IISS Manama Dialogue 2017

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 13TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 8–10 DECEMBER 2017

The IISS Manama Dialogue

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 13TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 8–10 DECEMBER 2017

The IISS Manama Dialogue

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

13TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 8–10 DECEMBER 2017

The IISS Manama Dialogue The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London | wc2r 3pg | UK www.iiss.org

Š February 2018 The International Institute for Strategic Studies Director-General and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman Contributors Nick Childs, Virginia Comolli, Jessica Delaney, Mark Fitzpatrick,

Bastian Giegerich, James Hackett, Emile Hokayem, Alia Moubayed, John Raine, Dr Nicholas Redman, Jonathan Stevenson, Hebatalla Taha Arabic Editor Yusuf Mubarak Editorial Sara Hussain, Sam Stocker Editorial Research and Media Shirley Dent Production and Design Kelly Verity

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the institute.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies is an independent centre for research, information and debate on the problems of conflict, however caused, that have, or potentially have, an important military content. The Council and Staff of the Institute are international and its membership is drawn from over 90 countries. The Institute is independent and it alone decides what activities to conduct. It owes no allegiance to any government, any group of governments or any political or other organisation. The IISS stresses rigorous research with a forward-looking policy orientation and places particular emphasis on bringing new perspectives to the strategic debate.

Contents Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Chapter 1

Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Chapter 2

Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Chapter 3

Press coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Selected IISS publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Chapter 4

Social media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Contents

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(l–r): Gavin Williamson, Secretary of State for Defence, UK; HH Sheikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, Deputy Prime Minister, Bahrain; HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal Al Saud, Chairman of the Board, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Saudi Arabia

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Foreword

The International Institute for Strategic Studies is pleased to share this summary of the proceedings of the IISS Manama Dialogue 2017: 13th Regional Security Summit, which was held from 8 to 10 December 2017. As every year, the IISS Manama Dialogue serves as a platform for major policy pronouncements by senior officials, as well a forum for vigorous debate.

The conference is also an opportunity for quiet defence diplomacy, and bilateral meetings that strengthen regional stability and encourage new relationships.

Over 500 delegates from 41 countries – comprising senior ministers, military and intelligence chiefs, top diplomats, opinion-shapers, analysts and senior journalists – took part in the 13th annual gathering. Two-thirds of the participants were government officials, reflecting the sustained interest of local, regional and international governments alike in attending and contributing to the important policy discussions facilitated by the IISS. The IISS Manama Dialogue was an occasion to reflect on and assess the significant political and security events that the Middle East witnessed throughout 2017. Accordingly, among the themes covered extensively in public plenaries and speForeword

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cial sessions were the defeat of the so-called caliphate of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL; questions about the future of militias in Iraq and Syria; post-conflict dispensation in Syria; rising tensions between Qatar and its erstwhile Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners; debate in the United States over the Iran nuclear deal; the Trump administration’s decision to formally recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel; and the prospects for economic reform in the region. While regional turmoil stirred both anxiety and interest, the IISS Manama Dialogue also encouraged new ways of thinking about the Middle East’s international relations by hosting senior Asian ministers. IISS senior analysts provided fresh analytical perspectives throughout the Dialogue.

The IISS remains grateful to the Kingdom of Bahrain, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government agencies for their continued support of the IISS Manama Dialogue. It also thanks all government and non-government participants for their active contributions.

Sir John Jenkins, KCMG LVO Executive Director, IISS–Middle East

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13TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 8–10 DECEMBER 2017

The IISS Manama Dialogue

CHAPTER 1

Agenda

Dr Anwar Mohammad Gargash, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, UAE

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Agenda

Friday 8 December 2017 All day

Bilateral meetings between ministers and officials

17:00 - 18:30 IISS-C5 SPECIAL WORKSHOP

– Al Ghazal III CYBER SECURITY INNOVATION AND THE MIDDLE EAST Chair: Sean Kanuck

Director of Future Conflict and Cyber Security, IISS 19:00 - 20:00 SKY NEWS ARABIA OPENING TELEVISED PLENARY

AFTER MOSUL AND RAQQA: STABILISING THE MIDDLE EAST, AND FIGHTING TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM WORLDWIDE Dr Ibrahim Al Jaafari

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iraq

HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal Al Saud

Chairman of the Board, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Saudi Arabia

Yenny Zannuba Wahid

Director, The Wahid Foundation, Indonesia

20:00 - 21:00 OPENING RECEPTION

– Grand Foyer

21:00 - 23:00 OPENING DINNER

– Al Noor Ballroom

Hosted by: HRH Prince Salman bin Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa

Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Bahrain, Deputy Supreme Commander and First Deputy Prime Minister, Kingdom of Bahrain

Keynote Speech: Sir John Jenkins

Corresponding Executive Director, IISS–Middle East Agenda

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Saturday 9 December 2017 Unless otherwise stated all Plenary Sessions will be chaired by Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS 09:20 - 09:30 OPENING OF THE SUMMIT

– Al Noor Ballroom

Introduction and welcome by Dr John Chipman Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS

09:30 - 11:00 FIRST PLENARY SESSION

– Al Noor Ballroom CREATING A STABLE REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE Ayman Safadi

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Jordan

Sh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bahrain

General (Retd) David Petraeus

Chairman, KKR Global Institute; former Director, Central Intelligence Agency, US

11:00 - 11:30 Break 11:30 - 13:00 SECOND PLENARY SESSION

– Al Noor Ballroom POLITICAL AND MILITARY RESPONSES TO EXTREMISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST Gavin Williamson

Secretary of State for Defence, UK

Faleh Al Fayad

National Security Adviser, Iraq

Dr Anwar Mohammad Gargash

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, UAE

13:00 - 15:00 DELEGATE LUNCH

Villa Gazebo, Ritz-Carlton

PRIVATE LUNCH FOR DELEGATION LEADERS Bushido

15:00 - 17:00 PRIVATE AUDIENCE FOR DELEGATION LEADERS WITH

HM KING HAMAD BIN ISA AL KHALIFA

Bilateral meetings between ministers and officials

17:00 - 17:30 Break

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17:30 - 19:00 THIRD PLENARY SESSION

– Al Noor Ballroom EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST Taro Kono

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Japan

Mobashar Jawed Akbar

Minister of State for External Affairs, India

Sayyid Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi

Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oman

Sunday 10 December 2017 09:30 - 11:00 SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSIONS

– Al Ghazal Ballrooms

Group I:

PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN SYRIA AND YEMEN – Al Ghazal II

Chair: Sir John Jenkins

Corresponding Executive Director, IISS–Middle East

Abdulmalik Al Mikhlafi

Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Yemen

Ramzy E Ramzy

Deputy Special Envoy for Syria, UN

Ümit Yalçın

Undersecretary for Middle East and Asia-Pacific Affairs, Turkey

Group II:

