IISS Manama Dialogue 2018

14 ‫قمة األمن اإلقليمي‬ 2018 ‫ أكتوبر‬28-26 ،‫مملكة البحرين‬

‫حوار المنامة‬

THE 14TH IISS REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT

‫المعهد الدولي للدراسات االستراتيجية‬

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 14TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 26–28 OCTOBER 2018

THE MANAMA DIALOGUE 2018

The IISS Manama Dialogue

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 14TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 26–28 OCTOBER 2018

The IISS Manama Dialogue

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

14TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 26–28 OCTOBER 2018

The IISS Manama Dialogue The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London | wc2r 3pg | UK www.iiss.org

© February 2019 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Director-General and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman Contributors Dana Allin, Dr Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Nick Childs, Virginia Comolli, Jessica

Delaney, John Drennan, Michael Elleman, Bastian Giegerich, James Hackett, Emile Hokayem, Elisabeth Marteu, Meia Nouwens, Dr Nicholas Redman, Clément Therme Arabic Editor Yusuf Mubarak Editorial Clea Gibson, Sara Hussain, Bao-Chau Pham Editorial Research and Media Shirley Dent Production and Design Kelly Verity

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the institute.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies is an independent centre for research, information and debate on the problems of conflict, however caused, that have, or potentially have, an important military content. The Council and Staff of the Institute are international and its membership is drawn from over 90 countries. The Institute is independent and it alone decides what activities to conduct. It owes no allegiance to any government, any group of governments or any political or other organisation. The IISS stresses rigorous research with a forward-looking policy orientation and places particular emphasis on bringing new perspectives to the strategic debate.

Contents Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Chapter 1

Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Chapter 2

Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Chapter 3

Press coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Selected IISS publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Contents

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(l–r): HRH Prince Salman bin Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa Crown Prince, Deputy Supreme Commander and First Deputy Prime Minister, Kingdom of Bahrain; James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, US

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The IISS Manama Dialogue 2018

Foreword

The International Institute for Strategic Studies is pleased to share this summary of the proceedings of the IISS Manama Dialogue 2018: 14th Regional Security Summit, which was held from 26 to 28 October 2018 in the Kingdom of Bahrain.

Since its inception in 2004, the IISS Manama Dialogue has become a central element in the Middle East’s security architecture. It serves as a platform from which national leaders and ministers from the Gulf, the wider Middle East, North America, Europe, Asia and Africa make major policy statements. Moreover, supported by senior officials, they are offered a bespoke occasion to consult bilaterally and multilaterally on the most important security and foreign-policy challenges of the moment.

Nearly 500 delegates from 49 countries – comprising senior ministers, military and intelligence chiefs, top diplomats, opinion-formers, analysts and leading journalists – took part in the 14th annual gathering. Two-thirds of the delegates were government officials demonstrating the continuing interest of local, regional and international governments in attending and contributing to important policy discussions facilitated by the IISS. Nearly 30 senior journalists attended, supported by a press corps of over 100. Their presence underlines the Foreword

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importance of government–media interaction and the value of independent discussion in the heart of the Middle East.

The IISS Manama Dialogue 2018 was an occasion to reflect on the ‘reordering of the Middle East’. His Majesty King Abdullah II Ibn Al Hussein of Jordan’s keynote address painted the regional picture from its centre. United States Secretary of Defense James Mattis laid out the United States’ sustained interest in the region, amid a backdrop of increasing questions relating to the country’s foreign-policy priorities. Russia’s broadening of its regional involvement – making common cause with Turkey and Iran in Syria while developing closer ties to the Gulf – was also parsed. Regionally, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia continued with determination to chart its own course, often supported by the United Arab Emirates.

The reordering could be said to be a feature during the previous seven years and is ongoing, but events immediately before the summit also reinforced the relevance of an annual Dialogue: the Syrian Arab Armed Forces’ encirclement of the strategically important Idlib province; the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in a Saudi consulate in Istanbul; and the prime minister of Israel making a surprise visit to Oman.

For the first time, reflecting regional interest in the Horn of Africa, senior delegates attended from East Africa and the Horn.

Alongside strong representation from East and South Asia, African and Asian presence highlights both the Middle East region’s economic-linchpin status but also the range of security challenges affecting and emanating from the Middle East.

The IISS gives thanks to all government and nongovernment participants for their active contribution to the Regional Security Summit. The IISS remains sincerely grateful to the Kingdom of Bahrain, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government agencies for their continued support to the IISS Manama Dialogue.

Sir Tom Beckett Executive Director, IISS–Middle East 6

The IISS Manama Dialogue 2018

14TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 26–28 OCTOBER 2018

The IISS Manama Dialogue

CHAPTER 1

Agenda

Ayman Safadi, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Jordan

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The IISS Manama Dialogue 2018

Agenda

Friday 26 October 2018 All day

Bilateral meetings between ministers and officials

16:00 - 17:00 SIDE MEETING

– Al Ghazal III US POLICY IN SYRIA Colonel Joel Rayburn

Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Levant and Special Envoy for Syria, US Department of State

19:00 - 20:00 SKY NEWS ARABIA OPENING TELEVISED PLENARY

– Al Ghazal I THE RE-ORDERING OF THE MIDDLE EAST: BUILDING STABILITY FROM CHAOS? Dr Ahmed Abo El Gheit

Secretary-General, League of Arab States

General (Retd) David Petraeus

Chairman, KKR Global Institute; former Director, Central Intelligence Agency, US

Dr Abdulaziz bin Sager

Chairman, Gulf Research Center

Mina Al-Oraibi

Editor-in-Chief, The National

20:00 - 21:00 OPENING RECEPTION – Grand Foyer 21:00 - 23:00 OPENING DINNER – Al Noor Ballroom Hosted by: HRH Prince Salman bin Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa Crown Prince, Deputy Supreme Commander and First Deputy Prime Minister, Kingdom of Bahrain

Keynote Speech: HM King Abdullah II Ibn Al Hussein King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Delivered by: Ayman Safadi

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jordan Agenda

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Saturday 27 October 2018 Unless otherwise stated all Plenary Sessions will be chaired by Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS 08:25 - 08:30 OPENING OF THE SUMMIT

– Al Noor Ballroom

Introduction and welcome by: Dr John Chipman Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS

08:30 - 09:15 FIRST PLENARY SESSION

– Al Noor Ballroom US POLICY IN A CHANGING MIDDLE EAST James Mattis

Secretary of Defense, US

09:15 - 10:30 SECOND PLENARY SESSION

– Al Noor Ballroom SHIFTING RELATIONSHIPS AND THE EMERGING MIDDLE EASTERN ORDER Sh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bahrain

Adel al-Jubeir

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saudi Arabia

10:30 - 11:00 Break 11:00 - 12:15 THIRD PLENARY SESSION

– Al Noor Ballroom CONFLICT AND DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST Dr Ursula von der Leyen

Minister of Defence, Germany

Dr Elisabetta Trenta

Minister of Defence, Italy

Yousef bin Alawi

Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs, Oman

12:15 - 14:15 DELEGATE LUNCH – Villa Gazebo, Ritz-Carlton

PRIVATE MINISTERIAL LUNCH

14:15 - 15:30 FOURTH PLENARY SESSION

– Al Noor Ballroom STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST Taro Kono

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Japan

Ayman Safadi

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jordan

Brett McGurk

Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, US 10

The IISS Manama Dialogue 2018

15:30 - 16:00 Break 16:00 - 17:15 FIFTH PLENARY SESSION

– Al Noor Ballroom SECURITY AND COMPETITION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA Raychelle Omamo

Cabinet Secretary for Defence, Kenya

Abdisaid Ali

National Security Advisor, Somalia

Jean-Christophe Belliard

Deputy Secretary-General for Political Affairs; Political Director, European External Action Service, European Union

Sunday 28 October 2018 09:30 - 11:00 SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSIONS

– Al Ghazal Ballrooms

Group I:

DEFENCE MODERNISATION AND INDUSTRIALISATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST – Al Ghazal II

Chair: Lieutenant General (Retd) Sir Thomas Beckett Executive Director, IISS–Middle East

General Joseph Votel

Commander, US Central Command

Professor Dr İsmail Demir

President, Presidency for Defence Industries, Turkey

General Sir Christopher Deverell

Commander, Joint Forces Command, Ministry of Defence, UK

Group II:

SECURITY IN THE BAB EL-MANDEB – Al Ghazal I Chair: Virginia Comolli

Senior Fellow for Conflict, Security and Development, IISS

Vice Admiral Scott Stearney

Commander, US Naval Forces Central Command

Alexander Rondos

EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, European External Action Service

Lise Grande

Resident Humanitarian Coordinator in Yemen; Resident Representative, UN Development Programme Yemen, UN

Agenda

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CYBER THREATS AND CYBER DEFENCE – Al Ghazal C

Group III:

Chair: John Raine

Senior Adviser for Geopolitical Due Diligence, IISS

Marcus Willett

Former Director of Cyber, GCHQ

General (Retd) Keith Alexander

President and Chief Executive Officer, IronNet Cybersecurity; former Director, US National Security Agency and Commander, US Cyber Command

Charles-Edouard Bouée

Chief Executive Officer; Asia President and Greater China Chairman, Roland Berger

Group IV:

NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST – Al Ghazal III Chair: Dr Kori Schake

Deputy Director-General, IISS

Nicolas Roche

Director, Strategic Affairs, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, France

Dr Kamal Araj

Vice-Chairman, Jordan Atomic Energy Commission, Jordan

Dr Hassan Elbahtimy

Lecturer, Department of War Studies, King’s College London

11:00 -11:30 Break 11:30 - 13:00 CONCLUDING PLENARY SESSION

– Al Noor Ballroom NAVIGATING GEOPOLITICAL CHANGE: THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT Dr Kori Schake

Deputy Director-General, IISS

Lieutenant General (Retd) Sir Thomas Beckett Executive Director, IISS–Middle East

Dr David Gordon

Senior Adviser, Geo-economics and Strategy, IISS

Virginia Comolli

Senior Fellow for Conflict, Security and Development, IISS

13:00 - 14:30 FAREWELL LUNCH FOR ALL DELEGATES

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– Villa Gazebo, Ritz-Carlton

The IISS Manama Dialogue 2018

14TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 26–28 OCTOBER 2018

The IISS Manama Dialogue

CHAPTER 2

Executive summary

John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS

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The IISS Manama Dialogue 2018

Executive summary

Keynote Speech Ayman Safadi, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of Jordan, delivered remarks on behalf of His Majesty King Abdullah II Ibn Al Hussein, at the opening address of the IISS Manama Dialogue 2018.

Recognising the simultaneity of numerous crises in the region, the King first highlighted their intertwined nature.

Refugees, economic challenges and lack of opportunities, but also environmental issues, terrorism and Islamophobia are all ‘global in scope’ and have ‘deep roots’. Therefore, solutions to such complex problems need also to rely on global and farreaching approaches.

Among these crises, the King pointed out three in particular, reflecting on Jordan’s most pressing security concerns of the day: the fight against the khawarej or ‘outlaws of Islam’; the refugee crisis; and the Israel–Palestine conflict.

While the fight against extreme Islamism has achieved military victories, the King stressed that the fight is ideological and generational. In particular, fighting the spread of this ‘pseudo-religious ideology’ requires the international community to provide a counter-narrative that Executive summary

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Ayman Safadi, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Jordan

‘offers human solidarity and hope’. Such an effort to promote coexistence must be exerted everywhere, from ‘the local community to cyberspace’.

With regard to the situation of refugees, he recalled that Jordan plays a leading role in welcoming and harbouring refugees from conflicts in neighbouring countries. In the same vein, the King called on international solidarity until the refugee crisis is ‘truly over’, both to assist refugees to return home and to rebuild ‘peaceful, prosperous communities’, but also to support host countries like Jordan and efforts towards ‘sustainable inclusive development’ in the region.

Finally, King Abdullah II emphasised the urgent issue of Palestinian statehood. The situation of Palestinians remains a focal point fuelling regional and global instability. He recalled that ‘eight years ago, here at the Manama Dialogue, I argued that our region will not enjoy security and stability unless we solve the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. This has sadly proved to be true.’ The way forward remains a twostate solution, leading to an independent Palestinian state, along the 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital. However, peace would be secured not only with the

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The IISS Manama Dialogue 2018

existence of a sovereign state, but if Palestinians are ‘empowered to prepare for the day of peace’.

The King concluded on a call for the international community’s engagement in achieving this goal, including through funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and the protection of Jerusalem’s holy sites and ‘historic Arab, Muslim and Christian identity’.

Sky News Arabia Television Debate: The Reordering of the Middle East: Building Stability from Chaos?

The first speaker Dr Ahmed Abo El Gheit, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, focused on how the Mid-

Sky News Arabia Opening Televised Plenary (l–r): Dr Abdulaziz bin Sager, Chairman, Gulf Research Center; Mina Al-Oraibi, Editor-inChief, The National; General (Retd) David Petraeus, Chairman, KKR Global Institute; former Director, Central Intelligence Agency, US; Dr Ahmed Abo El Gheit, SecretaryGeneral, League of Arab States; and Abdulaziz Al Khamis, Moderator, Skynews Arabia

dle East region could move from chaos to stability. Firstly, he underlined the importance of recognising that there is chaos in the region. He criticised the discourse surrounding the so-called Arab Spring, despite the hope for change among the people. The Arab Spring did not succeed at realising this hope because of the role of some ‘currents inside the region’ as well as the role of certain external powers. As a result, the Arab states have been weakened and Executive summary

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Dr Ahmed Abo El Gheit, Secretary-General, League of Arab States

stability in the area have become a dream for many people in the region.

According to his view, the nation-state is paramount for the region to resist foreign interferences as can be seen in the rise of the influence of states like Iran and Turkey. He also said that during the last eight years we noticed that the Palestinian question was put aside as if it does not exist. The fact is that the Palestinian question is the main issue of the Middle East and putting it aside, cancelling the peace process and seeing the Palestinians being convinced that there is no hope will definitely harm this area.

Beyond the centrality of the Palestinian question, Abo El Gheit highlighted three main issues in the Middle East. Firstly, there is the war in Syria, which is nearing its end, and considerations of the post-war situation – the regime must be flexible in order to secure progress and reconstruction. Secondly, the international community has to stop the funding of militias in Libya, where there is both ‘wealth and chaos’. Thirdly, there is 18

The IISS Manama Dialogue 2018

Yemen, where Iran’s role is ‘extremely dangerous’ and where ‘there should have been an intervention’. The Arab League was marginalised in all of these three countries. Despite these challenges, there are ‘bright sides’ in the Middle East mainly

General (Retd) David Petraeus, Chairman, KKR Global Institute; former Director, Central Intelligence Agency, US

focused on development, economic successes and the defeat of terrorist groups.

The second speaker, General (Retd) David Petraeus, Chairman of the KKR Global Institute and erstwhile director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, focused on Iran’s future reaction to the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). He shed light on the shortcomings of the JCPOA and the unrealistic hopes of the Obama administration: The hope that Iran would reduce its malign activity, as the secretary-general mentioned – in Lebanon, in Syria, in Iraq, in Yemen, in Gaza and so forth – none of this halted; in fact, if anything, in many cases it actually increased over the years. The missile programme, which has gotten more and more threatening to the countries in the region, continued its development.

Executive summary

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Mina Al-Oraibi, Editorin-Chief, The National

With the Trump administration’s new Iran strategy of the, there is going to be ‘full pressure’ on Iran: China, Europe and India are going to reduce their oil imports from said country.

‘The ball is in Iran’s court’, regarding engaging in negotiations with the US. Iran is trying to ‘“Lebanonise” Syria and Iraq the way they Lebanonised Lebanon: with a very powerful militia’. Iran continues the work of building a ‘Shia Crescent, all the way from Tehran through Baghdad, Damascus and down into southern Lebanon’.

Petraeus said that the latest US sanctions against Iran will be ‘more all-encompassing’ and the impact on the Iranian citizens greater. Therefore, Iran will have to make ‘a very significant choice’ because the current US administration is not one ‘that is going to want to compromise much on this’.

The third speaker, Editor-in-Chief of the The National Mina Al-Oraibi, explained that Iran is ‘tapping’ into the chaos in Iraq, and that the latter is vulnerable. She remarked that participation in the elections was at most 44% and so the government’s challenges are myriad, and stem from the needs of the population.

Iraq faces the challenge of financial and administrative corruption, but it does not have an environment where those

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called out for corrupt practices will be punished. There is also the need to strengthen the Iraqi state against Iranian interference. However, Iraq also has to build a good relationship with

Dr Abdulaziz bin Sager, Chairman, Gulf Research Center

Iran given its influence in the former. The nomination of a new president and a new prime minister are good news, but it is not sufficient given the weakness of the institutions.

The last speaker Dr Abdulaziz bin Sager, Chairman of the Gulf Research Center, evoked the non-unified Gulf position.

He criticised the legacy of eight years of former US President Barack Obama and said that when Donald Trump came to power, he gave a clearer vision for the region. The US is not supportive of the JCPOA, and it has concerns regarding the Iranian missile programme. Sager stated that US policy in the region should not be based on what the Gulf states pay in order to be protected by the US. The region is also strategic because of the Strait of Hormuz and the international interest in energy security. He also mentioned the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Oman; Petraeus underlined the gradual alignment between Israel and the Arab states, expressing the belief that such public closeness between Israel and the Gulf states is a positive development for the Middle East.

Executive summary

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James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, US

First Plenary Session: US Policy in a Changing Middle East In his speech for the first plenary session, United States Secretary of Defense James Mattis began by echoing Jordanian King Abdullah II Ibn Al Hussein’s Keynote Speech, adding that ‘to create peace … is our obligation to the next generation’. Mattis then identified Iran as the biggest obstacle to fulfilling that obligation: We cannot ignore the malign influence and destabilising behaviour pursued by violent extremist organisations and by Iran’s outlaw regime … today I reiterate the US stance against Iran’s proliferation of advanced conventional weapons and its provision of financial and technical assistance to lethal militants, amid proxy terrorists and others across the region they support, their impact being on display in Yemen, in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and even here in the Kingdom of Bahrain.

Mattis focused especially on Syria, as well as Iran and Russia’s roles there, saying that ‘nothing is more emblematic of Iran’s malign activities in the Middle East than its support for Assad’s murderous regime. This support, 22

The IISS Manama Dialogue 2018

coupled with Russia’s repeated vetoes of the [United Nations Security Council] resolutions, is the leading reason Assad remains in power.’ He also sought to reassure traditional US partners about the US security commitment, stating that ‘Russia’s presence in the region cannot replace the long-standing, enduring and transparent US commitment to the Middle East’.

Mattis was more guarded in criticising the divisions within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that have resulted in the isolation of Qatar by Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Nonetheless, US frustration was clear when Mattis said that a resolution was vital: ‘Without it, we weaken our security at a time when UN Special Envoys Martin Griffiths in Yemen and Staffan de Mistura and his successor in Syria will need our aligned full support.’

In this context, Mattis indicated US support for ‘ongoing discussions to explore the formation of an inclusive Middle East Strategic Alliance (what we call MESA) … that brings together all partners to productively and effectively address shared challenges’. He decried Iran’s role in the region’s conflicts, and insisted that those conflicts require negotiated solutions. Syria ‘requires a political resolution’; likewise in Yemen: ‘compromise must replace combat’.

Mattis went on to address the murder of exiled Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi Arabia’s Istanbul consulate.

He prefaced the subject by arguing that a nation’s security, especially against extremism, is enhanced when there is space for ‘peaceful opposition’.

With our collective interest in peace and unwavering respect for human rights in mind, the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in a diplomatic facility must concern us all greatly … the US does not tolerate this kind of ruthless action to silence Mr Khashoggi, a journalist, through violence. Failure of any one nation to adhere to international norms and the rule of law Executive summary

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undermines regional stability at a time when it is needed most … We will maintain our twin imperatives … of protecting America and our interests and holding accountable those responsible for this murder.

During questions and comments from the floor, Mattis was challenged on some of the Trump administration’s departures from former US policy, including US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, as well as the move of the US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He was also asked for elaboration on his statement that a successful Yemen peace process would require compromises, and whether a renewed focus on China and Russia in the administration’s National Defense Strategy has implications for US military posture in the Middle East.

In response, Mattis argued that the JCPOA was ‘in effect … saying it is okay to go for a nuclear weapon’. On withdrawing from the INF Treaty, he said that both the Obama and Trump administrations had worked ‘to bring Russia back into compliance’ but ‘eventually we have to look reality in the eye’. On moving the US embassy to Jerusalem, he acknowledged the criticisms, but added: ‘I think the most important thing is that we have a commitment to the Middle East peace process.’ On Yemen he argued that Houthis ‘will not find a better time than now to engage with Martin Griffiths … as the UN special envoy’ for a settlement in which ‘they have some degree of autonomy … and have their voices heard, but they do not need any help from Iran to do this’.

Mattis drew a distinction between China and Russia.

It is now clear, he said, that ‘Russia had chosen a different path than partnership with Europe and with NATO’. Yet he sounded more hopeful with regard to China, given that ‘strategic competition does not imply hostility’. Mattis also insisted that focus on these relations would not come at the expense of partnerships in the Middle East.

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Second Plenary Session: Shifting Relationships and the Emerging Middle Eastern Order Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s Minister of For-

Sh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bahrain

eign Affairs, opened the second plenary session by reflecting on the current crisis in the Middle East and the attempt by regional states, precisely Iran and Qatar, to impose their hegemony: Syria, a proud and historic Arab country with a multicultural society, has now become a battleground for territory and influence, with regional states attempting to stake their claims whilst terrorist organisations and non-state actors compete for influence and control … Yemen has become the latest casualty of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s quest for regional dominance … In Iraq and in Lebanon, the effects of regional interference are also stark … they are confronted by Iranian-backed groups or individuals who place loyalty to the Islamic Republic over the national interests of their countries … Within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), we have witnessed attempts by Qatar to intervene in the politics of other member states in contradiction to the agreement signed between GCC members and to the norms of our region.

Executive summary

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Adel al-Jubeir, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saudi Arabia

In response to the problem of regional hegemonic ambitions, he emphasised the importance of the balance of power in the Middle East, and partnerships between allies, saying that the region needs ‘a non-competitive balance between major powers in the region; a balance that does not draw a line, placing countries on opposing sides against one another; a balance of interests; a balance that places the shared interests of the international community in the region first’.

Sheikh Khalid’s closing remarks were in support of the United States proposal to establish a Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), bringing together the US, all six of the GCC states, and potentially Egypt and Jordan. The objective of this so-called ‘Arab NATO’ is in part to counter Iran’s expansion in the region. While some observers mentioned the risks of redundancy with other existing alliances and the bellicose nature of that project, the Minister insisted on the collaborative and stabilising intent of the forthcoming security agreement: MESA is not against anyone. It is an alliance for security and prosperity in the region and it will be open to those who accept its principles. Through MESA, we aim to boost the

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collective security of the region and to make sure our defence partnerships are ready to withstand the challenges of the twenty-first century, including terrorism, cyber security and the effects of rogue states.

Later in the discussion, Sheikh Khalid summed it up thus: ‘I think, when we come back next year, MESA will be prominent on our agenda.’

Adel al-Jubeir, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, began his speech by recalling that the Middle East has been constantly affected by conflicts since the 1950s. But he underlined that the current crises are no longer driven by external powers seeking to dominate the Middle East (such as during the Cold War), but by regional actors (in particular Iran) determined to change the regional order.

The primary regional actor for instability has been the Khomeini revolution in Iran, and the behaviour and the actions of the Iranian state ever since … We are now dealing in the Middle East with two competing visions. One is a vision of light, which seeks all the things I just mentioned; and one is a vision of darkness, which seeks to spread sectarianism, encourages terrorism, seeks to dominate other countries and seeks to destabilise the region. One is what we stand for in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries; the other is what Iran stands for.

The panel then fielded questions on the Khashoggi murder. They were asked about what Saudi Arabia has been doing to hold the perpetrators of the killing of Jamal Khashoggi accountable, and about the alleged involvement of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the murder of the journalist in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul at the beginning of October.

Jubeir answered that an investigation was going on in Riyadh and Istanbul, and criticised what he perceived as a political and media overreaction: Executive summary

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This issue has become fairly hysterical. I think people have assigned blame on Saudi Arabia with such certainty before the investigation is complete … We know that a mistake was committed. We know that people exceeded their authority.

And we know that we are investigating them … We will hold people to account and those responsible will be punished.

As the session was dedicated to ‘shifting relationships’, the audience addressed the possible rapprochement between the Arab countries and Israel. Jubeir stated that Saudi Arabia had no relations with Israel and that ‘the key to normalising relations will have to be the peace process’. Sheikh Khalid recalled his support for an independent Palestinian state and commented on the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Oman on 25 October: With the visit of the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr Benjamin Netanyahu, to the Sultanate of Oman, we definitely never, ever question the wisdom and the far-sightedness of His Majesty Sultan Qaboos in trying to help and do their part in reaching a solution for this issue. And this is something that we look forward for His Majesty to succeed in his effort.

Third Plenary Session: Conflict and Diplomacy in the Middle East The third plenary session focused on the theme of conflict and diplomacy in the Middle East. Dr Ursula von der Leyen, Germany’s Minister of Defence, suggested there was now a window for diplomacy that might be used to resolve conflicts in the region. She contrasted the situation in Syria with Iraq.

In Syria, investment to help reconstruct and rebuild was conceivable, ‘if there is a satisfying political process that includes all parties. There is no other way than engaging in the peace talks of the [United Nations].’ For Iraq, she saw a more immediate opportunity to rebuild and reconcile parties in con28

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flict, because ‘the Iraqi government and the people of Iraq, [as well as] an international coalition of more than 70 countries, fought and defeated Daesh’, referring to the Islamic State, also

Dr Ursula von der Leyen, Minister of Defence, Germany

known as ISIS or ISIL. Dr Elisabetta Trenta, Minister of Defence, Italy, argued that recently most armed conflict has occurred within states rather than among states and has involved violent extremist organisations. She referred to the effects of social media on conflict, insisting that ‘Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, Telegram, Skype, YouTube and others have been changing the way information is produced, gathered and disseminated by a lot of users that are not traditional editors in conflict-affected societies.’ As a result, more actors were involved and technology was sometimes an enabler of conflict and could contribute to escalation and radicalisation. Trenta used the example of how ISIS has wielded communication tools to draw ‘almost 40,000’ to its ranks and rendered ‘millions … sympathetic to their cause across the globe’. She concluded her remarks by saying that ‘we need to work together … with the prime aim of turning communication from an element of threat to a tool of collective security and international stability’.

Executive summary

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Dr Elisabetta Trenta, Minister of Defence, Italy

Yousef bin Alawi, Oman’s Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs, spoke about the visit to Oman by the president of the Palestinian Authority, as well as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, that occurred on the opening day of this year’s Manama Dialogue. Bin Alawi said that, in his view, the Palestinian issue was at the heart of conflict in the region. He argued that ‘we understand and we read that the State of Israel has become a state thanks to some circumstances after the Second World War’, while the establishment of the state of Palestine ‘has become a strategic necessity’ to contain ‘terrorism, ignorance and delay’. Bin Alawi said that ‘establishing an independent Palestinian state is a strategic request’, essential for stability in the Middle East.

The minister clarified that while Oman could not be a mediator, the country wanted to facilitate a process in which Palestinians and Israelis worked together for a peaceful future.

The three statements triggered a lively question-andanswer session that touched on Israel–Palestine and other conflicts in the region. Many were concerned with further understanding Oman’s diplomatic involvement, and its

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relations to Israel in light of the recent visit. Other topics raised included the crisis in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); the diplomacy around Syria; the role that private com-

Yousef bin Alawi, Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs, Oman

panies might play in conflict resolution; the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and its impact on Western policy towards Saudi Arabia; European arms exports and the need for a coordinated approach; and non-state armed groups, particularly those supported by Iran.

Von der Leyen responded that the core goal of the Istanbul meeting on Syria was to revitalise the Geneva process, which had to be the overall umbrella for an acceptable outcome. On the question of Palestine and Israel, she insisted that Germany had a particular obligation to the Israeli people and that a two-state solution was the way forward. The minister clarified that there would be no further arms exports from Germany to Saudi Arabia for the time being. Germany, von der Leyen argued, would have preferred to work within the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear issue, not least because there were other critical issues to address with Iran such as its influence on non-state groups.

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Bin Alawi clearly stated that if a lasting solution to the Palestinian issue could not be found, there would not be stability. He explained that: Israel is a state that is present in this region … But despite that, Israel is not being treated by the other countries as it is treating the other countries. Maybe it is time for Israel to be treated the same, and it should also bear the same obligations as other countries … Israel has capabilities that allow it to benefit and to be beneficial for others, for the suffering of the Palestinians, the suffering of the Arabs and also the suffering of Israelis and Jews all over the world.

Regarding the GCC, bin Alawi argued that its member states remained keen on preserving the organisation and that the disputes among them did not target the GCC itself.

Trenta suggested that the private sector could play a more active role in conflict resolution because the network of customers and suppliers represents local stakeholders.

Furthermore, companies will have something to offer when it comes to reconstruction, including the funding of these efforts. Trenta insisted that European governments were well aware of the danger of militias and other non-state groups and were closely monitoring the activities of Iran in this area.

Fourth Plenary Session: Stabilisation and Reconstruction in the Middle East The fourth plenary session addressed the issue of stabilisation and reconstruction in the Middle East. Opening the session, Taro Kono, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Japan, emphasised Japan’s support for the reforms and modernisation currently underway in the Middle East. He shared Japan’s own experiences of modernisation and reforms, which allowed the country to successfully industrialise and modernise while preserving its values. In particular, he stressed the need to invest in human capital, and to introduce merit32

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based recruitment systems for government, in order to provide every citizen with opportunities.

Taro Kono, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Japan

One of Kono’s key themes was the investment in educational infrastructure and policies. He recalled Japan’s contributions in the region, through the opening of schools and vocational training programmes, and the empowerment of youth via young leaders’ programmes. He concluded by highlighting that such human-capital development would be critical for successful stabilisation and reconstruction, and cited a Meiji-era educator who wrote that ‘national independence must be obtained through personal independence.’

Ayman Safadi, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Jordan, argued that to be able to discuss reconstruction, destruction should stop first. He therefore addressed the roots of destruction in the Middle East. The first conflict he mentioned was that of Israel–Palestine, stressing the need for a two-state solution. Today there is no hope on the horizon, while despair makes it easier for radicals to exploit and spread hate agendas. In Syria as well, a political solution is needed. The Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, thrives on an environment of hopelessness and despair, and this Executive summary

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Ayman Safadi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jordan

environment needs to be changed. Indeed, ‘stabilisation means providing conditions under which people will live in dignity’. This is crucial to ensure the return of refugees – Jordan currently hosts 1.3 million Syrian refugees. Families will return to their country only when they can be assured of a secure situation for their children.

Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Brett McGurk, of the United States Department of State, first reminded the audience of the results achieved since the campaign against ISIS began in September 2014. ISIS now controls less than 2% of the territory that it held four years ago. The counter-ISIS coalition, which has grown from 12 to 79 members, has used a comprehensive approach in its intervention, including with regard to humanitarian aspects and stabilisation. This implies concrete action, ‘stabilisation really being the nuts and bolts of what comes immediately after the military operations: clearing landmines, getting basic water, essential services, electricity back into these areas so that people can return home’. Following the Mosul campaign, every internally displaced person (IDP) who fled from Mosul received shelter and aid. Thanks to the stabilisation

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efforts, some of them have started going back to Eastern Mosul, although it will take more time for Western Mosul. In Syria as well, stabilisation and reconstruction will take years.

Brett McGurk, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, US

Following the retaking of Raqqa, more than 250,000 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were cleared, and 150,000 Syrians could return to their homes. However, the challenges are daunting and the hardest part remains ahead.

Key issues which surfaced in the discussion that followed included the refugee camp in Rukban at the border between Syria and northeast Jordan, and the situation of refugees in general. Kono suggested that, because most governments’ resources are limited, an ‘international-solidarity tax’ could be put in place: ‘if we put a very thin tax on, say, currency exchange, and give the money to international organisations directly, and task them to take care of the refugees and IDPs, it could probably provide a better support for those people’.

As the question of the relationship with Israel was raised, Safadi stressed again that a two-state solution should be implemented and that an Arab peace initiative has been presented since 2002. For him, ‘Israel is in the Middle East, but it has yet to become of the Middle East’, which would occur Executive summary

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Raychelle Omamo, Cabinet Secretary for Defence, Kenya

only after Israeli–Palestinian peace is achieved. Finally, the question of armed forces and militias in Iraq was addressed in particular to McGurk. He recalled that training missions were still under way for the increased professionalisation of Iraqi armed forces, in support of the Iraqi government’s policy of ‘all arms being under the control of the state’.

Fifth Plenary Session: Security and Competition in the Horn of Africa This year’s Manama Dialogue introduced a new geopolitical and geostrategic dimension discussing the relationship between Gulf countries and the Horn of Africa. Saudi and Emirati reliance on African military bases to wage attacks against the Houthis in Yemen; the increased importance of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait for international trade; and the unravelling rivalries among Gulf countries which are playing out in Africa and that contribute to the renewed interest in Gulf–Horn of Africa relations.

Discussing Kenya’s experience in dealing with regional security challenges, Cabinet Secretary for Defence Raychelle Omamo underlined ‘the importance of partnership and collaboration’, reminding the audience that ‘innovative peace 36

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and security models which draw on elaborate collaboration between regional governments and the international community have been devised’ successfully in the region. With

Abdisaid Ali, National Security Advisor, Somalia

regard to relations with the Gulf, it was paramount in her view to ‘recalibrate these bonds’ so that they become even more mutually beneficial towards ‘peacebuilding, wealth and job creation, trade, innovation, infrastructure development and socio-economic progress’.

Somalia’s National Security Advisor Abdisaid Ali followed on from Omamo’s point, adding a word of caution and stressing that despite the benefits that came with the increased involvement of the Gulf states in the region, ‘the current political crisis in the Gulf means that agreements and negotiations involving one of the Gulf parties risks drawing Somalia into crisis’.

Similar concerns were voiced by Jean-Christophe Belliard, Deputy Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Political Director for the European External Action Service, European Union: ‘We have – and it is a factor of complication in Somalia – Qatar and Turkey doing one thing and Saudi Arabia and Emirates doing another thing; and this is something which will need to be addressed if we want to be successful.’ Ali also Executive summary

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Jean-Christophe Belliard, Deputy Secretary-General for Political Affairs; Political Director, European External Action Service, European Union

stressed that Somalia was gradually stabilising and revealing its potential and advantages for prospective partners and investors, opening a new era ‘with greater investment in [Somali] ports and infrastructure and greater recognition of the diplomatic bridge that Somalia can make between the regions’, but security remained fragile and vulnerable to shocks.

A strong message that emerged from the session was Africa’s need for continued foreign investment. According to Omamo, ‘there can be no sustainable peace without development … Regional insecurity must therefore be tied to unlocking the vast resources and economic potential of the Horn of Africa.’ As such, she urged continued Gulf investment in the region which would serve both security and economic purposes. Protecting key logistical and trade routes in the Red Sea, in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Arabian Sea would promote regional growth and stability. Along similar lines, Ali encouraged the audience to ‘recognise [Somalia’s] unique strategic position, with promise to become a commercial and economic powerhouse of the future’. However, when addressing specific questions on China’s role in the region and investment in infrastructural projects, he argued

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that ‘the Chinese do deals that are fast and maybe with certain encouragements. And maybe less accountability ... It is faster, it is more efficient, but there could be consequences in those agreements.’ This was a sentiment echoed by Omamo: ‘For the longest time nobody bothered about Africa … The Chinese took a risk. They provided funding and they have helped Africans build roads, hospitals, railways and so on.’

Notwithstanding the increased presence of Middle Eastern and Asian actors in the Horn, Belliard made clear that the region as a whole remained important for the EU … It is about our blood artery, the commerce between Europe and Asia. It is about Suez, Bab el-Mandeb; it is about our relation with China, with Japan, with Australia, with ASEAN [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations], with India, countries with whom we have free-trade agreements and which constitute something like two-thirds of our commerce.

He went on to say that ‘today the future of Europe is being played in Africa. If Africa fails, Europe will fail. If Africa succeeds, Europe will succeed.’

He also praised Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for their positive role, including in brokering the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and encouraged them to play an even bigger role in providing funding for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), education, infrastructure and economic development.

All three speakers acknowledged the importance of ensuring that citizens are the main recipients of peace dividends. Ali also spoke of the efforts made by the Somali government to create jobs and training opportunities for the youth: ‘Arguably the greatest challenge facing the Horn of Africa and the Gulf states is how to effectively enable and support our youth population to contribute to our stability and prosperity and to give them a brighter future in our interconnected world.’

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(l-r): Lieutenant General (Retd) Sir Thomas Beckett, Executive Director, IISS–Middle East; and General Joseph Votel, Commander, US Central Command

Special Session 1: Defence Modernisation and Industrialisation in the Middle East The backdrop for this session was an overall reordering of the Middle East and its military dimensions, including the lessons learned from a variety of ongoing conflicts, a continuing asymmetric threat and the implications of all of this for defence modernisation. The vital importance of inter-operability was underscored – few nations operate alone. Also in terms of modernisation plans, it was agreed that it is not just about buying or selling high-capability equipment, but about having the structures in place to sustain it over the long term. In terms of priority threats, ballistic-missile defence was highlighted, and the challenges that it represents.

The point was made that defence budgets in the Middle East – and therefore the amounts to spend on modernisation – tend to be among the highest relative to overall national income by global standards. However, industrial capacity is low, thereby creating its own dependencies. Therefore there needs to be a long-term industrial plan. Speakers also highlighted the need to guard against emerging as well as traditional threats in modernisation plans – including threats below the level of

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conflict, such as organised crime; the need for cyber security and the protection of critical national infrastructure; and the need to defend against information operations.

The potential acquisition of Russian-built capabilities, and the possible exposure of Western defence technology, were other issues raised (Turkey was particularly cited, with its plans

(l-r): Professor Dr Ä°smail Demir, President, Presidency for Defence Industries, Turkey; and General Sir Christopher Deverell, Commander, Joint Forces Command, Ministry of Defence, UK

for a Russian air-defence system). These were acknowledged as major concerns. Another concern that was identified was the need to understand Iranian developments in planning, particularly Iran’s technical expertise and potential for innovation.

This was followed by an acknowledgement of the challenge of operating with proxies on the ground, and how that must not lead to a lowering of standards in terms of operational practice.

Further challenges include the changing market, and the proliferation of technology from suppliers with less rigorous export standards than is traditional in the West (the issue of unmanned aerial systems was raised, in particular) – in response, Western suppliers may need to be more flexible, for example, by putting in place better end-user monitoring. More broadly, it was agreed that the proliferation of dual-use technologies represents a challenge in terms of regulation.

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Special Session 2: Security in the Bab el-Mandeb (l-r): Virginia Comolli, Senior Fellow for Conflict, Security and Development, IISS; and Vice Admiral Scott Stearney, Commander, US Naval Forces Central Command

The security situation in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is complex due to its land- and maritime-based threats, and although the latter have decreased, they have not yet disappeared. Successful anti-piracy missions and private-sector involvement need to be continued, as piracy in the Gulf of Aden will not dissipate without a whole-of-government approach and solving the land-based drivers of piracy.

The land domain is also increasingly complex, with threats multiplying and intensifying. The destabilised security situations in neighbouring regions, notably the Middle East and the Sahel, must also be considered, as they affect the Horn of Africa directly. The geographical understanding of the Horn of Africa should therefore be expanded and should move away from narrow connotations. In order to achieve this, various drivers of instability in the wider region – such as criminalisation, ‘Somalisation’ and weaponisation – must all be addressed.

Whole-of-government approaches in the Horn of Africa, and in neighbouring African and Middle Eastern states, should be pursued during what is currently the Horn of Africa’s period of transition. The governments of the region

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should play increasingly conspicuous roles – in order to be seen and heard – supported by international assistance from the European Union, the United States and even East Asian nations. International financial and multilateral institutions should also be included.

Aside from general disquiet over the political stability and security of the region, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen was of particular concern. Delegates discussed the point that, according to the United Nations, 75% of the population of Yemen

(l-r): Alexander Rondos, EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, European External Action Service, European Union; and Lise Grande, Resident Humanitarian Coordinator in Yemen; Resident Representative, UN Development Programme Yemen, United Nations

is in need of some form of humanitarian assistance, and the country is judged to be in a pre-famine phase. Lack of food and ‘income famine’ – when food is available but civilians are too poor to purchase it – are critical concerns for humanitarian organisations operating in Yemen. However, questions were raised with regards to the definition of famine; the methods and metrics used to measure famine in Yemen by the UN; and the guarantees against biased or incorrect information. Not only is the current crisis in Yemen a humanitarian tragedy, it was described as a ‘cancer’ growing counter to the stability of the wider region, exacerbating mass migration; epidemics; human smuggling; the breakdown of law and order; and the Executive summary

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(l-r): John Raine, Senior Adviser for Geopolitical Due Diligence, IISS; and Marcus Willett, former Director of Cyber, GCHQ

entrenchment and spread of radical forces with international aspirations and intent. Until the crisis in Yemen is resolved, the region will not find peace.

Special Session 3: Cyber Threats and Cyber Defence In what has become a standard session at the Manama Dialogue in recent years, speakers and participants assessed trends in the cyber domain and key cyber issues relevant to a Middle East undergoing major alignment shifts.

Speakers agreed that the past ten years bore witness to a remarkable shift in the cyber realm. Whereas in the past cyber was relegated to the world of technical experts who argued about definitions, today’s ministers and senior government officials regularly contend with major cyber issues.

The amount of data that has been created and the emergence of new technologies has provided both risks and opportunities.

Amid ubiquitous state-sponsored and criminal hacking, governments must reassess both their cyber-security practices and the way in which they operate. In the private sector, two types of companies were identified: those who have been hacked and know it, and those who have been hacked and do not.

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Attackers, whether states or criminals, still maintain the advantage in cyberspace, although defenders are continuing to improve their capabilities. Participants argued for changes to how people think about networks and highlighted the need for government–government cooperation, as well as between governments and the private sector. They also contended that good cyber-security practices should become a market differential for companies.

