IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2015

The International Institute for Strategic Studies 14th Asia Security Summit SINGAPORE, 29–31 MAY 2015

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

The International Institute for Strategic Studies 14th Asia Security Summit SINGAPORE, 29–31 MAY 2015

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

The International Institute for Strategic Studies 14th Asia Security Summit SINGAPORE, 29–31 MAY 2015

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

The International Institute for Strategic Studies Arundel House | 13–15 Arundel Street | Temple Place | London | wc2r 3dx | UK www.iiss.org

© July 2015 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Director-General and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman

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Editor Dr Tim Huxley

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Contents Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Chapter 1 Keynote address and opening dinner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Chapter 2 First plenary session The United States and challenges to Asia-Pacific security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Chapter 3 Second plenary session New forms of security collaboration in Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Chapter 4 Third plenary session Preventing conflict escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Chapter 5 Simultaneous special sessions Session 1 Armed forces and new terrorist threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Session 2 Energy security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Session 3 Challenges for maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Session 4 Emerging challenges to small state security in the Asia-Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Session 5 Avoiding military competition and arms-racing in Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36 38 40 42 44

Chapter 6 Fourth plenary session Strengthening regional order in the Asia-Pacific: towards more active conflict resolution and coopration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Chapter 7 Fifth plenary session Global security challenges and the Asia-Pacific: building cooperation between regions . . . . . . . . . . 53 Chapter 8 Social media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Chapter 9 Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Appendices I. Selected press coverage of the 2015 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 II. Selected IISS publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Foreword

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

China Sea. These debates were frank, yet notably

(IISS) is pleased to present this summary of the 14th

moderate in tone. There was much consensus on the

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, which we convened in

need for measures to prevent further escalation of

Singapore during 29–31 May 2015. This Dialogue was

maritime disputes.

marked by the strength of delegations from key par-

We thank the government of Singapore for its

ticipating states’ defence establishments, the fact that

continuing generous support for the IISS Shangri-La

many of the delegation leaders were participating for

Dialogue,

the first time, and the constructive nature of its discus-

Shangri-La Dialogue process under the terms of the

sions. As in previous years, the 2015 IISS Shangri-La

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreed in

Dialogue provided participating states’ defence minis-

May 2012. That MOU provided for the extension of

ters, permanent heads of ministries and military chiefs

the Singapore government’s support for the Dialogue

with unrivalled opportunities for candid exchanges of

to 2019, the establishment of two IISS Shangri-La

views on the current and emerging security challenges

Dialogue Senior Fellows for Asia-Pacific Security,

of the broad Asia-Pacific region. As well as the plenary

and for a IISS Shangri-La Dialogue publications pro-

sessions and special sessions, government delegations

gramme (including an annual Asia-Pacific Regional

participated in more than a hundred private bilateral

Security Assessment, the second issue of which was

and trilateral meetings with their counterparts from

distributed to all delegates at the 2015 Dialogue), and

other participating countries. Delegation leaders were

for a series of annual specialist workshops on regional

guests at a ministerial reception, and two ministerial

defence and security issues. As part of the expanded

luncheons hosted by Singapore’s Minister for Defence.

Shangri-La Dialogue process, the third IISS Fullerton

This report summarises the discussions that were open

Forum: the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa Meeting

to all delegates in the plenary and special sessions.

was convened successfully in January 2015, bringing

The full transcripts of all sessions, including ques-

together more than 60 delegates from 22 states that

tions and answers, are available on the IISS website.

regularly participate in the summit.

and

for

supporting

an

expanded

There was a particularly large cohort of approxi-

In addition, we express our gratitude to the fol-

mately 480 delegates, half of them from governments

lowing commercial, institutional and governmental

and armed forces. In 2015, 26 governments and

benefactors for their additional, vital financial sup-

the European Union sent delegations to the IISS

port: Airbus Group, The Asahi Shimbun, BAE Systems,

Shangri-La Dialogue, led in most cases by ministers

The Boeing Company, Lockheed Martin, Mitsubishi

or their equivalents. In addition, seven countries that

Corporation, Raytheon, and Singapore Technologies

were not regular Dialogue participants were repre-

Engineering. The IISS looks forward to developing

sented, three of them by full ministers.

these partnerships in the interests of further advancing

Aspects of the Dialogue that stood out this year

regional security dialogue and cooperation.

included a wide-ranging keynote address at the opening dinner by Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, and important discussions in plenary sessions, particularly regarding the roles of the major powers in regional security and tensions in the South

Dr John Chipman cmg, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS–Asia

Foreword

5

Introduction

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue (originally known as

each annual Dialogue, the emphasis each year has

the ‘Asia Security Summit’) was initiated in 2002 in

been on the most important contemporary and emerg-

response to the evident need for a forum where Asia-

ing regional security challenges. At the 2015 IISS

Pacific defence ministers could engage in dialogue

Shangri-La Dialogue, there was – as in 2014 – a strong

aimed at building confidence and fostering practi-

emphasis in ministers’ addresses and discussions on

cal cooperation. Today, the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

inter-state security concerns. There was a particular

remains the only annual meeting for defence minis-

focus on the implications of China’s assertiveness in

ters from across the broad Asia-Pacific region. It also

relation to its maritime claims for other states’ inter-

convenes chiefs of defence staff, permanent heads of

ests. Plenary sessions heard much from ministers, and

defence ministries and (in a parallel meeting) intelli-

in subsequent question-and-answer sessions, about

gence chiefs from the region. It has established itself as

the need to enhance regional security cooperation, and

a key element of the emerging regional security archi-

there was near-unanimity on the desirability of China

tecture, and maintains its status as the most important

and ASEAN agreeing and implementing their long-

and inclusive gathering of top-level defence profes-

anticipated Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

sionals in the Asia-Pacific. By providing an agenda that

However, there was also renewed emphasis on non-

responds specifically to their concerns and interests,

state challenges to security in the Asia-Pacific. Many

and by facilitating easy communication and fruitful

who spoke in plenary paid special attention to the

contact among them, the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue has

threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

helped to cultivate a sense of community among key

in the Middle East, which had found support among

policymakers in the defence and security establish-

a small minority of Muslims in other regions, includ-

ments of regional states and of those major powers

ing Southeast Asia. As in previous years, there was

with significant stakes in Asia-Pacific security. Since

widespread recognition of the huge dangers that nat-

the first IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, growing openness

ural disasters posed to human security in the region.

has characterised the summits discussions, and this

Whereas cooperation in relation to inter-state security

was evident at the fourteenth Dialogue in June 2015.

concerns was axiomatically a massive challenge, finding ways to collaborate in the face of shared security challenges, notably in the realms of counter-terrorism

MANAGING REGIONAL TENSIONS, CONFRONTING NEW CHALLENGES

and humanitarian assistance and disaster response,

Because of the Asia-Pacific region’s great geographical

implicitly as one which might offer a way of building

scope, the breadth of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue’s

confidence among states which might distrust each

membership across the region, and the sheer diversity

other over conventional security issues.

was widely recognised as an easier proposition and

of the region’s security challenges, the IISS has always

Since 2002 it has been tradition that the summit

ensured that the agenda for the Dialogue’s plenary

commences with a keynote address by a leading

and special sessions is wide-ranging. While there is

regional political figure at the opening dinner on

no confected overarching ‘theme’ for the agenda of

the Friday evening. In that year, Singapore’s Senior

Introduction

7

Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore; Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, Singapore; and Professor François Heisbourg, Chairman of the Council, IISS; and Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS

Dato’ Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, Minister of Defence, Malaysia; and Dr Ursula von der Leyen, Federal Minister of Defence, Germany

Minister (later Minister Mentor) Lee Kuan Yew made

plenary, Japanese Defence Minister Gen Nakatani,

the keynote address, and in subsequent years Prime

Indonesian Minister of Defence General (retired)

Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Senior Minister (later

Ryamizard Ryacudu, and India’s Minister of State for

Emeritus Senior Minister) Goh Chok Tong deliv-

Defence Rao Inderjit Singh, presented their countries’

ered speeches. In 2009 Prime Minister Kevin Rudd

views on new forms of security collaboration in Asia.

of Australia was the first leader of a country other

In the third plenary session, the UK’s Secretary of

than Singapore to address the opening dinner. He

State for Defence, Michael Fallon, Malaysian Minister

was followed in 2010 by President Lee Myung-bak

of Defence Hishamuddin Hussein, and General

of the Republic of Korea, in 2011 by Prime Minister

Tea Banh, Cambodia’s Deputy Prime Minister and

Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia,

Minister of National Defense, shared their views on

in 2012 by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

the prevention of conflict escalation.

from Indonesia, in 2013 by Prime Minister Nguyen

In the fourth plenary session, on the Sunday morn-

Tan Dung of Vietnam, and in 2014 by Prime Minister

ing of the Dialogue, Chinese Deputy Chief of the

Shinzo Abe of Japan. Abe emphasised that continued

General Staff Admiral Sun Jianguo, New Zealand’s

prosperity in Asia depended on ‘rock solid’ peace and

Minister of Defence Gerry Brownlee, and Germany’s

stability, which in turn required that ‘all countries

Federal Minister of Defence, Ursula von der Leyen,

must observe international law’. Appropriately, given

explained their perspectives on how regional secu-

that 2015 marks the fiftieth anniversary of Singapore’s

rity cooperation could be strengthened, and on the

independent statehood, Singapore Prime Minister Lee

options for more active conflict resolution and cooper-

Hsien Loong delivered the keynote address in 2015.

ation. In the fifth and final plenary session, Australian

Lee’s speech focused on three core themes which reso-

Minister of Defence Kevin Andrews, the European

nated throughout the summit: the regional balance of

Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and

power, regional security cooperation, and terrorism.

Security Policy (and Vice President of the European

In the opening plenary session on Saturday morn-

Commission), Federica Mogherini, and Singapore’s

ing, US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter called for

Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen paid special

an inclusive approach for all in Asia to ‘rise, prosper

attention to the links between global security chal-

and win’, while reinforcing the message that the US

lenges and the Asia-Pacific region and the potential for

was determined to ‘rebalance’ to Asia. In the second

inter-regional cooperation in facing these challenges.

8

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

On the Dialogue’s Saturday afternoon, five special sessions chaired by IISS senior staff and members of the Institute’s governance bodies, convened to discuss a range of more specialised topics: ‘Armed forces and new terrorist threats’; ‘Energy security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region’; ‘Challenges for maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance’; ‘Emerging challenges to small state security in the Asia Pacific’; and ‘Avoiding military competition and arms-racing in Asia’. A total of twenty-three panellists, including ministers of defence and foreign affairs, deputy ministers, high-ranking officials, senior military commanders (including chiefs of defence), academic experts, and – for the first time – representatives of industry presented opening comments, which were followed in each session by lively discussions.

John Harris, Chief Executive Officer, Raytheon International; Patrick Dewar, Executive Vice President, Lockheed Martin International; and Kevin Andrews, Minister of Defence, Australia

represented at a high level. Even at the first IISS

STRONG AND DIVERSE PARTICIPATION

BY GOVERNMENTS

Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002, 14 countries were rep-

Despite the increasing calls on the time and attention

or close equivalents. In 2015, 17 countries were repre-

of defence ministers, military chiefs, and top-ranking

sented at full ministerial level: Australia, Cambodia,

defence officials as a result of more recently estab-

Germany, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea,

lished series of meetings such as the ASEAN Defence

Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New

Ministers’ Meeting (and its offshoot, the ADMM-

Guinea, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand,

Plus), as well as a growing number of defence and

Timor-Leste, the United Kingdom and the United

security meetings in the Asia-Pacific region that

States. The European Union’s High Representative for

serve essentially national objectives (such as the

Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (who is addition-

Xiangshan Forum, which China’s People’s Liberation

ally a Vice-President of the European Commission)

Army (PLA) convened for the fifth time in November

also participated. Deputy ministers, high-ranking

2014), governments have maintained – and in many

officials, or chiefs of defence led the delegations from

cases strengthened – their participation in the IISS

Bangladesh, Canada, China, India, Laos, Myanmar,

Shangri-La Dialogue, which has become institution-

Norway, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri

alised as a recurrent fixture in the diaries of defence

Lanka, Tonga, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam.

ministers, permanent secretaries and military chiefs.

A notable feature of the 2015 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

resented by their defence ministers, deputy ministers,

Total delegate numbers increased from approxi-

was that many of the ministers who participated and

mately 160 in 2002, to 250 in 2006, 330 in 2010, 364

spoke were relatively new in their appointments

in 2013, and 451 in 2014. In 2015, delegate numbers

and were at the Dialogue for the first time as princi-

increased to more than 490 as a result of the IISS making

pals. These included US Secretary of Defense Ashton

determined efforts to increase participation by senior

Carter, who had previously attended the Dialogue as

officials concerned with security matters from foreign

an academic delegate.

ministries and national security secretariats, and also

As has become the case each year, there was much

to increase the numbers of female and media delegates.

interest among governments, the expert community

From the Dialogue’s beginning, many key national

and in the media over China’s level of participation.

players in the Asia-Pacific ensured that they were

Commensurate with China’s international status,

Introduction

9

General Liang Guanglie, then Minister of National Defence, led a strong PLA delegation to the 2011 summit, at which he spoke in a solo plenary session. General Liang’s participation indicated China’s acknowledgement of both the permanence and the utility of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue as a platform for what might be called ‘strategic communication’ in the Asia-Pacific region. Regrettably, China was not represented at a senior level at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in 2012, due to domestic concerns associated with the generational handover of leadership of the Chinese Communist Party that year. But Chinese assurances that Beijing would again be represented at a higher level were subsequently borne out at the 2013 Dialogue. In that year, Lieutenant-General Qi Jianguo, who had been appointed as a Deputy Chief, General

Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom; and Lui Tuck Yew, Second Minister for Defence, Singapore

Staff Department in 2012, led a particularly strong delegation including two two-star and three one-star

China’s official position and other Chinese view-

officers, thus restoring the level of Chinese participa-

points on regional security matters to be heard clearly.

tion to that which prevailed from 2007 to 2010. At the

Reflecting the importance that China now assigns to

2014 IISS Shangri-la Dialogue, the PLA sent an equally

the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Beijing chose to publish

strong delegation, led by another Deputy Chief,

its latest defence White Paper, China’s Military Strategy,

Lieutenant-General Wang Guanzhong, with approxi-

just three days before the 2015 Dialogue commenced,

mately the same composition as in the previous year.

and the Chinese delegation presented the first copies to

During preparations for 2015 IISS Shangri-La

be given to foreigners to IISS Directing Staff on 27 May.

Dialogue, the IISS engaged particularly closely with

Other key participant countries, such as Australia,

the Ministry of National Defence in Beijing, including

Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia,

through the medium of the third IISS Fullerton Forum:

New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States

the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa Meeting in

– and, of course, Singapore, the host nation – have for

Singapore in January 2015, with the intent of securing

many years sent strong delegations led by ministers to

the best-possible PLA representation. China’s confi-

the Dialogue. Other governments, have strengthened

dence that a strong participation in the IISS Shangri-La

their contingents over time. In 2015, it was notable

Dialogue served its interests was evident, as Beijing

that Cambodia, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam,

sent its largest delegation to date, led by first Admiral

as well as China, sent particularly full delegations.

Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief, General Staff Department,

European interest in the Dialogue has grown stead-

who as a four-star officer was a rank senior to previ-

ily, and in 2015 Switzerland’s foreign-affairs minister

ous General Staff Department officers who had led

and Spain’s defence minister each participated for the

Chinese delegations. The PLA contingent comprised

first time, as did strong ministerial-level delegations

no fewer than 18 delegates, including five two-star

from the European Union, Germany and the United

officers. The civilian Chinese presence at the Dialogue

Kingdom. However, the IISS is conscious that some

was also impressive, and included leading academics

countries with important regional security roles (most

in the field of international relations and representa-

notably, India) were not represented at full ministerial

tives of top defence and security think-tanks, as well

level in 2015, and will continue to encourage the gov-

as influential media delegates. Overall, this strong

ernments in question to play a stronger role in future

military and non-governmental representation allowed

IISS Shangri-La Dialogues.

10

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

The extent to which the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

and in the air; enhanced intelligence, surveillance and

has become an important fixture in the calendars

reconnaissance capabilities to protect international

of the defence and security establishments of Asia-

sea lanes; and the improvement of disaster-response

Pacific states and outside powers has been evident in

capabilities.

the participation of national delegations in spite of

Government delegations to the IISS Shangri-La

domestic political upheavals and occasional crises.

Dialogue have increasingly used it as a venue for pri-

In 2014, despite the military coup in Thailand only

vate bilateral and trilateral meetings. The Institute is

eight days before the Dialogue commenced, that

aware of 67 bilateral meetings in the Shangri-La Hotel

country was represented by a strong delegation led

during the Dialogue weekend and more than 100

by the Permanent Secretary and Acting Minister of

such meetings in total. The detailed content of these

Foreign Affairs, Sihasak Phuangketkeow, who was

meetings, which have become more numerous each

accompanied by the defence ministry’s permanent

year, has naturally remained confidential. Over time,

secretary, the deputy chief of defence forces, and

though, they have become more transparent, with

senior officials from his own ministry. In 2015, the

governments often divulging at least elements of their

United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Defence,

substance in public statements. Among the bilateral

Michael Fallon, spoke at the Dialogue despite the fact

meetings held on the sidelines of the 2015 Dialogue,

that the new British government had been formed

US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter met with min-

less than three weeks earlier.

isters from each of the United States’ regional allies

Over the years, the unique IISS Shangri-La

and security partners. US discussions with the Chinese

Dialogue culture of frank, open debate has helped

delegation were convened at a lower level, with

to foster and facilitate substantive cooperation on

David Shear, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian

important security issues, and ministers have used

and Pacific Affairs, meeting Admiral Sun Jianguo to

the Dialogue as a platform from which to propose

discuss preparations for the US–China defence dia-

and advance initiatives in areas as diverse as maritime

logue scheduled to take place in Washington DC in

security cooperation in the Malacca Strait, the analysis

June 2015. China’s delegation also had discussions

of the implications of regional states’ expanding sub-

with Japanese defence officials, focusing on potential

marine capabilities, the regional proliferation of small

improvements to communications between the PLA

arms and light weapons, the structure of the regional

and the Japan Self-Defense Forces. In addition, the

security architecture, and the idea of a ‘no first use

Japanese and Korean defence ministers met bilaterally

of force’ agreement in the South China Sea. In 2014,

for the first time since 2011, as well as trilaterally with

the Chinese delegation leader, Lieutenant-General

the US defense secretary. In the fifth trilateral meet-

Wang Guanzhong, called for deepened dialogue and

ing between the US defense secretary and the defence

exchanges between regional states’ defence establish-

ministers of Australia and Japan, the three principals

ments, including through the ASEAN-China Defence

exchanged views on North Korea, expressed serious

Ministers’ Meeting, scheduled for 2015, including

concern over Chinese land-reclamation activities in

closer cooperation on counter-terrorism, disaster

the South China Sea, and discussed enhanced ‘practi-

relief and maritime security, and the more effective

cal trilateral defence cooperation’.

management of ‘differences’ through strengthened

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue has remained

communication among regional countries. In 2015,

above all a ‘Track One’ inter-governmental meeting.

US Secretary of Defense Carter launched a Southeast

However, participation by non-official delegates has

Asia Maritime Security Initiative aimed at build-

from the beginning served to animate and enrich the

ing regional states’ capabilities. Japan’s Minister of

summit’s proceedings, particularly through the ques-

Defense, Gen Nakatani, proposed what he called the

tions such delegates regularly pose to ministerial and

‘Shangri-la Dialogue Initiative’, comprising three ele-

other speakers in the plenary and special sessions.

ments: the promotion of common rules and laws at sea

Many of the non-official delegates at the Dialogue in

Introduction

11

the 2015 Dialogue, ASEAN, INTERPOL, NATO and the OSCE were all represented. The NATO delegation was particularly strong and included the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.

From the time of the first Dialogue in 2002, to which then-Senator Chuck Hagel led a strong, bipartisan US Congressional Delegation (CODEL), the IISS has been particularly keen to involve legislators with strong defence, security and foreign-affairs interests. In 2015, Senator John McCain, Chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Committee, led a strong CODEL including four other Senators and three senior staffers. Senator McCain, flanked by his fellow members Dr Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, United States; and Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, Singapore

of the Armed Services Committee, spoke at a CODEL press conference on the US role in the Asia-Pacific.

Others legislators among the delegates were Reinhard

2015 were leading academics and think-tank analysts at

Bütikofer (Member, European Parliament), Ichita

the forefront of debate on Asia-Pacific security, includ-

Yamamoto (Member, Japan’s House of Councillors),

ing a number of younger delegates participating for

and Lord Powell of Bayswater (Member, House of

the first time. The IISS was pleased that Global Voices

Lords, United Kingdom).

was again able to sponsor the participation of new delegates from Australia. There was also a strong cohort of media delegates including columnists and bloggers

Looking ahead

on regional security affairs, as well as business repre-

Bringing the 2015 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue to a

sentatives. For the first time, speakers from the private

close, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive Dr

sector were invited to join the panels of two of the

John Chipman said the IISS was ‘delighted as co-host

Dialogue’s special sessions. By refreshing each year the

that many of the ministers used the platform of the

ranks of non-governmental delegates, and by making

Shangri-La Dialogue to test ideas or to make specific

constant efforts to increase their diversity from across

policy proposals’. He said that some of the results of

the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, awareness of the

the summit ‘will emerge over the months to come’. In

IISS Shangri-La Dialogue has continuously expanded

all, 38 countries and international organisations were

in the wider policy community. In addition, the IISS

represented. He noted that the dates for the next IISS

has made efforts to involve senior representatives of

Shangri-La Dialogue had already been decided on:

relevant international and inter-state institutions. At

3–5 June 2016.

12

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

14th Asia Security Summit SINGAPORE, 29–31 MAY 2015

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

chapter 1

Keynote address and opening dinner Friday 29 May 2015, 20:00 SPEAKER Lee Hsien Loong Prime Minister of Singapore

Keynote address and opening dinner Introducing Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, IISS

In his address, Prime Minister Lee noted that 2015

Director-General and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman

is the fiftieth anniversary of his country’s separation

highlighted ‘strategic unease’ as a defining characteristic

from Malaysia. This was a good time, he said, to ‘step

of the contemporary Asia-Pacific region. A condition of

back and … look at what has changed over the past 50

flux defined relations among states, and tentative secu-

years’, focusing on three issues that had been on the

rity alignments and strategic hedging were prevalent.

agenda of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue since it was

Dr Chipman noted that the first half of 2015 had seen

first convened in 2002: ‘the balance of power, regional

renewed tensions in the South China Sea, with various

cooperation, and terrorism’.

claimant states engaging in large-scale land reclama-

Lee said that, while the Obama administration had

tion and construction. The last week, he remarked, had

reaffirmed the United States’ role as a Pacific power

seen the release of a Chinese defence White Paper that

through its ‘strategic rebalance’, the balance of power

was ‘sure to be viewed as a foundational text for a more

in Asia was shifting, particularly as a result of China’s

extrovert Chinese defence policy’. The most important

growing economic power and influence, as well as its

overarching question facing security policymakers in

military build-up. He said that the US–China relation-

the Asia-Pacific concerned the type of regional order

ship was ‘the key’ to China’s peaceful rise, arguing

that would best assure ‘long-term peace and stability’.

that this relationship was ‘not a zero-sum game’: it

More than ever, he said, Asia-Pacific states and their

includes ‘many interdependencies and opportuni-

extra-regional partners needed to think strategically

ties’. The prime minister emphasised that no Asian

about their long-term interests.

country wanted to choose sides between the US and Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore

Click to see video

14

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore

China, and that ‘we are glad that successive US admin-

maritime disputes were handled, said the prime min-

istrations and … Chinese leaderships have engaged’

ister. While these disputes were likely to ‘outlive the

with each other. While peaceful competition between

Shangri-La Dialogue’, they needed to be contained in

these two major powers across the region was to be

order to avoid ‘bad outcomes’. Lee argued that China

expected, it was important that they should not divide

and ASEAN should conclude their Code of Conduct

the region into two spheres of influence, which would

on the South China Sea ‘as soon as possible’ and that

circumscribe other countries’ options and increase the

adherence to international law, including the UN

risk of rivalry and conflict. A more desirable form of

Convention on the Law of the Sea, would be ‘the best

competition would involve China ‘deepening its coop-

outcome’. In contrast, an outcome determined by

eration and making friends all over Asia’. The prime

‘might is right’ would set ‘a bad precedent’, even if a

minister noted that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

physical clash was avoided. In the long term, a stable

would give substance to the US rebalance to Asia.

regional order would require ‘consent and legiti-

While there is ‘clearly a competitive dynamic’ between

macy’ as well as a balance of power.

the TPP and China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment

Regarding Japan, Lee said that even 70 years after

Bank (AIIB) initiative, Lee noted that Singapore hoped

its end, the Second World War continued to ‘cast a

that ‘eventually China will join the TPP, and the US

shadow’ over Japan’s relations with its neighbours

and Japan will join the AIIB’.