THE FUTURE OF IRAQ – Al Ghazal I Chair: Professor Toby Dodge

Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East, IISS; Director, Middle East Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science

Dr Salim Al Jabouri

Speaker, Parliament of Iraq

Falah Mustafa Bakir

Head, Department of Foreign Relations, Kurdistan Regional Government

Dr Mesut Özcan

Director, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey

Colonel Joel Rayburn

Senior Director for Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, National Security Council, US

Agenda

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Group III:

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM – Al Ghazal III Chair: John Raine

Senior Adviser for Geo-Political Due Diligence, IISS

General Joseph Votel

Commander, US Central Command, US

General Zubair Mahmood Hayat

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Armed Forces, Pakistan

Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach Chief of the Defence Staff, UK

Major General Mohammed El Keshky

Assistant Minister of Defence, Egyptian Armed Forces

Group IV:

THE SECURITY IMPERATIVE OF ECONOMIC REFORM – Al Ghazal C Chair: Dr Nicholas Redman

Director of Editorial; Editor, Strategic Survey and Adelphis, IISS

Khalid Al Rumaihi

Chief Executive Officer, Bahrain Economic Development Board, Bahrain

Dr Rola Dashti

Chairman, Higher Planning Council, Faro International; former State Minister for Planning and Development, Kuwait

Alia Moubayed

Director of Geo-Economics and Strategy, IISS

Dr Karen Young

Senior Resident Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institute, US

11:00 - 11:30 Break 11:30 - 13:00 CONCLUDING PLENARY SESSION

– Al Noor Ballroom REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND TERRORISM: POLICY OPTIONS Professor Toby Dodge

Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East, IISS; Director, Middle East Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science

John Raine

Senior Adviser for Geo-Political Due Diligence, IISS

Emile Hokayem

Senior Fellow for Middle East Security, IISS

13:00 - 14:30 FAREWELL LUNCH FOR ALL DELEGATES

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– Villa Gazebo, Ritz-Carlton

The IISS Manama Dialogue 2017

13TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 8–10 DECEMBER 2017

The IISS Manama Dialogue

CHAPTER 2

Executive summary

Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS

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Executive summary

Keynote Speech The keynote address at the 2017 IISS Manama Dialogue was delivered by Sir John Jenkins, Corresponding Executive Director, IISS–Middle East. Jenkins reflected on the past three decades of regional security in the Middle East, arguing that this region ‘has suffered more than most from internal strife and external interventions’. While there have been many shifts in political alignments over the past 30 years, both within the region and beyond, and although demographic change has generated increasing pressures on governments and societies, Jenkins identified two major continuities: the sustained recovery and rise of Iran, and the spread of radical and often violent forms of Islamist ideology. Jenkins argued that factors driven by dynamics inside the region deserved part of the blame: Both Iran and radical Islamists have fed on discontent in this region that emerged from the flawed creation of the modern Middle East in the 1920s … the loss of Palestine; and the failure in many parts of the region to address the challenges of social inclusion, effective, responsive and distributed government, and social justice.

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Sir John Jenkins, Corresponding Executive Director, IISS–Middle East

However, external powers contributed significantly – through a combination of flawed interventions, inaction and lack of imagination – to the emergence of political vacuums that other actors could then exploit for their own ends, such as the overthrow of Saddam’s Iraq in 2003 with no adequate long-term plan to provide security and provide for the construction of a better state in the aftermath of his fall; the similar failure over Libya, compounded by intervention from others on the side of Islamist militias, and confusion … over what sort of government we in the West prefer – in spite of Libyans voting overwhelmingly in 2012 for a technocratic and non-ideological government that would deliver a better life to ordinary Libyans.

The error that we made in Afghanistan, of believing that the removal of the Soviet Union would solve all of our problems; the failure to respond adequately to the first stirrings of popular revolt in Syria and then to enforce our own red lines; and the sustained failure … to see that the Islamic Republic of Iran was an equally ideological Islamist state … and to push back against it in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.

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The IISS Manama Dialogue provides one of the few regional fora that can serve to identify – and possibly even expand – common ground among participants, which can then serve as a basis for collective action. Jenkins identified six issues on which such collective action could usefully focus, and in which Europe and the United States should play leading roles: • Bringing about a satisfactory end to the war in Yemen, to stop the damage it is inflicting on ordinary people, and to stop it draining resources better deployed elsewhere.

• Rolling back Iranian influence in Iraq and Syria, which would need to see the Kurdish Regional Government rebuild a durable relationship with Baghdad, and a nonsectarian representative political structure in Iraq.

• Constraining Iran’s ability to cause disruption and interference in the region and beyond, including through the use of proxies.

• Supporting the ongoing reform programmes launched by governments in the region, such as Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

• Investing in the region’s ability to provide education to its young population, including tertiary education and including education for women.

• Reaching a just settlement for the Palestinian issue, which would require many of the parties involved to genuinely consider new approaches, and which could unlock progress on other more fundamental threats to regional security.

Jenkins acknowledged that this policy agenda required vision and commitment of the kind that might well be hard to muster, given the many pressing items on leaders’ agendas. Nevertheless, Western leaders working with progressive forces in the region have it in their hands to make a difference.

Jenkins closed by saying, ‘the key is determination, resilience, strategic patience and vision. Our opponents have all this; we need to match them.’

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Sky News Arabia Opening Televised Plenary (l–r): Yenny Zannuba Wahid, Director, The Wahid Foundation, Indonesia; Dr Ibrahim Al Jaafari, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iraq; HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal Al Saud, Chairman of the Board, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Saudi Arabia; and Fadila Souissi, Presenter, Sky News Arabia

Sky News Arabia Television Debate: After Mosul and Raqqa: stabilising the Middle East, and fighting terrorism and extremism worldwide Asked to reflect on major developments in the fight against terrorism, the speakers in this televised plenary session adopted a medical metaphor to emphasise the virus-like nature of the threat terrorism poses, and the need for regional and international actors to develop an epidemiological response.

HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal Al Saud, Chairman of the Board, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Saudi Arabia, was keen to stress the widespread nature of the challenges posed by terrorism and the importance of international cooperation in combatting it: There are many places that know this epidemic, that is really benefiting by the failures of some of the leaders in these countries, that led to these places of war and these pockets in Yemen, Libya, Syria and others. But we see also that terrorism is really reaching other places, whether we are talking about the different continents, and this terrorism is also trying to grasp any opportunity to hinder the worldwide peace that we

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need to live within in this world. Consequently, the solution is to be through the collaboration and the cooperation, not only through the exchange of information, but also through the basis to face terrorism, whether we are talking about security, about the social level or the doctrinal level.

HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal Al Saud, Chairman of the Board, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Saudi Arabia

Such sentiments were shared by Dr Ibrahim Al Jaafari, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iraq, who proudly celebrated Iraq’s victory in Mosul against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, which he described as a success, ‘not only for Iraq but for the entire region, because ISIS is an international and a worldwide threat, and consequently, the Iraqi answer was also a worldwide one’.