Participants suggested that beyond being a threat, Iran’s cyber capabilities also represent an impetus for Gulf

(l-r): General (Retd) Keith Alexander, President and Chief Executive Officer, IronNet Cybersecurity; former Director, US National Security Agency and Commander, US Cyber Command; and CharlesEdouard Bouée, Chief Executive Officer; Asia President and Greater China Chairman, Roland Berger

countries to work towards stronger collective-defence mechanisms. They argued that the proposed Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) – a notional alliance among the six Gulf Arab states, Egypt and Jordan to counter Iran – could include agreements on the sharing of threatrelated information.

On privacy issues in cyberspace, the speakers agreed that more transparency was needed to assuage concerns about government overreach. If governments are not able to convince their citizens that there is no malign intent, their citizens are likely to be against any proposed policies.

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(l-r): Dr Kori Schake, Deputy DirectorGeneral, IISS; and Nicolas Roche, Director, Strategic Affairs, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, France

Special Session 4: Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation in the Middle East Over 60 years ago, then-president of the United States Dwight D. Eisenhower presented the ‘Atoms of Peace’ plan, which sought to promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology under a system of safeguards. This initiative produced many of the most important elements of today’s nuclear non-proliferation regime, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the concept of nuclear safeguards and the norm of nuclear non-proliferation itself. It also hastened the global diffusion of nuclear knowledge and infrastructure. However, some recipient states – notably India, Israel and Pakistan – diverted nuclear assistance to military uses.

This session grappled with the inherent tension between supporting nuclear-energy development and preventing nuclear proliferation in the context of today’s Middle East.

Three major themes emerged during the discussions. Firstly, many countries in the region seek an alternative to carbonbased power generation, and there is a strong appetite for developing indigenous nuclear capacity. However, there is a general yet vivid perception that the US applies a more

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stringent set of standards for Arab governments wishing to build nuclear power plants. Why must countries in the Middle East accept the ‘gold standard’, which forecloses a country’s right to pursue fissile-material production, while some Asian countries are not required to forswear the nuclear fuel cycle?

Secondly, in recognising the uneven application of standards by the US and other nuclear suppliers, discussants

(l-r): Dr Kamal Araj, Vice-Chairman, Jordan Atomic Energy Commission, Jordan; and Dr Hassan Elbahtimy, Lecturer, Department of War Studies, King’s College London

suggested that regional cooperation could help address concerns of individual countries attempting to exploit civilian nuclear programmes for military purposes. A regional repository for enriched uranium in Jordan – akin to Europe’s Euratom – was proposed as a way to ensure Middle Eastern countries’ unfettered access to nuclear fuel.

Finally, there was considerable discussion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the US decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear accord. Some discussants viewed the JCPOA as a failure and welcomed Washington’s action, citing the accord’s failure to address Iran’s missile capabilities and its malign behaviour in the region. In their view, the nuclear negotiations with Iran should have included regional powers, much like the Executive summary

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Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS

decade-old ‘Six-Party Talks’ that sought to curtail North Korea’s nuclear programme. Others, however, argued that nuclear issues were prioritised over Tehran’s ballistic missiles and hegemonic activities, with one discussant arguing that ‘if you don’t like the JCPOA, imagine the region without the nuclear deal’.

Concluding Plenary Session: Navigating Geopolitical Change: The Middle East in the Global Context In this concluding session, the IISS gathered key voices in the Institute to offer broad insights and thoughts, in order to ‘draw together the threads of our discussion over the last 36 hours and to arrive at some useful analytical conclusions’, as explained by IISS Director-General and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman.

Dr David Gordon, IISS Senior Adviser for Geo-economics and Strategy, addressed the risk of a reciprocal tariff imposition between the United States and China escalating to a trade war. He argued that it was still not clear whether the Trump administration wished for a more equitable trade balance with China, or sought to limit China’s role in the global 48

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economy; the picture would become clearer at the G20 summit in Buenos Aires. He concluded:

Dr David Gordon, Senior Adviser, Geo-economics and Strategy, IISS

Xi Jinping is quite motivated to avoid a new Cold War with the [United States], so I think there is a reasonable chance of a turnaround here ‌ I do not think it is going to be a grand bargain, but I do think we could have a move, again, towards some element of a negotiation around particularly the bilateral trade relationship.

Gordon also noted a shift in expectations within East Asia regarding the Gulf area. Whereas previously, East Asian states had assumed that Iran would be their principal partner, they now acknowledge a greater role for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. The perception of Iran as a regional commercial hegemon has declined. Turning to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Gordon said it had lost some of its multilateral character in recent years and this had prompted resistance in Europe and parts of Asia, alongside concern that it would eventually lead to indebted states surrendering assets to China. This has prompted Beijing to seek new Executive summary

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Virginia Comolli, Senior Fellow for Conflict, Security and Development, IISS

partnerships, including with Japan on the BRI. Gordon concluded that it was increasingly likely that China is going to be looking to the Gulf region as a potential partner in BRI activities. If you look at the BRI maps, they sort of leave the Gulf out a little bit. But I think that we are in a new phase now and I think that Gulf states, along with Japan and others, could play a significant role in reorienting the BRI back to its more multilateral origins.

Virginia Comolli, IISS Senior Fellow for Conflict, Security and Development, addressed the deepening engagement of Gulf states in the Horn of Africa to protect commercial shipping, promote national interests and combat extremist groups.

A major breakthrough for security in the Horn of Africa was made in 2018 with the peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which she noted was made possible through the involvement of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and indeed the deal was reached in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. The two countries ... are 50

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really positioning themselves as true powerhouses in the Horn of Africa. Their growing influence has also made it possible for them to convince border rivals Djibouti and Eritrea also to enter into a dialogue.

Lieutenant General (Retd) Sir Thomas Beckett, Executive Director, IISS–Middle East

At the same time, Comolli noted, smaller states in East Africa faced difficulty in navigating between the competing agendas of Gulf states. The advent of Gulf influence in the Horn of Africa has somewhat sidelined the African Union and led to a different focus within peace agreements, placing greater focus on security and less on good governance. There is a worry, she concluded, that while such an approach may be effective in the short term in fostering the normalisation of relations among rivals, such as in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, it might actually have a negative impact on the prospects for long-term peace and stability if the priorities of partners and foreign partners actually change.

Lieutenant General (Retd) Sir Thomas Beckett, Executive Director of IISS–Middle East, observed that the two principal Executive summary

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Dr Kori Schake, Deputy Director-General, IISS

threats to the region – extremism and Iran – were confronted through alliances. In Syria, he noted, two separate alliances were operating against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, in the same territory but with very different approaches to rules of engagement. Although Russia and Iran have scored victories in recent years, Western states were now adopting a carrot-and-stick approach with regard to financing the reconstruction of Syria.

The carrot is that Russia will be able to take its hand out of the mangle, because if they deliver political transition from Assad then the West will invest. But of course, the stick is that if Russia does not do that, and they do not get their hand out of the mangle, the poor Syrian people will continue to be in an unconstructed environment.

Turning to Iran, Beckett challenged the Saudi view that Iran was being contained at present. Looking ahead, he argued, Iran’s position looked hopeless – although he noted that Iran ‘got out of a hole in Syria through forming a coalition with Russia’, and it might be able to do so again.

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Dr Kori Schake, IISS Deputy Director-General, spoke about regional dynamics that limited the scope for an improved security environment. She identified four important policy choices. Firstly, the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that pleased regional partners but displeased extra-regional partners who had been crucial to the success of the sanctions that led to the JCPOA. It was, she noted, a decision justified more on non-nuclear than nuclear grounds and so presented ‘a rebalancing over the priorities of the prior administration’ that brought the US into closer alignment with regional partners. Secondly, the US decision to move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. Thirdly, the reviving salience of the Palestinian issue, as underlined by the topic’s presence during the Manama Dialogue, in particular in Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yousef bin Alawi’s speech during the third plenary session. Fourthly, the strong Western reaction to the murder of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. This will complicate the alliance of external and regional powers against Iran, because enforcing a common sense of ‘moral clarity’ would be extraordinarily difficult. Furthermore, the prospects for a Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) appear dim, given that the Trump administration has ‘very little appetite … for a lot more commitment to the region’ and the increased focus in US security policy of great-power competition, which will pull US interest towards other regions.

In the subsequent discussion, many questioners probed what they felt were omissions in the Dialogue as a whole and during the speakers’ round-ups. For example, the role of Somalia in the Ethiopia–Eritrea rapprochement. They also drew on the panellists’ areas of expertise to gain insight into the many intricacies of the Middle East’s relations with the wider world. How should national actors be engaged, be expected to behave or be aided? Gordon was asked about China’s appetite for post-conflict reconstruction in Libya, Yemen and elsewhere. He answered: Executive summary

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I think China’s appetite for post-war reconstruction in the Horn is actually going to be quite high. The Chinese have made a big investment in that part of the world, particularly in Ethiopia. They are very concerned about Islamic extremism re-emerging as a very powerful force.

Responding to a question from General (Retd) David Petraeus about the prospects for reconciliation between Qatar and Saudi–United Arab Emirates, Beckett said: As one senior leader in the region said to me: “Remember, Tom, first of all it is the tribe, then it is the religion, then it is the nation.” I think the issues that are local will be dealt with first; there is a deep local grievance that is going to be dealt with and the only way it can be dealt with is in Riyadh … before it becomes regional.

Schake was asked about international engagement in Yemen. She noted that: the narrative in the media coverage of Yemen is no longer focused on either the Houthi surge and destabilisation of the government in Yemen … It is now focused on the potential for the world’s largest humanitarian disaster, and that makes it hard to sustain both the moral clarity and the effort and support of security in Saudi Arabia and the UAE – and the Khashoggi murder is only going to ramp that up in the American conversation.

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14TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 26–28 OCTOBER 2018

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CHAPTER 3

Press coverage Selected IISS publications

Taro Kono, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Japan

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Press coverage

Reuters 27 October 2018

Mattis says Khashoggi killing undermines regional stability U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said on Saturday that the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi undermined Middle Eastern stability and that Washington would take additional measures against those responsible.

Washington Post columnist Khashoggi’s murder has escalated into a crisis for the world’s top oil exporter.

Saudi Arabia’s allies have reacted with outrage toward a country that is the lynchpin of a U.S.-backed regional bloc against growing Iranian influence in the Middle East.

But Mattis also said U.S. respect for the Saudi people was undimin-

ished, while Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir said those behind the killing would be prosecuted in the kingdom and that the investigation would take time.

U.S. President Donald Trump has said he wants to get to the bottom of the case, while also highlighting Riyadh’s role as an ally against Tehran and Islamist militants, as well as a major purchaser of U.S. arms.

“With our collective interests in peace and unwavering respect for human rights in mind, the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in a diplomatic facility must concern us all greatly,” Mattis told a conference in Bahrain.

“Failure of any one nation to adhere to international norms and the rule of law undermines regional stability at a time when it is needed most,” Mattis said. He did not mention de facto Saudi ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman by name at any point.

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Saudi Arabia’s public prosecutor said Khashoggi’s killing was premeditated, contradicting a previous official statement that it happened accidentally during a tussle in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

Saudi officials have also said he was accidentally killed in a botched security operation to return him to the kingdom.

In his remarks at the Manama Dialogue security conference, Mattis went through a list of what he described as disruptive Iranian behavior - a message most Gulf allies will view positively since they share similar concerns about Iran’s increasing influence in Syria and Iraq.

While these were some of the sharpest comments Mattis has made on the Khashoggi killing, he also said the two countries still needed to collaborate on stability in the region.

“It’s hard to imagine that this administration in particular is going to change fundamentally how it views the role of the Saudis in terms of counterterrorism, in terms of counter-Iran,” said Dennis Ross, who served as top Middle East adviser to President Barack Obama in his first term.

Foreign Minister Jubeir, speaking at the same conference, said Riyadh’s relations with Washington were “ironclad” amid what he called “hysteria in the media” over Khashoggi’s killing.

In response to the killing, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo this week announced moves against 21 Saudis to either revoke their visas or make them ineligible for U.S. visas after the Khashoggi killing.

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“Our Secretary of State ...will be taking additional measures as the situation is clarified,” Mattis said.

ALLIANCES Mattis said the presence in the Middle East of Russia - a major ally of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad - could not be a replacement for the United States, whose “long-standing, enduring, and transparent” commitment to the region he reiterated.

He said that it was important to end a 16-month-old dispute between Qatar and four Arab states that analysts say has weakened regional coordination against Iran.

Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt cut off travel and trade ties with Qatar in June 2017, accusing it of backing their archrival, Iran, and supporting terrorism. Qatar denies the charges.

“The solving of internal debates among our GCC partners is vital for realizing this vision. Without it, we weaken our security,” he said, referring to the Gulf Cooperation Council nations.

Mattis said he continued to support partners in the region who were defending themselves against Houthi attacks in Yemen but also called for an end to fighting there.

A Saudi-led coalition that intervened in Yemen’s war in 2015 has conducted frequent air strikes targeting the Iran-aligned Houthi group and has often hit civilians, although it denies doing so intentionally. ©Reuters Reprinted with permission

Financial Times 27 October 2018

Saudi Arabia rules out extradition of Khashoggi suspects Saudi Arabia has ruled out the extradition to Turkey of eighteen men it said it had arrested in connection with the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, the dissident killed in the country’s Istanbul consulate three weeks ago.

Istanbul’s chief prosecutor had announced on Friday he had prepared an extradition request after Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish president, repeated his demand for the 18 suspects to be sent to Turkey to stand trial.

On Saturday Adel Jubeir, the Kingdom’s foreign minister told the Manama Dialogue, an international security conference in Bahrain that the suspects would be tried at home. “On the issue of the extradition, the individuals are Saudi nationals, they are detained in Saudi Arabia, the investigation is in Saudi Arabia and they will be prosecuted in Saudi Arabia,” he said.

Responding to the Saudi refusal to hand over the men, Mr Erdogan repeated his insistence that Riyadh needed to answer key questions about the case.

“Who sent those 18 people to Turkey? That is a question that needs to be answered by Saudi officials,” he said, adding that Saudi Arabia needed to disclose the identity of a local collaborator that it says disposed of Khashoggi’s body.

Speaking at a summit on Syria in Istanbul, the Turkish president added: “The crime was committed in Istanbul.

If the Saudis authorities are not going to do what is necessary, we are ready to take responsibility and try these 18 people in Turkey.”

Mr Erdogan has been raising the pressure on Riyadh, a regional rival, through a series of intelligence leaks since the disappearance of Khashoggi on October 2.

Turkey’s request has not yet been formally submitted, a Turkish official said on Saturday, but the country’s foreign ministry is expected to deliver it to Saudi Arabia in the coming days.

Mr Erdogan said in his speech, which also attacked Saudi Arabia’s “childish” explanations in the first weeks after Khashoggi’s disappearance, that a Saudi prosecutor would arrive in Turkey on Sunday as part of a joint investigation.

The kingdom has come under intense international pressure following the murder of Mr Khashoggi. The insider turned critic who was based in the US, where he was a columnist for the Washington Post, frequently criticising the policies of Mohammed Bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince and de facto ruler.

After denying it had anything to do with the killing for two weeks, Riyadh said it was an operation by rogue security elements working without orders.

Mr Jubeir described the international outcry over the murder as hysterical and said people should wait for the results of the investigation. He said the kingdom would hold the culprits ac-

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countable and that the killing was done by people exceeding their authority.

Analysts and diplomats familiar with Saudi Arabia have said the killing could not have happened without a green light from the crown prince, but Saudi officials including Mr Jubeir have insisted he had no knowledge of the operation.

That assertion has been met with scepticism by western governments and even Donald Trump, the US president, who has made clear he wants to contain the damage to the relationship with Saudi Arabia. Mr Trump suggested last week that the prince might have been involved, saying: “He is running things over there.”

Speaking at the same security conference in Bahrain, Jim Mattis, the US defence secretary said the Khashoggi killing was a threat to security.

While insisting on US support for partners in the Gulf, and without naming Saudi Arabia in relation to the killing, he said: “Failure of any one nation to adhere to international norms and the rule of law undermines regional stability when it is needed most.” ©Financial Times Reprinted with permission

Associated Press News 27 October 2018

US defence chief: killing of writer is threat to stability The killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi “undermines regional stability” and the U.S. State Department plans to take

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further action in response to the killing, U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said Saturday at an international conference in the Middle East.

Mattis never mentioned Saudi Arabia directly in connection with the Oct. 2 slaying of Khashoggi at the kingdom’s consulate in Istanbul, Turkey.

But he noted that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo revoked visas of Saudis implicated in the killing of the Washington Post writer, and he said additional measures will be taken.

Turkish officials have said that a Saudi team of 15 men tortured, killed and dismembered the writer and in a premeditated act. The kingdom initially said it knew nothing about what happened to Khashoggi, but on Thursday said evidence shows that the killing was premeditated.

Mattis made no move to directly blame Saudi and did not refer to the calls from members of Congress to cut arms sales to Saudi Arabia or impose sanctions on the kingdom. But his broader mention of the matter toward the end of his speech underscores the serious national security ramifications the incident poses for relations with a key U.S. ally.

“With our collective interests in peace and unwavering respect for human rights in mind, the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in a diplomatic facility must concern us all greatly,” Mattis told international officials and experts at the Manama Dialogue. “Failure of any one nation to adhere to international norms and the rule of law undermines regional stability at a time when it is needed most.”

He added that he will continue to consult with President Donald Trump and Pompeo as they consider the broader implications of the matter.

Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Jubeir, who spoke after Mattis at the conference, said hysterical media are rushing to judgment in the Khashoggi case.

“Unfortunately there has been this hysteria in the media about Saudi Arabia’s guilt before the investigation is completed,” he said, in response to questions about the killing. “What we say to people is wait until everything is done” then decide if the investigation was serious or not.

He said that the kingdom will hold those responsible accountable and put mechanisms in place to ensure this doesn’t happen again. “We will overcome” the consequences of the Khashoggi killing, he added.

Still, Mattis’ speech also reflected the difficult dilemma this has caused. In one section deeply critical of Iran, he referred to the ongoing attacks on Saudi by Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen.

“I reiterate U.S. support for our partners’ right to defend themselves against Iranian-supplied Houthi attacks on their sovereign territory, and at the same time call for an urgent end to the fighting,” Mattis said.

Others in the U.S., however, have condemned the Saudis for what has been called indiscriminate bombings that have slaughtered civilians. Mattis and others, meanwhile, have said the U.S. is providing key support to the Saudi-led coalition, and that the assistance is helping the kingdom improve its targeting.

The U.S. he said, wants to continue to build the capacity of the Yemeni security forces who are batting the Houthis in a brutal civil war.

Mattis also later talked about America’s shared interests with its Arab and Israeli partners, adding that “our respect for the Saudi people is undiminished.”

But, he cautioned that respect “must come with transparency and trust.”

Saudi Arabia’s slow shift to reveal more details about the killing also reflects the kingdom’s acknowledgement that the killing could have a serious diplomatic, and possibly economic impact.

Khashoggi lived in self-imposed exile in the U.S. for the past year and wrote editorial columns for The Washington Post that were critical of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the kingdom’s heir apparent. He lived in self-imposed exile in the United States for nearly a year before his death, had written critically of Prince Mohammed’s crackdown on dissent.

More broadly, Mattis’ speech Saturday, focused on regional cooperation and the U.S. commitment to the Middle East.

He repeated his frequent criticism of Iran’s “outlaw regime,” which has fueled insurgencies in Yemen and Iraq, backed Syrian President Bashar Assad’s brutal government and fostered proxy terrorists across the region.

And he made clear that the U.S. commitment to the region outpaces any presence by Russia, which he said lacks essential moral principles. ©Associated Press News Reprinted with permission

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New York Times 27 October 2018

Saudi Arabia Rejects Turkey’s Extradition Request in Khashoggi Killing Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister on Saturday rejected a call by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey to try the suspects in the killing of the dissident commentator Jamal Khashoggi in that country, saying that the men arrested would be prosecuted on Saudi soil.

Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir called the international outrage over the killing “fairly hysterical” and said that once the Saudi investigation was complete, the suspects would be held accountable “in Saudi Arabia.”

“Unfortunately, there has been this hysteria in the media before the investigation was complete,” he said during a panel at the Manama Dialogue, which was organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Manama, the capital of Bahrain.

Mr. Khashoggi, a Virginia resident and a columnist for The Washington Post who was also a critic of Saudi Arabia’s current rulers, was killed on Oct. 2 by a team of Saudi agents in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul.

Turkish officials have said that the agents dismembered Mr. Khashoggi with a bone saw in order to dispose of the body, as part of a premeditated assassination. Many current and former Western officials have argued that

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such an operation could have been authorized only by Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

In a speech this past week, Mr. Erdogan called on Saudi Arabia to extradite any suspects for a trial in Turkey.

He has argued that the rulers of Saudi Arabia face a conflict of interest in overseeing any trial because the killing was ordered and directed from within the Saudi government for political reasons.

Mr. Jubeir’s remarks on Saturday amounted to a rejection of Mr. Erdogan’s request for extradition, as expected. The foreign minister also did not directly respond to questions about how the kingdom would convince its allies that Prince Mohammed had no ties to the killing.

Saudi Arabia acknowledged that Mr. Khashoggi had died inside the consulate only after more than two weeks of changing stories. Last Saturday, the kingdom said its investigators had concluded that Saudi agents accidentally strangled Mr. Khashoggi during a brawl that broke out while they were attempting to persuade him to voluntarily return home.

On Thursday, however, the kingdom revised its story, saying that Turkey had provided evidence that showed the killing had been premeditated.

That disclosure appeared to have been timed to get ahead of a report to President Trump by the director of the C.I.A., Gina Haspel, who visited Ankara, the Turkish capital, this past week.

Turkish officials have said they have audio recordings of the killings inside the

consulate, presumably obtained though surveillance, and Ms. Haspel was expected to hear those recordings.

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, who spoke at the conference earlier in the day, said Mr. Khashoggi’s death “undermines regional stability.” He promised the United States would seek to hold accountable those responsible for the death, though he did not mention Saudi Arabia by name.

The kingdom said it had arrested 18 Saudis in connection with the killing.

The royal court also fired a number of senior intelligence officials said by Saudi officials to have orchestrated the operation or participated in covering it up.

Also fired was Saud al-Qahtani, a close adviser to Prince Mohammed who was said to have played a role in creating the environment in which violence was used against Mr. Khashoggi. But neither Mr. Qahtani nor the intelligence officials have been arrested by the kingdom, raising questions about its commitment to holding them accountable.

In his comments on Saturday, Mr. Jubeir, the Saudi foreign minister, said the kingdom’s alliance with the United States was “ironclad.” He praised Mr. Trump’s regional foreign policy as “rational, realistic.”

After the investigation, he added, “we will know the truth.”

“We will put in place measures to stop it from happening again,” he said.

“And we will be transparent about it.” ©New York Times Reprinted with permission

National 27 October 2018

King Abdullah says ‘full funds’ must go to Palestinian aid agency Jordan’s Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi called on Friday for “full funds” to be allocated to UN’s Palestinian refugee agency, following a financial crisis triggered by US funding cuts.

Mr Safadi spoke on behalf of King Abdullah of Jordan who cancelled a scheduled appearance at a security conference in Manama, Bahrain, after the deaths of at least 21 people in flash floods near the Dead Sea. “A critical security concern for the region and the world is the long denial of Palestinian statehood. This conflict has been a global disrupter of peace and stability,” Mr Safadi said, reading a statement written by King Abdullah at the The Manama Dialogue summit in Bahrain.

The minister called for schools and opportunities for the youth to be nurtured, and the full funding of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

In September, the US administration described the organisation as “irredeemably flawed”, announcing it had “carefully reviewed” the issue and “will not make additional contributions to UNRWA A spokesman for the agency, Chris Gunness, rejected Washington’s decision.

“We reject in the strongest possible terms the criticism that UNRWA’s schools, health centres, and emergency

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assistance programs are ‘irredeemably flawed’,” he said on Twitter.

The United States was by far the biggest contributor to the agency.

It received pledges of $118 million (DH433 million) from donor countries to help it overcome the crisis.

Kuwait and the European Union were among the biggest contributors along with Germany, Ireland and Norway.

The agency was founded in 1949 after the first Arab-Israeli war, in the wake of the exodus of around 700,000 refugees who fled or were driven out of Israel on its founding as a state.

UNRWA now looks after more than 5 million descendants of those original refugees, in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The Palestinians assert the right under international law to return to homes abandoned in Israel or be compensated.

Jordan says funding cuts to UNRWA undermine that right.

Mr Safadi urged the international community to assist Israel and Palestine in finding a durable two-state solution.

“In order for people to live in peace, they must be empowered to prepare for the day of peace,” Mr Safadi said.

“Security and stability will not prevail until a two state solution is accepted,” he said, adding that lasting peace cannot be unilateral.

A solution must be one that meets the needs of both sides, is fully in accord with international law and resolutions, that creates, a viable, independent, sovereign Palestinian state, on the 1967 lines, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

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“Any such solution, based on unilateral acts and unequal rights, would be a moral disaster and a recipe for continued conflict,” he warned.

“Peace can only be built by respecting the rights, hopes, and needs of both sides. This is the real security of peace,” he urged.

“We need all of you in the lead to help the international community work together, talk together, and keep to its principles,” the minister said. ©National Reprinted with permission

Gulf News 28 October 2018

Speculations abound on Netanyahu Oman visit As the finer details about the purposes of the unexpected visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Oman last week remain deeply shrouded in mystery, analysts are increasingly inclined to tie it to Iran, rather than to Palestine.

The Palestine connection was made because a few days earlier, Sultan Qaboos received Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and a Palestinian delegation in Muscat.

It was tempting for observers and media to deduce that Oman, a country that has built a reputation for mediating in complex situations, was working on a mediation between Palestinians and Israelis.

However, one day after the visit and amid a flurry of denunciations and cheers, Oman’s Foreign Minister Yousuf Bin Alawi told the Manama Dialogue in Bahrain that his country was not acting as mediator and was offering ideas to help Israel and the Palestine to come together for negotiations.

Moemen Basri, a Gulf analyst, said that improving relations between Israel and Palestine would mean a trip to Egypt, not to Oman.

He said that he believed that Oman was rather working on improving the situation between the US and Iran, just like it did in 2013, and that at that Israel was a crucial factor for the success of such an enterprise.

“I see it the announcement of the visit as a bold step by Oman to find a way out of crises that are plaguing or threatening the region,” he said.

“There is of course a strong inclination to help put an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by giving a new chance to the parties involved to come together, but Muscat also wants to ensure there is no conflict with Iran as the screws are being tightened around it with the serious US-imposed sanctions looming larger,” he said.

Writing for Al Sharq Al Awsat, Abdul Rahman Al Rashed argued that “what has been said about the Omani mediation between the Palestinians and the Israelis is unlikely, given that Egypt is taking over the task.”

“Is it related to the Iranian-Israeli issue? Maybe, given that Oman has the confidence of the two sides as an honest broker,” he said.

“Iran is living its worst days on two fronts. It has been struck in Syria and the US sanctions, which will culminate in depriving it of its oil exports and of dealing in dollars, are one week away.

The most important development is the growing role of Israel in the region because of the Syrian civil war and the arrival of Iran and its militias into areas considered by Israel as its security belt.”

Al Rashed said that Israel has played a critical role in decimating growing Iranian influence in Syria and thus played roles that Arab countries failed to do.

“Israel has imposed itself at the very heart of the regional camps. Without its intervention, it would not have been possible to prevent the expansion of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which had taken advantage of the emergence of the Russian military and political presence,” he wrote.

“Will Iran increase its understanding with Israel and reassure it through mediators or does Israel want to deliver its messages to Tehran, considering that Israel is influencing the US decision to boycott Iran and to strangle it economically?”

Al Rashed predicted that such important changes in the region would not stop the activities of the Israeli leaders in Muscat.

“They are the beginning of a political division based on conflicts in Syria, Yemen and other areas.”

For columnist Khairallah Khairallah, Iran has seemingly realised the seriousness of the US and asked Oman to mediate again.

Oman had played a role in the beginning of the negotiations that led to the

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Iranian nuclear deal in 2015 and which the US left in 2018.

“There is, for the first time, an administration in Washington that knows exactly where the problem with Iran lies. This problem is not in the Iranian nuclear issue, which was a trick used by Tehran to cover up its regional behaviour,” Khairallah said.

“The problem is in Iranian behaviour. This behaviour is not limited to repression within Iran itself, but also includes the oppression of Arab peoples as well. What is Iran doing in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iraq?” ©Gulf News Reprinted with permission

Wall Street Journal 28 October 2018

Khashoggi Killing Rocks Saudi Role as West’s Arab Ally The uproar over a Saudi journalist’s killing has put Saudi Arabia’s ability to rally others against Iran at risk, posing a challenge for the Trump administration’s Middle East policy, U.S. and Arab officials said.

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis highlighted those worries this weekend with rare public criticism of an ally, telling a security conference here that Saudi Arabia’s actions were destabilizing for the entire region “at a time when it needs it most.”

Mr. Mattis stopped short of blaming the Saudi leadership for writer Jamal Khashoggi’s Oct. 2 death, but his

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comments drew attention to how the gruesome murder—and the kingdom’s handling of it—has strained the Saudi leadership’s close ties with President Donald Trump. The Trump administration has put the kingdom at the center of a Middle East policy largely defined by efforts to contain Iranian influence.

The U.S. and other Western governments now are trying to balance the political cost of supporting the monarchy with the need to preserve the kingdom’s role as their most important Arab ally. Arab and Western allies worry the kingdom will have trouble making the moral argument that it must lead efforts to counter Iran, say government officials and experts.

“They are worried because Saudi Arabia anchors the relationship with the United States…and because of regional stability,” said a senior Western official who tracks the Middle East, referring the kingdom’s Arab allies. “They think it weakens Saudi Arabia.”

Saudi officials have sought to show allies that the Khashoggi incident is an aberration.

Speaking at the same Bahrain conference, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir described Saudi Arabia as a beacon of light combating Iran’s “vision of darkness.” He dismissed the public response to Mr. Khashoggi’s death as “hysterical.”

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman last week called Mr. Khashoggi’s death a “hideous incident” and vowed justice.

Saudi officials have struggled to present a credible narrative of what happened, as Turkish authorities released

information on the continuing investigation bit-by-bit, contradicting the kingdom’s initial denials of wrongdoing.

Saudi authorities have so far detained 18 people in connection with Mr. Khashoggi’s death and called it “premeditated,” but denied that Prince Mohammed, the country’s day-to-day ruler, played any role—a view some world leaders have greeted with skepticism, including Mr. Trump. Turkish and Western officials suspect the operation would have required the approval from the highest level of government.

The U.S. State Department has imposed travel restrictions on 21 Saudi government employees suspected of involvement in the killing. More penalties could follow, including financial sanctions aimed at human-rights violators, a possibility raised by U.S. lawmakers.

Some regional allies rallied behind Saudi Arabia.

King Abdullah II of Jordan and Pakistan’s Imran Khan—both recipients of Saudi financial aid—showed up at Riyadh’s premier investment conference after American and European executives and officials pulled out over the Khashoggi crisis.

But Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, one of Saudi Arabia’s closest Arab partners, was invited but didn’t go, according to two people familiar with the matter. A spokesman for Mr. Sisi didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Privately, Gulf and other Arab allies expressed worry the Khashoggi murder could compromise their own relations with the West.

“This is outrageous because this is not the kind of behavior that we are used to seeing from Saudi Arabia,” Mohammed Alyahya, an independent Saudi political analyst. “This is the kind of thing Iran and Syria do.”

Mr. Alyahya noted that, while Saudi Arabia’s regional goals remain unchanged, its priority right now is domestic: overhauling the security apparatus to ensure such an incident won’t happen again.

Saudi-U.S. relations had improved after Mr. Trump took office, buoyed by shared concerns over Iran and the desire to scrap the Obama administration-led deal to lift sanctions over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, which Mr. Trump did in May. Riyadh’s role against Iran is most prominent inside Yemen, where it is leading a military coalition against Houthi rebels aligned with Iran. U.S. and Gulf officials say Iran backs the rebels with weapons and training, an allegation Tehran denies.

The war has become a humanitarian disaster and thousands of civilians have been killed under the Saudi-led bombing campaign. Mr. Khashoggi’s death has resulted in new scrutiny from U.S. lawmakers the Saudi’s conduct of the war and U.S. military support for it, including air refueling and intelligence.

The White House still publicly support a Saudi arms deal worth billions of dollars, but lawmakers from both parties have suggested they would consider blocking aspects of the deal, which include precision-guided munitions and other weaponry.

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The Khashoggi killing “will require Saudi Arabia to make a much stronger public case for why Iran’s influence is malign and destabilizing while theirs is in everybody’s interest,” said Kori Schake, deputy director-general at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank.

German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen on Saturday called for the circumstances surrounding the journalist’s killing to be “fully investigated and brought to light, regardless of considerable political consequences.”

Germany has already vowed to suspend all weapons sales to the kingdom until there is more clarity on what happened to Mr. Khashoggi.

Washington’s calculation is complex.

As grave as the Khashoggi killing has become to the U.S.-Saudi relationship, there are significant implications for any moves the U.S. makes that could be seen as an overreaction in Riyadh and an opening for American competitors.

Riyadh could react angrily to any American downgrading of Saudi Arabia and persuade other Gulf allies to cool relations with the U.S., perhaps severing military exercises, for example.

“We’ve had a close relationship with Saudi Arabia for decades, and its geopolitical importance impacts multiple strategic security, energy, and regional interests,” said Norman Roule, a retired U.S. intelligence official with three decades of regional experience. “A fracture of the U.S.-Saudi relationship would be viewed as a gift by Moscow, Tehran and Beijing.” ©Wall Street Journal Reprinted with permission

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Arab News 28 October 2018

Petraeus: Why the world must curb Iran If anyone understands the consequences of Iranian involvement in Middle East affairs, David Petraeus does.

Before becoming director of the CIA in 2011, Petraeus was a four-star general with a glittering 37-year in the US military; he has commanded US and coalition forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and as head of US Central Command he led all US military operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt.

Which is why, if anyone is suspicious of attempts to preserve the 2015 deal that was supposed to curb Iran’s nuclear program, and to dilute the effects of US sanctions on Iran — as some European countries would like to do — David Petraeus is.

“The Europeans focused on the strengths of the agreement and would like to continue it,” he says. “I would have some understanding for that, were it not for the fact that I’ve been on battlefields where American, coalition and Iraqi soldiers have been killed by lethal weapons and ammunition provided

by Iran, along with funding. “Iran is a country … that pushes until there is firm pushback. I think that you are now seeing an American administration that is willing to push back very firmly. It has, with the additional defense spending and robust economic growth, a stronger foundation from which to push

back and renew partnerships with its allies in the Gulf.”

Petraeus, now chairman of the KKR Global Institute, is a key speaker at the Manama Dialogue, the annual security conference in Bahrain organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. As the Nov. 4 deadline draws near for the reimposition of US sanctions on Iran’s energy sector, including its crucial oil trade, Iranian influence and its threat to the region was a major focus of the conference.

Petraeus says: “Iran has continued its support for lethal activities in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and other places. It has continued the threatening missile program developments and a variety of different activities that indicated it did not want to take advantage of the opportunity that it had to capitalize on this nuclear deal.

“Will they continue their destabilizing activity? I think they will for some time, but at a certain point they’ll realize that this is a different administration that is going to be unyielding in its position on these sanctions. It may then be willing to come back to the table and recognize that it cannot get away with what is clearly unacceptable activities in the region and in the eyes of the rest of the world.

“In truth, Iran wants to ‘Lebanonize’ not just Lebanon, but Iraq, perhaps Syria, and other countries.”

Petraeus says there is ample evidence that Iran has armed, trained, funded and equipped powerful militias on the streets to give it clout on the ground. That becomes clear when some

members of these militias are represented in their countries’ parliaments, as has happened in Lebanon and to some degree in Iraq.

Addressing the conference on Saturday, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel AlJubeir referred to the 12 demands that the US has made of Iran before normal relations can be considered, demands that were laid out by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in May. Petraeus, of course, knows Al-Jubeir well from the minister’s time as the Saudi Ambassador to the US from 2007 to 2015. “I have enormous respect for the Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir, as I worked with him very closely when he was the ambassador,” he says.

“He was one of a less than a handful of ambassadors who could come and see me in the CIA at any time, and I would always speak with him. Always, it was a guarantee.”

Petraeus believes Saudi Arabia will play a major and pivotal role once the new US sanctions on Iranian oil take effect. He believes the Kingdom must bring its own additional capacity online to stabilize the market, as it has pledged to do.

Though Iran does play a major role in creating chaos and instability in the region, Petraeus believes it has become a common denominator in the region’s relationships with other countries in the world.

“I think Iran is the unifying force in the Gulf,” he says. “It has done something no other activity or interest could do — it has brought together just about all the countries in the region, and frank-

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ly it has led to an improvement in the relationship between Gulf states and Israel.

“It’s not a formal relationship, there’s no diplomatic recognition yet, but the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’ — except in Syria where it’s not necessarily the case, one reason why that is such a complex situation.” ©Arab News Reprinted with permission

Bloomberg 29 October 2018

Oman’s Sultan Puts Himself Back in the Driver’s Seat I couldn’t be in Oman this weekend for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s groundbreaking visit, but I was in the next best place: in Manama, Bahrain, at a regional security conference hosted by the International Institute of Strategic Studies. With hundreds of top government officials and military brass in attendance — representing almost every Arab nation, and most of the major Western countries — it was the perfect place to gauge reactions to the surprising events in Muscat.

The astonishment was palpable in the conference center, where the news quickly dominated discussions on the sidelines, even overtaking speculation about the price Saudi Arabia would pay for the killing of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi. By happy coincidence, Oman’s minister in charge of foreign affairs, Yousef bin Alawi, was

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due to participate in a panel discussion, and eyebrows climbed even higher when he offered the once-heretical view that Arab states ought to treat Israel like any other nation in the Middle East.

Arab delegates were divided over the official explanation for Netanyahu’s visit: that he wanted to discuss a peace deal for the Palestinians. Ahmed Abo El Gheith, secretary general of the League of Arab States, said it was “too soon” after the latest Israeli bombing in Gaza for Oman to show Netanyahu such hospitality. Khalid bin Ahmed al Khalifa, Bahrain’s minister of foreign affairs, was more diplomatic: “We must never, ever question the wisdom and far-sightedness” of longtime Omani leader Sultan Qaboos bin Saad.

In private conversations, some delegates complained that Oman should have forced Netanyahu to make at least a symbolic concession to the Palestinians before agreeing to host him. Others shrugged it off as a small step forward from the 2008 visit by Tzipi Livni, then Israel’s foreign minister. One official from the United Arab Emirates grumbled good-naturedly that Netanyahu’s Muscat trip overshadowed a visit to Abu Dhabi by Israel’s culture minister, Miri Regev. “The Omanis have stolen our thunder,” he joked.

Among the non-Arab delegates, the consensus was that the visit was a welcome development, part of what David Petraeus, former head of U.S. Central Command and director of the CIA, described as a “general realignment” in a region where the perceived threat from Iran is changing some

Arab perceptions of Israel. (Iran, not represented in Manama, condemned the visit as an attempt to “create rifts among the Islamic countries.”)

Opinion is mixed on whether the visit will actually move the needle on Middle East peace; the Omani minister said he expected the U.S. to do the heavy lifting, citing the Trump administration’s promise of a “deal of the century.” But there seemed to be a general consensus that Netanyahu’s trip marked a return to the Arab centerstage for Oman.

As Petraeus told me, “The Sultan’s put himself back in the mix.”

The sultanate has been sidelined by a series of events in recent years, from President Donald Trump’s rescinding of the Iran nuclear deal (Oman had been a go-between for early negotiations between Barack Obama’s administration and the regime in Tehran), to the Saudi-led war in Yemen (Oman refused to join the coalition). The sultan, who has ruled since 1970, is thought to be gravely ill, leading to speculation about paralyzing succession intrigues.

The Omani economy has weakened, shrinking for the first time in 2017. As a result, Oman has been notably absent from discussions of Arab affairs, recently dominated by two crown princes, Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia and Mohammed bin Zayed of the U.A.E., known as MBS and MBZ. But the welcome given to Netanyahu is a timely reminder that Qaboos has a seat at the high table, where he has often played a subtler game than the young princes, keeping his country outside the Gulf Arab consensus. He maintains con-

tact with Iran, as Netanyahu is surely aware. And he continues to do business with Qatar, defying the blockade imposed on the tiny emirate by Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Bahrain and some other Arab nations.

When time comes to end the embargo, MBS and MBZ may well need Qaboos to play the go-between. Because Oman also remains in contact with the Houthi rebels in Yemen, the sultan could be a key figure in any future deal to end the quagmire the crown princes have created for themselves there.

Qaboos is, as Petraeus put it, “in the mix” of some of the region’s key power plays. If the Arab elite had forgotten that, Netanyahu just jogged their collective memory. ©Bloomberg Reprinted with permission

The Economist 1 November 2018

America turns the screws on Iran Just in time for Halloween, the waters around China are filling with ghosts.

The Dino I, a Panama-flagged tanker, disappeared on October 13th outside Dalian, a big oil terminal. When it switched its transponder back on days later it was near Taiwan—and riding higher on the water. Its cargo, millions of tonnes of Iranian oil, had been discharged in secret. The tanker is now sailing for Kharg Island, where Iran’s state oil company has a filling station. At least half a dozen other

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“ghost tankers” have plied the same route this autumn.

Iran thought it was finished with such chicanery. The deal it signed with six world powers in 2015 lifted most economic sanctions in exchange for strict limits on its nuclear programme.

The Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, promised his people a flood of new investment and jobs. Instead they got Donald Trump, who calls the nuclear pact the “worst deal ever”. (Confusingly, it is not the only deal to which he attaches this label.) He withdrew America from it in May and reimposed some sanctions in August. On November 4th he will put sanctions on Iran’s all-important oil industry.

The last time America did this, Iran’s exports tumbled from 2.5m barrels per day (bpd) in 2011 to 1.1m bpd three years later. No one knows how far they will fall this time. They have already dropped by about a third since their peak in April of 2.8m bpd. South Korea and Japan stopped buying Iranian oil. India reduced its imports. China is harder to gauge, in part because vessels like the Dino I hide themselves.