China and Korea. In Lee’s view, Japan ‘needs to

In a different model of competition, however,

acknowledge past wrongs’, particularly regarding spe-

‘unhappy outcomes’ might be ‘tougher to avoid’. The

cific issues such as ‘comfort women’ and the Nanjing

disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea

Massacre. But, for their part, Japan’s neighbours ‘need

have ‘heated up significantly’. In the South China

to accept Japan’s acknowledgements and not demand

Sea, ‘claimant states are taking unilateral actions in

that Japan apologises over and over again’. Given the

the disputed areas, drilling for oil and gas, reclaim-

way that historical controversy has impeded Prime

ing land, setting up outposts and reinforcing their

Minister Abe’s desire for Japan to play a more active

military presence’. The US had responded with

role in Asia, such reconciliation would help Japan to

‘increased overflights and sailings’ near the dis-

‘become a normal country’. Mr Lee also expressed

puted territories. Non-claimant Asian countries,

hope that India could ‘make a big contribution’

including Singapore, had a stake in how the region’s

through a deepening partnership with the rest of Asia.

Keynote address and opening dinner

15

Turning to the question of regional cooperation

ment centre’ for ISIS, and ISIS has said it intends to

and integration, Lee remarked that, compared with

establish a wilayat (province) of its intended global

50 years earlier when there were relatively few links

caliphate there. While this was a ‘pie-in-the-sky’

between Asian countries, the region is now ‘coming

idea, it was ‘not so far-fetched’ that it could estab-

closer together’. However, Southeast Asia’s latest

lish a physical base somewhere in the region. For its

humanitarian crisis, involving ‘the human trafficking

part, Singapore ‘takes terrorism, and in particular

of Rohingyas and Bangladeshis’, had put ‘huge stress’

ISIS, very, very seriously’ and is participating in the

on Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. A ‘response at

international coalition against the organisation. The

the source’, as well as at sea, was necessary in order to

prime minister announced that the Singapore air

find a solution.

force’s deployment of an in-flight refuelling aircraft

ASEAN was building ‘a framework of coopera-

to the coalition ‘starts today’.

tion in the broader region’, using mechanisms such

Concluding his address, Lee asserted his hope that

as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defence

in 50 years’ time ‘a stable regional balance’ will con-

Ministers’ Meeting, and the East Asia Summit (EAS).

tinue, that ASEAN would be ‘an effective and relevant

With its broad membership, said Lee, the EAS ‘ties

actor’, that ‘there will be free trade in the Asia-Pacific

together the two sides of the Pacific’, reducing the risk

instead of the current alphabet soup of trading

of ‘an East Asian bloc … which might split the Pacific

arrangements’, and that it should not be the case that

down the middle’. But strong nationalist sentiments

‘might is right’.

and some governments’ domestic preoccupations implied that ‘we have our work cut out’ to ensure that regional cooperation continues to develop.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

On terrorism, Lee noted that the Islamic State

To a question from Republic of Korea’s Ambassador

of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) was ‘the latest virulent

for National Security Affairs, Dr Chung Min Lee,

incarnation of the jihadi threat’, and that it had

about how China’s rise as a military power should

attracted ‘malcontents and misfits, misguided souls

be managed, the prime minister replied that China

and naïve youths from all over the world’. Jihadis

was preoccupied with domestic problems and that all

returning to their home countries posed serious

Southeast Asian countries wanted to have ‘good rela-

security risks, as did the prospect of ‘lone-wolf’

tions’ with China despite the ‘problem’ of the South

attackers. Southeast Asia, he said, is ‘a key recruit-

China Sea. Answering Chinese People’s Liberation

Dr Chung Min Lee, Ambassador for National Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea; Professor of International Relations, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University

16

Colonel Lu Yin, Associate Research Fellow, Strategic Teaching and Research Department, National Defense University, People’s Liberation Army

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Haruhisa Takeuchi, Ambassador of Japan to Singapore

Army Colonel Lu Yin’s question about how Singapore

levels’. Asked by Japan’s Ambassador to Singapore,

might help promote China–US relations, Lee said that

Haruhisa Takeuchi, for his reflections on Singapore’s

as ‘a very small country’, Singapore could play only

achievements and future, Lee emphasised Singapore’s

a ‘modest’ role, while noting that the IISS Shangri-La

advantages as a small state that could implement

Dialogue was useful as a place where China and the

policy changes relatively quickly, and also the bene-

US could talk to each other. But China and the US

fits from its ‘credible’ and ‘professional’ armed forces,

also needed to communicate directly ‘at the highest

which provided security.

Keynote address and opening dinner

17

18

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

14th Asia Security Summit SINGAPORE, 29–31 MAY 2015

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

chapter 2

first plenary session

The United States and challenges to Asia-Pacific security

Saturday 30 May 2015, 09:00 SPEAKER Dr Ashton Carter Secretary of Defense, United States

First plenary session

The United States and challenges to Asia-Pacific security Dr Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, United States

Click to see video

In the first plenary session, on the Dialogue’s

agreements and are working on a measure to prevent

Saturday morning, on ‘The United States and chal-

dangerous air-to-air encounters.

lenges to Asia-Pacific security’, US Secretary of

Carter raised an issue of contention with China

Defense Dr Ashton Carter promoted the vision of

concerning its activities in the South China Sea. He

a shared regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific

noted that several nations that claim parts of that sea

region in which ‘all nations have the opportu-

have developed outposts over the years. Yet China has

nity to rise and prosper’. The US rebalance toward

gone ‘much further and faster than any other’; in just

Asia-Pacific is aimed at helping the region fulfil its

the past 18 months, China has reclaimed over 2,000

promise, Carter said. The next phase of the rebalance

acres, more than all other claimants combined. This

includes new military platforms as well as economic

was a source of tension.

and diplomatic engagement. He extolled the Trans-

Expressing deep concern about the pace and

Pacific Partnership trade agreement, which recently

scope of the land reclamation, the prospect for

passed an important milestone in winning congres-

further militarisation and the potential for these

sional approval.

activities to lead to miscalculation or conflict, Carter

Carter announced that the US Department of

called for an immediate and lasting end to land rec-

Defense is launching a new Southeast Asia Maritime

lamation by all claimants. Washington also opposes

Security Initiative to help build capacity. In enumer-

the construction of military structures on reclaimed

ating enhanced cooperation with several US partners

land. He encouraged ASEAN and China to con-

in the region, he said that in late 2014 America and

clude their Code of Conduct on the South China Sea

China had reached two ‘historic’ confidence-building

this year.

20

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

The US will continue to protect freedom of naviga-

he said, was that many nations in the region conse-

tion and overflight, Carter said, and to ‘fly, sail, and

quently want to strengthen their relationships with the

operate wherever international law allows’. Making it

US and other partners. Carter said, ‘this kind of behav-

clear that America ‘would not be deterred from exer-

iour, if it does not stop, one of the consequences will be

cising these rights’, he said ‘turning an underwater

the continued coalescing of concerned nations around

rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights

the region and the world’. Josh Rogin, columnist for

of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international

Bloomberg View, asked about North Korea’s growing

air or maritime transit’. China’s actions in the South

nuclear arsenal and whether Carter, as the perceived

China Sea put it out of step with the international rules

‘new leader of the Asia portfolio’ in the Obama

and norms that underscore the Asia-Pacific security

Administration planned to reinvigorate what many

architecture, he added.

feel is a ‘failed policy of strategic patience’. Correcting Rogin, Carter said Obama is the leader of the policy, and noted that it is a policy of seven decades of suc-

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

cessive administrations to build a principled security

Professor François Heisbourg, Chairman of the IISS

system in Asia based on norms, and not coercion.

Council, asked Carter about his understanding of

While the effort to achieve a nuclear-weapons-free

China’s purpose in its activities in the South China Sea

environment on the Korean Peninsula had not yet suc-

and what China’s continued pursuits there said about

ceeded, the policy has united the five key countries in

the effectiveness of the US response. Carter said China

their opposition to nuclear proliferation.

could speak for itself as to its purpose, and he repeated

Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo, Deputy Director-

that America’s call for a halt to reclamation activities

General, China–US Defense Relations Research Center,

and to further militarisation was not directed only at

Academy of Military Science, PLA, called Carter’s

China. Yoichi Kato, National Security Correspondent

criticism of China’s island and reef construction

for Japan’s Asahi Shimbun, noted that China has not

activities ‘groundless and not constructive’. Freedom

responded to previous rhetorical appeals to stop rec-

of navigation in the South China Sea has never been

lamation activity and asked if it was not time for the

affected, he said, and China has never taken any ‘pro-

US to take its response to a new phase in order to deter

active measures’ through construction activities that

low intensity provocations. Rephrasing the question,

affect peace and stability. To the contrary, ‘over the

Carter suggested that one consider the effect of failing

past decades, the region has been peaceful and stable

to resolve the disputes in a peaceful way. The answer,

because of China’s great restraint’. He called China’s

Professor François Heisbourg, Chairman of the Council, IISS; Special Adviser, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique

Yoichi Kato, National Security Correspondent, The Asahi Shimbun

Josh Rogin, Columnist, Bloomberg View

First plenary session

21

Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo, Deputy DirectorGeneral, China–US Defense Relations Research Center, Academy of Military Science, China

Professor Kishore Mahbubani, Dean and Professor in the Practice of Public Policy, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore

Senator Dan Sullivan, Member, Armed Services Committee, US Senate

activities in the region ‘legitimate, reasonable and jus-

the US does not see the situation in terms of having

tified’. He asked if America’s harsh criticism, military

‘allowed China to rise’. Rather, the US was part of a

reconnaissance activities and military threats help to

regional system of peace and stability wherein China

resolve disputes in the South China Sea and maintain

could peacefully develop its economy. He repeated

peace and stability in the region. In response, Carter

his theme of ‘creating an environment in which every-

repeated that land reclamation in the South China Sea

body can rise and win’. He was personally committed

was not limited to China, but that China’s recent large-

to working with China’s government and military on

scale activities are unprecedented. He said America’s

confidence-building measures. Senator Dan Sullivan,

air and sea operations in this maritime region have

Member of the US Senate Armed Services Committee,

taken place for decades and would continue. Nor was

reinforced a point Carter had mentioned about the

it new, he said, when the ‘free press of the West covers

strong bipartisan support in the US for the rebalance

large-scale reclamation activities’. Professor Kishore

toward Asia-Pacific. Sullivan asked Carter to expand

Mahbubani, Dean and Professor in the Practice of

on the potential with regard to energy security and

Public Policy, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy,

broader security in the region of the US energy

National University of Singapore, commented that

revolution. Carter noted that the domestic energy rev-

the US had done a ‘remarkable job of managing’ the

olution was rapidly turning the US from a net energy

rise of China through its benevolent actions. As China

consumer to a net energy producer, but this did not

keeps rising, however, strategic adjustments will have

change the fact that for China, Japan and other coun-

to be made. He asked what these adjustments are

tries, oil-tanker transit through the Malacca Strait was

likely to be and what additional confidence-building

a vital lifeline. It was thus important to ensure free-

measures would be needed. Carter responded that

dom of navigation.

22

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

14th Asia Security Summit SINGAPORE, 29–31 MAY 2015

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

chapter 3

second plenary session

New forms of security collaboration in Asia

Saturday 30 May 2015, 10:00 SPEAKERS Gen Nakatani Minister of Defense, Japan General (Retd) Ryamizard Ryacudu Minister of Defense, Indonesia Rao Inderjit Singh Minister of State for Defence, India

Second plenary session

New forms of security collaboration in Asia Gen Nakatani, Minister of Defense, Japan

Click to see video

In the second plenary session, on ‘New forms of

in the East China Sea. He called for agreement on a

security collaboration in Asia’, ministers from Japan,

Code of Conduct for the South China Sea.

Indonesia and India offered their thoughts on threats

Minister Nakatani set out Japan’s ideas for future

to regional security and proposed new mechanisms

security collaboration based around three pillars. The

for collaboration on dealing with them. Gen Nakatani,

first of these was the Japan–US Alliance, which had

Japan’s Minister of Defense, said that although mul-

recently been updated with revised Guidelines for

tilateral security cooperation in Asia was often seen

Japan–US Defense Cooperation. These would enable

as lagging behind Europe’s, the region had enjoyed

seamless cooperation with the US to ensure regional

peace since the end of the Cold War in spite of serious

stability, and in domains such as cyber security and

security challenges. This success story was the result

space, and would foster cooperation with other

of a combination of factors, including the solidarity

partners. The second pillar was Japan’s own efforts

of ASEAN and the various multilateral forums con-

to pursue regional peace and prosperity, deriving

structed around it, as well as the bilateral alliances and

from its ‘deep remorse’ over the Second World War.

military presence of the United States. ASEAN should

Legislation before parliament would allow Japan to

remain at the centre of regional security.

contribute more actively.

However, Nakatani described as deeply regretta-

The third pillar was closer cooperation with

ble that ‘at this very moment, vast land reclamation

regional countries. In this context, Nakatani pro-

and construction of sea ports and airstrips are being

posed a Shangri-La Dialogue Initiative (SLDI), under

conducted at a rapid pace in the South China Sea.’ In

which nations would promote common rules both

addition, there were attempts to change the status quo

at sea and in the air. This would firstly ensure safety

24

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

General (Retd) Ryamizard Ryacudu, Minister of Defense, Indonesia

Click to see video

and freedom of navigation and overflight. Nakatani

was using moderate Islamic organisations to spread

gave the example of joint exercises using the Code for

peaceful religious teaching, while keeping alert to

Unplanned Encounters at Sea, such as those recently

threats and interrupting logistical support to terror-

completed by Japan and the Philippines. Measures to

ist groups. There was also a need for ASEAN leaders

prevent accidents involving submarines must also be

to address the humanitarian issue of the Rohingya

considered. Secondly, the SLDI would enhance safety

boat people. Meanwhile, the Nepal earthquake

in sea lanes and air-traffic routes. Nakatani noted

had once again shown the need for quick regional

that the Malaysian airliner that disappeared in 2014

responses to disasters.

had still not been found, demonstrating the need for

It was necessary to think one step ahead in order

a system to monitor and control regional aerospace

to ward off each threat to regional security. ASEAN

around the clock.

has developed various mechanisms to deal with secu-

Thirdly, the SLDI would improve disaster response

rity issues, including its ADMM and ADMM-Plus

capability, specifically by streamlining procedures for

meetings, which had been acknowledged as models.

rapid deployment of aircraft carrying emergency relief

But according to the minister, ‘a vast new form of

and establishing rules for their admission to stricken

security collaboration in Asia is inevitable … because

areas. Japan, Nakatani said, was determined to put the

a security incident that hits a nation will at the same

SLDI into practice.

time affect other neighbouring countries as well as the

General (retired) Ryamizard Ryacudu, Indonesia’s

international community.’ For example, an incident

Minister of Defense, said ASEAN had evolved into

in the Malacca Strait would affect not only Indonesia,

a ‘family organisation that exerts the spirit of broth-

Malaysia and Singapore, but also East Asia, Europe, the

erhood among member states’. Members were able

Middle East and North America. Another example was

to solve their differences with each other, but faced

the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which had

common challenges such as terrorism, radicalisation,

affected both regional and international communities.

natural disasters, pandemic disease, piracy, insur-

New forms of collaboration would improve on

gency, cyber attacks and drug smuggling. Structures

existing structures, without adding more organisa-

and mechanisms of cooperation were needed to tackle

tions. What was needed was ‘a new concept, new

these threats.

culture and understanding.’ Talks were needed to find

A regional strategy was needed to address terrorist threats and radicalism. For its part, Indonesia

a solution to South China Sea disputes, and Ryacudu suggested joint patrols among stakeholders.

Second plenary session

25

Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister of State for Defence, India

Click to see video

Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister of State for Defence,

was one example, as was the SIMBEX naval exercises

India, said regional security threats were taking on

with Singapore. In 2008, India established the Indian

new forms, and they demanded a stronger and more

Ocean Naval Symposium, which by 2015 brought

innovative security architecture.

together 35 navies to enhance understanding of mari-

The growth of terrorism and religious extremism posed the greatest threat. The rise of ISIS had shown

time challenges and develop collective capacities to address them.

the need for intelligence-sharing and collaboration

Other areas for improved cooperation included dis-

between different countries’ police and immigration

aster relief, evacuation of nationals trapped in conflict,

authorities. However, new forms of collaboration had

and challenges in the cyber domain. Public transport,

also arisen because security was being defined in a

electricity distribution and banking systems could all

more comprehensive manner than before to include

be threatened ‘if there are chinks in our cyber secu-

food, energy, water, information and navigation.

rity’. Extremists’ use of the internet and social media

Newer forms of cooperation were based on regular, structured dialogue between nations rather than

to radicalise recruits also required law-enforcement agencies to work together.

on formal alliances: examples included ASEAN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. ‘ASEAN is without doubt the best example of a forum that pro-

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

motes an environment of shared security in its region

In the question and answer session, delegates noted a

through a transparent, open and inclusive dialogue,’

proliferation of new cooperation initiatives. Not only

Singh said. India had expanded its engagement with

was there the Shangri-La Dialogue Initiative proposed

ASEAN to a full strategic partnership under which it

by Nakatani, there was also a South East Asia Maritime

would play a more active role in helping to address

Security Initiative from US Defence Secretary Ashton

threats in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.

Carter and, more recently, a South China Sea Peace

Amidst growing threats to freedom of navigation,

Initiative proposed by Taiwan’s president. Aiko Doden

India was creating a robust system of coastal surveil-

of NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation noted that in

lance and monitoring, and was collaborating with

spite of Ryacudu’s description of ASEAN’s coopera-

partner countries to share experiences, conduct exer-

tion, there had been differences between members, and

cises and exchange information. A joint coastguard

it was now facing issues such the South China Sea dis-

exercise between India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives

putes and Rohingya refugees. She asked how ASEAN

26

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Aiko Doden, Senior Commentator, NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation

PS Suryanarayana, Editor, Current Affairs, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore

Dr Chikako Ueki, Professor, International Relations, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University

could evolve into an organisation of true strength.

tion organisations. Dr Chikako Uedi from Waseda

PS Suryanarayana, Institute of South Asian Studies,

University asked Minister Nakatani to elaborate on the

National University of Singapore, asked whether

Shangri-La Dialogue Initiative that he had mentioned,

India–US–Japan security cooperation would extend to

and asked if Japan and the US would share maritime

the South China Sea, and whether India and the US

domain awareness information with other countries

planned joint patrols in the South China Sea as part

in the region. Nakatani replied that the Shangri-La

of their recent moves to enhance security cooperation.

Dialogue Initiative involved three main elements:

On the latter point, Singh responded that specifics of

more common rules in the air and at sea, including the

the new strategic partnership had not been worked

regional implementation of the Code for Unplanned

out, but that the US and India ‘would take all steps

Encounters at Sea; the preservation of air and sea

to ensure peace in the region’. On ASEAN, Ryacudu

safety, including greater sharing of air - and maritime-

reiterated that member countries were able to settle

traffic data; and common rules for facilitating disaster

every difference among themselves, and he hoped

response. He said that air and maritime information

it would be a role model for other regional-coopera-

should be shared ‘as much as possible’.

Second plenary session

27

28

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

14th Asia Security Summit SINGAPORE, 29–31 MAY 2015

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

chapter 4

third plenary session

Preventing conflict escalation

Saturday 30 May 2015, 12:00 SPEAKERS Dato’ Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein Minister of Defence, Malaysia General Tea Banh Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, Cambodia Michael Fallon Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom

third plenary session

Preventing conflict escalation

Dato’ Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, Minister of Defence, Malaysia

Click to see video

Opening the third plenary session, on ‘Preventing

today’s complex and uncertain world, one set of tools

conflict escalation’, Malaysian Minister of Defence

and one strategic mindset were not enough.

Dato’ Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein said that

Southeast Asia faced three flashpoints. The first

the topic of discussion gave rise to both optimism

was the Rohingya refugee crisis. Malaysia had taken a

and pessimism: optimism, because it suggested that

leadership role in providing the Rohingyas with tem-

it lay within our power to prevent conflict; pessi-

porary shelter and protection, but this issue required

mism, because it suggested conflicts were inevitable.

a just and comprehensive settlement at the source and

Existing conflicts in the Middle East, Europe and

had to be resolved in ‘the ASEAN way’.

Africa appeared not only to be unresolved but looked

So far the focus had been on the second flashpoint,

set to get worse. Peace and stability remained crucial

defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)

for Southeast Asia and the world. Conflicts elsewhere

in Syria and Iraq, but ISIS had established a foothold

could spread to the region, so Southeast Asia had a

in other regions, including Southeast Asia, where

strong stake in conflict prevention.

some 30 groups had pledged allegiance to it. Two hun-

Shifts in technology had created an unpredict-

dred Malaysians had joined ISIS in Syria and a further

able threat environment. It had become conventional

100 had been arrested for supporting ISIS. There was

wisdom to emphasise non-state threats. This broadly

a need for vigilance and cooperation to prevent the

conveyed the current reality, but the risk of state

establishment of an ISIS caliphate and to combat ISIS

threats could not be ignored. Policymakers risked

ideology by addressing the social and political con-

falling into habits of mind shaped by existing trends

cerns of vulnerable young people and enhancing their

and failing to give attention to longer-term issues. In

sense of dignity.

30

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

General Tea Banh, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, Cambodia

Click to see video

The third, most serious, issue was tension in the South China Sea, which could escalate into the deadli-

had been able to establish communities and with them norms of conduct.

est conflict of the modern age. Malaysia supported the

As to the absence of rules governing interaction

implementation of a code of conduct and the avoid-

between states, here too there were some positive

ance of actions that might raise tensions. There were

examples, including the non-use of chemical weapons

encouraging precedents for the bilateral resolution

during the Second World War, and nuclear restraint

of claims through the International Court of Justice.

during the Cold War.

States had the right to act as they saw fit in their sover-

Dialogue should always be the first resort in dealing

eign areas but also had the responsibility to be aware

with tensions. Existing mechanisms within Southeast

of the wider implications of their actions.

Asia had already proved their worth, including the

In conclusion, there was a need for states to: keep

ADMM, chaired by Dato’ Seri Hishammuddin, which

sight of the bigger picture; develop early-warning

at its Langkawi meeting in March 2015 had focused

systems for security issues; develop detailed strate-

on the threat from ISIS and had agreed to enhance

gies for dealing with social media; and promote more

cooperation in addressing it. Other achievements

military diplomacy, intelligence exchanges, openness

of the ADMM included an agreement on the avoid-

and transparency.

ance of incidents at sea. Maritime security remained

General Tea Banh, Cambodia’s Deputy Prime

a pressing regional concern. Disputes had to be

Minister and Minister of National Defense, said that

resolved peacefully and Cambodia supported the

most wars began gradually and this meant there was

code-of-conduct proposal. Without existing regional

scope for diplomacy to have an effect. There were

mechanisms, the situation in the South China Sea

three main causes of escalation: strategic uncertainty, a

would have already escalated. In conclusion, General

lack of attention by the international community, and

Tea Banh said that managing strategic tension was a

a lack of rules of interaction. Miscalculation of the kind

vital issue and required states to change their percep-

engendered by security dilemmas and a lack of confi-

tions of each other.

dence in each other’s intentions could lead to conflict.

Michael Fallon, the UK’s Secretary of State for

Another cause of conflict was the lack of a sense of

Defence, said that the UK had strong links with the

community, which might lead to the conviction that

Asia-Pacific region in trade and security, and shared

only force would generate security. This was not inevi-

the values of most Asia-Pacific states, namely toler-

table and, over the course of history, groups of states

ance, justice and the rule of law.

Third plenary session

31

Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom

Click to see video

The world was becoming a more dangerous place.

act, and the UK had shown a willingness to engage

In Europe, old threats were re-emerging with Russia’s

in the Baltic states and against ISIS. The UK was the

activities in Ukraine. In the Middle East and Africa,

fifth-largest funder of UN peacekeeping missions and

ISIS and Boko Haram were seeking to establish states.

was involved in operations around the world, includ-

In Asia, North Korea continued behaviour justifying

ing in the search for MH370, the Philippines typhoon,

its ‘rogue state’ label. And land-reclamation projects in

Vanuatu and Nepal.

the South China Sea risked giving rise to miscalcula-

The third lesson was the need to strengthen inter-

tion. Regional tensions in the Asia-Pacific region had

national relationships. Existing post-Second World

global consequences.

War institutions remained valid and NATO was more

The UK had drawn lessons from its security engage-

relevant than ever. As part of the European defence

ments in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Firstly, it was

architecture, the UK wished to see the evolution of a

essential to speak out about the causes of aggression

regional defence architecture in the Asia-Pacific region

and to defend one’s values. The UK government had

but also supported a central US role. The UK also wel-

no position on sovereignty claims in the South China

comed China’s contribution to international public

Sea but provocative behaviour there risked escalation.

goods, and was developing defence relations with

The UK was concerned by the scale and speed of cur-

Japan and Korea. Its commitment to the Five Power

rent land reclamation and the implications for freedom

Defence Arrangements was undiminished.

of navigation, and called on all parties to refrain from provocative actions. The focus should be on restraint and responsibility, dialogue and diplomacy, and the

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

establishment of a binding code of conduct.