Jaafari attributed the success of Iraqi forces to their ability to mobilise Iraq’s society, government and security apparatus, and to gather international support on an unprecedented scale: This has led to having the entire world, for the first time in history, to have all the world supporting one idea. If you read all the books, you will not find anywhere in history where all the populations of the world were on the one side. This has Executive summary

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Dr Ibrahim Al Jaafari, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Iraq

happened with Iraq. We have seen it in the United Nations, and the Arab League of States, all the states have supported Iraq. And thus, we should not only be proud and be happy with our success. This is a pride for all the countries that have participated.

The involvement of high numbers of foreign fighters and the risks they pose upon their return to their countries of origin are significant security challenges associated with ISIS and the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. Fadila Souissi of Sky News Arabia explored this issue with Yenny Zannuba Wahid, Director of the Wahid Foundation in Indonesia, who reflected on the successful experience of her country, which has the largest Muslim population in the world: I think in our country we have got a good system in which we try to overcome these challenges. Actually, the model of Saudi Arabia, the counselling programme, and also the campaign, the Sakinah Campaign that Saudi Arabia embarks on, is also a good model that we try to replicate in our country.

We look at the radicals from the point of view of these policy 20

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approaches. So, you look at the problems. You divide the society into three different categories. The first one is the healthy one. The second one is maybe the people who have a little bit

Yenny Zannuba Wahid, Director, The Wahid Foundation, Indonesia

of virus already, contracted some virus. The third ones are the ones who are chronically infected. The approaches that you have about these groups are different. You do not put too much emphasis, for example, for the healthy ones. You do not really target them. But for the radicals, sometimes there are no other approaches than the security approach. But for the middle ground, you need to make sure that they are immune from other persuasions, that they are not going to be persuaded to join the radical cause.

Along similar lines, Jaafari likened ISIS to ‘microbes’ which inhabit ‘a specific environment’: Where did we see Daesh occurring or blooming? In a political area that is destabilised, that has never witnessed electoral periods, women that represent half of the community are not getting all of their rights, so those are regimes that do not know how to deal with crisis.

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In addition to the internal issues that may transform a region or country into a fertile ground for the spread of extremist ideology, international events also impact on the region, and can feed and amplify the rhetoric of jihadist leaders. All who participated in this session characterised the decision of US President Donald Trump to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and to relocate the American embassy there from Tel Aviv as an example of just such a development. Prince Turki warned: This is going to give oxygen to the lost souls. They will become active again, and they will be in fact very difficult to deal with. I hope that President Trump, who has thrown himself in the sea, before he drowns, I wish that he will be saved and I wish that he will issue a statement recognising the state of Palestine with Jerusalem East as its capital. I think that this is the only measure that can allow us to overcome the current situation in terms of turmoil and instability, not only in the region but worldwide.

Jaafari echoed these remarks: This is a bad decision and it will have negative repercussions.

I think that this is a step towards war, and such a step, if there is no going back, it will definitely lead to repercussions, and God knows what will be these repercussions.

Indeed, Indonesia is one of the countries in which such repercussions are already manifest, according to Wahid: The issue, the decision by President Trump, for us is really a reckless decision, because it will contribute to the instability of many countries in the region, not just in the Middle East but also in countries where there are many Islamic communities. In Indonesia, for example, we have got demonstrations already. People took to the street, voicing their sense 22

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of solidarity. People feel that there is an injustice going on.

This is going to be a platform that will be used by the radical groups to recruit more people to join their cause.

Notably, it is not just social unrest that concerns Indonesia and, indeed, other countries with substantial Muslim communities. Protests could simply be the tip of the iceberg as frustrated young people could turn to violence, Wahid continued: These young people, they want to fight this injustice. They want to fight against this injustice, but they do not want to go to Palestine, so they will be asked to do some acts in their own countries. That is the kind of manifestation of the frustrations that the jihadist group is going to use to get to young people.

The discussion then turned to the role of Iran and state sponsoring of terrorism across the Middle East in places such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. The extent of Iran’s involvement in supporting terrorist group across the region was the most debated issue of the session. Jaafari was sceptical that Tehran sponsors groups in Iraq: I can say, honestly, that I have not seen any Iranian citizens coming, carrying weapons, as I have seen with 124 countries from the world. Despite all this, and if we consider that we have Iranians coming, like others, so it will be like all the other countries and consequently we cannot condemn the country because of these young people.

Prince Turki however was of a different opinion: in Yemen, we see that Iran is supporting the Houthis. What has happened, the Houthis have destroyed Yemen. ‌ This country witnesses the fingerprint of Iran in each of its villages, Executive summary

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in each of its streets. In Syria, who is fighting with Bashar alAssad? This tyrant who has killed more than half a million persons among his population. Who is supporting him? The Iranian Revolutionary Guards, along with some volunteers who were brought by Iran from Afghanistan, Pakistan and many other places.

In the course of the debate, Prince Turki also explicitly denounced the Syrian regime for its violent repression of the country’s civilian population, and the international community for allowing President Bashar al-Assad to act with impunity: The numbers that they have killed, and the destruction that they have led, is not 1% of what Bashar al-Assad has done. We do not see the international community going towards sanctioning him, because this person, those who supported him, those who have assisted him in this issue, so these people will not be punished and sanctioned. … killing, displacing, torturing, so all these acts that were perpetrated by Bashar al-Assad are multifold and widely more important than those that were perpetrated by the gangs and by the groups.

A number of questions from the floor for Jaafari concerned the uncertain future of the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU, also known as the Hashd al-Shaabi), a controversial umbrella organisation of militia groups that coalesced to fight against ISIS, and fought alongside Iraqi forces and Peshmerga in the battle for Mosul. Jaafari explained that: The army had in fact been unable to face this problem, so this is where the Hashd al-Shaabi saw the light. This is in fact a fact that proves that all of the Iraqis can act under the Armed Forces. … Hashd al-Shaabi is part of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

It has been recognised constitutionally.

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The issue linked to the broader picture of Iraq’s future and reconstruction. In this respect, Jaafari asked the international community to design ‘a modified Marshall Plan for Iraq’, so that the country might receive a similar amount of aid as did West Germany in the aftermath of the Second World War. In closing, and bringing the discussion back to its original focus on counter-terrorism, Wahid encouraged all involved to broaden efforts beyond the production of counter-narratives to the development of a coherent ‘counter-identity’ that would strengthen local communities, increase their resilience to extremism and bind local communities together as nations.

In this context, she praised ongoing reforms in Saudi Arabia: I was very pleased when the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman made the announcement that Saudi Arabia was a moderate country before 1979, and that the thinking of reverting back to the old traditions. I think it is very important for countries to articulate the values that will bind the people together, and that is the counter-identity that I mean.