Other tankers have moved millions of barrels into storage to await future buyers. Iran may lure them by offering it at a discount.

By year’s end, though, Iranian oil sales will be at least 1m bpd below their peak. Oil accounts for almost 70% of its exports and half of government revenue.

The economy is already weak. Inflation climbed to 15.9% last month. The rial trades, unofficially, at around 150,000 to the dollar, down from 40,000 a year

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ago. Strikes and protests break out daily.

Truckers walked off the job in September to complain about rising costs. Teachers staged a sit-in weeks later.

Despite the economic turmoil, Iran has not restarted its nuclear work. Instead it has appealed to Europe, hoping that the deal’s other parties will help it bypass the sanctions. In August the European Union enacted a “blocking regulation” that prohibits European firms from complying with them. eu leaders have also mooted creating a clearinghouse to handle trade with Iran denominated in euros. This would allow firms to bypass American banks, and thus American sanctions.

These efforts sound good in theory.

But Iran should not expect them to work. European firms will ignore the blocking regulation. Total has already pulled out of a deal to develop Iran’s main gasfield. Airbus will not deliver scores of passenger jets. The threat of losing access to American markets and the American financial system is too great. No eu member state is yet willing to host the proposed clearing-house.

And Iran should not overestimate the support it enjoys in Europe. Federica Mogherini, the eu foreign-policy chief who championed the nuclear deal, will leave office next year. Danish officials have called for sanctions over an alleged plot to assassinate an Iranian dissident in Denmark.

South Korea and Japan, among others, want American waivers to keep buying at least some Iranian oil. Hawks in Washington want to pre-empt this by forcing Iran out of the Society for

Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (swift), the nerve centre of the global financial system. If it loses access, as it did in 2012, buyers would have to barter for Iranian oil or pay in cash. Its biggest customer, China, is happy to do this. During the last round of sanctions it swapped Geely cars and other consumer goods for oil. Disconnecting Iran from swift will mostly hurt ordinary Iranians by making legitimate trade harder.

Mr Trump will not drive Iran’s oil exports down to zero, as he hopes. But he will inflict pain. The question is what he hopes to achieve; sanctions are a tool, not a strategy. Barack Obama made clear that he wanted a nuclear deal. Critics argue that his focus was too narrow.

Mr Trump has the opposite problem.

His secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, has a wishlist for any future agreement. It asks Iran not only to halt its nuclear programme, but also to stop testing ballistic missiles, withdraw its troops from Syria and abandon regional proxies, such as Lebanon’s Hizbullah.

Taken together this amounts to asking Iran to change its entire security

doctrine of backing Shia militias. The Islamic Republic has maintained that posture despite decades of economic pain. It has little incentive to compromise with a president it sees as bent on regime change.

At the Manama Dialogue, an annual security pow-wow in Bahrain, officials were enthusiastic about this maximalist approach. “Iran is contained,” says Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi foreign minister. Outside the ballrooms of the RitzCarlton, however, the picture looks different. Iranian forces have helped Bashar al-Assad to win Syria’s civil war.

Iranian-backed Houthi rebels continue to torment Saudi Arabia and its allies in Yemen. Hizbullah is poised to gain influence in Lebanon’s next government.

Mr Trump is convinced he can make a better deal than his predecessor. But with whom? He has discredited Mr Rouhani, who will leave office in 2021.

If Iran is still under crippling sanctions, a hardliner may replace him. And if the oil pumps are still off, the centrifuges may come back on. ©The Economist Reprinted with permission

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Selected IISS publications

Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, the Institute’s bimonthly journal, is a leading forum for analysis and debate of international and strategic affairs. Recent articles of interest include: Simon, Steven, ‘The Arabian Prince’, Survival, vol. 61, no. 1, February– March 2019, pp. 75–84.

Therme, Clément, ‘Post-withdrawal Iran’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 6, December 2018–January 2019, pp.

231–240.

Jones, Seth G., ‘Al-Qaeda’s Quagmire in Syria’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 5, October– November 2018, pp. 181–198.

Byman, Daniel, ‘Yemen’s Disastrous War’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 5, October– November 2018, pp. 141–158.

Wrong, Michaela, ‘Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Perils of Reform’, Survival, vol.

60, no. 5, October–November 2018, pp. 49–57.

Dodge, Toby, ‘Iraq: A Year of Living Dangerously’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 5, October–November 2018, pp. 41–48.

Rouhani, Mahsa, ‘US–Iran Tensions and the Oil Factor’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 5, October–November 2018, pp. 33–40.

Greene, Toby and Jonathan Rynhold, ‘Europe and Israel: Between Conflict and Cooperation’, Survival, vol. 60, no.

4, August–September 2018, pp. 91–112.

Simon, Steven, ‘Iran and President Trump: What is the Endgame?’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 4, August– September 2018, pp. 7–20.

‘Iran Disillusioned’, Survival, vol. 60, no.

2, April–May 2018, pp. 231–236.

Mendelsohn, Barak, ‘The Future of alQaeda: Lessons from the Muslim Brotherhood’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 2, April–May 2018, pp. 151–178.

Ahmadian, Hassan, ‘Iran and Saudi Arabia in the new Age of Trump’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 2, April–May 2018, pp. 133–150.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, ‘Iran’s Protests and the Fate of the Nuclear Deal’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 1, February– March 2018, pp. 69–74.

Marteu, Elisabeth, ‘Israel and the Jihadi Threat’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 1, February–March 2018, pp. 85–106.

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Byman, Daniel, ‘Confronting Iran’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 1, February– March 2018, pp. 107–28.

Brands, Hal and Peter Feaver, ‘Was the Rise of ISIS Inevitable?’, Survival, vol.

59, no. 3, June–July 2017, pp. 7–54.

Lahoud, Nelly and Jonathan Pieslak, ‘Music of the Islamic State’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 1, February–March 2018, pp. 153–68.

Dobbins, Janes and Seth G. Jones, ‘The End of a Caliphate’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 3, June–July 2017, pp. 55–72.

Lahoud, Nelly, ‘How Will the Islamic State Endure?’, Survival, vol. 59, no.

6, December 2017–January 2018, pp. 55–57.

Lewis, Jeffrey and Bruno Tertrais, ‘The Thick Red Line: Implications of the 2013 Chemical-Weapons Crisis for Deterrence and Transatlantic Relations’, Survival, vol. 59, no.

6, December 2017–January 2018, pp. 77–108.

Posch, Walter, ‘Ideology and Strategy in the Middle East: The Case of Iran’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 5, October– November 2017, pp. 69–98.

Friedman Lissner, Rebecca, ‘Nuclear Legacies of the First Gulf War’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 5, October– November 2017, pp. 143–56.

Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry, ‘Realism, Liberalism and the Iraq War’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 4, August– September 2017, pp. 7–26.

Arsenault, Elizabeth Grimm, ‘US Detention Policy Towards ISIS: Between a Rock and a Hard Place’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 4, August– September 2017, pp. 109–34.

Freilich, Charles D. ‘Chuck’, ‘Can Israel Survive Without America?’ Survival, vol. 59, no. 4, August–September 2017, pp. 135–50.

Ben Israel, Isaac and Deganit Paikowsky, ‘The Iron Wall Logic of Israel’s Space Programme’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 4, August–September 2017, pp. 151–66.

Simon, Steven, ‘Rollback?’, Survival, vol.

59, no. 4, August–September 2017, pp. 209–12.

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Carter, Ash, ‘The Logic of American Strategy in the Middle East’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 2, April–May 2017, pp. 13–24.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, ‘An Order of Priorities in Confronting Iran’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 2, April–May 2017, pp. 25–29.

Lacher, Wolfram, ‘Was Libya’s Collapse Predictable?’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 2, April–May 2017, pp. 139–52.

Hannay, David and Thomas R. Pickering, ‘Building on the Iran Nuclear Agreement’, Survival, vol.

59, no. 2, April–May 2017, pp. 153–66.

Rafati, Naysan, ‘Iran’s Revolutionary Guards: Readying Strength’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 2, April–May 2017, pp. 167–76.

Lahoud, Nelly, ‘Can Women Be Soldiers of the Islamic State?’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 1, February–March 2017, pp. 61–78.

Hokayem, Emile and David B. Roberts, ‘The War in Yemen’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 6, December 2016–January 2017, pp. 157–86.

Mousavian, Seyed Hossein, ‘EU–Iran Relations After Brexit’, Survival, vol.

58, no. 5, October–November 2016, pp. 83–94.

Hecht, Eado and Eitan Shamir, ‘The Case for Israeli Ground Forces’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 5, October–November 2016, pp. 123–48.

Chivvis, Christopher S., ‘Countering the Islamic State in Libya’, Survival, vol.

58, no. 4, August–September 2016, pp. 113–30.

Ahram, Ariel I. and Ellen Lust, ‘The Decline and Fall of the Arab State’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 2, April–May 2016, pp. 7–34.

Larrabee, F. Stephen, ‘Turkey and the Changing Dynamics of the Kurdish Issue’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 2, April– May 2016, pp. 67–73.

Gaub, Florence, ‘The Cult of ISIS’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 1, February– March 2016, pp. 113–30.

Fishman, Ben, ‘Defining ISIS’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 1, February–March 2016, pp. 179–88.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, ‘Iran: A Good Deal’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 5, October– November 2015, pp. 47–52.

Moore, Thomas C., ‘Iran: NonProliferation Overshadowed’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 5, October– November 2015, pp. 53–58.

Avis Bohlen, ‘Iran: An Opening for Diplomacy?’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 5, October–November 2015, pp. 59–66.

Tertrais, Bruno, ‘Iran: An Experiment in Strategic Risk-Taking’, Survival, vol.

57, no. 5, October–November 2015, pp. 67–73.

Hanna, Michael Wahid, and Dalia Dassa Kaye, ‘The Limits of Iranian Power’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 5, October– November 2015, pp. 173–98.

Fishman, Ben, ‘Could Libya’s Decline Have Been Predicted?’, Survival, vol.

57, no. 5, October–November 2015, pp. 199–208.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, ‘Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Nuclear Rumour Mill’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 4, August– September 2015, pp. 105–08.

Scheipers, Sibylle, ‘Auxiliaries at War in the Middle East’, Survival, vol. 57, no.

4, August–September 2015, pp. 121–38.

Fromson, James, and Steven Simon, ‘ISIS: The Dubious Paradise of Apocalypse Now’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 3, June–July 2015, pp. 7–56.

Ahram, Ariel I., ‘Sexual Violence and the Making of ISIS’, Survival, vol. 57, no.

3, June–July 2015, pp. 57–78.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, ‘Relief’, Survival, vol.

57, no. 3, June–July 2015, pp. 219–26.

Freilich, Charles D., ‘Why Can’t Israel Win Wars Any More?’, Survival, vol.

57, no. 2, April–May 2015, pp. 79–92.

Holbrook, Donald, ‘Al-Qaeda and the Rise of ISIS’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 2, April–May 2015, pp. 93–104.

Cheterian, Vicken, ‘ISIS and the Killing Fields of the Middle East’, Survival, vol.

57, no. 2, April–May 2015, pp. 105–18.

Fishman, Ben, ‘Jordan: Caught in the Middle Again’, Survival, vol. 56, no.

6, December 2014–January 2015, pp. 39–48.

Farwell, James P., ‘The Media Strategy of ISIS’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 6, December 2014–January 2015, pp. 49–55.

The Adelphi series of books is the Institute’s principal contribution to policy-relevant, original academic research.

Recent publications include: Fitzpatrick, Mark, Michael Elleman and Paulina Izewicz, Uncertain Future: The JCPOA and Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programmes, Adelphi 466–467, Routledge for the IISS, 2019.

Barry, Ben, Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Chancing Character of War, Adelphi 461, Routledge for the IISS, 2016.

Puri, Samir, Fighting and Negotiating with Armed Groups, Adelphi 459, Routledge for the IISS, 2016.

Hokayem, Emile and Taha, Hebatalla (eds), Egypt After the Spring: Revolt and Reaction, Adelphi 453–4, Routledge for the IISS, 2016.

Fishman, Ben (ed.), North Africa in Transition: The Struggle for Democracies and Institutions, Adelphi 452, Routledge for the IISS, 2015.

Dodge, Toby and Emile Hokayem, Middle Eastern Security, the US Pivot and the Rise of ISIS, Adelphi 447–8, Routledge for the IISS, 2014.

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Hokayem, Emile, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant, Adelphi 438, Routledge for the IISS, 2013.

Dodge, Toby, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism, Adelphi 434–5, Routledge for the IISS, 2012.

Dodge, Toby and Nicholas Redman, Afghanistan to 2015 and Beyond, Adelphi 425–6, Routledge for the IISS, 2011.

Phillips, Sarah, Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, Adelphi 420, Routledge for the IISS, 2011.

Berdal, Mats and Achim Wennmann, Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace: Economic Perspectives, Adelphi 412–3, Routledge for the IISS, 2010.

Hashim, Ahmed S., Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency, Adelphi Paper 402, Routledge for the IISS, 2009.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding Worst-Case Outcomes, Adelphi Paper 398, Routledge for the IISS, 2008.

Perkovich, George and James M. Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, Adelphi Paper 396, Routledge for the IISS, 2008.

Kurth Cronin, Audrey, Ending Terrorism: Lessons for defeating alQaeda, Adelphi Paper 394, Routledge for the IISS, 2008.

The Strategic Dossier series harnesses the Institute’s technical expertise to present detailed information on key strategic issues.

Recent publications include: Missile-Defence Cooperation in the Gulf, IISS, 2016.

Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities: A Net Assessment, IISS, 2011.

Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, IISS, 2010.

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Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, IISS, 2008.

Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks: A Net Assessment, IISS, 2007.

Strategic Comments is the Institute’s online source of analysis of international security and politico-military issues. Recent articles of interest include: ‘The protests in Sudan’, Strategic Comments, vol. 25, no. 2 – January 2019.

‘The US withdrawal from Syria’, Strategic Comments, vol. 25, no. 1 – January 2019.

‘Muhammad bin Salman and the new Saudi Arabia’, Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 39 – December 2018.

‘Iran’s Eastern strategy’, Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 36 – November 2018.

‘Morocco’s Africa Policy’, Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 35 – November 2018.

‘The Caspian Sea Treaty’, Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 33 – November 2018.

‘Yemen’s debilitating war’, Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 32 – November 2018.

‘The US–Turkey rift’, Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 26 – August 2018.

‘Lebanon’s interlocking challenges’, Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 25 – August 2018.

‘Turkey’s new presidential system’, Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 23 – August 2018.

‘The UN’s election gamble in Libya’, Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 18 – June 2018.

‘Strategic rivalries around the Bab elMandeb Strait’, Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 16 – May 2018.

‘The future of the JCPOA’, Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 15 – May 2018.

‘Rising Israeli–Iranian tensions’, Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 11 – May 2018.

‘Trump’s Jerusalem move’, Strategic Comments, vol. 24, no. 4 – January 2018.

‘Humanitarian implications of armed conflicts in cities’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 42 – December 2017.

‘The repercussions of the Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 38 – November 2017.

‘Al-Qaeda’s evolution since 9/11’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 32 – September 2017.

‘Iran under Rouhani: increasing constraint’, Strategic Comments, vol.

23, no. 27 – August 2017.

‘High noon for Libya’s Potemkin government’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 26 – August 2017.

‘Trump’s erratic Middle East policy’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 23 – July 2017.

‘Social divisions and rising terrorist violence in Turkey’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 40 – January 2017.

‘The Islamic State and Southeast Asia’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 36 – November 2016.

‘The evolution of US–Israel relations’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 32 – October 2016.

‘The United States’ Syria quandary’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 30 – October 2016.

‘Libya’s faltering new government’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 27 – September 2016.

‘India and Pakistan’s evolving relationship with the Gulf’, Strategic Comments, vol.

22, no. 25 – September 2016.

‘Turkey: the attempted coup and its troubling aftermath’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 19 – July 2016.

‘Jordan’s pragmatism and current challenges’, Strategic Comments, vol.

22, no. 14 – June 2016.

‘Iraq’s political turmoil’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 13 – June 2016.

‘The Kurds’ precarious balancing act in Syria’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no.

15 – May 2017.

‘The tenuous diplomacy of the Syrian conflict’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 8 – April 2016.

‘The battle for Mosul’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 14 – May 2017.

‘Turkey’s diminishing policy options in Syria’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no.

7 – April 2016.

‘TLAMs in Syria’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 10 – April 2017.

‘Shia militias in Iraq’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 9 – March 2017.

‘US–Israel relations under Trump’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 8 – March 2017.

‘The urban refugee crisis’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 7 – March 2017.

‘The future of US Syria policy’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 4 – February 2017.

‘The percolating proxy war in Yemen’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 2 – February 2017.

‘After Brussels: understanding and countering ISIS’s strategy’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 6 – March 2016.

‘US–Saudi relations: between friction and accommodation’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 4 – March 2016.

‘Confronting failed government and the Islamic State in Libya’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 1 – February 2016.

‘Turkey’s growing security concerns’, Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 27 – October 2015.

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‘Libya’s fragmented conflict resists solutions’, Strategic Comments, vol.

21, no. 22 – September 2015.

‘Rouhani’s re-election and Iran’s regional relations’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. 180–84.

‘Iran’s nuclear agreement: the terms’, Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 19 – July 2015.

‘Saudi Arabia’s new leadership and the Qatar crisis’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. 184–88.

‘Iraqi Kurdistan: the essential briefing’, Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 7 – March 2015.

‘War in Libya and Yemen’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. 188–92.

‘Iran nuclear talks approach conclusive deadline’, Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 4 – February 2015.

‘Libya’s civil war: the essential briefing’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 50 – February 2015.

Strategic Survey is the Institute’s annual review – and, to a lesser degree, projection – of strategic developments throughout the world.

Recent sections of interest include: ‘The Maghreb’s Strategic Myopia’, Strategic Survey 2018, pp. 234–243.

‘Yemen: The Broken Country’, Strategic Survey 2018, pp. 226–234.

‘Iran and the JCPOA’, Strategic Survey 2018, pp. 218–226.

‘Muhammad bin Salman and the Remaking of Saudi Arabia’, Strategic Survey 2018, pp. 211–218.

‘Iran’s growing role in the Middle East and Southwest Asia’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. VI–VII. ‘Constitutional change and conflict in Turkey’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp.

XVI–XVII. ‘Syria’s civil war’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. 170–72.

‘Decline of the ISIS caliphate’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. 172–75.

‘Iraq’s disorder and divisions’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. 175–77.

‘Turkey’s descent into authoritarianism’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. 177–80.

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‘Israel’s regional outreach’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. 192–95.

‘The evolving threat of ISIS’, Strategic Survey 2016, pp. XII–XIII. ‘Syria’, Strategic Survey 2016, pp. 159–63.

‘Iraq’, Strategic Survey 2016, pp. 163–66.

‘ISIS’, Strategic Survey 2016, pp. 167–72.

‘The Saudi–Iranian rivalry’, Strategic Survey 2016, pp. 172–78.

‘Iran after the nuclear deal’, Strategic Survey 2016, pp. 178–84.

‘Yemen’, Strategic Survey 2016, pp. 184–88.

‘Turkey’, Strategic Survey 2016, pp. 189–98.

‘Syria: New Rebel Alliances’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 192–202.

‘Iraq: Battling ISIS’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 203–10.

‘ISIS: Widening Impact’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 211–13.

‘Jordan: Struggle to Preserve Stability’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 213–15.

‘Lebanon: Burden of Syrian War’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 215–16.

‘Israel and Palestine: Hardline Politics and Resurgent Violence’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 217–22.

‘Iran: Nuclear Agreement Reached’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 223–35.

‘Saudi Arabia: Succession amid Regional Crises’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp.

235–40.

‘Gulf States: Tentative Integration’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 241–45.

‘Yemen: From Political Transition to Civil War’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp.

245–51.

‘Egypt: New Political Order’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 252–7.

‘Maghreb: Differing Political Trajectories’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 257–61.

The Military Balance is the Institute’s annual assessment of military capabilities and defence economics worldwide. Region-byregion analyses cover the major military and economic trends and

developments affecting security policy and the trade in weapons and other military equipment.

Comprehensive tables portray key data on weapons and defence economics.

Defence-expenditure trends over a ten-year period are also shown.

The Military Balance 2019. Routledge for the IISS, February 2019.

Selected IISS publications

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14TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 26–28 OCTOBER 2018

The IISS Manama Dialogue The 14th Regional Security Summit: The IISS Manama Dialogue was held in the Kingdom of Bahrain in October 2018, 13 years after the inaugural Summit. The Dialogue brought together the national-security establishments of key regional actors including Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; other regional countries including Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Yemen; and important outside powers: the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, India, Pakistan, China, Japan, Singapore and Australia. The Manama Dialogue was convened by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), with the support of the Kingdom of Bahrain. The IISS also convenes the annual Asia Security Summit: The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, bringing together in Singapore defence ministers, chiefs of defence staff, national-security advisers and other senior officials from countries that are members of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The IISS, a registered charity with offices in London, Washington, Bahrain and Singapore, is the world’s leading authority on political-military conflict. It is the primary independent source of accurate, objective information on international strategic issues. Publications include The Military Balance,

14 ‫قمة األمن اإلقليمي‬ 2018 ‫ أكتوبر‬28-26 ،‫مملكة البحرين‬

‫حوار المنامة‬

.2018 ‫ في مملكة البحرين في أكتوبر‬IISS ‫ حوار المنامة‬:‫انعقدت قمة األمن اإلقليمي الرابعة عشرة‬ ‫ جمع الحوار مؤسسات األمن الوطني من دول فاعلة إقليميا شملت‬،‫ عاما ً من القمة االفتتاحية‬13 ‫بعد‬ ‫ ودول إقليمية أخرى‬،‫مملكة البحرين وسلطنة عمان والمملكة العربية السعودية واإلمارات العربية المتحدة‬ ‫ الواليات المتحدة‬:‫ تمثلت في‬،‫ وقوى خارجية مهمة‬،‫من ضمنها مصر والعراق واألردن وتركيا واليمن‬ ‫والمملكة المتحدة وكندا وفرنسا وألمانيا وإيطاليا وهولندا وروسيا والهند وباكستان والصين واليابان‬ ‫ حوار المنامة بدعم من مملكة‬IISS ‫ ينظم المعهد الدولي للدراسات االستراتيجية‬.‫وسنغافورة وأستراليا‬ ‫ حيث يجتمع سنويا‬،‫ حوار شانغريال في سنغافورة‬:‫ ينظم المعهد كذلك قمة األمن اآلسيوي‬.‫البحرين‬ ‫وزراء الدفاع وقادة األركان ومستشارو األمن الوطني ومسؤولون كبار آخرون من الدول األعضاء في‬ ‫ وله‬،‫ مسجل كهيئة خيرية لألبحاث‬IISS ‫ المعهد الدولي للدراسات االستراتيجية‬.‫منتدى آسيان اإلقليمي‬ ‫ يعد المعهد المصدر المستقل األبرز للمعلومات الدقيقة‬.‫مكاتب في لندن و واشنطن والبحرين وسنغافورة‬ ،‫ تشمل إصدارات المعهد تقرير التوازن العسكري‬.‫والموضوعية حول القضايا االستراتيجية الدولية‬ ‫ وهو مراجعة‬،‫وهو عمل مرجعي سنوي يتناول القدرات الدفاعية لكل دولة؛ وتقرير المسح االستراتيجي‬ ‫ وتصدر كل شهرين متناولة‬،‫ السياسات العالمية واالستراتيجية‬:‫ ودورية سرفايفل‬،‫سنوية للشؤون العالمية‬ ‫ وهي سلسلة تحليالت شهرية لقضايا الساعة في الشؤون‬،‫الشؤون الدولية؛ و التعليقات االستراتيجية‬ .‫الدولية؛ وسلسلة كتب أديلفي التي تتناول القضايا االستراتيجية المرتبطة بالسياسات‬

an annual reference work on each nation’s defence capabilities; Strategic Survey, an annual review of world affairs; Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, a bimonthly journal on international affairs; Armed Conflict Survey, an annual digest of the political, military and humanitarian dimensions of all major armed conflicts; Strategic Comments, a weekly analysis of topical issues in international affairs; and the Adelphi books series on policy-relevant strategic issues.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London |

wc2r 2pg

The International Institute for Strategic Studies | UK

Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London |

wc2r 2pg

| UK

t. +44 (0) 20 7379 7676 f. +44 (0) 20 7836 3108 e. iiss@iiss.org w. www.iiss.org

t. +44 (0) 20 7379 7676 f. +44 (0) 20 7836 3108 e. iiss@iiss.org w. www.iiss.org

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Asia

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Asia

9 Raffles Place | #51-01 Republic Plaza | Singapore 048619

9 Raffles Place | #51-01 Republic Plaza | Singapore 048619

t. +65 6499 0055 f. +65 6499 0059 e. iiss-asia@iiss.org

t. +65 6499 0055 f. +65 6499 0059 e. iiss-asia@iiss.org

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Middle East

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Middle East

14th floor, GBCORP Tower | Bahrain Financial Harbour | Manama | Kingdom of Bahrain

14th floor, GBCORP Tower | Bahrain Financial Harbour | Manama | Kingdom of Bahrain

t. +973 1718 1155 f. +973 1710 0155 e. iiss-middleeast@iiss.org

t. +973 1718 1155 f. +973 1710 0155 e. iiss-middleeast@iiss.org

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Americas

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Americas

2121 K Street, NW | Suite 801 | Washington, DC 20037 | USA

2121 K Street, NW | Suite 801 | Washington, DC 20037 | USA

t. +1 202 659 1490 f. +1 202 659 1499 e. iiss-americas@iiss.org

t. +1 202 659 1490 f. +1 202 659 1499 e. iiss-americas@iiss.org

14TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 26–28 OCTOBER 2018

The IISS Manama Dialogue The 14th Regional Security Summit: The IISS Manama Dialogue was held in the Kingdom of Bahrain in October 2018, 13 years after the inaugural Summit. The Dialogue brought together the national-security establishments of key regional actors including Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; other regional countries including Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Yemen; and important outside powers: the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, India, Pakistan, China, Japan, Singapore and Australia. The Manama Dialogue was convened by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), with the support of the Kingdom of Bahrain. The IISS also convenes the annual Asia Security Summit: The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, bringing together in Singapore defence ministers, chiefs of defence staff, national-security advisers and other senior officials from countries that are members of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The IISS, a registered charity with offices in London, Washington, Bahrain and Singapore, is the world’s leading authority on political-military conflict. It is the primary independent source of accurate, objective information on international strategic issues. Publications include The Military Balance,

14 ‫قمة األمن اإلقليمي‬ 2018 ‫ أكتوبر‬28-26 ،‫مملكة البحرين‬

‫حوار المنامة‬

.2018 ‫ في مملكة البحرين في أكتوبر‬IISS ‫ حوار المنامة‬:‫انعقدت قمة األمن اإلقليمي الرابعة عشرة‬ ‫ جمع الحوار مؤسسات األمن الوطني من دول فاعلة إقليميا شملت‬،‫ عاما ً من القمة االفتتاحية‬13 ‫بعد‬ ‫ ودول إقليمية أخرى‬،‫مملكة البحرين وسلطنة عمان والمملكة العربية السعودية واإلمارات العربية المتحدة‬ ‫ الواليات المتحدة‬:‫ تمثلت في‬،‫ وقوى خارجية مهمة‬،‫من ضمنها مصر والعراق واألردن وتركيا واليمن‬ ‫والمملكة المتحدة وكندا وفرنسا وألمانيا وإيطاليا وهولندا وروسيا والهند وباكستان والصين واليابان‬ ‫ حوار المنامة بدعم من مملكة‬IISS ‫ ينظم المعهد الدولي للدراسات االستراتيجية‬.‫وسنغافورة وأستراليا‬ ‫ حيث يجتمع سنويا‬،‫ حوار شانغريال في سنغافورة‬:‫ ينظم المعهد كذلك قمة األمن اآلسيوي‬.‫البحرين‬ ‫وزراء الدفاع وقادة األركان ومستشارو األمن الوطني ومسؤولون كبار آخرون من الدول األعضاء في‬ ‫ وله‬،‫ مسجل كهيئة خيرية لألبحاث‬IISS ‫ المعهد الدولي للدراسات االستراتيجية‬.‫منتدى آسيان اإلقليمي‬ ‫ يعد المعهد المصدر المستقل األبرز للمعلومات الدقيقة‬.‫مكاتب في لندن و واشنطن والبحرين وسنغافورة‬ ،‫ تشمل إصدارات المعهد تقرير التوازن العسكري‬.‫والموضوعية حول القضايا االستراتيجية الدولية‬ ‫ وهو مراجعة‬،‫وهو عمل مرجعي سنوي يتناول القدرات الدفاعية لكل دولة؛ وتقرير المسح االستراتيجي‬ ‫ وتصدر كل شهرين متناولة‬،‫ السياسات العالمية واالستراتيجية‬:‫ ودورية سرفايفل‬،‫سنوية للشؤون العالمية‬ ‫ وهي سلسلة تحليالت شهرية لقضايا الساعة في الشؤون‬،‫الشؤون الدولية؛ و التعليقات االستراتيجية‬ .‫الدولية؛ وسلسلة كتب أديلفي التي تتناول القضايا االستراتيجية المرتبطة بالسياسات‬

an annual reference work on each nation’s defence capabilities; Strategic Survey, an annual review of world affairs; Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, a bimonthly journal on international affairs; Armed Conflict Survey, an annual digest of the political, military and humanitarian dimensions of all major armed conflicts; Strategic Comments, a weekly analysis of topical issues in international affairs; and the Adelphi books series on policy-relevant strategic issues.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London |

wc2r 2pg

The International Institute for Strategic Studies | UK

Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London |

wc2r 2pg

| UK

t. +44 (0) 20 7379 7676 f. +44 (0) 20 7836 3108 e. iiss@iiss.org w. www.iiss.org

t. +44 (0) 20 7379 7676 f. +44 (0) 20 7836 3108 e. iiss@iiss.org w. www.iiss.org

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Asia

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Asia

9 Raffles Place | #51-01 Republic Plaza | Singapore 048619

9 Raffles Place | #51-01 Republic Plaza | Singapore 048619

t. +65 6499 0055 f. +65 6499 0059 e. iiss-asia@iiss.org

t. +65 6499 0055 f. +65 6499 0059 e. iiss-asia@iiss.org

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Middle East

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Middle East

14th floor, GBCORP Tower | Bahrain Financial Harbour | Manama | Kingdom of Bahrain

14th floor, GBCORP Tower | Bahrain Financial Harbour | Manama | Kingdom of Bahrain

t. +973 1718 1155 f. +973 1710 0155 e. iiss-middleeast@iiss.org

t. +973 1718 1155 f. +973 1710 0155 e. iiss-middleeast@iiss.org

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Americas

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Americas

2121 K Street, NW | Suite 801 | Washington, DC 20037 | USA

2121 K Street, NW | Suite 801 | Washington, DC 20037 | USA

t. +1 202 659 1490 f. +1 202 659 1499 e. iiss-americas@iiss.org

t. +1 202 659 1490 f. +1 202 659 1499 e. iiss-americas@iiss.org

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﺗﺭﺍﻣﺏ ﻟﺩﻳﻬﺎ ”ﺍﻟﻘﻠﻳﻝ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺷﻬﻳﺔ ‪ ...‬ﻟﻣﺯﻳﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻻﻟﺗﺯﺍﻡ ﺗﺟﺎﻩ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ“ ﻭﺯﻳﺎﺩﺓ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺭﻗﺎﺑﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻧﺎﻓﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻯ ﺍﻟﻌﻅﻣﻰ‪ ،‬ﺍﻷﻣﺭ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ‬ ‫ﺳﻳﺣﻭﻝ ﺍﻻﻫﺗﻣﺎﻡ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻲ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻣﻧﺎﻁﻖ ﺃﺧﺭﻯ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻠﺕ ﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﺗﻡ ﻁﺭﺡ ﻣﺳﺎﺋﻝ ﻛﺛﻳﺭﺓ ﺷﻌﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﻓﺩﻭﻥ ﺑﺄﻧﻪ‬ ‫ﻟﻡ ﻳﺗﻡ ﺍﻟﺗﻁﺭﻕ ﺇﻟﻳﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﻛﻛﻝ ﻭﻓﻲ ﺃﺛﻧﺎء ﺟﻠﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺛﻳﻥ‪ .‬ﻣﻧﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫ﺳﺑﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺛﺎﻝ‪ ،‬ﺩﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﺻﻭﻣﺎﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﻘﺎﺭﺏ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺇﺛﻳﻭﺑﻳﺎ ﻭﺇﺭﻳﺗﺭﻳﺎ‪ .‬ﻛﻣﺎ ﺍﺳﺗﻔﺎﺩﻭﺍ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﻣﺟﺎﻻﺕ ﺧﺑﺭﺓ ﺃﻋﺿﺎء ﻓﺭﻳﻖ ﺍﻟﻧﻘﺎﺵ ﻻﻛﺗﺳﺎﺏ ﻓﻬﻡ ﻋﻣﻳﻖ ﻟﻠﻌﺩﻳﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﻘﻳﺩﺍﺕ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﻋﻼﻗﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻡ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻊ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﻳﻑ ﻳﻧﺑﻐﻲ ﺇﺷﺭﺍﻙ ﺍﻟﺟﻬﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻭﻁﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﺔ‪ ،‬ﺃﻭ ﺗﻭﻗﻊ ﺗﺻﺭﻓﺎﺗﻬﺎ ﺃﻭ ﻣﺳﺎﻋﺩﺗﻬﺎ؟ ﺳﺋﻝ ﺟﻭﺭﺩﻭﻥ ﻋﻥ ﺭﻏﺑﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻹﻋﻣﺎﺭ ﺑﻌﺩ ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ ﻓﻲ ﻟﻳﺑﻳﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ ﻭﺃﻣﺎﻛﻥ ﺃﺧﺭﻯ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺩ‬ ‫ﺃﺟﺎﺏ‪:‬‬ ‫ﺃﻋﺗﻘﺩ ﺃﻥ ﺭﻏﺑﺔ ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻹﻋﻣﺎﺭ ﺑﻌﺩ ﺍﻟﺣﺭﺏ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ‬ ‫ﺳﺗﻛﻭﻥ ﻗﻭﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻐﺎﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻟﻘﺩ ﻗﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻧﻳﻭﻥ ﺑﺎﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎﺭ ﻛﺑﻳﺭ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺟﺯء ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻡ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻭﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺇﺛﻳﻭﺑﻳﺎ‪ .‬ﺇﻧﻬﻡ ﻗﻠﻘﻭﻥ ﻟﻠﻐﺎﻳﺔ ﻣﻥ ﻣﻌﺎﻭﺩﺓ ﻅﻬﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﺗﻁﺭﻑ ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻣﻲ‬ ‫ﻛﻘﻭﺓ ﺷﺩﻳﺩﺓ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺭﺩﺍ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺳﺅﺍﻝ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺟﻧﺭﺍﻝ )ﻣﺗﻘﺎﻋﺩ( ﺩﻳﻔﻳﺩ ﺑﺗﺭﺍﻳﻭﺱ ﺣﻭﻝ ﺁﻓﺎﻕ ﺍﻟﻣﺻﺎﻟﺣﺔ‬ ‫ﺑﻳﻥ ﻗﻁﺭ ﻭﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻹﻣﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﻝ ﺑﻳﻛﻳﺕ‪:‬‬ ‫ﻣﺛﻠﻣﺎ ﺃﺧﺑﺭﻧﻲ ﺃﺣﺩ ﻛﺑﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺩﺓ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪” :‬ﺗﺫﻛﺭ ﺗﻭﻡ‪ ،‬ﺃﻭﻻ ﻭﻗﺑﻝ ﻛﻝ ﺷﻲء‬ ‫ﺗﺟﺩ ﺍﻟﻘﺑﻳﻠﺔ‪ ،‬ﺛﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﺛﻡ ﺍﻷﻣﺔ“‪ .‬ﺃﻋﺗﻘﺩ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﺿﺎﻳﺎ ﺍﻟﻣﺣﻠﻳﺔ ﺳﻭﻑ ﻳﺗﻡ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣﻝ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﺃﻭﻻ‪ .‬ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ﺷﻛﻭﻯ ﻣﺣﻠﻳﺔ ﻋﻣﻳﻘﺔ ﺳﻳﺗﻡ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣﻝ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﻭﺣﻳﺩﺓ‬ ‫ﻟﻠﺗﻌﺎﻣﻝ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺭﻳﺎﺽ ‪ ...‬ﻗﺑﻝ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺻﺑﺢ ﺇﻗﻠﻳﻣﻳﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺳﺋﻠﺕ ﺷﺎﻛﻲ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ‪ ،‬ﻓﺄﺷﺎﺭﺕ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻠﻲ‪:‬‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ﻟﻡ ﺗﻌﺩ ﺍﻟﺗﻐﻁﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﻋﻼﻣﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻳﻣﻥ ﻣﺭﻛﺯﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻧﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺣﻭﺛﻲ ﻭﺯﻋﺯﻋﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ ‪ ...‬ﻭﻫﻲ ﺗﺭﻛﺯ ﺍﻵﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺇﻣﻛﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﺣﺩﻭﺙ ﺃﻛﺑﺭ‬ ‫ﻛﺎﺭﺛﺔ ﺇﻧﺳﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻡ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺫﺍ ﻳﺟﻌﻝ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺻﻌﺏ ﺍﻟﺣﻔﺎﻅ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﻝ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﺿﻭﺡ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﺧﻼﻗﻲ ﻭﺟﻬﻭﺩ ﻭﺩﻋﻡ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻹﻣﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ – ﻭﺳﻳﺯﺩﺍﺩ ﺍﻟﺣﺩﻳﺙ ﺣﺗﻣﺎ ﻋﻥ ﺟﺭﻳﻣﺔ ﻗﺗﻝ ﺧﺎﺷﻘﺟﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺧﻁﺎﺏ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻲ‪.‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭﺓ ﻛﻭﺭﻱ ﺷﺎﻛﻲ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻧﺎﺋﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ‪IISS ،‬‬

‫ﻣﻳﺅﻭﺱ ﻣﻧﻪ ‪ -‬ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺭﻏﻡ ﻣﻥ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻗﺩ ﺃﺷﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ”ﺧﺭﺟﺕ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﻔﺭﺓ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﻭﻗﻌﺕ ﻓﻳﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ ﻣﻥ ﺧﻼﻝ ﺗﺷﻛﻳﻝ ﺗﺣﺎﻟﻑ ﻣﻊ ﺭﻭﺳﻳﺎ“‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺩ ﺗﻛﻭﻥ‬ ‫ﻗﺎﺩﺭﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻘﻳﺎﻡ ﺑﺫﻟﻙ ﻣﺭﺓ ﺃﺧﺭﻯ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺗﺣﺩﺛﺕ ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭﺓ ﻛﻭﺭﻱ ﺷﺎﻛﻲ‪ ،‬ﻧﺎﺋﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻟﻠﻣﻌﻬﺩ‪ ،‬ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻐﻳﺭﺍﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺣﺩّﺕ ﻣﻥ ﻧﻁﺎﻕ ﺗﻁﻭﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺑﻳﺋﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﻧﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺣﺩﺩﺕ ﺃﺭﺑﻌﺔ ﺧﻳﺎﺭﺍﺕ‬ ‫ﺳﻳﺎﺳﻳﺔ ﻫﺎﻣﺔ‪ .‬ﺃﻭﻻ‪ ،‬ﺍﻧﺳﺣﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﻣﻥ ﺧﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺗﺭﻛﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ‪ ،‬ﺍﻷﻣﺭ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺃﺳﻌﺩ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻛﺎء ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻳﻳﻥ ﻭﻟﻛﻧﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻧﻔﺱ ﺍﻟﻭﻗﺕ ﺃﺛﺎﺭ ﺍﺳﺗﻳﺎء‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻛﺎء ﻣﻥ ﺧﺎﺭﺝ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻡ ﺍﻟﺫﻳﻥ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻟﻬﻡ ﺩﻭﺭ ﺣﺎﺳﻡ ﻓﻲ ﻧﺟﺎﺡ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻭﺑﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ‬ ‫ﺃﺩﺕ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺧﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺗﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ‪ .‬ﻭﺃﺷﺎﺭﺕ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺇﻳﺟﺎﺩ ﻣﺑﺭﺭﺍﺕ‬ ‫ﺃﻓﺿﻝ ﻟﻬﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻷﺳﺑﺎﺏ ﻏﻳﺭ ﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻷﺳﺑﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ ﻭﻳﺗﻳﺢ ﺑﺎﻟﺗﺎﻟﻲ‬ ‫”ﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺗﻭﺍﺯﻥ ﺣﻭﻝ ﺃﻭﻟﻭﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻹﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺑﻘﺔ“ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺟﻌﻠﺕ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‬ ‫ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﺗﻭﺍﺅﻣﺎ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻛﺎء ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻳﻳﻥ‪ .‬ﺛﺎﻧﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﻗﺭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﺑﻧﻘﻝ ﺳﻔﺎﺭﺗﻬﺎ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻘﺩﺱ‪ .‬ﺛﺎﻟﺛﺎ‪ ،‬ﺇﺣﻳﺎء ﺍﻟﻘﺿﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻧﺣﻭ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺃﻛﺩﺗﻪ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﺎﺕ ﺧﻼﻝ ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻻ ﺳﻳﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺧﻁﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺅﻭﻝ‬ ‫ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﻳﻭﺳﻑ ﺑﻥ ﻋﻠﻭﻱ ﺧﻼﻝ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻟﺛﺔ‪ .‬ﺭﺍﺑﻌﺎ‪ ،‬ﺭﺩ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻔﻌﻝ ﺍﻟﻐﺭﺑﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻱ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻘﺗﻝ ﺍﻟﺻﺣﻔﻲ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻱ ﺟﻣﺎﻝ ﺧﺎﺷﻘﺟﻲ‪ .‬ﻭﻫﺫﺍ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺷﺄﻧﻪ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻌﻘّﺩ ﺗﺣﺎﻟﻑ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻯ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻳﺔ ﺿﺩ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ‪ ،‬ﻷﻥ ﻓﺭﺽ ﻣﻔﻬﻭﻡ‬ ‫”ﺍﻟﻭﺿﻭﺡ ﺍﻷﺧﻼﻗﻲ“ ﺳﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﺻﻌﺑﺎ ﺑﺷﻛﻝ ﻏﻳﺭ ﻋﺎﺩﻱ‪ .‬ﻋﻼﻭﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﺗﺑﺩﻭ‬ ‫ﺍﺣﺗﻣﺎﻻﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺎﻟﻑ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻲ ﻟﻠﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﻗﺎﺗﻣﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺑﺎﻟﻧﻅﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺇﺩﺍﺭﺓ‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﺃﻛﺑﺭ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﻭﺑﺷﻛﻝ ﺃﻗﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻹﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺭﺷﻳﺩﺓ‪ .‬ﺍﺧﺗﺗﻣﺕ ﻛﻭﻣﻭﻟﻲ ﺑﻘﻭﻟﻬﺎ ﺃﻧﻪ‬ ‫ﺑﻳﻧﻣﺎ ﻗﺩ ﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻧﻬﺞ ﻣﻘﻠﻘﺎ‪ ،‬ﺇﻻ ﺃﻧﻪ‪:‬‬ ‫ﻓﻌﺎﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻯ ﺍﻟﻘﺻﻳﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻌﺯﻳﺯ ﺗﻁﺑﻳﻊ ﺍﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎﺕ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻓﺳﻳﻥ‪،‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﻔﺭﻳﻖ )ﻣﺗﻘﺎﻋﺩ( ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﺗﻭﻣﺎﺱ ﺑﻳﻛﻳﺕ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‪ IISS ،‬ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‬

