IISS Manama Dialogue 2014 – English

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 10TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 5–7 DECEMBER 2014

The IISS Manama Dialogue

th

Manama Dialogue

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 10TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 5–7 DECEMBER 2014

The IISS Manama Dialogue

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

10TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 5–7 DECEMBER 2014

The IISS Manama Dialogue The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Arundel House | 13–15 Arundel Street | Temple Place | London | wc2r 3dx | UK www.iiss.org

© February 2015 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Director-General and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman Editor Nicholas Redman Contributors Tim Huxley; Mark Fitzpatrick; Dana Allin; Samuel Charap; Christian Le-Miere;

Matthew Harries; Toby Dodge; James Hackett; Douglas Barrie Arabic Editor Yusuf Mubarak Editorial Dr Ayse Abdullah Editorial Research and Media James Howarth, Katharine Slowe Production and Design John Buck, Kelly Verity

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the institute.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies is an independent centre for research, information and debate on the problems of conflict, however caused, that have, or potentially have, an important military content. The Council and Staff of the Institute are international and its membership is drawn from over 90 countries. The Institute is independent and it alone decides what activities to conduct. It owes no allegiance to any government, any group of governments or any political or other organisation. The IISS stresses rigorous research with a forward-looking policy orientation and places particular emphasis on bringing new perspectives to the strategic debate.

Contents Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Chapter 1

Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Chapter 2

Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Chapter 3

Press coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Selected IISS publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Chapter 4

Social media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Contents

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Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, UK

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The IISS Manama Dialogue 2014

Foreword

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) is delighted to release this summary report of the proceedings of the 10th IISS Regional Security Summit: The Manama Dialogue, held from 5–7 December 2014.

This year’s conference celebrated a decade of Manama Dialogues, in which senior policymakers have assembled annually for high-level discussions on Middle East security affairs. The unprecedented series of security threats facing the region – indeed the world – as the 2014 summit convened only served to underline the essential role the Manama Dialogue plays in encouraging and hosting candid and free-flowing debate on regional issues.

The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) terrorist grouping, the three-year civil war in Syria and continued international negotiations over Iran’s controversial nuclear programme were three intertwined topics dominating much of the discussion among participants. Delegates from 35 countries and three international organisations – including ministers,

senior

officials,

parliamentary/congressional

leaders and military and intelligence chiefs – highlighted the necessity of regional and international cooperation in Foreword

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responding to the threat posed by ISIS (despite competing views on the role to be played by Iran and Syria).

In an environment of mounting complexity, faced by transnational challenges, an inclusive regional forum is a vital component of organised regional security diplomacy. Indeed, the Manama Dialogue is now sufficiently established to serve as an instrument of regional security. There was a powerful demonstration of this when on the sidelines of the Manama Dialogue 2014 the United Kingdom signed a landmark agreement with the Kingdom of Bahrain to expand and reinforce its naval presence in the Gulf. The deal will establish the first permanent British base ‘east of Suez’ for nearly half a century.

To mark the 10th Manama Dialogue, the IISS also released an Adelphi book examining security issues in the Gulf and the wider Middle East. Entitled Middle East Security, the US Pivot and the Rise of ISIS, this volume featured essays by nine IISS analysts and several analysts and capped a series of seminars held in Manama as part of the Middle East Research Agenda.

As the Manama Dialogue enters its second decade, the IISS will continue to strive hard to offer the most congenial environment for constructive defence and security consultations to take root. We thank the Kingdom of Bahrain, and in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for its gracious and generous support of this Manama Dialogue process, and to all the participating governments for their active engagement.

Dr John Chipman IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

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10TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 5–7 DECEMBER 2014

The IISS Manama Dialogue

CHAPTER 1

Agenda

Sh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bahrain

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Agenda

Friday 5 December 2014 All day

Bilateral meetings between ministers and officials

19:00 – 20:00 SKY NEWS ARABIA OPENING TELEVISED PANEL - Al Ghazal I

BEYOND CONFLICT: IMAGINING THE FUTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST Chair: Fadila Souissi

Presenter, Sky News Arabia

Sh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bahrain

Sameh Shoukry

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egypt

Hoshyar Zebari

Minister of Finance, Iraq

Seyed Hossein Mousavian

Research Scholar, Princeton University; former Head, Foreign Relations Committee, Supreme National Security Council, Iran

20:00 – 21:00 OPENING RECEPTION – Grand Foyer 21:00 – 23:00 OPENING DINNER – Al Noor Ballroom Hosted by: HRH Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa Crown Prince, Deputy Supreme Commander and First Deputy Prime Minister, Bahrain

Opening remarks: Dr John Chipman

Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS

Agenda

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Saturday 6 December 2014 All Plenary Sessions chaired by Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS 08:45 – 10:15 FIRST PLENARY SESSION – Al Noor Ballroom

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST Sh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bahrain

Sameh Shoukry

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egypt

Philip Hammond

Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, UK

Questions and answers 10:15 – 10:45 Staging Break 10:45 – 12:00 SECOND PLENARY SESSION – Al Noor Ballroom

IRAQ, SYRIA AND REGIONAL SECURITY Dr Ibrahim Al Jaafari

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iraq

Jean-Yves Le Drian

Minister of Defence, France

Questions and answers 12:00 – 12:15 Break 12:15 – 13:30 THIRD PLENARY SESSION – Al Noor Ballroom

COUNTERING EXTREMISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST Dr Nizar Madani

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Saudi Arabia

Major General Ali Al Ahmadi

Chief, National Security Bureau, Yemen

Questions and answers 13:30 – 15:30 PRIVATE LUNCH FOR DELEGATION LEADERS Trader Vic’s Restaurant

LUNCH FOR ALL OTHER DELEGATES Villa Gazebo, Ritz Carlton

15:00 – 17:00 Bilateral meetings between ministers and officials 17:00 – 18:30 FOURTH PLENARY SESSION – Al Noor Ballroom

COLLECTIVE APPROACHES TO CURRENT SECURITY ISSUES Dr Abdullatif Al Zayani

Secretary General, Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf

John Baird

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada 10

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Michael Fallon

Secretary of State for Defence, UK

Questions and answers 19:30 – 22:00 RECEPTION AND DINNER – Villa Gazebo

Sunday 7 December 2014 09:30 – 11:00 SPECIAL SESSIONS – Al Ghazal Ballrooms Group I:

Iran and the Region Beyond the Nuclear Negotiations – Al Ghazal II Chair: Mark Fitzpatrick

Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, IISS

General (Retd) Khalid Al Buainain

Chairman, Baynuna Group; President, Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis; former Commander, UAE Air Force

Dr Matthew Spence

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for the Middle East Policy, US

Seyed Hossein Mousavian

Research Scholar, Princeton University; former Head, Foreign Relations Committee, Supreme National Security Council, Iran

Group II:

Regional Counter-Terrorism and Counter Radicalisation Policies – Al Ghazal I Chair: Emile Hokayem

Senior Fellow for Regional Security, IISS-Middle East

Faris Al Mazrouei

Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs for Security and Military Affairs, UAE

Brett McGurk

Deputy Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL; Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, US Department of State

Nigel Inkster

Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk, IISS

Group III:

Preventing State Failure: Humanitarian and Geopolitical Approaches – Al Ghazal C Chair: Professor Toby Dodge

Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East, IISS

Andrew Gilmour

Political Director, Executive Office of the Secretary General, UN

Lapo Pistelli

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Italy Agenda

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Mokhtar Lamani

Former Head, Office of the UN-League of Arab States Joint Special Representative for Syria

Group IV: Regional Military Cooperation – Al Ghazal III Chair: General The Lord Richards of Herstmonceux

Senior Adviser, IISS; former Chief of the Defence Staff, UK

Dr Mohamad Maliki bin Osman

Minister of State for Defence and National Development, Singapore

General Lloyd James Austin III

Commander, US Central Command

General Sir Nicholas Houghton Chief of the Defence Staff, UK

11:00 – 11:30 Break 11:30 – 13:00 FIFTH PLENARY SESSION – Al Noor Ballroom

REFLECTIONS ON 10 YEARS OF REGIONAL SECURITY CHANGES

Chair: Dr John Chipman

Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS

Mark Fitzpatrick

Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, IISS

Dr Bassma Kodmani

Executive Director, Arab Reform Initiative

General The Lord Richards of Herstmonceux

Senior Adviser, IISS; former Chief of the Defence Staff, UK

Jamal Khashoggi

General Manager, Al Arab News Channel

Questions and answers 13:00 – 14:30 FAREWELL LUNCH FOR ALL DELEGATES – Villa Gazebo

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10TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 5–7 DECEMBER 2014

The IISS Manama Dialogue

CHAPTER 2

Executive summary

HRH Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, Crown Prince, Deputy Supreme Commander and First Deputy Prime Minister, Bahrain

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The IISS Manama Dialogue 2014

Executive summary

The dramatic territorial gains in Iraq and Syria made by the terrorist grouping that calls itself the ‘Islamic State’ (ISIS) framed the debate at the 10th Manama Dialogue, held in Bahrain on 5–7 December 2014. The Regional Security Summit brought together senior government and military officials, national-security practitioners, political analysts and journalists from the Middle East, Asia, Europe and North America.

Delegates reflected on three crises in particular: the multifaceted threat that ISIS posed to the region; Syria’s civil war; and the ongoing stand-off over the Iranian nuclear question. In all three cases, the Dialogue grappled with the nature of the threats at hand, their causes and the appropriate response. Much of the debate focused on whether the rise of ISIS – which many delegates referred to using the pejorative label Daesh – changed the calculus regarding the other two security crises. Some delegates mooted the possibility of pragmatic cooperation with the governments of Iran and Syria, and even the grouping Hizbullah, in order to secure the ground forces capable of inflicting a decisive defeat on ISIS. Others, however, were adamant that the immediacy of the ISIS threat should not cause a shift in their well-established Executive summary

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positions regarding the legitimacy of the Assad regime in Syria, and the terms on which the Iranian nuclear negotiations could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

As ever, the need to clarify and strengthen the regional political order attracted much attention. The desire for progress – which has motivated the IISS over the course of the last decade to bring together 54 foreign ministers, 16 defence ministers, 38 chiefs of defence staff and hundreds of leading non-governmental analysts – was expressed by several regional leaders.

These are problems whose effects cross borders, and which cannot be solved without the cooperation of all regional states.

Yet there remains a palpable sense of distrust, stemming from historic differences, the apportioning of blame for the region’s current problems and the plague of sectarianism.

The Crown Prince of Bahrain, Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, addressed the Dialogue’s opening dinner with a call for the region and its friends to move beyond the ‘war on terror’. Today’s challenge, he argued, was to fight a ‘war on theocrats’. Thus began a weekend of high-level discussion trying to make sense of a Middle East facing multiple crises, many confessional in nature.

Solutions to the problems of regional order will remain the topic of meetings to come. But this Manama Dialogue was also notable for a landmark in strengthening international support for regional security: namely, the announcement of an agreement to put the UK naval presence in Bahrain – and thus ‘east of Suez’, as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Philip Hammond noted – on a permanent footing.

Opening dinner and address Speaking at the opening dinner, the Crown Prince expressed satisfaction and pride at the accomplishments of the ten-year period of cooperation between Bahrain and the IISS. Noting that he was not giving a keynote speech as such, he wanted to leave one important thought with delegates, concerning the 16

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naming of the principal threat facing the region. To state that

Opening reception

we were engaged in a war on terrorism did not capture the ‘totality of our conflict, or of our strategic direction or threat.

Terrorism is merely the tool ... not an ideology’.

‘We are fighting theocrats,’ the Crown Prince said. Such people sullied the name and practice of a great tradition and divine philosophy; and they must be countered holistically, through a combination of military, social, political and economic policies. The Crown Prince mentioned some earlier efforts to accurately label the threat, including the invented word ‘theo-crism’ and the moniker ‘fascist theocracy’, but urged delegates to find something more appropriate. The failure to do so, he suggested, contributed to a non-holistic policy response, in which we ‘hop blindly and haphazardly from one threat to another’.

The Crown Prince referred to the events of 2011 as the ‘Arab Storm’ (as opposed to Arab Spring) and said that history would judge whether they were akin to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 or the Bolshevik takeover of Russia in 1917. In either case, they precipitated the collapse of state paradigms and created a vacuum in which an extreme ideology emerged.

Executive summary

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 Prince Salman Bin Hamad Al Khalifa

Predicting that we would be fighting ‘these theocrats’ for a very long time, the Crown Prince said the question was whether ‘we have the courage and the moral and intellectual integrity to call them out for what they are’. They were people who disregarded human life and the social order and social contracts upon which human society is established. They were people who oppressed women and slaughtered anyone who did not ‘subscribe to their own twisted ideology’. While politics might be a motivation for some of its adherents, it was the ideology itself that must be combatted. It must be named, shamed, contained and eventually defeated. In closing, he called on delegates to discard the term ‘war on terror’ and focus on ‘the rise of these evil theocracies’.

Dr John Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive, thanked the Crown Prince for his remarks and the invaluable support he has given the Manama Dialogue from the outset. Dr Chipman recalled that, inspired by the early success of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in promoting intergovernmental defence diplomacy, the IISS had considered how to contribute to wider national-security discussions in the Gulf region, where the states of the Gulf Cooperation

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 Council (GCC) lacked a forum to meet with their immediate neighbours and the leaders of extra-regional powers.

Turning to the state of the region, he recalled the vision

Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS

of a secure Gulf that the Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Prince Saud al Faisal, laid out at the first Dialogue, involving ‘a unified GCC, an integrating Yemen, a stable Iraq and a friendly Iran’. Those four conditions, Dr Chipman said, appeared uncertain then and remain fleeting now. Nevertheless, the Manama Dialogue had in its first ten years given a platform for policy announcements, an occasion for high-level discussion and an opportunity to engage all relevant states simultaneously. It had helped to make the regional security debate more transparent and direct, as well as becoming the venue at which the strategic pulse of the region could most accurately be taken.