First Plenary Session: Creating a stable regional security architecture Ayman Safadi, Jordan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, opened the first plenary session by reflecting on the region’s security challenges, and the underdevelopment of the institutions necessary to address them: Whenever we thought we had enough crises, we wake up to realise that more are unfortunately unfolding. This region remains, in terms of its ability to work together, to a great extent a region in name, but in terms of having the architecture that we need to effectively address the challenges, I think we all agree a lot needs to be done. And when I speak of the region, I speak of the region broadly defined. I speak of the Gulf and I speak of the broader Middle East.

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Ayman Safadi, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Jordan

He outlined the principal security challenges facing the Middle East: the Palestinian question, extremism and terrorism, the lack of educational opportunity for ten million children and Iranian involvement in regional states. More generally, he argued, there was a problem of external interference in the affairs of sovereign states: We cannot allow others to interfere in our domestic affairs.

Everybody needs to stop at the border. Everybody needs to know that continuing meddling in the internal affairs of the Arab world is going to only invite a reaction that is going to push us all into unwanted conflicts.

Safadi’s remark in defence of the Westphalian principle was the first of several aired during the session. The minister’s closing remarks concerned the very recent announcement by the United States that it would recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, which had prompted the Arab League to call an emergency meeting in Cairo.

He warned that the decision risked stoking extremism in the region: 26

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No issue is more potent than Jerusalem in terms of its ability to rally the Arab and Muslim world, and no issue is more effective in terms of provoking anger and sentiment and the

Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bahrain

radicals on all sides. The extremists on all sides will jump on this opportunity to exploit the anger and exploit the feeling of injustice that continues to exist as a result of our failure to address the legitimate concerns of the Palestinian people, and meet their rights to freedom and statehood.

Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, began by reviewing the region’s principal security challenges, starting with the long-running conflict in Yemen: In Yemen, we are fighting to prevent a proud Arab country, with a rich and varied history, from falling under the control of a vicious militia that has subjected our Yemeni brothers and sisters to violence, wanton assassinations and terrible destruction. If anybody has any doubts as to the intentions of the Houthis in Yemen, one need to look no further than the events unfolding in Sanaa as we speak. Houthi terrorists are Executive summary

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executing men by the hundreds, and have cut access to the internet and social media to prevent Yemenis from reporting their crimes to the world. The Houthis were offered a seat at the table. They were part of the political solution agreed in 2011. In fact, the first time and second time I met the Houthis was in Riyadh. But they refused to take their place among Yemen’s political representatives, and instead decided to violate the agreements, betray their countrymen and capture Yemen, attempting to turn the country into a repressive offshoot of the Islamic Republic on our very doorstep. We cannot and will not allow that to happen.

Sheikh Khalid underscored his point by noting that Lebanon provided an example of what can happen when a militia is not checked. Hizbullah, he noted, has become a potent political force in Lebanon, one that ignores the republic’s laws and customs and is answerable to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Furthermore, it has been a destabilising influence across the region: Hizbullah has used its base in the south of Lebanon to expand its operations into other regions. It has been a key factor in prolonging the Syrian crisis. It has wreaked havoc in Iraq, and it continues to train operatives to undertake terrorist attacks in Bahrain, here, and in Kuwait, along with smuggling weapons and explosives and stashing them in our neighbourhoods. We cannot stand by while an armed and dangerous terrorist organisation has its way in country after country.

Turning to the boycott of Qatar by Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Sheikh Khalid said it was taken in response to ‘decades of Qatari policies that threaten and jeopardise our national security’. He denied that the boycott was a response to Qatar’s relations with Iran: Some have claimed that this is about Qatar’s adopting a foreign policy independent of the GCC. It is not. The aim 28

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of the action is to stop Qatar from plotting to undermine and weaken our governments, and from supporting terrorist groups that destabilise countries like Egypt, Yemen and Libya, and to stop their interference in other countries, seek-

General (Retd) David Petraeus, Chairman, KKR Global Institute; former Director, Central Intelligence Agency, US

ing to influence its domestic politics for its gains. The groups funded by Qatar in Libya should be of particular concern to Europe, as terrorist groups establish bases in Libya from which they could easily access the European continent.

General (Retd) David Petraeus, Chairman, KKR Global Institute and former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, United States, began by reflecting on the deterioration of security conditions in Iraq since December 2008, when he was at the helm of US Central Command. At that time, the US-led coalition and its Iraqi partners had defeated both alQaeda and associated Sunni insurgent groups, and the Shia militia elements, supported by Iran, that had plagued Basra, Kadhimiya, Sadr City and other locations. The US had begun shifting its focus to Afghanistan, Somalia and Iran’s nuclear programme. By contrast, the contemporary situation was very difficult, with the region facing: Executive summary

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continued challenges by terrorist cells and insurgent remnants of ISIS in Iraq, the resurgence of Iranian-supported militias there, and serious political discord between Baghdad and Erbil and within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). As I have noted before, in fact, the battle after the battle in Iraq, the competition for political power and resources after the defeat of ISIS, may well prove more challenging than the defeat of ISIS once the US and coalition countries committed to support their Iraqi brothers. Here, we must work and support inclusive governance, rather than the exclusive governance that once again alienated the Sunni parts of the country after the US withdrawal in late 2011.

Petraeus saw analogous challenges in Syria, ‘a geopolitical Chernobyl’ in which extremists remain, and where there are also doubts as to whether the country could be reconstituted as a single entity. He also pointed to extremist involvement in Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey and Yemen. While strengthening Iranian influence was a feature in several states, Petraeus observed that the Emirati Air Force can still defeat that of Iran. If anything, in fact, it is even better now than it was then, after continuous combat operations, first in Afghanistan, where I was privileged to have Emiratis under my command, and more recently, of course, in Yemen.

The former CIA director went on to identify lessons for the US from its experience in the region since 2001. Firstly, that Islamic extremists would always exploit ungoverned spaces.

Secondly, that instability in those areas cannot be contained; rather, it spreads, and it has even touched Europe. Thirdly, that US leadership is imperative, and the US should act to enable as many partners as possible. Fourthly, that ‘we cannot counter terrorist organisations like ISIS and al-Qaeda with just counter-terrorist-force operations’, because comprehensive 30

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civil–military campaigns are needed. Finally, that this will be a generational struggle in which the US commitment must be sustainable in terms of the blood and treasure it expends.

Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS

Alluding to the problems of cooperation brought about by the Qatar crisis, Petraeus recalled a concept he first employed in 2008: multi-bilateralism. He described it as a concept in which the US, and perhaps select coalition partners, works bilaterally with countries in the region that may not be willing to work multilaterally, to stitch together increasingly important defensive and deterrent capabilities to counter the extremist-militia, missile, piracy and other threats in the region.