A number of questions focused on the South China

The second lesson was to maintain strong armed

Sea. Dr Sophie Boisseau du Rocher from the French

forces. States needed the means to enforce peace. The

Institute for International Relations (IFRI) asked

UK was investing in new military capabilities to the

if ASEAN’s High Council or Treaty of Amity and

tune of £160 billion over the next decade, including

Cooperation might be used to help prevent con-

new aircraft carriers and the Joint Strike Fighter. The

flict escalation. Bonnie Glaser from the Centre for

UK was also expanding its defence presence in the

Strategic and International Studies, asked for some

Asia-Pacific region and leveraging defence training.

‘concrete suggestions’ from the panel about how

However, capacity was of no use without the will to

to achieve consensus on international law and a

32

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Dr Sophie Boisseau du Rocher, Senior Research Fellow, Asia Centre, French Institute for International Relations (IFRI)

Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia, Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Dr Chikako Ueki, Professor, International Relations, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University

rules-based order. Dr Chikako Ueki from Waseda

was moving ‘at a glacial pace’, but asked what the

University, asked how ASEAN countries viewed the

alternative was for ASEAN and its members. Fallon

potential use of ‘negative sanctions, force if necessary’

said that the Code of Conduct was not ‘necessarily

to build and maintain the rule of law and order in

the answer’: other measures, including resolution of

the South China Sea. Senior Captain Zhang Junshe,

conflicting claims through legal mechanisms, would

Military Academic Research Institute, PLA, asked

also be necessary. Regarding the terrorist threat,

Minister Hishammuddin for his opinion of the ‘dual-

Lieutenant General Dato’ Pahlawan Dr William

track approach’ to the South China Sea that China had

Rangit Stevenson, Malaysian Institute of Defence and

proposed. Peter Jennings, Australian Strategic Policy

Security, Malaysia, asked how the ‘growing threat’

Institute, asked the British and Malaysian ministers if

from ISIS should be addressed. Hishammuddin said

any thought had been given to using the Five Power

that the threat in Southeast Asia was ‘real’ and that

Defence Arrangements to assert ‘the right of naviga-

Malaysia was ‘working very closely’ with Brunei,

tion and airspace access in the South China Sea’. In

Indonesia and the Philippines ‘to ensure that the ...

response, Hishammuddin admitted that the devel-

area they [ISIS] have identified in declaring a cali-

opment of mechanisms for preventing escalation

phate does not materialise’. Dzirhan Mahadzir,

Senior Captain Zhang Junshe, Research Fellow, Military Academic Research Institute, People’s Liberation Army, China

Peter Jennings, Executive Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute

Lieutenant General Dato’ Pahlawan Dr William Rangit Stevenson, Chief Executive, Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security

Third plenary session

33

Dzirhan Mahadzir, Malaysia Correspondent, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly

Professor Sven Biscop, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, Belgium

Malaysian Correspondent, IHS Janes’ Defence Weekly,

on a humanitarian bases. There were already 120,000

asked Hishammuddin about why the ASEAN Defence

Rohingyas in Malaysia, he said, with the prospect

Ministers’ Meeting was ‘missing in action’ in rela-

of many more arriving soon. Professor Sven Biscop

tion to the Rohingya crisis earlier in the month. The

from the Egmont Royal Institute for International

Malaysian minister replied that he was ‘relieved that

Relations, asked Fallon for his view on ‘the collective

the Rohingya issue had become internationalised’

European role’ in Asia. The British minister replied

and pointed to the role of Indonesia, Malaysia and

that there ‘clearly is a European interest here’ because

Thailand in providing temporary shelter for Rohingyas

of Europe’s economic stake in the region.

34

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

14th Asia Security Summit SINGAPORE, 29–31 MAY 2015

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

chapter 5

Simultaneous special sessions Saturday 30 May 2015 Session 1 Armed forces and new terrorist threats Session 2 Energy security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region Session 3 Challenges for maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance Session 4 Emerging challenges to small state security in the Asia-Pacific Session 5 Avoiding military competition and arms-racing in Asia

Special session 1

Armed forces and new terrorist threats

Click for transcript and audio

CHAIR General The Lord Richards of Herstmonceux

The session heard that states faced three different mili-

Senior Adviser for the Middle East and

tary threats: from states, from state-like actors, and

Asia-Pacific, IISS; former Chief of the Defence Staff, UK

from non-state actors. Conflicts that mixed two or three of these threats were increasingly characterised

OPENING REMARKS

as ‘hybrid’. There were insurgents and separatists in

Senator John McCain

the Asia-Pacific, but the Islamic State of Iraq and al-

Chairman, Armed Services Committee, US Senate General Knud Bartels Chairman, NATO Military Committee General Thomas Lawson Chief of the Defence Staff, Canada

Sham (ISIS) posed the most immediate concern. The ‘propaganda of the deed’ arising from the very existence of the ‘caliphate’, amplified by its modern and effective information operation, created two dangers: that of experienced foreign fighters returning home, and that of self-radicalised ‘lone wolves’. These dan-

Nigel Inkster Director for Transnational Threats and Political

gers were likely to increase. In the short-term in Iraq,

Risk, IISS

coalition air operations would only ever be a holding action, pending the ejection of ISIS by Iraqi forces.

Colonel Lu Yin Associate Research Fellow, Strategic Teaching and

It was not yet clear that the threat was sufficiently

Research Department, National Defense University,

contained, in Iraq and Syria, or globally. The inter-

People’s Liberation Army, China

national community was not displaying sufficient urgency on this matter. There was a vital requirement for more effective strategic communications to contest

36

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

General Knud Bartels, Chairman, NATO Military Committee

Nigel Inkster, Director for Transnational Threats and Political Risk, IISS

General Thomas Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, Canada

General The Lord Richards of Herstmonceux, Senior Adviser for the Middle East and AsiaPacific, IISS; former Chief of the Defence Staff, UK

Colonel Lu Yin, Associate Research Fellow, Strategic Teaching and Research Department, National Defense University, PLA, China

Senator John McCain, Chairman, Armed Services Committee, US Senate

the ISIS narrative. The long-term solution would be to

ership and robust military command and control.

address the root causes of insurgency and terrorism.

Intelligence agencies, police and military forces needed

This required the ability to integrate diverse types of

to be deployable, adaptable and to have full-spectrum

power in a comprehensive inter-agency approach, and

capabilities to contain non-state actors, whilst protect-

would inevitably take time. Multinational intelligence

ing the population was essential. The use of lethal

sharing and collaboration would be essential.

force would need to be carefully calibrated. This put

NATO states’ experience suggested that intel-

a premium on precision weapons, and the necessary

ligence, and a broad and deep understanding of the

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabili-

conflict, were essential, as were strong political lead-

ties to provide precision-targeting.

Special session 1

37

Special session 2

Energy security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region

Click for transcript and audio

CHAIR

The session addressed the opportunities for, and chal-

Lord Powell of Bayswater

lenges to, energy security in the Asia-Pacific. Overall,

Trustee, IISS; Member, House of Lords; former

panellists agreed that regional energy markets have

Private Secretary and Adviser on Foreign Affairs and

functioned reasonably well, through orthodox price

Defence to Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major

mechanisms. Threats to energy security included terrorist threats and political instability in the Middle

OPENING REMARKS

East, and the effects of supplier countries being sub-

Peter Varghese

jected to sanctions. Speakers identified the biggest

Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and

threat to energy security as being at the intersection

Trade, Australia

between energy markets and geopolitics.

Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Japan Self-Defense Forces

There was, however, broad agreement that there were reasons to be sanguine about potential disruptions to energy markets. The US continued to play an

Dr Pierre NoĂŤl Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Senior Fellow for Economic

active role in the security of the Strait of Hormuz. In

and Energy Security, IISS-Asia

the Malacca Strait, security is provided by littoral states with some financial and technical assistance from the

Energy Industry Comments

Republic of Korea and Japan. Despite territorial dis-

Melody Meyer

putes in the South China Sea, seaborne energy trade

38

President, Chevron Asia-Pacific Exploration and

has not been threatened. Such a relatively optimistic

Production Company

assessment, panellists said, did not preclude the need

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Dr Pierre NoĂŤl, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Senior Fellow for Economic and Energy Security, IISS-Asia

Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Japan Self-Defense Forces

Peter Varghese, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia

Melody Meyer, President, Chevron Asia-Pacific Exploration and Production Company

Lord Powell of Bayswater, Trustee, IISS; Member, House of Lords; former Private Secretary and Adviser on Foreign Affairs and Defence to Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major

for new measures to sustain energy security. It is pos-

into the provision of the public good of sea-lane secu-

sible that Asian powers and littoral states could take on

rity. Rather, the challenge stems from the geopolitical

more of the burden of securing the Strait of Hormuz.

problem of managing the regional balance of power as

The session heard that the challenge to energy security in Asia was more intractable than bringing China

Asia transitions from a US-led regional order to one where China plays a substantively bigger role.

Special session 2

39

Special session 3

Challenges for maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

Click for transcript and audio

CHAIR

The fundamental importance and the considerable

Dr Tim Huxley

demands of maritime intelligence, surveillance and

Executive Director, IISS–Asia

reconnaissance (ISR) in the Asia-Pacific were laid out starkly by all the panellists, who also stressed the

OPENING REMARKS

importance of the maritime domain. Each speaker

General Tan Sri Zulkifeli Mohd Zin

acknowledged that guaranteed access to sea lines of

Chief of Defence Forces, Malaysia

communication was essential to the economic well-

Admiral Harry B Harris Commander, US Pacific Command Vice Admiral Alexander Lopez Commander, Western Command, Armed Forces of

being of the region. Territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea, only served to further the need for ISR to ‘bridge the gaps in trust’.

The issue of trust was a theme woven throughout the session. It was emphasised that partners must be

the Philippines

able to share information with the assurance of its

Defence Industry Comments

security, particularly in the maritime domain given the

Christopher Chadwick

inherent multinational nature of the environment. It

President and Chief Executive Officer, Boeing

was noted that the security of the sea lines of commu-

Defense, Space and Security, The Boeing Company

nication could not be tackled by just a single country.

However, it was acknowledged that maritime security

Patrick Dewar

40

Executive Vice President, Lockheed Martin

cooperation was still only in its developmental stage

International

in the Asia-Pacific, and previous efforts of countering

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

General Tan Sri Zulkifeli Mohd Zin, Chief of Defence Forces, Malaysia

Admiral Harry B Harris, Commander, United States Pacific Command

Vice Admiral Alexander Lopez, Commander, Western Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines

Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS-Asia

Christopher Chadwick, President and Chief Executive Officer, Boeing Defense, Space and Security, The Boeing Company

Patrick Dewar, Executive Vice President, Lockheed Martin International

threats and challenges from a joint and multinational

that ‘In maritime ISR, as in most things in life, one can

level have not always been very encouraging.

sometimes have too much of a good thing. Our com-

Industry perspectives suggested that technology

mander has access to more data than ever before; that

could continue to help with the maritime ISR chal-

same data can easily become overwhelming. What is

lenges the region faces. However, it was remarked

needed is actionable information.’

Special session 3

41

Special session 4

Emerging challenges to small state security in the Asia-Pacific

Click for transcript and audio

CHAIR

All panellists in the session underlined the pivotal dip-

Virginia Comolli

lomatic role that small - and medium-sized countries

Research Fellow for Security and Development, IISS

play, both in relation to larger powers and in terms of their contribution to regional governance. The defence

OPENING REMARKS

ministers of Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea

Dr Cirilo José Cristóvão

(PNG)

Minister of Defence, Timor-Leste

highlighted access and control of maritime

resources as strategic priorities for small sea-dependent countries. Timor-Leste disputes its maritime

Dr Fabian Pok Minister for Defence, Papua New Guinea Air Vice-Marshal Mike Yardley Chief of Air Force, New Zealand Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo

boundary with the far larger Australia, with uncertain implications for hydrocarbon extraction and resource sharing. PNG oversees one of the largest Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the region, but with insuf-

Deputy Director-General, China–US Defense

ficient resources to police it properly. Both ministers

Relations Research Center, Academy of Military

also stressed climate-change challenges as urgent

Science, China

emerging security concerns representing threats to political and social stability.

New Zealand’s Chief of Air Force, Air ViceMarshal Mike Yardley, and China’s Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo both returned to a more conventional defence focus in framing challenges to small-state

42

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Dr Cirilo José Cristóvão, Minister of Defence, Timor-Leste

Dr Fabian Pok, Minister for Defence, Papua New Guinea

Air Vice-Marshal Mike Yardley, Chief of Air Force, New Zealand

Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo, Deputy DirectorGeneral, China–US Defense Relations Research Center, Academy of Military Science, China

Virginia Comolli, Research Fellow for Security and Development, IISS

security. As a small trading country – geographi-

spoke of Beijing’s view of a ‘community of shared

cally far removed from its most important markets

destiny’, regardless of country size. Trust should be

– New Zealand is highly dependent on the region’s

built on the basis that ‘big countries should not bully

strategic

military-to-military

small countries, and small countries should not pro-

relationships, disaster relief and assistance with

voke big countries’. China’s commitment to founding

exclusive-economic-zone surveillance are invaluable

the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with many

ways of mitigating security tensions and building

of its smaller neighbours was cited as a case in point.

regional trust.

However, some delegates voiced concern with the

context.

Dialogue,

Yardley maintained that security challenges for

way in which the inherent power asymmetry between

small countries are essentially the same as those for

small countries and larger powers could be exploited,

large countries, in terms of their potential region-

particularly with regard to China’s insistence that dis-

wide consequences. Similarly, Senior Colonel Zhao

putes between countries be resolved bilaterally.

Special session 4

43

Special session 5

Avoiding military competition and arms-racing in Asia

Click for transcript and audio

CHAIR

With military budgets across Asia continuing to rise

Peter Ho

and armed forces still modernising amid continuing

Member of Council, IISS; Senior Adviser, Centre for

tensions between states, common themes emerged

Strategic Futures; former Head, Civil Service, Singapore

from the panel’s five presentations, which principally discussed trust and transparency.

OPENING REMARKS Minister of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland; Chairman,

the region to be open about their defence policies and

OSCE Asian Contact Group

transparent in their long-term strategic intentions.’

Another panelist remarked that the US and China had

Anatoly Antonov Deputy Minister of Defence, Russia Air Marshal Mark Binskin Chief of the Defence Force, Australian Defence Force Nobukatsu Kanehara

been engaged in military competition for 20 years.

The question was ‘whether we can avoid something that truly deserves to be referred to as an arms race.’

However, the session also heard that this competition

Deputy Secretary General, National Security

might ‘lead to to a dynamic stability in which poten-

Secretariat, Japan

tial opponents are both deterred from using force or

Dr Aaron Friedberg Professor of Politics and International Affairs,

44

As one speaker said, because of accelerating military modernisation ‘it is important for all countries in

Didier Burkhalter

threats of force against one another’.

The importance of military-to-military cooperation

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International

was evident, as was as the benefit of joint exercises and

Affairs, Princeton University

the publication of White Papers, regular dialogue and

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Click for transcript

Click to download remarks

Didier Burkhalter, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland; Chairman, OSCE Asian Contact Group

Anatoly Antonov, Deputy Minister of Defence, Russia

Air Marshal Mark Binskin, Chief of the Defence Force, Australian Defence Force

Peter Ho, Member of Council, IISS; Senior Adviser, Centre for Strategic Futures; former Head, Civil Service, Singapore

Nobukatsu Kanehara, Deputy Secretary General, National Security Secretariat, Japan

Dr Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

cooperation within multilateral forums. Cooperative

seems desirable, said one panellist, ‘from the perspec-

security developments need not impede bilateral secu-

tive of a stronger status quo power … and much less

rity arrangements, but could provide ‘an extra layer

appealing to a state that perceives itself as weaker and

of security.’ Speakers discussed cooperative security

perhaps has intentions to alter the status quo.’ But even

measures in Europe and, while some questioned the

if a state decided to be more transparent, that could

utility of these in the Asian context, others agreed they

still raise questions of intent. For instance, Washington

were ‘a vehicle to create trust’.

had taken the position that Beijing should become

One speaker pointed to the need for transparency

more transparent. China had recently issued its latest

with respect to strategic intentions as well as capability

White Paper, and while Beijing is ‘perhaps being more

development. Others questioned whether transpar-

forthcoming and more open … that doesn’t necessar-

ency was necessarily good for stability. Transparency

ily mean it’s reassuring to everyone’.

Special session 5

45

46

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

14th Asia Security Summit SINGAPORE, 29–31 MAY 2015

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

chapter 7

fourth plenary session

Strengthening regional order in the Asia-Pacific: towards more active conflict resolution and cooperation

Sunday 31 May 2015, 09:00 SPEAKERS Admiral Sun Jianguo Deputy Chief, General Staff Department, People’s Liberation Army, China Gerry Brownlee Minister of Defence, New Zealand Dr Ursula von der Leyen Federal Minister of Defence, Germany

fourth plenary session

Strengthening regional order in the Asia-Pacific: towards more active conflict resolution and cooperation Admiral Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief, General Staff Department, People’s Liberation Army, China

Click to see video

Click to see video (Chinese)

The Sunday morning of the Dialogue opened with a

was increasing, with the PLA involved in military

speech on ‘Strengthening regional order in the Asia-

training activities with over 50 countries. Security dia-

Pacific: towards more active conflict resolution and

logue and exchanges with the United States, Russia

cooperation’, from Admiral Sun Jianguo, Deputy

and ASEAN nations were expanding.

Chief of General Staff of China’s People’s Liberation

Referring to territorial disputes in the South China

Army, who began by emphasising China’s commit-

Sea, Admiral Sun insisted that China had always ‘exer-

ment to peaceful development and international

cised enormous restraint’ and contributed to a situation

stability. He suggested, following China’s President

that was, overall, stable and peaceful: freedom of navi-

Xi Jingping, ‘a community of shared destiny for all

gation had never been at risk. He argued that China’s

mankind’, which would promote peace and economic

construction activities in the South China Sea were

prosperity. To achieve this, zero-sum thinking in inter-

essentially functional, primarily aimed at delivering

national relations had to be replaced by new models for

public goods including maritime search and rescue,

win–win cooperation, he said. He stressed that China

disaster prevention and relief, safety of navigation, envi-

was ready to fulfil its obligations in regional and inter-

ronmental protection, and meteorological observation.

national security. Examples included China’s growing

A third strand in the admiral’s speech centred on

contribution to UN peacekeeping missions and its

ideas for enhanced defence and security cooperation.

provision of naval escorts for ships taking chemical

Enduring peace with an international order based on

weapons from Syria for destruction. Furthermore,

the principles of the UN Charter would go hand-in-

China was actively engaged in disaster-response oper-

hand with relations among countries based on trust

ations. Bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation

and inclusiveness. The resolution of differences and

48

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Gerry Brownlee, Minister of Defence, New Zealand

Click to see video

disputes was possible through step-by-step consul-

eration could bring practical benefits because many

tation and dialogue. Shared responsibilities, said

security challenges were shared, he said. These included

Admiral Sun, required that large countries did not

counter-piracy activities and counter-terrorism, but also

bully smaller ones, but small countries would also

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Defence

have to refrain from using regional security issues for

establishments should undertake efforts to ensure that

individual gain. In closing, Admiral Sun returned to

future leaders from both military and civilian organi-

the principle of ‘win–win cooperation’, which would

sations had opportunities to work together for regional

build peace and guarantee security.

security. Brownlee cited the ADMM-Plus Future

New Zealand’s Minister of Defence, Gerry Brownlee,

Leaders’ Programme as an example.

emphasised his country’s dependence on seaborne

Throughout the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, speakers

trade and freedom of navigation to underscore the link

from Europe stressed their economic interdependence

between stability and economic integration in Asia. New

with Asia, which gave them a direct stake in stability

Zealand, he stressed, had benefitted greatly from Asian

and security in the region. Dr Ursula von der Leyen,

economic growth. Brownlee warned, however, that ‘eco-

Germany’s Federal Minister of Defence, pointed out

nomic interdependence on its own will not prevent a

that while the regional contexts quite clearly differed

drift towards strategic competition.’ An open and inclu-

in Asia and in Europe, many security challenges were

sive regional security order was a necessary addition to

similar: transnational terrorism, failing states, military

prevent miscalculation, escalation and conflict.

power projection and latent territorial conflicts were

Brownlee highlighted four pillars of activity for con-

pressing concerns in both regions.

flict prevention and resolution: multilateral integration,

Dr von der Leyen offered lessons learnt from a

confidence-building measures, military cooperation,

German perspective, arguing that cooperation among

and people-to-people links. New Zealand was pursu-

European countries – which had been enemies in the

ing the first pillar through its current non-permanent

Second World War – over the course of the last seven

UN Security Council seat and its partnership with

decades, was ‘living proof’ that collaboration can pro-

ASEAN. Transparency was at the root of confidence-

duce prosperity for all nations involved. Germany had

building, otherwise rapid military modernisation in the

been able to rise as an economic power because its

region would be difficult to manage; indeed, it might

companies could trade all over the world, benefitting

ultimately endanger the very economic growth that

from the freedom of the sea. The lesson was that ‘sta-

enables defence-spending increases. Military coop-

bility, security and prosperity are indivisible’.

Fourth plenary session

49

Dr Ursula von der Leyen, Federal Minister of Defence, Germany

Click to see video

To maintain the conditions for stability and prosperity, it was necessary to invest in an overarching security

ing of experiences across regions and continents would lead to a world that was ‘united, more stable and safer.’

architecture consisting of alliances and partnerships, she said. Even though partnerships were hard work, they were clearly valuable, and evolved around five ele-

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

ments. Firstly, they provided structures and procedures

Philippe

for dialogue in times of crisis. Secondly, their rules-based

Relations and Strategy, Ministry of Defence, France,

nature engendered respect for the rule of law. Thirdly,

asked about China’s plans for developing a cyber

the transparency that came with constant interaction

force. Christopher Nelson of Samuels International

furthered mutual trust. Fourthly, a sustainable security

Associates, wondered whether China was ready to

architecture was never directed against any country, but

consider a moratorium on island-building in the South

rather focused on cooperation for mutual benefit. Fifthly,

China Sea and would commit to not stationing offen-

by working together, small and large countries gained

sive military equipment there. Professor Chiyuki Aoi,

strategic relevance in a global context. Dr von der Leyen

Aoyama Gakuin University, enquired about China’s

closed by expressing her hope that dialogue and the shar-

view of the Responsibility to Protect principle in the

Philppe Errera, Director-General, International Relations and Strategy, Ministry of Defence, France

50

Errera,

Christopher Nelson, Editor, The Nelson Report; Senior Vice President, Samuels International Associates

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Director-General,

International

Dr Chiyuki Aoi, Professor of International Politics, Aoyama Gakuin University

Dr Harry Harding Jr, Professor of Public Policy, Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia

Professor François Heisbourg, Chairman, IISS and Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia, Freeman Chair in China Studies, Centre for Strategic and International Studies

UN context. Professor Harry Harding, University of

about China’s view of US–Indian regional security

Virginia, asked Admiral Sun if he felt that China had

coordination. Hervé Lemahieu, Research Associate for

overcome the century of humiliation or whether there

Political Economy and Security, IISS, asked Admiral

still was a legacy and issues to be considered. Professor

Sun to expand on China’s ‘periphery diplomacy’ in

François Heisbourg, Chairman of the Council, IISS, sug-

Southeast Asia, in particular with a view to Myanmar.

gested there was a marked difference between China’s

Hideshi Tokuchi, Ministry of Defence, Japan, expressed

inclusive and prudent policy as a global power and its

concern about the possibility of China declaring an Air

actions in the South China Sea, which by many partners

Defence Identification Zone over the South China Sea.

in the region are perceived as exclusive and weakening

Josh Rogin, Bloomberg View, asked whether Admiral

mutual trust. Bonnie Glaser, Centre for Strategic and

Sun felt China’s policies in the South China Sea were an

International Studies, asked whether the admiral could

example of the win–win cooperation the Admiral had

clarify China’s 9-dash line claim in the South China

mentioned. Reinhard Bütikofer, European Parliament,

Sea and suggested his insistence China was not chal-

wondered why Admiral Sun had omitted language on

lenging freedom of navigation would require further

the rule of law from his speech.

explanation. PS Suryanarayana, National University of

Addressing Dr von der Leyen, Dr Chung Min Lee,

Singapore, asked whether China was trying to create an

Ambassador for National Security Affairs, Ministry

alternative route to the Strait of Malacca and enquired

of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, suggested

PS Suryanarayana, Editor, Current Affairs, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore

Hervé Lemahieu, Research Associate for Political Economy and Security, IISS

Hideshi Tokuchi, Director-General, Ministry of Defence, Japan

Fourth plenary session

51

Josh Rogin, Columnist, Bloomberg View

Reinhard Bütikofer, Member, European Parliament

Dr Chung Min Lee, Ambassador for National Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea; Professor of International Relations, Yonsei University

that a strong NATO would be good for Asia as well.