Today, there was intense diplomatic activity to determine whether a collective approach could be fashioned to meet the world’s multiplying security problems. Ungoverned spaces had widened, and newly governed spaces were under the control of unimaginably dangerous people, Dr Chipman stated. Sectarian politics had assumed a geopolitical shape, Executive summary

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while regional competition for leadership had intensified. The issues raised at the Manama Dialogue, he added, demanded proper analytical treatment. To help address this, the IISSMiddle East office would from January 2015 be led by a new Executive Director, Sir John Jenkins, who was currently the UK Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and previously led UK diplomatic missions to Libya, Iraq and Syria. Sir John would deepen IISS relations with regional governments and the private sector; under his leadership IISS–Middle East would contribute to regional policy circles, and engage the best and the brightest women and men in the region.

Opening Televised Panel Debate The panel for the debate, chaired and presented by Fadila Souissi from Sky News Arabia, featured Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sameh Shoukry, Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Hoshyar Zebari, Iraq’s Minister of Finance, together with Seyed Hossein Mousavian, the former head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.

The debate’s main focus was the threat posed by ISIS and the necessity of regional and international cooperation in response to this challenge. A related question concerned Iran’s role in regional security, and whether this was constructive and necessary, or unwelcome and destabilising.

There was broad agreement on the panel that military action by Iraqi forces supported by a US-led international coalition of Western and Arab states had inflicted substantial damage on ISIS. Nevertheless, panellists concurred that the group continued to pose a serious threat to security not just in Iraq and Syria, but also across the Arab world and perhaps even more widely.

Mousavian claimed that Iran, which was reported to have made airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq, was ‘a very serious partner’ in the anti-terrorist coalition. However, he also asserted that the self-styled Islamic State was just one element 20

The IISS Manama Dialogue 2014

of a broader challenge posed by ‘the rise of extremism’ in the Middle East. In his view, it was necessary to address the ‘root causes’ of extremism and for there to be region-wide cooperation between the GCC, Iran, Iraq and Turkey against extremism ‘for decades to come’.

Zebari agreed that it was important ‘to tackle the motivation behind Daesh’ in order to ‘eradicate’ the movement.

This could only be achieved by comprehensive regional cooperation, with international support, involving financial and political, as well as military, dimensions. He saw it as particularly necessary to stop foreign volunteers from Western countries going to fight for ISIS and to cut off international financial support for the terrorists. Shoukry emphasised the

Opening Televised Panel (l–r): Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Research Scholar, Princeton University, and former Head, Foreign Relations Committee, Supreme National Security Council, Iran; Hoshyar Zebari, Minister of Finance, Iraq; Sameh Shoukry, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egypt; Sh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bahrain; and Fadila Souissi, Presenter, Sky News Arabia

importance of eradicating the ‘culture’ of ISIS, which used ‘the alibi of religion’ to pursue political goals. He argued that it was necessary to challenge the discourse of ISIS. Zebari asserted the importance of cooperating with the Syrian government, because the civil war in Syria had ‘directly influenced Iraq’s internal situation’. Mousavian argued that a ‘power-sharing solution’ was necessary in Syria, in order to assure its ‘integrity and unity’. In his view, the permanent Executive summary

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members of the United Nations Security Council and five regional powers needed to agree ‘principles for resolving the Syrian crisis’.

On the question of Iran, Sheikh Khalid was implicitly critical of Teheran’s regional role under its present regime, pointing to the ‘positive’ part it had played in Gulf security before 1979, under the Shah. However, he saw the potential for Iran to play a constructive role in the future, perhaps as part of regional maritime-security arrangements.

Zebari admitted that Iran had substantial political influence in Iraq – all Iraqi leaders had ‘close ties with Iran’, he said – but emphasised that this did not amount to Iranian ‘control’ of his country. It was ‘the Iraqi people and elected government’, not Iran, who made decisions. He thought that Iraq could play a useful role as a ‘bridge’ between Iran on one side and Arab states and the West on the other.

Mousavian said ‘Iran is accused of everything’, but pointed to the Arab world’s ‘decades of problems’. Iran had not interfered in Egypt, Libya of Tunisia, where the previous regimes had all collapsed due to domestic pressures. He argued that it was important for Iran to be part of a ‘regional cooperation system’ that could help find solutions to the crises in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. Dialogue between Iran and Saudi Arabia was ‘undoubtedly important’ in any regionwide initiative, which he admitted might take ‘ten or 20 years’ to come to fruition. He thought that such a regional system could have ‘excellent relations’ with outside powers with interests in the Middle East, i.e., Russia, as well as the United States and NATO. A question-and-answer session with the audience provided an opportunity for the panellists to clarify their positions on some important points. Egypt’s Shoukry claimed that there was no possibility of his country, alone or as part of an international coalition, intervening directly in the Libyan crisis; however, he said that it was important for interested outside parties to unite their efforts to protect Libyans’ ability 22

The IISS Manama Dialogue 2014

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 to determine their future in the face of Islamist pressures.

Iraq’s Zebari emphasised the need for ‘more democracy’ and stronger institutions in regional states, and for the protection

Sh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bahrain

of Christians and other religious minorities, as well as greater cooperation among Arab states against terrorism. Mousavian pointed to the danger of ‘a failed region’ if regional states did not unite to manage the present challenges.

First Plenary Session: Strategic Priorities In The Middle East Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s foreign minister, opened the first plenary session by identifying two challenges that he argued should be regional priorities. The first of these was that some unaffiliated terrorist groups had achieved an unprecedented level of scale and seriousness; ISIS in particular now held vast territory, money and military equipment. The second challenge was that states were still prominent in sponsoring terrorism or engaging directly in terrorist acts; he pointed to Hizbullah as an example of the former and the Syrian regime’s use of barrel bombs as an example of the latter. Tackling these challenges would be neither easy nor quick, Sheikh Khalid said. A comprehensive approach was Executive summary

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ď ľ Sameh Shoukry, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egypt

needed, embracing military efforts, financial sanctions and a drive to win the theological battle against militancy.

Sheikh Khalid noted that some regional progress on these fronts had already been made, in particular the recent Manama Declaration on Combating the Financing of Terrorism. However, he added that the ambitions of some regional powers to dominate the region stoked distrust and hindered cooperation. He went on to criticise Iran for interfering in the affairs of some regional states.

Egypt’s foreign minister, Sameh Shoukry, echoed the theme of distrust as a factor that hindered cooperation among regional states. His own review of the region’s main challenges and strategic priorities focused on domestic challenges caused by economic slowdown, population growth and contested national identity; the activity of extremists in exploiting socio-economic dislocation and sectarian difference, sometimes with state support; and the destabilising effects of the difficulty in arriving at a two-state solution to the Palestinian issue. Mr Shoukry called for the revival of the Arab peace initiative, with the support of the UN Security Council, to move towards the creation of a viable Palestinian state. To tackle the

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 other challenges, he suggested that states should modernise and integrate, rejecting hegemony and conducting dialogue on the basis of mutual respect. It was necessary, he averred, to adopt comprehensive solutions and to view security broadly,

Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, UK

as well as tackling all terrorist groups rather than focusing solely on ISIS. Philip Hammond, the UK’s foreign secretary, used his address to restate his country’s commitment to Gulf security.

He argued that there was a strong commonality of interest between London and the Gulf capitals on security, prosperity and stability. The just-signed agreement to re-establish a permanent naval presence in Bahrain was a clear statement of the UK’s commitment to a presence east of Suez, he said.

Mr Hammond stressed the collective nature of the GCC– Western effort to halt the advance of ISIS in Iraq. He identified further steps that would be needed to achieve victory: the enhanced use of ground forces; the establishment of stable, legitimate, self-sufficient governments in Iraq and Syria (specifically excluding Bashar al-Assad); building a culture to marginalise extremism, including through the empowerment of moderates in the Gulf and abroad; and enhancing broader Executive summary

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counter-terrorism efforts, including initiatives to stem terrorist financing.

Looking beyond the ISIS challenge, Mr Hammond stressed the importance of patience in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme, to ensure that a deal would fully meet international concerns. He called for pan-regional cooperation, involving Iran, to support Yemen’s Peace and National Partnership Agreement. It was also important not to give up on efforts to forge an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, which required bold leadership on both sides.

In the debate that followed, Professor Francois Heisbourg, chair of the IISS Council, asked the panel about the tension between Gulf and Western objectives regarding the threat of ISIS and the Syrian civil war, as most regional powers wanted to see the back of the Assad regime but it was potentially a valuable partner in the fight against ISIS. He also asked the speakers to comment on the proposal by Seyed Hossein Mousavian, the former head of the foreign relations committee of Iran’s National Security Council, of ‘P5+5’ talks to resolve the Syrian crisis. Sheikh Khalid rejected the notion, as it involved mixing the separate issues of Syria’s civil war with the challenge posed by terrorism across the region. Mr Hammond added that there was little point in adopting new formats if the participants did not share a single view of the way forward, and any proposed P5+5 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus five regional powers: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt) would lack consensus on the question of Assad’s future.

Professor Dewi Fortuna Anwar, deputy secretary for political affairs to the vice-president of Indonesia, asked how Egypt would manage its relations with smaller powers. In response, Mr Shoukry said that Egypt did not aspire to lead either from the front or from behind, but rather was determined to work in unison with other Arab states to realise their shared goals and ambitions. Egypt had no expansionist agenda, he added.

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 Second Plenary Session: Iraq, Syria and Regional Security Dr Ibrahim Al Jaafari, Iraq’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, focused entirely on the challenge of confronting ISIS, without

Dr Ibrahim Al Jaafari, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iraq

question Iraq’s most significant security challenge. ISIS, he argued, was a departure from Iraq’s long history of moderate Islam and tolerance. The battle to confront it would need to be global and generational, he said, drawing a comparison to the Thirty Years’ War in seventeenth-century Europe. The minister noted that ISIS recruited young people from all over the world, including from Western democracies. It was vital to produce a cultural antithesis or antidote to ISIS. That antidote, he said, should be respect for human rights.

Al Jaafari called for a global mobilisation against ISIS, including the creation of an equivalent to the Second World War alliance of the Soviet Union with the US, Britain and France. Adversaries should come together, he argued. The minister said that Iraq was well placed to lead such an effort, since it had strong relationships throughout the region, including with Iran and the GCC countries.

The Iraqi government has attempted to deal with the social basis of ISIS by forming a government that Executive summary

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 Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister of Defence, France

represents all of the country’s groups. The minister called on the international community to do more to support his country militarily, since it was the spearhead of the fight against ISIS. Iraq needed weapons, logistics, training and intelligence.

Al Jaafari expressed Iraq’s gratitude for the sacrifice and support of those countries that had supported the effort against ISIS. He called for sustained efforts to find common ground in the region and to focus on the ISIS threat.

Jean-Yves Le Drian, the Minister of Defence of France, focused on ISIS from the perspective of an outside power with a long history in the region. As he put it, ‘We are not from this region but this region is not foreign to us.’ He called for a regional coalition against terrorism that showed respect for Islam, but added that the crisis had extra-regional impacts and thus was a matter for the entire international community.

Le Drian noted that the crisis in the Middle East began over a decade ago with the September 2001 terror attacks on the US. It was a complex regional crisis that fed on state weakness, hatreds, extremism and social marginalisation. Today, the jihadi threat was two-headed, with al-Qaeda still maintaining branches throughout the Gulf, while ISIS had 20,000–30,000

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fighters and aspired to building its territorial holdings into a caliphate, threatening the entire region. Unlike al-Qaeda, ISIS combined ideological extremist terrorism and traditional military tactics. He noted the alarming fact that other extremist groups in other regions had declared allegiance to ISIS. The minister stressed the global aspects of the current crisis. He said that 1,100 French nationals had participated in jihad in Syria, and 370 fought for ISIS. France had committed 15 fighter planes to the air campaign against ISIS. While noting the success of some operations thus far, Le Drian argued that airstrikes alone would not solve the problem; only the determination of the people of Iraq and the countries of the region to staunch the flow of political and financial support to ISIS would make success possible. The anti-ISIS effort must focus on building sustainable state institutions and inclusive national identity that embraced all citizens. In this context, Le Drian noted, the violent, sectarian regime of Bashar al-Assad bore much responsibility for the ascent of ISIS. Le Drian characterised the French intervention in Mali, and the ongoing 4,000-troop commitment to the country, as an example of an effort that did pay off. He closed with a warning that various terrorist and extremist groups from the Horn of Africa through to the Middle East and into Asia could become interconnected. The international community must prevent their unification.

The discussion period began with an intervention by Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). He stated that ISIS could not be defeated without a political process in Syria. He also said that Iran could not be a partner in this effort when Iran and its proxies were interfering and acting as an occupying power in Syria. Sheikh Abdullah suggested that Western states did not match the Gulf states in the determination to fight terrorism.

He pointed out that European states were much more tolerant of hate speech than their Gulf counterparts, and added that while Western states were mostly concerned with weapons and Executive summary

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finance, the states of the Gulf region were engaged in a fight for their culture, religion and very existence.

The rest of the discussion centred on the challenges of bringing communities into the battle against ISIS and counterradicalisation, specifically concerning the role of social media in promoting extremism.

Third Plenary Session: Countering Extremism in the Middle East In the third plenary session, Dr Nizar Madani, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, argued that the GCC had proven stronger and more resourceful than many cynics had expected. Despite challenges and scepticism, perseverance had been ‘the rock on which we relied’. The organisation’s priority had been security, for without security there was no freedom or prosperity, he insisted. And, despite numerous challenges, growth and employment rates had soared.