‫ﻛﻣﺎ ﻫﻭ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺇﺛﻳﻭﺑﻳﺎ ﻭﺇﺭﻳﺗﺭﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺩ ﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﻟﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﺗﺄﺛﻳﺭ ﺳﻠﺑﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫ﺍﺣﺗﻣﺎﻻﺕ ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ ﻭﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻯ ﺍﻟﻁﻭﻳﻝ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻛﺎﻧﺕ ﺃﻭﻟﻭﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻛﺎء‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻟﺷﺭﻛﺎء ﺍﻷﺟﺎﻧﺏ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﺗﺗﻐﻳﺭ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺃﺷﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻔﺭﻳﻖ )ﻣﺗﻘﺎﻋﺩ( ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺭ ﺗﻭﻣﺎﺱ ﺑﻳﻛﻳﺕ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ ﻟﻔﺭﻉ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪ ،‬ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻗﺩ ﺗﻣﺕ ﻣﻭﺍﺟﻬﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻬﺩﻳﺩﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺳﻳﻳﻥ ﻟﻠﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ‪-‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻁﺭﻑ ﻭﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ‪ -‬ﻣﻥ ﺧﻼﻝ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺎﻟﻔﺎﺕ‪ .‬ﻭﺑﺎﻟﻧﺳﺑﺔ ﻟﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﺃﺷﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺣﺎﻟﻔﻳﻥ‬ ‫ﻣﻧﻔﺻﻠﻳﻥ ﻛﺎﻧﺎ ﻳﻌﻣﻼﻥ ﺿﺩ ﺗﻧﻅﻳﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻣﻳﺔ )ﺩﺍﻋﺵ( ﻓﻲ ﻧﻔﺱ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‬ ‫ﻭﻟﻛﻥ ﻣﻊ ﻣﻧﺎﻫﺞ ﻣﺧﺗﻠﻔﺔ ﺟﺩﺍ ﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺍﻻﺷﺗﺑﺎﻙ‪ .‬ﻭﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺭﻏﻡ ﻣﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺭﻭﺳﻳﺎ‬ ‫ﻭﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﺣﻘﻘﺗﺎ ﺍﻧﺗﺻﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺳﻧﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻷﺧﻳﺭﺓ‪ ،‬ﺇﻻ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻐﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺗﺗﺑﻧﻰ ﺍﻵﻥ‬ ‫ﻧﻬﺞ ﺍﻟﻌﺻﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﺟﺯﺭﺓ ﻓﻳﻣﺎ ﻳﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺗﻣﻭﻳﻝ ﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺇﻋﻣﺎﺭ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺟﺯﺭﺓ ﻫﻲ ﺃﻥ ﺭﻭﺳﻳﺎ ﺳﻭﻑ ﺗﻛﻭﻥ ﻗﺎﺩﺭﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺇﺧﺭﺍﺝ ﻳﺩﻫﺎ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻔﻭﺿﻰ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻷﻧﻪ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻣﺎ ﻗﺎﻣﺕ ﺑﻌﻣﻠﻳﺔ ﺍﻧﺗﻘﺎﻝ ﺳﻳﺎﺳﻲ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻷﺳﺩ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﺍﻟﻐﺭﺏ ﺳﻭﻑ ﻳﺳﺗﺛﻣﺭ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﻟﻛﻥ ﺑﺎﻟﻁﺑﻊ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺻﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺃﻧﻪ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻟﻡ ﺗﻔﻌﻝ ﺭﻭﺳﻳﺎ ﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻡ ﺗﺧﺭﺝ ﺃﻳﺩﻳﻬﺎ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻔﻭﺿﻰ‪ ،‬ﻓﺳﻭﻑ ﻳﺳﺗﻣﺭ ﺍﻟﺷﻌﺏ ﺍﻟﺳﻭﺭﻱ ﻳﻌﺎﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻳﺋﺔ ﻏﻳﺭ ﻣﺣﻛﻭﻣﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺑﺎﻻﻧﺗﻘﺎﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ‪ ،‬ﺗﺣﺩﻯ ﺑﻳﻛﻳﺕ ﻭﺟﻬﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻅﺭ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﺑﺄﻥ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﺗﻡ‬ ‫ﺍﺣﺗﻭﺍﺅﻫﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻭﻗﺕ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﺿﺭ‪ .‬ﻭﻗﺎﻝ ﺇﻧﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻧﻅﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﻘﺑﻝ‪ ،‬ﻳﺑﺩﻭ ﻣﻭﻗﻑ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫ﻓﻳﺭﺟﻳﻧﻳﺎ ﻛﻭﻣﻭﻟﻲ‪ ،‬ﺯﻣﻳﻝ‬ ‫ﻭﺑﺎﺣﺙ ﺃﻭﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻧﻣﻳﺔ‪IISS ،‬‬

‫ﺟﻭﺭﺩﻭﻥ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺭﺟﺢ ﺑﺷﻛﻝ ﻣﺗﺯﺍﻳﺩ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺗﻁﻠﻊ ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ‬ ‫ﻛﺷﺭﻳﻙ ﻣﺣﺗﻣﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺃﻧﺷﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺑﺎﺩﺭﺓ‪ .‬ﺇﺫﺍ ﻧﻅﺭﺕ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺧﺭﺍﺋﻁ ﺍﻟﻣﺑﺎﺩﺭﺓ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻧﻬﺎ ﻻ‬ ‫ﺗﺭﻛﺯ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﻛﺛﻳﺭﺍ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻛﻧﻲ ﺃﻋﺗﻘﺩ ﺃﻧﻧﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺭﺣﻠﺔ ﺟﺩﻳﺩﺓ ﺍﻵﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻋﺗﻘﺩ ﺃﻥ‬ ‫ﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺟﺎﻧﺏ ﺍﻟﻳﺎﺑﺎﻥ ﻭﻏﻳﺭﻫﺎ ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻠﻌﺏ ﺩﻭﺭﺍ ﻣﻬﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ‬ ‫ﺗﻭﺟﻳﻪ ”ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻣﺑﺎﺩﺭﺓ“ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﺻﻭﻟﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻌﺩﺩﺓ ﺍﻷﻁﺭﺍﻑ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺗﺣﺩﺛﺕ ﻓﺭﺟﻳﻧﻳﺎ ﻛﻭﻣﻭﻟﻲ‪ ،‬ﺯﻣﻳﻝ ﻭﺑﺎﺣﺙ ﺃﻭﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ ﻭﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻧﻣﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ‪ ،‬ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻳﻘﺔ ﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ ﻟﺣﻣﺎﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺷﺣﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﺟﺎﺭﻱ ﻭﺗﻌﺯﻳﺯ ﺍﻟﻣﺻﺎﻟﺢ ﺍﻟﻭﻁﻧﻳﺔ ﻭﻣﻛﺎﻓﺣﺔ ﺍﻟﺟﻣﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻁﺭﻓﺔ‪ ،‬ﺣﻳﺙ‬ ‫ﺗﺣﻘﻖ ﺗﻘﺩﻡ ﻛﺑﻳﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ ﺧﻼﻝ ﻋﺎﻡ ‪ 2018‬ﻣﻊ ﺍﺗﻔﺎﻗﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺇﺛﻳﻭﺑﻳﺎ ﻭﺇﺭﻳﺗﺭﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺃﺷﺎﺭﺕ ﺇﻟﻳﻬﺎ ﺑﻘﻭﻟﻬﺎ‪:‬‬ ‫ﺃﺻﺑﺣﺕ ﺍﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗﻳﺔ ﻗﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﻧﻔﺎﺫ ﺑﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻹﻣﺎﺭﺍﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‪ ،‬ﻭﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻝ ﺗﻡ ﺍﻟﺗﻭﺻﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﺗﻔﺎﻕ ﻓﻲ ﺟﺩﺓ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﺇﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺗﻳﻥ ‪ ...‬ﺗﺿﻌﺎﻥ ﺃﻧﻔﺳﻬﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻝ ﻛﻘﻭﺓ ﺣﻘﻳﻘﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ‪ ،‬ﻛﻣﺎ ﻣ ّﻛﻧﻬﻣﺎ ﻧﻔﻭﺫﻫﻣﺎ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻧﺎﻣﻲ ﺃﻳﺿﺎ ﻣﻥ ﺇﻗﻧﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻧﺎﻓﺳﻳﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺣﺩﻭﺩ‬ ‫ﻭﻫﻣﺎ ﺟﻳﺑﻭﺗﻲ ﻭﺇﺭﻳﺗﺭﻳﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺩﺧﻭﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺣﻭﺍﺭ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﻓﻲ ﻧﻔﺱ ﺍﻟﻭﻗﺕ ﻻﺣﻅﺕ ﻛﻭﻣﻭﻟﻲ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻷﺻﻐﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺷﺭﻕ ﺃﻓﺭﻳﻘﻳﺎ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﺟﻬﺕ ﺻﻌﻭﺑﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻘﻝ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺍﻷﺟﻧﺩﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻧﺎﻓﺳﺔ ﻟﻠﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺟﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻟﻘﺩ ﺃﺩﻯ‬ ‫ﻅﻬﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﻧﻔﻭﺫ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺟﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺗﻬﻣﻳﺵ ﺍﻻﺗﺣﺎﺩ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ ﺑﻌﺽ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺷﻲء‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﺩﻯ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺗﺭﻛﻳﺯ ﻣﺧﺗﻠﻑ ﻓﻲ ﺇﻁﺎﺭ ﺍﺗﻔﺎﻗﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ‪ ،‬ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺗﺭﻛﻳﺯ ﺑﺷﻛﻝ‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﺗﻧﺎﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﺩﻳﻔﻳﺩ ﺟﻭﺭﺩﻭﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﺍﻷﻭﻝ ﻟﻠﺟﻐﺭﺍﻓﻳﺎ ﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎﺩﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ‪ ،‬ﺧﻁﺭ ﻓﺭﺽ ﺗﻌﺭﻳﻔﺔ ﻣﺗﺑﺎﺩﻟﺔ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‬

‫ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﺟﻭﻥ ﺗﺷﻳﺑﻣﺎﻥ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻭﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺱ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‪IISS ،‬‬

‫ﻭﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ ﻣﻣﺎ ﻗﺩ ﻳﺗﺻﺎﻋﺩ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺣﺭﺏ ﺗﺟﺎﺭﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻭﻗﺎﻝ ﺇﻧﻪ ﻻ ﻳﺯﺍﻝ ﻣﻥ ﻏﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻭﺍﺿﺢ‬ ‫ﻣﺎ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻛﺎﻧﺕ ﺇﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﺗﺭﺍﻣﺏ ﺗﺭﻏﺏ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺣﻘﻳﻖ ﺗﻭﺍﺯﻥ ﺗﺟﺎﺭﻱ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﺇﻧﺻﺎﻓﺎ ﻣﻊ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ ﺃﻭ ﺳﻌﺕ ﻟﻠﺣﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺩﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎﺩ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺎﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺧﺗﺎﻡ ﺳﺗﺻﺑﺢ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺻﻭﺭﺓ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﻭﺿﻭﺣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻣﺔ ﻣﺟﻣﻭﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺷﺭﻳﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻭﻳﻧﺱ ﺁﻳﺭﺱ‪:‬‬ ‫ﺇﻥ ﺷﻲ ﺟﻧﺑﻳﻧﻎ ﻣﺗﺣﻣﺱ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺣﺩ ﻛﺑﻳﺭ ﻟﺗﺟﻧﺏ ﺣﺭﺏ ﺑﺎﺭﺩﺓ ﺟﺩﻳﺩﺓ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‪ ،‬ﻟﺫﺍ ﺃﻋﺗﻘﺩ ﺃﻥ ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ﻓﺭﺻﺔ ﻣﻌﻘﻭﻟﺔ ﻟﻠﺗﺣﻭﻝ ﻫﻧﺎ ‪ ...‬ﻻ ﺃﻋﺗﻘﺩ ﺃﻧﻬﺎ ﺳﺗﻛﻭﻥ‬ ‫ﺻﻔﻘﺔ ﻛﺑﺭﻯ‪ ،‬ﻟﻛﻧﻧﻲ ﺃﻋﺗﻘﺩ ﺃﻧﻧﺎ ﺳﻧﻣﺿﻲ ﻧﺣﻭ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺭﻙ ﻣﺭﺓ ﺃﺧﺭﻯ ﻧﺣﻭ ﺑﻌﺽ‬ ‫ﻋﻧﺎﺻﺭ ﺍﻟﺗﻔﺎﻭﺽ ﺣﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﺟﺎﺭﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺛﻧﺎﺋﻳﺔ ﺑﺷﻛﻝ ﺧﺎﺹ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻛﻣﺎ ﺃﺷﺎﺭ ﺟﻭﺭﺩﻭﻥ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺣﺩﻭﺙ ﺗﺣﻭﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﻭﻗﻌﺎﺕ ﺩﺍﺧﻝ ﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺷﺭﻕ‬ ‫ﺁﺳﻳﺎ ﻓﻳﻣﺎ ﻳﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ‪ .‬ﻓﻔﻲ ﺣﻳﻥ ﺳﺑﻖ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻓﺗﺭﺿﺕ ﺩﻭﻝ ﺷﺭﻕ ﺁﺳﻳﺎ ﺃﻥ‬ ‫ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﺳﺗﻛﻭﻥ ﺷﺭﻳﻛﻬﺎ ﺍﻷﻭﻝ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﻌﺗﺭﻑ ﺍﻵﻥ ﺑﺩﻭﺭ ﺃﻛﺑﺭ ﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﻣﺟﻠﺱ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻭﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺟﻲ‪ .‬ﻟﻘﺩ ﺗﺿﺎءﻝ ﺗﺻﻭﺭ ﻫﻳﻣﻧﺔ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺗﺟﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻭﺑﺎﻻﻧﺗﻘﺎﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ‬ ‫ﻣﺑﺎﺩﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺣﺯﺍﻡ ﻭﺍﻟﻁﺭﻳﻖ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﻝ ﺟﻭﺭﺩﻭﻥ ﺃﻧﻬﺎ ﻓﻘﺩﺕ ﺑﻌﺽ ﺧﺻﺎﺋﺻﻬﺎ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻌﺩﺩﺓ ﺍﻷﻁﺭﺍﻑ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺳﻧﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻷﺧﻳﺭﺓ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺩ ﺃﺩﻯ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻣﻘﺎﻭﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺃﻭﺭﻭﺑﺎ‬ ‫ﻭﺃﺟﺯﺍء ﻣﻥ ﺁﺳﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﺇﻟﻰ ﺟﺎﻧﺏ ﺍﻟﻘﻠﻖ ﻣﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺳﻳﺅﺩﻱ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻧﻬﺎﻳﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻗﻳﺎﻡ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺛﻘﻠﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺩﻳﻭﻥ ﺑﺗﺳﻠﻳﻡ ﺍﻷﺻﻭﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ‪ .‬ﻭﻗﺩ ﺩﻓﻊ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺑﻛﻳﻥ ﻟﻠﺑﺣﺙ ﻋﻥ‬ ‫ﺷﺭﺍﻛﺎﺕ ﺟﺩﻳﺩﺓ ﺑﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺫﻟﻙ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﻳﺎﺑﺎﻥ ﺣﻭﻝ ﻣﺑﺎﺩﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺣﺯﺍﻡ ﻭﺍﻟﻁﺭﻳﻖ‪ .‬ﻭﺧﻠﺹ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﺩﻳﻔﻳﺩ ﺟﻭﺭﺩﻭﻥ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻣﺳﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﺃﻭﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺟﻐﺭﺍﻓﻳﺎ‬ ‫ﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎﺩﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫‪IISS‬‬

‫ﺃﺧﻳﺭﺍ‪ ،‬ﺟﺭﻯ ﻧﻘﺎﺵ ﻛﺑﻳﺭ ﻟﺧﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺗﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﻭﻗﺭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﺍﻻﻧﺳﺣﺎﺏ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﻳﺭﺍﻧﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻧﻅﺭ ﺑﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﻳﻥ ﺇﻟﻰ‬ ‫ﺧﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺗﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﺑﺎﻋﺗﺑﺎﺭﻫﺎ ﻓﺷﻼ ﻭﺭﺣﺑﻭﺍ ﺑﺈﺟﺭﺍءﺍﺕ ﻭﺍﺷﻧﻁﻥ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻣﺷﻳﺭﻳﻥ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻓﺷﻝ ﺍﻻﺗﻔﺎﻕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣﻝ ﻣﻊ ﻗﺩﺭﺍﺕ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﺍﻟﺻﺎﺭﻭﺧﻳﺔ ﻭﺳﻠﻭﻛﻬﺎ‬ ‫ﻏﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺣﻣﻳﺩ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪ .‬ﻣﻥ ﻭﺟﻬﺔ ﻧﻅﺭﻫﻡ‪ ،‬ﻛﺎﻥ ﻳﺗﻭﺟﺏ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺿﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﻔﺎﻭﺿﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ ﻣﻊ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻯ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺗﻣﺎﻣﺎ ﻣﺛﻝ ”ﺍﻟﻣﺣﺎﺩﺛﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺳﺩﺍﺳﻳﺔ“ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ‬ ‫ﻣﺿﻰ ﻋﻠﻳﻬﺎ ﻋﺷﺭ ﺳﻧﻭﺍﺕ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺳﻌﺕ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺗﻘﻠﻳﺹ ﺑﺭﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﻛﻭﺭﻳﺎ ﺍﻟﺷﻣﺎﻟﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻱ‪ .‬ﻣﻊ ﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﺭﺃﻯ ﺁﺧﺭﻭﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﺿﺎﻳﺎ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ ﺃُﻋﻁﻳﺕ ﺍﻷﻭﻟﻭﻳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫ﺻﻭﺍﺭﻳﺦ ﻁﻬﺭﺍﻥ ﺍﻟﺑﺎﻟﺳﺗﻳﺔ ﻭﺃﻧﺷﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻬﻳﻣﻧﺔ‪ ،‬ﺣﻳﺙ ﻗﺎﻝ ﺃﺣﺩ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﻳﻥ ﺃﻧﻪ ”ﺇﺫﺍ‬ ‫ﻟﻡ ﺗﻌﺟﺑﻛﻡ ﺧﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺗﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﺗﺧﻳﻠﻭﺍ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺑﺩﻭﻥ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻻﺗﻔﺎﻕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻱ“‪.‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺧﺗﺎﻣﻳﺔ‪ :‬ﺍﺟﺗﻳﺎﺯ ﺍﻟﺗﻐﻳّﺭ ﺍﻟﺟﻳﻭﺳﻳﺎﺳﻲ‪ :‬ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﻕ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻣﻲ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺧﺗﺎﻣﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺟﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ ﻋﺩﺩﺍ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﺻﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺳﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻟﻪ ﻟﺗﻘﺩﻳﻡ ﺭﺅﻯ ﻭﺃﻓﻛﺎﺭ ﻭﺍﺳﻌﺔ ﻣﻥ ﺃﺟﻝ ”ﺟﻣﻊ ﺧﻳﻭﻁ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﺎﺕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺩﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟـﺳﺗﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺛﻼﺛﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺎﺿﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻭﺻﻭﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺑﻌﺽ‬ ‫ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻧﺗﺎﺟﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﻠﻳﻠﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻔﻳﺩﺓ“‪ ،‬ﻛﻣﺎ ﺃﻭﺿﺢ ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻭﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬ ‫ﻟﻠﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﺟﻭﻥ ﺗﺷﻳﺑﻣﺎﻥ‪.‬‬ ‫‪44‬‬

‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﻬﻧﺩ ﻭﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ ﻭﺑﺎﻛﺳﺗﺎﻥ ‪ -‬ﺑﺗﺣﻭﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺎﻋﺩﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻣﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﺳﻛﺭﻳﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻛﻣﺎ ﻧﺎﻗﺷﺕ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻭﺗﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺄﺻﻝ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺩﻋﻡ ﺗﻁﻭﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻁﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻭﻣﻧﻊ ﺍﻻﻧﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻱ ﻓﻲ ﺳﻳﺎﻕ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﺍﻟﻳﻭﻡ‪ ،‬ﻭﻅﻬﺭﺕ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﻣﻭﺍﺿﻳﻊ‬ ‫ﺃﺳﺎﺳﻳﺔ ﺧﻼﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﺎﺕ‪ .‬ﺃﻭﻻ‪ ،‬ﺗﺳﻌﻰ ﻋﺩﻳﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺑﻠﺩﺍﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺇﻳﺟﺎﺩ‬

‫)ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻳﺳﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻳﻥ(‪:‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭﺓ ﻛﻭﺭﻱ ﺷﺎﻛﻲ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻧﺎﺋﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ‪IISS ،‬؛‬ ‫ﻧﻳﻛﻭﻻﺱ ﺭﻭﺷﻳﻪ‪ ،‬ﻣﺩﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻭﺯﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻷﻭﺭﻭﺑﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﺭﻧﺳﺎ‬

‫ﺑﺩﻳﻝ ﻟﺗﻭﻟﻳﺩ ﺍﻟﻛﻬﺭﺑﺎء ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻁﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﻛﺭﺑﻭﻧﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﻧﺎﻙ ﺷﻬﻳﺔ ﻗﻭﻳﺔ ﻟﺗﻁﻭﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻘﺩﺭﺓ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺣﻠﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻣﻊ ﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﻳﻭﺟﺩ ﺇﺩﺭﺍﻙ ﻋﺎﻡ ﻟﻛﻥ ﺿﺭﻭﺭﻱ ﺑﺄﻥ ﺗﻘﻭﻡ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﺑﺗﻁﺑﻳﻖ ﻣﺟﻣﻭﻋﺔ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﻣﺭﻭﻧﺔ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﺎﻳﻳﺭ ﻟﻠﺣﻛﻭﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ‬ ‫ﺗﺭﻏﺏ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻧﺎء ﻣﺣﻁﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻁﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻟﻣﺎﺫﺍ ﻳﺟﺏ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‬ ‫ﻗﺑﻭﻝ ”ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻳﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺫﻫﺑﻲ“‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻳﻠﻐﻲ ﺣﻖ ﺃﻱ ﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻲ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺇﻧﺗﺎﺝ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺍﺩ‬ ‫ﺍﻻﻧﺷﻁﺎﺭﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﻲ ﺣﻳﻥ ﻻ ﻳُﻁﻠﺏ ﻣﻥ ﺑﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻵﺳﻳﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﺧﻠﻲ ﻋﻥ ﺩﻭﺭﺓ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻭﻗﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻱ؟‬ ‫ﺛﺎﻧﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﺍﻋﺗﺭﺍﻓﺎ ﻣﻧﻬﻡ ﺑﺎﻟﺗﻁﺑﻳﻖ ﻏﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺳﺎﻭﻱ ﻟﻠﻣﻌﺎﻳﻳﺭ ﻣﻥ ﻗﺑﻝ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﻭﻣﻧﺗﺟﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺍﺩ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﻵﺧﺭﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﻗﺗﺭﺡ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﻭﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻭﻥ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻲ‬ ‫ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺃﻥ ﻳﺳﺎﻋﺩ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻌﺎﻟﺟﺔ ﻣﺧﺎﻭﻑ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺣﺎﻭﻝ ﺍﺳﺗﻐﻼﻝ ﺍﻟﺑﺭﺍﻣﺞ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻧﻳﺔ ﻟﻸﻏﺭﺍﺽ ﺍﻟﻌﺳﻛﺭﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﺗﻡ ﺍﻗﺗﺭﺍﺡ ﻣﺳﺗﻭﺩﻉ ﺇﻗﻠﻳﻣﻲ ﻟﻠﻳﻭﺭﺍﻧﻳﻭﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﺧﺻﺏ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺍﻷﺭﺩﻥ – ﻋﻠﻰ ﻏﺭﺍﺭ )ﺍﻟﺟﻣﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻷﻭﺭﻭﺑﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻁﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﺫﺭﻳﺔ ﻳﻭﺭﺍﺗﻭﻡ( ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺃﻭﺭﻭﺑﺎ ‪ -‬ﻛﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ ﻟﺿﻣﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﺻﻭﻝ ﻏﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻘﻳﺩ ﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻭﻗﻭﺩ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻱ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫)ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻳﺳﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻳﻥ(‪:‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﻛﻣﺎﻝ ﺍﻷﻋﺭﺝ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻧﺎﺋﺏ ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﻬﻳﺋﺔ ﻭﻣﻔﻭﺽ‬ ‫ﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﻣﻔﺎﻋﻼﺕ ﺍﻟﻁﺎﻗﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻫﻳﺋﺔ ﺍﻟﻁﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﺫﺭﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﺭﺩﻧﻳﺔ؛ ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﺣﺳﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺑﻬﺗﻳﻣﻲ‪ ،‬ﻣﺣﺎﺿﺭ ﻓﻲ ﻗﺳﻡ‬ ‫ﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺣﺭﺏ‪ ،‬ﻛﻠﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻛﻧﻐﺯ‪ ،‬ﻟﻧﺩﻥ‬

‫ﺍﻗﺗﺭﺡ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﻭﻥ ﺃﻧﻪ ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻛﻭﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﻬﺩﻳﺩﺍ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﻗﺩﺭﺍﺕ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻹﻟﻛﺗﺭﻭﻧﻳﺔ ﺗﻣﺛﻝ ﺃﻳﺿﺎ ﻗﻭﺓ ﺩﺍﻓﻌﺔ ﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﻟﻠﻌﻣﻝ ﻧﺣﻭ ﺁﻟﻳﺎﺕ ﺃﻗﻭﻯ ﻟﻠﺩﻓﺎﻉ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺟﻣﺎﻋﻲ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻛﺩﻭﺍ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺎﻟﻑ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻘﺗﺭﺡ ﻟﻠﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ )‪(MESA‬‬ ‫– ﻭﻫﻭ ﺗﺣﺎﻟﻑ ﻭﻁﻧﻲ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﺍﻟﺳﺕ ﻭﻣﺻﺭ ﻭﺍﻷﺭﺩﻥ ﻟﻠﺗﺻﺩﻱ ﻟﺗﻬﺩﻳﺩﺍﺕ‬ ‫ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ‪ ،‬ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺃﻥ ﻳﺷﻣﻝ ﺍﺗﻔﺎﻗﻳﺎﺕ ﺑﺷﺄﻥ ﺗﻘﺎﺳﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻠﻭﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺗﻬﺩﻳﺩﺍﺕ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﻓﻳﻣﺎ ﻳﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﻘﺿﺎﻳﺎ ﺍﻟﺧﺻﻭﺻﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﺿﺎء ﺍﻹﻟﻛﺗﺭﻭﻧﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﺗﻔﻖ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺛﻭﻥ‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻣﺯﻳﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺷﻔﺎﻓﻳﺔ ﻟﺗﻬﺩﺋﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺧﺎﻭﻑ ﺑﺷﺄﻥ ﺗﺟﺎﻭﺯ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﺎﺕ‪ .‬ﺇﺫﺍ‬ ‫ﻟﻡ ﺗﻛﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﺎﺕ ﻗﺎﺩﺭﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺇﻗﻧﺎﻉ ﻣﻭﺍﻁﻧﻳﻬﺎ ﺑﻌﺩﻡ ﻭﺟﻭﺩ ﻧﻳﺔ ﻏﻳﺭ ﺳﻠﻳﻣﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺣﺗﻣﻝ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻌﺎﺭﺽ ﻣﻭﺍﻁﻧﻭﻫﺎ ﺃﻱ ﺳﻳﺎﺳﺎﺕ ﻣﻘﺗﺭﺣﺔ‪.‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺑﻌﺔ‪ :‬ﺍﻟﻁﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ ﻭﻋﺩﻡ ﺍﻧﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﺍﻷﺳﻠﺣﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‬ ‫ﻣﻧﺫ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﻣﻥ ‪ 60‬ﻋﺎﻣﺎ‪ ،‬ﻗﺩﻡ ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﺣﻳﻧﻬﺎ ﺩﻭﺍﻳﺕ ﺩﻱ‬ ‫ﺁﻳﺯﻧﻬﺎﻭﺭ ﺧﻁﺔ ”ﺫﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ“ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺳﻌﺕ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺗﻌﺯﻳﺯ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﺍﻟﺳﻠﻣﻲ‬ ‫ﻟﻠﺗﻛﻧﻭﻟﻭﺟﻳﺎ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻅﻝ ﻧﻅﺎﻡ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺿﻣﺎﻧﺎﺕ‪ .‬ﺃﻧﺗﺟﺕ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻣﺑﺎﺩﺭﺓ ﻋﺩﻳﺩﺍ‬ ‫ﻣﻥ ﺃﻫﻡ ﻋﻧﺎﺻﺭ ﻧﻅﺎﻡ ﻋﺩﻡ ﺍﻻﻧﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻱ ﺍﻟﻳﻭﻡ‪ ،‬ﺑﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺍﻟﻭﻛﺎﻟﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻁﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﺫﺭﻳﺔ )‪ (IAEA‬ﻭﻣﻔﻬﻭﻡ ﺍﻟﺿﻣﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ ﻭﻗﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﻋﺩﻡ‬ ‫ﺍﻻﻧﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻱ ﻧﻔﺳﻬﺎ‪ .‬ﻛﻣﺎ ﺃﺳﺭﻋﺕ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻧﺷﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻣﻲ ﻟﻠﻣﻌﺭﻓﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺑﻧﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺗﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻣﻊ ﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﻣﺕ ﺑﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻠﻘﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﺗﻛﻧﻭﻟﻭﺟﻳﺎ ‪ -‬ﺧﺎﺻﺔ‬ ‫‪42‬‬

‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻟﺛﺔ‪ :‬ﺍﻟﺗﻬﺩﻳﺩﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺑﺭﺍﻧﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺑﺭﺍﻧﻲ‬ ‫ﺃﺻﺑﺣﺕ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺷﺑﻪ ﺩﺍﺋﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻷﻋﻭﺍﻡ ﺍﻷﺧﻳﺭﺓ‪ ،‬ﺣﻳﺙ‬ ‫ﻗﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺛﻭﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﻭﻥ ﺑﺗﻘﻳﻳﻡ ﺍﻻﺗﺟﺎﻫﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﺿﺎء ﺍﻹﻟﻛﺗﺭﻭﻧﻲ ﻭﺍﻟﻘﺿﺎﻳﺎ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺳﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻣﺟﺎﻝ ﻭﺫﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺻﻠﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻳﺷﻬﺩ ﺗﺣﻭﻻﺕ‬ ‫ﺗﺣﺎﻟﻔﻳﺔ ﻗﺩ ﺗﻛﻭﻥ ﺟﺫﺭﻳﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺍﺗﻔﻖ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺛﻭﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺳﻧﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻌﺷﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﺎﺿﻳﺔ ﺷﻬﺩﺕ ﺣﺩﻭﺙ ﺗﺣﻭﻝ‬

‫)ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻳﺳﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻳﻥ(‪:‬‬ ‫ﺟﻭﻥ ﺭﺍﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﻣﺳﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﺃﻭﻝ‬ ‫ﻟﻠﺗﺣﻭﻁ ﺍﻟﺟﻳﻭﺳﻳﺎﺳﻲ‪،‬‬ ‫‪IISS‬؛ ﻣﺎﺭﻛﻭﺱ ﻭﻳﻠﻳﺕ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺑﻖ‬ ‫ﻟﻼﺳﺗﺧﺑﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﺄﺛﻳﺭﺍﺕ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻣﻘﺭ ﺍﻻﺗﺻﺎﻻﺕ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﻳﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‬

‫ﻣﻠﺣﻭﻅ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺎﻟﻡ ﺍﻹﻧﺗﺭﻧﺕ‪ .‬ﻓﻲ ﺣﻳﻥ ﺍﻗﺗﺻﺭ ﺍﻹﻧﺗﺭﻧﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﺎﺿﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﺎﻟﻡ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺧﺑﺭﺍء ﺍﻟﺗﻘﻧﻳﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﺫﻳﻥ ﻭﺿﻌﻭﺍ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺭﻳﻔﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﻭﺯﺭﺍء ﺍﻟﻳﻭﻡ ﻭﻛﺑﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺅﻭﻟﻳﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﻳﻳﻥ ﻳﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠﻭﻥ ﺑﺎﻧﺗﻅﺎﻡ ﻣﻊ ﻗﺿﺎﻳﺎ ﺍﻹﻧﺗﺭﻧﺕ ﺍﻟﻛﺑﺭﻯ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺃﺗﺎﺣﺕ ﻛﻣﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺑﻳﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻡ ﺇﻧﺷﺎﺅﻫﺎ ﻭﻅﻬﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﺗﻛﻧﻭﻟﻭﺟﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺟﺩﻳﺩﺓ ﻛﻼ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺧﺎﻁﺭ ﻭﺍﻟﻔﺭﺹ‪ .‬ﻓﻲ ﺧﺿ ّﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﺻﻧﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﻭﺍﻹﺟﺭﺍﻣﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺭﻋﺎﻫﺎ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻳﺟﺏ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﺎﺕ ﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺗﻘﻳﻳﻡ ﻣﻣﺎﺭﺳﺎﺗﻬﺎ ﺍﻷﻣﻧﻳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻹﻧﺗﺭﻧﺕ ﻭﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ‬ ‫ﻋﻣﻠﻬﺎ‪ .‬ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﻁﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺹ ﺗﻡ ﺗﺣﺩﻳﺩ ﻧﻭﻋﻳﻥ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻛﺎﺕ‪ :‬ﺗﻠﻙ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻡ ﺍﺧﺗﺭﺍﻗﻬﺎ‬ ‫ﻭﻫﻲ ﺗﻌﻠﻡ ﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﻭﺗﻠﻙ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻌﺭﺿﺕ ﻟﻼﺧﺗﺭﺍﻕ ﻭﺗﺟﻬﻝ ﺫﻟﻙ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻻ ﻳﺯﺍﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﻬﺎﺟﻣﻭﻥ‪ ،‬ﺳﻭﺍءﺍ ﻛﺎﻧﻭﺍ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﻣﺟﺭﻣﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﻣﺗﻘﺩﻣﻳﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﺿﺎء‬ ‫ﺍﻹﻟﻛﺗﺭﻭﻧﻲ ﺭﻏﻡ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺩﺍﻓﻌﻳﻥ ﻳﺳﺗﻣﺭﻭﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺣﺳﻳﻥ ﻗﺩﺭﺍﺗﻬﻡ‪ .‬ﺗﺣﺩﺙ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﻭﻥ‬ ‫ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﻐﻳﻳﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﻁﺭﺃﺕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﻳﻔﻳﺔ ﺗﻔﻛﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺱ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺑﻛﺎﺕ ﻭﺃﺑﺭﺯﻭﺍ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﺟﺔ‬ ‫ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻭﻥ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﺫﻟﻙ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﻟﻘﻁﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺹ‪ .‬ﻛﻣﺎ ﻧﺎﺩﻭﺍ‬ ‫ﺑﺄﻥ ﺗﺷﻛﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﻣﺎﺭﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻷﻣﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﻟﻛﺗﺭﻭﻧﻳﺔ ﻓﺎﺭﻗﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺳﻭﻕ ﺑﺎﻟﻧﺳﺑﺔ ﻟﻠﺷﺭﻛﺎﺕ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫)ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻳﺳﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻳﻥ(‪:‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺟﻧﺭﺍﻝ )ﻣﺗﻘﺎﻋﺩ(‬ ‫ﻛﻳﺙ ﺃﻟﻳﻛﺳﺎﻧﺩﺭ‪ ،‬ﺭﺋﻳﺱ‬ ‫ﻣﺟﻠﺱ ﺍﻹﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺱ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‪ ،‬ﺁﻳﺭﻭﻥ ﻧﺕ ﻟﻸﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺑﺭﺍﻧﻲ؛ ﺷﺎﺭﻝ‪-‬ﺇﺩﻭﺍﺭﺩ‬ ‫ﺑﻭﻭﻳﻪ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬ ‫ﻭﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﻗﻁﺎﻉ ﺁﺳﻳﺎ ﻭﻣﻌﻅﻡ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﺭﻭﻻﻧﺩ ﺑﻳﺭﺟﺭ‬ ‫ﻟﻼﺳﺗﺷﺎﺭﺍﺕ‬

‫ﻭﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﻭﺣﺗﻰ ﺩﻭﻝ ﺷﺭﻕ ﺁﺳﻳﺎ‪ .‬ﻭﻳﻧﺑﻐﻲ ﺃﻳﺿﺎ ﺇﺩﺭﺍﺝ ﺍﻟﻣﺅﺳﺳﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺎﻟﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﺗﻌﺩﺩﺓ ﺍﻷﻁﺭﺍﻑ‪.‬‬ ‫)ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻳﺳﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻳﻥ(‪ :‬ﺃﻟﻳﻛﺳﺎﻧﺩﺭ ﺭﻭﻧﺩﻭﺱ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﺑﻌﻭﺙ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺹ ﻟﻠﻘﺭﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ‪ ،‬ﻫﻳﺋﺔ ﺍﻻﺗﺣﺎﺩ ﺍﻷﻭﺭﻭﺑﻲ ﻟﻠﻌﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻲ؛ ﻟﻳﺯﺍ ﻏﺭﺍﻧﺩﻱ‪ ،‬ﻣﻧﺳﻘﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﻡ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﻟﻠﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻹﻧﺳﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻘﻠﻖ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﺑﺷﺄﻥ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﻲ ﻭﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻛﺎﻧﺕ ﺍﻷﺯﻣﺔ ﺍﻹﻧﺳﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ ﻣﺻﺩﺭ ﻗﻠﻖ ﺧﺎﺹ‪ .‬ﻧﺎﻗﺵ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﻓﺩﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻧﻘﻁﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻘﻭﻝ ﺃﻧﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻓﻘﺎ ﻟﺗﻘﺎﺭﻳﺭ ﺍﻷﻣﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‪ 75 ،‬ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﺎﺋﺔ ﻣﻥ ﺳﻛﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺑﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺷﻛﻝ ﻣﻥ ﺃﺷﻛﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﺍﻹﻧﺳﺎﻧﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺩ ﺗﻛﻭﻥ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﻣﺭﺣﻠﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻗﺑﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺟﺎﻋﺔ‪ .‬ﺇﻥ ﺍﻻﻓﺗﻘﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻐﺫﺍء ﻭ ”ﻣﺟﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﺩﺧﻝ“ – ﻋﻧﺩﻣﺎ‬ ‫ﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻐﺫﺍء ﻣﺗﺎﺣﺎ ﻭﻟﻛﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻧﻳﻳﻥ ﻓﻘﺭﺍء ﺑﺩﺭﺟﺔ ﻻ ﺗﺳﻣﺢ ﻟﻬﻡ ﺑﺷﺭﺍﺋﻪ – ﻳﺷﻛﻼﻥ‬ ‫ﻫﻣﻭﻣﺎ ﺣﺭﺟﺔ ﻟﻠﻣﻧﻅﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻹﻧﺳﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ‪ .‬ﻛﻣﺎ ُ‬ ‫ﻁﺭﺣﺕ ﺃﺳﺋﻠﺔ ﻓﻳﻣﺎ‬ ‫ﻳﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺗﻌﺭﻳﻑ ﺍﻟﻣﺟﺎﻋﺔ‪ ،‬ﺍﻷﺳﺎﻟﻳﺏ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﻘﺎﻳﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﺧﺩﻣﺔ ﻟﻘﻳﺎﺱ ﺍﻟﻣﺟﺎﻋﺔ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ ﻣﻥ ﻗﺑﻝ ﺍﻷﻣﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﺿﻣﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺿﺩ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻠﻭﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﻳﺯﺓ ﺃﻭ ﻏﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺻﺣﻳﺣﺔ‪ .‬ﺇﻥ ﺍﻷﺯﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﻟﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ ﻟﻳﺳﺕ ﻣﺄﺳﺎﺓ ﺇﻧﺳﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﻓﺣﺳﺏ‪ ،‬ﺑﻝ ﻭﺻﻔﺕ‬ ‫ﺑﺄﻧﻬﺎ ﺳﺭﻁﺎﻥ ﻳﻧﻣﻭ ﻭﻳﺗﺻﺎﺭﻉ ﻣﻊ ﺍﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻊ‪ ،‬ﻣﻣﺎ ﺃﺩﻯ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺗﻔﺎﻗﻡ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻬﺟﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺟﻣﺎﻋﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻷﻭﺑﺋﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺗﻬﺭﻳﺏ ﺍﻟﺑﺷﺭ ﻭﺍﻧﻬﻳﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻧﻭﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻧﻅﺎﻡ‪ ،‬ﺇﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ‬ ‫ﺗﺭﺳﻳﺦ ﻭﺍﻧﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻯ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺩﻳﻛﺎﻟﻳﺔ ﺫﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻁﻣﻭﺣﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﻟﻧﻭﺍﻳﺎ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻭﺣﺗﻰ ﻳﺗﻡ‬ ‫ﺣﻝ ﺍﻷﺯﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ ﻓﺈﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﻟﻥ ﺗﺟﺩ ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ‪.‬‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﻧﻁﺎﻕ ﺃﻭﺳﻊ‪ ،‬ﺗﻡ ﺍﻻﺗﻔﺎﻕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻧﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﺗﻛﻧﻭﻟﻭﺟﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﺯﺩﻭﺝ ﻳﻣﺛﻝ‬ ‫ﺗﺣﺩﻳﺎ ﻣﻥ ﺣﻳﺙ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻅﻳﻡ‪.‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﻳﺔ‪ :‬ﺃﻣﻥ ﺑﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺩﺏ‬ ‫ﺇﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﺿﻊ ﺍﻷﻣﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺿﻳﻖ ﺑﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺩﺏ ﻣﻌﻘﺩ ﺑﺳﺑﺏ ﺗﻬﺩﻳﺩﺍﺗﻪ ﺍﻟﺑﺭﻳﺔ‬