Responding, Admiral Sun argued that while the

He expressed his concern about stagnating levels of

South China Sea issue pose much debate in expert

defence spending in NATO, and asked how the German

circles, it did not pose a risk to stability. Regarding

Minister of Defence foresaw NATO defence spending

a possible Air Defence Identification Zone in the

in an age of austerity. Gong Xianfu, China Institute

South China Sea, he suggested that China would

for Strategic Studies, asked von der Leyen whether she

base its decisions on the risk to safety and security

had any particular advice for countries in Asia regard-

it perceived from activities there. Von der Leyen

ing how to proceed on the path towards a stronger

acknowledged the defence-spending challenge for

regional security order. Michael Maclay, Montrose

NATO, but stressed that Germany had recently

Associates, wondered how active a role Europe could

managed a turnaround, making an additional €8 bil-

play in Asia and asked von der Leyen to expand on

lion available for defence during 2016–19. Brownlee

her thoughts about closer EU–ASEAN cooperation. Dr

expressed scepticism regarding capacity-building

Nicholas Redman Director of Editorial; Senior Fellow

in the region, arguing many Pacific nations were too

for Geopolitical Risk and Economic Security, IISS,

small to expand their armed forces significantly. He

referring to the special role New Zealand had within

felt that alliances and dialogue between small and

the South Pacific, suggested Minister Brownlee com-

large nations on the basis of common interest were a

ment on the scope for capacity-building in the region.

more viable route to increased capacity.

Major General (Retd) Gong Xianfu, Vice Chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies

52

Michael Maclay, Executive Chairman, Montrose Associates

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Dr Nicholas Redman, Director of Editorial; Senior Fellow for Geopolitical Risk and Economic Security, IISS

14th Asia Security Summit SINGAPORE, 29–31 MAY 2015

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

chapter 8

fifth plenary session

Global security challenges and the Asia-Pacific: building cooperation between regions

Sunday 1 June 2015, 11:30 SPEAKERS Federica Mogherini High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; Vice-President, European Commission Kevin Andrews Minister for Defence, Australia Dr Ng Eng Hen Minister for Defence, Singapore

fifth plenary session

Global security challenges and the AsiaPacific: building cooperation between regions Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; VicePresident, European Commission

Click to see video

Opening the final plenary session, Federica Mogherini,

strategic purpose, involving concrete commitments

High Representative of the European Union for

and priorities. These include the extension to ASEAN

Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President

of the EU’s unmatched experience in breaking down

of the European Commission, told delegates that the

barriers among member states and building unity.

EU is not an Asian or a Pacific power, but it has sig-

The European Commission is doubling its aid budget

nificant economic stakes and political partnerships in

for ASEAN and total EU aid to the ten-member bloc

the region. Europe and Asia face common challenges

is approaching €3 billion. There is also a High-Level

to which only joint responses could be effective. She

Dialogue on disaster relief.

noted that more goods and services traded between

Beyond the Asia-Pacific, Mogherini said there was

Europe and Asia than across the Atlantic. Europe is

scope for Europe and Asia to be partners in contribut-

also the largest foreign-aid donor to the Asia-Pacific,

ing to the stabilisation of fragile states. Military force

and EU engagement with regional states is extensive.

alone will not defeat the Islamic state of Iraq and al-

Asia is both dynamic and fragile: its economic

Sham (ISIS), she suggested, and it was necessary for

weight is enormous but the region’s latent conflict

Europe to make the most of its huge potential and to

potential cannot be ignored, Mogherini noted. Europe

use all its tools and strengths in a coordinated and

has a direct interest in ensuring freedom of naviga-

coherent way.

tion because of global supply chains, and hence it

The High Representative concluded by recalling

hopes to see an ASEAN–China Code of Conduct on

that the EU, while thought of primarily as an economic

the South China Sea concluded as soon as possible.

power, has deployed personnel to crisis zones for

Europe’s vision, she added, was partnership with a

more than ten years. Currently it is running five mili-

54

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Kevin Andrews, Minister for Defence, Australia

Click to see video

tary and 11 civilian missions on three continents, with

coercive behaviour. In fact, it may facilitate coercive

7,000 personnel deployed. Some of these missions

behaviour. Australia is worried about any development

benefit Asian states directly, in particular the Atalanta

that raises tension in the East or South China seas. That

anti-piracy naval mission off the Horn of Africa, which

includes large-scale land reclamation by claimants and

reduced attacks from 163 in 2009 to two in 2014.

in particular the prospect of artificial structures being

Kevin Andrews, Minister for Defence, Australia,

militarised. Thus Australia considers essential the swift

began by noting that Canberra had come to realise that

conclusion of a Code of Conduct between China and

it must consider the mutual dependencies between

ASEAN. It also calls on all parties to exercise restraint,

its home region of the Asia-Pacific and the rest of the

halt reclamation activities, refrain from provocative

world. The Asia-Pacific’s rise would depend on its

actions, and take steps to ease tensions.

continued economic progress, he said, and that in turn rests on continuing freedom of navigation and trade.

In common with other ministers at the Dialogue, Andrews directly addressed the threat to the region

Half of Australia’s trade is routed through the

posed by fighters returning from Iraq and Syria – a

South China Sea and so tension and competing claims

phenomenon that underscores the connection between

in that area greatly concern Canberra. The shared

global security challenges and the region. Many in

dependence of the Indo-Pacific powers on such cor-

the region are connected with or inspired by ISIS, he

ridors should create a powerful incentive to manage

noted, and so regional states must cooperate to defeat

conflicts peacefully and ensure freedom of naviga-

a threat that is likely to be present for several decades.

tion for all, he said. There are grounds for optimism

Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, Singapore,

because the regional states’ shared interests have

began by crediting the international milieu as well

already led to enhanced cooperation on common chal-

as the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew for Singapore’s

lenges such as natural disasters, piracy and terrorism.

extraordinary development over the previous 50

The anti-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa is a

years. The rules-based system constructed by the US

conspicuous success and the day-to-day cooperation

and leading Western powers, he said, was generally

there builds a level of confidence that it would be more

inclusive and allowed many states to progress. The US

difficult for Asian navies to achieve closer to home.

presence in Asia provided vital strategic reassurance

Greater interdependence might lessen, but does not

and its dominance of the global commons enabled

eliminate, the chance of conflict, and it does not pre-

all East Asian export-based economies to develop. In

vent the risk of miscalculation or of states engaging in

time, ASEAN, India and China were beneficiaries too.

Fifth plenary session

55

Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, Singapore

Click to see video

This system is now in flux, Dr Ng noted. China and

grow. Thus the regional states must work together to

India are no longer poor countries marginalised by the

provide clarity, if not on principles and law, then on

Cold War or sequestered behind ‘the Bamboo Curtain’.

procedures and practices to secure stability and restore

New institutions have emerged, reflecting the rise

confidence. Dr Ng said he hoped the Code of Conduct

of Asia: the BRICS Development Bank, the Asian

in the South China Sea would soon be finalised.

Infrastructure Investment Bank, China’s ‘One Belt One

Change in the international and regional system

Road’ initiative, and the US$40-billion Silk Road Fund.

is inevitable as new powers emerge, the minister

Japan too is active, collaborating with ASEAN to offer

observed, but it was important at the same time to

US$110bn for building Asian infrastructure in the next

ensure that the security architecture remained inclu-

five years, and the US is pushing forward its Trans-

sive and operated on widely accepted global norms.

Pacific Partnership, which Singapore hopes will be a

The rules-based framework that underwrote our pros-

driving force for the region.

perity and security for decades must remain relevant

As powers rise in the Asia-Pacific, Dr Ng said, there

and strong, he concluded.

will be pressures for the rules that have governed the international order to accommodate ‘nationalistic aspirations’. Events in the East and South China seas

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

are manifestations of this change in power dynamics.

Dr Bastian Giegerich, Director, Defence and Military

Air Defence Identification Zones, or similar regimes

Analysis Programme, IISS, asked Federica Mogherini

for the seas, whilst ostensibly protecting freedom of

about the level of EU ambition with regard to a global

navigation and overflight by others, have resulted in

role. She replied that she favoured a full-spectrum

incidents at sea and in the air.

approach rather than simply relying on soft power,

Preservation of a rules-based system is necessary

with an initial focus on neighbouring regions – the

but not sufficient to maintain peace and stability in

Mediterranean, Middle East and Russia. Having a pos-

the Asia-Pacific: states must also be infused with the

itive influence in those regions would have a positive

correct spirit, the minister observed. Singapore is con-

influence globally, she said.

cerned that there are uncertainties within international

Dr Wenguang Shao, Consulting Senior Fellow

agreements and that these frameworks have not built

for China and International Affairs, IISS, and Senior

mutual confidence and trust. Instead, they have cre-

Europe Adviser, Phoenix Satellite Television Holdings,

ated instability. A deficit of trust now exists and can

pointed to the rapid pace of arms acquisition in the

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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

Dr Bastian Giegerich, Director, Defence and Military Analysis Programme, IISS

Dr Wenguang Shao, Consulting Senior Fellow for China and International Affairs, IISS; Senior Europe Advisor, Phoenix Satellite Television Holdings

Sir John Jenkins, Executive Director, IISS–Middle East

Peter Jennings, Executive Director, Australian Strategic Policy Institute

Asia-Pacific and asked whether arms control was nec-

and Western powers. Propaganda now goes directly

essary. Kevin Andrews disagreed: arms procurement

into living rooms and bedrooms of young people, in

is mainly a function of economic growth, he said,

a way that it did not previously, creating a new chal-

adding that peace is best secured from a position of

lenge. He suggested that ISIS was not amenable to a

strength. Thus the modernisation of defence capacity

negotiated solution and so it had to be defeated on the

is not at odds with the peaceful resolution of disputes.

battlefield, while the Syrian conflict had to be settled

Sir

John

Jenkins,

Executive

Director,

IISS-

politically. Dr Ng noted the widespread recognition at

Middle East, and Peter Jennings, Executive Director,

the Dialogue that religious-based terrorism is a global

Australian Strategic Policy Institute, both asked ques-

phenomenon. Singapore has been successful thus far

tions about the threat that ISIS and its supporters posed

in combating Islamist extremism, and intelligence-

to the region. Is enough being done on the ideological

sharing helped to unearth a Jemaah Islamiah cell. It is

front, is there sufficient cooperation among states, and

important to keep Muslim communities on the side of

what military steps must be taken to eradicate the ISIS

the government, he added, to provide intelligence and

threat? Kevin Andrews responded that there is con-

maintain social cohesion in the face of a threat that is

siderable intelligence-sharing between the Asia-Pacific

likely to persist for many decades.

Fifth plenary session

57

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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

14th Asia Security Summit SINGAPORE, 29–31 MAY 2015

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

chapter 8

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special session I:

Armed forces and new terrorist threats

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special session 2:

Energy security challenges

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in the Indo-Pacific region

special session 3:

Challenges for maritime

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intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

special session 4:

Emerging challenges to

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small state security in the Asia-Pacific

special session 5:

Avoiding military competition and arms-racing in Asia

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The Shangri-La Dialogue

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The Shangri-La Dialogue

14th Asia Security Summit SINGAPORE, 29–31 MAY 2015

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

chapter 6

Reception

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The Shangri-La Dialogue

65

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The Shangri-La Dialogue

14th Asia Security Summit SINGAPORE, 29–31 MAY 2015

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

appendices

I. Selected press coverage of the 2015 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue II. Selected IISS publications

appendix I

Selected press coverage of the 2015 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

BBC 29 May 2015

US-China tensions rise over Beijing’s ‘Great Wall of Sand’

By Jonathan Marcus You often hear politicians and strategic thinkers talk about establishing “facts on the ground” - the need to take account of what actually exists when framing policy.

Well in the South China Sea, the Chinese government is going one step further.

As defence ministers and strategic thinkers from across the Asia-Pacific region gather for the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, China is not just creating facts on the ground, it is creating the very ground itself.

In a number of locations in the Spratly Islands, Chinese dredgers are spewing up torrents of sand from the sea bed, turning reefs into new islands.

The transformation of Mischief Reef for example, (known to the Chinese as Meiji Reef) in territory also claimed by the Philippines, is a case in point.

This is only one of several small outposts the Chinese have been constructing in an effort to press their expansive claims hundreds of miles from China’s own shores.The US says China has been building on reclaimed land in the disputed Spratly Islands.

Every year the Shangri-La Dialogue, organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) brings together everyone who is anyone in Asia-Pacific defence circles “to take the temperature” - as IISS director general John Chipman puts it - of security developments in the region.

This year, once again, US-China tensions are centre stage.

Beijing’s efforts to create new facts on the ground have been termed by some as an attempt to construct a “Great Wall of Sand” to delineate the boundary of China’s interests - a reference to the ancient Great Wall that guarded China’s frontier.

Mr Chipman says: “In both the State Department and

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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

the Pentagon, we are seeing real concern about Chinese activities in the South China Sea but also about some of the activities of other claimant states who have sometimes sought to make the areas they feel able to control more habitable or to build facilities on them.”

‘Preposterous’ claims So does he expect some strong exchanges over the coming few days on this subject?

After all, the newly promoted head of US Pacific Command Admiral Harry B Harris only a day ago described China›s claims to a vast swathe of islands in the South China Sea as “preposterous”.

Admiral Harris was speaking on his way to Singapore where he is accompanying his boss, the US Defence Secretary Ash Carter, who is also known for his habit of plain speaking.

“The US Secretary of Defence is going to err on the side of strategic clarity rather than strategic ambiguity,” Mr Chipman told me, “and really call for a stop to this activity by all sides.

“After all in 2002, all of the Asean states in a declaration of principle agreed not to seek to change the status quo.”

That’s a polite way of saying expect tough words from the Americans.

But what about actions? US maritime patrol aircraft and warships have already ventured close to some of the newly constructed facilities, ignoring urgent messages from the Chinese authorities to go away.

There is a real danger of serious friction. “The US is going to argue that it needs to continually demonstrate the freedom of the seas,” says Mr Chipman.

One of the things he hopes will happen at this Singapore meeting is that “there will be a continuation of the US-China military-to-military talks to try to ensure that there are no accidents or incidents at sea or in the air”.

Just ahead of the meeting, Beijing has published what many have dubbed a “Defence White Paper” setting out the country’s strategic horizons and goals.

Mr Chipman believes that this document “will be seen in time as a foundational text for a new more extrovert

Chinese defence policy.

“It actually says that China should abandon its obsession with land security and that security overall has to be achieved through predominance at sea. They are almost casting the Navy as the senior service.”

‘Responsible stakeholder’ Of course, he notes, there are two aspects to this document.

In its concluding paragraph it says that China wants to contribute to the public good of international security.

It’s a signal that Beijing is interested in playing a wider role - something senior US officials have long demanded of China, that it become “a responsible stakeholder” in international society.

Human security will also figure in the talks over the coming days, the plight of the Rohingya boat people highlighting the complex issues thrown up by refugees and migration.

In the Asia-Pacific though, just as in Europe, there are no easy answers here given the powerful mix of diplomatic and domestic factors.

The Shangri-La Dialogue derives much of its importance from the fact that there is no formal security architecture in the region - there’s no Asian Nato for example.

While there have been meetings of Asean defence ministers, and wider gatherings, Mr Chipman told me that it is “very difficult to imagine” a formal defence body in the region.

Some countries, he says, “will tilt a bit towards China, some will tilt towards the United States, most would prefer not to have to have a choice and I think it is this that will still colour defence and diplomatic relations in the region for some time to come” ©2015, BBC Reprinted with permission

Reuters 29 May 2015

Break the vicious cycle, Singapore tells South China Sea rivals

By Rujun Shen and David Alexander Singapore’s prime minister called on countries on Friday to break the “vicious cycle” of the South China Sea row, as the United States and China exchanged increasingly angry barbs over reclaimed islands in the disputed waterway.

Inaugurating Asia’s biggest security forum, the Shangri-La Dialogue, Lee Hsien Loong also warned of the threat of Islamic State militancy in Southeast Asia and said it was not inconceivable that the ultra-radicals could establish a base in the region physically under their control, like in Syria or Iraq.

Just hours before Lee spoke, the Pentagon said China

had placed mobile artillery weapons systems on a reclaimed island in the South China Sea. U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter, who is to address the three-day Shangri-La Dialogue on Saturday, has called for a halt to the reclamation work, saying it was out of step with the regional consensus.

Admiral Sun Jianguo, a deputy chief of China’s People’s Liberation Army, will speak the following day.

Singapore’s Lee said that if the rise of China in the international order was to remain peaceful, U.S.-Chinese relations had to remain strong.

“No country wants to choose sides between U.S. or China,” he said.

But after weeks of angry rhetoric, the two sides were at loggerheads again on Friday.

The U.S. says China’s actions undermine international law and interfere with the freedom of navigation in international waters. China says the islands are sovereign Chinese territory.

Pentagon spokesman Brent Colburn, who is traveling with Carter, said China’s reclamation created “an air of uncertainty in a system that has been based on certainty and agreed-upon norms”.

China’s Xinhua news agency said some of the participants in the Shangri-La Dialogue “attempt to monopolize the right to speak in the field of international security.”

“They echo each other, distort the truth, magnify differences, add fuel to fire, so that dialogue diverges from the path of strengthening exchanges and enhancing mutual trust.”

Singapore’s Lee said: “These maritime disputes...can and should be managed and contained. If the present dynamic continues, it must lead to more tensions and bad outcomes.”

Islamic State Base Lee’s comments on Islamic State were the strongest made by a regional leader on the threat posed by the radicals.

“The idea that ISIS can turn Southeast Asia into a wilayat - a province of a worldwide Islamic caliphate - is a grandiose, pie-in-the-sky idea,” he said. “But it is not so far-fetched that ISIS could establish a base somewhere in the region, somewhere where the governments’ writs do not run.”

Hundreds of people from Southeast Asia have joined Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria and regional security experts have warned of the dangers they may pose if they return.

Terrorism, maritime security and energy security are among the topics to be discussed at the three-day security dialogue, where defense ministers, military officers and international security experts from the United States, Europe and Asia are participating.

Aside from debate in open forums, most of the countries hold closed-door bilateral meetings, with over 200 such sessions scheduled according to the organizers.

Before events formally started on Friday, China’s Admiral Sun held a series of bilaterals, including ones

Selected press coverage

69

with Japan’s Director-General of the Ministry of Defense, Hideshi Tokuchi and Vietnam’s deputy defense minister General Nguyen Chi Vinh.

“We believe that through mutual cooperation the two parties will be able to solve the South China Sea dispute,” Sun said on his meeting with Vietnam, which also has territorial claims in the region.

Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei and the Philippines also claim parts of the sea.

John Chipman, director general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies that organizes the forum, said despite the sharp rhetoric from politicians, there has been improved dialogue between the militaries of the countries involved in the maritime disputes, which this weekend’s meeting could build on.

“It will be interesting if the defense ministers point in their remarks to the importance of keeping that military dialogue going, whatever the political postures of the countries’ leadership might be,” he said. ©2015, Reuters Reprinted with permission

The Straits Times 29 May 2015

14 years of giving it a go for regional security

By William Choong NOT many observers of regional affairs will know that it was the late Mr Lee Kuan Yew who gave the much-needed push for the establishment of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the annual defence summit that will kick off its 14th edition tonight.

In 2001, Dr John Chipman, the director-general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), had a brainwave - compared to Europe, Asia did not have a defence forum which involved meetings of more than two defence ministers. So he sought the advice of Mr Lee. Mr Lee’s curt answer: “Give it a go.”

Fourteen years on, the Dialogue has come a long way.

It also bears Mr Lee›s imprimatur, given that the themes he espoused still resonate today.

Speaking at the first Dialogue in 2002, it was Mr Lee who noted that the immediate threats to South-east Asia were Muslims who had returned home after fighting with Al-Qaeda and Taleban forces in Afghanistan. Addressing the Dialogue in 2003, Mr Lee expressed his worry about the contending objectives of regional powers vis-a-vis North Korea.

But Mr Lee’s biggest contribution to the Dialogue and regional security was his obsession with the regional power balance. Speaking at the 2008 inauguration of the Lee Kuan Yew Conference Room at Arundel House, the London headquarters of the IISS, he stressed that a stable global

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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue

order would need support from all powers - America, the European Union, as well as China, India and Brazil as they grew and Russia as it turned more muscular.

So as Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong addresses the Dialogue tonight, it is likely that he would reiterate these broad themes. In fact, having attended a decade’s worth of Dialogues, I’d eat my hat if Mr Lee doesn’t reiterate the importance of “open and inclusive” regionalism.

Speaking at the 2005 Dialogue, the younger Mr Lee stressed that Singapore believed that an “open regional architecture” would give all major powers a stake in Asia and produce a “stable, predictable regional order”.

Today, regional order is supported by economic dynamism and institutions such as the Asean Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit and the Shangri-La Dialogue.

Among them, the Dialogue is the forum of choice. In 2002, Mr Lee Kuan Yew spoke to 160 delegates. This year’s Dialogue will see a tripling of that figure to approximately 480 delegates.

The tenor of the Dialogue has also changed since 2002.

Europe is now well-represented, with the defence ministers of Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom participating, as well as the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

More importantly, China is now playing a bigger role in the Dialogue - a forum it once feared as a Western-led, anti-China grouping.

Like last year, in 2015 China is sending one of the largest national delegations to the Dialogue. Its 18-strong delegation of senior military officers, officials and researchers will be led by Admiral Sun Jianguo, the first deputy chief of general staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

While this is a step lower compared to 2011, when China sent its defence minister, it may be significant that Admiral Sun is a “four-star” officer, more senior in rank than Lieutenant-General Wang Guanzhong, the three-star officer who led China’s delegation last year. It is rumoured that Adm Sun is slated for promotion to China’s Central Military Commission, the PLA’s highest policymaking body.

Expect the three “Ts” of Asia-Pacific affairs - terrorism, trade policy, and territorial disputes - to be discussed this year.

Speaking in January at the Fullerton Forum - a senior officials’ meeting for countries represented at the Dialogue - Singapore Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen echoed Mr Lee Kuan Yew’s 2002 point when he spoke about the threat posed by “returning waves” of South-east Asian fighters from the wars in Iraq and Syria.

It is also likely that trade and broader geo-economic issues will be highlighted this year.

US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter will probably offer Washington’s mantra about America being a “resident Asia-Pacific power” and stress the durability of its “rebalance” to the region. He will harp on the attractiveness of

the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-nation free trade deal which he says is as important as an aircraft carrier.

Adm Sun may expound on the peacefulness of China’s rise (and again provoke a flurry of interventions from the floor). He would likely talk about China’s desire to share the fruits of its economy, in the form of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and China’s “one belt, one road” vision to link up the Middle East to China.

By far, the most explosive issue could be concern over territorial disputes in the South China Sea. At the Dialogue last year, the United States and China clashed openly over the latter’s actions in the South China Sea. Since then, China has been busy carrying out reclamation works in the Spratlys - sparking concerns that Beijing is presenting the region with a fait accompli. Only last week, a US Navy P-8 Poseidon patrol aircraft flying over the features was warned by the PLA to “leave immediately”.

No matter what happens this weekend, one needs to see the Dialogue from a wider perspective - fireworks in the Island Ballroom do not stand in the way of tangible cooperation between great powers; at times, it can beat the path to greater cooperation.

Only months after the China-US spat at the 2014 Dialogue, US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in November and agreed on a technology deal, an accord to prevent accidental military clashes, as well as a joint plan to curb carbon emissions.

That said, the Shangri-La Dialogue cannot afford to rest on its laurels.

Late last year, China held the Xiangshan Forum, a security forum that some see as the Chinese analogue to the Shangri-La Dialogue.

While the emergence of more multilateral institutions such as the Xiangshan Forum could lead to unwieldy or “messy” regionalism, it is still better that more countries are “giving it a go”, as the late Mr Lee Kuan Yew said, in building regional stability. ©2015, The Straits Times Reprinted with permission

El Pais 29 May 2015

EE UU acusa a China de llevar armas a una isla en disputa del Pacífico

By Macarena Vidal Liy Las reclamaciones territoriales de Pekín en el mar del Sur de China, cada vez más contundentes, protagonizarán este fin de semana elDiálogo Shangri-La, el foro anual sobre Seguridad más importante en Asia Pacífico. Estados Unidos ha acusado a China de haber colocado equipos móviles de artillería en una isla en disputa en el Pacífico. “Se trata de

un hecho molesto y supone una escalada”, ha dicho el senador John McCain. Un portavoz del Pentágono que viaja con el secretario de Defensa al foro, ha confirmado a Reuters que EE UU conoce la existencia de este armamento.

La portavoz del Ministerio de Exteriores chino, Hua Chunying, ha asegurado carecer de información sobre esos supuestos equipos.

Analistas militares citados por Reuters consideraron que el armamento parece representar más una declaración de principios que un intento de desequilibrar la situación.

“Hay que recordar que potencialmente tienen bastante más artillería en los buques de guerra que desplazan de manera habitual por aguas del mar del Sur de China”, declaró un agregado militar a esa agencia.

China reclama la mayor parte del mar de Sur de China.

Filipinas, Vietnam, Malasia, Brunéi y Taiwán también reclaman partes de esta importante ruta comercial.

Los ministros de Defensa o altos cargos militares de 26 países, incluido el ministro español, Pedro Morenés, se reúnen desde este viernes y hasta el domingo en Singapur en medio de una escalada retórica entre Pekín y Washington por la construcción china de islas artificiales en zonas en disputa.

EE UU calcula que los dragados chinos han creado una superficie de 809 hectáreas en total en cinco emplazamientos de las islas Spratly, de las que 607 se han añadido este año.