The future of the GCC would rely on three dimensions: local, regional and international. For the local dimension, the GCC members themselves needed to build upon their own rich and diversified experience. Regionally, future stability required building constructive relations with neighbouring countries, which in turn should avoid meddling in the internal affairs of others and backing sectarian militias. Madani specified that he was talking about Iran, ‘an important country’ that ‘has the right to be a key player in the region’, but only if it served stability rather than strife. In the international dimension, there was the dire need for collective efforts to counter terrorism. To do so, however, meant addressing the link between terrorist movements and humanitarian crises in Syria, Palestine, Libya and elsewhere.

General Ali Al Ahmadi, the chief of Yemen’s National Security Bureau, spoke on a day when two hostages held by an al-Qaeda-affiliated group in his country died during an operation to free them. Against this tragic backdrop, Ahmadi noted that Yemen was among the countries most damaged 30

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 by terrorism. The government was fighting hard against the terrorists, had launched damaging operations, including airstrikes, against them, and had worked with foreign partners,

Dr Nizar Madani, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Saudi Arabia

including the US, with joint operations and the sharing of intelligence. However, the rapid rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria dictated caution in making assessments about the future of any terrorist threat and how close it was to being defeated.

In Yemen, meanwhile, civil strife continued. The general blamed rebellious Houthis for violations causing the almost total disintegration of peace efforts. Whereas most of his prepared remarks focused on Yemen’s difficulties, he concluded by identifying the Palestinian issue as the ‘central cause’ of Middle East turmoil, because, in his words, ‘Israeli tyranny’ had been ‘exploited by many, including al Qaeda’.

In discussion, several delegates focused on Saudi relations with Iran and the problem of Sunni extremism. On the latter, David Roberts of Kings College London argued that Saudi Arabia was ‘in denial’ about the sources of extremism in its own Wahhabi fundamentalism. Another critical question was posed by Hoshyar Zebari, Iraq’s Minister of Finance, who challenged the Saudi position towards Iran. Iran was Executive summary

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 Major General Ali Al Ahmadi, Chief, National Security Bureau, Yemen

an important neighbouring country, Zebari insisted, and it was a ‘primordial principle of dialogue’ that it should take place between countries that disagreed rather than those that agreed. Zebari asked whether there a possibility of a renewed dialogue as in the days of Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami.

Other delegates questioned whether the Gulf needed to deal with Iran, whose policies in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq were portrayed as stoking sectarianism and thus boosting recruitment to ISIS. Madani in response said that Saudi Arabia agreed with dialogue as a matter of principle, but believed that success required some common denominators. Trust and transparency were prerequisites before starting any dialogue, he said.

Above all, ‘countries should not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs’. He also rejected the charge of a link between Saudi religious practice and the ideology that fuels ISIS. ‘The Islamic religion is innocent of these acts,’ he said.

In regard to Yemen, two delegates, from Lebanon and the UAE, mentioned the difficulty of putting into force political agreements meant to end the conflict with the Houthis. There seemed to be no will either from the Houthis or Yemen’s

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president to implement these agreements, according to one delegate. And unless the deals were respected and implemented, the country would fall back into civil strife. The overriding question, the Chairwoman of the Emirates Policy Center, Dr Ebetesam Al Ketbi, argued from the floor, was how to close off Iran’s influence in Yemeni affairs. Dr Nicholas Redman of the IISS meanwhile focused on what Gulf neighbours might do to ease the country’s economic difficulties.

Given that these countries were wealthy and employed foreign labour, and that Yemen was poor and populous, couldn’t there be a use for the latter’s surplus labour, even if it meant Yemen would be a remittance economy?

Al Ahmadi focused in his responses on the problem of implementing peace agreements. Implementation had been stymied by discord, he said, and the Houthis had refused to withdraw from Sanaa and instead gone back to fighting. Iran, he added, had continued to play a malign role, supporting the rebels with money and arms.

Fourth Plenary Session: Collective approaches to current security issues Given recent divisions among the states of GCC, collective approaches to security were an issue of great currency. The GCC Secretary General, Dr Abdullatif Al Zayani, highlighted the inherent difficulties in having multiple parties work in harmony. He identified three factors necessary for this process: participation should be as inclusive and comprehensive as possible; discussions should be supported by a consultation process among relevant parties; and there should be effective implementation of any process involving coordinated regional and international strategies.

Al Zayani was sceptical that Gulf states had devised necessary implementation mechanisms, as they were often overwhelmed by temporary challenges. But there were positive signs: Saudi Arabia had suggested an international counter-terrorism centre, and pledged $100m in support.

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 Dr Abdullatif Al Zayani, Secretary General, Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC)

Canada’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, John Baird, noted that most challenges in the Gulf region were driven by sectarianism and that sectarian divisions were being exploited by ‘sinister state actors’ and ‘nefarious non-state actors’, with Iran’s support for Shia militias an example. For Baird, the answer to such sectarianism was pluralism. Globalisation ensured that events in the Middle East resonated around the globe, Baird believed. Thus, the need for collective action could not be greater. Ultimately, however, extremism and sectarianism could not be countered with just military power, Baird argued. Economic stability and dynamism were necessary to empower people and ensure long-term prosperity.

Michael Fallon, the UK Secretary of State for Defence, claimed the world was in an ‘unprecedently dangerous’ situation. In this environment, the UK retained the political will and the military capabilities to intervene, despite a parliamentary vote in 2013 rejecting military strikes in Syria. Fallon identified some relevant historical lessons: firstly, that liberty is underpinned by credible armed forces ready to deploy rapidly and at scale. Secondly, partnerships are vital. Moreover, although there is plenty of scope for the use of soft power in

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 the Gulf, there is no substitute for hard power. A possible final lesson is that the more secure the Gulf states are, the more

John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada

secure the West remains.

In the debate that followed, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, formerly Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, berated Baird for ‘spending your time in palaces and luxury hotels fighting ISIS’ while the Iranian general Qasem Soleimani was risking his life on the front line. Why, Mousavian asked, was Canada more aggressive towards Iran than even the US? What lay behind this position? Baird responded that Canada wanted Iran to play a major regional role, but was disturbed by its backing for Shia militias in Iraq and its support for terrorist groups in nearly every Middle Eastern state. Its human-rights record was also a concern, as well as Iran’s nuclear programme which Baird concluded was designed to deliver a nuclear weapons capability.

Zayani then spoke about the steps needed to make a breakthrough in relations between Iran and its Gulf neighbours. Firstly, it should act to resolve its territorial dispute with the UAE concerning three islands that Iran has occupied.

Secondly, it should facilitate the withdrawal of Hizbullah from Syria, where it is responsible for the death of many Executive summary

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 Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, UK

Syrians. Iran’s good faith could only be impressed upon the region by bold steps, he said.

Fallon answered questions from Zaid Belbagi, of the Prince Salman Centre for Innovative Government, and Neil Hawkins, Australia’s Ambassador to Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. These concerned whether the military operation against ISIS had to be at a similar scale to the 1991 operation to liberate Kuwait; whether Western states had the appetite for such an undertaking; and the importance for Western public opinion of seeing a strong, active Gulf presence within the US-led coalition. Fallon said that it would take an effort on a par with the 1991 Gulf War, and that with 50 states involved the enterprise was scaling upwards. He confirmed that GCC involvement was very helpful for Western governments to justify their involvement to their electorates. He confirmed that airpower alone could not defeat ISIS, and pointed to the reconstitution of the Iraqi army and the creation of a national guard as evidence that the ground component was being build up. It was vital, he said, that the new Iraqi army should have support right across Iraqi society.

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 Dr Chipman concluded the session by questioning whether the oft-heard call for tackling the root causes was a recipe for delay and inaction: ‘I wonder sometimes whether we are making the analytically perfect the enemy of the politically necessary.’ Understanding the proximate causes, he explained, and tackling them ‘with vigour, enthusiasm, clarity, fairness and good governance’ might be enough ‘to help stabilise this very complex world in which we live’.

Fifth Plenary Session: Reflections on Ten Years of Regional Security Changes Opening this final session, Mark Fitzpatrick, Director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at the IISS,

(l–r): Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, NonProliferation and Disarmament Programme, IISS; Dr Bassma Kodmani, Executive Director, Arab Reform Initiative; Dr John Chipman, DirectorGeneral and Chief Executive, IISS; General The Lord Richards of Herstmonceux, Senior Adviser, IISS, and former Chief of the Defence Staff, UK; and Jamal Khashoggi, General Manager, Al Arab News Channel

traced the evolution of Iran’s nuclear programme over ten years. Iran now has a stockpile of low-enriched uranium that is sufficient to make up to six bombs, if further enriched. The interim deal agreed in 2013 resembled a ceasefire, in which Iran agreed to stop the production of near highly enriched uranium, and cap the number of centrifuges, in exchange for no new sanctions. Tehran’s late-2014 deal with Russia to provide enriched uranium for eight new reactors eliminated the Executive summary

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 Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, NonProliferation and Disarmament Programme, IISS

practical need for Iran to have an enrichment programme of its current size. The country’s insistence on preserving it was due not only to pride but also to a desire to have the option of developing nuclear weapons. The key to a deal lay in whether Iran was willing to put this hedging strategy ‘on ice’.

Dr Bassma Kodmani, the Executive Director of the Arab Reform Initiative, discussed Syria within the context of broader societal dynamics. The governance of diverse societies was, she said, key to state security and stability; poor governance of diversity led to fragmented societies. The reassertion of a strong military role in Egypt in 2011 marked a turning point for regional politics, putting the accent on security solutions to the challenge of extremism. The advance of ISIS in Iraq, and the focus this received from regional and foreign powers, meant that the situation in Syria was becoming more complex. There was no strategy for Syria, Kodmani argued, and it was not clear which opposition forces would be trained and how would they be vetted. A strategy was needed to define reliable groups, she said.

General the Lord Richards of Herstmonceux, formerly the UK’s Chief of Defence Staff, offered a critique of recent military engagements in the region. There was, he said, ‘lots of

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 policy masquerading as strategy, and certainly lots of tactics, but few joined-up, long-term plans that successfully synthesise strategic ends, ways and means, the essence of a strategy’.

Dr Bassma Kodmani, Executive Director, Arab Reform Initiative

States that want to achieve strategic success, he argued, have to be fully committed to the cause. Western experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan had left political leaders reluctant to risk similar outcomes and led to other solutions, particularly operations using local or proxy forces. The GCC states could create a militarily efficient joint command to tackle future challenges together, he argued, although to be effective under fire it was vital to have good command and control.

Jamal Khashoggi, General Manager of the Al Arab News Channel, noted that the danger from ISIS was real; it was, he said, not an army but an idea ‘that feeds on our failures’. He argued that most analysts and governments had failed to notice the rise of ISIS because of the post-2011 focus on Iran and Iraq.

ISIS was a radical group that flourished because of bad governance, poor education and social injustice. When the Arab Spring began in 2011, some states accommodated demands for more freedom and justice; the states that chose instead to rely on old methods provided a fertile ground for ISIS. Executive summary

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 General The Lord Richards of Herstmonceux, Senior Adviser, IISS, and former Chief of the Defence Staff, UK

In response to a question from Seyed Hossein Mousavian about the possibility of improved relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Jamal Khashoggi said he was pessimistic for three reasons: Iran’s role in Syria; the fact that ISIS was an Arab failure and must be fixed by Arabs; and because ISIS was a Sunni problem that would become more complex if Iran were involved.

Dr Toby Dodge, IISS Senior Consulting Fellow for the Middle East, took issue with Khashoggi’s assertion that the population of Mosul embraced ISIS when its fighters seized control of the city. He argued that there was insufficient data to support such a conclusion. Rather, he suggested, it would be more sustainable to suggest that ‘the generalised revolt that we saw spread across the northwest of Iraq from … 2012 through 2013–14 created the arena within which five or six insurgent groups, one of which was the Islamic State, managed to seize large amounts of territory’.

Dr Ayman Safadi, the former Deputy Prime Minister of Jordan, suggested that the current strategy was a result of Western misunderstanding and Arab complacency, and was doomed to fail for these reasons. In particular, he argued,

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 the focus on Iraq – even if taken to a successful conclusion – would allow ISIS to regenerate in Syria. Richards agreed with his analysis, saying that he disapproved of the incre-

Jamal Khashoggi, General Manager, Al Arab News Channel

mental approach towards ISIS, which ceded the strategic intiative. Syria was vital, Richards argued, and there had to be a regional grand strategy.

Kodmani tackled another question from Safadi, who had suggested the moderate opposition in Syria had disappeared.

They still existed, Kodmani replied, but had no space to operate at present. The media focus was squarely on ISIS, while the moderate opposition had not received the funding that foreign states had given to armed groups. Only the US could enforce coherence on the various donors in support of a single strategy.

In closing, Fitzpatrick was pessimistic about the chances for an agreement with Iran. He thought Western states would act militarily if Iran got too close to nuclear capability, and for that reason Iran would stop short of acquiring a weapon. He rejected suggestions that Iran was justified in refusing to give up its enrichment capability in favour of imports. In particular, he criticised as fundamentally flawed the argument that Iran’s sunk costs impelled it to continue down the route of self-sufficiency.

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(l–r): Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, NonProliferation and Disarmament Programme, IISS; and General (Retd) Khalid Al Buainain, Chairman, Baynuna Group, President, Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis, and former Commander, UAE Air Force

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Special Session 1: Iran and the Region Beyond the Nuclear Negotiations The specific mandate of this rich and contentious session proved difficult to fulfil. When participants did manage to leave the nuclear issue behind, they often proved unwilling to move beyond the divisions that have plagued attempts to establish a new and more stable regional order.

