armed Groups: The Difficulty of Securing Strategic Outcomes, Adelphi 459 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2016).

William C. Potter and Sarah Bidgood, eds, Once and Future Partners: The United States, Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation, Adelphi 464–465 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018).

Brian Ganson and Achim Wennmann, Business and Conflict in Fragile States: The Case for Pragmatic Solutions, Adelphi 457– 458 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2016).

James Hamill, Africa’s Lost Leader: South Africa’s Continental Role Since Apartheid, Adelphi 463 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018).

James E. Doyle, Renewing America’s Nuclear Arsenal: Options for the 21st Century, Adelphi 462 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2017).

Ben Barry, Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Changing Character of War, Adelphi 461 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2017).

86

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Nigel Inkster, China’s Cyber Power, Adelphi 456 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2016).

Mark Fitzpatrick, Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Adelphi 455 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2016).

Jonas Parello-Plesner and Mathieu Duchâtel, China’s Strong Arm: Protecting Citizens and Assets Abroad, Adelphi 451 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2015).

Jeffrey Lewis, Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture, Adelphi 446 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2014).

Aaron L. Friedberg, Beyond Air–Sea Battle: The Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia, Adelphi 444 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2014).

Monika Barthwal-Datta, Food Security in Asia: Challenges, Policies and Implications, Adelphi 441–442 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2014).

Emile Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant, Adelphi 438 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2013).

Christian Le Mière and Sarah Raine, Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes, Adelphi 436–437 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2013).

The Strategic Dossier series harnesses the Institute’s technical expertise to present detailed information on key strategic issues. Recent publications include: IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2019: Key Developments and Trends (London: IISS, 2019).

Strategic Comments is the Institute’s online source of analysis of international security and politicomilitary issues. Articles on South, Southeast and Northeast Asia published between December 2015 and August 2019 include: ‘Hong Kong’s protests’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 25, no. 24, August 2019.

‘Thailand’s hybrid politics’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 25, no. 13, May 2019.

‘Tensions in the Taiwan Strait’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 25, no. 11, April 2019.

‘The India–Pakistan security crisis’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 25, no. 10, April 2019.

‘The US–China trade war’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 25, no.

5, March 2019.

‘The second Trump–Kim summit’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 25, no. 4, February 2019.

IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2018: Key Developments and Trends (London: IISS, 2018).

‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America and the Caribbean’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 40, December 2018.

IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2017: Key Developments and Trends (London: IISS, 2017).

‘North Korea’s military power’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol.

24, no. 24, August 2018.

IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2016: Key Developments and Trends (London: IISS, 2016).

‘The evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 19, June 2018.

IISS, Missile-defence Cooperation in the Gulf (London: IISS, 2016).

‘Thailand’s political direction’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 12, April 2018.

IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2015: Key Developments and Trends (London: IISS, 2015).

IISS, Evolution of the Cyber Domain: The Implications for National and Global Security (London: IISS, 2015).

IISS, Regional Security Assessment 2014: Key Developments and Trends in Asia-Pacific Security (London: IISS, 2014).

IISS, North Korean Security Challenges: A Net Assessment (London: IISS, 2011).

IISS, The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of ‘Raúl Reyes’ (London: IISS, 2011).

IISS, Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London: IISS, 2011).

IISS, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London: IISS, 2010).

IISS, Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia (London: IISS, 2009).

IISS, Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran (London: IISS, 2008).

‘China’s evolving role in African security’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 3, January 2018.

‘The Rohingya crisis’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 36, October 2017.

‘US Afghanistan policy: regional aspects’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 34, October 2017.

‘The Trump administration’s Afghanistan policy’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 23, September 2017.

‘The North Korea crisis’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no.

31, September 2017.

‘US–China dialogue and the tenuous bilateral relationship’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 21, June 2017.

‘South Korea’s presidential transition and strategic challenges’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 19, June 2017.

‘China–North Korea relations and the 19th Party Congress’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 12, April 2017.

Selected IISS publications

87

The Military Balance is the Institute’s annual assessment of military capabilities and defence economics worldwide.

Region-by-region analyses cover the major military and economic trends and developments affecting security policy and the trade in weapons and other military equipment. Comprehensive tables portray key data on weapons and defence economics. Defence expenditure trends over a ten-year period are also shown.

IISS, The Military Balance 2019 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2019).

The Armed Conflict Survey is the Institute’s annual review of political, military and humanitarian trends in current conflicts.

IISS, Armed Conflict Survey 2019 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2019).

Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, the Institute’s bimonthly journal, is a leading forum for analysis and debate of international and strategic affairs.

Recent articles of interest include: Andray Abrahamian, ‘North Korea’s Bounded Rationality’, Survival, vol. 61, no. 1, February–March 2019, pp. 141–160.

Nigel Inkster, ‘The Huawei Affair and China’s Technology Ambitions’, Survival, vol. 61, no. 1, February–March 2019, pp. 105–111.

Denny Roy, ‘Assertive China: Irredentism or Expansionism?’, Survival, vol. 61, no. 1, February–March 2019, pp. 51–74.

Alexander Lukin, ‘The US–China Trade War and China’s Strategic Future’, Survival, vol. 61, no. 1, February–March 2019, pp. 23–50.

Nadège Rolland, ‘A China–Russia Condominium over Eurasia’, Survival, vol. 61, no. 1, February–March 2019, pp. 7–22.

Karl Gustafsson, Linus Hagström and Ulv Hanssen, ‘Japan’s Pacifism Is Dead’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 6, December 2018– January 2019, pp. 137–158.

Stephan Frühling, ‘Is ANZUS Really an Alliance? Aligning the US and Australia’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 5, October– November 2018, pp. 191–218.