‫)ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻳﺳﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻳﻥ(‪:‬‬ ‫ﻓﻳﺭﺟﻳﻧﻳﺎ ﻛﻭﻣﻭﻟﻲ‪ ،‬ﺯﻣﻳﻝ‬ ‫ﻭﺑﺎﺣﺙ ﺃﻭﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻧﻣﻳﺔ‪IISS ،‬؛‬ ‫ﺍﻷﺩﻣﻳﺭﺍﻝ ﺳﻛﻭﺕ ﺳﺗﻳﺭﻧﻲ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻗﺎﺋﺩ ﺍﻟﻘﻳﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﻣﺭﻛﺯﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻟﻠﻘﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺭﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﺔ‬

‫ﻭﺍﻟﺑﺣﺭﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺭﻏﻡ ﻣﻥ ﺗﺭﺍﺟﻊ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺗﻬﺩﻳﺩﺍﺕ ﻓﺈﻧﻬﺎ ﻟﻡ ﺗﺧﺗﻑ ﺑﻌﺩ‪ .‬ﻳﺟﺏ‬ ‫ﺃﻥ ﺗﺳﺗﻣﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻬﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺟﺣﺔ ﻟﻣﻛﺎﻓﺣﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﺻﻧﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺑﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﻁﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺹ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻷﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﺻﻧﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﻋﺩﻥ ﻟﻥ ﺗﺗﺑﺩﺩ ﺩﻭﻥ ﺍﺗﺑﺎﻉ ﻧﻬﺞ ﺣﻛﻭﻣﻲ ﻣﺗﻛﺎﻣﻝ ﻭﺣﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺣﺭﻛﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺑﺭﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻘﺭﺻﻧﺔ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺭﻳﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻛﻣﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﺿﻊ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻷﺭﺽ ﻣﻌﻘﺩ ﺑﺷﻛﻝ ﻣﺗﺯﺍﻳﺩ‪ ،‬ﺣﻳﺙ ﺗﺗﺿﺎﻋﻑ ﺍﻟﺗﻬﺩﻳﺩﺍﺕ‬ ‫ﻭﺗﺗﺯﺍﻳﺩ‪ ،‬ﻭﻳﺟﺏ ﺃﻳﺿﺎ ﺍﻟﻧﻅﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﻻﺕ ﺍﻷﻣﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻔﺗﻘﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻁﻖ ﺍﻟﻣﺟﺎﻭﺭﺓ‪ ،‬ﻻ ﺳﻳﻣﺎ ﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﻭﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺣﻝ‪ ،‬ﻷﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﺅﺛﺭ‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ ﺑﺷﻛﻝ ﻣﺑﺎﺷﺭ‪ .‬ﻟﺫﻟﻙ ﻳﺟﺏ ﺗﻭﺳﻳﻊ ﺍﻟﻔﻬﻡ ﺍﻟﺟﻐﺭﺍﻓﻲ ﻟﻠﻘﺭﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ ﻭﺍﻻﺑﺗﻌﺎﺩ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻻﻻﺕ ﺍﻟﺿﻳﻘﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﺗﺣﻘﻳﻖ ﺫﻟﻙ ﻳﺟﺏ ﻣﻌﺎﻟﺟﺔ ﻣﺧﺗﻠﻑ ﺩﻭﺍﻓﻊ‬ ‫ﻋﺩﻡ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻊ ‪ -‬ﻣﺛﻝ ﺍﻟﺗﺟﺭﻳﻡ ﻭ ”ﺍﻟﺻﻭﻣﻠﺔ“ ” ﻭ ”ﺍﻟﺗﺳﻠﺢ“‪.‬‬ ‫ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺿﺭﻭﺭﻱ ﺍﺗﺑﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﻧﻬﺞ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻛﺎﻣﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ ﻭﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺃﻭﺳﻁﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺟﺎﻭﺭﺓ ﺧﻼﻝ ﻓﺗﺭﺓ ﺍﻻﻧﺗﻘﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﻟﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ‪ .‬ﻳﺟﺏ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻛﻭﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻠﻌﺏ ﺃﺩﻭﺍﺭﺍ ﻭﺍﺿﺣﺔ ﺑﺷﻛﻝ ﻣﺗﺯﺍﻳﺩ‬ ‫ ﻟﻛﻲ ﻳﺗﻡ ﺭﺅﻳﺗﻬﺎ ﻭﺳﻣﺎﻋﻬﺎ ‪ -‬ﻣﺩﻋﻭﻣﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻣﺳﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻳﺔ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻻﺗﺣﺎﺩ ﺍﻷﻭﺭﻭﺑﻲ‬‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫)ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻳﺳﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻳﻥ(‪:‬‬ ‫ﺃﻟﻳﻛﺳﺎﻧﺩﺭ ﺭﻭﻧﺩﻭﺱ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺑﻌﻭﺙ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺹ ﻟﻠﻘﺭﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ‪ ،‬ﻫﻳﺋﺔ ﺍﻻﺗﺣﺎﺩ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻭﺭﻭﺑﻲ ﻟﻠﻌﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻲ؛‬ ‫ﻟﻳﺯﺍ ﻏﺭﺍﻧﺩﻱ‪ ،‬ﻣﻧﺳﻘﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﻡ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﻟﻠﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻹﻧﺳﺎﻧﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ‬

‫ﻣﻘﺎﺭﻧﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺩﺧﻝ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻣﻲ ﺍﻹﺟﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﺣﺳﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﺎﻳﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻣﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻣﻊ ﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﺩﺭﺓ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺻﻧﺎﻋﻳﺔ ﻣﻧﺧﻔﺿﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺑﺎﻟﺗﺎﻟﻲ ﻻ ﻳﻣﻛﻧﻬﺎ ﺍﻻﻋﺗﻣﺎﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻔﺳﻬﺎ‪ .‬ﻟﺫﻟﻙ ﻳﺟﺏ ﺃﻥ‬ ‫ﺗﻛﻭﻥ ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ﺧﻁﺔ ﺻﻧﺎﻋﻳﺔ ﻁﻭﻳﻠﺔ ﺍﻷﺟﻝ‪ .‬ﻛﻣﺎ ﺳﻠﻁ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺛﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺿﻭء ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻭﻗﺎﻳﺔ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﻬﺩﻳﺩﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺷﺋﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻘﻠﻳﺩﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺧﻁﻁ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺙ – ﺑﻣﺎ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺍﻟﺗﻬﺩﻳﺩﺍﺕ ﺗﺣﺕ ﻣﺳﺗﻭﻯ ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ‪ ،‬ﻣﺛﻝ ﺍﻟﺟﺭﻳﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻅﻣﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﺍﻹﻟﻛﺗﺭﻭﻧﻲ ﻭﺣﻣﺎﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺑﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺗﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻭﻁﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺣﺳﺎﺳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﻟﻠﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﺿﺩ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻠﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺳﺗﻬﺩﻑ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻠﻭﻣﺎﺕ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺎﺋﻝ ﺍﻷﺧﺭﻯ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﻧﺎﻗﺷﺗﻬﺎ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ‪ ،‬ﺍﺣﺗﻣﺎﻝ ﺣﻳﺎﺯﺓ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﺩﺍﺕ ﺣﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺭﻭﺳﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺻﻧﻊ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻌﺭﺽ ﺍﻟﻣﺣﺗﻣﻝ ﻟﺗﻛﻧﻭﻟﻭﺟﻳﺎ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﻐﺭﺑﻳﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫)ﺗﻡ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺷﻬﺎﺩ ﺑﺷﻛﻝ ﺧﺎﺹ ﺑﺗﺭﻛﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﻣﻊ ﺧﻁﻁﻬﺎ ﻟﻧﻅﺎﻡ ﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﺟﻭﻱ ﺭﻭﺳﻲ(‪.‬‬ ‫ﺗﻡ ﺍﻹﻗﺭﺍﺭ ﺑﺄﻥ ﺫﻟﻙ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺧﺎﻭﻑ ﺍﻷﺳﺎﺳﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺷﻭﺍﻏﻝ ﺍﻷﺧﺭﻯ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻡ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻁﺭﻕ ﺇﻟﻳﻬﺎ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻓﻬﻡ ﺍﻟﺗﻁﻭﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻹﻳﺭﺍﻧﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﺧﻁﻳﻁ‪ ،‬ﻻ ﺳﻳﻣﺎ ﺍﻟﺧﺑﺭﺓ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻘﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﻳﺭﺍﻧﻳﺔ ﻭﺇﻣﻛﺎﻧﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺑﺗﻛﺎﺭ‪ .‬ﺃﻋﻘﺏ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺍﻋﺗﺭﺍﻑ ﺑﺎﻟﺗﺣﺩﻱ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻣﺛﻝ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﻭﻛﻼء ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻷﺭﺽ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﻳﻑ ﻳﺟﺏ ﺃﻻ ﻳﺅﺩﻱ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺧﻔﺽ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﺎﻳﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﻣﻥ ﺣﻳﺙ ﺍﻟﻣﻣﺎﺭﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﺷﻐﻳﻠﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﺗﺷﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻷﺧﺭﻯ ﺍﻟﺗﻐﻳّﺭﺍﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺳﻭﻕ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻧﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺗﻛﻧﻭﻟﻭﺟﻳﺎ ﻣﻥ ﻣﻭﺭﺩﻳﻥ ﺫﻭﻱ ﻣﻌﺎﻳﻳﺭ ﺗﺻﺩﻳﺭ ﺃﻗﻝ ﺻﺭﺍﻣﺔ ﻣﻣﺎ ﻫﻭ‬ ‫ﺗﻘﻠﻳﺩﻱ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻐﺭﺏ )ﻭﻋﻠﻰ ﻭﺟﻪ ﺍﻟﺧﺻﻭﺹ ﺃﺛﻳﺭﺕ ﻗﺿﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﻧﻅﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺟﻭﻳﺔ ﺑﺩﻭﻥ‬ ‫ﻁﻳﺎﺭ( – ﻭﻟﻣﻭﺍﺟﻬﺔ ﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﻗﺩ ﻳﺣﺗﺎﺝ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺭﺩﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻐﺭﺑﻳﻭﻥ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻛﻭﻧﻭﺍ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ‬ ‫ِّ‬ ‫ﻣﺭﻭﻧﺔ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻰ ﺳﺑﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺛﺎﻝ ﻣﻥ ﺧﻼﻝ ﻭﺿﻊ ﺃﻓﺿﻝ ﻟﺭﺻﺩ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﺧﺩﻡ ﺍﻟﻧﻬﺎﺋﻲ‪ .‬ﻋﻠﻰ‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﺷﺑﺎﺑﻧﺎ ﺑﺷﻛﻝ ﻓﻌﺎﻝ ﻟﻠﻣﺳﺎﻫﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭﻧﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﺭﺧﺎء ﻭﺗﺣﻘﻳﻖ ﻣﺳﺗﻘﺑﻝ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﺇﺷﺭﺍﻗﺎ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﻋﺎﻟﻣﻧﺎ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺭﺍﺑﻁ“‪.‬‬ ‫)ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻳﺳﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻳﻥ(‪ :‬ﺍﻟﻔﺭﻳﻖ )ﻣﺗﻘﺎﻋﺩ( ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺭ ﺗﻭﻣﺎﺱ ﺑﻳﻛﻳﺕ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‪ IISS ،‬ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ؛ ﺍﻟﺟﻧﺭﺍﻝ ﺟﻭﺯﻳﻑ ﻓﻭﺗﻳﻝ‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﺋﺩ ﺍﻟﻘﻳﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﻣﺭﻛﺯﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻟﻠﻘﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﻠﺣﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﺔ‬

‫)ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻳﺳﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻳﻥ(‪:‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻔﺭﻳﻖ )ﻣﺗﻘﺎﻋﺩ( ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﺗﻭﻣﺎﺱ ﺑﻳﻛﻳﺕ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‪ IISS ،‬ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ؛ ﺍﻟﺟﻧﺭﺍﻝ ﺟﻭﺯﻳﻑ‬ ‫ﻓﻭﺗﻳﻝ‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﺋﺩ ﺍﻟﻘﻳﺎﺩﺓ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺭﻛﺯﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻘﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﻠﺣﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﺔ‬

‫ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺍﻷﻭﻟﻰ‪ :‬ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺙ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﺻﻧﻳﻊ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻋﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‬ ‫ﺭﻛﺯﺕ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺗﺭﺗﻳﺏ ﺍﻟﺷﺎﻣﻝ ﻟﻠﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‬ ‫ﻭﺃﺑﻌﺎﺩﻩ ﺍﻟﻌﺳﻛﺭﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺑﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﻭﺱ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﻔﺎﺩﺓ ﻣﻥ ﻣﺟﻣﻭﻋﺔ ﻣﺗﻧﻭﻋﺔ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺟﺎﺭﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻬﺩﻳﺩ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﻣﺭ ﻏﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻣﺎﺛﻝ ﻭﺁﺛﺎﺭ ﻛﻝ ﺫﻟﻙ ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺙ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻋﻲ‪ .‬ﺗﻡ ﺍﻟﺗﺄﻛﻳﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻷﻫﻣﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺣﻳﻭﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﺗﺷﻐﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﺑﻳﻧﻲ ‪ -‬ﺣﻳﺙ ﺗﻌﻣﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻘﻠﻳﻝ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺑﻣﻔﺭﺩﻫﺎ‪ .‬ﺃﻳﺿﺎ ﻣﻥ ﺣﻳﺙ ﺧﻁﻁ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺙ‪ ،‬ﺗﻡ ﺍﻻﺗﻔﺎﻕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻣﺭ ﻻ ﻳﻘﺗﺻﺭ ﻓﻘﻁ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺷﺭﺍء ﺃﻭ ﺑﻳﻊ ﻣﻌﺩﺍﺕ ﻋﺎﻟﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﺩﺭﺓ‪ ،‬ﺑﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻭﺟﻭﺩ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻬﻳﺎﻛﻝ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺋﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺣﻔﺎﻅ ﻋﻠﻳﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻯ ﺍﻟﻁﻭﻳﻝ‪ .‬ﻭﻣﻥ ﺣﻳﺙ ﺍﻟﺗﻬﺩﻳﺩﺍﺕ ﺫﺍﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻭﻟﻭﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺗﻡ ﺗﺳﻠﻳﻁ ﺍﻟﺿﻭء ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﺑﺎﻟﺻﻭﺍﺭﻳﺦ ﺍﻟﺑﺎﻟﻳﺳﺗﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ‬ ‫ﺗﻣﺛﻠﻬﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺃُﺛﻳﺭﺕ ﻧﻘﻁﺔ ﻣﻔﺎﺩﻫﺎ ﺃﻥ ﻣﻳﺯﺍﻧﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ – ﻭﺑﺎﻟﺗﺎﻟﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺑﺎﻟﻎ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻧﻔﻘﻬﺎ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺙ – ﺗﻣﻳﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻛﻭﻧﻬﺎ ﻣﻥ ﺃﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻧﺳﺏ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫)ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻳﺳﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻳﻥ(‪:‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺑﺭﻭﻓﻳﺳﻭﺭ ﺇﺳﻣﺎﻋﻳﻝ‬ ‫ﺩﻳﻣﻳﺭ‪ ،‬ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﺻﻧﺎﻋﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻋﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺗﺭﻛﻳﺎ؛ ﺍﻟﺟﻧﺭﺍﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺭ ﻛﺭﻳﺳﺗﻭﻓﺭ ﺩﻳﻔﻳﺭﻳﻝ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻗﺎﺋﺩ ﻫﻳﺋﺔ ﺍﻷﺭﻛﺎﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺗﺭﻛﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺑﺭﻳﻁﺎﻧﻳﺔ‬

‫ﺃﻭﻣﺎﻣﻭ‪” :‬ﺳﻧﻭﺍﺕ ﻁﻭﻳﻠﺔ ﻟﻡ ﻳﻅﻬﺭ ﺃﺣﺩ ﺍﻻﻫﺗﻣﺎﻡ ﺑﺈﻓﺭﻳﻘﻳﺎ ‪ ...‬ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻧﻳﻭﻥ ﻗﺑﻠﻭﺍ ﻫﺫﻩ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺧﺎﻁﺭﺓ‪ ،‬ﻟﻘﺩ ﻗﺩﻣﻭﺍ ﺍﻟﺗﻣﻭﻳﻝ ﻭﺳﺎﻋﺩﻭﺍ ﺍﻷﻓﺎﺭﻗﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﻧﺎء ﺍﻟﻁﺭﻕ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﺷﻔﻳﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻟﺳﻛﻙ ﺍﻟﺣﺩﻳﺩﻳﺔ ﻭﻣﺎ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺫﻟﻙ“‪.‬‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺭﻏﻡ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺯﺍﻳﺩ ﻟﻠﺟﻬﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﻭﺁﺳﻳﺎ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ‪ ،‬ﺃﻭﺿﺢ ﺑﻳﻠﻳﺎﺭﺩ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﻛﻛﻝ‪:‬‬ ‫ﺗﺳﺗﻣﺭ ﻓﻲ ﻛﻭﻧﻬﺎ ﻫﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻼﺗﺣﺎﺩ ﺍﻷﻭﺭﻭﺑﻲ ‪ ...‬ﺇﻧﻬﺎ ﺷﺭﻳﺎﻥ ﺩﻣﺎﺋﻧﺎ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺗﺟﺎﺭﺓ‬ ‫ﺑﻳﻥ ﺃﻭﺭﻭﺑﺎ ﻭﺁﺳﻳﺎ‪ .‬ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺑﻬﺎ ﻗﻧﺎﺓ ﺍﻟﺳﻭﻳﺱ ﻭﺑﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺩﺏ‪ .‬ﺍﻷﻣﺭ ﻳﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﻌﻼﻗﺗﻧﺎ‬ ‫ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻳﺎﺑﺎﻥ ﻭﺃﺳﺗﺭﺍﻟﻳﺎ ﻭﻣﻊ ﺭﺍﺑﻁﺔ ﺩﻭﻝ ﺟﻧﻭﺏ ﺷﺭﻕ ﺁﺳﻳﺎ )ﺁﺳﻳﺎﻥ( ﻭﺍﻟﻬﻧﺩ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﻟﺩﻳﻧﺎ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﺍﺗﻔﺎﻗﻳﺎﺕ ﻟﻠﺗﺟﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺣﺭﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺷﻛﻝ ﺣﻭﺍﻟﻲ ﺛﻠﺛﻲ ﺗﺟﺎﺭﺗﻧﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﺃﺿﺎﻑ‪” :‬ﺍﻟﻳﻭﻡ ﻳﺗﻡ ﺭﺳﻡ ﻣﺳﺗﻘﺑﻝ ﺃﻭﺭﻭﺑﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺃﻓﺭﻳﻘﻳﺎ‪ .‬ﺇﺫﺍ ﻓﺷﻠﺕ ﺃﻓﺭﻳﻘﻳﺎ‬ ‫ﺳﺗﻔﺷﻝ ﺃﻭﺭﻭﺑﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﺇﺫﺍ ﻧﺟﺣﺕ ﺃﻓﺭﻳﻘﻳﺎ ﻓﺳﺗﻧﺟﺢ ﺃﻭﺭﻭﺑﺎ“‪.‬‬ ‫ﻛﻣﺎ ﺃﺷﺎﺩ ﺑﺎﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻹﻣﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﻟﺩﻭﺭﻫﻣﺎ‬ ‫ﺍﻹﻳﺟﺎﺑﻲ‪ ،‬ﺑﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺍﻟﺗﻭﺳﻁ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﻘﺎﺭﺏ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺇﺛﻳﻭﺑﻳﺎ ﻭﺇﺭﻳﺗﺭﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﺷﺟﻌﻬﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫ﻟﻌﺏ ﺩﻭﺭ ﺃﻛﺑﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻭﻓﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺗﻣﻭﻳﻝ ﻟﺑﻌﺛﺔ ﺍﻻﺗﺣﺎﺩ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺻﻭﻣﺎﻝ )ﺃﻣﻳﺳﻭﻡ(‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻁﻭﻳﺭ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺟﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﻠﻳﻡ ﻭﺍﻟﺑﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺗﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻧﻣﻳﺔ ﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎﺩﻳﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﺃﻗﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺛﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﺑﺄﻫﻣﻳﺔ ﺿﻣﺎﻥ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺍﻁﻧﻭﻥ ﻫﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﻔﻳﺩﻭﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺳﻳﻭﻥ ﻣﻥ ﻓﻭﺍﺋﺩ ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ‪ .‬ﻛﻣﺎ ﺗﺣﺩﺙ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺟﻬﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺑﺫﻟﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺻﻭﻣﺎﻟﻳﺔ ﻹﻳﺟﺎﺩ ﻓﺭﺹ ﻋﻣﻝ ﻭﻓﺭﺹ ﺗﺩﺭﻳﺑﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﺷﺑﺎﺏ‪” :‬ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻝ ﺑﺄﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻱ ﺍﻷﻛﺑﺭ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻳﻭﺍﺟﻪ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ ﻭﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﻫﻭ ﻛﻳﻔﻳﺔ ﺗﻣﻛﻳﻥ ﻭﺩﻋﻡ‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﻳﺟﺏ ﻣﻌﺎﻟﺟﺗﻪ ﺇﺫﺍ ﺃﺭﺩﻧﺎ ﺃﻥ ﻧﻛﻭﻥ ﻧﺎﺟﺣﻳﻥ‪” .‬ﻭﺷﺩﺩ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺻﻭﻣﺎﻝ‬ ‫ﻳﺗﺟﻪ ﺗﺩﺭﻳﺟﻳﺎ ﻧﺣﻭ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻭﻳﻛﺷﻑ ﻋﻥ ﺇﻣﻛﺎﻧﻳﺎﺗﻪ ﻭﻣﺯﺍﻳﺎﻩ ﺃﻣﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻛﺎء‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﺛﻣﺭﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺣﺗﻣﻠﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﻳﻔﺗﺢ ﺣﻘﺑﺔ ﺟﺩﻳﺩﺓ ”ﺑﺎﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺃﻛﺑﺭ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻭﺍﻧﺊ‬ ‫]ﺍﻟﺻﻭﻣﺎﻝ[ ﻭﺍﻟﺑﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺗﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﺯﻳﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺭﻑ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻫﻣﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺟﺳﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﺑﻠﻭﻣﺎﺳﻲ‬

‫ﺟﺎﻥ‪-‬ﻛﺭﻳﺳﺗﻭﻑ ﺑﻳﻠﻳﺎﺭﺩ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻧﺎﺋﺏ ﺍﻷﻣﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻟﻠﺷﺅﻭﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﻲ‬ ‫ﻟﻬﻳﺋﺔ ﺍﻻﺗﺣﺎﺩ ﺍﻷﻭﺭﻭﺑﻲ‬ ‫ﻟﻠﻌﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻲ‬

‫ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﻟﻠﺻﻭﻣﺎﻝ ﺗﺷﻳﻳﺩﻩ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻁﻖ‪ ،‬ﻟﻛﻥ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﻻ ﻳﺯﺍﻝ ﻫﺷﺎ ﻭﻋﺭﺿﺔ‬ ‫ﻟﻠﺻﺩﻣﺎﺕ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﻛﺎﻧﺕ ﺍﻟﺭﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺍﻧﺑﺛﻘﺕ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﻫﻲ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺃﻓﺭﻳﻘﻳﺎ ﺇﻟﻰ‬ ‫ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎﺭ ﺍﻷﺟﻧﺑﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﻣﺭ‪ .‬ﻭﻭﻓﻘﺎ ﻷﻭﻣﺎﻣﻭ ”ﻻ ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ﺳﻼﻡ‬ ‫ﻣﺳﺗﺩﺍﻡ ﺑﺩﻭﻥ ﺗﻧﻣﻳﺔ ‪ ...‬ﻟﺫﻟﻙ ﻳﺟﺏ ﺭﺑﻁ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻲ ﺑﺈﺗﺎﺣﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺍﺭﺩ ﺍﻟﻬﺎﺋﻠﺔ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻹﻣﻛﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎﺩﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ ﺍﻹﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ“‪ .‬ﻟﻬﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺳﺑﺏ‪ ،‬ﺣﺛﺕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﺳﺗﻣﺭﺍﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺟﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺳﻳﺣﻘﻖ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻧﻣﻳﺔ ﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎﺩﻳﺔ ﻣﻌﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺇﻥ ﺣﻣﺎﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻁﺭﻕ ﺍﻟﻠﻭﺟﺳﺗﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﺟﺎﺭﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺳﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺭ ﺍﻷﺣﻣﺭ‪ ،‬ﻭﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﻣﺿﻳﻖ ﺑﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺩﺏ ﻭﺑﺣﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺏ‪ ،‬ﺳﻳﻌﺯﺯ ﺍﻟﻧﻣﻭ ﻭﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻳﻳﻥ‪ .‬ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫ﻧﻔﺱ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻭﺍﻝ‪ ،‬ﺷﺟﻊ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺍﻟﺟﻣﻬﻭﺭ ﻋﻠﻰ ”ﺇﺩﺭﺍﻙ ﺍﻟﻭﺿﻊ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﺭﻳﺩ‬ ‫]ﻟﻠﺻﻭﻣﺎﻝ[ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﻭﻋﺩ ﺑﺄﻥ ﻳﺻﺑﺢ ﻗﻭﺓ ﺍﻗﺗﺻﺎﺩﻳﺔ ﻭﺗﺟﺎﺭﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﻘﺑﻝ“‪ .‬ﻣﻊ‬ ‫ﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﻋﻧﺩ ﺗﻧﺎﻭﻝ ﺃﺳﺋﻠﺔ ﻣﺣﺩﺩﺓ ﺣﻭﻝ ﺩﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﻭﺍﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎﺭ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﻣﺷﺎﺭﻳﻊ ﺍﻟﺑﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺗﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﻝ ﺃﻥ ”ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻧﻳﻳﻥ ﻳﺑﺭﻣﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺻﻔﻘﺎﺕ ﺑﺳﺭﻋﺔ ﻭﺭﺑﻣﺎ ﻣﻊ‬ ‫ﺑﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﺗﺷﺟﻳﻊ‪ ،‬ﻭﺩﺭﺟﺔ ﻣﺳﺎءﻟﺔ ﺃﻗﻝ‪ ...‬ﺇﻥ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗﻳﺎﺕ ﺃﺳﺭﻉ ﻭﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﻛﻔﺎءﺓ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻭﻟﻛﻥ ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻛﻭﻥ ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ﻋﻭﺍﻗﺏ ﻟﻬﺎ“‪ .‬ﻛﺎﻥ ﻫﺫﺍ ﻫﻭ ﺍﻟﻣﻔﻬﻭﻡ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺭﺩﺩﺗﻪ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫ﻋﺑﺩﻱ ﺳﻌﻳﺩ ﻋﻠﻲ‪ ،‬ﻣﺳﺗﺷﺎﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻣﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺻﻭﻣﺎﻝ‬

‫ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﻓﻲ ﺃﻓﺭﻳﻘﻳﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺳﺎﻫﻡ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺟﺩﺩ ﺍﻻﻫﺗﻣﺎﻡ ﺑﻌﻼﻗﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﻣﻌﺭﺽ ﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﺔ ﺗﺟﺭﺑﺔ ﻛﻳﻧﻳﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣﻝ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻷﻣﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻳﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺃﻛﺩﺕ ﻭﺯﻳﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﻛﻳﻧﻳﺔ ﺭﺍﻳﺷﻳﻝ ﺃﻭﻣﺎﻣﻭ ﻋﻠﻰ ”ﺃﻫﻣﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﺍﻛﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻭﻥ“‪،‬‬ ‫ﻣﺫﻛﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺟﻣﻬﻭﺭ ﺑﺄﻥ ”ﻧﻣﺎﺫﺝ ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ ﻭﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺑﺗﻛﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻌﺗﻣﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻭﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻭﺛﻳﻖ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻗﺩ ُ‬ ‫ﻁﺑﻘﺕ ﺑﻧﺟﺎﺡ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓﻳﻣﺎ ﻳﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎﺕ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ‪ ،‬ﻛﺎﻥ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻷﻫﻣﻳﺔ ﺑﻣﻛﺎﻥ ﻣﻥ ﻭﺟﻬﺔ ﻧﻅﺭﻫﺎ‬ ‫”ﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺗﻘﻭﻳﻡ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺭﻭﺍﺑﻁ“ ﺣﺗﻰ ﺗﺻﺑﺢ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﻣﻧﻔﻌﺔ ﻭﺑﺻﻭﺭﺓ ﻣﺗﺑﺎﺩﻟﺔ ﺗﺟﺎﻩ ”ﺑﻧﺎء‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺛﺭﻭﺓ ﻭﺇﻳﺟﺎﺩ ﻓﺭﺹ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺗﺑﺎﺩﻻﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﺟﺎﺭﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻻﺑﺗﻛﺎﺭ‪ ،‬ﻭﺗﻁﻭﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺑﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺗﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻘﺩﻡ ﺍﻻﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﻲ‪-‬ﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎﺩﻱ“‪.‬‬ ‫ﺑﻧﻰ ﻣﺳﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻣﻲ ﺍﻟﺻﻭﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﻋﺑﺩﻱ ﺳﻌﻳﺩ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻭﺟﻬﺔ ﻧﻅﺭ‬ ‫ﺃﻭﻣﺎﻣﻭ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻛﻧﻪ ﻁﻠﺏ ﺗﻭﺧﻲ ﺍﻟﺣﺫﺭ ﻣﺅﻛﺩﺍ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺭﻏﻡ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻔﻭﺍﺋﺩ ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺟﻣﺔ ﻋﻥ‬ ‫ﺯﻳﺎﺩﺓ ﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﺍﻷﺯﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﻟﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ‬ ‫ﺗﻌﻧﻲ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗﻳﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﻔﺎﻭﺿﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺗﺿﻣﻥ ﺃﺣﺩ ﺍﻷﻁﺭﺍﻑ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺟﻳﺔ ﺗﺟﺫﺏ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺻﻭﻣﺎﻝ ﻧﺣﻭ ﺃﺯﻣﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﻗﺩ ﺃﻋﺭﺏ ﺟﺎﻥ‪-‬ﻛﺭﻳﺳﺗﻭﻑ ﺑﻳﻠﻳﺎﺭﺩ‪ ،‬ﻧﺎﺋﺏ ﺍﻷﻣﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻟﻠﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﻬﻳﺋﺔ ﺍﻻﺗﺣﺎﺩ ﺍﻷﻭﺭﻭﺑﻲ ﻟﻠﻌﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻲ‪ ،‬ﻋﻥ ﻣﺧﺎﻭﻑ‬ ‫ﻣﻣﺎﺛﻠﺔ‪” :‬ﻧﺣﻥ ﺃﻣﺎﻡ ﻭﺿﻊ – ﻭﻫﻭ ﺃﺣﺩ ﻋﻭﺍﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﻘﻳﺩ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺻﻭﻣﺎﻝ – ﺗﻘﻭﻡ ﻓﻳﻪ‬ ‫ﻗﻁﺭ ﻭﺗﺭﻛﻳﺎ ﺑﻌﻣﻝ ﻣﺎ ﻭﺗﻘﻭﻡ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻹﻣﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺑﻌﻣﻝ ﺃﻣﺭ ﺁﺧﺭ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺫﺍ ﺷﻲء‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﻭﺿﻊ ”ﺿﺭﻳﺑﺔ ﺗﺿﺎﻣﻥ ﺩﻭﻟﻳﺔ“‪” :‬ﺇﺫﺍ ﻓﺭﺿﻧﺎ ﺿﺭﺍﺋﺏ ﻗﻠﻳﻠﺔ ﺟﺩﺍ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫ﺳﺑﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺛﺎﻝ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻰ ﺻﺭﻑ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻼﺕ‪ ،‬ﻭﺇﻋﻁﺎء ﺍﻷﻣﻭﺍﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻅﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻳﺔ‬

‫ﺭﺍﻳﺷﻳﻝ ﺃﻭﻣﺎﻣﻭ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﻳﺭﺓ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ‪ ،‬ﻛﻳﻧﻳﺎ‬

‫ﻣﺑﺎﺷﺭﺓ ﻭﺗﺗﻭﻟﻰ ﻣﻬﻣﺔ ﺭﻋﺎﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻼﺟﺋﻳﻥ ﻭﺍﻷﺷﺧﺎﺹ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺭﺩﻳﻥ ﺩﺍﺧﻠﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﻫﺫﺍ ﻳﻣﻛﻥ‬ ‫ﺃﻥ ﻳﻭﻓﺭ ﺩﻋﻣﺎ ﺃﻓﺿﻝ ﻟﻬﺅﻻء ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺱ“‪.‬‬ ‫ﻣﻊ ﻁﺭﺡ ﻣﺳﺄﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﻣﻊ ﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ‪ ،‬ﺷﺩﺩ ﺍﻟﺻﻔﺩﻱ ﻣﺭﺓ ﺃﺧﺭﻯ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻥ‬ ‫ﺣﻝ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺗﻳﻥ ﻳﺟﺏ ﺃﻥ ﻳﺗﻡ ﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻩ ﻭﺃﻥ ﻣﺑﺎﺩﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﻗﺩﻣﺕ ﻣﻧﺫ ﻋﺎﻡ‬ ‫‪ .2002‬ﺑﺎﻟﻧﺳﺑﺔ ﻟﻪ‪” ،‬ﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻛﻥ ﻳﺟﺏ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺻﺑﺢ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ”‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺫﺍ ﻟﻥ ﻳﺣﺩﺙ ﺇﻻ ﺑﻌﺩ ﺗﺣﻘﻳﻖ ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ ﺍﻹﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻠﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻲ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺃﺧﻳﺭﺍ‪ ،‬ﺗﻡ ﺗﻧﺎﻭﻝ ﻣﺳﺄﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﻠﺣﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﻳﻠﻳﺷﻳﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺍﻕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻭﺟﻪ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺧﺻﻭﺹ ﺑﺎﻟﻧﺳﺑﺔ ﻟﻣﺎﻏﻭﺭﻙ‪ ،‬ﺣﻳﺙ ﺃﺷﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺑﻌﺛﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﺩﺭﻳﺏ ﻻ ﺗﺯﺍﻝ ﺟﺎﺭﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻟﺯﻳﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻻﺣﺗﺭﺍﻓﻳﺔ ﻟﺩﻯ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﻠﺣﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺍﻗﻳﺔ ﺩﻋﻣﺎ ﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺍﻗﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻣﺛﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ ”ﺃﻥ ﺟﻣﻳﻊ ﺍﻷﺳﻠﺣﺔ ﺗﺧﺿﻊ ﻟﺳﻳﻁﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺔ“‪.‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﻣﺳﺔ‪ :‬ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻧﺎﻓﺱ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ‬ ‫ﻗﺩﻡ ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻬﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﺑﻌﺩﺍ ﺟﻳﻭﺳﻳﺎﺳﻳﺎ ﻭﺟﻐﺭﺍﻓﻳﺎ ﺟﺩﻳﺩﺍ ﻳﻧﺎﻗﺵ ﺍﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ‬ ‫ﺑﻳﻥ ﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﻭﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ‪ ،‬ﻣﻧﻪ ﺍﻻﻋﺗﻣﺎﺩ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻱ ﻭﺍﻹﻣﺎﺭﺍﺗﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﻋﺩ ﺍﻟﻌﺳﻛﺭﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻳﺔ ﻟﺷﻥ ﻫﺟﻣﺎﺕ ﺿﺩ ﺍﻟﺣﻭﺛﻳﻳﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻷﻫﻣﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺯﺍﻳﺩﺓ ﻟﻣﺿﻳﻖ ﺑﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺩﺏ ﻟﻠﺗﺟﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﺣﺗﺩﺍﻡ ﺍﻟﻧﺩﻳّﺔ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺩﻭﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫ﺑﺭﻳﺕ ﻣﺎﻏﻭﺭﻙ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﺑﻌﻭﺙ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺭﺋﺎﺳﻲ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺹ ﻟﻼﺋﺗﻼﻑ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻬﺯﻳﻣﺔ ﺩﺍﻋﺵ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‬

‫ﻗﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﺑﻌﻭﺙ ﺍﻟﺭﺋﺎﺳﻲ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺹ ﻟﻼﺋﺗﻼﻑ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻬﺯﻳﻣﺔ ﺩﺍﻋﺵ ﺑﺭﻳﺕ‬ ‫ﻣﺎﻏﻭﺭﻙ‪ ،‬ﻣﻥ ﻭﺯﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺃﻭﻻ ﺑﺗﺫﻛﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺟﻣﻬﻭﺭ ﺑﺎﻟﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ‬ ‫ﺗﺣﻘﻘﺕ ﻣﻧﺫ ﺑﺩء ﺍﻟﺣﻣﻠﺔ ﺿﺩ ﺩﺍﻋﺵ ﻓﻲ ﺳﺑﺗﻣﺑﺭ ‪ .2014‬ﻳﺳﻳﻁﺭ ﺩﺍﻋﺵ ﺍﻵﻥ‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻗﻝ ﻣﻥ ‪ 2٪‬ﻣﻥ ﺍﻷﺭﺍﺿﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺍﺳﺗﻭﻟﻰ ﻋﻠﻳﻬﺎ ﻣﻧﺫ ﺃﺭﺑﻊ ﺳﻧﻭﺍﺕ‪ .‬ﻭﻗﺩ ﺍﺗﺑﻊ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺎﻟﻑ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻫﺽ ﻟﺩﺍﻋﺵ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻧﻣﺎ ﻣﻥ ‪ 12‬ﺇﻟﻰ ‪ 79‬ﻋﺿﻭﺍ‪ ،‬ﻧﻬﺟﺎ ﺷﺎﻣﻼ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺗﺩﺧﻼﺗﻪ ﺑﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺍﻟﺟﻭﺍﻧﺏ ﺍﻹﻧﺳﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﻭﺗﺣﻘﻳﻖ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ‪ .‬ﻭﻫﺫﺍ ﻳﻧﻁﻭﻱ ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫ﻋﻣﻝ ﻣﻠﻣﻭﺱ‪” ،‬ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻫﻭ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻷﺳﺎﺳﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺄﺗﻲ ﻣﺑﺎﺷﺭﺓ‬ ‫ﺑﻌﺩ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻠﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻌﺳﻛﺭﻳﺔ‪ :‬ﺇﺯﺍﻟﺔ ﺍﻷﻟﻐﺎﻡ ﺍﻷﺭﺿﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺣﺻﻭﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻣﻳﺎﻩ ﻭﻋﻭﺩﺓ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺧﺩﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻷﺳﺎﺳﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻛﻬﺭﺑﺎء ﻣﺭﺓ ﺃﺧﺭﻯ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻁﻖ ﺣﺗﻰ ﻳﺗﻣﻛﻥ ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺱ‬ ‫ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﻭﺩﺓ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺩﻳﺎﺭﻫﻡ“‪ .‬ﻓﻲ ﺃﻋﻘﺎﺏ ﺣﻣﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺻﻝ‪ ،‬ﺣﺻﻝ ﻛﻝ ﻧﺎﺯﺡ ﺩﺍﺧﻠﻲ‬ ‫ﻫﺭﺏ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺻﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺄﻭﻯ ﻭﻣﺳﺎﻋﺩﺍﺕ‪ .‬ﻭﺑﻔﺿﻝ ﺟﻬﻭﺩ ﺗﺣﻘﻳﻖ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺑﺩﺃ ﺍﻟﺑﻌﺽ ﻣﻧﻬﻡ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻭﺩﺓ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺻﻝ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻗﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺭﻏﻡ ﻣﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻷﻣﺭ‬ ‫ﺳﻳﺳﺗﻐﺭﻕ ﻣﺯﻳﺩﺍ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﻗﺕ ﻓﻲ ﻏﺭﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺻﻝ‪ .‬ﻭﻓﻲ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ ﺃﻳﺿﺎ ﺳﻳﺳﺗﻐﺭﻕ‬ ‫ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻭﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺑﻧﺎء ﺳﻧﻭﺍﺕ‪ .‬ﺗﻡ ﺗﻁﻬﻳﺭ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﻣﻥ ‪ 250,000‬ﻋﺑﻭﺓ ﻧﺎﺳﻔﺔ‬ ‫ﺑﻌﺩ ﺍﺳﺗﻌﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺭﻗﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﻋﻭﺩﺓ ‪ 150,000‬ﺳﻭﺭﻱ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺩﻳﺎﺭﻫﻡ‪ .‬ﻣﻊ ﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺎﺕ ﻫﺎﺋﻠﺔ ﻭﻻ ﻳﺯﺍﻝ ﺍﻟﺟﺯء ﺍﻷﺻﻌﺏ ﺃﻣﺎﻣﻧﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﺷﻣﻠﺕ ﺍﻟﻘﺿﺎﻳﺎ ﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺳﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﻅﻬﺭﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻠﺕ ﺫﻟﻙ ﻣﺧﻳﻡ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻼﺟﺋﻳﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺭﻛﺑﺎﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺣﺩﻭﺩ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ ﻭﺷﻣﺎﻝ ﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﺭﺩﻥ ﻭ ﻭﺿﻊ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻼﺟﺋﻳﻥ ﺑﺷﻛﻝ ﻋﺎﻡ‪ .‬ﺍﻗﺗﺭﺡ ﻛﻭﻧﻭ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻧﻅﺭﺍ ﻷﻥ ﻣﻭﺍﺭﺩ ﻣﻌﻅﻡ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﺎﺕ ﻣﺣﺩﻭﺩﺓ‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﻭﻛﺎﻥ ﺃﺣﺩ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺍﺿﻳﻊ ﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺳﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﻧﺎﻗﺷﻬﺎ ﻛﻭﻧﻭ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺑﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺗﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﻠﻳﻣﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻭﺃﺷﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻣﺳﺎﻫﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻳﺎﺑﺎﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﻣﻥ ﺧﻼﻝ ﻓﺗﺢ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺩﺍﺭﺱ ﻭﺑﺭﺍﻣﺞ ﺍﻟﺗﺩﺭﻳﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﻬﻧﻲ ﻭﺗﻣﻛﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﺷﺑﺎﺏ ﻣﻥ ﺧﻼﻝ ﺑﺭﺍﻣﺞ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺩﺓ‬