El secretario de Defensa de EE UU, Ashton Carter, que intervendrá en el foro que organiza el Instituto Internacional de Estudios Estratégicos (IISS) el sábado, ya ha comenzado a adelantar sus argumentos. “Lo nuevo es [la fabricación de islas artificiales y] la escala a la que se construye”, declaró a bordo del avión que le transportaba a Singapur. Y acerca de las quejas chinas por los sobrevuelos estadounidenses de las zonas en disputa, instó a que “nadie se equivoque: EE UU volará, navegará y operará donde le permita el derecho internacional, como hacemos por todo el mundo”.

En una parada previa en una base militar en Hawái, Carter había instado a China a poner fin de inmediato a las obras. Según afirmó entonces, las actividades de Pekín “hacen que se incrementen los llamamientos para que EE UU se implique en Asia Pacífico. Vamos a atender esos llamamientos”. EE UU, aseguró, “seguirá siendo la principal potencia en Asia Pacífico durante décadas”.

China ha respondido en un tono similar. Sus medios oficiales aseguran que ningún país extranjero tiene derecho a dictarle lo que puede hacer en áreas que considera bajo su soberanía. Y en una entrevista concedida al diario China Daily, Ouyang Yujing, director general del Ministerio de Exteriores, puso sobre la mesa la posibilidad de declarar una zona de identificación aérea, o ADIZ, en el mar del Sur de China, como ya hizo Pekín de manera unilateral en un área del mar del Este de China que incluye el archipiélago que se disputa con Japón, conocido como Senkaku en japonés y Diaoyu en mandarín.

Selected press coverage

71

China ha dejado claro en los últimos días que no está dispuesta a ceder en sus reclamaciones territoriales y que se toma muy en serio el defenderlas. Esta semana ha publicado un nuevo libro blanco sobre estrategia militar en el que subraya el protagonismo cada vez mayor de su Marina.

En lugar de limitarse a la defensa de las aguas costeras, ha indicado, sus barcos tendrán también como misión la defensa en aguas internacionales.

En una muestra de la importancia que da a lo que pueda ocurrir en el foro, Pekín ha enviado una numerosa delegación, de 29 personas, encabezada por el almirante Sun Jianguo, el militar de rango más alto del Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) que ha participado en estos encuentros.

Pero un portavoz del Ministerio de Defensa chino ha indicado que el discurso de Sun, previsto para el domingo, se centrará en la colaboración, el diálogo y la defensa conjunta.

El libro blanco también asegura que, aunque China no rehuirá una confrontación si es atacada, no atacará ella primero.

Según afirma Niklas Swanström, director del Instituto para la Política de Seguridad y Desarrollo, el riesgo de que se produzca una escalada en la situación en el mar del Sur de China “existe, pero no es serio”. En su opinión, “ni China ni EE UU tienen interés en un conflicto”.

Más allá de las fricciones entre EE UU y China, el foro tomará la temperatura a la situación de la seguridad de la región, donde la creciente reafirmación militar china ha llevado también a aumentar el gasto militar de países como Japón o India, sus principales rivales en la zona. ©2015, El Pais Reprinted with permission

Le Monde 30 May 2015

Pékin fixe à sa marine de guerre des horizons planétaires La Chine, soucieuse de protéger ses intérêts à l’étranger et ses ressortissants répartis sur tous les continents, -confirme sa transformation en puissance navale. Dans un nouveau Livre blanc, publié mardi 26 mai, le premier consacré à la stratégie militaire, le Conseil d’Etat (gouvernement) a exposé la vision de ses stratèges afin de donner un rôle plus global à ses forces armées. Cet exposé, présenté par Pékin comme un acte de transparence, intervient sur fond de querelle sino-américaine dans les mers de Chine du Sud, où les chantiers de poldérisation de récifs et d’atolls menés par Pékin sont la cible depuis plusieurs mois d’une virulente campagne de dénonciation de la part de Washington.

Ce Livre blanc chinois de la défense entérine la mue attendue d’une puissance commerciale désormais planétaire. Le document souligne que “ la sécurité des intérêtsoutre-mer - de la Chine - dans l’énergie et les ressources, les voies maritimes stratégiques, ainsi que des institutions,

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du personnel et des actifs présents à l’étranger, est devenue une préoccupation majeure “. Le texte juge également qu’” avec l’expansion des intérêts nationaux chinois, la sécurité nationale est devenue plus vulnérable aux tumultes régionaux et internationaux, le terrorisme, la piraterie, enfin, les désastres naturels et les épidémies majeures “.

Ce n’est pas la première fois qu’il est fait mention des “ intérêts outre-mer “ dans un document officiel. Mais, relève le spécialiste Mathieu Duchâtel, qui dirige le bureau pékinois du Stockholm-International Peace Research Institute, ils “ ont pris une place si importante dans ce nouveau document, celle d’une préoccupation majeure “.

Confrontation sino-américaine “ L’idée a fait son chemin. Elle est maintenant presque liée à l’identité de la Chine comme grande puissance, celle qu’elle projette à l’intérieur du pays et à l’extérieur “, poursuit le coauteur, avec le diplomate danois Jonas Parello-Plesner, d’un livre à paraître tout prochainement en anglais, China’s Strong Arm : Protecting Citizens and Assets Abroad.

Pour le chercheur, les deux tropismes qui ressortent de l’exposé, “ les affaires maritimes dans la région et la protection des intérêts extrarégionaux d’une Chine globalisée, se combinent dans la construction de la puissance navale chinoise “. “ Le changement de ton est évident par rapport au dernier Livre blanc, qui mettait l’accent sur la coopération internationale de l’APL - Armée populaire de libération - au sein de missions multilatérales, souligne-t-il.

L’environnement, cette année, est bien différent en raison de la -confrontation Chine-Etats-Unis en mer de Chine du Sud et du dangereux cycle surveillance/contre-surveillance. “ Selon M. Duchâtel, “ la surveillance maritime constante à -laquelle la marine chinoise est soumise en mer de Chine du Sud explique beaucoup des comportements chinois (y compris les constructions d’îles artificielles), au moins autant que les intérêts de souveraineté “. L’échange radio survenu, le 20 mai, devant les caméras de CCN entre l’équipage d’un avion de surveillance américain Poseidon survolant plusieurs de ces atolls au large des Philippines et le contrôle aérien de la marine chinoise a fait monter un peu plus le ton entre Pékin et Washington, à quelques jours du Dialogue du Shangri-La, à Singapour du 29 au 31 mai, le grand rendezvous des ministres de la défense de la zone Asie-Pacifique.

Liberté de navigation Lors de ces échanges radio, les Américains se sont évertués à faire valoir la liberté de navigation dans les eaux territoriales, tandis que les Chinois leur intimaient, sur un ton d’abord poli, puis de plus en plus sec, de quitter le “ territoire souverain “ chinois.

Le Pentagone avait préalablement fait savoir qu’il étudiait l’envoi de navires et d’avions dans la zone des 12 milles autour de ces îlots artificiels chinois, provoquant une levée de boucliers en Chine, le quotidien à gros tirage Global Times, porte-parole belliqueux du régime, appelant même

la Chine à “ se préparer minutieusement “ à la possibilité d’un -conflit avec les Etats-Unis.

S’exprimant depuis Pearl Harbour lors d’une cérémonie de passation des pouvoirs à la tête de la flotte du Pacifique, le mercredi 27 mai, le secrétaire américain de la défense, Ashton Carter, a rappelé que les Etats-Unis entendaient “ voler, naviguer et agir partout où les lois internationales l’autorisent “. Ceux-ci souhaitent “ un arrêt immédiat et durable des projets de poldérisation de la Chine et des autres pays concernés “, a-t-il ajouté, accusant Pékin “ d’être en déphasage, à travers ses actions en mer de Chine du Sud, avec les normes internationales qui sous-tendent l’architecture de sécurité de l’Asie-Pacifique “.

Pour Mathieu Duchâtel, la notion de “ liberté de navigation “ défendue par les Etats-Unis se voit opposer une riposte rhétorique par les Chinois dans le nouveau Livre blanc, celle de “ protection en haute mer “ (open seas protection) : “ Elle suggère un passage sécurisé pour la marine chinoise dans les eaux internationales, ce qui peut être important lors d’évacuations de ressortissants, par exemple ; elle peut aussi faire référence à des opérations d’escorte de flotte commerciale comme dans le golfe d’Aden. “ Reste à savoir comment les Chinois entendent la mettre en pratique. ©2015, Le Monde Reprinted with permission

BBC 30 May 2015

Business interests propel change in China’s global role

By Jonathan Marcus One of the chief tasks of any government is to ensure the safety of its citizens abroad.

Sometimes this might even require military action to evacuate or maybe even extricate people from some crisis in a far-flung country.

In this sense, China is fast becoming no different from any other major player in the world.

And in the process, its foreign policy and its global footprint are significantly changing.

A new book released here by the International Institute for Strategic Studies at its Shangri-La Dialogue - Asia’s premier security forum - investigates for the first time these subtle changes in China’s global role.

Entitled China’s Strong Arm: Protecting Citizens and Assets Abroad, it consciously borrows a phrase attributed to the great British statesman Palmerston during the zenith of Britain’s imperial power, when he spoke of its “strong arm” in protecting its passport holders wherever they ventured.

According to one of the book’s co-authors, Jonas ParelloPlesner, a Danish diplomat: “For some years now, Chinese

companies have been going out to unstable parts of the world - to Sudan for oil exploration, to Libya, Afghanistan and Pakistan for mining and construction - and have brought along with them a corps of Chinese workers which has created... a profoundly changed global risk map for China’s leaders, both in terms of its human presence and for its assets abroad.”

The seminal event, he says, was in 2011 in Libya “when China managed in 12 days in late February through to the beginning of March to rescue more than 35,000 workers who came out by ship, aeroplane, or by bus”.

He points to a similar evacuation in Yemen in March, “where Chinese naval vessels went in, docked and brought out more than 600 Chinese citizens as well as other foreign nationals”.

In this sense, China was behaving exactly like other major countries when faced by such a crisis.

But surely the despatch of warships to a conflict zone raises questions about that traditional cornerstone of China’s foreign policy, namely non-interference in other countries’ affairs?

Constant tension Mathieu Duchatel, a specialist at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, who is based in Beijing (and the book’s other co-author) told me that this shift in China’s foreign policy was “clearly being driven by practical concerns rather than ideology”.

“There was a major turning point in 2004, which was completely unexpected,” he says.

“Within a few months, there were three attacks on Chinese nationals - one in Sudan, one in Pakistan and one in Afghanistan.

“And this prompted a strong reaction in China - it attracted the attention of the top leadership. China realised that it had so many nationals overseas and that some of them were based in unstable countries - war zones in some cases - and so they realised that protecting them was a national interest.”

This realisation established what has become a constant tension in China’s foreign policy that has not yet been resolved.

As Mr Parello-Plesner told me: “China has companies willing to accept risk who are out there to secure business or markets in virgin territories where there isn’t necessarily a high-level of Western competition.

“That’s why in the search for oil they have gone into Sudan.”

Then, on the other hand, you have the Chinese government, which is traditionally inclined towards noninterference and more risk averse and would rather stay out of troublespots.

These two trends converge, he says, and “we see the Beijing government having to do much more, often in innovative ways”.

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He gave the example of South Sudan where the Chinese are now fielding a combat battalion in the UN mission that’s there to stabilise the country.

“But it’s also part of the UN mandate that they can help to secure oil workers who are predominantly Chinese, so there you see a combination of China pursuing its national interest which works for the broader public good.”

Fortuitous This of course raises a fundamental question - does China have the military resources needed for such interventions to protect its nationals abroad?

In some cases the answer is clearly yes.

This is now explicitly part of Beijing’s new defence strategy that was published last week.

But, as Mr Duchatel told me, the Chinese navy’s involvement in evacuations in Libya and Yemen was slightly fortuitous in that it had warships nearby, as part of antipiracy operations in the Gulf.

What about a crisis further from China’s own resources - suppose an evacuation were needed in a West African country where over 30,000 Chinese passport holders might be involved?

China, he says, “simply couldn’t carry that out with the same level of military involvement”.

There are those in the West who see this growing Chinese global role as a potential threat, offering Beijing a potential excuse to justify the deployment of military forces in all kinds of places that might traditionally have been well away from its routine concerns.

Of course, China does not yet have the means to do this.

Common ground But Mr Duchatel suggests that on the contrary, this could perhaps be a positive development.

“It is hard to think of scenarios of any evacuation from a country where the West and China would be opposed,” he says.

In contrast to what is happening in the South China Sea, this is an area where there is a lot of common ground and, he argues, “there is potential for China and the West - meaning the US and Europe - to work together to enhance stability”.

There are technical things the militaries could do together in cases of evacuation.

Says Mr Duchatel: “It is pretty clear that when there is an evacuation, China is not the only country to evacuate - Pakistan, the Europeans and the US all carry out such operations and there has to be some degree of co-ordination just to avoid competition for limited resources like landing areas.” ©2015, BBC Reprinted with permission

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Agence France Press 30 May 2015

US hits China over sea reclamation, vows more patrols Singapore // The United States on Saturday called for an immediate halt to China’s land reclamation in the disputed South China Sea and vowed to continue sending military aircraft and ships to the tense region.

Beijing’s behaviour is “out of step” with international norms, the US defence secretary Ashton Carter said at a high-level security conference in Singapore.

“First, we want a peaceful resolution of all disputes. To that end, there should be an immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by all claimants,” Mr Carter told the annual Shangri-La Dialogue on security, with a Chinese military delegation in the audience.

“We also oppose any further militarisation of disputed features,” he said.

He acknowledged that other claimants had developed outposts of differing scope and degree, including Vietnam with 48, the Philippines with eight, Malaysia with five and Taiwan with one.

“Yet, one country has gone much farther and much faster than any other.

“China has reclaimed over 2,000 acres, more than all other claimants combined and more than in the entire history of the region. And China did so in only the last 18 months,” Mr Carter said.

“It is unclear how much farther China will go. That is why this stretch of water has become the source of tension in the region and front-page news around the world.”

China insists it has sovereignty over nearly all of the South China Sea, a major global shipping route believed to be home to oil and gas reserves.

During a question and answer session after Mr Carter’s speech, a Chinese military official said the criticism was “groundless and not constructive”.

“Freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is not at all an issue because the freedom has never been affected,” said Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo from China’s Academy of Military Science.

The head of the Chinese delegation, Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of the general staff department at the People’s Liberation Army, is scheduled to address the forum on Sunday.

Last week the Chinese military ordered a US Navy P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft to leave an area above the heavily disputed Spratly Islands. The American plane ignored the demand.

“There should be no mistake: the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, as US

forces do all around the world,” Mr Carter said.

“After all, turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international air or maritime transit.”

Washington on Friday accused China of deploying two artillery pieces on one of its artificial islands in the South China Sea. The heavy weapons, since removed, posed no security threat but their positioning – within range of territory claimed by Vietnam – underscored Washington’s concerns that China is pursuing a massive island-building project for military purposes, US officials said.

In his speech, Mr Carter urged China and the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations to adopt a “code of conduct” in the disputed waters.

Along with Vietnam, fellow Asean members the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei all claim parts of the sea, as does Taiwan. ©2015, Agence France Press Reprinted with permission

Associated Press 30 May 2015

Pentagon chief criticizes Beijing’s South China Sea moves

By Lolita C Baldor and Matthew Pennington SINGAPORE (AP) — China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea is out of step with international rules, and turning underwater land into airfields won’t expand its sovereignty, Defense Secretary Ash Carter told an international security conference Saturday, stepping up America’s condemnation of the communist giant as Beijing officials sat in the audience.

Carter told the room full of Asia-Pacific leaders and experts that the U.S. opposes “any further militarization” of the disputed lands.

His remarks were immediately slammed as “groundless and not constructive” by a Chinese military officer in the audience.

Carter’s comments came as defense officials revealed that China had put two large artillery vehicles on one of the artificial islands it is creating in the South China Sea. The discovery, made at least several weeks ago, fuels fears in the U.S and across the Asia-Pacific that China will try to use the land reclamation projects for military purposes.

The weaponry was discovered at least several weeks ago, and two U.S. officials who are familiar with intelligence about the vehicles say they have been removed. The officials weren’t authorized to discuss the intelligence and spoke only on condition of anonymity.

The Pentagon would not release any photos to support its contention that the vehicles were there.

China’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea has become an increasingly sore point in relations with the United States, even as President Barack Obama and China’s President Xi Jinping have sought to deepen cooperation in other areas, such as climate change.

Pentagon spokesman Brent Colburn said the U.S. was aware of the artillery, but he declined to provide other details. Defense officials described the weapons as self-propelled artillery vehicles and said they posed no threat to the U.S. or American territories.

While Carter did not refer directly to the weapons in his speech, he told the audience that now is the time for a diplomatic solution to the territorial disputes because “we all know there is no military solution.”

“Turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international air or maritime transit,” Carter told the audience at the International Institute for Strategic Studies summit.

China’s actions have been “reasonable and justified,” said Senior Col. Zhao Xiaozhuo, deputy director of the Center on China-America Defense Relations at the People’s Liberation Army’s Academy of Military Science.

Zhao challenged Carter, asking whether America’s criticism of China and its military reconnaissance activities in the South China Sea “help to resolve the disputes” and maintain peace and stability in the region.

Carter responded that China’s expanding land reclamation projects are unprecedented in scale. He said the U.S. has been flying and operating ships in the region for decades and has no intention of stopping.

While Carter’s criticism was aimed largely at China, he made it clear that other nations who are doing smaller land reclamation projects also must stop.

One of those countries is Vietnam, which Carter is scheduled to visit during this 11-day trip across Asia. Others are Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan.

Asked about images of weapons on the islands, China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said she was “not aware of the situation you mention.”

She also scolded Carter, saying the U.S. should be “rational and calm and stop making any provocative remarks, because such remarks not only do not help ease the controversies in the South China Sea, but they also will aggravate the regional peace and stability.”

Carter appeared to strike back in his speech, saying that the U.S. is concerned about “the prospect of further militarization, as well as the potential for these activities to increase the risk of miscalculation or conflict.” And he said the U.S. “has every right to be involved and be concerned.”

But while Carter stood in China’s backyard and added to the persistent drumbeat of U.S. opposition to Beijing’s activities, he did little to give Asia-Pacific nations a glimpse

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into what America is willing to do to achieve a solution.

He said the U.S. will continue to sail, fly and operate in the region, and warned that the Pentagon will be sending its “best platforms and people” to the Asia-Pacific. Those would include, he said, new high-tech submarines, surveillance aircraft, the stealth destroyer and new aircraft carrier-based early-warning aircraft.

U.S. Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., who also is attending the Singapore conference, told reporters that the U.S. needs to recognize that China will continue its activities in the South China Sea until it perceives that the costs of doing so outweigh the benefits.

He said he agreed with Carter’s assertion that America will continue flights and operations near the building projects, but “now we want to see it translated into action.”

One senior defense official has said the U.S. is considering more military flights and patrols closer to the projects in the South China Sea, to emphasize reclaimed lands are not China’s territorial waters. Officials also are looking at ways to adjust the military exercises in the region to increase U.S. presence if needed. That official was not authorized to discuss the options publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity.

One possibility would be for U.S. ships to travel within 12 miles of the artificial islands, to further make the point that they are not sovereign Chinese land. McCain said it would be a critical mistake to recognize any 12-mile zone around the reclamation projects.

The U.S. has been flying surveillance aircraft in the region, prompting China to file a formal protest.

U.S. and other regional officials have expressed concerns about the island building, including worries that it may be a prelude to navigation restrictions or the enforcement of a possible air defense identification zone over the South China Sea. China declared such a zone over disputed Japanese-held islands in the East China Sea in 2013.

China has said the islands are its territory and that the buildings and other infrastructure are for public service use and to support fishermen. ©2015, Associated Press Reprinted with permission

Today (Singapore) 30 May 2015

End vicious cycle in South China Sea: PM

By Xue Jianyue SINGAPORE — Amid renewed tensions between the United States and China over reclaimed islands in the South China Sea, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong yesterday warned regional leaders that every Asian country stands to lose if regional security and stability are threatened.

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Delivering the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Mr Lee set out what needs to be done to ensure a stable regional order, which requires consent and legitimacy in the international community and “cannot be maintained by just by superior force” in the long run. He also called on China and the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) to conclude a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea “as soon as possible, so as to break the vicious cycle and not let the disputes sour the broader relationship”.

“If all parties adhere to international law... that is the best outcome,” he said. “On the other hand, if a physical clash occurs, which escalates into wider tension or conflict, either by design or more likely by accident, that would be very bad.”

He added: “But even if we avoid a physical clash, if the outcome is determined on the basis of might is right, it will set a bad precedent. It may not lead immediately to a hot conflict, but it will be an unhappier and less sustainable position.”

In recent weeks, US and China exchanged increasingly angry barbs over the reclaimed islands. On Thursday, Beijing defended its building of the artificial islands and accused Washington of stirring up trouble in the economically vital region.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said no outside actors had the right to dictate to China in an area it claims as its sovereign territory. Ms Hua’s remarks came less than a day after US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter delivered the strongest US warning yet against Beijing’s moves in the South China Sea, demanding a halt to land reclamation in disputed waters and vowing that Washington would remain Asia’s leading power “for decades to come”.

Mr Lee is the second Singapore leader in recent weeks to urge China and ASEAN to swiftly agree on the code. Earlier this month, Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen had called on the two parties to “expeditiously” do so as maritime territorial disputes, if left unchecked, could be disruptive to the global economy.

Away from the territorial disputes, Mr Lee said that World War II continues to cast a shadow over relations between Japan and its neighbours China and South Korea, even though it had ended 70 years ago. “It is past the time to put this history behind us properly, like the Europeans have done. This requires statesmanship and largeness of spirit on both sides,” he said.

Japan needs to acknowledge past wrongs, and Japanese public opinion needs to be more forthright in rejecting the more outrageous interpretations of history by right-wing academics and politicians, Mr Lee said. While Japan has made apologies in general terms, its positions on specific issues such as comfort women and the Nanjing massacre has been “less than equivocal”, he noted.

At the same time, Japan’s neighbours need to accept the country’s acknowledgements and “not demand that Japan apologises over and over again”.

Mr Lee said: “The history of the war should not be used to put Japan on the defensive, or to perpetuate enmities into future generations. Only with largeness of heart can all sides move forward to reduce distrust and build up cooperation.”

Mr Lee stressed the importance of positive relations between the US and China, and the need for the former to be part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). “The US-China relationship is fundamentally different from the US-Soviet relationship of old. It is not a zero-sum game.

There are elements of competition, but many interdependencies and opportunities for mutual benefit,” he said.

A step towards establishing the TPP involves the passing of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) by the US Congress. The TPA provides the US President with the authority to negotiate international agreements that Congress can approve or disapprove, but cannot amend or filibuster.

“Failing to get the TPP done will hurt the credibility and standing of the US not just in Asia, but worldwide,” Mr Lee said.

Mr Lee said he expects that the US, China and Japan will remain major powers, while India will play an increasing role in the region. He hopes the world will continue to have an open global system of trade, investment and economic cooperation, and “certainly free trade in the Asia-Pacific instead of the current alphabet soup of trading arrangements”.

“It should not be a world where might is right, the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must,” he said. “It should be a world where legitimacy and constructive engagement are the international norm, and every country, big and small, can compete peacefully for a chance to prosper.” ©2015, Today (Singapore) Reprinted with permission

Times of India 31 May 2015

Island row: China and Japan may sign pact to end crisis

By Saibal Dasgupta BEIJING: China and Japan may sign an agreement to diffuse maritime crisis between the two nations.

The two countries have come close to a military confrontation over a sea dispute on a few occasions in recent years.

Two military leaders, Vice Chief of Staff of China’s People’s Liberation Army Sun Jianguo and Director

General of the Japanese Defense Ministry’s Defense Policy Bureau Hideshi Tokuchi, have expressed hope that the two countries will soon sign a Memorandum of Understanding on the maritime and aerial crisis liaison mechanism.

The two were brought together in the same platform by the Shangri-La Dialogue. The Shangri-La Dialogue is organized by the Britain-based International Institute for Strategic Studies which brings together defense ministers, senior officials and security experts to exchange views on key issues that shape the defense and security landscape of the region.

They also expect to launch the mechanism and implement the agreement at an early date, the officials said after a meeting on the sidelines of the ongoing Shangri-La Dialogue involving defense ministers of 26 nations in Singapore.

Sources said that the move is significant because Japan has decided to get out its pacifists constitution and develop military capability of its own instead of depending entirely on the United States. China also wants Tokyo to get out of the US influence and deal directly with it, observers said.

The two countries are quarrelling over ownership of the Diayou Islands (called Senkaku in Japanese) in the East China Sea which is currently in Japan’s control. China also has a serious grouse against Japan for allowing its soldiers to torture thousands of Chinese men and women during World War II. Sun told Japanese officials that China is willing to work with Japan to promote the good- neighborly relations and cooperation, according to the official Xinhua news agency.

It wants to protect the hard-won progress in the improvement of bilateral ties, Sun said, indicating that China would do nothing to aggravate the differences.