Participants gathered soon after the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 powers had been extended by seven months. They heard updates on outstanding issues, including matters of verification and transparency, and finding mutually acceptable parameters for Iranian fuel-cycle capacity. In fact, the format of the negotiations was of as much interest as the content. A number of participants regretted the absence of an Arab state in the negotiations (and the lack of transparency towards Arab states), and were apprehensive of possible outcomes of the parallel bilateral US–Iranian track.

These concerns underpinned a broader Gulf unease that the US was, firstly, failing to recognise Iranian stalling tactics, and, secondly, moving to reach a regional settlement with Iran over the heads of other parties. Even stronger were Gulf

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participants’ complaints about Iranian interference in others’ domestic politics. Iran’s commitment to exporting revolution was described by one participant as part of a two-pronged foreign policy which also supposedly pledged non-interference.

This was greeted with the counter-accusation that Gulf states were to blame for the jihadist scourge of today’s Middle East.

It was argued that Iran posed a multi-faceted threat to regional security, not only through its support of revolution but also through its conventional, cyber and ballistic-mis-

(l–r): Dr Matthew Spence, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy, US; and Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Research Scholar, Princeton University, and former Head, Foreign Relations Committee, Supreme National Security Council, Iran

sile capabilities, and its disruptive potential in the Strait of Hormuz. These were matched by a substantial (and supposedly Asian-pivot-proof) US presence in the Gulf, consisting of advanced hardware and more than 35,000 personnel.

All agreed that no enduring solution to the problems of regional political order could be reached without the involvement of Iran. But just as problematic as the political-military stand-off in the region was the inheritance of mutual distrust, reinforced by contemporary developments, that prevented real Gulf–Iran dialogue from taking place. Here, the gap between two images of Iran – either as a putative hegemon seeking nuclear weapons, exporting sectarianism and Executive summary

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(l–r): Faris Al Mazrouei, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs for Security and Military Affairs, UAE; and Brett McGurk, Deputy Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, US Department of State

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destabilising its neighbours, or as an encircled, defensive victim – was palpable. So too was the reluctance of all parties to take the necessary first steps, in political terms, towards a comprehensive regional settlement.

Special Session 2: Regional Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Radicalisation Policies Participants agreed that defeating terrorism involved a sustained, multi-front effort in the region and beyond, not least because an estimated 16,000–18,000 of ISIS’s fighters were foreign. Tackling the ISIS threat required military action, efforts to disrupt its recruitment and revenue (especially through organised criminal activity) and to challenge its extremist ideology. A solid legal framework was part of the solution, but it was pointed out that the support of Western states may be difficult to sustain over the next decade or more if anti-terrorism laws were used in some regional states to curb the activity of opposition forces as well as extremists.

States have successfully formulated and implemented counter-terrorism plans in the past, but often old lessons were forgotten and states tended to overreact in the face of a new

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threat. Success depended on the state quickly correcting its stance and adopting an all-government approach to improve governance, thereby steadily reducing the terrorist threat to the point where it becomes a law-and-order problem. Looking at regional conflicts, participants agreed that it was important

(l–r): Emile Hokayem, Senior Fellow for Regional Security, IISS–Middle East; and Nigel Inkster, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk, IISS

to avoid state collapse because it created a vacuum in which terrorists could thrive. There was some disagreement over whether the Syrian state could be saved, or whether it had already collapsed.

Counter-radicalisation was focused in large part on an effort by more than 60 states to challenge the ideology, religious authority and narrative of extremist groups. ISIS’s discourse of inevitable victory followed by a utopian future stood at odds with the reality that many volunteers would either die or be arrested, and this was something governments could exploit. Video of atrocities in Syria and Iraq, committed by Sunni and Shia militants, had radicalised young people in both communities rapidly; it was not only a Sunni/ISIS phenomenon. Some participants stressed that the brutality of the Syrian government towards its own population was a driver of radicalism; others drew attention to the Executive summary

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(l–r) Andrew Gilmour, Political Director, Executive Office of the Secretary General, UN; and Professor Toby Dodge, Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East, IISS;

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negative impact of the aggressively sectarian policies of the Maliki government in Iraq.

Western governments faced a dilemma regarding their nationals who have fought in Syria and Iraq. A number of these fighters were disillusioned and would like to return home, but they feared arrest. These young people could be useful to establish a counter narrative to the ISIS message, but only if handled carefully. Although it was important to combat and defeat extremism ideologically, that was not the whole solution. As one participant remarked, many of the young recruits were malleable and sought excitement; winning the theological argument alone would not deliver victory.

Special Session 3: Preventing State Failure: Humanitarian and Geopolitical Approaches Worries about state failure and the possibility of regional failure pervaded the Dialogue and were addressed directly in this session. The experience of two decades of UN-led interventions in failed or failing states yielded four lessons.

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Arab states, specifically corruption and repression, that resulted in state failure in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya. Efforts to rebuild and strengthen states should therefore focus on empowering parliaments, rebuilding competent courts and defending personal freedoms. This was vital to restore trust between state and society.

(l–r) Lapo Pistelli, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Italy; and Mokhtar Lamani, Former Head, Office of the UN–League of Arab States Joint Special Representative for Syria

Secondly, intervening powers should not use excessive coercion or pursue a victor’s justice. De-Ba’athification in Iraq and the Political Isolation Law in Libya had played central roles in destabilising the new political settlements.

Thirdly, the international community had to act with speed when faced with the prospect of state failure: intervention in the Balkans came too late. Finally, there was a need for effective, detailed, long-range planning before an intervention was undertaken.

The post-2001 trend of ‘securitising’ the problems of the Middle East attracted particular criticism, because a weak state is deficient in three main areas: security, legitimacy and capacity. Securitisation leads to over-concentration on the first shortcoming, creating a high level of dependency between the exogenous supplier of security and the consuming state. The Executive summary

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(l–r): Dr Mohamad Maliki bin Osman, Minister of State for Defence and National Development, Singapore; and General Lloyd James Austin III, Commander, US Central Command

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EU had started to learn this lesson; only five of its 38 missions were primarily military in focus.

The panel then went on to examine both Syria and Iraq.

The Syrian crisis was multifaceted and existed at the local, national, regional and international levels simultaneously.

There were very high levels of mistrust at all of these levels.

Opposition forces at the local and national levels were so fractured that they could not be dealt with as a single entity. For this reason, the Geneva Two peace process was never likely to be productive.

The debate on Iraq generated several perspectives. Firstly, that the present crisis originated in a political process started under occupation. Secondly, that the 2003 invasion was a catalyst for the Arab revolutions of 2011, by encouraging democracy in the region. However, the failure to provide adequate security for six months after the invasion led to a division of society between those fighting the occupation and those wishing to democratise. It was necessary, particpants agreed, to enable indigenous local actors to drive the reconstitution of state power and legitimacy, in partnership with the international community.

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Special Session 4: Regional Military Cooperation Participants agreed that the region presently faced a binary challenge: the pressing need to cooperate to defeat ISIS and the long-term issue of crafting military cooperation to provide an effective and self-sustaining security architecture.

The overriding immediate security concern for the region, and beyond, was confronting and defeating ISIS, with several

(l–r): General The Lord Richards of Herstmonceux, Senior Adviser, IISS, and former Chief of the Defence Staff, UK; and General Sir Nicholas Houghton, Chief of the Defence Staff, UK

regional nations involved actively in supporting the US-led campaign. Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had contributed to the air campaign to strike at ISIS in Syria, while several European nations were taking part in air operations in Iraq.

The challenge of ISIS, by its very nature a pan-regional threat, required that it be countered militarily and ideologically on a multinational basis. Achieving this would probably be the work of a generation. The pacing of the military aspects of a counter-strategy, however, might pose potential difficulties for some local states: have their respective militaries the capacity to sustain prolonged operations, and may wider pressures risk stressing their civil societies? The emergence of ISIS had forced nations in the region to reassess intra-regional cooperation.

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The military defeat of ISIS in Iraq would shift the focus of the military campaign to Syria. This would present fresh problems, for while Iraq retained at least a notionally functioning – if degraded – army that could provide the basis of the required ground campaign, this was not the case in Syria.

Bolstering moderate opposition forces in Syria would also require time.

Looking beyond the huge challenge posed by ISIS, the region remained some way from supporting an adequate cooperative security arrangement to provide collective defence. Within the GCC there was still a considerable gap between ambition and actual capacity. There were doubts, for example, as to whether the GCC command-and-control infrastructure was robust and resilient enough to meet the kinds of threats it might actually face.

The existence of an external security guarantor, the US, was reassuring, but could paradoxically undercut local efforts to improve genuinely regional capacity. The back-stop of US military might ironically act as a brake on the impetus to develop an independent regional capability. There remained also the long-standing issue of Iran and how any regional security architecture could manage or perhaps even accommodate relations with Tehran.

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10TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 5–7 DECEMBER 2014

The IISS Manama Dialogue

CHAPTER 3

Press coverage Selected IISS publications

Dr Ibrahim Al Jaafari, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iraq

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Press coverage

UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office Press Release 5 December 2014

UK-Bahrain sign landmark defence agreement New arrangement will strengthen and expand existing UK MOD facilities in Bahrain In the margins of the 10th IISS Manama Dialogue, Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond signed a new defence arrangement with His Excellency Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed bin Mohammed AlKhalifa, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister and in the presence of HRH Prince Salman Bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, Crown Prince, Deputy Supreme Commander and first Deputy Prime Minister and UK Defence Secretary Michael Fallon.

The arrangement will improve onshore facilities at the Bahrain Defence Force (BDF) Mina Salman Port in Bahrain, where the UK has four mine-hunter warships permanently based and from where British Destroyers and Frigates in the Gulf are supported. Under the arrangement, the UK is planning to bolster the existing facilities at the Port, providing the Royal Navy with a forward operating base and a place to plan, store equipment for naval operations and accomodate Royal Navy personnel.

Commenting today, Philip Hammond said: “I’m delighted to have signed this arrangement with HE Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister, in the presence of HRH the Crown Prince. This will guarantee the presence of the Royal Navy in Bahrain well into the future. The expansion of Britain’s footprint builds upon our 30year track record of Gulf patrols and is just one ex-

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ample of our growing partnership with Gulf partners to tackle shared strategic and regional threats.”

Defence Secretary Michael Fallon added: “This new base is a permanent expansion of the Royal Navy’s footprint and will enable Britain to send more and larger ships to reinforce stability in the Gulf. We will now be based again in the Gulf for the long term.”

HE Sheikh Khalid said: “I am very pleased to sign this arrangement with the Foreign Secretary, marking a further step in the long cooperation between Bahrain and the United Kingdom. It reaffirms our joint determination to maintain regional security and stability in the face of challenging circumstances, and gives further strength to our multifaceted partnership. Bahrain looks forward to the early implementation of today’s arrangement, and to continuing to work with the UK and other partners to address threats to regional security.” © 2014, UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office Press Release Reprinted with permission

Associated Press 5 December 2014

Bahrain prince urges new name for extremist fight

By Adam Schreck MANAMA, Bahrain (AP) — A top Bahraini official called Friday for new ter-

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minology to describe the fight against extremists such as the Islamic State group that better describes their desire for theocratic rule.

Bahraini Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa issued the call at the start of the annual Manama Dialogue security conference in the tiny island nation, a key Western ally in the Middle East. He said the time has come to discard the term “war on terrorism” because it is misleading — describing the tool of extremists rather than their ideology — and because it fails to capture “the totality of our conflict.”

“We are not only fighting terrorists.

We are fighting theocrats,” the crown prince said.

Salman is next in line to lead Bahrain, which hosts the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet and is a member of the Americanled coalition fighting the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria. The Sunniruled kingdom has been roiled by ongoing low-level unrest following a 2011 Arab Spring-inspired uprising calling for greater political rights that was led by the country’s Shiite majority.

Salman’s comments reflect the sensitivity among many moderate Muslims that their religion is used by extremists.

The name of the Islamic State group in particular upsets many Muslims who reject its claims of a self-declared caliphate ruled by a violent interpretation of Islamic law. The group is also known as ISIS and ISIL as well as the Arabic name Daesh — a term the group itself disapproves of.

“This war we are engaged in cannot be against Islam ... It is unfair to those

of us who practice our religion responsibly,” the crown prince said. “It sullies the name of a great tradition ... that is divine and must be above politics.”

Salman suggested it might be more appropriate to use the term “fascist theocracy” to describe the extremists’ ideology.

“We must find a term we can all share,” he added. “We will be fighting these theocrats for a very long time.” © 2014, Associated Press Reprinted with permission

Gulf Daily News 6 December 2014

Terrorists posing ‘a real threat’

By Sandeep Singh Grewal GLOBAL leaders should focus their efforts on combating the spread of theocrats in the region, said Bahrain’s Crown Prince.

His Royal Highness Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, Crown Prince, Deputy Supreme Commander and First Deputy Premier was speaking during the opening of the 10th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Regional Security Summit: The Manama Dialogue 2014, which was held at the Ritz-Carlton Bahrain, Hotel and Spa last night.

“I call on you to disregard the term ‘war on terror’ and focus on the real threat which is the rise of these evil theocrats,” said Prince Salman.

“If we look at the strategic situation our war on terror is a little bit older than

10 years, but not by much, and I think the time has come for us to get rid of that name.

“It is a bit misleading.

“Terrorism is merely a tool used by people.”

He said the international community should name and shame groups that instigate extremist ideologies.

“The absurdity of having ISIL, ISIS, Daesh all representing one group, Al Qaeda, and God knows what else allows us to hot blindly and haphazardly from one threat to another without containing it,” he said.