‫ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﺃﻳﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺻﻔﺩﻱ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻭﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻐﺗﺭﺑﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﺭﺩﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻬﺎﺷﻣﻳﺔ‬

‫ﺍﻟﺷﺑﺎﺏ‪ .‬ﻭﺍﺧﺗﺗﻡ ﺑﺎﻟﺗﺭﻛﻳﺯ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻧﻣﻳﺔ ﺭﺃﺱ ﺍﻟﻣﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﺑﺷﺭﻱ ﻳﻌﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻷﻣﻭﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺣﺎﺳﻣﺔ ﻟﺗﺣﻘﻳﻖ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻭﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻹﻋﻣﺎﺭ ﺑﻧﺟﺎﺡ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﺳﺗﺷﻬﺩ ﺑﺈﺣﺩﻯ ﻛﺗﺎﺑﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﻠﻡ ﻣﻥ ﺣﻘﺑﺔ ﻣﻳﺟﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﺎﺭﻳﺧﻳﺔ ﻣﻔﺎﺩﻫﺎ ﺃﻧﻪ ”ﻳﺟﺏ ﺍﻟﺣﺻﻭﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﻼﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻭﻁﻧﻲ ﻣﻥ ﺧﻼﻝ ﺗﺣﻘﻳﻖ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﻼﻝ ﺍﻟﺷﺧﺻﻲ“‪.‬‬ ‫ﻗﺎﻝ ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﺭﺩﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﺃﻳﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺻﻔﺩﻱ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻟﻛﻲ ﺗﺗﻣ ّﻛﻥ‬ ‫ﻣﻥ ﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﺔ ﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻹﻋﻣﺎﺭ‪ ،‬ﻳﺟﺏ ﺃﻥ ﻳﺗﻭﻗﻑ ﺍﻟﺗﺩﻣﻳﺭ ﺃﻭﻻ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﺫﻟﻙ ﺗﻧﺎﻭﻝ ﺟﺫﻭﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻣﺎﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪ .‬ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ ﺍﻷﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺫﻛﺭﻩ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ ﺍﻹﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻠﻲ‬ ‫ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻲ‪ ،‬ﻣﺅﻛﺩﺍ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺣﻝ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺗﻳﻥ‪ .‬ﺍﻟﻳﻭﻡ ﻻ ﻳﻭﺟﺩ ﺃﻣﻝ ﻓﻲ‬‫ﺍﻷﻓﻖ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﻳﺄﺱ ﻳﺟﻌﻝ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺳﻬﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺩﻳﻛﺎﻟﻳﻳﻥ ﺍﺳﺗﻐﻼﻝ ﻭﻧﺷﺭ ﺑﺭﺍﻣﺞ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻛﺭﺍﻫﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺣﻝ ﺳﻳﺎﺳﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ ﻛﺫﻟﻙ ﻷﻥ ﺗﻧﻅﻳﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻣﻳﺔ )ﺩﺍﻋﺵ( ﻳﺯﺩﻫﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻳﺋﺔ ﺍﻟﻳﺄﺱ ﻭﻓﻘﺩﺍﻥ ﺍﻷﻣﻝ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺑﻳﺋﺔ ﺑﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ‬ ‫ﺗﻐﻳﻳﺭ‪ .‬ﻭﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻭﺍﻗﻊ ”ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻳﻌﻧﻲ ﺗﻭﻓﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻅﺭﻭﻑ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﻳﻌﻳﺵ ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺱ ﻓﻲ ﻅﻠﻬﺎ‬ ‫ﺑﻛﺭﺍﻣﺔ“‪ .‬ﻫﺫﺍ ﺃﻣﺭ ﺣﺎﺳﻡ ﻟﺿﻣﺎﻥ ﻋﻭﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﻼﺟﺋﻳﻥ ‪ -‬ﻭﻳﺳﺗﺿﻳﻑ ﺍﻷﺭﺩﻥ ﺣﺎﻟﻳﺎ‬ ‫‪ 1.3‬ﻣﻠﻳﻭﻥ ﻻﺟﺊ ﺳﻭﺭﻱ‪ .‬ﻭﻟﻥ ﺗﻌﻭﺩ ﺍﻷﺳﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺑﻠﺩﻫﺎ ﺇﻻ ﻋﻧﺩﻣﺎ ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺿﻣﺎﻥ‬ ‫ﺣﺻﻭﻟﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻭﺿﻊ ﺁﻣﻥ ﻷﻁﻔﺎﻟﻬﻡ‪.‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫ﺗﺎﺭﻭ ﻛﻭﻧﻭ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻳﺎﺑﺎﻥ‬

‫ﻭﻓﻳﻣﺎ ﻳﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺩﻭﻝ ﻣﺟﻠﺱ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺟﻲ‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﻝ ﺑﻥ ﻋﻠﻭﻱ ﺃﻥ ﺩﻭﻟﻪ ﺍﻷﻋﺿﺎء‬ ‫ﻣﺎ ﺯﺍﻟﺕ ﺣﺭﻳﺻﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺣﻔﺎﻅ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻅﻣﺔ ﻭﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻧﺯﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﺑﻳﻧﻬﺎ ﻟﻡ ﺗﺳﺗﻬﺩﻑ‬ ‫ﺩﻭﻝ ﻣﺟﻠﺱ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺟﻲ ﻧﻔﺳﻪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺍﻗﺗﺭﺣﺕ ﺗﺭﻳﻧﺗﺎ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﻟﻠﻘﻁﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺹ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻠﻌﺏ ﺩﻭﺭﺍ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﻧﺷﺎﻁﺎ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺣﻝ ﺍﻟﻧﺯﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﻷﻥ ﺷﺑﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻼء ﻭﺍﻟﻣﻭﺭﺩﻳﻥ ﺗﻣﺛﻝ ﺃﺻﺣﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﺻﻠﺣﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺣﻠﻳﻳﻥ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻋﻼﻭﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﺳﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﻟﺩﻯ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻛﺎﺕ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺩﻣﻪ ﻋﻧﺩﻣﺎ ﻳﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺍﻷﻣﺭ ﺑﺈﻋﺎﺩﺓ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺑﻧﺎء‪ ،‬ﺑﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺗﻣﻭﻳﻝ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺟﻬﻭﺩ‪ .‬ﺃﺻﺭﺕ ﺗﺭﻳﻧﺗﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻭﺭﻭﺑﻳﺔ ﻛﺎﻧﺕ ﺗﺩﺭﻙ ﺟﻳﺩﺍ ﺧﻁﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻠﻳﺷﻳﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﻟﺟﻣﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻷﺧﺭﻯ ﻏﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺗﺎﺑﻌﺔ‬ ‫ﻟﻠﺩﻭﻝ ﻭﺃﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﺭﺍﻗﺏ ﻋﻥ ﻛﺛﺏ ﺃﻧﺷﻁﺔ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻣﺟﺎﻝ‪.‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺑﻌﺔ‪ :‬ﺗﺛﺑﻳﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻭﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻹﻋﻣﺎﺭ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‬ ‫ﺗﻧﺎﻭﻟﺕ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺑﻌﺔ ﻗﺿﻳﺔ ﺗﺛﺑﻳﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻭﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻹﻋﻣﺎﺭ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪ .‬ﺃﻛﺩ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺩ ﺗﺎﺭﻭ ﻛﻭﻧﻭ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻳﺎﺑﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﺩﻋﻡ ﺍﻟﻳﺎﺑﺎﻥ‬ ‫ﻟﻺﺻﻼﺣﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺛﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺟﺎﺭﻳﺔ ﺣﺎﻟﻳﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪ ،‬ﻭﺗﻘﺎﺳﻡ ﺧﺑﺭﺍﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻳﺎﺑﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺙ ﻭﺍﻹﺻﻼﺣﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﻣﻣﺎ ﺳﻣﺢ ﻟﻠﺑﻠﺩ ﺑﺎﻟﻧﺟﺎﺡ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﺻﻧﻳﻊ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺙ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺣﻔﺎﻅ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻳﻣﻬﺎ ﻭﺗﻘﺎﻟﻳﺩﻫﺎ‪ .‬ﻋﻠﻰ ﻭﺟﻪ ﺍﻟﺧﺻﻭﺹ‪ ،‬ﺷﺩﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺭﺃﺱ ﺍﻟﻣﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﺑﺷﺭﻱ‪ ،‬ﻭﺇﺩﺧﺎﻝ ﺃﻧﻅﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻭﻅﻳﻑ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺋﻣﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺟﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﻟﻠﺣﻛﻭﻣﺔ‪ ،‬ﻣﻥ ﺃﺟﻝ ﺗﻭﻓﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻔﺭﺹ ﻟﻛﻝ ﻣﻭﺍﻁﻥ‪.‬‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﺍﻷﻭﺭﻭﺑﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻧﻬﺞ ﻣﻧﺳﻖ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺟﻣﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﻠﺣﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﻻ ﺗﺗﺑﻊ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ‬ ‫ﻭﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺗﻠﻙ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺩﻋﻣﻬﺎ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ‪.‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭﺓ ﺇﻟﻳﺯﺍﺑﻳﺗﺎ ﺗﺭﻳﻧﺗﺎ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻭﺯﻳﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ‪ ،‬ﺇﻳﻁﺎﻟﻳﺎ‬

‫ﺃﺟﺎﺑﺕ ﻓﻭﻥ ﺩﻳﺭ ﻻﻳﻥ ﺑﺄﻥ ﺍﻟﻬﺩﻑ ﺍﻷﺳﺎﺳﻲ ﻣﻥ ﺍﺟﺗﻣﺎﻉ ﺍﺳﻁﻧﺑﻭﻝ ﺑﺷﺄﻥ‬ ‫ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ ﻫﻭ ﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺇﺣﻳﺎء ﻋﻣﻠﻳﺔ ﺟﻧﻳﻑ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﻳﺟﺏ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻛﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻅﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﻟﺗﺣﻘﻳﻖ‬ ‫ﻧﺗﻳﺟﺔ ﻣﻘﺑﻭﻟﺔ‪ .‬ﻓﻳﻣﺎ ﻳﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﻘﺿﻳﺔ ﻓﻠﺳﻁﻳﻥ ﻭﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ‪ ،‬ﺃﺻﺭﺕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺃﻟﻣﺎﻧﻳﺎ‬ ‫ﻟﺩﻳﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﺗﺯﺍﻡ ﺧﺎﺹ ﺗﺟﺎﻩ ﺍﻟﺷﻌﺏ ﺍﻹﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻠﻲ ﻭﺃﻥ ﺣﻝ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺗﻳﻥ ﻫﻭ ﺍﻟﻁﺭﻳﻖ ﺇﻟﻰ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻣﺎﻡ‪ .‬ﻭﺃﻭﺿﺣﺕ ﺍﻟﻭﺯﻳﺭﺓ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻟﻥ ﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ﺍﻟﻣﺯﻳﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺻﺎﺩﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻷﺳﻠﺣﺔ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺃﻟﻣﺎﻧﻳﺎ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻭﻗﺕ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﻟﻲ‪ .‬ﻭﻗﺎﻟﺕ ﺃﻥ ﺃﻟﻣﺎﻧﻳﺎ ﺗﻔﺿﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺇﻁﺎﺭ ﺧﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺗﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﺑﺷﺄﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﺿﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﻳﺭﺍﻧﻳﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻷﻗﻝ ﻷﻧﻪ ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ﻗﺿﺎﻳﺎ ﺃﺧﺭﻯ ﻫﺎﻣﺔ ﻳﺟﺏ ﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﺗﻬﺎ ﻣﻊ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﻣﺛﻝ ﺗﺄﺛﻳﺭﻫﺎ‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺟﻣﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﻏﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺗﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻟﻠﺩﻭﻝ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺻﺭﺡ ﺑﻥ ﻋﻠﻭﻱ ﺑﻭﺿﻭﺡ ﺃﻧﻪ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻟﻡ ﻳﺗﻡ ﺍﻟﺗﻭﺻﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺣﻝ ﺩﺍﺋﻡ ﻟﻠﻘﺿﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﻠﻥ ﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ﺍﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ‪ .‬ﻭﺃﻭﺿﺢ ﺃﻥ‪:‬‬ ‫ﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ ﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﻣﻭﺟﻭﺩﺓ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ‪ ...‬ﻟﻛﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺭﻏﻡ ﻣﻥ ﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ‬ ‫ﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ ﻻ ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻷﺧﺭﻯ ﺑﻣﺛﻝ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻝ ﻫﻲ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻷﺧﺭﻯ‪ .‬ﺭﺑﻣﺎ‬ ‫ﺣﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﻗﺕ ﻟﻛﻲ ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻝ ﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ ﺑﻧﻔﺱ ﺍﻟﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ‪ ،‬ﻛﻣﺎ ﻳﺟﺏ ﻋﻠﻳﻬﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺗﺣﻣﻝ ﻧﻔﺱ‬ ‫ﺍﻻﻟﺗﺯﺍﻣﺎﺕ ﻣﺛﻝ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻷﺧﺭﻯ ‪ ...‬ﺗﻣﺗﻠﻙ ﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ ﻗﺩﺭﺍﺕ ﺗﺳﻣﺢ ﻟﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻻﺳﺗﻔﺎﺩﺓ‬ ‫ﻣﻥ ﺍﻵﺧﺭﻳﻥ ﻭﺇﻓﺎﺩﺗﻬﻡ‪ ،‬ﻟﻣﻌﺎﻧﺎﺓ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﻳﻥ ﻭﻣﻌﺎﻧﺎﺓ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺏ ﻭﺃﻳﺿﺎ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﺎﺓ‬ ‫ﺍﻹﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻠﻳﻳﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻳﻬﻭﺩ ﻓﻲ ﺟﻣﻳﻊ ﺃﻧﺣﺎء ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻡ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﻳﻭﺳﻑ ﺑﻥ ﻋﻠﻭﻱ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺅﻭﻝ ﻋﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺳﻠﻁﻧﺔ‬ ‫ﻋﻣﺎﻥ‬

‫ﺗﺣﺩﺙ ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﻳﻭﺳﻑ ﺑﻥ ﻋﻠﻭﻱ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺅﻭﻝ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺳﻠﻁﻧﺔ ﻋﻣﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺯﻳﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﻗﺎﻡ ﺑﻬﺎ ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﺳﻠﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺳﻠﻁﻧﺔ‬ ‫ﻋﻣﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﺫﻟﻙ ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﻭﺯﺭﺍء ﺍﻹﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻠﻲ ﺑﻧﻳﺎﻣﻳﻥ ﻧﺗﻧﻳﺎﻫﻭ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺻﺎﺩﻓﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻳﻭﻡ ﺍﻷﻭﻝ ﻣﻥ ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ‪ .‬ﻗﺎﻝ ﺑﻥ ﻋﻠﻭﻱ‪ ،‬ﻓﻲ ﺭﺃﻳﻪ‪ ،‬ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﺿﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﺔ ﻛﺎﻧﺕ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻠﺏ ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪ .‬ﻛﻣﺎ ﻗﺎﻝ ﺑﺄﻧﻧﺎ ”ﻧﻔﻬﻡ ﻭﻧﻘﺭﺃ‬ ‫ﺃﻥ ﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ ﺃﺻﺑﺣﺕ ﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﺑﻔﺿﻝ ﺑﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﻅﺭﻭﻑ ﺑﻌﺩ ﺍﻟﺣﺭﺏ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻣﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﻳﺔ“‪ ،‬ﻓﻲ ﺣﻳﻥ ﺃﺻﺑﺢ ﺇﻧﺷﺎء ﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﻓﻠﺳﻁﻳﻥ ”ﺿﺭﻭﺭﺓ ﺇﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ“ ﻻﺣﺗﻭﺍء‬ ‫”ﺍﻹﺭﻫﺎﺏ ﻭﺍﻟﺟﻬﻝ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﺄﺧﻳﺭ“‪ .‬ﻭﺃﻛﺩ ﺑﻥ ﻋﻠﻭﻱ ﺇﻥ ”ﺇﻗﺎﻣﺔ ﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﻓﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﺔ ﻣﺳﺗﻘﻠﺔ‬ ‫ﻫﻭ ﻣﻁﻠﺏ ﺍﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻲ“ ﻭﺃﻣﺭ ﺿﺭﻭﺭﻱ ﻟﻼﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﺃﻭﺿﺢ ﺍﻟﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺣﻳﻥ ﻻ ﺗﺳﺗﻁﻳﻊ ﻋﻣﺎﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻛﻭﻥ ﻭﺳﻳﻁﺎ‪ ،‬ﺃﺭﺍﺩﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﺗﺳﻬﻳﻝ ﻋﻣﻠﻳﺔ ﻳﺳﺗﻁﻳﻊ ﻣﻥ ﺧﻼﻟﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﻭﻥ ﻭﺍﻹﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻠﻳﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﻣﻌﺎ‬ ‫ﻣﻥ ﺃﺟﻝ ﻣﺳﺗﻘﺑﻝ ﺳﻠﻣﻲ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺃﺛﺎﺭﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﺻﺭﻳﺣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺃﺳﺋﻠﺔ ﻭﺃﺟﻭﺑﺔ ﺣﻳﺔ ﺗﻁﺭﻗﺕ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ‬ ‫ﻭﻓﻠﺳﻁﻳﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻷﺧﺭﻯ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪ .‬ﻛﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻛﺛﻳﺭﻭﻥ ﻣﻬﺗﻣﻳﻥ ﺑﻔﻬﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﺯﻳﺩ‬ ‫ﺣﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺩﺑﻠﻭﻣﺎﺳﻳﺔ ﻟﺳﻠﻁﻧﺔ ﻋﻣﺎﻥ ﻭﻋﻼﻗﺎﺗﻬﺎ ﺑﺈﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺿﻭء ﺍﻟﺯﻳﺎﺭﺓ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﺧﻳﺭﺓ‪ .‬ﻭﺷﻣﻠﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺍﺿﻳﻊ ﺍﻷﺧﺭﻯ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺃﺛﻳﺭﺕ ﺍﻷﺯﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺩﺍﺋﺭﺓ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺟﻠﺱ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺟﻲ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺩﺑﻠﻭﻣﺎﺳﻳﺔ ﺣﻭﻝ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺩﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻠﻌﺑﻪ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻛﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺣﻝ ﺍﻟﻧﺯﺍﻋﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﻘﺗﻝ ﺍﻟﺻﺣﻔﻲ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻱ ﺟﻣﺎﻝ ﺧﺎﺷﻘﺟﻲ‬ ‫ﻭﺃﺛﺭﻩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻐﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺗﺟﺎﻩ ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺻﺎﺩﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻷﺳﻠﺣﺔ‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﻏﻳﺭ ﺍﻻﻧﺧﺭﺍﻁ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺣﺎﺩﺛﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ ﻟﻸﻣﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‪ .‬ﺑﺎﻟﻧﺳﺑﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﺭﺍﻕ‪ ،‬ﺭﺃﺕ‬ ‫ﻓﻭﻥ ﺩﻳﺭ ﻻﻳﻥ ﻓﺭﺻﺔ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﺇﻟﺣﺎﺣﺎ ﻹﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺑﻧﺎء ﻭﺍﻟﻣﺻﺎﻟﺣﺔ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺃﻁﺭﺍﻑ‬

‫ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭﺓ ﺃﻭﺭﺳﻭﻻ ﻓﻭﻥ ﺩﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﻻﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﻳﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ‪ ،‬ﺃﻟﻣﺎﻧﻳﺎ‬

‫ﺍﻟﻧﺯﺍﻉ‪ ،‬ﻷﻥ ”ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺍﻗﻳﺔ ﻭﺷﻌﺏ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺍﻕ‪] ،‬ﻭﻛﺫﻟﻙ[ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺎﻟﻑ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ‬ ‫ﻣﻥ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﻣﻥ ‪ 70‬ﺩﻭﻟﺔ‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﺗﻠﻭﺍ ﻭﺩﺣﺭﻭﺍ ﺩﺍﻋﺵ“‪ ،‬ﻓﻲ ﺇﺷﺎﺭﺓ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺗﻧﻅﻳﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻣﻳﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺃﻛﺩﺕ ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭﺓ ﺇﻟﻳﺯﺍﺑﻳﺗﺎ ﺗﺭﻳﻧﺗﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﻳﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﺍﻹﻳﻁﺎﻟﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺃﻥ ﻣﻌﻅﻡ ﺍﻟﻧﺯﺍﻋﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺳﻠﺣﺔ ﺍﻷﺧﻳﺭﺓ ﻭﻗﻌﺕ ﺩﺍﺧﻝ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﻭﻟﻳﺱ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﺷﺗﻣﻠﺕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻧﻅﻣﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﻣﺗﻁﺭﻓﺔ ﻋﻧﻳﻔﺔ‪ .‬ﻭﺃﺷﺎﺭﺕ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺗﺄﺛﻳﺭﺍﺕ ﻭﺳﺎﺋﻝ ﺍﻻﻋﻼﻡ ﺍﻻﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻭﺃﺻﺭﺕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻥ ”ﻓﻳﺳﺑﻭﻙ‪ ،‬ﻭﺗﻭﻳﺗﺭ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻧﺳﺗﺟﺭﺍﻡ‪ ،‬ﻭ ﻭﺍﺗﺱ ﺃﺏ ﻭﺗﻳﻠﻳﺟﺭﺍﻡ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻭﺳﻛﺎﻳﺏ‪ ،‬ﻭﻳﻭﺗﻳﻭﺏ ﻭﻏﻳﺭﻫﺎ ﻗﺩ ﻏﻳّﺭﺕ ﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ ﺑﺙ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻠﻭﻣﺎﺕ ﻭﺟﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﻭﻧﺷﺭﻫﺎ‬ ‫ﻣﻥ ﻗﺑﻝ ﺍﻟﻛﺛﻳﺭ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﺧﺩﻣﻳﻥ ﻏﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺗﻘﻠﻳﺩﻳﻳﻥ“‪ .‬ﻧﺗﻳﺟﺔ ﻟﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﺷﺎﺭﻙ ﻋﺩﺩ ﺃﻛﺑﺭ‬ ‫ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺟﻬﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﺎﻧﺕ ﺍﻟﺗﻛﻧﻭﻟﻭﺟﻳﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻌﺽ ﺍﻷﺣﻳﺎﻥ ﻋﺎﻣﻼ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻣﻛﻳﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ ﻭﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺳﺎﻫﻡ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﺻﻌﻳﺩ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻁﺭﻑ‪ .‬ﺍﺳﺗﺧﺩﻣﺕ ﺍﻟﻭﺯﻳﺭﺓ ﺗﺭﻳﻧﺗﺎ‬ ‫ﻣﺛﺎﻻ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﻳﻔﻳﺔ ﺍﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﺩﺍﻋﺵ ﻷﺩﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻻﺗﺻﺎﻝ ﻟﺿﻡ ﻗﺭﺍﺑﺔ ‪ 40,000‬ﺷﺧﺹ‬ ‫ﺇﻟﻰ ﺻﻔﻭﻑ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻅﻳﻡ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﺄﺛﻳﺭ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻼﻳﻳﻥ ”ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻌﺎﻁﻔﻳﻥ ﻣﻊ ﻗﺿﻳﺗﻬﻡ ﻓﻲ ﺟﻣﻳﻊ‬ ‫ﺃﻧﺣﺎء ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻡ“‪ .‬ﻭﺍﺧﺗﺗﻣﺕ ﺣﺩﻳﺛﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻭﻝ ”ﻧﺣﻥ ﺑﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﻣﻌﺎ ‪ ...‬ﺑﻬﺩﻑ‬ ‫ﺃﺳﺎﺳﻲ ﻫﻭ ﺗﺣﻭﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﺗﻭﺍﺻﻝ ﻣﻥ ﻋﻧﺻﺭ ﺗﻬﺩﻳﺩ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﺩﺍﺓ ﻟﺗﺣﻘﻳﻖ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺟﻣﺎﻋﻲ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ“‪.‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫ﺫﻛﺭﺗﻬﺎ ﻟﻠﺗﻭ‪ ،‬ﻭﺭﺅﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻅﻼﻡ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺳﻌﻰ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻧﺷﺭ ﺍﻟﻁﺎﺋﻔﻳﺔ ﻭﺗﺷﺟﻊ ﺍﻹﺭﻫﺎﺏ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻟﺳﻳﻁﺭﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺩﻭﻝ ﺃﺧﺭﻯ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺯﻋﺯﻋﺔ ﺍﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪ .‬ﺍﻟﺭﺅﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻭﻟﻰ ﺗﻣﺛﻝ ﻣﺎ ﻧﺩﺍﻓﻊ ﻋﻧﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻭﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﺍﻷﺧﺭﻯ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻷﺧﺭﻯ ﻫﻲ ﻛﻝ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻣﺛﻠﻪ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺛﻡ ﺑﺩﺃﺕ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺑﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﺔ ﻋﺩﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻷﺳﺋﻠﺔ ﺣﻭﻝ ﻣﻘﺗﻝ ﺧﺎﺷﻘﺟﻲ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺩ ُ‬ ‫ﻁ ِﺭﺣﺕ‬ ‫ﺃﺳﺋﻠﺔ ﻋﻥ ﻣﺎ ﻗﺎﻣﺕ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻟﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ ﻣﺭﺗﻛﺑﻲ ﺟﺭﻳﻣﺔ ﻗﺗﻝ‬ ‫ﺟﻣﺎﻝ ﺧﺎﺷﻘﺟﻲ‪ ،‬ﻭﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﻭﺭﻁ ﺍﻟﻣﺯﻋﻭﻡ ﻟﻭﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻷﻣﻳﺭ ﻣﺣﻣﺩ ﺑﻥ ﺳﻠﻣﺎﻥ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﺗﻝ ﺍﻟﺻﺣﻔﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﻧﺻﻠﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﺳﻁﻧﺑﻭﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺑﺩﺍﻳﺔ ﺃﻛﺗﻭﺑﺭ‪ .‬ﺃﺟﺎﺏ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺟﺑﻳﺭ ﺑﺄﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﻘﻳﻖ ﻳﺟﺭﻱ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺭﻳﺎﺽ ﻭﺍﺳﻁﻧﺑﻭﻝ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻧﺗﻘﺩ ﻣﺎ ﺍﻋﺗﺑﺭﻩ ﺭﺩ ﻓﻌﻝ‬ ‫ﻣﺑﺎﻟﻎ ﻓﻳﻪ ﺳﻳﺎﺳﻳﺎ ﻭﺇﻋﻼﻣﻳﺎ‪:‬‬ ‫ﺃﺻﺑﺣﺕ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻘﺿﻳﺔ ﻫﺳﺗﻳﺭﻳﺔ ﺑﺷﻛﻝ ﻏﺭﻳﺏ‪ ،‬ﺃﻋﺗﻘﺩ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺱ ﻗﺩ ﺃﻟﻘﺕ ﺍﻟﻠﻭﻡ‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﺑﻬﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻳﻘﻳﻥ ﻗﺑﻝ ﺍﻛﺗﻣﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﻘﻳﻖ ‪ ...‬ﻭﻧﺣﻥ ﻧﻌﻠﻡ ﺃﻥ ﺧﻁﺄ ﻣﺎ ﻗﺩ‬ ‫ﺍﺭﺗُﻛﺏ ﻭﺃﻥ ﺑﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺱ ﺗﺟﺎﻭﺯﻭﺍ ﺳﻠﻁﺗﻬﻡ ﻭﻧﻘﻭﻡ ﺑﺎﻟﺗﺣﻘﻳﻘﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻼﺯﻣﺔ ﻣﻌﻬﻡ ‪...‬‬ ‫ﻭﺳﻧﺣﺎﺳﺏ ﺃﻱ ﻣﺗﻭﺭﻁ ﻭﺳﻳُﻌﺎﻗﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺅﻭﻟﻭﻥ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﺑﻣﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﻛﺎﻧﺕ ﻣﺧﺻﺻﺔ ”ﻟﺗﺣﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎﺕ“ ﻓﻘﺩ ﺗﻧﺎﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺣﺿﻭﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻘﺎﺭﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﺣﺗﻣﻝ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﻭﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ‪ .‬ﻭﺫﻛﺭ ﺟﺑﻳﺭ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻟﻳﺳﺕ ﻟﻬﺎ ﻋﻼﻗﺎﺕ ﻣﻊ ﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ ﻭﺃﻥ ”ﻣﻔﺗﺎﺡ ﺗﻁﺑﻳﻊ ﺍﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎﺕ ﻳﺟﺏ ﺃﻥ‬ ‫ﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﻋﻣﻠﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ“‪ .‬ﻭﺗﺫﻛﺭ ﺍﻟﺷﻳﺦ ﺧﺎﻟﺩ ﺩﻋﻣﻪ ﻟﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﻓﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﺔ ﻣﺳﺗﻘﻠﺔ ﻭﻋﻠﻖ‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﺯﻳﺎﺭﺓ ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﻭﺯﺭﺍء ﺍﻹﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻠﻲ ﺑﻧﻳﺎﻣﻳﻥ ﻧﺗﻧﻳﺎﻫﻭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻋﻣﺎﻥ ﻓﻲ ‪25‬‬ ‫ﺃﻛﺗﻭﺑﺭ‪:‬‬ ‫ﻣﻊ ﺯﻳﺎﺭﺓ ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﻭﺯﺭﺍء ﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺩ ﺑﻧﻳﺎﻣﻳﻥ ﻧﺗﻧﻳﺎﻫﻭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺳﻠﻁﻧﺔ ﻋُﻣﺎﻥ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻧﺣﻥ ﺑﺎﻟﺗﺄﻛﻳﺩ ﻻ ﻧﺷﻛﻙ ﺃﺑﺩﺍ ﻓﻲ ﺣﻛﻣﺔ ﻭﻧﻔﺎﺫ ﺑﺻﻳﺭﺓ ﺣﺿﺭﺓ ﺻﺎﺣﺏ ﺍﻟﺟﻼﻟﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻠﻁﺎﻥ ﻗﺎﺑﻭﺱ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺣﺎﻭﻟﺗﻪ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﻘﻳﺎﻡ ﺑﺟﻬﻭﺩﻩ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﻭﺻﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺣﻝ ﻟﻬﺫﻩ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻘﺿﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻧﺗﻁﻠﻊ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻧﺟﺎﺡ ﺟﻼﻟﺗﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺟﻬﻭﺩﻩ ﺗﻠﻙ‪.‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻟﺛﺔ‪ :‬ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ ﻭﺍﻟﺩﺑﻠﻭﻣﺎﺳﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‬ ‫ﺭﻛﺯﺕ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻟﺛﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻭﺿﻭﻉ ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ ﻭﺍﻟﺩﺑﻠﻭﻣﺎﺳﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪ .‬ﻭﺍﻗﺗﺭﺣﺕ ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭﺓ ﺃﻭﺭﺳﻭﻻ ﻓﻭﻥ ﺩﻳﺭ ﻻﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﻳﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻟﻣﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﺇﻣﻛﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﺳﺗﺧﺩﺍﻡ ﻧﺎﻓﺫﺓ ﻣﺗﺎﺣﺔ ﻟﻠﺩﺑﻠﻭﻣﺎﺳﻳﺔ ﻟﺣﻝ ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪ .‬ﻟﻘﺩ ﻗﺎﺭﻧﺕ ﺍﻟﻭﺿﻊ ﻓﻲ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺍﻕ‪ .‬ﻛﺎﻥ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻛﻥ ﺗﺻﻭﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎﺭ ﻟﻠﻣﺳﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﻓﻲ ﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻹﻋﻣﺎﺭ ﻭﺍﻟﺑﻧﺎء ﻓﻲ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ‪” ،‬ﺇﺫﺍ ﻛﺎﻧﺕ ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ‬ ‫ﻋﻣﻠﻳﺔ ﺳﻳﺎﺳﻳﺔ ﻣﻘﺑﻭﻟﺔ ﺗﺷﻣﻝ ﺟﻣﻳﻊ ﺍﻷﻁﺭﺍﻑ“‪ .‬ﻻ ﺗﻭﺟﺩ ﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ ﺃﺧﺭﻯ‬ ‫‪26‬‬

‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﻣﺭﺍﻗﺑﻳﻥ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻣﺧﺎﻁﺭ ﺍﻟﺗﻛﺭﺍﺭ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺎﻟﻔﺎﺕ ﺍﻷﺧﺭﻯ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺋﻣﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻁﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻟﻌﺩﻭﺍﻧﻲ‬ ‫ﻟﺫﻟﻙ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺭﻭﻉ‪ ،‬ﺃﺻﺭ ﺍﻟﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻬﺩﻑ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻭﻧﻲ ﻭﺍﻟﺛﺎﺑﺕ ﻟﺗﺣﻘﻳﻖ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺭﺗﻘﺑﺔ‪:‬‬

‫ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﺍﻷﺳﺗﺎﺫ ﻋﺎﺩﻝ‬ ‫ﺑﻥ ﺃﺣﻣﺩ ﺍﻟﺟﺑﻳﺭ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ‬

‫ﺇﻥ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺎﻟﻑ ﺍﻹﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻲ ﻟﻠﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﻟﻳﺱ ﺿﺩ ﺃﻱ ﻁﺭﻑ‪ .‬ﺇﻧﻪ‬ ‫ﺗﺣﺎﻟﻑ ﻣﻥ ﺃﺟﻝ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﻭﺍﻻﺯﺩﻫﺎﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﻭﺳﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﻣﻔﺗﻭﺣﺎ ﻟﻣﻥ ﻳﻘﺑﻝ‬ ‫ﻣﺑﺎﺩﺋﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻧﺣﻥ ﻧﻬﺩﻑ ﻣﻥ ﺧﻼﻟﻪ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺗﻌﺯﻳﺯ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺟﻣﺎﻋﻲ ﻟﻠﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﺄﻛﺩ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﺳﺗﻌﺩﺍﺩ ﺷﺭﺍﻛﺎﺗﻧﺎ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻋﻳﺔ ﻟﺗﺣﻣﻝ ﺗﺣﺩﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﺩﻱ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﺷﺭﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﺑﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺫﻟﻙ‬ ‫ﺍﻹﺭﻫﺎﺏ ﻭﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﺍﻹﻟﻛﺗﺭﻭﻧﻲ ﻭﻣﺷﺎﻛﻝ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺎﺭﻗﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﺃﻳﺿﺎ ﺃﺛﻧﺎء ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻧﻘﺎﺵ‪ ،‬ﻟﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺷﻳﺦ ﺧﺎﻟﺩ ﺍﻷﻣﺭ ﺑﻘﻭﻟﻪ‪” :‬ﺃﻋﺗﻘﺩ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻋﻧﺩﻣﺎ‬ ‫ﻧﻌﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﻘﺑﻝ‪ ،‬ﺳﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺎﻟﻑ ﺍﻟﺟﺩﻳﺩ ﺑﺎﺭﺯﺍ ﻓﻲ ﺟﺩﻭﻝ ﺃﻋﻣﺎﻟﻧﺎ“‪.‬‬ ‫ﺑﺩﺃ ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﺍﻷﺳﺗﺎﺫ ﻋﺎﺩﻝ ﺑﻥ ﺃﺣﻣﺩ ﺍﻟﺟﺑﻳﺭ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻛﻠﻣﺗﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﺗﺫﻛﻳﺭ ﺑﺄﻥ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﻗﺩ ﺗﺄﺛﺭ ﺑﺎﺳﺗﻣﺭﺍﺭ ﺑﺎﻟﺻﺭﺍﻋﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﻣﻧﺫ ﺍﻟﺧﻣﺳﻳﻧﻳﺎﺕ‪ .‬ﻟﻛﻧﻪ ﺷﺩﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻷﺯﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﻟﻳﺔ ﻟﻡ ﺗﻌﺩ ﻣﺩﻓﻭﻋﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻭﻯ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺳﻌﻰ ﻟﻠﺳﻳﻁﺭﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ )ﻛﻣﺎ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﻝ ﺧﻼﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺣﺭﺏ ﺍﻟﺑﺎﺭﺩﺓ( ﻭﻟﻛﻥ ﻣﻥ ﻗﺑﻝ ﺍﻷﻁﺭﺍﻑ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻳﺔ )ﻭﻻ ﺳﻳﻣﺎ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ( ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﻋﻘﺩﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﺯﻡ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻐﻳﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻧﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻲ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻛﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﻝ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻲ ﺍﻷﻭﻝ ﻟﻌﺩﻡ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻫﻭ ﺛﻭﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺧﻣﻳﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ‬ ‫ﻭﺳﻠﻭﻙ ﻭﺃﻓﻌﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﺍﻹﻳﺭﺍﻧﻳﺔ ﻣﻧﺫ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺍﻟﺣﻳﻥ ‪ ...‬ﺇﻧﻧﺎ ﻧﺗﻌﺎﻣﻝ ﺍﻵﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﺑﺭﺅﻳﺗﻳﻥ ﻣﺗﻧﺎﻓﺳﺗﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﺭﺅﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﺭ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺳﻌﻰ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻛﻝ ﺍﻷﺷﻳﺎء ﺍﻟﺗﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﻳﺦ ﺧﺎﻟﺩ ﺑﻥ ﺃﺣﻣﺩ‬ ‫ﺁﻝ ﺧﻠﻳﻔﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺭﻳﻥ‬