The panel then fielded questions on the US decision on Jerusalem, policies to stabilise Iraq and Syria, and Iran’s regional influence. Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS, asked Sheikh Khalid about Russia’s position in the region and its relations with Iran. Bahrain’s foreign minister characterised the Moscow–Tehran axis as a ‘marriage of convenience’. He added: Executive summary

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we shall continue to engage with Russia. We shall continue to build bridges with Russia, and open more doors with Russia with our countries, in order to build a solid partnership with everybody so Russian interests are with the whole region and not only with one country. Then, we do not want to wake up one day and that marriage of convenience becomes a marriage of love of any sort. So, this is something that we have to pay attention to. Russia is important, and we should always engage Russia.

Petraeus agreed on the importance of constructive engagement with Russia, pointing to significant agreements on so-called de-confliction or ceasefire lines. He added that the Iran nuclear agreement had made significant achievements, but also had significant shortcomings, but went on to highlight the need for responses to Iran’s missile development: There have to be defensive measures that are strengthened.

This includes, by the way, a very robust element of this multibilateralism that I discussed, where the US has to be the key to tying together the ballistic-missile-defence and early-warning systems of countries that in some cases will not do so bilaterally, and therefore we have to be the integrator for this. And that has gotten tougher, obviously, as a result of the dispute between the Saudis and Emiratis and Bahrainis on one hand and the Qataris on the other.

Second Plenary Session: Political and military responses to extremism in the Middle East This session opened with the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Defence, Gavin Williamson, highlighting three lessons of the recent past. Firstly, he said, there is the need to fight extremism on all fronts, virtual as well as real, addressing hearts and minds as well as hardware. Secondly, it is vital to win the battle of ideas: 32

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We want to proudly promote our way of life as a better alternative for the disaffected, showing we stand for the values of moderation, belief in human life, tolerance of different

Gavin Williamson, Secretary of State for Defence, UK

views and justice for all. Showing we support free trade and its power to create opportunity for each and every citizen.

Showing nothing can dampen our desire to deepen democracy and encourage its spread.

The third lesson Williamson mentioned is that defeating global terror requires stronger global partnerships. He amplified the UK’s support for the efforts of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and noted that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had created a space in which terrorism could flourish. He highlighted the importance of Gulf security and the UK’s strong endeavours to improve it, including the re-established naval base HMS Jufair in Bahrain, the permanent British defence staff in Dubai and the UK’s commitment to a permanent presence in Oman.

Finally, he observed that the struggle against extremism is a generational one.

Faleh Al Fayad, National Security Adviser, Iraq, first suggested that the confidence and optimism of the Manama Executive summary

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Faleh Al Fayad, National Security Adviser, Iraq

Dialogue had been compromised by US President Donald Trump’s announcement that the United States planned to move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv, and implied that the counter-terrorism rationale offered for it was flawed, as the move was likely to encourage terrorism. Moving on, he noted that Middle Eastern governments, including Iraq, needed to address ongoing internal conflicts within their own countries to combat terrorism. He elaborated: Neglecting them will not be putting them aside. Consequently, it is a very important element for us to look at our internal problems and our internal failures and our internal gaps at the political, educational and religious levels in order for us to create an environment that undermines terrorism instead of supporting it and nurturing it.

The national security adviser also framed regional security and stability as key elements of a counter-terrorism strategy, stressing that Iraq had launched a policy of rapprochement with all Arab countries. He sought to reassure other countries that the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU, also known as the 34

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Hashd al-Shaabi) – Iraqi-sponsored and Iranian-supported Shia militias mobilised against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL – were under the firm military control of the Iraqi state. He also cast the formation of the PMU in a positive

Dr Anwar Mohammad Gargash, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, UAE

light, as an example of national unity among disparate groups that produced victory over ISIS in Mosul and provided a demonstration of why the principle of collaboration and participation is basic and is very important in fighting and countering terrorism.

I do not see any problem in talking about the victory of Iraq that has taken place thanks to the assistance of the military, the police, the al-Hashd al-Shaabi, the Peshmerga. All these elements were a part of this Iraqi victory.

Dr Anwar Mohammad Gargash, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, United Arab Emirates (UAE), outlined three salient themes pertaining to the region: a return to relative stability (noting Iraq and Syria, and to a lesser extent, Yemen); Iran’s disruptive regional behaviour through proxies and sectarian rhetoric (citing Executive summary

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Bahrain, Kuwait and Lebanon, as well as Yemen); and the link between extremist narratives and terrorism. In regard to the latter, he said that while the mobilising connection can be subtle and fluid, as with the Muslim Brotherhood, events of the past five years proved that the UAE’s targeting of the Brotherhood was valid.

Accordingly, he suggested, the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s tough stand on Qatar – ‘one of the small elephants in the room’ – was justified. He described Qatar as a small state but a very wealthy state that is using some of its immense wealth as a platform to support jihadist rhetoric, to support jihadist groups. This is something quite opportunistic that we have seen since the beginning of the Arab Spring, where they put all their chips on this jihadist agenda. As a result, I think addressing … the 13 demands, as a framework for constructive discussion and solution, is really necessary.

The minister further noted that the United States’ Jerusalem decision was ‘a gift to radicalism’ and expressed dismay that Washington had not sent appropriate senior officials to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the Manama Dialogue to explain the decision. He considered it ominous: I am not necessarily worried about today and tomorrow and the day after. However, what I am worried about is that a few years down the road, that some people are going to see the Jerusalem decision as a turning point, sometimes the same way we think of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan or we think of some other events that have proven to be watersheds.

I hope not but this is a worry for me.

Gargash concluded with the observation that strengthening the nation-state and participating operationally in ending conflicts – as the UAE is in Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen 36

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– were essential to combatting extremism in the Middle East.

The panel then entertained questions on a wide range of issues pertaining to regional security. Topics included the tendency of militarised counter-terrorism to foment radicalisation; post-conflict reconstruction as a means of creating stability; the possibility that Iran might exploit the United States’ Jerusalem decision; the possible hostility of the PMU towards displaced persons who might otherwise return home; the risks of isolating Qatar; Iran–Iraq relations; the importance of education in discouraging extremism; resolving the conflict in Yemen; reducing sectarianism; and the UK’s apparent diplomatic retreat and the decline of its ‘special relationship’ with the United States in the wake of the 2016 vote to leave the European Union.

With regard to Yemen, Gargash stated that a political solution … has to ensure several things. One of them is a political process that will move the conflict from being a military conflict to a political bargaining process where various Yemeni parties, including the Houthis, will be part of the process, but not at the barrel of a gun.

He added that the conflict in Yemen had illuminated the need to deal with the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the region. On radicalisation, he commented that very few of India’s many Muslims had joined ISIS, and that India was therefore worth studying from the standpoint of countering extremism.

Fayad characterised the PMU as ‘national heroes’, rejecting any comparison between them and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, and contended that the reluctance of displaced persons to return to their homes turned mainly on damaged infrastructure.