“We will be fighting these theocrats for a very long time.

“Do we have the courage, moral and intellectual integrity to call them out for what they are?

“These are people who isolate themselves from the rest of the international community.

“These are people who disregard human life and do not value the social order and social contract that we established ourselves in the society.

“These are people who oppress women and these are people who slaughter anyone who does not condone or approve all or subscribe to their own twisted ideology.

“It is the ideology that must be named, shamed and must be contained and eventually must be defeated.”

Meanwhile, IISS director-general and chief executive Dr John Chipman said his organisation aimed to promote discussion within the GCC countries and their immediate neighbours such as Iran, Iraq and Yemen.

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He also said that the Manama Dialogue, over the last 10 years, has played a key role in regional security consultations.

“As a result, it is at the IISS Manama Dialogue that the strategic pulse of the region is most accurately taken,” he said.

“Increasingly, we expect that the Manama Dialogue will be a catalyst for governments to agree policies and arrangements with each other, using the Dialogue as an action-forcing event to spur defence diplomatic agreements.”

Dr Chipman also revealed plans to expand the IISS office in Bahrain by recruiting more staff and conducting research activities to develop a fresh strategy to support the Manama Dialogue process.

Meanwhile, Bahrain and the UK last night signed an agreement to strengthen and expand existing British Ministry of Defence facilities in the kingdom.

The arrangement will improve onshore facilities at the Bahrain Defence Force (BDF) base at Mina Salman, where the UK has four mine-hunter warships permanently based and from where British destroyers and frigates in the Gulf are supported. Under the arrangement, the UK is planning to bolster the existing facilities at the Port, providing the Royal Navy with a forward operating base and a place to plan, store equipment for naval operations and accommodate Royal Navy personnel.

The accord was signed, in the presence of His Royal Highness Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, Crown Prince, Deputy Supreme Commander and First Deputy Premier, by Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al

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Khalifa and British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond on the sidelines of the Manama Dialogue.

Deputy Premier Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Deputy Premier Jawad Al Arrayed and Minister of State for Defence Affairs Lieutenant General Dr Shaikh Mohammed bin Abdulla Al Khalifa, BDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Shaikh Daij bin Salman Al Khalifa and British Secretary of State for Defence Michael Fallon attended.

Shaikh Khalid described the agreement as an important step in the multifaceted partnership bonding Bahrain and the UK. “The agreement reflects joint keenness on supporting regional security and stability,” he said, stressing Bahrain’s keenness on implementing the deal soon as part of joint action with the UK and international partners to confront regional security challenges.

“I am very pleased to sign this arrangement, marking a further step in the long co-operation between Bahrain and the UK. It reaffirms our joint determination to maintain regional security and stability in the face of challenging circumstances, and gives further strength to our multifaceted partnership. Bahrain looks forward to the early implementation of today’s arrangement, and to continuing to work with the UK and other partners to address threats to regional security,” said Shaikh Khalid.

“I’m delighted to have signed this arrangement. This will guarantee the presence of the Royal Navy in Bahrain well into the future. The expansion of Britain’s footprint builds upon our 30-

year track record of Gulf patrols and is just one example of our growing partnership with Gulf partners to tackle shared strategic and regional threats,” Mr Hammond said.

“This new base is a permanent expansion of the Royal Navy’s footprint and will enable Britain to send more and larger ships to reinforce stability in the Gulf. We will now be based again in the Gulf for the long term,” Mr Fallon said. © 2014, Gulf Daily News Reprinted with permission

Agence France-Presse 6 December 2104

Britain to open new military base in Bahrain London (AFP) - Britain is to open a new military base in Bahrain, both countries announced, its first permanent base in the Middle East since it formally withdrew from the region in 1971.

The new base is part of a deal to increase cooperation in tackling security threats in the Middle East, ministers said Friday.

Gulf states including Bahrain have found common ground with the United States and European powers in opposing Islamic State militants, and its crown prince on Friday urged war on “evil theocracy”.

The tiny island kingdom is part of a US-led coalition carrying out airstrikes on the IS extremist group, which has

carved out vast areas of control in Syria and Iraq.

The agreement was reached at the annual Manama Dialogue regional security summit in Bahrain.

It means Britain will have a place to plan and to store equipment and will be able to add to the four mine-hunter warships based in Mina Salman Port, where Britain currently uses US facilities.

It will cost £15 million to build ($23 million, 19 million euros).

“This new base is a permanent expansion of the Royal Navy’s footprint and will enable Britain to send more and larger ships to reinforce stability in the Gulf,” said defence secretary Michael Fallon.

“We will now be based again in the Gulf for the long term.”

Britain withdrew from bases in the Gulf in 1971 as part of its plan to pull out from “East of Suez”.

Nicholas Houghton, head of the British armed forces, told BBC radio: “It’s the strategic importance of this. Rather than just being seen as a temporary deployment to an area for a specific operational purpose, this is more symbolic of the fact that Britain does enjoy interests in the stability of this region.”

Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Khalid al-Khalifa said the deal “reaffirms our joint determination to maintain regional security and stability in the face of challenging circumstances”.

“Bahrain looks forward to the early implementation of today’s arrangement, and to continuing to work with the UK and other partners to address threats to regional security,” Khalid said.

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Britain ended its troop presence in southern Iraq in 2009, leaving their bases in Basra built after the 2003 invasion.

Britain retains two sovereign bases on Cyprus in the Mediterranean. © 2014, Agence France-Presse Reprinted with permission

The National 6 December 2014

ISIL radicals threaten our way of life Editorial The UAE won’t rest in the war on terror, UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Abdullah stressed in a recent newspaper interview. “Our position in the fight against terrorism, by standing against terrorist acts and organisations of all forms and types, has remained clear and consistent for decades,” he said. The fight against ISIL would continue with all “necessary support”.

Now, Jordan’s King Abdullah, has reiterated just how seriously the region views the threat posed by the militants.

Speaking in the US before meeting Barack Obama on Friday, the king said that the war against ISIL was a “fight between good and evil” and called for stepped up action against the group. It was clear that he didn’t speak lightly and took the broadest possible view of the poisonous hate and brutal extremism espoused by such radical groups.

In a narrower sense, of course, Jordan is severely threatened by the unrest in the region. The spillover from

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the Syrian civil war has swelled that small country’s population by up to 15 per cent.

But both King Abdullah and Sheikh Abdullah have highlighted the broad, dangerously existential threat posed by ISIL. Moderate, outward looking Muslim countries like Jordan and the UAE are role models that ISIL, and radicals like them, would happily see wiped out.

More than any other single topic, what is to be done about ISIL was discussed over the weekend at the Manama Dialogue, an international security conference in Bahrain. Representatives came not merely from western and Gulf countries, but from Egypt, Yemen and Iraq, all of which are threatened by the rise of radicalism.

Taken together, these developments emphasise the importance of eliminating the scourge of radicalism. What is happening in Syria and Iraq is threatening the region for two reasons. Instability is making millions homeless and driving people into refugee camps.

More serious by far, is the threat that radical groups like ISIL pose to the idea of openness, innovation and equality, which characterise moderate Arab societies. This is why both Jordan and the UAE have taken such a forceful line against ISIL. Nothing would please the militants more than taking these open societies and turning them into barbaric, inward looking ones. King Abdullah and Sheikh Abdullah make clear this will not be allowed to happen. © 2014, The National Reprinted with permission

Agence France Presse 6 December 2014 La France a mis en garde samedi contre toute “complaisance” à l’égard de Téhéran, refusant de lier l’épineux dossier nucléaire à la participation iranienne à la lutte contre le groupe Etat islamique (EI).

“Si l’Iran souhaite lutter contre Daech (acronyme pour l’EI), c’est bien parce que ce groupe peut constituer une menace contre ses propres intérêts”, a déclaré le ministre français de la Défense Jean-Yves Le Drian lors du “Dialogue de Manama”, un forum annuel organisé par l’Institut international d’études stratégiques (IISS).

“Espérer un appui accru de l’Iran à nos efforts contre Daech en échange d’une complaisance de notre part sur les violations par Téhéran de ses engagements en matière de non-prolifération serait une erreur profonde”, a-t-il souligné.

A cet égard, le responsable français a réaffirmé la fermeté des grandes puissances sur le dossier nucléaire iranien: “Notre détermination collective à lutter contre les tentatives de Téhéran d’accéder à toute capacité nucléaire militaire demeure entière” et “il n’est pas possible d’envisager la sécurité régionale autrement”.

Mardi dernier, le Pentagone a révélé que des chasseurs-bombardiers iraniens, des F-4 Phantom, avaient mené des raids aériens contre des positions de l’EI dans l’est de l’Irak, près de la frontière iranienne.

Le lendemain, le secrétaire d’Etat américain John Kerry avait jugé que

toute frappe de l’Iran contre l’EI aurait “au final” un effet “positif”.

Sur le dossier nucléaire, l’Iran et les grandes puissances viennent de manquer une occasion de conclure un accord, mais Washington et Téhéran ont assuré que rien n’était perdu, la négociation se trouvant à nouveau prolongée de sept mois.

Comme un expert iranien, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, interpellait M. Le Drian en affirmant que rien ne prouvait que l’Iran cherchait à acquérir l’arme nucléaire, le ministre a répondu: “Non, je le sais pas. L’AIEA (Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique) ne le sait pas non plus”.

Et d’ajouter: “le meilleur moyen pour garantir votre interpellation, c’est d’aboutir à un accord lorsque le processus ira à son terme dans six mois. Merci d’y contribuer. Ce que nous souhaitons”.

La 10e édition du “Dialogue de Manama” s’est ouverte vendredi soir à Bahreïn et se poursuivra jusqu’à dimanche, en présence de délégations du monde entier comprenant des ministres de la Défense, des Affaires étrangères, des militaires, des diplomates et des experts en matière de sécurité.

La lutte internationale contre l’EI et la politique régionale de l’Iran ont largement dominé les débats de ce forum organisé chaque année à Bahreïn.

- Méfiance Cheikh Khaled ben Ahmed Al Khalifa, ministre des Affaires étrangères de ce petit royaume du Golfe qui abrite la Ve Flotte américaine, s’en est pris à Téhéran.

“Certains Etats régionaux caressent l’ambition de dominer l’ensemble

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de la région ou autant qu’ils le peuvent”, a-t-il affirmé, en déplorant que ces visées aboutissent à la “méfiance” et à un “manque de coopération et d’information” dans le contexte de la lutte contre les groupes jihadistes en Irak et en Syrie.

“Nous ne pouvons nous permettre d’être sélectifs dans le choix de nos alliés”, a déclaré son homologue irakien Ibrahim Al Jaafari, dont le pays est proche de Téhéran.

Le secrétaire d’Etat britannique aux Affaires étrangères Philip Hammond a reconnu que l’Iran était “un voisin difficile, mais important. Trop gros pour être ignoré” car ce pays est un “facteur vital pour l’avenir de la sécurité dans le Golfe”.

Concernant l’épineux dossier nucléaire, M. Hammond a estimé que la communauté internationale devait “choisir la persévérance au lieu de la commodité”: ne rien céder sur l’enrichissement de l’uranium, au lieu de “succomber à la tentation de faire des concessions imprudentes”.

De son côté, le ministre égyptien des Affaires étrangères Sameh Choukri, interrogé sur les ambitions de la nouvelle Egypte, a déclaré que Le Caire souhaitait “s’impliquer davantage” dans les affaires régionales après les turbulences de ces quatre dernières années.

Cependant, a-t-il ajouté, “nous n’avons pas besoin de créer de nouvelle entité ou d’architecture” régionale, la Ligue arabe et le Conseil de coopération du Golfe remplissant selon lui ces fonctions. © 2014, Agence France Presse Reprinted with permission

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Sunday Telegraph 6 December 2014

Britain returns ‘East of Suez’ with permanent Royal Navy base in Gulf

By Richard Spencer Britain is to open a permanent Royal Navy base in the Gulf as it seeks a return “East of Suez” in a major strategic reversal of course, Philip Hammond, the Foreign Secretary, said on Saturday.

Mr Hammond said that Britain and France were intending to take up a greater security role in the Middle East as the United States “pivoted” towards Asia.

The base, which will host the Royal Navy’s Type 45 destroyers as well as the two new aircraft carriers it is building, will mark a return to the Gulf 40 years after Britain pulled out in the early 1970s and wound down its overseas Empire.

“As the United States focuses more of its effort on the Asia-Pacific region, we and our European partners will be expected to take a greater share of the burden in the Gulf, the Near East and North Africa,” Mr Hammond said.

David Cameron’s new government four years ago made reviving Britain’s old alliance with the Gulf states the key priority of its foreign policy, with highlevel visits arranged immediately for Liam Fox, then defence secretary.

That was called into question almost

immediately as the Arab Spring drew renewed attention to the Gulf’s record on human rights, including in Bahrain, and was also set back by Mr Fox’s resignation over the role played by his adviser Adam Werritty on his trips to the region.

However, Mr Hammond said that stability in the Gulf was a vital British interest, and rejected calls to “leave the Middle East to sort out their own affairs”.

He also said that talks were under way for a greater army role in the region, saying that Britain was exploring the possibility of using joint training facilities in one or other Gulf state.

There has been concern in the armed forces that following the withdrawal from first Iraq and this year Afghanistan the army would lose experience in Middle East conditions, even though the region remains the most likely focus of British future military involvement.

“We are looking at how we can maintain the readiness of our land forces for ‘hot and dry conditions’ warfare,” Mr Hammond told The Telegraph.

The new base, at a cost of £15 million, will upgrade the facilities used by four British minehunters currently working out of the Gulf.