‫ﺃﺻﺑﺣﺕ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﻲ ﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﻋﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺫﺍﺕ ﺗﺎﺭﻳﺦ ﻋﺭﻳﻖ ﻭﻣﺷﺭﻑ ﻭﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ‬ ‫ﻣﺗﻌﺩﺩ ﺍﻟﺛﻘﺎﻓﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﺳﺎﺣﺔ ﻣﻌﺭﻛﺔ ﻟﻠﺳﻳﻁﺭﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﻧﻔﻭﺫ‪ ،‬ﺣﻳﺙ ﺗﺣﺎﻭﻝ ﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺃﻥ‬ ‫ﺗﺗﻌﺎﻣﻝ ﻣﻊ ﻣﻁﺎﻟﺑﻬﺎ ﺑﻳﻧﻣﺎ ﺗﺗﻧﺎﻓﺱ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻅﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻹﺭﻫﺎﺑﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺟﻬﺎﺕ ﻏﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﻛﻡ ﻭﺍﻟﺳﻳﻁﺭﺓ ‪ ...‬ﻟﻘﺩ ﺃﺻﺑﺢ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ ﺃﺣﺩﺙ ﺿﺣﻳﺔ ﻟﺳﻌﻲ ﺍﻟﺟﻣﻬﻭﺭﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻣﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﻳﺭﺍﻧﻳﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻬﻳﻣﻧﺔ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻳﺔ ‪ ...‬ﻭﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺍﻕ ﻭﻟﺑﻧﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﺁﺛﺎﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﺩﺧﻝ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻲ ﺃﻳﺿﺎ ﻭﺍﺿﺣﺔ ‪ ...‬ﻓﺎﻟﺩﻭﻟﺗﺎﻥ ﺗﻭﺍﺟﻬﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺟﻣﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻋﻭﻣﺔ‬ ‫ﻣﻥ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﺍﺩ ﺍﻟﺫﻳﻥ ﻓﺿﻠﻭﺍ ﺍﻟﻭﻻء ﻟﻠﺟﻣﻬﻭﺭﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻣﻳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻣﺻﺎﻟﺢ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻭﻁﻧﻳﺔ ﻟﺩﻭﻟﻬﻡ‪ .‬ﻭﻓﻲ ﺩﻭﻝ ﻣﺟﻠﺱ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺟﻲ‪ ،‬ﺷﻬﺩﻧﺎ ﻣﺣﺎﻭﻻﺕ ﻣﻥ ﺟﺎﻧﺏ‬ ‫ﻗﻁﺭ ﻟﻠﺗﺩﺧﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺳﻳﺎﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻷﻋﺿﺎء ﺍﻷﺧﺭﻯ‪ ،‬ﻓﻲ ﺗﻧﺎﻗﺽ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻭﻗﻌﺔ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺩﻭﻝ ﻣﺟﻠﺱ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺟﻲ ﻭﻣﻌﺎﻳﻳﺭ ﻣﻧﻁﻘﺗﻧﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﺭﺩﺍ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺷﻛﻠﺔ ﻁﻣﻭﺣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻬﻳﻣﻧﺔ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺷﺩﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻫﻣﻳﺔ ﺗﻭﺍﺯﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻯ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺷﺭﺍﻛﺎﺕ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﻠﻔﺎء‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﺋﻼ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺑﺣﺎﺟﺔ‬ ‫ﺇﻟﻰ ”ﺗﻭﺍﺯﻥ ﻏﻳﺭ ﺗﻧﺎﻓﺳﻲ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻯ ﺍﻟﻛﺑﺭﻯ ﻓﻳﻬﺎ“‪ .‬ﺗﻭﺍﺯﻥ ﻻ ﻳﺭﺳﻡ ﺧﻁﺎ‪ ،‬ﻳﺿﻊ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻁﺭﺍﻑ ﻣﺗﻌﺎﺭﺿﺔ ﺿﺩ ﺑﻌﺿﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﺑﻌﺽ‪ ،‬ﺗﻭﺍﺯﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺻﺎﻟﺢ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺗﻭﺍﺯﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻳﺿﻊ ﺍﻟﻣﺻﺎﻟﺢ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺗﺭﻛﺔ ﻟﻠﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺃﻭﻻ“‪.‬‬ ‫ﻛﺎﻧﺕ ﻣﻼﺣﻅﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺷﻳﺦ ﺧﺎﻟﺩ ﺍﻟﺧﺗﺎﻣﻳﺔ ﺩﺍﻋﻣﺔ ﻻﻗﺗﺭﺍﺡ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‬ ‫ﺑﺈﻧﺷﺎء ﺗﺣﺎﻟﻑ ﺍﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻲ ﻟﻠﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﻳﺟﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﻭﻛﻝ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﺕ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺟﻠﺱ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻭﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﺭﺑﻣﺎ ﻣﺻﺭ ﻭﺍﻷﺭﺩﻥ‪ .‬ﺇﻥ ﻫﺩﻑ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺳﻣﻰ ”ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺗﻭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻲ“ ﻫﻭ ﻓﻲ ﺟﺯء ﻣﻧﻪ ﻣﻭﺍﺟﻬﺔ ﺗﻭﺳﻊ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪ .‬ﻭﺑﻳﻧﻣﺎ ﺃﺷﺎﺭ ﺑﻌﺽ‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﺿﺭﻭﺭﺍﺗﻧﺎ ﺍﻟﻣﺯﺩﻭﺟﺔ ‪ ...‬ﺣﻣﺎﻳﺔ ﺃﻣﻳﺭﻛﺎ ﻭﻣﺻﺎﻟﺣﻧﺎ ﻭﻣﺣﺎﺳﺑﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺅﻭﻟﻳﻥ ﻋﻥ‬ ‫ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺧﻼﻝ ﺍﻷﺳﺋﻠﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻌﻠﻳﻘﺎﺕ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺟﻣﻬﻭﺭ‪ ،‬ﺗﻣﺕ ﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﺔ ﻣﺎﺗﻳﺱ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻌﺽ‬ ‫ﺣﺎﻻﺕ ﺧﺭﻭﺝ ﺇﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﺗﺭﺍﻣﺏ ﻋﻥ ﺳﻳﺎﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺑﻘﺔ‪ ،‬ﺑﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺫﻟﻙ‬ ‫ﺍﻧﺳﺣﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﻣﻥ ﺧﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺗﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﻭﻣﻌﺎﻫﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ ﻣﺗﻭﺳﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻯ )‪ ،(INF‬ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻧﺗﻘﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﺳﻔﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ ﻣﻥ ﺗﻝ ﺃﺑﻳﺏ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻘﺩﺱ‪ .‬ﻛﻣﺎ ُ‬ ‫ﻁﻠﺏ ﻣﻧﻪ ﺗﻭﺿﻳﺢ ﺗﻔﺎﺻﻳﻝ ﺗﺻﺭﻳﺣﻪ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺋﻝ ﺑﺄﻥ ﻧﺟﺎﺡ ﻋﻣﻠﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ ﺳﻳﺗﻁﻠﺏ ﺗﻧﺎﺯﻻﺕ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﺎ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﺭﻛﻳﺯ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺟﺩﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ ﻭﺭﻭﺳﻳﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﻭﻁﻧﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﻟﻪ ﺗﺄﺛﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﻗﻑ ﺍﻟﻌﺳﻛﺭﻱ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺭﺩﺍ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﺃﺟﺎﺏ ﻣﺎﺗﻳﺱ ﺑﺄﻥ ﺧﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺗﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﻛﺎﻧﺕ‬ ‫”ﻓﻌﻠﻳﺎ ‪ ...‬ﺗﻘﻭﻝ ﺇﻧﻪ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻘﺑﻭﻝ ﺇﻧﺗﺎﺝ ﺍﻟﺳﻼﺡ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻱ“‪ ،‬ﻭﻋﻧﺩ ﺍﻻﻧﺳﺣﺎﺏ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﺎﻫﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺣﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻷﺳﻠﺣﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﻝ ﺇﻥ ﺇﺩﺍﺭﺗﻲ ﺃﻭﺑﺎﻣﺎ ﻭﺗﺭﺍﻣﺏ ﻋﻣﻠﺗﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫”ﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺭﻭﺳﻳﺎ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻻﻣﺗﺛﺎﻝ“ ﻭﻟﻛﻥ ”ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻧﻬﺎﻳﺔ ﻳﺗﻌﻳﻥ ﻋﻠﻳﻧﺎ ﺃﻥ ﻧﻭﺍﺟﻪ ﺍﻟﻭﺍﻗﻊ“‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﺑﺷﺄﻥ ﻧﻘﻝ ﺍﻟﺳﻔﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻘﺩﺱ‪ ،‬ﺃﻗﺭ ﺑﺎﻻﻧﺗﻘﺎﺩﺍﺕ‪ ،‬ﻟﻛﻧﻪ ﺃﺿﺎﻑ‪” :‬ﺃﻋﺗﻘﺩ‬ ‫ﺃﻥ ﺃﻫﻡ ﺷﻲء ﻫﻭ ﺃﻥ ﻟﺩﻳﻧﺎ ﺍﻟﺗﺯﺍﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﻣﻠﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ“‪ .‬ﻭﺣﻭﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﺳﺋﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﻁﺭﺣﺕ ﺑﺷﺄﻥ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﻝ ﺇﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﻭﺛﻳﻳﻥ ”ﻟﻥ ﻳﺟﺩﻭﺍ ﻭﻗﺗﺎ ﺃﻓﺿﻝ“‬ ‫ﻣﻥ ﺍﻵﻥ ﻟﻠﺗﻭﺍﺻﻝ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺎﺭﺗﻥ ﺟﺭﻳﻔﻳﺙ ‪ ...‬ﻛﻣﺑﻌﻭﺙ ﺧﺎﺹ ﻟﻸﻣﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺃﺟﻝ ﺍﻟﺗﻭﺻﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺗﺳﻭﻳﺔ ﺣﻳﺙ ﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﻟﺩﻳﻬﻡ ﺑﻣﻭﺟﺑﻬﺎ ”ﻗﺩﺭ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﻼﻝ ﺍﻟﺫﺍﺗﻲ‬ ‫‪...‬ﻭﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺃﻥ ﻧﺳﺗﻣﻊ ﺇﻟﻳﻬﻡ‪ ،‬ﻟﻛﻧﻬﻡ ﻻ ﻳﺣﺗﺎﺟﻭﻥ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻳﺔ ﻣﺳﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﻣﻥ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﻟﻠﻘﻳﺎﻡ‬ ‫ﺑﺫﻟﻙ“‪.‬‬ ‫ﺗﺣﺩﺙ ﻣﺎﺗﻳﺱ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﻣﻳﻳﺯ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ ﻭﺭﻭﺳﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﺣﻳﺙ ﻗﺎﻝ ﺇﻧﻪ ﺃﺻﺑﺢ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻭﺍﺿﺢ ﺍﻵﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺭﻭﺳﻳﺎ ﻗﺩ ﺍﺧﺗﺎﺭﺕ ﻣﺳﺎﺭﺍ ﻣﺧﺗﻠﻔﺎ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﺍﻛﺔ ﻣﻊ ﺃﻭﺭﻭﺑﺎ‬ ‫ﻭﻣﻊ ﺣﻠﻑ ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺗﻭ‪ .‬ﻭﻣﻊ ﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﺑﺩﺍ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﺗﻔﺎﺅﻻ ﻓﻳﻣﺎ ﻳﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﺻﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎﻟﻧﻅﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻥ‬ ‫”ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻓﺳﺔ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ ﻻ ﺗﻌﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﻌﺩﺍء“‪ .‬ﻛﻣﺎ ﺃﺻﺭ ﻣﺎﺗﻳﺱ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﺭﻛﻳﺯ ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎﺕ ﻟﻥ ﻳﺄﺗﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺳﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﺍﻛﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪.‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﻳﺔ‪ :‬ﺍﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﻭﻟﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻧﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺃﻭﺳﻁﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺷﺊ‬ ‫ﺍﻓﺗﺗﺢ ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﻳﺦ ﺧﺎﻟﺩ ﺑﻥ ﺃﺣﻣﺩ ﺁﻝ ﺧﻠﻳﻔﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺭﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﻣﻥ ﺧﻼﻝ ﺍﻟﺗﻔﻛﻳﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻷﺯﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﻟﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﻭﻣﺣﺎﻭﻟﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺗﺣﺩﻳﺩﺍ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﻭﻗﻁﺭ‪ ،‬ﻓﺭﺽ ﻫﻳﻣﻧﺗﻬﺎ‪:‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫ﺟﻳﻣﺱ ﻣﺎﺗﻳﺱ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‬

‫ﻋﻧﺩﻣﺎ ﻗﺎﻝ ﻣﺎﺗﻳﺱ ﺃﻥ ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﻣﻠﺣﺔ ﻻﺗﺧﺎﺫ ﻗﺭﺍﺭ‪” :‬ﺑﺩﻭﻥ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻧﺣﻥ‬ ‫ﻧﺿﻌﻑ ﺃﻣﻧﻧﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻭﻗﺕ ﻳﺣﺗﺎﺝ ﻓﻳﻪ ﺍﻟﻣﺑﻌﻭﺛﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺻﺎﻥ ﻟﻸﻣﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﻣﺎﺭﺗﻥ‬ ‫ﺟﺭﻳﻔﻳﺙ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ ﻭﺳﺗﺎﻓﺎﻥ ﺩﻱ ﻣﻳﺳﺗﻭﺭﺍ ﻭﺧﻠﻔﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺩﻋﻣﻧﺎ ﺍﻟﻛﺎﻣﻝ“‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﻕ‪ ،‬ﺃﺷﺎﺭ ﻣﺎﺗﻳﺱ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺩﻋﻡ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ”ﻟﻠﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﻣﺭﺓ ﻻﺳﺗﻛﺷﺎﻑ ﺗﺷﻛﻳﻝ ﺗﺣﺎﻟﻑ ﺍﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻲ ﺷﺎﻣﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ )ﻣﺎ‬ ‫ﺃﻁﻠﻖ ﻋﻠﻳﻪ ‪ ... (MESA‬ﻳﺟﻣﻊ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺟﻣﻳﻊ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻛﺎء ﻣﻥ ﺃﺟﻝ ﻣﻭﺍﺟﻬﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺗﺭﻛﺔ ﺑﺷﻛﻝ ﻓﻌﺎﻝ ﻭﻧﺎﺟﺢ“‪ .‬ﻭﺷﺟﺏ ﺩﻭﺭ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺻﺭﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻭﺃﺻﺭ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻠﻙ ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﺗﺗﻁﻠﺏ ﺣﻠﻭﻻ ﺗﻔﺎﻭﺿﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ ”ﺗﺗﻁﻠﺏ ﻗﺭﺍﺭﺍ‬ ‫ﺳﻳﺎﺳﻳﺎ“ ﻭﺑﺎﻟﻣﺛﻝ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ‪” :‬ﺍﻟﺣﻠﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻭﺳﻁ ﻳﺟﺏ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺣﻝ ﻣﺣﻝ ﺍﻟﻘﺗﺎﻝ“‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﺍﺻﻝ ﻣﺎﺗﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﺗﻁﺭﻕ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻣﻭﺿﻭﻉ ﻣﻘﺗﻝ ﺍﻟﺻﺣﻔﻲ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻱ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻔﻲ ﺟﻣﺎﻝ‬ ‫ﺧﺎﺷﻘﺟﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻧﺻﻠﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﺑﺈﺳﻁﻧﺑﻭﻝ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺩ ﺍﺳﺗﻬﻝ ﺍﻟﺣﺩﻳﺙ‬ ‫ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺿﻭﻉ ﺑﻘﻭﻟﻪ ﺇﻥ ﺃﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺔ‪ ،‬ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺍﻟﺟﻬﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﻣﺑﺫﻭﻟﺔ ﻟﻣﻛﺎﻓﺣﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻁﺭﻑ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻳﺗﻌﺯﺯ ﻋﻧﺩﻣﺎ ﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﻫﻧﺎﻙ ﻣﺟﺎﻝ ﻟﻠﻣﻌﺎﺭﺿﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻠﻣﻳﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﻣﻊ ﺍﻷﺧﺫ ﺑﻌﻳﻥ ﺍﻻﻋﺗﺑﺎﺭ ﺍﻫﺗﻣﺎﻣﻧﺎ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺗﺭﻙ ﺑﺎﻟﺳﻼﻡ ﻭﺍﻻﺣﺗﺭﺍﻡ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺳﺦ‬ ‫ﻟﺣﻘﻭﻕ ﺍﻹﻧﺳﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﻣﻘﺗﻝ ﺟﻣﺎﻝ ﺧﺎﺷﻘﺟﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻧﺷﺄﺓ ﺩﺑﻠﻭﻣﺎﺳﻳﺔ ﻳﺟﺏ ﺃﻥ‬ ‫ﻳﺯﻋﺟﻧﺎ ﺟﻣﻳﻌﺎ ﺑﺷﻛﻝ ﻛﺑﻳﺭ ‪ ...‬ﻻ ﺗﺗﺳﺎﻣﺢ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﻣﻊ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻉ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﻭﺣﺷﻲ ﻹﺳﻛﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺻﺣﻔﻲ ﺧﺎﺷﻘﺟﻲ ﺑﺎﺳﺗﻌﻣﺎﻝ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻌﻧﻑ‪ .‬ﺇﻥ ﻓﺷﻝ ﺃﻱ‬ ‫ﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﻘﻳﺩ ﺑﺎﻟﻣﻌﺎﻳﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻳﺔ ﻭﺳﻳﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻧﻭﻥ ﻳﻘﻭﺽ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻲ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻭﻗﺕ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻧﺣﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺃﻣﺱ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ‪ ...‬ﺳﻧﺣﺎﻓﻅ ﻋﻠﻰ‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﺃﻥ ”ﺇﺣﻼﻝ ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ ‪ ...‬ﻫﻭ ﺍﻟﺗﺯﺍﻣﻧﺎ ﻟﻠﺟﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺩﻡ“‪ .‬ﺛﻡ ﺃﻛﺩ ﻣﺎﺗﻳﺱ ﺃﻥ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﺃﻛﺑﺭ‬ ‫ﻋﺎﺋﻖ ﺃﻣﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﻭﻓﺎء ﺑﻬﺫﺍ ﺍﻻﻟﺗﺯﺍﻡ‪:‬‬ ‫ﻻ ﻳﻣﻛﻧﻧﺎ ﺃﻥ ﻧﺗﺟﺎﻫﻝ ﺍﻟﺗﺄﺛﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺧﺑﻳﺙ ﻭﺍﻟﺳﻠﻭﻙ ﺍﻟﻣﺯﻋﺯﻉ ﻟﻼﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ‬

‫ﺳﻌﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻷﺳﺗﺎﺫﺓ ﻣﻳﻧﺎ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﺭﻳﺑﻲ‪ ،‬ﺭﺋﻳﺳﺔ ﺗﺣﺭﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﺻﺣﻳﻔﺔ ﺫﺍ ﻧﺎﺷﻭﻧﺎﻝ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺃﺑﻭﻅﺑﻲ‬

‫ﺗﻧﺗﻬﺟﻪ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻅﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻁﺭﻓﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻧﻳﻔﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻧﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻹﻳﺭﺍﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺝ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻧﻭﻥ ‪...‬‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻟﻳﻭﻡ ﺃﻋﻳﺩ ﺍﻟﺗﺄﻛﻳﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﻗﻑ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻲ ﺿﺩ ﻧﺷﺭ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﻟﻸﺳﻠﺣﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻘﻠﻳﺩﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻘﺩﻣﺔ ﻭﺗﻭﻓﻳﺭﻫﺎ ﻟﻠﻣﺳﺎﻋﺩﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺎﻟﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻘﻧﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻣﻘﺎﺗﻠﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻁﺭﻓﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻹﺭﻫﺎﺑﻳﻳﻥ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﻟﻭﻛﺎﻟﺔ ﻭﻏﻳﺭﻫﻡ ﻋﺑﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﻓﺭﺿﻭﺍ ﻧﻔﻭﺫﻫﻡ ﻋﻠﻳﻬﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﻳﻅﻬﺭ ﺗﺄﺛﻳﺭ ﺫﻟﻙ‬ ‫ﻭﺍﺿﺣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ ﻭﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ ﻭ ﻟﺑﻧﺎﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﺭﺍﻕ ﻭﺣﺗﻰ ﻫﻧﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺭﻳﻥ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺭﻛﺯ ﻣﺎﺗﻳﺱ ﺑﺷﻛﻝ ﺧﺎﺹ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﺩﻭﺍﺭ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﻭﺭﻭﺳﻳﺎ‬ ‫ﻫﻧﺎﻙ‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﺋﻼ‪” :‬ﻻ ﺷﻲء ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﺩﻻﻟﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻷﻧﺷﻁﺔ ﺍﻹﻳﺭﺍﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺿﺎﺭﺓ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﻣﻥ ﺩﻋﻣﻬﺎ ﻟﻧﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻷﺳﺩ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺗﻝ‪ .‬ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺩﻋﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﻘﺗﺭﻥ ﺑﺎﻻﻋﺗﺭﺍﺿﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺭﻭﺳﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻛﺭﺭﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﺭﺍﺭﺍﺕ ]ﻣﺟﻠﺱ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ[ ﻫﻭ ﺍﻟﺳﺑﺏ ﺍﻷﺳﺎﺳﻲ‬ ‫ﻭﺭﺍء ﺑﻘﺎء ﺍﻷﺳﺩ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺳﻠﻁﺔ“‪ .‬ﻛﻣﺎ ﺳﻌﻰ ﻣﺎﺗﻳﺱ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻁﻣﺄﻧﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻛﺎء ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﻳﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻘﻠﻳﺩﻳﻳﻥ ﺣﻭﻝ ﺍﻻﻟﺗﺯﺍﻡ ﺍﻷﻣﻧﻲ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻲ‪ ،‬ﻗﺎﺋﻼ ﺃﻧﻪ ’ﻻ ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺃﻥ ﻳﺣﻝ ﻭﺟﻭﺩ‬ ‫ﺭﻭﺳﻳﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﻣﺣﻝ ﺍﻟﺗﺯﺍﻡ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﺑﺕ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﻣﺭ ﻭﺍﻟﺷﻔﺎﻑ‬ ‫ﺗﺟﺎﻩ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ“‪.‬‬ ‫ﻛﺎﻥ ﻣﺎﺗﻳﺱ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﺣﺭﺻﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻧﺗﻘﺎﺩ ﺍﻻﻧﻘﺳﺎﻣﺎﺕ ﺩﺍﺧﻝ ﻣﺟﻠﺱ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻭﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺟﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺃﺩﺕ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻋﺯﻝ ﻗﻁﺭ ﻣﻥ ﻗﺑﻝ ﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺭﻳﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻹﻣﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‪ .‬ﺃﻳﺿﺎ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺍﻹﺣﺑﺎﻁ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻲ ﻭﺍﺿﺣﺎ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫ﺳﻌﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﻋﺑﺩﺍﻟﻌﺯﻳﺯ‬ ‫ﺑﻥ ﺻﻘﺭ‪ ،‬ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﻣﺭﻛﺯ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﻟﻸﺑﺣﺎﺙ‬

‫ﺟﻳﺩﺓ ﻣﻊ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﺑﺎﻟﻧﻅﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻧﻔﻭﺫﻩ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺑﻖ‪ .‬ﻳﻌﺗﺑﺭ ﺗﺭﺷﻳﺢ ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﻭﺭﺋﻳﺱ‬ ‫ﻭﺯﺭﺍء ﺟﺩﻳ َﺩﻳْﻥ ﺑﻣﺛﺎﺑﺔ ﺗﻁﻭﺭﺍﺕ ﺟﻳﺩﺓ‪ ،‬ﻟﻛﻧﻬﺎ ﻟﻳﺳﺕ ﻛﺎﻓﻳﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻧﻅﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺿﻌﻑ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺅﺳﺳﺎﺕ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺗﻁﺭﻕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺙ ﺍﻷﺧﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﻋﺑﺩ ﺍﻟﻌﺯﻳﺯ ﺑﻥ ﺻﻘﺭ‪ ،‬ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﻣﺭﻛﺯ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﻟﻸﺑﺣﺎﺙ‪ ،‬ﺇﻟﻰ ﻣﻭﻗﻑ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﻏﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺣﺩ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻧﺗﻘﺩ ﺇﺭﺙ ﺛﻣﺎﻥ ﺳﻧﻭﺍﺕ‬ ‫ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻲ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺑﻖ ﺑﺎﺭﺍﻙ ﺃﻭﺑﺎﻣﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺎﻝ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻋﻧﺩﻣﺎ ﺟﺎء ﺩﻭﻧﺎﻟﺩ‬ ‫ﺗﺭﺍﻣﺏ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﺳﻠﻁﺔ‪ ،‬ﺃﻋﻁﻰ ﺭﺅﻳﺔ ﺃﻭﺿﺢ ﻟﻠﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪ .‬ﻻ ﺗﺩﻋﻡ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‬ ‫ﺧﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺗﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﺩﻳﻬﺎ ﻣﺧﺎﻭﻑ ﺑﺷﺄﻥ ﺑﺭﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻟﺻﻭﺍﺭﻳﺦ‬ ‫ﺍﻹﻳﺭﺍﻧﻲ‪ .‬ﺫﻛﺭ ﺻﻘﺭ ﺃﻥ ﺳﻳﺎﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﻻ ﻳﺟﺏ ﺃﻥ‬ ‫ﺗﺳﺗﻧﺩ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺗﺩﻓﻌﻪ ﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﻣﻥ ﺃﺟﻝ ﺣﻣﺎﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‪ .‬ﻛﻣﺎ ﺗﻌﺩ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ ﺃﻳﺿﺎ ﺑﺳﺑﺏ ﻣﺿﻳﻖ ﻫﺭﻣﺯ ﻭﺍﻻﻫﺗﻣﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﺑﺄﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻁﺎﻗﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻛﻣﺎ ﺃﺷﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺯﻳﺎﺭﺓ ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﻭﺯﺭﺍء ﺍﻹﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻠﻲ ﺑﻧﻳﺎﻣﻳﻥ ﻧﺗﻧﻳﺎﻫﻭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻋُﻣﺎﻥ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺑﺩﻭﺭﻩ ﺃﻛﺩ ﺑﺗﺭﺍﻳﻭﺱ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺗﻘﺎﺭﺏ ﺍﻟﺗﺩﺭﻳﺟﻲ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ ﻭﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻣﻌﺑﺭﺍ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻋﺗﻘﺎﺩﻩ ﺑﺄﻥ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺗﻘﺎﺭﺏ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ ﻭﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﻳﻌﺩ ﺗﻁﻭﺭﺍ‬ ‫ﺇﻳﺟﺎﺑﻳﺎ ﻟﻠﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪.‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻷﻭﻟﻰ‪ :‬ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺷﺭﻕ ﺃﻭﺳﻁ ﻣﺗﻐﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﻛﻠﻣﺗﻪ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺃﻟﻘﺎﻫﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻷﻭﻟﻰ‪ ،‬ﺑﺩﺍ ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻲ‬ ‫ﺟﻳﻣﺱ ﻣﺎﺗﻳﺱ ﻣﺭﺩﺩﺍ ﻟﺧﻁﺎﺏ ﺟﻼﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻠﻙ ﻋﺑﺩ ﷲ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ ﺑﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﺳﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﻣﺿﻳﻔﺎ‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﻣﻊ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﻳﺭﺍﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺟﺩﻳﺩﺓ ﻹﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﺗﺭﺍﻣﺏ‪ ،‬ﺳﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ”ﺿﻐﻁ‬ ‫ﻛﺎﻣﻝ“ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ‪ :‬ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ ﻭﺃﻭﺭﻭﺑﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﻬﻧﺩ ﺳﺗﺧﻔﺽ ﻭﺍﺭﺩﺍﺗﻬﺎ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻧﻔﻁ ﻣﻥ‬

‫ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﺃﺣﻣﺩ ﺃﺑﻭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻐﻳﻁ‪ ،‬ﺍﻷﻣﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ‪ ،‬ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ‬

‫ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺑﻠﺩ‪” .‬ﺍﻟﻛﺭﺓ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻠﻌﺏ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ“ ﻓﻳﻣﺎ ﻳﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻔﺎﻭﺿﺎﺕ ﻣﻊ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‪ .‬ﺗﺣﺎﻭﻝ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﺟﻌﻝ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﺭﺍﻕ ﻣﺛﻝ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﺑﻧﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﻭﺑﻧﻔﺱ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻁﺭﻳﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺍﺳﺗﺧﺩﻣﻭﻫﺎ ﻣﻊ ﻟﺑﻧﺎﻥ‪ :‬ﺑﺗﺷﻛﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﻳﻠﻳﺷﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻐﺎﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺗﻭﺍﺻﻝ‬ ‫ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﻧﺎء ”ﺍﻟﻬﻼﻝ ﺍﻟﺷﻳﻌﻲ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻰ ﻁﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻁﺭﻳﻖ ﻣﻥ ﻁﻬﺭﺍﻥ ﻋﺑﺭ‬ ‫ﺑﻐﺩﺍﺩ ﻭﺩﻣﺷﻖ ﻭﺻﻭﻻ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺟﻧﻭﺏ ﻟﺑﻧﺎﻥ“‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﻗﺎﻝ ﺑﺗﺭﺍﻳﻭﺱ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻭﺑﺎﺕ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﺧﻳﺭﺓ ﺿﺩ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﺳﺗﻛﻭﻥ ”ﺃﻛﺛﺭ‬ ‫ﺷﻣﻭﻟﻳﺔ“ ﻭﺳﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﺍﻷﺛﺭ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺍﻁﻧﻳﻥ ﺍﻹﻳﺭﺍﻧﻳﻳﻥ ﺃﻛﺑﺭ‪ .‬ﻟﺫﻟﻙ ﻳﺗﻌﻳﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ‬ ‫ﺃﻥ ﺗﺣﺩﺩ ”ﺧﻳﺎﺭﺍ ﻫﺎﻣﺎ ﺟﺩﺍ“ ﻷﻥ ﺍﻹﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﻟﻳﺔ ﻟﻳﺳﺕ ﺇﺩﺍﺭﺓ ”ﻣﺳﺗﻌﺩﺓ‬ ‫ﻟﺗﻘﺩﻳﻡ ﺍﻟﻛﺛﻳﺭ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﺎﺯﻻﺕ ﺑﺷﺄﻥ ﺫﻟﻙ“‪.‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺛﺔ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻟﺛﺔ ﻛﺎﻧﺕ ﻣﻳﻧﺎ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﻳﺑﻲ‪ ،‬ﺭﺋﻳﺳﺔ ﺗﺣﺭﻳﺭ ﺻﺣﻳﻔﺔ ﺫﺍ ﻧﺎﺷﻭﻧﺎﻝ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺃﺑﻭﻅﺑﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺃﻭﺿﺣﺕ ﺃﻥ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ”ﺗﺳﺗﻐﻝ“ ﺍﻟﻔﻭﺿﻰ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺍﻕ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺍﻕ‬ ‫ﺃﺻﺑﺣﺕ ﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﺿﻌﻳﻔﺔ‪ .‬ﻭﻻﺣﻅﺕ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﻧﺗﺧﺎﺑﺎﺕ ﻛﺎﻧﺕ ﺑﻧﺳﺑﺔ ‪44‬‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﺎﺋﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﺗﻘﺩﻳﺭ‪ ،‬ﻭﺑﺎﻟﺗﺎﻟﻲ ﻓﺈﻥ ﺗﺣﺩﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﺔ ﻻ ﺗﻌﺩ ﻭﻻ ﺗﺣﺻﻰ‬ ‫ﻭﺗﻧﺑﻊ ﻣﻥ ﺍﺣﺗﻳﺎﺟﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺳﻛﺎﻥ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻳﻭﺍﺟﻪ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺍﻕ ﺗﺣﺩﻱ ﺍﻟﻔﺳﺎﺩ ﺍﻟﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﻭﺍﻹﺩﺍﺭﻱ ﻟﻛﻥ ﻻ ﺗﻭﺟﺩ ﺑﻳﺋﺔ ﻳﻌﺎﻗﺏ ﻓﻳﻬﺎ‬ ‫ﺃﻭﻟﺋﻙ ﺍﻟﺫﻳﻥ ﺛﺑﺗﺕ ﻋﻠﻳﻬﻡ ﻣﻣﺎﺭﺳﺎﺕ ﻓﺎﺳﺩﺓ‪ .‬ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ﺃﻳﺿﺎ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﻟﺗﻌﺯﻳﺯ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺍﻗﻳﺔ ﺿﺩ ﺍﻟﺗﺩﺧﻝ ﺍﻹﻳﺭﺍﻧﻲ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﻊ ﺫﻟﻙ ﻳﺟﺏ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺍﻕ ﺃﻳﺿﺎ ﺑﻧﺎء ﻋﻼﻗﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫ﺍﻟﺟﻧﺭﺍﻝ )ﻣﺗﻘﺎﻋﺩ( ﺩﻳﻔﻳﺩ‬ ‫ﺑﺗﺭﺍﻳﻭﺱ ‪ ،‬ﺭﺋﻳﺱ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﻬﺩ ‪ KKR‬ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻣﻲ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺑﻖ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﺎﻟﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺧﺑﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺭﻛﺯﻳﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‬

‫ﺇﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻣﺭﻛﺯﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﺿﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺳﻠﻁ ﺃﺑﻭ ﺍﻟﻐﻳﻁ ﺍﻟﺿﻭء ﻋﻠﻰ ﺛﻼﺙ ﻗﺿﺎﻳﺎ‬ ‫ﻣﺣﻭﺭﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪ .‬ﺃﻭﻻ‪ ،‬ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ﺍﻟﺣﺭﺏ ﻓﻲ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻘﺗﺭﺏ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﻧﻬﺎﻳﺗﻬﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻋﺗﺑﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﺩ ﺍﻟﺣﺭﺏ ‪ -‬ﻳﺟﺏ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻧﻅﺎﻡ ﻣﺭﻧﺎ ﻣﻥ ﺃﺟﻝ‬ ‫ﺿﻣﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺗﻘﺩﻡ ﻭﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻹﻋﻣﺎﺭ‪ .‬ﺛﺎﻧﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﻳﺟﺏ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻭﻗﻑ ﺗﻣﻭﻳﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﻳﺷﻳﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﻟﻳﺑﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﺣﻳﺙ ﺗﻭﺟﺩ ”ﺍﻟﺛﺭﻭﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﻔﻭﺿﻰ“‪ .‬ﺛﺎﻟﺛﺎ‪ ،‬ﻣﺳﺄﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ‪ ،‬ﺣﻳﺙ‬ ‫ﺩﻭﺭ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ”ﺧﻁﻳﺭ ﻟﻠﻐﺎﻳﺔ“ ﻭﺣﻳﺙ ”ﻛﺎﻥ ﻳﺟﺏ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ﺗﺩﺧﻝ“‪ .‬ﻟﻘﺩ ﺗﻡ‬ ‫ﺗﻬﻣﻳﺵ ﺍﻟﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺛﻼﺙ ﺟﻣﻳﻌﻬﺎ‪ .‬ﻭﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺭﻏﻡ ﻣﻥ ﻫﺫﻩ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺎﺕ ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ”ﺟﻭﺍﻧﺏ ﻣﺷﺭﻗﺔ“ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﺗﺭﻛﺯ ﺑﺷﻛﻝ ﺃﺳﺎﺳﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻣﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻧﺟﺎﺣﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎﺩﻳﺔ ﻭﻫﺯﻳﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺟﻣﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻹﺭﻫﺎﺑﻳﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺃﻣﺎ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺙ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﺟﻧﺭﺍﻝ )ﻣﺗﻘﺎﻋﺩ( ﺩﻳﻔﻳﺩ ﺑﺗﺭﺍﻳﻭﺱ‪ ،‬ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﻣﻌﻬﺩ‬ ‫‪ KKR‬ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻣﻲ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺑﻖ ﻟﻭﻛﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺧﺑﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺭﻛﺯﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﻘﺩ‬ ‫ﺭﻛﺯ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺭﺩ ﻓﻌﻝ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﻘﺑﻠﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻻﻧﺳﺣﺎﺏ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻲ ﻣﻥ ﺧﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻣﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺗﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ )‪ .(JCPOA‬ﺳﻠﻁ ﺑﺗﺭﺍﻳﻭﺱ ﺍﻟﺿﻭء ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻭﺟﻪ ﺍﻟﻘﺻﻭﺭ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺧﻁﺔ ﻭﺍﻵﻣﺎﻝ ﻏﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻭﺍﻗﻌﻳﺔ ﻹﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﺃﻭﺑﺎﻣﺎ‪:‬‬ ‫ﺇﻥ ﺍﻷﻣﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻘﻠﻝ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﻣﻥ ﻧﺷﺎﻁﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﺿﺎﺭ‪ ،‬ﻛﻣﺎ ﺫﻛﺭ ﺍﻷﻣﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ‪ -‬ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﻟﺑﻧﺎﻥ ﻭﻓﻲ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﺭﺍﻕ ﻭﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ ﻭﻏﺯﺓ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﺎ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺫﻟﻙ ‪ -‬ﻟﻡ ﻳﻭﻗﻑ ﺃﻳﺎ ﻣﻥ ﺫﻟﻙ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻫﻧﺎﻟﻙ ﺃﻱ ﺷﻲء‪ ،‬ﻓﻲ ﻛﺛﻳﺭ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﺎﻻﺕ‪ ،‬ﻓﻘﺩ ﺍﺯﺩﺍﺩ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻝ ﻫﺫﺍ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻧﺷﺎﻁ ﺍﻟﺿﺎﺭ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺭ ﺍﻟﺳﻧﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﺳﺗﻣﺭ ﺗﻁﻭﻳﺭ ﺑﺭﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻟﺻﻭﺍﺭﻳﺦ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺃﺻﺑﺢ‬ ‫ﻳﻬﺩﺩ ﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﻓﺄﻛﺛﺭ‪.‬‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﻼﺟﺋﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﻳﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﺩﻧﻰ )ﺍﻷﻭﻧﺭﻭﺍ(‪ ،‬ﻭﺣﻣﺎﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﺎﻛﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻘﺩﺳﺔ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﺩﺱ ﻭﺍﻟﻬﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﺎﺭﻳﺧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻹﺳﻼﻣﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﺳﻳﺣﻳﺔ‪.‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻠﻔﺯ ﻟﻘﻧﺎﺓ ﺳﻛﺎﻱ ﻧﻳﻭﺯ ﻋﺭﺑﻳﺔ ”ﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺗﺭﺗﻳﺏ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪ :‬ﺑﻧﺎء ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻔﻭﺿﻰ؟“‬ ‫ﺭﻛﺯ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺙ ﺍﻷﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﺃﺣﻣﺩ ﺃﺑﻭ ﺍﻟﻐﻳﻁ‪ ،‬ﺍﻷﻣﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻟﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﻳﻔﻳﺔ ﺍﻧﺗﻘﺎﻝ ﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻔﻭﺿﻰ ﺇﻟﻰ‬ ‫ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ‪ .‬ﺃﻭﻻ‪ ،‬ﺷﺩﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻫﻣﻳﺔ ﺍﻻﻋﺗﺭﺍﻑ ﺑﻭﺟﻭﺩ ﻓﻭﺿﻰ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻧﺗﻘﺩ ﺍﻟﺧﻁﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﺣﻳﻁ ﺑﻣﺎ ﻳﺳﻣﻰ ﺍﻟﺭﺑﻳﻊ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻲ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺭﻏﻡ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻷﻣﻝ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻐﻳﻳﺭ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺱ‪ .‬ﻟﻡ ﻳﻧﺟﺢ ﺍﻟﺭﺑﻳﻊ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺣﻘﻳﻖ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻷﻣﻝ ﺑﺳﺑﺏ ﺩﻭﺭ‬ ‫ﺑﻌﺽ ”ﺍﻟﺗﻳﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺩﺍﺧﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ“ ﻭﻛﺫﻟﻙ ﺩﻭﺭ ﺑﻌﺽ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻯ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻭﻧﺗﻳﺟﺔ‬ ‫ﻟﺫﻟﻙ ﺿﻌﻔﺕ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﻭﺃﺻﺑﺢ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺣﻠﻣﺎ ﻟﻛﺛﻳﺭ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺱ‪.‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻻﻓﺗﺗﺎﺣﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻠﻔﺯﺓ‬ ‫ﻟﻘﻧﺎﺓ ﺳﻛﺎﻱ ﻧﻳﻭﺯ ﻋﺭﺑﻳﺔ‬ ‫)ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻳﺳﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻳﻥ(‪:‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﻋﺑﺩ ﺍﻟﻌﺯﻳﺯ ﺑﻥ‬ ‫ﺻﻘﺭ‪ ،‬ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﻣﺟﻠﺱ‬ ‫ﺇﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﻣﺭﻛﺯ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ‬ ‫ﻟﻸﺑﺣﺎﺙ‪ .‬ﻣﻳﻧﺎ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﻳﺑﻲ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺭﺋﻳﺳﺔ ﺗﺣﺭﻳﺭ ﺻﺣﻳﻔﺔ ﺫﺍ‬ ‫ﻧﺎﺷﻭﻧﺎﻝ‪ ،‬ﺃﺑﻭﻅﺑﻲ‪ .‬ﺍﻟﺟﻧﺭﺍﻝ‬ ‫)ﻣﺗﻘﺎﻋﺩ( ﺩﻳﻔﻳﺩ ﺑﺗﺭﺍﻳﻭﺱ‬ ‫‪ ،‬ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﻣﻌﻬﺩ ‪KKR‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻣﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺑﻖ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻭﻛﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺧﺑﺎﺭﺍﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺭﻛﺯﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‪ .‬ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﺃﺣﻣﺩ ﺃﺑﻭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻐﻳﻁ‪ ،‬ﺍﻷﻣﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻟﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﺍﻹﻋﻼﻣﻲ‬ ‫ﻋﺑﺩﺍﻟﻌﺯﻳﺯ ﺍﻟﺧﻣﻳﺱ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻣﺣﺎﻭﺭ‪ ،‬ﻗﻧﺎﺓ ﺳﻛﺎﻱ ﻧﻳﻭﺯ‬ ‫ﻋﺭﺑﻳﺔ‪.‬‬

‫ﻭﻭﻓﻘﺎ ﻟﻭﺟﻬﺔ ﻧﻅﺭﻩ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻣﻳﺔ ﻫﻲ ﺍﻷﻫﻡ ﺑﺎﻟﻧﺳﺑﺔ ﻟﻠﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﻟﻣﻘﺎﻭﻣﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﺩﺧﻼﺕ ﺍﻷﺟﻧﺑﻳﺔ ﻛﻣﺎ ﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺭﺅﻳﺗﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺻﻌﻭﺩ ﻧﻔﻭﺫ ﺩﻭﻝ ﻣﺛﻝ ﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﻭﺗﺭﻛﻳﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﻗﺎﻝ ﺃﻳﺿﺎ ﺃﻧﻪ ” ﺧﻼﻝ ﺍﻟﺛﻣﺎﻥ ﺳﻧﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺎﺿﻳﺔ ﻻﺣﻅﻧﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﺿﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻭﺿﻌﺕ ﺟﺎﻧﺑﺎ ﻛﻣﺎ ﻟﻭ ﺃﻧﻬﺎ ﻏﻳﺭ ﻣﻭﺟﻭﺩﺓ‪ .‬ﻭﺍﻟﺣﻘﻳﻘﺔ ﻫﻲ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﺿﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﺔ ﻫﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻘﺿﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺳﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﻭﻭﺿﻌﻬﺎ ﺟﺎﻧﺑﺎ ﻭﺇﻟﻐﺎء ﻋﻣﻠﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ ﻭﺭﺅﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﻳﻥ ﻣﻘﺗﻧﻌﻳﻥ ﺑﺄﻧﻪ ﻻ ﻳﻭﺟﺩ ﺃﻣﻝ ﺳﻳﺿﺭ ﺑﺎﻟﺗﺄﻛﻳﺩ ﺑﻬﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﺃﻳﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺻﻔﺩﻱ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻭﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻐﺗﺭﺑﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﺭﺩﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻬﺎﺷﻣﻳﺔ‬

‫ﻣﺛﻝ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺟﻬﺩ ﻟﺗﻌﺯﻳﺯ ﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻳﺵ ﻓﻲ ﻛﻝ ﻣﻛﺎﻥ ﻣﻥ ”ﺍﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﻣﺣﻠﻲ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻔﺿﺎء‬ ‫ﺍﻹﻟﻛﺗﺭﻭﻧﻲ“‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﻓﻳﻣﺎ ﻳﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﻭﺿﻊ ﺍﻟﻼﺟﺋﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﺃﺷﺎﺭ ﺟﻼﻟﺗﻪ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻷﺭﺩﻥ ﻳﻠﻌﺏ ﺩﻭﺭﺍ‬ ‫ﻗﻳﺎﺩﻳﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺗﺭﺣﻳﺏ ﺑﺎﻟﻼﺟﺋﻳﻥ ﻭﺇﻳﻭﺍﺋﻬﻡ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻋﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺟﺎﻭﺭﺓ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻔﺱ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻭﺍﻝ‪ ،‬ﺩﻋﺎ ﺟﻼﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻠﻙ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﺗﺿﺎﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻧﺗﻬﻲ ﺃﺯﻣﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻼﺟﺋﻳﻥ ”ﻓﻌﻠﻳﺎ“‪ ،‬ﻟﻣﺳﺎﻋﺩﺗﻬﻡ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻌﻭﺩﺓ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺩﻳﺎﺭﻫﻡ ﻭﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺑﻧﺎء ”ﺍﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻌﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻠﻣﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﺯﺩﻫﺭﺓ“‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻳﺿﺎ ﺩﻋﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﺿﻳﻔﺔ ﻣﺛﻝ ﺍﻷﺭﺩﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺟﻬﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﻣﺑﺫﻭﻟﺔ‬ ‫ﻧﺣﻭ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻣﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﺩﺍﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺃﺧﻳﺭﺍ‪ ،‬ﺃﻛﺩ ﺟﻼﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻠﻙ ﻋﺑﺩ ﷲ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻘﺿﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﺟﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻣﺛﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ‬ ‫ﺇﻗﺎﻣﺔ ﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﻓﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻻ ﺗﺯﺍﻝ ﺍﻟﻘﺿﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﺔ ﻧﻘﻁﺔ ﻣﺣﻭﺭﻳﺔ ﺗﻐﺫﻱ ﻋﺩﻡ‬ ‫ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻲ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻣﻲ‪ .‬ﻭﺃﺷﺎﺭ ﺟﻼﻟﺗﻪ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻗﺩ ﺃﻛﺩ ﻗﺑﻝ ﺛﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﺳﻧﻭﺍﺕ‬ ‫ﻫﻧﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ‪ ،‬ﺑﺄﻥ ﻣﻧﻁﻘﺗﻧﺎ ﻟﻥ ﺗﺗﻣﺗﻊ ﺑﺎﻷﻣﻥ ﻭﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻣﺎ ﻟﻡ ﻧﺣﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻲ ﺍﻹﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻠﻲ‪ .‬ﻭﻗﺩ ﺛﺑﺕ ﺃﻥ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺃﻣﺭ ﺻﺣﻳﺢ‪ .‬ﻓﺎﻟﻁﺭﻳﻖ ﺇﻟﻰ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻣﺎﻡ ﻳﺣﺗّﻡ ﺣﻝ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺗﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﻣﻣﺎ ﻳﺅﺩﻱ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻗﻳﺎﻡ ﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﻓﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﺔ ﻣﺳﺗﻘﻠﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻁﻭﻝ‬ ‫ﺣﺩﻭﺩ ‪ 1967‬ﻭﻋﺎﺻﻣﺗﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻘﺩﺱ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻗﻳﺔ‪ .‬ﻭﻣﻊ ﺫﻟﻙ ﻟﻥ ﻳﻛﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ ﻣﺿﻣﻭﻧﺎ‬ ‫ﻓﻘﻁ ﺑﻭﺟﻭﺩ ﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﺫﺍﺕ ﺳﻳﺎﺩﺓ ﻭﻟﻛﻥ ﺇﺫﺍ ﺗﻡ ﺗﻣﻛﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻳﻳﻥ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻌﺩﺍﺩ ﻟﻳﻭﻡ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻼﻡ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﺍﺧﺗﺗﻡ ﺟﻼﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻠﻙ ﺑﺩﻋﻭﺓ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺣﻘﻳﻖ ﻫﺫﺍ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻬﺩﻑ‪ ،‬ﺑﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺫﻟﻙ ﻣﻥ ﺧﻼﻝ ﺗﻣﻭﻳﻝ ﻭﻛﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﻹﻏﺎﺛﺔ ﻭﺗﺷﻐﻳﻝ‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

‫ﻛﻠﻣﺔ ﺍﻻﻓﺗﺗﺎﺡ‬ ‫ﺃﻟﻘﻰ ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﺃﻳﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺻﻔﺩﻱ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﻭﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻐﺗﺭﺑﻳﻥ‬ ‫ﺑﺎﻷﺭﺩﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻛﻠﻣﺔ ﺍﻻﻓﺗﺗﺎﺣﻳﺔ ﻧﻳﺎﺑﺔ ﻋﻥ ﺟﻼﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻠﻙ ﻋﺑﺩ ﷲ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ ﺑﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﺳﻳﻥ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻣﻠﻙ ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻷﺭﺩﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻬﺎﺷﻣﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﻲ ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪ 2018‬ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﻧﻅﻣﻪ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﺇﺩﺭﺍﻛﺎ ﻟﺗﺯﺍﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺩﻳﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻷﺯﻣﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪ ،‬ﺳﻠﻁ ﺟﻼﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻠﻙ ﺍﻟﺿﻭء‬ ‫ﺃﻭﻻ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻁﺑﻳﻌﺗﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺷﺎﺑﻛﺔ‪ ،‬ﻣﺛﻝ ﺃﺯﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﻼﺟﺋﻳﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎﺩﻳﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻭﺍﻻﻓﺗﻘﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻔﺭﺹ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﺫﻟﻙ ﺍﻟﻘﺿﺎﻳﺎ ﺍﻟﺑﻳﺋﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻹﺭﻫﺎﺏ ﻭﻛﺭﺍﻫﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻡ ﻭﻛﻠﻬﺎ‬ ‫”ﻋﺎﻟﻣﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻁﺎﻕ“ ﻭﻟﻬﺎ ”ﺟﺫﻭﺭ ﻋﻣﻳﻘﺔ“‪ .‬ﻭﻟﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﻠﻭﻝ ﻟﻬﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﻛﻼﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻘﺩﺓ ﺗﺣﺗﺎﺝ ﺃﻳﺿﺎ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻻﻋﺗﻣﺎﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻧﻬﺞ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻣﻲ ﺑﻌﻳﺩ ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻯ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﻣﻥ ﺑﻳﻥ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻷﺯﻣﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﺃﺷﺎﺭ ﺟﻼﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻠﻙ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﻣﻧﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻭﺟﻪ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺧﺻﻭﺹ‪ ،‬ﻣﻌﺑﺭﺍ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺧﺎﻭﻑ ﺍﻷﻣﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﻛﺛﺭ ﺇﻟﺣﺎﺣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻷﺭﺩﻥ ﺣﺎﻟﻳﺎ‪:‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻌﺭﻛﺔ ﺿﺩ ﺍﻟﺧﻭﺍﺭﺝ ﺃﻭ ”ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﻥ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻡ“‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﺯﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﻼﺟﺋﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ‬ ‫ﺍﻹﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻠﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺳﻁﻳﻧﻲ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﺑﻳﻧﻣﺎ ﺣﻘﻘﺕ ﺍﻟﺣﺭﺏ ﺿﺩ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻁﺭﻓﻳﻥ ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻣﻳﻳﻥ ﺍﻧﺗﺻﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﻋﺳﻛﺭﻳﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺃﻛﺩ ﺟﻼﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻠﻙ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﺭﻛﺔ ﺁﻳﺩﻳﻭﻟﻭﺟﻳﺔ ﻭﻣﻌﺭﻛﺔ ﺃﺟﻳﺎﻝ‪ ،‬ﻭﻋﻠﻰ ﻭﺟﻪ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺧﺻﻭﺹ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﻣﺣﺎﺭﺑﺔ ﺍﻧﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﻫﺫﻩ ”ﺍﻵﻳﺩﻳﻭﻟﻭﺟﻳﺔ ﺷﺑﻪ ﺍﻟﺩﻳﻧﻳﺔ“ ﺗﺗﻁﻠﺏ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﺧﻁﺎﺑﺎ ﻣﺿﺎﺩﺍ ﻳﻘﺩﻡ ”ﺍﻟﺗﺿﺎﻣﻥ ﺍﻹﻧﺳﺎﻧﻲ ﻭﺍﻷﻣﻝ“‪ .‬ﻳﺟﺏ ﺑﺫﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

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‫ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﺟﻭﻥ ﺗﺷﻳﺑﻣﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻭﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺱ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﻗﻣﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻲ ‪14‬‬ ‫‪ 28 – 26‬ﺃﻛﺗﻭﺑﺭ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ‬

‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ‬

‫ﺍﻟﻔﺻﻝ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ‬

‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‬

‫ﻟﻳﺯ ﻏﺭﺍﻧﺩﻱ‬ ‫ﻣﻧﺳﻘﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﻟﻠﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻹﻧﺳﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺟﻣﻭﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻟﺛﺔ‪ :‬ﺍﻟﺗﻬﺩﻳﺩﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺑﺭﺍﻧﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺑﺭﺍﻧﻲ – ﻗﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻐﺯﺍﻝ ‪C‬‬ ‫ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ‪ :‬ﺟﻭﻥ ﺭﺍﻳﻥ‬ ‫ﻣﺳﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﺃﻭﻝ ﻟﻠﺗﺣﻭﻁ ﺍﻟﺟﻳﻭﺳﻳﺎﺳﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻣﺎﺭﻛﻭﺱ ﻭﻳﻠﻳﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺑﻖ ﻟﻼﺳﺗﺧﺑﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﺄﺛﻳﺭﺍﺕ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻣﻘﺭ ﺍﻻﺗﺻﺎﻻﺕ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺟﻧﺭﺍﻝ )ﻣﺗﻘﺎﻋﺩ( ﻛﻳﺙ ﺃﻟﻳﻛﺳﺎﻧﺩﺭ‬ ‫ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﻣﺟﻠﺱ ﺍﻹﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‪ ،‬ﺁﻳﺭﻭﻥ ﻧﺕ ﻟﻸﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺑﺭﺍﻧﻲ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺳﺎﺑﻖ ﻟﻭﻛﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻣﻲ ﻭﻭﻛﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﻳﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺑﺭﺍﻧﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‬ ‫ﺷﺎﺭﻝ‪-‬ﺇﺩﻭﺍﺭﺩ ﺑﻭﻭﻳﻪ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‪ ،‬ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﻗﻁﺎﻉ ﺁﺳﻳﺎ ﻭﻣﻌﻅﻡ ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺭﻭﻻﻧﺩ ﺑﻳﺭﺟﺭ ﻟﻼﺳﺗﺷﺎﺭﺍﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺟﻣﻭﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺑﻌﺔ‪ :‬ﺍﻟﻁﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ ﻭﻋﺩﻡ ﺍﻧﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﺍﻷﺳﻠﺣﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﻭﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ – ﻗﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻐﺯﺍﻝ ‪3‬‬ ‫ﺭﺋﻳﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ‪ :‬ﺩ‪ .‬ﻛﻭﺭﻱ ﺷﺎﻛﻲ‪ ،‬ﻧﺎﺋﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻧﻳﻛﻭﻻﺱ ﺭﻭﺷﻪ‬ ‫ﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻷﻭﺭﻭﺑﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﺭﻧﺳﺎ‬ ‫ﺩ‪ .‬ﻛﻣﺎﻝ ﺍﻷﻋﺭﺝ‬ ‫ﻧﺎﺋﺏ ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﻬﻳﺋﺔ ﻭﻣﻔﻭﺽ ﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﻣﻔﺎﻋﻼﺕ ﺍﻟﻁﺎﻗﺔ‪ ،‬ﻫﻳﺋﺔ ﺍﻟﻁﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﺫﺭﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﺭﺩﻧﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺩ‪ .‬ﺣﺳﻥ ﺍﻟﺑﻬﺗﻳﻣﻲ‬ ‫ﻣﺣﺎﺿﺭ‪ ،‬ﻗﺳﻡ ﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺣﺭﺏ‪ ،‬ﻛﻠﻳﺔ ﻛﻧﻐﺯ‪ ،‬ﻟﻧﺩﻥ‬ ‫‪ 1130-1100‬ﺍﺳﺗﺭﺍﺣﺔ‬ ‫‪ 1300-1130‬ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺧﺗﺎﻣﻳﺔ – ﻗﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﺟﺗﻳﺎﺯ ﺍﻟﺗﻐﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺟﻳﻭ‪-‬ﺳﻳﺎﺳﻲ‪ :‬ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﻕ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻣﻲ‬ ‫ﺭﺋﻳﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ‪ :‬ﺩ‪ .‬ﻛﻭﺭﻱ ﺷﺎﻛﻲ‪ ،‬ﻧﺎﺋﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻔﺭﻳﻖ )ﻣﺗﻘﺎﻋﺩ( ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺭ ﺗﻭﻣﺎﺱ ﺑﻳﻛﻳﺕ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‪ IISS ،‬ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‬ ‫ﺩ‪ .‬ﺩﻳﻔﻳﺩ ﺟﻭﺭﺩﻭﻥ‬ ‫ﻣﺳﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﺃﻭﻝ ﻟﻠﺟﻐﺭﺍﻓﻳﺎ ﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎﺩﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻓﻳﺭﺟﻳﻧﻳﺎ ﻛﻭﻣﻭﻟﻲ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺯﻣﻳﻝ ﻭﺑﺎﺣﺙ ﺃﻭﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ ﻭﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻧﻣﻳﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺣﻔﻝ ﺍﻟﻐﺩﺍء ﺍﻟﻭﺩﺍﻋﻲ ﻟﺟﻣﻳﻊ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﻓﺩﻳﻥ –‬ ‫‪1430-1300‬‬ ‫ﻓﻳﻼ ﻏﺎﺯﻳﺑﻭ – ﺭﻳﺗﺯ ﻛﺎﺭﻟﺗﻭﻥ‬ ‫‪12‬‬

‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﺩ‪ .‬ﺃﻳﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺻﻔﺩﻱ‬ ‫ﻭﺯﻳﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﻭﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻐﺗﺭﺑﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﻷﺭﺩﻥ‬ ‫ﺑﺭﻳﺕ ﻣﺎﻏﻭﺭﻙ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺑﻌﻭﺙ ﺍﻟﺭﺋﺎﺳﻲ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺹ ﻟﻠﺗﺣﺎﻟﻑ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻣﻛﺎﻓﺣﺔ ﺩﺍﻋﺵ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‬ ‫‪ 1600-1530‬ﺍﺳﺗﺭﺍﺣﺔ‬ ‫‪ 1715-1600‬ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﻣﺳﺔ – ﻗﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻧﺎﻓﺱ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ‬ ‫ﺭﺍﻳﺷﻳﻝ ﺃﻭﻣﺎﻣﻭ‬ ‫ﻭﺯﻳﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ ‪ ،‬ﻛﻳﻧﻳﺎ‬ ‫ﻋﺑﺩﻱ ﺳﻌﻳﺩ ﻋﻠﻲ‬ ‫ﻣﺳﺗﺷﺎﺭ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻣﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺻﻭﻣﺎﻝ‬ ‫ﺟﺎﻥ‪-‬ﻛﺭﻳﺳﺗﻭﻑ ﺑﻳﻠﻳﺎﺭﺩ‬ ‫ﻧﺎﺋﺏ ﺍﻷﻣﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻟﻠﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﻳﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﻲ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻫﻳﺋﺔ ﺍﻻﺗﺣﺎﺩ ﺍﻷﻭﺭﻭﺑﻲ ﻟﻠﻌﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻲ‬

‫ﺍﻷﺣﺩ ‪ 28‬ﺃﻛﺗﻭﺑﺭ ‪2018‬‬ ‫‪ 1100-0930‬ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺯﺍﻣﻧﺔ – ﻗﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻐﺯﺍﻝ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺟﻣﻭﻋﺔ ﺍﻷﻭﻟﻰ‪ :‬ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺙ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﺻﻧﻳﻊ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻋﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ‪-‬ﻗﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻐﺯﺍﻝ ‪2‬‬ ‫ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ‪ :‬ﺍﻟﻔﺭﻳﻖ )ﻣﺗﻘﺎﻋﺩ( ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺭ ﺗﻭﻣﺎﺱ ﺑﻳﻛﻳﺕ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‪ IISS ،‬ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺟﻧﺭﺍﻝ ﺟﻭﺯﻳﻑ ﻓﻭﺗﻳﻝ‬ ‫ﻗﺎﺋﺩ ﺍﻟﻘﻳﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﻣﺭﻛﺯﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻘﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﻠﺣﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺑﺭﻭﻓﻳﺳﻭﺭ ﺇﺳﻣﺎﻋﻳﻝ ﺩﻳﻣﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﺻﻧﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻋﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺗﺭﻛﻳﺎ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺟﻧﺭﺍﻝ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺭ ﻛﺭﻳﺳﺗﻭﻓﺭ ﺩﻳﻔﻳﺭﻳﻝ‬ ‫ﻗﺎﺋﺩ ﻫﻳﺋﺔ ﺍﻷﺭﻛﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺗﺭﻛﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﺑﺭﻳﻁﺎﻧﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺟﻣﻭﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﻳﺔ‪ :‬ﺃﻣﻥ ﺑﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺩﺏ – ﻗﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻐﺯﺍﻝ ‪1‬‬ ‫ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ‪ :‬ﻓﻳﺭﺟﻳﻧﻳﺎ ﻛﻭﻣﻭﻟﻲ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺯﻣﻳﻝ ﻭﺑﺎﺣﺙ ﺃﻭﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ ﻭﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻧﻣﻳﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﺩﻣﻳﺭﺍﻝ ﺳﻛﻭﺕ ﺳﺗﻳﺭﻧﻲ‬ ‫ﻗﺎﺋﺩ ﺍﻟﻘﻳﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﻣﺭﻛﺯﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻘﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺭﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻏﻭﻧﻎ ﺷﻳﺎﻭﺷﻳﻧﻎ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺑﻌﻭﺙ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺹ ﻟﻘﺿﺎﻳﺎ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﻭﻏﺭﺏ ﺁﺳﻳﺎ ﻭﺷﻣﺎﻝ ﺃﻓﺭﻳﻘﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﺍﺭﺓ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﺻﻳﻥ‬ ‫ﺃﻟﻳﻛﺳﺎﻧﺩﺭ ﺭﻭﻧﺩﻭﺱ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺑﻌﻭﺙ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺹ ﻟﻠﻘﺭﻥ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ‪ ،‬ﻫﻳﺋﺔ ﺍﻻﺗﺣﺎﺩ ﺍﻷﻭﺭﻭﺑﻲ ﻟﻠﻌﻣﻝ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻲ‬

‫ﺟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻷﻋﻣﺎﻝ‬

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‫ﺍﻟﻛﻠﻣﺔ ﺍﻻﻓﺗﺗﺎﺣﻳﺔ‪ :‬ﻟﺟﻼﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻠﻙ ﻋﺑﺩﷲ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ ﺑﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﺳﻳﻥ‬ ‫ﻣﻠﻙ ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻷﺭﺩﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻬﺎﺷﻣﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻳﻠﻘﻳﻬﺎ ﻧﻳﺎﺑﺔ ﻋﻥ ﺟﻼﻟﺗﻪ ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﺩ‪ .‬ﺃﻳﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺻﻔﺩﻱ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﻭﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻐﺗﺭﺑﻳﻥ‬

‫ﺍﻟﺳﺑﺕ ‪ 27‬ﺃﻛﺗﻭﺑﺭ ‪2018‬‬ ‫ﻳﺗﺭﺃﺱ ﺩ‪ .‬ﺟﻭﻥ ﺗﺷﻳﺑﻣﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ ﻟﻠﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻹﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻛﺎﻓﺔ ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺇﻻ ﺇﺫﺍ ﺫﻛﺭ ﺧﻼﻑ ﺫﻟﻙ‬ ‫‪ 0830-0825‬ﺍﻓﺗﺗﺎﺡ ﺍﻟﻘﻣﺔ – ﻗﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻘﺩﻣﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻛﻠﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﺭﺣﻳﺑﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺩ‪ .‬ﺟﻭﻥ ﺗﺷﻳﺑﻣﺎﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ ﻟﻠﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ‬ ‫‪ 0915-0830‬ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻷﻭﻟﻰ – ﻗﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺷﺭﻕ ﺃﻭﺳﻁ ﻣﺗﻐﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﺟﻳﻣﺱ ﻣﺎﺗﻳﺱ‬ ‫ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‬ ‫‪ 1030-0915‬ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﻳﺔ – ﻗﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﻭﻟﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻧﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺃﻭﺳﻁﻲ ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺷﺊ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﻳﺦ ﺧﺎﻟﺩ ﺑﻥ ﺃﺣﻣﺩ ﺁﻝ ﺧﻠﻳﻔﺔ‬ ‫ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺭﻳﻥ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﺃ‪ .‬ﻋﺎﺩﻝ ﺑﻥ ﺃﺣﻣﺩ ﺍﻟﺟﺑﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ‬ ‫‪ 1100-1030‬ﺍﺳﺗﺭﺍﺣﺔ‬ ‫‪ 1215-1100‬ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻟﺛﺔ – ﻗﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺻﺭﺍﻉ ﻭﺍﻟﺩﺑﻠﻭﻣﺎﺳﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‬ ‫ﺩ‪ .‬ﺃﻭﺭﺳﻭﻻ ﻓﻭﻥ ﺩﻳﺭ ﻻﻳﻥ‬ ‫ﻭﺯﻳﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ ‪ ،‬ﺃﻟﻣﺎﻧﻳﺎ‬ ‫ﺩ‪ .‬ﺇﻟﻳﺯﺍﺑﻳﺗﺎ ﺗﺭﻳﻧﺗﺎ‬ ‫ﻭﺯﻳﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ‪ ،‬ﺇﻳﻁﺎﻟﻳﺎ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﻳﻭﺳﻑ ﺑﻥ ﻋﻠﻭﻱ ﺑﻥ ﻋﺑﺩﷲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻭﺯﻳﺭﺍﻟﻣﺳﺅﻭﻝ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻟﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺳﻠﻁﻧﺔ ﻋﻣﺎﻥ‬ ‫‪ 1415-1215‬ﻏﺩﺍء ﺍﻟﻣﻭﻓﺩﻳﻥ – ﻓﻳﻼ ﻏﺎﺯﻳﺑﻭ‪ ،‬ﺭﻳﺗﺯ ﻛﺎﺭﻟﺗﻭﻥ‬ ‫ﻏﺩﺍء ﻭﺯﺍﺭﻱ ﺧﺎﺹ‬ ‫‪ 1530-1415‬ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺑﻌﺔ – ﻗﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﺭ‬ ‫ﺗﺛﺑﻳﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻭﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻹﻋﻣﺎﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‬ ‫ﺗﺎﺭﻭ ﻛﻭﻧﻭ‬ ‫ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻳﺎﺑﺎﻥ‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﺟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻷﻋﻣﺎﻝ‬

‫ﺍﻟﺟﻣﻌﺔ ‪ 26‬ﺩﻳﺳﻣﺑﺭ ‪2018‬‬ ‫ﻁﻭﺍﻝ ﺍﻟﻳﻭﻡ‬

‫ﺍﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﺛﻧﺎﺋﻳﺔ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﺯﺭﺍء ﻭﻣﺳﺅﻭﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﺎﺕ‬

‫‪ 1700-1600‬ﺍﺟﺗﻣﺎﻉ ﺟﺎﻧﺑﻲ – ﻗﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻐﺯﺍﻝ ‪3‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻳﺩ )ﻣﺗﻘﺎﻋﺩ( ﺟﻭﻝ ﺭﺍﻳﺑﺭﻥ‪ ،‬ﻧﺎﺋﺏ ﻣﺳﺎﻋﺩ ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻲ‬ ‫ﻟﺷﺅﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﺑﻌﻭﺙ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺹ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ‬ ‫‪ 2000-1900‬ﺍﻟﺟﻠﺳﺔ ﺍﻹﻓﺗﺗﺎﺣﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣُﺗﻠﻔﺯﺓ – ﺳﻛﺎﻱ ﻧﻳﻭﺯ ﻋﺭﺑﻳﺔ – ﻗﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻐﺯﺍﻝ ‪1‬‬ ‫ﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺗﺭﺗﻳﺏ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪ :‬ﺑﻧﺎء ﺍﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻔﻭﺿﻰ؟‬ ‫ﻋﺑﺩﺍﻟﻌﺯﻳﺯ ﺍﻟﺧﻣﻳﺱ‬ ‫ﻣﺣﺎﻭﺭ‪ ،‬ﺳﻛﺎﻱ ﻧﻳﻭﺯ ﻋﺭﺑﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﺩ‪ .‬ﺃﺣﻣﺩ ﺃﺑﻭ ﺍﻟﻐﻳﻁ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻣﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ‪ ،‬ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﺍﻟﺟﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺟﻧﺭﺍﻝ )ﻣﺗﻘﺎﻋﺩ( ﺩﻳﻔﻳﺩ ﺑﺗﺭﺍﻳﻭﺱ‬ ‫ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﻣﻌﻬﺩ ‪ KKR‬ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻣﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻷﺳﺑﻖ ﻟﻠـ ‪CIA‬‬ ‫ﺩ‪ .‬ﻋﺑﺩﺍﻟﻌﺯﻳﺯ ﺑﻥ ﺻﻘﺭ‬ ‫ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﻣﺭﻛﺯ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ ﻟﻸﺑﺣﺎﺙ‬ ‫ﻣﻳﻧﺎ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﻳﺑﻲ‬ ‫ﺭﺋﻳﺳﺔ ﺗﺣﺭﻳﺭ ﺻﺣﻳﻔﺔ ﺫﺍ ﻧﺎﺷﻭﻧﺎﻝ‬ ‫‪ 2100-2000‬ﺣﻔﻝ ﺍﻹﺳﺗﻘﺑﺎﻝ – ﺍﻟﺑﻬﻭ ﺍﻟﻛﺑﻳﺭ‬ ‫‪ 2300-2100‬ﺍﻟﻌﺷﺎء ﺍﻻﻓﺗﺗﺎﺣﻲ – ﻗﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻭﺭ‬ ‫ﻓﻲ ﺿﻳﺎﻓﺔ‪ :‬ﺻﺎﺣﺏ ﺍﻟﺳﻣّﻭ ﺍﻟﻣﻠﻛﻲ ﺍﻷﻣﻳﺭ ﺳﻠﻣﺎﻥ ﺑﻥ ﺣﻣﺩ ﺁﻝ ﺧﻠﻳﻔﺔ‬ ‫ﻭﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﻌﻬﺩ‪ ،‬ﻧﺎﺋﺏ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺋﺩ ﺍﻷﻋﻠﻰ ﻟﻘﻭﺓ ﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺭﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺋﺏ ﺍﻷﻭﻝ ﻟﺭﺋﻳﺱ‬ ‫ﻣﺟﻠﺱ ﺍﻟﻭﺯﺭﺍء‪ ،‬ﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺭﻳﻥ‬ ‫ﺟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻷﻋﻣﺎﻝ‬

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‫ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﺩﻛﺗﻭﺭ ﺃﻳﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺻﻔﺩﻱ‪ ،‬ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﻭﺷﺅﻭﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻐﺗﺭﺑﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻷﺭﺩﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻬﺎﺷﻣﻳﺔ‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﻗﻣﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻲ ‪14‬‬ ‫‪ 28 – 26‬ﺃﻛﺗﻭﺑﺭ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ‬

‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ‬

‫ﺍﻟﻔﺻﻝ ﺍﻷﻭﻝ‬

‫ﺟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻷﻋﻣﺎﻝ‬

‫ﻣﻥ ﻣﺭﻛﺯﻫﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻛﺩ ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ ﺍﻷﻣﺭﻳﻛﻲ ﺟﻳﻣﺱ ﻣﺎﺗﻳﺱ ﺍﻫﺗﻣﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﻣﺭ ﺑﺎﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺳﻁ ﺧﻠﻔﻳﺔ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻷﺳﺋﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺯﺍﻳﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺄﻭﻟﻭﻳﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﺑﻼﺩ‪ .‬ﻛﻣﺎ ﺗﻡ ﺍﻟﺗﻁﺭﻕ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺗﻭﺳﻳﻊ ﺭﻭﺳﻳﺎ ﻟﻧﻔﻭﺫﻫﺎ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻲ‬ ‫ ﻭﺗﺣﺎﻟﻔﻬﺎ ﻣﻊ ﺗﺭﻛﻳﺎ ﻭﺇﻳﺭﺍﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﺎ ﻣﻊ ﺗﻁﻭﻳﺭ ﻋﻼﻗﺎﺕ ﺃﻭﺛﻖ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ‪.‬‬‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺻﻌﻳﺩ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻲ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﺻﻠﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﺗﺻﻣﻳﻣﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺭﺳﻡ‬ ‫ﻣﺳﺎﺭﻫﺎ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺹ ﺍﻟﺫﻱ ﺗﺩﻋﻣﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻛﺛﻳﺭ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻷﺣﻳﺎﻥ ﺍﻹﻣﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻭﻳﻣﻛﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻝ ﺑﺄﻥ ﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺗﺭﺗﻳﺏ ﻛﺎﻧﺕ ﺇﺣﺩﻯ ﻣﻼﻣﺢ ﺍﻟﺳﻧﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺳﺑﻊ ﺍﻟﻣﺎﺿﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻭﻣﺎﺯﺍﻟﺕ ﻣﺳﺗﻣﺭﺓ‪ ،‬ﻟﻛﻥ ﺍﻷﺣﺩﺍﺙ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺟﺭﺕ ﻗﺑﻝ ﺍﻟﻘﻣﺔ ﻣﺑﺎﺷﺭﺓ ﻋﺯﺯﺕ ﺃﻳﺿﺎ‬ ‫ﺃﻫﻣﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺳﻧﻭﻱ‪ :‬ﺗﻁﻭﻳﻖ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﻠﺣﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺳﻭﺭﻳﺔ ﻟﻣﻘﺎﻁﻌﺔ ﺇﺩﻟﺏ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻬﻣﺔ ﺍﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﻘﺗﻝ ﺍﻟﺻﺣﻔﻲ ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻱ ﺟﻣﺎﻝ ﺧﺎﺷﻘﺟﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﻧﺻﻠﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻌﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﺑﺈﺳﻁﻧﺑﻭﻝ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﻳﺎﻡ ﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﻭﺯﺭﺍء ﺇﺳﺭﺍﺋﻳﻝ ﺑﺯﻳﺎﺭﺓ ﻣﻔﺎﺟﺋﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺳﻠﻁﻧﺔ‬ ‫ﻋﻣﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻠﻣﺭﺓ ﺍﻷﻭﻟﻰ‪ ،‬ﺇﺑﺩﺍء ﺍﻫﺗﻣﺎﻡ ﺇﻗﻠﻳﻣﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺭﻥ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ‪ ،‬ﻭﺣﺿﻭﺭ ﻛﺑﺎﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻭﻓﺩﻳﻥ ﻣﻥ ﺷﺭﻕ ﺃﻓﺭﻳﻘﻳﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﻘﺭﻥ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ‪ .‬ﺇﻟﻰ ﺟﺎﻧﺏ ﺍﻟﺗﻣﺛﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻱ ﻣﻥ ﺷﺭﻕ‬ ‫ﻭﺟﻧﻭﺏ ﺁﺳﻳﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﻳﺑﺭﺯ ﺍﻟﺗﻭﺍﺟﺩ ﺍﻷﻓﺭﻳﻘﻲ ﻭﺍﻵﺳﻳﻭﻱ ُﻛﻼ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﺿﻊ ﺍﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎﺩﻱ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺣﻳﻭﻱ ﻟﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪ ،‬ﻭﻧﻁﺎﻕ ﺍﻟﺗﺣﺩﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻷﻣﻧﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺅﺛﺭ ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ ﻭﺗﻧﺑﻊ ﻣﻧﻪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺧﺗﺎﻣﺎ‪ ،‬ﻳﺗﻘﺩﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ ﺑﺟﺯﻳﻝ ﺍﻟﺷﻛﺭ ﻟﺟﻣﻳﻊ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﻳﻳﻥ ﻭﻏﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﻳﻳﻥ ﻟﻣﺳﺎﻫﻣﺗﻬﻡ ﺍﻟﻔﻌﺎﻟﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻣﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻲ‪ .‬ﻛﻣﺎ ﻳﺟﺩﺩ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺧﺎﻟﺹ ﺷﻛﺭﻩ ﻭﺗﻘﺩﻳﺭﻩ ﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺭﻳﻥ ﻭﻭﺯﺍﺭﺓ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻬﻳﺋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﺧﺭﻯ ﻟﺩﻋﻣﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﻣﺭ ﻟﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺭ ﺗﻭﻡ ﺑﻳﻛﻳﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺩﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ ‪ -‬ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﻣﻘ ّﺩ ﻣﺔ‬

‫ﻳﺳﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻘﺩﻡ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﻟﻭﻗﺎﺋﻊ ﺣﻭﺍﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪ :2018‬ﻗﻣﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻲ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺑﻌﺔ ﻋﺷﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﻋﻘﺩﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﺗﺭﺓ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫‪ 26‬ﺇﻟﻰ ‪ 28‬ﺃﻛﺗﻭﺑﺭ ‪ 2018‬ﺑﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺭﻳﻥ‪ .‬ﻣﻧﺫ ﺍﻧﻁﻼﻗﺗﻪ ﻋﺎﻡ ‪ ،2004‬ﺃﺻﺑﺢ‬ ‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ﻋﻧﺻﺭﺍ ﻣﺣﻭﺭﻳﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻬﻳﻛﻝ ﺍﻷﻣﻧﻲ ﻟﻠﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪ ،‬ﻓﻘﺩ ﺃﺻﺑﺢ‬ ‫ﺑﻣﺛﺎﺑﺔ ﻣﻧﺻﺔ ﻳﺳﺗﺧﺩﻣﻬﺎ ﻗﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻝ ﻭﺍﻟﻭﺯﺭﺍء ﻣﻥ ﻣﻧﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﺧﻠﻳﺞ‪ ،‬ﻭﻋﻣﻭﻡ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻣﺭﻳﻛﺎ ﺍﻟﺷﻣﺎﻟﻳﺔ ﻭﺃﻭﺭﻭﺑﺎ ﻭﺁﺳﻳﺎ ﻭﺃﻓﺭﻳﻘﻳﺎ ﻹﺻﺩﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺑﻳﺎﻧﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻬﺎﻣﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻋﻼﻭﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻙ‪ ،‬ﻭﺑﺩﻋﻡ ﻣﻥ ﻛﺑﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺅﻭﻟﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﺗُﺗﺎﺡ ﻟﻬﻡ ﻓﺭﺻﺔ ﺳﺎﻧﺣﺔ‬ ‫ﻟﻠﺗﺷﺎﻭﺭ ﺑﺷﻛﻝ ﺛﻧﺎﺋﻲ ﻭﻣﺗﻌﺩﺩ ﺍﻷﻁﺭﺍﻑ ﺣﻭﻝ ﺃﻫﻡ ﺗﺣﺩﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻷﻣﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﺔ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺭﺟﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻭﻗﺕ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﻫﻥ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺷﺎﺭﻙ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺗﻘﻰ ﺍﻟﺳﻧﻭﻱ ﺍﻟﺭﺍﺑﻊ ﻋﺷﺭ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻘﺎﺭﺏ ﺍﻟـ ‪ 500‬ﻣﻭﻓﺩ ﻣﻥ‬ ‫‪ 49‬ﺩﻭﻟﺔ ‪ -‬ﻣﻥ ﻭﺯﺭﺍء ﺑﺎﺭﺯﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺎﺩﺓ ﻋﺳﻛﺭﻳﻳﻥ ﻭﻗﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﺳﺗﺧﺑﺎﺭﺍﺕ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﺑﺎﺭ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺩﺑﻠﻭﻣﺎﺳﻳﻳﻥ ﻭﺻﺎﻧﻌﻲ ﺍﻟﺭﺃﻱ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﺣﻠﻠﻳﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺻﺣﻔﻳﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﺑﺎﺭﺯﻳﻥ‪ .‬ﻭﻛﺎﻥ ﺛﻠﺛﺎ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﻳﻥ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺅﻭﻟﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﻳﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﻣﻣﺎ ﺃﻅﻬﺭ ﺍﺳﺗﻣﺭﺍﺭ ﺍﻫﺗﻣﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺣﻠﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻳﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺣﺿﻭﺭ ﻭﺍﻟﻣﺳﺎﻫﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻗﺷﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺳﻳﺎﺳﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻬﺎﻣﺔ‬ ‫ﺑﺭﻋﺎﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻬﺩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺭﺍﺗﻳﺟﻳﺔ ﻭﺑﺣﺿﻭﺭ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻘﺎﺭﺏ ﺍﻟـ ‪ 30‬ﻣﻥ‬ ‫ﻛﺑﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺻﺣﻔﻳﻳﻥ‪ ،‬ﺑﺩﻋﻡ ﻣﻥ ﺟﺳﺩ ﺻﺣﻔﻲ ﺿﻡ ﺃﻛﺛﺭ ﻣﻥ ‪ 100‬ﻣﺭﺍﺳﻝ‪ ،‬ﻳﺅﻛﺩ‬ ‫ﻭﺟﻭﺩﻫﻡ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻫﻣﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻔﺎﻋﻝ ﺑﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﻛﻭﻣﺔ ﻭﻭﺳﺎﺋﻝ ﺍﻹﻋﻼﻡ ﻭﺿﺭﻭﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﻧﻘﺎﺵ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﻘﻝ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻠﺏ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺩﻋﺎ ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪ 2018‬ﻟﻠﺗﻔﻛﻳﺭ ﻓﻲ ”ﺇﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺗﺭﺗﻳﺏ ﺍﻟﺷﺭﻕ ﺍﻷﻭﺳﻁ“‪ .‬ﺭﺳﻡ‬ ‫ﺧﻁﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻫﻝ ﺍﻷﺭﺩﻧﻲ ﺟﻼﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﻠﻙ ﻋﺑﺩ ﷲ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ ﺑﻥ ﺍﻟﺣﺳﻳﻥ ﺍﻟﺻﻭﺭﺓ ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻳﻣﻳﺔ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﺩّﻣﺔ‬

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‫)ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻳﺳﺎﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻳﻣﻳﻥ(‪:‬‬ ‫ﺻﺎﺣﺏ ﺍﻟﺳﻣﻭ ﺍﻟﻣﻠﻛﻲ ﺍﻷﻣﻳﺭ‬ ‫ﺳﻠﻣﺎﻥ ﺑﻥ ﺣﻣﺩ ﺁﻝ ﺧﻠﻳﻔﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻌﻬﺩ ﻧﺎﺋﺏ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺋﺩ ﺍﻷﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻧﺎﺋﺏ‬ ‫ﺍﻷﻭﻝ ﻟﺭﺋﻳﺱ ﻣﺟﻠﺱ ﺍﻟﻭﺯﺭﺍء‪،‬‬ ‫ﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺭﻳﻥ؛ ﺟﻳﻣﺱ ﻣﺎﺗﻳﺱ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻭﺯﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﺩﻓﺎﻉ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻭﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻣﺗﺣﺩﺓ‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ ‪2018‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﻣﺣﺗﻭﻳﺎﺕ‬

‫ﺍﻟﻣﺣﺗﻭﻳﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﺩﻣﺔ‪5......................................................‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻔﺻﻝ ﺍﻷﻭﻝ‬ ‫ﺟﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻷﻋﻣﺎﻝ‪7.............................................‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻔﺻﻝ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻣﻠﺧﺹ ﺍﻟﺗﻧﻔﻳﺫﻱ‪13.........................................‬‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻔﺻﻝ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻟﺙ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻐﻁﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺻﺣﻔﻳﺔ‪55..........................................‬‬ ‫ﺇﺻﺩﺍﺭﺍﺕ ﻣﺧﺗﺎﺭﺓ ﻣﻥ ‪75 ............................. IISS‬‬ ‫‪ISS‬‬

‫ﺍﻟﻣﺣﺗﻭﻳﺎﺕ‬

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‫ﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﻧﺎﻣﺔ‬ Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London | wc2r 3pg | UK www.iiss.org

© February 2019 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Director-General and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman Contributors Dana Allin, Dr Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Nick Childs, Virginia Comolli, Jessica

Delaney, John Drennan, Michael Elleman, Bastian Giegerich, James Hackett, Emile Hokayem, Elisabeth Marteu, Meia Nouwens, Dr Nicholas Redman, Clément Therme Arabic Editor Yusuf Mubarak Editorial Clea Gibson, Sara Hussain, Bao-Chau Pham Editorial Research and Media Shirley Dent Production and Design Kelly Verity

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14 ‫قمة األمن اإلقليمي‬ 2018 ‫ أكتوبر‬28-26 ،‫مملكة البحرين‬

‫حوار المنامة‬

THE 14TH IISS REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT

‫المعهد الدولي للدراسات االستراتيجية‬

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 14TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 26–28 OCTOBER 2018

THE MANAMA DIALOGUE 2018

The IISS Manama Dialogue

The International Institute for Strategic Studies