Tricia Bacon, ‘Slipping the Leash? Pakistan’s Relationship with the Afghan Taliban’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 5, October– November 2018, pp. 159–180.

Bruce Bennet, James Dobbins, Jeffrey W. Hornung and Andrew Scobell, ‘After the Summit: Prospects for the Korean Peninsula’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 4, August–September 2018, pp. 21–28.

Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘Kim Jong-un’s Singapore Sting’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 4, August–September 2018, pp. 29–36.

88

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘Competing with China’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 3, June–July 2018, pp. 7–64.

Nigel Inkster, ‘Chinese Culture and Soft Power’, Survival, vol.

60, no. 3, June–July 2018, pp. 65–70.

Andrew B. Kennedy, ‘China’s Innovation Trajectories’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 3, June–July 2018, pp. 71–86.

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, ‘India, the Indo-Pacific and the Quad’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 3, June–July 2018, pp. 181–194.

Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘Globalisation and Chinese Grand Strategy’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 1, February–March 2018, pp. 7–40.

Gordon Barrass and Nigel Inkster, ‘Xi Jinping: the Strategist Behind the Dream’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 1, February–March 2018, pp. 41–68.

Ben Barry, ‘Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Practical Drawbacks and Opportunity Costs’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 1, February–March 2018, pp. 75–81.

John L. Harper, ‘Cold War in East Asia?’, Survival, vol. 59, no.

6, December 2017–January 2018, pp. 197–204.

Michael Elleman, ‘The Secret to North Korea’s ICBM Success’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 5, October–November 2017, pp. 25–36.

Christopher D. Kolenda, ‘America’s Generals Are Out of Ideas for Afghanistan’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 5, October– November 2017, pp. 37–46.

Tim Huxley and Benjamin Schreer, ‘Trump’s Missing Asia Strategy’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 3, June–July 2017, pp. 81–89.

Robert Ayson and Manjeet S. Pardesi, ‘Asia’s Diplomacy of Violence: China–US Coercion and Regional Order’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 2, April–May 2017, pp. 85–124.

Strategic Survey is the Institute’s annual review of strategic developments throughout the world.

Recent sections of interest include: ‘China: Renewed Ideology, New Foreign Policy’, Strategic Survey 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018).

‘Japan: Abe’s Legacy’, Strategic Survey 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018).

‘DPRK: Desiring Peace?’, Strategic Survey 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018).

‘Southeast Asia and the Belt and Road Initiative’, Strategic Survey 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018).

‘Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan’, Strategic Survey 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018).

‘India and China: Prospects for Accommodation and Competition’, Strategic Survey 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018).

‘Pakistan: Seeking a Strategic Space Between the United States and China’, Strategic Survey 2018 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2018).

The IISS wishes to thank these sponsors of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2019 LEAD SPONSORS

PRINCIPAL SPONSORS

MAIN SPONSORS

18TH IISS ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Since the inception of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002, this unique experiment in multilateral defence diplomacy has involved defence ministers, deputy ministers, chiefs of defence staff, nationalsecurity advisers, permanent under-secretaries, intelligence chiefs and other national-security and defence officials from: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, the European Union, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States and Vietnam.

The result has been the growth of the Shangri-La Dialogue into the richest gathering of defence professionals in the Asia-Pacific. The goal of the IISS is to ensure that the Shangri-La Dialogue will continue to serve as the best available vehicle in the Asia-Pacific for developing and channelling astute and effective public policy on defence and security.

The IISS, a registered charity with offices in London, Washington, Manama and Singapore, is the world’s leading authority on political–military conflict. It is the primary independent source of accurate, objective information on international strategic issues. Publications include The Military Balance, an annual reference work on each nation’s defence capabilities; Strategic Survey, an annual review of world affairs; Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, a bimonthly journal on international affairs; Strategic Comments, offering online analysis of topical issues in international affairs; and the Adelphi book series, the Institute’s principal contribution to policy-relevant, original academic research.

The range of IISS publications, the Institute’s convening power, and its strong international policy perspective make the IISS a key actor in the global strategic and economic debate.

‘In times of upheaval and tensions, it is precisely forums of this kind that not only serve as a chief register of regional geopolitical temperature, but also spell the difference between collectively espousing a path of diplomacy and peace instead of conflict and confrontation.’

Major-General (Retd) Delfin Lorenzana, Secretary of National Defense, Philippines ‘For 18 consecutive years, the [Shangri-La Dialogue] has been able to validate its role and prove its significance and gravity in the region, and the wider world, as a tier-one forum for dialogue and global security, providing a platform for participants to share viewpoints and find ways to achieve regional peace, stability and prosperity.’

General Ngô Xuân Lich, Minister of National Defence, Vietnam ‘Events like the Shangri-La Dialogue provide an invaluable opportunity for us all to re-establish and renew existing connections and to develop new ones.’

Senator Linda Reynolds, Minister of Defence, Australia

The International Institute for Strategic Studies Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London | wc2r 2pg | UK t. +44 (0) 20 7379 7676 f. +44 (0) 20 7836 3108 e. iiss@iiss.org w. www.iiss.org

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Americas 2121 K Street NW | Suite 801 | Washington, DC 20037 | USA t. +1 202 659 1490 f. +1 202 659 1499 e. iiss-americas@iiss.org

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Asia 9 Raffles Place | #51-01 Republic Plaza | Singapore 048619 t. +65 6499 0055 f. +65 6499 0059 e. iiss-asia@iiss.org

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Middle East

14th floor, GBCORP Tower | Bahrain Financial Harbour | Manama | Kingdom of Bahrain t. +973 1718 1155 f. +973 1710 0155 e. iiss-middleeast@iiss.org