Notwithstanding the Trump administration’s Jerusalem decision, Williamson reiterated UK support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Executive summary

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Britain has always been in four-square support of the twostate solution, working with partners, both Israeli and Palestinian, to get there. That is what we will continue to do. We are absolutely passionate and believe that this is what is required.

Third Plenary Session: Evolving international partnerships in the Middle East Participants in this session shared three complementary views on the future of the relationship between Asia and the Middle East. Indian Minister of State for External Affairs Mobashar Jawed Akbar questioned the tendency to cast India as distant and removed from the Middle East.

To fly from Delhi to Dubai, he pointed out, takes just three hours – the same as it takes to fly from Dubai to Cairo.

Yet from the Gulf, Akbar said, ‘Cairo is seen as a neighbour, and Delhi is seen in terms of distance’. On this basis, Akbar suggested a new approach to defining the regional neighbourhood: A neighbour must not only be described by distance. A neighbour also has to be someone who shares the same or similar values. Because, without sharing the values, the neighbourhood does not improve.

Nations that share a maritime border, Akbar continued, are no less connected than those joined by land, adding that India’s ‘sea map’ is increasingly important to its foreign policy.

A neighbourhood can no longer be defined only by a land map. India, like so many other countries, also has a sea map.

And the sea map now is increasingly becoming a very important fact in our definition of who is a nation to engage with and who not.

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While the economic potential of the partnership between Asia and the Middle East was clear, Akbar argued, there are also evident threats to stability and shared prosperity.

Mobashar Jawed Akbar, Minister of State for External Affairs, India

Akbar identified terrorism as the most pressing of these dangers, and warned against underestimating its political objectives, as terrorists seek to undermine the nation-state and destroy pluralism.

Akbar argued that partnerships should not be limited solely to government contacts, and that a human dimension is also crucial, particularly for addressing humanitarian challenges. In this respect, Akbar cited the example of Yemen: Yemen is something more than an exercise in government formation. There are 20 million human beings there in urgent need of food, shelter and medicine. And of these, 11 million are children. Four hundred thousand or half a million may be facing severe malnutrition. How much attention are we actually paying this?

Akbar made clear that India sought to engage with all regional states, emphasising that Executive summary

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while engaging with the Gulf countries, India’s approach has to remain and will remain non-intrusive, non-judgemental and non-prescriptive. We do not take sides in intra-regional disputes. Despite the current regional flux, we have progressively structured closer ties with all counties in the region towards safeguarding mutual benefits in political, trade and investment, energy, diaspora and security interests.

He then highlighted India’s commitment to developing security partnerships with regional states. Akbar cited various examples, such as an agreement on security cooperation with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed in 2011; a memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation agreed between India and Saudi Arabia in 2014; and a visit to India by the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in January 2017, during which both India and the UAE restated their commitment to consolidate existing ties.

Akbar concluded by challenging the dominant conceptual framework of Asia’s geography, asking ‘what is the Middle East in the Middle of?’ Akbar suggested that this geographical construct – which ultimately stems from the Ancient Greek idea of Asia, updated throughout the early modern period – needs rethinking to better reflect the modern world, as ‘we cannot be trapped by the age of exploration’.

Secretary-General at the Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sayyid Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi cited growing linkages through formal trade agreements – such as the Ashgabat agreement – as the latest links in a long tradition of trade between Asia and the Middle East, which date back to imperial and colonial times, ‘but this time the initiative is coming from within Asia’. He captured the optimism engendered in Oman by the economic opportunities of trade with Asia, in particular through the Belt and Road Initiative. But that partnership was to be complementary to – and not a substitute for – existing relations. He stressed: 40

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Our engagement with China does not reflect a loosening of ties with others. We have always taken an inclusive view of international relations. We have always argued for an inclu-

Sayyid Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, SecretaryGeneral, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oman

sive security architecture for the Gulf. And likewise, if visiting naval vessels from friends and allies, from the US or the UK, from India or China, or indeed Japan, share facilities in our ports, we believe this is good for security. Relationships develop security on the meaningful foundation of practical co-operation.

Al Busaidi said that port development in the region is of particular importance to Oman, and welcomed the development of Chabahar in Iran, and Gwadar in Pakistan. He compared it to Oman’s own Duqm port, and stressed that Oman does not see the facilities of Iran and Pakistan in the region as rivals, stating rather that ‘all the region stands to benefit from the success of both, and from the success of all ports in this region’.

Relations between Asia and the Middle East were, he believed, at a historic juncture rich in opportunities for both: Executive summary

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This is a moment of historical significance. Over the last 50 to 60 years, oil exports have been at the heart of our economic thinking, and have set the agenda for our infrastructure priorities and our approach to questions of regional and global security. In the next 50 years, we will see this agenda and these priorities shifting towards something new. The biggest sea- and land-transport network ever constructed in human history will link Europe and Asia even further. We hope to be part of this network.

Looking at the region from Japan’s perspective, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Kono reminded us of the four principles on which Japanese foreign policy towards the Middle East was based: contributing to counter-extremism efforts and post-conflict reconstruction, aiding socio-economic development, patient engagement with regional powers and a commitment to conflict resolution. He highlighted the importance of the Middle East to Japan, and the wider Asia-Pacific region: The Middle East geopolitically connects Asia and Africa, and has become a hub of energy resources, financial dealings and commodity distribution, with several critically important choke points. For these reasons, the Middle East is vital to our free and open Indo-Pacific strategy.

Kono noted that although the military campaign against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, was drawing to a close, there remained much work to be done throughout Iraq and Syria on post-conflict reconstruction, to build ‘societies that can tolerate and respect diversity in the region’. Kono suggested that Japan could organise educational exchanges with regional states, as it has previously with some Asian countries; Japan would also support the Iraqi government in arranging a weapons-surrender programme. Kono also highlighted the significant contributions Japan has made to 42

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humanitarian initiatives in the region, how in

Taro Kono, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Japan

Syria and its neighbouring countries, we have recently decided to provide additional humanitarian assistance of around US$21 million. … this year alone, Japan’s assistance in total will reach over US$100 million for all Syrian people in need inside Syria, and around US$320 million in Iraq, Syria and its neighbouring countries.

Kono stressed Japan’s enduring commitment to the Israel– Palestine peace process. In this regard, Kono cited Japan’s Corridor for Peace and Prosperity initiative, which involves cooperation with and between Israel, Jordan and Palestine, to build mutual trust. The Jericho Agro Industrial Park (JAIP), its flagship project, has now been running for ten years, and Kono expressed his hope that JAIP’s products could be exported through Jordan to the Gulf countries, and then beyond to the global market.

Kono also placed the Middle East within a wider strategic context and highlighted the challenge of improving communications and upholding the rules-based order: Executive summary

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Japan … is trying to uphold a free and open maritime order, and improve connectivity from the eastern coast of Africa, such as Djibouti or Mombasa, Kenya, to even the West Coast of the United States. The Middle East sits in the middle of our Indo-Pacific strategy.