China is keen to push Washington out of the picture although the US maintains significant naval presence in the region to reassure its allies like Japan of its protection, sources said.

Sun expressed hope that the two sides would continue defense exchanges and cooperation, strengthen mutual understanding along with enhanced management and control over contradictions and crisis.

Tokuchi said Japan is willing to make efforts to improve the bilateral ties there were sharp difficulties and differences in the Sino-Japan relations.

Cooperation in the defense and security field would go a long way to improve bilateral ties, he said. There are indications the two countries might take a step forward and consider holding a joint military exercise at a limited scale as a confidence building measure, sources said. ©2015, Times of India Reprinted with permission

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New York Times May 31 2015

Building of Islands Is Debated, but China and U.S. Skirt Conflict at Talks

By Matthew Rosenberg SINGAPORE — It was an unexpectedly direct exchange: With nearly every significant Asian defense official gathered in a single room, a senior Chinese military officer on Saturday defended his country’s island-building spree in the South China Sea and rebuked Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter for saying it threatened the region’s stability.

If anything, “the region has been peaceful and stable just because of China’s great restraint,” said Senior Col. Zhou Bo, the Chinese officer.

Yet a few moments later, away from the crowd and cameras, Colonel Zhou’s defiant tone gave way to a seemingly more subtle appreciation of the complex relationship that binds the United States and China together and, at the same time, pushes them apart. The speech by Mr. Carter that prompted his comments had “balance,” Colonel Zhou said in a brief interview.

“We do not disagree on all things,” he added, before rushing off to huddle with fellow Chinese officers at the conference.

After a week of public rancor over China’s rush to build artificial islands on reefs, rocks and atolls in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, the first full day of the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual security meeting in Singapore that attracts almost every major and minor player in Asia, gave both sides the chance to lower the temperature.

Though Mr. Carter did not hold any formal meetings with Chinese officials, lower-ranking American officials did, and it was apparent that they in effect agreed to disagree on what constitutes sovereign Chinese territory for the time being. But American officials made it clear that the dispute would not hinder nascent military cooperation with China or threaten the deep economic ties that are the bedrock of Asia’s stability and prosperity.

Adm. Harry Harris, the new chief of American forces in the Pacific, summed it up succinctly in a briefing with reporters at the end of the day: “Conflict is bad for business.”

The dispute over the South China Sea has festered for decades with China, Vietnam, the Philippines and a handful of other countries all making overlapping claims to a stretch of ocean rich with natural gas and other resources.

While this issue simmered in the background for a long time, disputes have escalated in recent years, most notably when China placed an oil rig near Vietnam last year,

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but also with skirmishes between naval forces and fishing boats from the various claimants.

Those tensions have heightened as the scope of the Chinese building spree became apparent — American officials say 2,000 acres of land were added in the past 18 months — and a pair of mechanized artillery pieces were briefly spotted on two of the islands, raising fears that China was moving to back up its claims to the new islands with military force.

Chinese forces also this month ordered an American surveillance plane to leave the skies over Fiery Cross Reef, where China has built an island with a landing strip. The American aircraft did not comply.

Then last week China released a document outlining a strategic vision for its navy to project force beyond its coastal waters into the open oceans. Western officials said the release appeared timed to challenge participants at the conference.

Other countries have also built outposts in the South China Sea. But the construction was done before 2002, when China and nine Southeast Asian nations signed a nonbinding agreement to “exercise self-restraint” and refrain from trying to inhabit any land features that were uninhabited at that time. And the pre-2002 construction was never done at the pace and on the scale of China’s recent land reclamation efforts.

Mr. Carter, whose speech opened the day, reiterated a call he made earlier in the week for China to halt the construction, saying that American warships and military aircraft would continue to operate in the area, which the United States still considers to be international waters, not Chinese territory. He also listed numerous weaponry that the United States could bring to bear in Asia — though he did not directly link any of it to China — and unveiled a new American effort to help China’s neighbors build up their naval capabilities.

But he balanced his tough talk with entreaties to China to work with its neighbors and the United States to ensure stability in the region, saying that through cooperation “everybody wins.”

He also sought to assuage Chinese fears that the United States was using the dispute over the sea simply to keep China in check. The United States expected countries like China to broaden the scope of their interests as they grew more powerful, and it was ready to work with them to keep the peace, he said.

The United States “has never aimed to hold any nation back or push any country down,” he said.

Mr. Carter also cited areas where the American and Chinese militaries were already cooperating, and new initiatives, such as a measure the two sides are working on that would help prevent dangerous air-to-air encounters between military aircraft.

The official Chinese response was to come Sunday when

Adm. Sun Jianguo, the deputy chief of the general staff of the People’s Liberation Army, addresses the conference.

American, European and Asian officials here said they expected blustery language, and that had little expectation that the Chinese would suddenly halt their effort to construct new territory in the South China Sea. Colonel Zhou may have provided a preview on Saturday during the question-and-answer period that followed Mr. Carter’s speech.

After calling Mr. Carter’s criticism groundless, he said that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea was not a problem because it was never really free, and then concluded with a loaded question. “The U.S. has taken some measures, such as harsh criticism toward China, and military reconnaissance activities, your military threat,” he said. “Do these measures help to resolve the dispute in the South China Sea and maintain peace and stability?”

The American answer was that its military has always flown and sailed in international airspace and water, and that it is China that is trying to alter the facts on the ground, not the United States.

But neither side for now appears willing to do much more than demand that the other stop.

In the meantime, American officials said they would continue to build the military capacity of allies in the region, and forge closer ties with former adversaries like Vietnam, so they too could benefit from American military assistance. Over time, the hope is that stronger neighbors backed by the United States would serve as a deterrent to China.

Senator John McCain, who led a Congressional delegation to the conference, told reporters that he planned to introduce legislation next week to lift parts of an embargo on sending weapons to Vietnam.

American allies, though, did not appear entirely convinced that the United States had a long-term plan, or that it would back up its talk about freedom of navigation and the need to respect international laws with action.

“If we leave any unlawful situation unattended, order will soon turn to disorder, and peace and stability will collapse,” Gen Nakatani, the defense minister of Japan, told the forum. “I hope and expect all the countries, including China, to behave as a responsible power.”

But few, if anyone, seemed willing to see order enforced at the risk of war. “This has the potential to escalate into one of the deadliest conflicts of our time, if not history,” said Hishammuddin Hussein, the defense minister of Malaysia.

“Inflamed rhetoric does not do any nation any good.” ©2015, New York Times Reprinted with permission

Bloomberg 31 May 2015

Nice Words From China and U.S. Fail to Dim South China Sea Tensions

By David Tweed, Sharon Chen and Chris Brummitt Inside a plush Singapore hotel, top American and Chinese defense officials spent the weekend treading carefully on China’s pushiness in the South China Sea. Outside that bubble, tensions between the world’s two biggest economies over the key shipping lane are undiminished.

The Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore is an annual venue for the U.S. and China to set out their role in the region, for the U.S. to tell China to stop being so assertive against other claimant states in the South China Sea, and China to say it has every right to defend its territory.

In contrast to last year when then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel traded barbs with Chinese Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong, this year’s speeches by U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter and Chinese Admiral Sun Jianguo were couched in more moderate tones. Yet the external backdrop is more tense: China has dramatically escalated its reclamation of disputed reefs and is warning planes from other countries away.

The lack of fireworks at Shangri-La potentially reflects unease among some Southeast Asian nations about the pickup in tensions, as the U.S. boosts its patrols of the South China Sea. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong warned on Friday that smaller countries in the region don’t want to be squeezed by the two major powers and have to pick a side.

Regardless of what was said inside the forum, “it is more dangerous now than last time because of the construction and the U.S. response has been very robust, shown resolve,” said Susan Shirk, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia, referring to China’s reclamation. “The U.S. may be prepared to take some risks to demonstrate the credibility of that resolve.”

Surveillance Flights Shirk, who is chair of the 21st Century China Program at the University of California in San Diego, also attended last year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, held in Singapore since 2002.

When Hagel spoke last year there was little risk the U.S. military would be dragged into a quarrel that had blown up over a Chinese oil rig parked in waters also claimed by Vietnam. Now, the tensions are more directly felt between China and the U.S. A U.S. surveillance plane was recently warned by the Chinese Navy to stop patrolling near reefs China claims in the Spratly Island area.

Still, Carter, while maintaining his warning that the U.S. would fly or sail wherever international law allowed, also

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noted strengthening ties between the nations’ militaries.

Admiral Sun focused his speech on presenting China as a “reliable friend and sincere partner” to developing countries and a nation seeking to cooperate.

Next Step Throughout the three-day forum, Chinese officials talked about their country as being beset by unreasonable neighbors intent on foiling its rights to the islands. China claims about 80 percent of the South China Sea based on a ninedash line drawn on a 1940s map.

“Both sides seem to be wanting to find a way to pipe down,” said Ong Keng Yong, executive deputy chairman of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Singapore’s non-resident ambassador to Iran and Pakistan.

“Since America is not regarded as aggressive, China also took one step back, but where is all this leading to? Both are trying to measure each other’s position and see what’s the next possible step.”

Some of the remarks from Sun and Carter show why tensions in the South China Sea will remain. Carter on Saturday called for an “immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by any claimant” and said the U.S. would continue its patrols. A day later, Sun said China would resist any effort to subjugate it.

Shipping Lanes Protecting freedom of navigation resonates in the region region because the South China Sea hosts more than $5 trillion of shipping each year and is home to about a 10th of the world’s annual fishing catch. Parts of the waters are also claimed by Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan.

While China says its artificial islands will be for civilian use - from search-and-rescue operations to marine meteorological forecasting - it also says they’d have military purposes, and it reserves the right to declare an air defense identification zone over the area.

Satellite images show the construction of an airstrip big enough to handle the largest of China’s military aircraft, while two mobile artillery pieces have been detected on a reef.

China’s turning rocky outcrops or reefs into a “full airport,” while putting weapons on them is a militarization that hasn’t occurred before, Australia’s Defense Minister Kevin Andrews said in an interview.

“There has to be a halt to this kind of destabilizing activity,” said Bonnie Glaser, a senior adviser for Asia at the Washington, DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. “There is insufficient agreement among all the nations about how to move forward.”

Air Zone Whether China establishes an air defense identification zone over the South China Sea depends “on whether our security in the air and maritime area will be threatened and to what extent,” said Sun, who is deputy chief of the general staff in the People’s Liberation Army.

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Sun declined to directly address a flurry of questions about China’s policy after his speech, citing time constraints. He was mobbed by reporters as he left the ballroom.

Chinese officials attempted to take the moral high ground during the forum, presenting themselves as victims in the South China Sea, pushed and provoked despite attempts to promote stability. A senior Chinese colonel on Saturday accused the Philippines of “bullying” at the Scarborough Shoal in 2012.

“Part of the Chinese message was that whether or not you agree with our policy on our territorial claims, the greater good is for you to engage with us economically to mutual benefit, and let’s not have a difficult conversation,” said Ben Barry, a defense analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

“Behind the polite and restrained message was there any hint of concession?” he said. “No.” ©2015, Bloomberg Reprinted with permission

Wall Street Journal 31 May 2015

China’s Island-Building Poses Dilemma for U.S.

By Andrew Browne, Gordon Lubold and Trefor Moss SINGAPORE—China’s refusal to curtail island-building in the South China Sea has sparked a debate in Washington between those who believe such muscle-flexing shouldn’t go unchecked, and others who fear the wrong response could trigger a military confrontation or a new Cold War. The delicacy of the Obama administration’s position was on display throughout the weekend at the Shangri-La Dialogue, a major security conference where Defense Secretary Ash Carter tried to convince Beijing to stop its building of islets in the disputed Spratly Islands.

U.S. officials say China’s program, which has expanded dramatically in recent months, includes transforming semisubmerged reefs into forward bases with airfields fit for military use—sparking anxiety among China’s neighbors and threatening America’s decadeslong military primacy in East Asia.

Obama administration officials are struggling to find “that right balance” to exert pressure without inflaming the situation “more than it needs to be as we try to pursue our goals and objectives,” a U.S. official said.

“There aren’t any silver bullets to resolving this,” said David Shear, a former U.S. ambassador to Vietnam who is now the assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs.

In Singapore, Mr. Carter insisted the U.S. “will fly, sail,

and operate wherever international law allows,” despite Beijing’s claims that coming too close to the islands would be provocative. He also listed new weapons systems the U.S. plans to move to Asia as part of its longer-term rebalance of military assets to the region, including the newest stealth destroyer, the Zumwalt.

Yet Mr. Carter couched his remarks in language that stressed a common vision of Asian prosperity in which “everyone rises.” By portraying China as disrupting this status quo and defying international norms, he appeared to be carefully laying the groundwork for any future show of force.

China appeared unfazed by Mr. Carter’s remarks and showed little indication of backing down. Zhao Xiaozhou, a Chinese colonel, said Mr. Carter “wasn’t as tough as I expected.”

On Sunday, Adm. Sun Jianguo repeated Beijing’s line that the islands are China’s sovereign territory and would benefit Asia, providing maritime search and rescue, disaster relief, and scientific research bases. “There is no reason for people to play up the issue in the South China Sea,” said Adm. Sun, the deputy chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army’s General Staff. The new islands “do not target any other countries, or affect freedom of navigation.”

That leaves President Barack Obama facing a dilemma.

His signature pivot to Asia early in his first term was meant to reassure allies worried about China’s rise. But an overly aggressive approach now risks antagonizing China and could polarize the world’s most vibrant economic region— a recurring dread of Asian countries that don’t want to have to choose sides.

On the other side, Chinese President Xi Jinping is a strong nationalist who views the expanding islands as symbols of China’s rise and its determination to recover territory lost during a “century of humiliation” at the hands of imperialist powers.

Even within the U.S. military, there isn’t a consensus on how to approach the situation, the U.S. official said.

Some officials inside U.S. Pacific Command see a need to respond to China’s aggression, for example, while others in the Pentagon wonder if responding too muscularly is an overreaction.

“There’s not a monolithic view in the Defense Department,” the official said. “Everyone agrees that what they’re doing is wrong, but it’s a question of what actions do you take to influence that behavior.”

Some analysts have argued for a grand bargain in which the U.S. would concede greater influence to China in its own backyard, possibly involving U.S. troop withdrawals to create neutral buffer zones.

That would effectively mean the end of the post-World War II status quo in which America has served as the predominant power in Asia, ensuring the right of unfettered access to shipping lanes.

Others, including some in Congress, believe the U.S. ultimately will have to demonstrate military resolve, despite the danger of miscalculation on both sides.

Sen. John McCain, (R., Ariz.), who was at the Shangri-La Dialogue with a bipartisan delegation of senators, also urged tougher action. “We need to recognize this reality that China will likely continue with its destabilizing activities unless and until it perceives that the costs of doing so outweigh the benefits,” he said after Mr. Carter’s speech.

“Clearly, it has not yet concluded that.”

In weighing how forcefully to press its case, though, the U.S. is constrained by the fact that China’s island-building doesn’t violate maritime law, and other claimants to the Spratlys, including Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines, have all expanded the geographical features they control, albeit not nearly as dramatically.

Nor has China threatened shipping in the South China Sea, which carries more than half the world’s trade. And although the U.S. accuses China of militarizing the islands, so far it has identified only two light motorized artillery pieces on one of them.

Even after their expansion—in the past 18 months China has added 2,000 or so acres of land—the islands remain mere specks in the ocean and have limited military value.

Situated some 660 miles from the Chinese mainland, they are virtually indefensible.

“It’s not a Cuban missile crisis,” said Euan Graham, the program director for International Security at the Lowy Institute, an Australian think tank.

Still, the islands could be tokens in a much wider struggle likely to play out over decades, as China seeks to break free from a chain of U.S. alliances stretching from Korea to Australia that it believes is throttling its rise.

Washington fears that China plans to set up an airdefense zone over the South China Sea as it has done over the East China Sea, including islands disputed with Japan.

The expanded islets in the Spratly Islands could help enforce that regime.

Mr. Graham says China’s long-term goal is to make the South China Sea safe for its navy, including submarines carrying nuclear ballistic missiles now bottled up in the shallower East China Sea. Ahead of the Shangri-La Dialogue China produced a defense White Paper that outlined its plans to project naval power farther afield.

Pressure for a short-term fix could rise as more Asian nations, alarmed by China’s expansionism, line up behind the U.S. Zhu Feng, a professor at Nanjing University, said he heard “growing flexibility” in China’s language at the Shangri-La Dialogue this year. “They want to de-escalate,” said Mr. Zhu, the director of the China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea. There was also an indication the U.S. might show flexibility in at least one area. Ahead of the meeting, there was

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speculation that the U.S. might withdraw an invitation for China to attend the biannual Rim of the Pacific naval exercises off Hawaii next year.

But Adm. Harry Harris, the new commander of U.S. Pacific Command, who created a stir several weeks ago by labeling China’s new islands a “Great Wall of sand,” said the Chinese were still welcome.

“We’ll see how it goes, but a lot can happen between now and then,” he said. ©2015, Wall Street Journal Reprinted with permission

Financial Times 31 May 2015

Cooler heads are needed in the South China Sea In the past 18 months, China has been enthusiastically dredging sand from the bottom of the South China Sea and building artificial islands in disputed waters. During that period, according to Ashton Carter, US secretary of defence, Beijing has reclaimed more land than all the other claimants put together over the history of the dispute. True, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan have all built islands to bolster their territorial claims. Yet Beijing’s actions dwarf those efforts in both speed and scale.

The exercise is being carried out in a state of secrecy.

No one knows quite what China is up to nor what it hopes to achieve. The lack of transparency is unnerving given China’s territorial ambitions. With little or no basis in international law, it lays claim to virtually all of the South China Sea, asserting ownership of everything within a nine-dash line hugging the coast of the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam. One theory is that Beijing wants to build a runway in order to enforce an air defence identification zone over the entire sea. Beijing should desist from such an unnecessary provocation.

In the run-up to this weekend’s Shangri-La Dialogue, a regional security summit held in Singapore, Washington has begun to push back. This month, it flew a P-8 Poseidon aircraft — with a CNN television crew on board — over one of China’s new islands, eliciting a sharp warning from the Chinese navy. The US says it has detected artillery pieces and has reserved the right to sail warships within 12 miles of the newly created islands. This weekend, Mr Carter made it clear the US would “fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows” and said China’s act of “turning an underwater rock into an airfield” in no way conferred sovereign rights. Chinese Admiral Sun Jianguo responded that Beijing’s actions were “justified, legitimate and reasonable” and were intended to provide “international public services”. His words will bring little comfort to the Asian nations that feel threatened by China’s behaviour.

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In the short term, both China and the US need to ratchet down tensions. All nations, including China, should give thought to Mr Carter’s call for a moratorium on new island construction. The atmosphere would then be more conducive to conclude a code of conduct that could prevent accidents and unnecessary provocations in future. China should also spell out exactly what its nine-dash claim means and explain what it hopes to achieve through island construction. It should reiterate its commitment to freedom of navigation. For its part, the US should stop grandstanding via the television cameras and should think hard before it sails warships past Chinese-built islands. The danger is that Beijing will feel obliged to respond in kind.

In the longer run, there is a more fundamental issue at stake. China’s actions are nothing less than the beginning of a challenge to US dominance in the Pacific. Given its economic might, that is hardly surprising, nor need it be threatening. Most countries in the region want to strike a balance between the ambitions of a rising China and the comfort of US presence. At the moment, the two countries are on a slow, but unmistakable collision course. The trick will be to bind both China and the US into a wider, regional security framework that establishes rules of the road — and of the sea and the air. Such rules will have to have widespread support, including from the two most powerful Pacific powers themselves. The status quo is probably unsustainable. Yet it will not be in the region’s interests simply to replace the Pax Americana with a Pax Sinica. ©2015, Financial Times Reprinted with permission

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 31 May 2015

Auf dem Shangri-la-Dialog zum Konflikt um das Südchinesische Meer steht China isolierter da als je zuvor

By Till Fähnders SINGAPUR, 31. Mai.Asiens wichtigste Sicherheitskonferenz, der Shangri-la-Dialog in Singapur, läuft seit einigen Jahren nach dem gleichen Schema ab: Am Tag nach der Eröffnung hält der amerikanische Verteidigungsminister die erste Rede, in der er Chinas aggressives Verhalten in der Nachbarschaft kritisiert und ein verstärktes Engagement Amerikas in der Region verspricht. In der anschließenden Fragerunde meldet sich dann ein uniformiertes Mitglied der chinesischen Delegation, um die Anschuldigungen zurückzuweisen. Am zweiten Konferenztag ist dann ein Chinese dran, der die Vorwürfe in aller Breite zurückweist und die friedlichen Absichten Chinas betont. Daraufhin

wird er selbst mit bohrenden Fragen der Delegierten überhäuft, die er ausweichend beantwortet.

Die Presse kann dann über diesen “Schlagabtausch” berichten. Andere Teilnehmer, darunter Verteidigungsminister und weitere Repräsentanten aus Südostasien, Ostasien und Ozeanien sowie Europas, tun auf der Veranstaltung ansonsten vor allem ihre Sorgen kund. Am stärksten tat dies nun Malaysias Verteidigungsminister Hishammuddin Hussein. Er warnte, dass das “alte” Problem sich überlappender Gebietsansprüche im Südchinesischen Meer “zu einem der tödlichsten Konflikte unserer Zeit, vielleicht sogar der Geschichte” eskalieren könnte. Der deutsche Europaabgeordnete der Grünen Reinhard Bütikofer nannte den Konflikt “nicht weniger brisant als die Ukraine-Krise”.

In diesem Jahr waren die Erwartungen, dass es zu einer verbalen Konfrontation zwischen den Mächten China und Amerika kommen würde, noch größer als sonst. Daran hatten beide Länder ihren Anteil. China versetzt mit seiner Landgewinnung im Südchinesischen Meer die Nachbarländer seit Monaten in Aufregung. Die Aufschüttung von Inseln dort, wo sich Gebietsansprüche Chinas mit denen Vietnams, der Philippinen, Malaysias, Bruneis und Taiwans überlappen, dienen teilweise eindeutig militärischen Zwecken. Auch auf der Shangri-LaKonferenz wurden keine echten Lösungen gefunden. “Die Ratlosigkeit ist mit Händen zu greifen”, sagte ein ranghoher Teilnehmer.

Selbst die Vereinigten Staaten scheinen in der Sache keinen stringenten Plan zu verfolgen. Um China zu zeigen, dass es nicht einfach Fakten schaffen kann, hatte Washington vor wenigen Tagen ein Aufklärungsflugzeug über die Atolle geschickt und auch ein Fernsehteam des Senders CNN an Bord genommen. Die Journalisten erlebten, wie die Amerikaner von der chinesischen Marine aufgefordert wurden, das umstrittene Gebiet zu verlassen. Das ändert zwar nichts am neuen Status quo, aber mit dem CNN-Bericht war die Bühne bereitet, auf der Verteidigungsminister Ashton Carter am Samstag die Einstellung der Bautätigkeiten fordern konnte, über die Amerika “sehr besorgt” sei.

Der Amerikaner gab damit nicht nur der Sorge seiner Regierung Ausdruck, sondern auch die der meisten anderen auf der Konferenz vertretenden Länder, mit Ausnahme natürlich Chinas. Carter sagte, dass auch andere Länder militärische Außenposten in dem Gebiet errichtet hätten.

Jedoch seien die chinesischen Aktivitäten “beispiellos” in ihrem Ausmaß. Er ließ keinen Zweifel daran, dass Amerika sich nicht abschrecken lassen werde. Aus Sicht Amerikas handelt es sich bei dem Gebiet um die Korallenriffe und Atolle herum klar um internationale Gewässer.

Aus der chinesischen Delegation war es dem bekannten Schema nach an Zhao Xiaozhuo, einem Obersten der Volksbefreiungsarmee, die “harsche Kritik” Carters zurückzuweisen. Chinas Aktivitäten seien “legitim,

angemessen und berechtigt”, sagte Zhao. Am Sonntag wiederholte der chinesische Delegationsleiter und stellvertretende Generalstabschef Sun Jianguo diese Formulierung.

Der Admiral stellte es zudem so dar, als handele es sich bei den Landgewinnungsmaßnahmen um eine harmlose Bautätigkeit, von der alle profitieren würden.

Insgesamt verlief der Schlagabtausch zwischen China und Amerika diesmal weniger heftig als im Jahr davor, als der damalige Verteidigungsminister Chuck Hagel China eine Destabilisierung der Region vorgeworfen hatte. Die Stimmung war konstruktiver, allerdings stand China noch isolierter da als in den vergangenen Jahren. Die von der britischen Denkfabrik IISS in einem Fünfsternehotel des reichen Stadtstaats Singapur veranstaltete Konferenz, an der jedes Jahr Hunderte Verteidigungspolitiker, Fachleute und Vertreter der Rüstungsindustrie teilnehmen, bemüht sich zwar darum, viele asiatische Stimmen zu Wort kommen zu lassen. Aber der Diskurs wird häufig von der westlichen Sicht dominiert.