It will enable sailors to be based permanently in Bahrain, along with their families, and massively expand the capabilities of the Mina Salman port, where the minehunters are based.

“This will guarantee the presence of the Royal Navy in Bahrain well into the future,” Mr Hammond said, as he signed an agreement with the Bahraini foreign minister, Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa.

“The expansion of Britain’s footprint builds upon our 30-year track record of Gulf patrols and is just one example of our growing partnership with Gulf partners to tackle shared strategic and regional threats.”

The then defence secretary Dennis Healey announced in 1968 that British troops would be withdrawn from all major military bases “East of Aden”.

The decision, often described as the East of Suez declaration in reference to a poem by Rudyard Kipling, came amid economic crisis following the Harold Wilson government’s devaluation of the pound and was seen as marking a formal end of the British Empire.

The Gulf states were awarded independence in 1971, and frequently bemoan the loss of British interest in the region. By contrast, the French have been investing heavily in recent years, opening a joint air, naval and land base in Abu Dhabi with the United Arab Emirates in 2009.

That base, however, cannot take the French flagship and aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle.

Mr Hammond said that the security of the “homeland” began abroad.

“Your security is our security,” he told the Manama Dialogue, a conference on Middle East affairs held by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Bahrain’s capital.

Britain’s determination to strengthen relations with the Gulf will be criticised by human rights and anti-arms trade campaigners. Bahrain, supported by troops from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, put down an uprising led by the coun-

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try’s Shia majority at the start of the Arab Spring in 2011, and continues to jail activists.

On Thursday, one prominent activist, Zainab al-Khawaja, was jailed for three years for tearing up a picture of Bahrain’s King Hamad al-Khalifa.

Her father, Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, is currently serving a life term for his involvement in the 2011 protests, while her sister, Maryam, who is currently in exile in Denmark was sentenced to a year in jail in absentia on charges of assaulting police. © 2014, Sunday Telegraph Reprinted with permission

Financial Times 7 December 2014

Bahrain naval base will give UK stronger Gulf presence

By Elizabeth Dickinson The rising threat from extremist group Isis, a deteriorating civil war in Syria, and the possibility of a nuclear Iran are among the threats that a £15m permanent British naval base in Bahrain will aim to combat, taking up some of the burden from the US military as it shifts its focus toward Asia.

The base, which is planned to open in 2016, will include accommodation for crews and facilities to support and resupply vessels, as well as support the long-term deployment of frigates and destroyers.

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The Royal Navy has used Bahrain’s Mina Salman Port since withdrawing from permanent bases in the region in 1971, but larger ships deployed in the region have been stationed in UK ports and docked only temporarily in Bahrain, with crews sleeping on board.

London will now have a permanent presence and, in addition to an existing air base in the United Arab Emirates, may expand land exercises in the region.

“This is an extremely important region for us. We have commercial interests here but also political interests,” UK defence secretary Michael Fallon told the FT. “There are a number of the threats in this region that have been engaging us very directly . . . and affect our own security.”

In the immediate term, the naval base could enhance the UK’s role in the 60-nation international coalition fighting Isis. “A lot of our effort now in Iraq is going to be training, with deployed trainers [stationed] around the new facilities that are being proposed,” Mr Fallon said. “Having an air base and naval base gives us more options.”

The UK also expects to be involved in training moderate opposition forces in Syria to combat Isis, “taking them away from the front lines to Jordan or Saudi. We’re scoping that at the moment,” he said.

The Royal Navy will also now be able to position its most advanced destroyer, the Type 45, as well as aircraft carriers, in the region.

“That means you can have bigger air support to bring into the battlefield,

whether in Iraq or countries facing crisis in the future,” says Riad Kahwaji, founder and chief executive of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis in Dubai.

The UK is expanding its engagement in the Gulf as the US has been perceived to be withdrawing as part of a commitment to “pivot to Asia”. The US Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain.

“Clearly as the US focuses more of its effort on the Asia Pacific region, we and our European partners will be expected to take a greater share of the burden in the Gulf,” UK foreign secretary Philip Hammond told journalists this weekend, where he was attending the Manama Dialogue, an annual security conference.

This may include expanded British use of Gulf-based land training facilities, as the UK seeks to maintain the readiness of forces to fight in the same “hot and dry” conditions they previously faced in Afghanistan, he said.

In addition to its own capabilities, the UK will use its regional presence to encourage co-operation between Gulf states on security. The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain have all taken part in air strikes against Isis in Iraq.

When the UK naval base deal was signed on Friday, Bahrain’s foreign minister Sheikh Khaled Al Khalifa said it would solidify a strong UK partnership.

A coalition of opposition parties in Bahrain said they had “deep concern” that the base could place Bahrain “at the centre of the tension and the con-

sequences taking place in countries of the region”.

Mr Fallon said he did not think the base would have an impact on domestic politics in Bahrain. © 2014, Financial Times Reprinted with permission

Gulf News 7 December 2014

Daesh must be fought on political, theological and military fronts, leaders say Manama meeting supports need to nurturing open minds, encouraging critical thinking

By Francis Matthew Manama: The struggle against terrorists and extremists is not only a military or security issue, and many participants in the Manama Dialogue recognise the necessity to engage Daesh on a theological and emotional level, and take back control of the agenda from the terrorists.

Many of the senior politicians at the meeting are well aware that the military effort to defeat Daesh must be combined with an immediate political solution, but also that any genuine long term answer has to come from winning the battle of ideas.

This priority has been recognised in the UAE for some time. His High-

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ness Shaikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice-President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, made an important statement a month ago when he spoke of the importance of nurturing open minds, encouraging critical thinking, and stable institutions, in fighting the terrorists ideologies.

Very similar ideas were being discussed this week in Bahrain at the Manama Dialogue organised by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in conjunction with the Government of Bahrain.

Crown Prince Salman Bin Hamad Al Khalifa spoke of the necessity to resist the fascist theology of Daesh, and the importance of containing the evil ideas that allows a single man at the top of power to strip any of his followers’ place in the hereafter.

Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmad Al Khalifa emphasised the importance in tackling the terrorists’ ideology in a sustainable way that will offer a winning challenge that will last for generations. “Our problem is that we have not been as enthusiastic about speaking the truth as our enemies have been about their ideas,” he said.

“We need to organise so that we can ensure that future generations will not be terrorists,” said Shaikh Khalid. “Part of this is building democracy and sustainable institutions, and safeguarding the rights of citizens. People need to feel they belong to the state.”

In this context, Shaikh Khalid spoke on the importance of open education, echoing what many others have said when looking at how to tackle terror.

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“We need education that is based on true Islamic values of critical thinking.

We need scholars and thinkers to speak up and give voice to our heritage” Dr Ebrahim Al Jaafari, Iraq’s Foreign Minister and former prime minister, spoke passionately about the terrible ideas emanating from Daesh that “have nothing to do with Islam. They are a plague that is spreading, and is totally removed from the peace that is in Islam.”

“But the roots of finding a cultural nemesis for this plague of Daesh is in standing up for human rights, and standing with the people as individuals against this threat,” he said.

Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry who is a former foreign ministry professional, said that fighting terror also needs a culture willing to oppose it on the intellectual and emotional level.

He spoke of the importance of a recent meeting between Mohammad Ahmad Al Tayyeb, the Grand Imam of Al Azhar with Coptic Pope Tawadros when both religious leaders recognised the tolerance that is embedded in Islam.

Shoukry saw this meeting as one move in a process of denying the extremists any credibility and he was vehement on the need to change the discourse away from that dominated by the radicals and to deny any political goals that function under the alibi of religion. © 2014, Gulf News Reprinted with permission

Straits Times 8 December 2014

Wary Gulf states rekindle plans for closer union Although there is no love lost between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, all six Gulf kingdoms recognise a common enemy in terrorism

By Jonathan Eyal IN LARGE swathes of the Middle East, anarchy and bloodshed are the order of the day. But in one important part of the region - the Gulf - the narrative appears to go in the opposite direction: towards a greater union between Arab states and a determination to enhance stability.

Pan-Arab assistance was the dominant theme of the discussions that took place between defence and foreign ministers from the Gulf states when they assembled for the so-called Manama Dialogue over the weekend - a local annual security conference organised in the Bahraini capital by the International Institute for Strategic Studies along lines similar to Singapore’s Shangri-La Dialogue.

Furthermore, later this week, at a summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the region’s heads of state are planning to announce a number of new initiatives designed to bind their economies and militaries closer together.

Although considerable doubt remains over the GCC’s ability to either protect its members from future trouble or impose stability in other parts of the Middle East, there is no question that all of its current efforts are positive and help counteract the otherwise depressing news from the region.

When Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman founded the GCC in 1981, few questioned the organisation’s relevance. All six GCC members are Sunni monarchies and, at that time, all were threatened by Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution. Sticking together made more than just common sense - it was a matter of survival.

Nor is there much doubt that, over the three subsequent decades, a common GCC identity has evolved among the region’s 50 million people.

Nevertheless, the differences between individual nations have remained far more important than the similarities.

Bahrain and the UAE, for instance, represent societies more open to foreign investment and receptive to foreign influence, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait adhere to more conservative codes of behaviour and government.

All are oil- and gas-rich, apart from Bahrain, which has almost no energy wealth. And all are very small, apart from Saudi Arabia, which dwarfs the entire region in every conceivable way.

Even regarding Iran - still viewed by all as an existential threat - there never was complete agreement about what the region’s states should do: While Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia re-

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mained keen to contain Iran’s influence, Qatar and Oman often argued that engagement was the only way of dealing with the Iranians.

The result was that, even though pledges for deeper regional cooperation were frequently made, little coordination was actually achieved.

A Customs union proclaimed in 2003 got nowhere, and will be up again for negotiations this week. A single currency was supposed to have been launched in 2010, but has since been postponed for at least another decade.

And a joint regional military command structure touted for years has remained just a slogan, as individual countries procured their own weapons and training from sources as far apart as France and the United States, or Britain and South Korea.

Given such a yawning gap between rhetoric and accomplishments, why should anyone take the forthcoming GCC summit with its routine promises of pan-Arab unity any more seriously?

Well, the latest wave of revolutions sweeping through the Middle East has reminded the Gulf’s Arab states just how vulnerable they are and how much they actually do need each other.

The GCC initially responded to the popular revolutions that erupted in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria in the only way it knew: by tightening internal security, and by offering lavish welfare benefits to its people in order to buy their acquiescence. But Qatar trailblazed in a different way: Instead of trying to isolate the revolutionary bacteria spreading through the region, it used

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its considerable wealth to embrace the revolutionaries instead.

The sight of the conservative, fabulously rich Qatari monarchy making friends with Muslim Brotherhood revolutionaries, who are committed to reshaping the Arab world by sweeping away all crowned heads, stunned other regional leaders and generated an antiQatari backlash that almost brought about the GCC’s demise. Earlier this year, Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia withdrew their ambassadors from the Qatari capital of Doha, and the region was rife with rumours that even a military confrontation between Qatar and its neighbours was no longer in the realm of fantasy.

Ultimately, however, the Gulf states grudgingly accepted that they needed one another far more than they cared to acknowledge in public.

Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood came to nothing, as the Brotherhood government was overthrown by the military in Egypt. Qatar realised that, although plenty of money goes a long way, cash has its limitations.

A country of 2.2 million inhabitants, of whom only 200,000 are native citizens, Qatar had simply over-reached itself and was in danger of becoming a pariah in the Arab world. It thus relented and prepared last week to return to the GCC fold by promising to cease its financial support for revolutionary movements, and by offering to tone down the criticism of other Arab monarchies broadcast by the Al Jazeera TV network, which is financed mostly by the Qatari government.

But the Saudis and the Kuwaitis who brokered this deal had to swallow their pride as well by accepting that Qatar’s views had to be taken into account, and by agreeing to attend the upcoming GCC summit, which will be hosted by Qatar. There is no love lost between the Qataris and the Saudis - even so, they all acknowledge that a return to public spats is no good for anyone.

One reason for this rekindled Gulf unity is the realisation that, if left unchecked, the violence promoted by the terrorist organisation that goes by the name of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as well as the vicious civil wars raging in Syria and Iraq threaten to suck in the entire Middle East. As Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed al Khalifa put it recently, “if Afghanistan was a primary school for terrorists, then Syria and Iraq are a university for them”. The common threat of terrorism is binding the GCC together.

Still, a greater driver for unity remains fear of a potentially nucleararmed Iran, coupled with the suspicion that the US no longer has the will or the interest to remain the Gulf’s pre-eminent power, and that Washington will either betray the Gulf monarchies as part of a new carve-up of spheres of influence in the Middle East or simply lose interest in ensuring their protection.

Most of these fears are misplaced. If anything, US President Barack Obama’s ability to make concessions to Iran is diminishing, given that a new Republican-dominated Congress will start work next month.

The US will maintain its current deployments in the Middle East, including the large airbase at Al Udeid in Qatar and a sizeable number of troops in Kuwait.

And despite all its planned defence expenditure cuts, the US will continue to keep one aircraft carrier group permanently stationed in the region. It’s ludicrous to suggest that the US will pull out of the Gulf - the Fifth Fleet deployed there is larger than the navies of most countries around the world.

Finally, Britain has just announced that it is re-establishing a permanent naval presence in Bahrain, overturning half a century of post-imperial withdrawal from the region.

By all accounts, therefore, the last thing that the GCC should worry about is the danger of being ignored. However, considering the huge and unexpected changes that have already taken place in the Middle East, Gulf leaders can be excused for refusing to feel reassured.

The thaw in relations between the GGC nations is still in its infancy. The Saudis suspect that, soon after the upcoming GCC summit ends, Qatar will return to its previous stance. The Qataris, in turn, fear that the concessions they have offered the Saudis will be followed by even more demands to conform to broader Saudi foreign and security priorities.