Japan is particularly well placed to make a meaningful contribution to the Middle East, Kono suggested: Japan is unique because we have remained neutral religiously and ethnically, and we have not left any negative footprint historically in the Middle East. Japan has always remained as a peaceful nation for over 70 years, after World War II, continually practising peace diplomacy with so-called soft power, without exercising coercion or force.

Kono concluded with a reflection on the contribution that states in the Middle East could make to the security of the Asia-Pacific, noted how remittances from North Korean workers across the Gulf eventually fund North Korea’s missile- and nuclear-development programmes. Governments in the region, he suggested, have a role to play in tackling this ‘unprecedented grave and imminent threat’.

Concluding Plenary Session: Regional conflicts and terrorism: policy options This final plenary session featured presentations by three senior IISS staff. Leading off, Professor Toby Dodge, Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East, expressed optimism about the future of Iraq following its liberation from the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, but also pessimism, stemming from a sense of familiarity of having seen past battlefield successes in 2003 and 2007 squandered politically: on each occasion, stunning military victories proved not to be politically sustainable, because the surge and the invasion 44

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of 2003 were not underpinned by a political strategy that was deliverable.

Dodge discussed the implications of and policy recommendations flowing from the three big historical events that have

Professor Toby Dodge, Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East, IISS; Director, Middle East Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science

dominated Iraq this year. The first of these was the July 2017 liberation of Mosul, a city that has changed hands seven times since 2003. Since then, the Iraqi state has been unable to deliver services in a meaningful way. There are high expectations for the Kuwait donor’s conference next year, but pledges of money from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and the rest of the international community hinge on meaningful pledges of economic reform from the Iraqi government. Related to this is legacy of the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU, also known as the Hashd al-Shaabi). Noting the drain on government resources provided to these groups, Dodge said: you need a section of the Hashd al-Shaabi to be integrated into the Iraqi military and put under the command and control of the government, but a large section, the majority to be demobilised, sent home and integrated into a productive economy.

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The second big event was the referendum held by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in September 2017, and the subsequent move of the Iraqi forces into Kirkuk and the disputed territories the following month. Dodge expressed concern that the respective heads of the KRG and the Iraqi government are not engaged in meaningful discussions, adding that sitting behind that is the profound question that has never been answered: how does federalism work in Iraq, and on what basis?

He offered a policy recommendation for Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi: to decentralise control along geographic and provincial lines, rather than on any sectarian, religious or nationalist basis, thus moving power into the provincial governments.

The third event is the upcoming national election in May 2018. He noted a ‘sense, amongst friends’ that Iraq may be moving beyond sectarian politics and the Muhassasa system which divides up the ministries amongst the successful political parties, which enables them to use the resources that the ministries bring for political corruption.

John Raine, Senior Adviser for Geopolitical Due Diligence, discussed counter-terrorism in the Middle East, where terrorism has put the region at the centre of the international security agenda for several decades. Calling counter-terrorism a ‘distance event’ he said: It is very unlikely that we are able to deliver what in military terms would be a decisive manoeuvre against terrorism. …

We must configure to be capable over time against terrorism, and effective in the moment.

He suggested that terrorism was entering a new phase, characterised, firstly, by ‘a remarkably high level of adaptability in our adversary’. Secondly, 46

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we should assume that terrorists will make not just the same use of contemporary capabilities and utilities as we make, but better use. And this is particularly relevant to cyber and the

John Raine, Senior Adviser for Geo-Political Due Diligence, IISS

next generation of cyber- and data-related capabilities.

A third illustration of the changing nature of the terrorist threat is its increasingly transnational character. We are no longer dealing just with transnational organisations, he said, but with transnational ideas or means where emulation and inspiration have taken the place of command-and-control structures. ‌ The adversary now has ‌ neither regulation nor a recognisable structure.

In the cyber domain, he noted the discrepancy between the appetite for digital connectivity and the ability to defend against cyber attacks: This is the domain in which we will win or lose the next phase against the terrorists. ‌ There is a great temptation to add on discussion of cyber once we have talked about Executive summary

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Emile Hokayem, Senior Fellow for Middle East Security, IISS

the more familiar dimensions of terrorism, in particular military response. I would suggest that we invert now the priorities ‌ and place cyber at the top, closely followed by the societal challenges that we need to meet in order to prevent the emergence or the recurrence of terrorism. ‌ only thirdly should we regard counter-terrorism as a military activity.

Emile Hokayem, Senior Fellow for Middle East Security, discussed the ongoing transformation of the Levant from Iraq to Lebanon, focusing particularly on Syria. The sense in some Manama Dialogue sessions that the endgame is approaching in Syria is still wishful thinking, he said, arguing that the potential for more violence, for low-intensity and highintensity conflicts, remains quite high in the region. Certainly, the 2003 Iraq war, and the 2011 Sunni uprising, both were followed by intense civil wars, have upended the regional and strategic balance. And the change is not just at the strategic level. It is a very structural one.

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He argued that the debilitating effects of demographic changes from massive sectarian engineering and a massive refugee crisis are only just beginning. The region is also witnessing a reordering of regional relationships, with Iran, Russia and Turkey sitting at a table managing their interests and the Arab states being largely absent. Other international actors show a level of fatigue, desensitisation and cynicism about the region.

On the ground, the military balance in Syria is quite clear, he said, with the Assad regime and its allies having the political and the military upper hand: It is not total victory, but it is good enough, and good enough is good enough for actors who do not define victory and do not have necessarily the same ambitions in terms of political stability, reconstruction of Syria. I do not think the Syrian government sees a need to offer any serious political compromise.

Political issues have been frozen or delayed, he said, arguing that the campaign against ISIS essentially served as a cover for local and regional players to advance and assert their competing interests. Related to this is the massive uncertainty about the US role in Syria: A year plus into the US campaign down the Euphrates river valley, it is unclear if the US intends to stay or to leave. There are very conflicting signs there. And, if the US decides to stay, what would be the purpose of the US posture? Is it to counter Iran? If so, what is the broader strategy?

Hokayem called the rise of transnational Shia militias a key driver of conflict in the region today. A related point is the position of Iran, which he called a clear strategic winner at this point: [Iran]Â has deployed networks, expertise, experience and strategic patience in Syria and Lebanon, where it operates at a Executive summary

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relative low cost with plenty of deniability, thanks to quite sophisticated asymmetric strategies. Iran is ahead in the game, and it is going to be very difficult to match it at that level, which is why I would argue that the Gulf states should not try to engage in proxy warfare, but rather focus on state consolidation, because that is probably the place where Iran has less of an edge.

Finally, he spoke about the transformation of the Israel– Iran dynamic in Lebanon and Syria, with large numbers of militiamen deploying in Syria and a much longer front line: The structural conditions for a massive war in the Levant are met. … I am not saying this is for tomorrow. These are sides once more, but both are ready, and both expect it. … If and when that happens, this is not going to be the 2006 scenario.