Neben den Appellen, endlich einen bindenden Kodex zwischen China und den zehn Asean-Staaten (COC) zu vereinbaren, der das Verhalten im Fall von Zwischenfällen in dem Meeresgebiet regelt, gab es weitere Vorschläge, wie mit der Krise im Südchinesischen Meer umzugehen sei: So kündigte Ashton Carter eine neue “Seesicherheits-Initiative für Südostasien” im Umfang von 425 Millionen Dollar an.

Was genau dahintersteckt, blieb indes ebenso undeutlich wie der Vorschlag des japanischen Verteidigungsministers Gen Nakatani einer “Shangri-La-Dialog-Initiative”. Alle diese Ansätze kranken daran, dass China entweder von vorneherein nicht einbezogen wird oder die Teilnahme jederzeit aufkündigen kann.

Einen Lichtblick bildeten die Europäer: Sie waren in Singapur so zahlreich vertreten wie lange nicht mehr. Neben Verteidigungsministerin Ursula von der Leyen sprachen auch die EU-Außenbeauftragte Federica Mogherini und der Verteidigungsminister Großbritanniens. Mit von der Leyen besuchte erstmals seit 2007 wieder ein deutscher Verteidigungsminister die Konferenz. In ihrer von vielen Teilnehmern gelobten Rede stellte von der Leyen die Erfahrungen Europas mit Konfliktlösungen vor. “Zwar sind die sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen in Europa und Asien nicht die gleichen, aber die Muster sind sehr ähnlich”, sagte sie.

Europa habe immer wieder in seine Partnerschaften und Allianzen investiert und die EU-Mitgliedstaaten auch Teile ihrer Souveränität abgegeben, sagte die Ministerin. Sie erinnerte an die deutsche Geschichte seit den Weltkriegen. Von der Leyen machte deutlich, dass auch Deutschland als Handelsnation Interessen im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum verfolgt. Schließlich ginge die Hälfte des gesamten Güterverkehrs, der über See transportiert werde, durch diesen Raum. Wie Ashton Carter sprach auch von der Leyen deshalb von einer

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Sicherheitsarchitektur, die Asien benötige. Sie verwies auf den Staatenbund Asean, mit dem die EU sicherheitspolitisch noch intensiver kooperieren wolle.

Die EU-Außenbeauftragte Federica Mogherini stellte den Plan der EU für eine weitergehende “Partnerschaft mit einer strategischen Absicht” vor. Das europäische Engagement gehe weit über Handel, Investitionen und Entwicklungshilfe hinaus. “Es muss sich auch auf dem Feld der Sicherheitspolitik weiterentwickeln”, sagte Mogherini.

Ihr Plan beinhaltet unter anderem die Erhöhung der finanziellen Unterstützung der EU für Asean. Auch die Europäer brachten zwar kein Rezept zur Lösung des Konflikts mit, sind aber immerhin gewillt, etwas für Frieden und Sicherheit in Asien zu tun. ©2015, Frankfurter Allgemeine Reprinted with permission

Washington Post 1 June 2015

China is not the only country reclaiming land in South China Sea

By Walter Pincus It’s time to get the facts straight on the military activities of all countries in the Spratly Islands before Washington intensifies its confrontation with China over Beijing’s intentions.

The headlines have been about China’s reclamation of some 2,000 acres from the South China Sea over the past 18 months and building military facilities on them.

Less attention has been paid — except by the Chinese — to smaller but similar reclamation and military construction efforts over the years and currently by Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, related to islands they claim in the Spratlys.

Taiwan, for example, has claimed Itu Aba Island since 1955, one of the largest in the Spratlys. It served as a Japanese submarine base during World War II and today tankers carrying most of China’s imported oil pass nearby.

In 2008, Taiwan announced a new 3,900-foot airstrip had been completed on the island that would support search and rescue operations. It also could support military aircraft, as Taiwan’s president proved that year when he landed in a C-130 transport plane.

The island now has a radar station, meteorological center and permanent troop support facilities for a Taiwanese marine unit.

More recently, Taiwan has begun a modest reclamation effort near the airstrip, which may be part of a proposed $100 million port designed to handle frigates and coast guard cutters.

Vietnam also has been expanding its holdings in the Spratlys, which lie just seven miles east of Taiwan’s Itu Aba

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Island and were first occupied in 1975. On Sand Cay and West London Reef, Vietnam has been reclaiming land from the sea to build military facilities but at about one-tenth the size of China’s project.

West London Reef’s eastern sandbank has been expanded by two square miles and work on a harbor facility is underway, according to a study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). On the southern portion a fourth structure is joining three multi-story military facilities. Another is going up in the northern portion.

A surveillance facility sits at the eastern side of Sand Cay with a heliport next to it. The Vietnamese are also constructing a pier and a complex of defense structures, including what may be artillery emplacements bunkers, according to the CSIS .

On the Spratly Island of Zhongye Dao, the Philippine government has had a military airstrip since 1975 known as Ranudo Air Field. The Philippine air force announced in June 2014 that $11 million had been allocated to upgrade the 4,200-foot runway and navy port facilities. Aside from the air field, which has been able to accommodate C-130s since 2002, the island has a military detachment and small civilian population.

Malaysia is also in the Spratly picture. In early 2013, the Chinese held naval exercises near James Shoals, a reef some 50 miles off Malaysia’s Borneo state of Sarawak, which Malaysia claims and is considered part of the Spratlys. In October 2013, Malaysian Defense Minister Hishamuddin Hussein announced his country’s plan to establish a marine corps that would be stationed at a new naval base to be constructed at Bintulu in Sarawak.

On Saturday, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter acknowledged, “It’s true that almost all the nations that claim parts of the South China Sea have developed outposts over the years . . . of differing scope and degree.”

Although Carter described China as “one country [that] has gone much further and much faster than any other,” he added, “We also oppose any further militarization of disputed features.”

Carter meant China and everyone else, but that may prove difficult for the United States to accomplish.

As the defense secretary pointed out, as Asian-Pacific “nations develop, as military spending increases, and as economies thrive — we expect to see changes in how countries define and pursue their interests and ambitions.”

The United States, for example, is increasing its military presence in the area, though its mainland is 7,000 miles away and its closest states, Alaska and Hawaii, are 4,500 and 6,000 miles away respectively.

On Wednesday, Carter pointed out the “tremendous” U.S. forces already in the region: more than 350,000 military and civilian personnel, nearly 2,000 aircraft and 180 naval vessels.

On Saturday, he said, “As the United States develops new systems, [the Defense Department] will continue to bring the best platforms and people forward to the Asia-Pacific.”

Meanwhile, the Chinese in their military white paper released Tuesday took a different view of the U.S. presence and its activities. In the paper, Beijing took aim at “some external countries” — no names mentioned — that “are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs,” along with “a tiny few [who] maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China.”

Should Americans be surprised that China says it is reorienting “from theater defense to trans-theater mobility,” from solely “offshore waters defense” to “open seas protection” and moving from “territorial air defense to both [air force] defense and offense?”

The Defense Department’s report on China’s military, released May 8, calmly says, “China seeks to ensure basic stability along its periphery and avoid direct confrontation with the United States in order to focus on domestic development and smooth China’s rise.”

If true, it appears that Carter will prove correct when he said Wednesday in Hawaii: “We will remain the principal security power in the Asia-Pacific for decades to come.” ©2015, Washington Post Reprinted with permission

Xinhua 1 June 2015

Experts believe Shangri-La Dialogue major platform for cooperation in Asia-Pacific SINGAPORE, May 31 (Xinhua) -- Although one of the main topics has been the South China Sea issue at the Shangri-La Dialogue, experts and officials have agreed that the security forum is still an important platform to promote collaboration and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

China’s Defense Ministry spokesperson Yang Yujun said the Shangri-La Dialogue, which concluded on Sunday, offered multilateral channels for governments and scholars to exchange views, while military officials and delegates could also use this platform to conduct communications to enhance mutual trust.

“It is good for better collaboration and regional security,” he said.

During the three-day event, Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of the General Staff of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), met separately with military officials and delegates from 13 countries, and exchanged views on issues such as regional security and bilateral military ties.

Organized by London-base International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Shangri-La Dialogue brought together

defense ministers, senior officials and security experts to exchange views on key issues that shape the defense and security landscape of the region.

The annual security summit has been widely recognized as Asia- Pacific’s foremost defense and security platform.

Just days before the forum, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter set a strong tone by claiming that China was “out of step” with both international rules and norms that underscore the Asia- Pacific’s security architecture.

However, in his speech on Saturday, the U.S. defense chief spent most of the time talking about the importance of regional cooperation and also vowed to build better habits of U.S.-China military-to-military cooperation, which “not only benefits both countries but the whole region as well.”

Sun, who delivered his speech on Sunday, also emphasized that China was committed to promoting win-win cooperation and a new model of international relations that meets the security and development needs of all countries.

“Confrontation must be replaced with cooperation and zero-sum game with mutual benefits if the purposes and principles of the UN Charter are to be carried forward.

And this is also the way to achieve peaceful development,” he said.

Tseng Hui-Yi, a research associate in East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore, told Xinhua that communication played an utmost role in maintaining regional security. Despite the existence of differences, it was necessary to keep the doors open, and the Shangri-La Dialogue was the platform to relieve pressure.

“No matter how fierce the conversation is, it is at least a form of communication,” she said.

Oh Ei Sun, a senior fellow with S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies of Singapore Nanyang Technological University, believed China’s participation in the dialogue helped other countries better understand its position.

“China’s continuous participation in the dialogue for many years would indeed, for example, clarify some misunderstanding in the international community against China, as well as deepen China ‘s understanding of what the wider international community is thinking in terms of defense, collective security and so on.”

He said China should continue to join the Shangri-La Dialogue as it will make a very constructive voice about how China views the regional security architecture.

Oh also pointed out that the overdue spotlight shed on the South China Sea disputes has led to the neglect of other issues that deserve equal attention, including anti-terrorism and humanitarian aid. Although these topics were brought up at this meeting, they were not fully discussed.

“The Shangri-La Dialogue shouldn’t just focus on a single regional issue that is currently still under control,” he said.

Echoing Oh, Jin Yinan, a military strategist at the National Defense University of the PLA, also expressed his

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concern. “There’ s a trend that delegates and the media are opt to intensify contradiction,” he said, adding that the dialogue should not be a breeding bed for stirring up conflicts, but a place to solve problems. ©2015, Xinhua Reprinted with permission

TIME 1 June 2015

The Next Step Toward Possible Conflict in the South China Sea

By Mark Thompson U.S. warships likely to challenge expanded Chinese sovereignty When discussing the growing conflict over China’s dredging new islands to extend its sovereignty 1,000 miles into the resource-rich South China Sea, one phrase frequently pops up from U.S. military officers past and present.

“China,” they say, “doesn’t do off-ramps well.” What they mean is that once Beijing has decided on a course of action, it is rarely deterred from pursuing it. Given that—and the U.S. declaration that it will not allow China’s sand grab to stand—what’s next?

The chance of shots being fired now stand at better than 50-50, says Bernard Cole, a retired Navy captain and China expert. But he believes any initial volley would more likely come from the Philippines or Vietnam, who also dispute China’s expanding territorial claims, than Beijing or Washington.

“I see no flexibility in China’s position at all,” says Cole, now a professor at the Pentagon’s National War College in Washington, D.C. “I think China’s plan is just to have a fait accompli, gambling on where the U.S. threshold for reaction is.”

Defense Secretary Ashton Carter has made clear in recent days that the U.S. won’t back down, either. “There should be no mistake: the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as U.S. forces do all over the world,” Carter said Saturday at the Shangri-La defense conference in Singapore. “After all, turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international air or maritime transit.”

If the Chinese don’t halt their island-building efforts in the Spratly Islands, new U.S. military hardware will soon be showing up in the region to help them reconsider, Carter warned. He rattled off an incoming roster of weapons, including “the latest Virginia-class submarines, the Navy’s P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft, the newest stealth destroyer, the Zumwalt, and brand-new carrier-based E-2D Hawkeye early-warning-and-control aircraft.”

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China didn’t seem to get the hint. “China and the Chinese military have never feared the devil or an evil force,” Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army, said at the same gathering Sunday, a day after Carter spoke. “Don’t ever expect us to surrender to devious heresies or a mighty power.”

Basically, the two sides spoke past one another at the weekend confab. “China is unlikely to stop its reclamation in the Spratlys,” William Choong, an Asian expert at the session, wrote afterwards. “In fact, the reclamation will continue.”

President Obama on Monday repeated his call for China to halt its island building. “We think that land reclamation, aggressive actions by any party in that area are counterproductive,” he said. “It may be that some of [China’s] claims are legitimate, but they shouldn’t just try to establish that based on throwing elbows and pushing people out of the way.”

U.S. officials say the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea bars what China is doing. “Artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands,” the treaty says. “They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf.”

U.S. naval experts say that if the U.S. is going to back it words with actions, the U.S. Navy soon will have to send warships near the growing Chinese-claimed islands to show its territorial claims are worthless. U.S. Navy officials have said planning for such deployments is in the works.

But the South China Sea has a reputation as a ships’ graveyard. It’s shallow enough to sink them, as well as to enable dredging gear to expand existing islands. That limits the U.S. Navy to dispatching one of its new lightlyarmed Littoral Combat Ships, or a flat-bottomed Marine amphibious ship, to poke around China’s islands, says retired Navy captain Jerry Hendrix, who spent much of his career in the Pacific.

The USS Fort Worth, a 4,000-ton, 387-foot LCS, recently sailed near the Spratlys, where Chinese vessels kept a close eye on her. “Routine operations like the one Fort Worth just completed in the South China Sea will be the new normal as we welcome four LCSs to the region in the coming years,” Captain Fred Kacher, commodore, Destroyer Squadron 7, said May 12 after the Fort Worth returned to the Philippines.

A bigger San Antonio or Whidbey Island-class amphibious warship would show the U.S. is serious, says Hendrix, now at the Center for a New American Security. “They’re large vessels with a very shallow draft,” he says, “and they also come with Marines.”

Hendrix believes the Chinese are trying to take advantage of a sense of U.S. wariness of overseas action. Chinese President “Xi Jinping has perceived the U.S. administration to have rolled over on Cuba, on the Iran nuclear deal,

on Russia in the Crimea and Ukraine,” he says. The U.S. refusal to budge in the South China Sea may also offend some Chinese sensibilities. “There may be a perception, at least among their military, that there may be a cultural bias here: ‘Wait a minute, you’ll deal with the Persians, with the Latins, and with the Slavs, but you won’t deal with us?’

That could be another source of friction.”

Cole says he’d bet on an LCS deployment. “But if I were still a Navy planner, I wouldn’t send an LCS in there by itself,” he adds. “The LCS almost can’t defend itself. I’d have a couple of DDGs [destroyers] or some airplanes just over the horizon.” Cole doubts either China or the U.S. would fire a first shot. “But suppose the Philippines manages to get one of those two old Coast Guard cutters underway that we gave them and it ends up getting sunk by the Chinese?” he frets. “We have a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of the Philippines that very clearly includes Philippine warships.” ©2015, Time Reprinted with permission

Sydney Morning Herald 1 June 2015

South China Sea dispute: Strong indication Australia will join push back on China’s island-building

By David Wroe and Philip Wen Defence Minister Kevin Andrews has issued the Abbott government’s strongest signal yet that Australia is prepared to join the United States and other countries in pushing back against China’s island-building and militarisation in the South China Sea. Further hardening Australia’s stance, Mr Andrews has used a speech at a key Asian security conference to state unequivocal opposition to large-scale land reclamation – a clear dig at China’s island-building and positioning of military hardware on the disputed Spratly Islands chain.

His remarks to the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore, which was attended by top Asia-Pacific defence officials including from China, closely echo those of US counterpart Ashton Carter, as worried countries across the region present an increasingly united front against Beijing’s assertiveness.

Mr Andrews issued a thinly veiled warning that other countries in the region will respond if Beijing persists, saying that actions in international security tend to produce “a corresponding counter-reaction”.

“As with Newton’s principles, aspects of international security are often characterised by an action and a corresponding counter-reaction,” he said. “In making decisions, countries and leaders should always be wary of the conse-

quences, intended or otherwise, of a particular course of action and the potential for these actions to lead to escalation and miscalculation.”

Mr Andrews added that Australia had a “legitimate interest in the maintenance of peace and stability ... unimpeded trade and freedom of navigation” – a possible signal that the Abbott government could, as Fairfax Media reported last week, take part in joint military exercises close to the Spratly Islands as a show of defiance against China’s claims.

Separately, Mr Andrews told the Wall Street Journal that Australia asserted its right to continue flying military patrols over the contested area – a rejection of any attempt

by China to declare an air defence identification zone – but said there had been no formal talks with the US about naval freedom-of-navigation exercises.

High among the region’s concerns are that China will follow its precedent in its dispute with Japan in the East China Sea and declare an air defence identification zone over the waters further south.

Such a move “depends on whether our security in air and maritime will be threatened and extensive factors will be taken into consideration”, Admiral Sun Jianguo, a deputy chief of staff of China’s People’s Liberation Army, said, in an address which rejected criticisms, including from the US, that China’s actions were “out of step” with international norms.

He said the construction was “justified, legitimate and reasonable”, and that the projects are for the purpose of providing “international public services” including maritime search and rescue, research and environmental protection.

Fairfax Media has reported that China has been shifting weapons onto artificial islands that it has built up from previously submerged atolls among the Spratly Islands.

Pentagon officials confirmed it had been aware of two motorised artillery guns, which it believed have since been removed.

Dr Carter, the US Defence Secretary, called for an “immediate and lasting halt” to the Chinese expansion and vowed that the US would defy any attempt by Beijing to impede freedom of navigation in the area.

“Turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international air or maritime transit,” he said.

China is locked in territorial disputes in the South China Sea with several neighbours including the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia.

There are particular fears that as well as using the military build-up to enforce its territorial claims, China could also threaten freedom of navigation through some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, which Australia relies upon heavily for its international trade.

In the past, Australian ministers have stressed Australia does not take sides in these competing claims, but Mr Andrews pointedly struck a tougher pose on Sunday.

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“Australia has made clear its opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions to change the status quo in the South and East China Sea,” Mr Andrews said.

“This includes any large-scale land reclamation activity by claimants in the South China Sea. “We are particularly concerned at the prospect of militarisation of artificial structures.”

Mr Andrews cloaked his language by avoiding mentioning China directly, rather calling on “all parties” to stop large-scale reclamation and “refrain from provocative actions”.

But while other countries have for decades carried out some building on islands in the South China Sea, China has done more in the past 18 months than all other countries combined throughout history. ©2015, Sydney Morning Herald Reprinted with permission

Asahi Shimbun 2 June 2015

China must immediately stop land reclamation in South China Sea A senior Chinese military officer has offered some insight into what China is trying to achieve in land reclamation work on reefs in the contested Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. At a security summit held in Singapore, Chinese Adm. Sun Jianguo stated on May 31 that Beijing has military objectives in mind.

The admiral, who is deputy chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army, told the annual meeting known as the Shangri-La Dialogue that the undertaking is partly aimed at meeting the country’s “necessary defense needs.” He also indicated that an airstrip being built on one of the reefs will be used for both military and civilian purposes.

His remarks are totally unacceptable. The reefs in this area are claimed by several neighboring countries in territorial disputes. China’s attempt to unilaterally create a fait accompli by force clearly violates international rules. China should stop the reclamation work immediately.

On Fiery Cross Reef, a runway is emerging on land reclaimed by China. It is becoming the largest patch of ground in the Spratly Islands, a group of hundreds of reefs, islets and atolls in waters close to vital shipping lanes.

China may establish an air defense identification zone over the land it is reclaiming.

A defense white paper released by the Chinese government on May 26 declared a shift in the focus of its defense strategy toward naval operations, promising to put higher priority on the navy than on the army. Sun’s remarks reflect this strategic shift.

In expanding its presence in the South China Sea, China

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is apparently trying to acquire military capabilities to control important shipping lanes as well as seeking to secure fisheries and seabed resources.

Sun also cited “maritime scientific research” and “environmental protection” as objectives for reclamation work.

But reclamation amounts to nothing less than destruction of the environment.

Beijing seems to be confident that its behavior will not lead to sanctions by other countries, despite the international criticism. But this is the arrogance of a major power.

China has defended its actions in the South China Sea by saying they are within its sovereignty. This argument is based on China’s claim that history warrants its sovereignty over the vast expanses of the resource-rich and strategically important South China Sea within the “ninedashed line,” or a U-shaped demarcation line used by the Chinese government for its territorial claims of most of the South China Sea. In maps used in China, the line is drawn as if it constituted part of the country’s national borders. But the line is not based on any solid legal grounds in terms of international law.

The Chinese administration of President Xi Jinping has pledged to pursue diplomatic relations with neighboring countries based on the principles of “sincerity” and “mutual benefits.”

Beijing has reached a series of agreements with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on peaceful solutions to territorial disputes in the South China Sea. China should realize that its strong-arm actions with regard to these issues are undermining the trust of its neighbors.

It is also worrisome that a number of Southeast Asian countries are expanding and enhancing their naval power in response to China’s actions.

The Philippines is reinforcing its military bases on islands under its effective control, while Vietnam is reportedly reclaiming land on reefs.

U.S. military operations aimed at keeping China land reclamation work in check could also further exacerbate tensions in the area.

Taiwan, which maintains effective control over one island, recently proposed that all the claimants agree to shelve the territorial disputes and work together to develop resources.

Taiwan’s proposal is worth serious consideration, even though Taipei cannot take part in international talks over such issues because of its relationship with China.

Serious international efforts to restore peace and calm in the South China Sea are needed immediately. Otherwise, the situation will continue to deteriorate rapidly. ©2015, Asahi Shimbun Reprinted with permission

South China Morning Post

The Straits Times

2 June 2015

3 June 2015

Cool heads can calm sea dispute

The mother of all security dialogues still going strong

The heated rhetoric Beijing and Washington exchanged on the South China Sea in the lead-up to the region’s premier security summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue, gave the impression that matters would come to a head at the annual forum. But the tone was markedly milder when People’s Liberation Army deputy chief of General Staff Admiral Sun Jianguo and US Defence Secretary Ash Carter spoke at the three-day event in Singapore that ended on Sunday.

Although both called for calm and a desire for peace, the delegates went home with tensions remaining high and the possibility of a mishap in the contested waters as real.

Cooler heads are needed to lower the risks and that is best done through dialogue and negotiations.

Positions were reiterated, with Carter painting China as a troublemaker for its land reclamation, while Sun emphasised sovereignty and the risks posed by American actions, which include strengthening military alliances with Chinese neighbours and a threatened deployment of military vessels. The commander of the US Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris, set the scene in Australia days earlier by referring to the turning of reefs into artificial islands as creating a “great wall of sand”. But China, as Carter acknowledged, is not alone, with Vietnam and the Philippines long ago starting such work. With an American spy plane overflying the area on May 20, it is unsurprising that Beijing’s latest defence white paper criticised Washington for “meddling”.

The South China Sea has become a friction point in the relationship, but both sides know of the dangers of escalating tensions. Toned-down words in Singapore reflected that; with important meetings coming up, ties have to be kept in check. The annual US-China strategic and economic dialogue will be held in Washington this month and President Xi Jinping makes an official visit in September.

Both sides also have much to cooperate on, North Korea among them. China has to work with neighbours on a code of conduct. The US, with trade and investment interests, has to act constructively and responsibly. ©2015, South China Morning Post Reprinted with permission

By William Choong WITH China’s controversial reclamation in the South China Sea, many participants had expected this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue to be a boxing ring, a reprise of last year, when China and the United States duelled sharply in the open.

In the end, both sides seemed to be part of a diplomatic gavotte. While they raised stern questions, the delivery was more deliberate and moderate. US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter called on China to stop its reclamation in the Spratlys. Even when a Chinese colonel sought to taunt him by saying China’s reclamation was “legitimate, reasonable and justified”, Dr Carter remained unflappable. The US position, he stressed, was that all claimants - including China - should halt reclamation, not militarise features in the South China Sea further, and pursue peaceful resolution.

His call for all Asian countries “to rise, prosper and determine their own destiny” sounded bizarrely familiar to the entreaties by Admiral Sun Jianguo, the head of the Chinese delegation, who called for “win-win” situations and cooperative security.

Staying true to the traditions of the Dialogue, whereby countries proposed new initiatives, Dr Carter said the Pentagon will spend US$425 million (S$576 million) to help regional countries boost their maritime security capacity.

Similarly, Japanese Defence Minister Gen Nakatani proposed the Shangri-La Dialogue Initiative, which seeks to promote common rules and laws at sea and in the air, increase the use of surveillance in the two domains, and build on the region’s disaster response mechanisms. While the details are sketchy, they would if realised tamp down dynamics that lead to tensions or even conflict.

At the very least, this year’s Dialogue has highlighted the very limits of what can be done about China’s reclamation in the South China Sea. With innovations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative, China has become adept at offering economic carrots to dampen perceptions of assertive Chinese power.

The most worrying aspect of China’s participation at the Dialogue this year was Admiral Sun’s dogged refusal to directly address the barrage of questions put to him, most of them about the South China Sea. Looking visibly irritated, the admiral said he could only address them “briefly”, that the answers were already in his speech, and added - quite bizarrely - that there are more “serious security issues than the South China Sea”.