Nevertheless, the efforts that the GCC is about to initiate towards the creation of a more unified political and military structure make perfect sense.

Although Gulf rulers will never be in a position to address the broader problems in the Middle East, they might at

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least be capable of preventing violence in the region from spreading further.

That, by the current standards of the Middle East, would still be quite an achievement. © 2014, Straits Times Reprinted with permission

Times of India 9 December 2014

India should try Turkish example to get hostages freed: Iraqi foreign minister

By Indrani Bagchi MANAMA (BAHRAIN): Iraq says India could use the Turkish example to try and free its 39 workers from ISIS captivity. In an exclusive chat with TOI on the sidelines of an international security meet here, Iraqi foreign minister Ibrahim Al Jaafari said the Iraqi army did not yet control Mosul and surrounding areas.

“When our army retakes those areas, and if we find the Indian hostages still there, we will keep them safe,” he said. But looking doubtful, Al Jaafari added, “One should have no expectations of this terror group. Their brutality and inhumanity are new lows in human behaviour.”

When ISIS (known by its Arabic name Daesh in this region) overran Mosul in northern Iraq in June, it captured 49 Turks from Turkey’s mission there.

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Three months later, in late September, Turkey succeeded in freeing its hostages. When questioned, Turkish Prime Minister Reccep Tayyip Erdogan denied that any ransom had been paid for the hostages. But subsequent news reports suggested that Turkey may have exchanged its nationals for an unspecified number of ISIS militants in its prisons.

Erdogan himself indicated this could be possible, he was quoted as saying that Israel too had released 1,500 Palestinians in return for one of their own.

It is impossible that India would be able to do so, being so far away from Iraq. Foreign minister Sushma Swaraj told Parliament last week that the government continued to hunt for the Indian hostages through a secretive web of shadowy organizations. Informing Parliament of the latest state of negotiations, Swaraj admitted that while she had no concrete proof of life, she couldn’t say with any certainty that they were dead either. The government, she said, would continue the search.

Laborating on the threat from Daesh, Al Jaafari said the world was fighting a global war against terrorism. “They are not limited to a certain country. It’s true they are in Iraq now but the members of Daesh (ISIS) span five continents -- Asia, Africa, America, Europe and Australia.

They recruited people from all continents for this fight. This means we are in the frontline of globalized terrorism.

And we must retaliate with a global response,” he said.

Calling for assistance from other countries, Al Jaafari told the Manama Dialogue (an annual meet on Gulf se-

curity by International Institute for Strategic Studies) that ISIS represented no religion and it was imperative to confront it, including the young generation before it spread its tentacles in other societies. He ascribed the terrorist attack in Canada’s Parliament earlier this year to the spread of ISIS’s ideology and practices.

Al Jaafari’s plea to the region came even as Iran confirmed that it had carried out air strikes against ISIS positions in northern Iraq on the request of the Iraqi government. Al Jaafari himself said air strikes from “friendly” countries were permissible if they conformed to UN Security Council recommendations. © 2014, Times of India Reprinted with permission

Press coverage

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Selected IISS publications

Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, the Institute’s bi-monthly journal, is a leading forum for analysis and debate of international and strategic affairs. Recent articles of interest include: Fishman, Ben, ‘Jordan: Caught in the Middle Again’, Survival, vol. 56, no.

6, December 2014–January 2015, pp.

39–48.

Farwell, James P., ‘The Media Strategy of ISIS’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 6, December 2014–January 2015, pp.

49–55.

Hokayem, Emile, ‘Iran, the Gulf States, and the Syrian Civil War’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 6, December 2014– January 2015, pp. 59–86.

Lister, Charles, ‘Assessing Syria’s Jihad’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 6, December 2014–January 2015, pp.

87–112.

Barkey, Henri J., ‘Turkey’s Syria Predicament’, Survival, vol. 56, no.

6, December 2014–January 2015, pp.

113–34.

Dodge, Toby, ‘Can Iraq Be Saved’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 5, October– November 2014, pp. 7–20.

Fetzek, Shiloh, and Mazo, Jeffrey, ‘Climate, Scarcity and Conflict’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 5, October– November 2014, pp. 143–70.

Roberts, Daniel B., ‘Qatar and the Brotherhood’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 4, August–September 2014, pp. 23–32.

Alsayed, Wafa, ‘The Impatience of Youth: Political Activism in the Gulf’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 4, August– September 2014, pp. 91–106.

Ozkan, Behlül, ‘Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 4, August–September 2014, pp. 119–140.

Stevenson, Jonathan, ‘The Syrian Tragedy and Precedent’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 3, June–July 2014, pp.

121–140.

Taspinar, Omer, ‘The End of the Turkish Model’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 2, April– May 2014, pp. 49–64.

Chubin, Shahram, ‘Is Iran a Military Threat’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 2, April– May 2014, pp. 65–88.

Selected IISS publications

71

Tanner, Rolf, ‘Narrative and Conflict in the Middle East’, Survival, vol. 56, no.

2, April–May 2014, pp. 89–108.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, ‘Overwhelming Global Vote for the Iran Nuclear Deal’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 1, February–March 2014, pp. 71–75.

Byman, Daniel, ‘Sectarianism Afflicts the New Middle East’, Survival, vol.

56, no. 1, February–March 2014, pp.

79–100.

Gaub, Florence, ‘Libya’s Recipe for Disaster’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 1, February–March 2014, pp. 101–20.

Mina, James, and Serwer, Daniel, ‘Circumventing Hormuz’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 1, February–March 2014, pp. 121–38.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, ‘Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 6, December 2013–January 2014, pp. 107–14.

Brockmeier, Sarah, ‘Germany and the Intervention in Libya’, Survival, vol.

55, no. 6, December 2013–January 2014, pp. 63–90.

Larrabee, Stephen F., ‘Turkey’s New Kurdish Opening’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 5, October–November 2013, pp.

133–46.

Simon, Steven, ‘Egypt’s Sorrow and America’s Limits’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 5, October–November 2013, pp.

79–84.

Peel, Michael, ‘Africa and the Gulf’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 4, August– September 2013, pp. 143–54.

Guzansky, Yoel and Yadlin, MajorGeneral (retd) Amos, ‘The Arab World’s Response to an Israeli Attack on Iran’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 4, August–September 2013, pp.

107–20.

Borghard, Erica D. and Rapp-Hooper, Mira, ‘Hizbullah and the Iranian Nuclear Programme’, Survival, vol.

55, no. 4, August–September 2013, pp. 85–106.

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Jones, Peter, ‘Hope and Disappointment: Iran and the Arab Spring’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 4, August–September 2013, pp. 73–84.

Jones, Seth G., ‘Syria’s Growing Jihad’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 4, August– September 2013, pp. 53–72.

Serwer, Daniel, ‘Muddling Through in Iraq’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 4, August– September 2013, pp. 35–40.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, ‘Reinforce Rowhani’s Mandate for Change’, Survival, vol.

55, no. 4, August–September 2013, pp. 31–34.

McCrisken, Trevor, ‘Obama’s Drone War’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 2, April– May 2013, pp. 97–122.

Bronk, Christopher and Tikk-Ringas, Eneken, ‘The Cyber Attack on Saudi Aramco’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 2, April–May 2013, pp. 81–96.

Charap, Samuel, ‘Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 1, February–March 2013, pp. 35–41.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, ‘Iran Will Determine Obama’s Legacy’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 6, December 2012–January 2013, pp. 41–46.

Barrie, Douglas, ‘Libya’s Lessons: The Air Campaign’, Survival, vol. 54, no.

6, December 2012–January 2013, pp.

57–65.

Chivvis, Christopher S., ‘Libya and the Future of Liberal Intervention’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 6, December 2012–January 2013, pp. 69–92.

Freilich, Charles D., ‘Striking Iran: The Debate in Israel’, Survival, vol. 54, no.

6, December 2012–January 2013, pp.

93–106.

Clayton, Blake and Levi, Michael, ‘The Surprising Sources of Oil’s Influence’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 6, December 2012–January 2013, pp.

107–22.

Barkey, Henri J., ‘Turkish–Iranian Competition after the Arab Spring’,

Survival, vol. 54, no. 6, December 2012–January 2013, pp. 139–62.

Jones, Erik, ‘Turkey Reconsidered’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 6, December 2012–January 2013, pp. 163–70.

Mousavian, Hossein, ‘Iran, the US and Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 5, October– November 2012, pp. 183–202.

Allin, Dana H., ‘Rumours of War’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 2, April–May 2012, pp. 211–20.

Elleman, Michael, ‘Containing Iran’s Missile Threat’, Survival, vol. 54, no.

1, February–March 2012, pp. 119–26.

Parasiliti, Andrew, ‘Leaving Iraq’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 1, February– March 2012, pp. 127–33.

Parasiliti, Andrew, ‘Closing the Deal with Iran’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 4, August–September 2012, pp. 33–41.

McKean, David, ‘After Iraq: The Trigger Doctrine’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 1, February–March 2012, pp. 159–74.

Stein, Ewan, ‘Revolution or Coup?

Egypt’s Fraught Transition’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 4, August–September 2012, pp. 45–66.

Dobbins, James, ‘Coping with a Nuclearising Iran’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 6, December 2011–January 2012, pp. 37–50.

Phillips, Christopher, ‘Syria’s Torment’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 4, August– September 2012, pp. 67–82.

Perthes, Volker, ‘Europe and the Arab Spring’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 6, December 2011–January 2012, pp.

73–84.

Farwell, James P. and Rohozinski, Rafal, ‘The New Reality of Cyber War’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 4, August– September 2012, pp. 107–20.

Keynoush, Banafsheh, ‘Iran after Ahmadinejad’, Survival, vol. 54, no.

3, June–July 2012, pp. 127–46.

Dodge, Toby, ‘Iraq’s Road Back to Dictatorship’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 3, June–July 2012, pp. 147168.

Hokayem, Emile, ‘Syria and its Neighbours’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 2, April–May 2012, pp. 7–14.

Samaan, Jean-Loup, ‘Jordan’s New Geopolitics’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 2, April–May 2012, pp. 15–26.

Bleek, Philipp C. and Stein, Aaron, ‘Turkey and America Face Iran’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 2, April–May 2012, pp. 27–38.

Bellodi, Leonardo, ‘Libya’s Assets and the Question of Sovereignty’, Survival, vol. 54, no. 2, April–May 2012, pp. 39–45.

Long, Austin and Radin, Andrew, ‘Enlisting Islam for an Effective Afghan Police’, Survival, vol. 54, no.

2, April–May 2012, pp. 113–28.

Springborg, Robert, ‘The Precarious Economics of Arab Springs’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 6, December 2011– January 2012, pp. 85–104.

Jones, Peter, ‘Succession and the Supreme Leader in Iran’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 6, December 2011– January 2012, pp. 105–26.

Barry, Ben, ‘Libya’s Lessons’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 5, October–November 2011, pp. 5–14.

Clary, Christopher and Karlin, Mara E., ‘Saudi Arabia’s Reform Gamble’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 5, October– November 2011, pp. 15–20.

Innocent, Malou, ‘Should America Liberate Afghanistan’s Women?’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 5, October– November 2011, pp. 31–52.

Esfandiary, Dina and Fitzpatrick, Mark, ‘Sanctions on Iran: Defining and Enabling “Success”’, Survival, vol.

53, no. 5, October–November 2011, pp. 143–156.

Rasul al-Sheikh, Safa and Sky, Emma, ‘Iraq Since 2003: Perspectives on a Divided Society’, Survival, vol. 53, no.

4, August–September 2011, pp. 119–42.

Selected IISS publications

73

Larrabee, F. Stephen and Tol, Gonul, ‘Turkey’s Kurdish Challenge’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 4, August– September 2011, pp. 143–52.

Levi, Michael A., ‘Drawing the Line on Iranian Enrichment’, Survival, vol.

53, no. 4, August–September 2011, pp. 169–96.

Inkster, Nigel, ‘The Death of Osama bin Laden’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 3, June– July 2011, pp. 5–10.

Stevenson, Jonathan, ‘Echoes of Gunfire: bin Laden, the US and the Greater Middle East’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 3, June–July 2011, pp. 11–18.

Mendelsohn, Barak, ‘Al-Qaeda’s Franchising Strategy’, Survival, vol.

53, no. 3, June–July 2011, pp. 29–50.

Jones, Bruce D., ‘Libya and the Responsibilities of Power’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 3, June–July 2011, pp.

51–60. van Genugten, Saskia, ‘Libya after Gadhafi’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 3, June–July 2011, pp. 61–74.

Menon, Anand, ‘European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 3, June–July 2011, pp. 75–90.

Allin, Dana H. and Jones, Erik, ‘As Good as it Gets?’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 3, June–July 2011, pp. 205–16.

Johnstone, Sarah and Mazo, Jeffrey, ‘Global Warming and the Arab Spring’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 2, April– May 2011, pp. 11–17.

Fakhro, Elham and Hokayem, Emile, ‘Waking the Arabs’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 2, April–May 2011, pp. 21–30.

Lynch, Marc, ‘America and Egypt After the Uprisings’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 2, April–May 2011, pp. 31–42.

Karawan, Ibrahim A., ‘Politics and the Army in Egypt’, Survival, vol. 53, no.

2, April–May 2011, pp. 43–50.

Al Sharekh, Alanoud, ‘Reform and Rebirth in the Middle East’, Survival,

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vol. 53, no. 2, April–May 2011, pp.

51–60.

Khatib, Lina, ‘Hizbullah’s Political Strategy’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 2, April–May 2011, pp. 61–76.