To its credit, China did send a strong delegation this year,

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and Admiral Sun is more senior in rank than Lt-General Wang Guanzhong, who attended the Dialogue last year.

Members of the Chinese delegation told Ms Bonnie Glaser, a China expert at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, that Admiral Sun was uncomfortable with answering questions directly, and held out hope that he would be more relaxed at doing so next year.

That said, there could be a longer-term strategy behind China’s participation at the Dialogue. It is an open secret that China has always felt that the Dialogue was a forum set up to criticise China’s defence policies.

That is simply untrue. Rather, the central idea of the Dialogue is that it facilitates a candid exchange of views that leads to recognition of, if not the resolution of, the region’s pressing problems. By virtue of its sheer weight, Beijing just happens to be a magnet for probing questions.

What is true is that China’s Xiangshan Forum and other defence forums such as the Jakarta International Defence Dialogue (JIDD) and Seoul Defence Dialogue could pose challenges to the Shangri-La Dialogue in the longer term.

The Shangri-La Dialogue is, and will remain for a long time, the mother of all dialogues. As former US defence secretary Robert Gates has said, the Dialogue is a “forum without peer”. The JIDD is a relative newcomer in the game. The Seoul Defence Dialogue invites vice defence ministers, and is largely focused on the Korean Peninsula (one policy wonk calls it the “little brother” to the Shangri-La Dialogue).

The Xiangshan Forum has potential. Last year, China upgraded it from a Track 2 (unofficial and largely academic) status to a Track 1.5 mode (participation of officials and experts).

China does have gravitational pull. Still, only six ministers of defence attended the Xiangshan Forum last year, including those from Singapore, Malaysia, the Maldives and Tajikistan. Compare this to 18 full ministers who were at the Dialogue this year.

That said, a defence forum with Chinese characteristics - where China insists on talking on matters it prefers to talk about, and not address the hard, controversial issues - might be less than desirable for regional security.

One Indian analyst tweeted cynically during the Dialogue that China’s “win-win” describes “circumstances in which China wins, and everybody else lets it win”.

To take an opposite tack to the overused Churchillian quote, too much jaw-jaw without recourse to action might actually lead to war-war. So yes, the Xiangshan Forum is a welcome complement to the Shangri-La Dialogue. But for it to attain the level of robust exchanges and action that has been a signature of the Dialogue since its inception will be a long time coming. ©2015, The Straits Times Reprinted with permission

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China Daily 3 June 2015

US should fight IS, not stir up maritime disputes

By Wang Hui This year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, held in Singapore over the weekend, was overshadowed by disputes in and differences over the South China Sea. Such a deviation from major security issues cannot possibly make the region’s countries work together to tackle security threats and risks.

US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter used much of his keynote speech on Saturday to lash out at China over the South China Sea issue. Carter said the United States was deeply concerned about the scale and speed of China’s reclamation work on some islands and islets, and insisted that US forces would continue to “fly, sail and operate” in the region to ensure the freedom of navigation and overflights permitted by law.

Carter’s remarks are the latest US attempt to put more pressure on China over the reclamation work on Nansha Islands. Differences over reclamations started before the security forum was held. The US and the Philippines have been leading a chorus of criticisms against China’s legitimate activities, raising time and again the temperature of the waters in the South China Sea. In response, Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army who addressed the forum a day after Carter, explained China’s stance on island rebuilding. He said China’s construction in the South China Sea is mainly to improve the functions of the relevant islands and reefs and the working and living conditions of the personnel stationed there.

Sun emphasized that the projects are designed in ways to help China better perform its international responsibilities and obligations in maritime search and rescue operations, disaster prevention and relief, marine research, meteorological studies, environmental protection, navigation safety and fishery production.

China, Sun said, has built an ocean survey station for the United Nations on Yongshu Jiao reef, and started building two multi-functional lighthouses on the Huayang Jiao and Chigua Jiao reefs to provide international public services.

His explanation should help dispel unnecessary concerns of the international community. As a big country which relies on the South China Sea as an important transport channel, China concerns about the safety and navigability of its waters more than any other country.

China’s reclamation work does not affect the freedom of navigation and overflight in anyway. And the US just

wants to use freedom of navigation as a pretext to interfere in the South China Sea issue.

In recent years, the US has hyped China’s maritime disputes with some Southeast Asian countries at regional forums such as the Shangri-La Dialogue and East Asia Summit.

The US meddling has only further complicated the issue and sowed seeds of discord in the region.

Washington’s assertion that it will continue to send military ships and planes to patrol the waters near the areas where Beijing is carrying out building activities could lead to strategic misjudgements and thus make the waters less secure.

As a country which claims to have a stake in world peace and stability, the US could do better to contribute to regional and world peace and security, instead of carping over the South China Sea issue. For instance, it should make more efforts to protect the world from its biggest threat today the Islamic State, which has been wreaking havoc in the Middle East.

At the Shangri-La forum, the region’s countries vowed to strengthen collaboration insecurity, especially in fight against terrorism. In his keynote speech at the forum on Friday, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said the IS could pose a serious threat to whole of Southeast Asia, because more than 500 Indonesians and dozens of Malaysians had joined the terror group.

Since the IS group has already conquered large swathes of land in Iraq and Syria, isn’t it time the world’s sole superpower shouldered its due international responsibilities? ©2015, China Daily Reprinted with permission

The Economist 6 June 2015

Whose splendid isolation?

THE Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual powwow in Singapore for Asia-Pacific defence chiefs, has begun to follow a pattern: America and its friends in Asia line up to criticise China for its alleged transgressions in the seas around its coast; China issues fierce, mendacious and unconvincing rebuttals; everybody goes home. Last year, China’s crimes were its declaration of an Air-Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over an area including islands it disputes with Japan; and its dispatch of an oil-rig to drill in waters claimed by Vietnam. The row was vitriolic. This year, it has been building frantically in contested waters in the South China Sea. At Shangri-La, both the criticism and its response were more measured. But the disagreements seem even more profound and irreconcilable than a year ago, and China even more isolated.

Five of the six countries with claims to all or some of the reefs and islets in the South China Sea have built structures

on them, often after reclaiming land. China, however, has taken this to unprecedented lengths. In his speech at the Dialogue, America’s defence secretary, Ash Carter, said China had filled in over 2,000 acres (810 hectares), “more than all other claimants combined…and more than in the entire history of the region”; and all in the past 18 months.

He called this a “source of tension”.

China argues that the sea is peaceful and stable—far from the kind of security threat the Dialogue should have been discussing. It insists its sovereignty is “indisputable”, and that its building work is for the international common good: search and rescue; disaster; meteorology; conservation; and so on. But American officials believe otherwise.

They say satellite pictures show that China brought two mobile-artillery vehicles to one of its man-made islands (though the weapons since seem to have been removed).

It has also added harbours and, on one or two islands, airstrips. This has enhanced their military potential and, China presumably hopes, created evidence of its control and sovereignty. Mr Carter warned against “further militarisation” of the sea.

America takes no position on the sovereignty disputes, of which those with Vietnam and the Philippines are the most active. But like many other countries it is worried about “freedom of navigation”: a huge chunk of global trade traverses the sea. To show the threat that this freedom is under, an American surveillance plane in late May flew close to the expanding islands, with a television-news crew on board. The Chinese navy told it repeatedly to go away.

China’s neighbours worry that eventually it will declare an ADIZ over these waters too.

Around the world, American forces sail and fly through areas of tension to prove that they have the freedom to do so. But such behaviour in the South China Sea infuriates China, which claims that freedom of navigation is not under threat. It has always objected to America’s insistence that one such freedom is the right to send surveillance planes and ships up to the edge of China’s territorial waters. This disagreement has led to incidents such as one in 2001 when a Chinese jet collided with an American spy-plane; and another in 2009 when America complained about Chinese “harassment” of one of its surveillance ships.

Another potentially alarming confrontation looms. Mr Carter demanded an “immediate and lasting halt” to the land reclamation by China and other claimants. China shows no sign of stopping, and it seems inconceivable that America would resort to force. But it is under pressure to go further in asserting its right to use the contested waters and airspace. Also at the Dialogue was a delegation of senators led by John McCain, who is chairman of the Senate’s Armed Services Committee. Mr McCain said he hoped America would disregard any “territorial waters” China may claim around the man-made islands.

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This is a complicated issue. China’s claims are unclear.

Its maps show a “nine-dash line” encompassing most of the sea. But under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), sovereignty depends on the land. Countries can claim 12 nautical miles (22km) of territorial sea and 200 nautical miles of “exclusive economic zone” (EEZ) off the coast of their mainlands and habitable islands. Uninhabitable “rocks” get the territorial waters but no EEZ; rocks that are submerged at high tide have no waters at all. The status of the places where China is building is uncertain. It is clear that, pre-construction, they were not “islands”; but some may be rocks with territorial waters; some “low-tide elevations” with none. Only “natural” features count, however, and America does not want to give the impression a low-tide elevation can become a rock, or a rock an island, thanks to construction. Despite never having ratified it, America does adhere to UNCLOS. And though it is not clear who does own these rocks and reefs (America, as one naval officer jokes, is “pretty sure they’re not ours”), the United States takes a keen interest in whether territorial lines have a basis in international law.

Don’t be troublesome, please The impression the Dialogue gave was of a world united in outrage at China’s bullying in the South China Sea. But if America goads it with intensive surveillance around its maritime claims, China may succeed in portraying the United States as the troublemaker. Moreover, China knows America itself does not want to ruin what both countries regard as a crucial relationship just to make a point about island-building. The two countries have their annual highlevel get-together, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, in Washington, DC, at the end of June; and China’s president, Xi Jinping, is due for a state visit in September. Preparations for both events are on track, despite the bickering.

As for the complaints it endures at the Shangri-La Dialogue, China may simply respond by stepping up efforts to develop its own, friendlier, alternative: an annual meeting in Beijing called the Xiangshan Forum, “Asia’s own platform for security dialogue”. Interfering American officials are not invited.

IISS Voices 09 June 2015

It’s Time to ‘Get the Gloves Back On’

By Colonel Lu Yin, Associate Researcher, Institute of Strategic Studies, National Defense University, China The 14-year-old Shangri-La Dialogue again proved itself to be a high-end multilateral security dialogue platform, as shown by the impressive attendance of 493 delegates from 38 countries, as well as the presence of international organisations and the involvement of nearly 5,000 people.

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The Shangri-La Dialogue began in the year 2002, coinciding with the rise of multilateral engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. After the Second World War, the continued existence of hostility and the lack of mutual trust made it difficult for the region to establish multilateral dialogue mechanisms. But after the Cold War – and with the progress of economic globalisation and regional integration – diversified, complicated and transnational security threats appeared. The existing bilateral military alliances in the region, which were exclusive in nature, were not able to cope with those emerging threats. Multinational coordination and cooperation became a necessity and multilateral security dialogue and cooperation mechanisms were called for.

The establishment in this period of the Shangri-La Dialogue served as a timely means of catering to such needs.

Singapore was chosen to be the venue of the Dialogue – a ‘bridge’ between the East and West, as many people saw it, and a politically and geographically convenient location for the gathering.

Certainly, Dr John Chipman had reason to declare proudly in his opening remarks at the fourteenth Dialogue: ‘The annual IISS Shangri-La Dialogue provides a unique opportunity to take the temperature of Asia-Pacific security.’ Senior defence and military officials/officers, as well as academics, view the Dialogue as an important venue for security dialogue and interactions, both multilateral and bilateral. Different viewpoints converge and even clash here, and contentious issues often become the focal point of attention. The candid exchange of ideas that reflect current major security concepts and concerns in the Asia-Pacific region, as expressed by high-ranking officials and officers at the Dialogue, has become one of the distinctive features of the conference.

Since 2007, China has been sending high-level delegations to the Dialogue, and this year it sent its largest ever.

The Chinese delegation, as always, attended the Dialogue to listen, speak and interact, with the intent of enhancing mutual understanding and promoting security cooperation. However, a handful of countries or people who are suspicious of China’s strategic intentions tend to take advantage of the Dialogue to present a negative image of the country.

The tension that was manifest during the thirteenth Dialogue last year was a case in point. Nigel Inkster figuratively and correctly used the phrase ‘the gloves come off’ to describe that situation. But people were relieved to see that the fourteenth Dialogue this year did not again become a ‘war of words’ (to use William Choong’s expression).

Though there were still some heated debates, on issues such as the South China Sea, one could notice the efforts of many sides to reduce tension and avoid confrontation.

Mr. Lee Hsien Loong, prime minister of Singapore, said in his thought-provoking keynote speechthat all Asian

countries hope that US–China relations will be positive and no country wants to choose sides between the United States and China. He also emphasised that in the broader region, ASEAN has taken the lead in progressively building a framework of cooperation, engaging South and East Asia, Australia and New Zealand, and the wider Asia-Pacific.

US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said in his speech that ‘we must be better connected’ – cautious phrasing compared to the harsh pronouncements he has made at some previous public occasions. ‘We can accomplish this by working together, communicating better, and developing habits of cooperation,’ he continued.

Admiral Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief of General Staff of China’s People’s Liberation Army, talkedabout China’s adherence to the path of peaceful development and the efforts of the Chinese military to strengthen Asia-Pacific security cooperation and shoulder more international obligations and responsibilities. He emphasised that China’s position of seeking a peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue and negotiation, as well as its objective of maintaining peace and stability, remained unchanged.

He also stated at the end of his speech that ‘We hope that all countries in the world will, in the spirit of win-win and all-win cooperation, strengthen communication and consultation, and make concerted efforts to safeguard peace and stability.’

It is now commonly accepted in the Asia-Pacific region that security dialogue platforms should not be merely talking shops but should also make substantive contributions to peace and stability. The Shangri-La Dialogue, which is also referred to as the ‘Asian Security Summit’, reflects this desire in its own way. The Dialogue needs to fit into the larger picture of peace and development, which constitutes the main theme of the current world, and that of prosperity and stability, which is the common aspiration of all countries. During the Dialogue, one should always strike a balance between allowing different voices to be heard and preventing this from escalating into confrontation. And – in the face of the variety of security threats present in the Asia-Pacific – the emphasis should be on finding solutions through cooperation, rather than focusing on differences and disputes that ultimately serve nobody’s interests. The Dialogue needs to be fair, objective and constructive, in terms of identifying security challenges and seeking solutions.

While the Shangri-La Dialogue is able to ‘take the temperature of Asia-Pacific security’, it is also expected to provide some effective ‘prescriptions’ for the resolution of security problems. It really is time to always ‘keep the gloves on’ during the Dialogue as well as in the real world, for the better future our global community of shared destiny.

Selected press coverage

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appendix II

Selected IISS publications

The Adelphi series is the Institute’s principal contribution to policy-relevant, original academic research. Books published since 2008 include: Parello-Plesner, Jonas and Duchâtel, Mathieu, China’s: Strong Arm: Protecting Citizens and Assets Abroad. Adelphi 451: Routledge for the IISS, 2015.

Lewis, Jeffrey, Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture. Adelphi 446: Routledge for the IISS, 2014.

Friedberg, Aaron L., Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The debate over US Military Strategy in Asia. Adelphi 444. Routledge for the IISS, 2014.

Barthwal-Datta, Monika, Food Security in Asia: Challenges, Policies and Implications. Adelphi 441–442. Routledge for the IISS, 2014.

Hokayem, Emile, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant. Adelphi 438. Routledge for the IISS, 2013.

Le Mière, Christian and Raine, Sarah, Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes. Adelphi 436–437. Routledge for the IISS, 2013.

Dodge, Toby, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism. Adelphi 434–435. Routledge for the IISS, 2012.

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Till, Geoffrey, Asia’s naval expansion: An arms race in the making?.

Adelphi 432–433. Routledge for the IISS, 2012.

D. Pollack, Jonathan, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security. Adelphi 418–419. Routledge for the IISS, 2011.

Holslag, Jonathan, Trapped Giant: China’s Military Rise. Adelphi 416. Routledge for the IISS, 2011.

Taylor, Brendan, Sanctions as Grand Strategy. Adelphi 411.

Routledge for the IISS, 2010.

Cortright, David and Väyrynen, Raimo, Towards Nuclear Zero.

Adelphi 410. Routledge for the IISS, 2010.

Bisley, Nick, Building Asia’s Security. Adelphi 408. Routledge for the IISS, 2009.

Raine, Sarah, China’s African Challenges. Adelphi 404–5.

Routledge for the IISS, 2009.

Hughes, Christopher W., Japan’s Remilitarisation. Adelphi 403.

Routledge for the IISS, 2009.

Perkovich, George and Acton, James M., Abolishing Nuclear Weapons. Adelphi 396. Routledge for the IISS, 2008.

The IISS Strategic Dossier series harnesses the Institute’s technical expertise to present detailed information on key strategic issues. Recent publications include: Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2015: Key developments and trends. IISS, 2015.

Regional Security Assessment 2014: Key developments and trends in Asia-Pacific security. IISS, 2014.

North Korean Security Challenges: A net assessment. IISS, 2011.

The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of ‘Raúl Reyes’. IISS, 2011.

Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities: A net assessment. IISS, 2011.

Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A net assessment. IISS, 2010.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia.

IISS, 2009.

Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the shadow of Iran. IISS, 2008.

European Military Capabilities: Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations. IISS, 2008.

Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks: A net assessment. IISS, 2007.

Strategic Comments is the Institute’s online source of analysis of international security and politicomilitary issues. Articles focused on South, Southeast and Northeast Asia published between March 2014 and June 2015 include: ‘India–US relations acquire new momentum’. Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 12, May 2015.

‘Vietnam: maritime spat stirs domestic dissent’.

Comments, vol. 20, no. 24, August 2014.

Strategic

‘North Korean lessons for an Iranian nuclear accord’. Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 18, May 2014.

‘Philippines–China dispute: a sign of regional shifts’. Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 17, May 2014.

‘Challenges for India’s new naval chief’. Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 16, May 2014.

‘Pacific Alliance trade bloc eyes global role’. Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 10, April 2014.

‘China’s national-security overhaul’. Strategic Comments, vol.

20, no. 8, March 2014.

The Military Balance is the Institute’s annual assessment of military capabilities and defence economics worldwide. Region-by-region analyses cover the major military and economic trends and developments affecting security policy and the trade in weapons and other military equipment.

Comprehensive tables portray key data on weapons and defence economics. Defence expenditure trends over a 10-year period are also shown.

The Military Balance 2015. Routledge for the IISS, 2015.

Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, the Institute’s bi-monthly journal, is a leading forum for analysis and debate of international and strategic affairs. Recent articles of interest include: Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘The Debate Over US China Strategy’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 3, June–July 2015, pp. 89–110.

‘Asian bank: funding infrastructure, building China’s influence’. Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 11, April 2015.

David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, ‘ Waging Cyber War the American Way’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 4, August–September 2015, pp. 7–28.

‘Japan’s defence budget bolsters altered military roles’.

Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 2, February 2015.

William Choong, ‘Defence and Japan’s Constitutional Debate’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 1, April–May 2015, pp. 173–192.

‘Chinese vision drives East Asian détente’. Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 44, December 2014.

Charlotte Kennedy, ‘Politics and Gender in Modern Australia’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 1, February–March 2015, pp. 189–196.

‘Landmark peace deal close in southern Philippines’. Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 43, December 2014.

Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball, ‘Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 6, December 2014– January 2015, pp. 135–166.

‘North Korea: growing threat despite charm offensive’.

Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 41, November 2014.

‘Uighur militancy threatens China’s ‘new Silk Road’. Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 39, November 2014.

‘Hong Kong’s protests hint at deeper problems for China’.

Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 34, October 2014.

‘Challenges for India’s new government’. Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 26, August 2014.

David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, ‘Cyber Warfare and Sino-American Crisis Instability’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 4, August–September 2014, pp. 7–22.

Yogesh Joshi and Frank O’Donnell, ‘India’s Submarine Deterrent and Asian Nuclear Proliferation’, Survival, vol.

56, no. 4, August–September 2014, pp. 157–174.

Roderic Broadhurst and Peng Wang, ‘After the Bo Xilai Trial: Does Corruption Threaten China’s Future?’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 3, June–July 2014, pp. 157–178.

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Michal Meidan, ‘The Implications of China’s EnergyImport Boom’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 3, June–July 2014, pp. 179–200.

Denny Roy, ‘The Problem with Premature Appeasement’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 3, June–July 2013, pp.

183–202.

Pierre Noël, ‘Asia’s Energy Supply and Maritime Security’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 3, June–July 2014, pp. 201–216.

Christian Le Mière, ‘Rebalancing the Burden in East Asia’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 2, April–May 2013, pp. 31–41.

Oriana Skylar Mastro, ‘The Problems of the Liberal Peace in Asia’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 2, April–May 2014, pp. 129–158.

Christian Le Mière, ‘The Spectre of an Asian Arms Race’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 1, February–March 2014, pp. 139–156.

Will Shield, ‘The Middle Way: China and Global Economic Governance’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 6, December 2013– January 2014, pp. 147–168.

Nigel Inkster, ‘Conflict Foretold: America and China’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 5, October–November 2013, pp. 7–28.

Wu Riqiang, ‘China’s Anxiety About US Missile Defence: A Solution’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 5, October–November 2013, pp. 29–52.

Brendan Taylor, ‘Does China Still Back North Korea?’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 5, October–November 2013, pp. 85–91.

Nick Bisley and Andrew Phillips, ‘A Rebalance To Where?: US Strategic Geography in Asia’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 5, October–November 2013, pp. 95–114.

Jasper Pandza, ‘China’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Proliferation Risks’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 4, August–September 2013, pp. 177–190.

Amitai Etzioni, ‘Accommodating China’, Survival, vol. 55, no.

2, April–May 2013, pp. 45–60.

Thomas Plant and Ben Rhode, ‘China, North Korea and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 2, April– May 2013, pp. 61–80.

Nigel Inkster, ‘Chinese Intelligence in the Cyber Age’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 1, February–March 2013, pp. 45–66.

William B. Milam and Matthew J. Nelson, ‘Pakistan’s Populist Foreign Policy’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 1, February–March 2013, pp. 121–34.

Strategic Survey is the Institute’s annual review of strategic developments throughout the world.

Recent sections of interest include: ‘India: Stalled Reforms’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 301–9.

‘Pakistan: New Counter-terrorism Efforts’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 309–14.

‘Sri Lanka: End of Rajapaksa’s Presidency’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 314–18.

‘Afghanistan: Critical Transitions’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp.

318–30.

Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘North Korea: Is Regime Change the Answer?’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 3, June–July 2013, pp. 7–20.

‘China: Assertive Leadership’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp.

336–55.

David C. Gompert, ‘North Korea: Preparing for the End’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 3, June–July 2013, pp. 21–46.

‘Japan: Defence Reforms and Faltering Recovery’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 356–66.

William Choong, ‘Japan’s New Politics’, Survival, vol. 55, no.

3, June–July 2013, pp. 47–54.

‘Korean Peninsula: Diplomatic Stasis’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 366–79.

Sheryn Lee & Benjamin Schreer, ‘The Taiwan Strait: Still Dangerous’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 3, June–July 2013, pp. 55–62.

‘Australia: Political Rows and Regional Hedging’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 380–7.

Kai Liao, ‘The Pentagon and the Pivot’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 3, June–July 2013, pp. 95–114.

Liu Chong, ‘After Fukushima: China’s Nuclear Safety’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 3, June–July 2013, pp. 115–128.

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‘Southeast Asia: Major Security Challenges, Political Uncertainties’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 387–411.

THE 14TH IISS ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT

The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Since the inception of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002, this unique experiment in multilateral defence diplomacy has involved, at one point or other, defence ministers, deputy ministers, chiefs of defence staff, national security advisers, permanent undersecretaries, intelligence chiefs and other national security and defence officials from: Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States and Vietnam.

The result has been the growth of the Shangri-La Dialogue into the richest collection of defence professionals in the Asia-Pacific. The goal of the IISS is to ensure that the Shangri-La Dialogue will continue to serve as the best available vehicle in the Asia-Pacific for developing and channelling astute and effective public policy on defence and security.

The IISS, a registered charity with offices in London, Washington, Manama and Singapore, is the world’s leading authority on political–military conflict. It is the primary independent source of accurate, objective information on international strategic issues. Publications include The Military Balance, an annual reference work on each nation’s defence capabilities; Strategic Survey, an annual review of world affairs; Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, a bi-monthly journal on international affairs; Strategic Comments, offering online analysis of topical issues in international affairs; and the Adelphi book series, the Institute’s principal contribution to policy-relevant, original academic research.

The range of IISS publications, its convening power, and the Institute’s strong international policy perspective make the IISS a key actor in the global strategic and economic debate.

“Over its history, IISS has hosted invaluable conversations like the Shangri-La Dialogue and produced important scholarship, and through all of that you have made our world more secure.”

Dr Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, United States “This annual Dialogue has emerged as a premier forum for exchange of views from strategic thinkers, policymakers and practitioners interested in the Asia-Pacific defence and security issues.”

Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister of State for Defence, India “This very important conference, [a] conference at which the security of half of the global population is discussed.”

Dr Ursula von der Leyen, Federal Minister of Defence, Germany “The Shangri-La Dialogue is one of the region’s premier security fora, and importantly, in this context its focus is not limited to the Asia-Pacific.”

Kevin Andrews, Minister for Defence, Australia

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