Whelan, Richard, ‘Al-Qaeda’s Theorist’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 2, April–May 2011, pp. 159–66.

Fandy, Mamoun, ‘Notes from Tahrir Square’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 2, April–May 2011, pp. 221–24.

Alkadiri, Raad, ‘Iraq: Back to the Future’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 1, February– March 2011, pp. 5–12.

Farwell, James P. and Rohozinski, Rafal, ‘Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War’, Survival, vol. 53, no. 1, February–March 2011, pp. 23–40.

Phillips, Sarah, ‘Al-Qaeda and the Struggle for Yemen’, Survival, vol.

53, no. 1, February–March 2011, pp.

95–120.

Allin, Dana H. and Simon, Steven, ‘Obama’s Dilemma: Iran, Israel and the Rumours of War’, Survival, vol.

52, no. 6, December 2010–January 2011, pp. 15–44.

Tertrais, Bruno, ‘A Nuclear Iran and NATO’, Survival, vol. 52, no. 6, December 2010–January 2011, pp.

45–62.

Farwell, James P., ‘Jihadi Video in the “War of Ideas”’, Survival, vol. 52, no.

6, December 2010–January 2011, pp.

127–50.

The Adelphi series of books is the Institute’s principal contribution to policy-relevant, original academic research.

Recent publications include: Dodge, Toby, and Hokayem, Emile, Middle Eastern Security, the US Pivot and the Rise of ISIS, Adelphi 447–8, Routledge for the IISS, 2014.

Hokayem, Emile, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant, Adelphi 438, Routledge for the IISS, 2013.

Dodge, Toby, Iraq: From War to a new Authoritarianism, Adelphi 434–5, Routledge for the IISS, 2012.

Dodge, Toby, Redman, Nicholas, Afghanistan to 2015 and Beyond, Adelphi 425–6, Routledge for the IISS, 2011.

Phillips, Sarah, Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, Adelphi 420, Routledge for the IISS, 2011.

Akkoyunlu, Karabekir, Military Reform and Democratisation: Turkish and Indonesian Experiences at the Turn of the Millennium, Adelphi Paper 392, Routledge for the IISS, 2007.

The Strategic Dossier series harnesses the Institute’s technical expertise to present detailed information on key strategic issues.

Recent publications include:

Berdal , Mats and Wennmann, Achim, Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace: Economic Perspectives, Adelphi 412–3, Routledge for the IISS, 2010.

Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities: A Net Assessment, IISS, 2011.

Bisley, Nick, Building Asia’s Security, Adelphi 408, Routledge for the IISS, 2009.

Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the shadow of Iran, IISS, 2008.

Synnott, Hilary, Transforming Pakistan: Ways Out of Instability, Adelphi 407, Routledge for the IISS, 2009.

Raine, Sarah, China’s African Challenges, Adelphi 406, Routledge for the IISS, 2009.

Hughes, Christopher W, Japan’s Remilitarisation, Adelphi 405, Routledge for the IISS, 2009.

Hashim, Ahmed S, Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency, Adelphi Paper 402, Routledge for the IISS, 2009.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding Worst-Case Outcomes, Adelphi Paper 398, Routledge for the IISS, 2008.

Perkovich, George and Acton, James M, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, Adelphi Paper 396, Routledge for the IISS, 2008.

Kurth Cronin, Audrey, Ending Terrorism: Lessons for defeating al-Qaeda, Adelphi Paper 394, Routledge for the IISS, 2008.

Ansari, Ali M, Iran under Ahmadinejad: The Politics of Confrontation, Adelphi Paper 393, Routledge for the IISS, 2007.

Iran’s Nuclear, Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, IISS, 2010.

Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks: A Net Assessment, IISS, 2007.

Strategic Comments is the Institute’s online source of analysis of international security and politico-mili­tary issues. Recent articles of interest include: ‘Libya’s civil war: the essential briefing’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 50 – February 2015.

‘Turkey’s Syria role risks instability at home, isolation abroad’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 36 – October 2014.

‘ISIS: the threat to homeland security’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 35 – October 2014.

‘Libya’s civil war no closer to resolution’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 31 – October 2014.

‘Iran nuclear talks extended for four more months’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 23 – June 2014.

Selected IISS publications

75

‘Egypt’s economic crisis challenges ElSisi’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no.

22 – June 2014.

‘Turkey’s civil unrest: a worrying new era?’, Strategic Comments, vol. 19, no.

19 – June 2013

‘Libya: Muslim Brotherhood’s tenuous hold’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no.

21 – June 2014.

‘Iran seeks stability in election’, Strategic Comments, vol. 19, no. 17 – June 2013

‘North Korean lessons for an Iranian nuclear accord’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 18 – May 2014.

‘Syria crisis highlights importance of Chemical Weapons Convention’, Strategic Comments, vol. 19, no. 12 – April 2013

‘Syria’s war: Assad gains upper hand’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 15 – May 2014.

‘Libya: fragile security, fragmented politics’, Strategic Comments, vol. 19, no. 10 – March 2013

‘Torn Turkey: more turbulence ahead’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 12 – April 2014.

‘Kuwait’s deepening political turmoil’, Strategic Comments, vol. 19, no. 9 – March 2013

‘Elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons stalls’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 11 – April 2014.

‘US need for foreign oil falls dramatically’, Strategic Comments, vol. 19, no. 6 – March 2013

‘Iraq violence grows ahead of elections’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 4 – February 2014.

‘Egypt: a country on edge’, Strategic Comments, vol. 19, no. 5 – February 2013

‘Libya: paralysed by militias’, Strategic Comments, vol. 19, no. 38 – November 2013

‘Jihad in Russia: the Caucasus Emirate’, Strategic Comments, vol. 18, no. 45 – December 2012.

‘Iran’s Rouhani: high hopes, narrow remit’, Strategic Comments, vol. 19, no. 37 – November 2013

‘Glimmer of hope in Iran nuclear gloom?’, Strategic Comments, vol. 18, no. 38 – October 2012.

‘Iranian ICBMs: a distant prospect’, Strategic Comments, vol. 19, no. 36 – November 2013

‘Turkey’s frustrations grow with Syrian civil war’, Strategic Comments, vol. 18, no. 37 – October 2012.

‘Al-Shabaab targeted after Nairobi attack’, Strategic Comments, vol. 19, no. 35 – November 2013

‘Benghazi attack throws Libya gains into question’, Strategic Comments, vol. 18, no. 35 – October 2012.

‘Equipment purchases boost Gulf defences’, Strategic Comments, vol. 19, no. 34 – November 2013

‘Russia’s Syrian stance: principled selfinterest’, Strategic Comments, vol. 18, no. 31 – September 2012.

‘Turkey’s deepening democratic deficit’, Strategic Comments, vol. 19, no. 33 – October 2013

‘Syria: foreign intervention still debated, but distant’, Strategic Comments, vol.

18, no. 28 – September 2012.

‘Egypt: shifting politics under army control’, Strategic Comments, vol. 19, no. 32 – October 2013

‘Unease grows over Syria’s chemical weapons’, Strategic Comments, vol.

18, no. 25 – August 2012.

‘Syrian chemical plan faces multiple challenges’, Strategic Comments, vol.

19, no. 29 – September 2013

‘Iran sanctions halt long-range ballisticmissile development’, Strategic Comments, vol. 18, no. 22 – July 2012.

‘Syrian war worsens Lebanon’s malaise’, Strategic Comments, vol. 19, no. 25 – September 2013

‘Kuwait’s political turmoil threatens progress’, Strategic Comments, vol. 18, no. 15 – April 2012.

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‘Iraq: Maliki power grab risks fresh civil war’, Strategic Comments, vol. 18, no.

14 – April 2012.

‘Egyptians choose order over further political upheaval’, Strategic Comments, vol. 17, no. 13 – March 2011.

‘Syria: inevitable descent into civil war?’, Strategic Comments, vol. 18, no.

7 – March 2012.

‘Libya: direct military hits, unclear political targets’, Strategic Comments, vol. 17, no. 12 – March 2011.

‘Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s disruptive military options’, Strategic Comments, vol. 18, no. 3 – January 2012.

‘Winds of change in Iraqi Kurdistan’, Strategic Comments, vol. 17, no. 11 – March 2011.

‘Egypt’s fragile transition to democracy’, Strategic Comments, vol. 17, no. 49 – December 2011.

‘Bread and protests: the return of high food prices’, Strategic Comments, vol.

17, no. 9 – March 2011.

‘IAEA report: death knell of Iran diplomacy?’, Strategic Comments, vol.

17, no. 45 – November 2011.

‘Stuxnet: targeting Iran’s nuclear programme’, Strategic Comments, vol.

17, no. 6 – February 2011.

‘Still quite narrow: the Gulf–Asia ‘new Silk Road’’, Strategic Comments, vol.

17, no. 43 – November 2011.

‘Signs of civil war in Syria’, Strategic Comments, vol. 17, no. 38 – October 2011.

‘Arab Awakening boosts Turkey’s confidence’, Strategic Comments, vol.

17, no. 36 – October 2011.

‘Early military lessons from Libya’, Strategic Comments, vol. 17, no. 34 – September 2011.

‘Forging a democracy from Libya’s jamahiriya’, Strategic Comments, vol.

17, no. 31 – September 2011.

‘Libya win unlikely to convince war-weary US Congress’, Strategic Comments, vol.

17, no. 29 – August 2011.

‘Making sense of Syria’, Strategic Comments, vol. 17, no. 25 – June 2011.

‘NATO steps up the pace in Libya’, Strategic Comments, vol. 17, no. 23 – June 2011.

‘Arab upheaval prompts concerns in Israel’, Strategic Comments, vol. 17, no. 19 – April 2011.

‘War in Libya: Europe’s confused response’, Strategic Comments, vol.

17, no. 18 – April 2011.

‘Iran dismisses post-Fukushima nuclear rethink’, Strategic Comments, vol. 17, no. 15 – April 2011.

Strategic Survey is the Institute’s annual review – and, to a lesser degree, projection – of strategic developments throughout the world.

Recent sections of interest include: ‘Syria: Escalation and Fragmentation’, Strategic Survey 2014, pp. 183–91.

‘Lebanon: Greater Insecurity and Complex Politics’, Strategic Survey 2014, pp. 192–95.

‘Israel and Palestine: Stalled Peace Process’, Strategic Survey 2014, pp.

196–200.

‘Iraq: Violent Insurgency’, Survey 2014, pp. 205–12.

Strategic

‘Iran: Interim Nuclear Deal’, Strategic Survey 2014, pp. 213–24.

‘Gulf States: Tensions Between Neighbours’, Strategic Survey 2014, pp. 224–36.

‘Egypt’s Revolution Stalls’, Strategic Survey 2014, pp. 238–44.

‘Maghreb: Legacy of the Arab Spring, Strategic Survey 2014, pp. 245–52.

‘Spreading Conflict in the Levant’, Strategic Survey 2013, pp. 179–88.

‘North Africa’s Difficult Transitions’, Strategic Survey 2013, pp. 188–204.

Selected IISS publications

77

‘Gulf States: Containing Change’, Strategic Survey 2013, pp. 204–16.

‘Israel and Palestine: Status Quo Amidst Regional Upheaval’, Strategic Survey 2013, pp. 216–21.

‘Iran: Persistent Confrontation’, Strategic Survey 2013, pp. 221–36.

‘Iraq: Political Deadlock’, Survey 2013, pp. 236–46.

Strategic

‘Economic Sanctions on Iran: A Case Study’, Strategic Survey 2012, pp.

61–74.

‘Difficult Transitions Follow Arab Uprisings’, Strategic Survey 2012, pp.

199–239.

‘Israel and Palestine: Deadlock and Stagnation’, Strategic Survey 2012, pp. 240–46.

‘Iran: Nuclear Confrontation Escalates’, Strategic Survey 2012, pp. 246–61.

‘Iraq: Maliki Strengthens Dominance’, Strategic Survey 2012, pp. 261–69.

The Military Balance is the Institute’s annual assessment of military capabilities and defence

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economics worldwide. Region-byregion analyses cover the major military and economic trends and developments affecting security policy and the trade in weapons and other military equipment.

Comprehensive tables portray key data on weapons and defence economics. Defence expenditure trends over a ten-year period are also shown.

The Military Balance 2015. Routledge for the IISS, February 2015.

The Manama Dialogue Report Online access to previous editions is available at www.iiss.org/ publications/conference proceedings/ sections/the-manama-dialogue-46e2.

10TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 5–7 DECEMBER 2014

The IISS Manama Dialogue

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10TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 5–7 DECEMBER 2014

The IISS Manama Dialogue The 10th IISS Regional Security Summit: The Manama Dialogue was held in the Kingdom of Bahrain in December 2014, ten years after the inaugural Summit. The Dialogue brought together the national-security establishments of the six Gulf Cooperation Council members: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; other regional countries including Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Yemen; and important outside powers: the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Estonia, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Russia, India, China, Japan, Singapore and Australia.

The Manama Dialogue was convened by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), with the support of the Kingdom of Bahrain. The IISS also convenes the annual Asia Security Summit: The Shangri-La Dialogue, bringing together in Singapore defence ministers, chiefs of defence staff, national-security advisers and other senior officials from countries that are members of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

The IISS, a registered charity with offices in London, Washington, Bahrain and Singapore, is the world’s leading authority on political-military conflict. It is the primary independent source of accurate, objective information on international strategic issues.

Publications include The Military Balance, an annual reference work on each nation’s defence capabilities; Strategic Survey, an annual review of world affairs; Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, a bi-monthly journal on international affairs; Strategic Comments, a monthly analysis of topical issues in international affairs; and the Adelphi series on policy-relevant strategic issues.

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