Iran is much stronger militarily today. Israel has changed its fundamental assumptions about Lebanon. And there is real uncertainty about who manages the conflict.

In the discussion period, many of the questions focused on the role of Iran. In reply, Raine called it a ‘premier-league’ cyber adversary, ‘an accomplished agent of proliferation’, and a provider of battle-hardened operators. Hokayem said he did not foresee a direct war between Israel and Iran, but rather between Israel and Iran’s allies. He suggested that there is no better nuclear deal to be had, but that other strategies needed to be devised, combining dialogue with Iran along with containment. Iran’s partnership with Russia is holding because the strategic returns were large enough. Iran’s image has improved because it ‘is a coherent, strategic actor’ that is able to define a vision for the region. But Iran now has the responsibilities of the victor, with a smaller margin for error, which is particularly relevant for the stand-off with Israel.

Dodge agreed with one questioner that Tehran’s hubris leaves it vulnerable.

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Among the other questions and comments was a plea for a commitment to gender diversity on plenary-session panels and a request for a youth delegation. John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, answered the latter points in his summing up, listing by name the seven female defence and foreign ministers who had been invited to speak.

Had half of them been able to come, the panels would have

(l-r): Abdulmalik Al Mikhlafi, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Yemen: Ramzy E Ramzy, Deputy Special Envoy for Syria, UN; and Ümit Yalçın, Undersecretary for Middle East and AsiaPacific Affairs, Turkey

been rightly diverse; meanwhile, what the IISS could do was ensure gender diversity within the debate, which he guessed to be roughly 50-50. For 2018, he added, the IISS will reinvest in ensuring that there is a strong young-strategist component at the Manama Dialogue.

Special Session 1: Prospects for conflict resolution and reconstruction in Syria and Yemen This special session assessed subjects that were in many ways central to broader discussions at the Dialogue. These included intra-regional relations; the role of external countries, the United Nations and regional peace initiatives in both countries; conflict-resolution; and humanitarian and reconstruction challenges.

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Speakers discussed the range of peace processes that have been pursued, with one discussing the range of peace initiatives that have tried to bring an end to the conflict in Yemen, including the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) initiative, Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference and UN Security Council Resolution 2216. That said, many of the comments and questions focused on Syria. Compared to last year, one speaker asserted, violence in Syria has significantly receded, a development which owed much, it was argued, to the Astana process, and the establishment of de-escalation zones. The amount of territory controlled by terrorists has significantly reduced. While there had been fears that the Astana process would overtake the UN Geneva process, it has created improved conditions.

Participants also discussed how the Russian initiative for Syrian peace talks in Sochi would fit into the Geneva process; one speaker thought that Astana, Geneva and Sochi should be seen as complementary. However, some criticism was levelled at the Syrian regime for the slow progress in Geneva: Damascus needed to be pressured to negotiate with the opposition. Importantly, and in contrast to discussions at the Dialogue in previous years, there was emerging international and regional consensus over Syria, though it was said that questions remained over whether the government was prepared to negotiate over UN Security Council Resolution 2254.

Participants agreed that for both Syria and Yemen, peace negotiations must involve the countries’ neighbours, and the international community will need to be prepared to deal with sectarian issues arising from the conflicts. These processes will also have to confront the questions posed by the presence of foreign actors in both Syria and Yemen, to enable sustainable solutions.

The humanitarian crises in both countries formed another unifying thread of debate during the session. In Syria, the UN has tried to separate humanitarian issues from the peace process. In both countries, there are significant complications in 52

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delivering humanitarian assistance and challenges in planning for reconstruction, not least the sheer level of destruction and the presence of explosive weapons.

Special Session 2: The future of Iraq

(l-r): Dr Salim Al Jabouri, Speaker, Parliament of Iraq; and Falah Mustafa Bakir, Head, Department of Foreign Relations, Kurdistan Regional Government

The session took place a day after Prime Minister Haider alAbadi declared Iraq’s final victory against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL. While congratulating Iraq on this achievement, participants warned that as military pressure on the Islamic State eases, intelligence will come to play a vital role. Participants also urged Iraqi security forces to maintain a presence in ungoverned spaces, to prevent any potential resurgence by armed groups.

Furthermore, there was consensus that military victory must be accompanied by political reform to address the underlying structural issues that led to the emergence of ISIS in the first place. This includes the establishment and consolidation of national institutions which ensure that alienated groups participate in the country’s political future. Three key policies highlighted during the session include the establishment of constitutional institutions on non-sectarian grounds; Executive summary

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(l-r): Dr Mesut Ă–zcan, Director, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey; and Colonel Joel Rayburn, Senior Director for Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, National Security Council, US

the demilitarisation and disarmament of Iraqi society; and national reconciliation.

The question of national reconciliation also pertains to the Kurdish population, whose independence referendum in September significantly worsened relations between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Participants stressed the importance of dialogue between the two, with some raising the possibility of international mediation by the United States, and the implementation of joint-security mechanisms in those contested areas to which Iraqi forces deployed in mid-October. Coexistence between Arab and Kurdish populations, one participant argued, must be voluntary, and based on mutual respect for identity.

Another policy proposal suggested by participants was bringing an end to the prominent role the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU, also known as the Hashd al-Shaabi) have played in Iraq, and ensuring that its members are prosecuted for any war crimes committed. Participants noted the often problematic attachment of the militias that constitute the PMU to sub-national loyalties, and their use of Iraqi state resources to further their own political objectives.

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Ahead of the 2018 election, which may be pivotal to Iraq’s future, all actors emphasised the importance of economic development for stabilisation. Iraq was encouraged to prioritise the fulfilment of its population’s basic needs, as well as investing in rebuilding those areas destroyed in conflict, to

(l-r): General Joseph Votel, Commander, US Central Command; and Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, Chief of the Defence Staff, UK

allow displaced persons to return home.

Special Session 3: International campaign against terrorism At the outset of the session, the point was made that terrorism impacts every security issue affecting the region, and has also been a subject on the Manama Dialogue agenda each year. Over time, however, its form and extent have evolved significantly.

Participants noted that the campaign to counter the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, is thoroughly international: it is a 60-nation coalition. It works against ISIS by operating with partners, within a coalition, and through a diplomatic and humanitarian framework. The speakers also acknowledged the importance of local partnerships and capitalising on local knowledge.

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(l-r): General Zubair Mahmood Hayat, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Armed Forces, Pakistan; and Major General Mohammed El Keshky, Assistant Minister of Defence, Egyptian Armed Forces

While the Islamic State’s physical ‘caliphate’ may be close to defeat on the ground, the ‘virtual caliphate’ remains dangerous, its ambition undiminished, and the franchises that follow may be more difficult to tackle. Governments will need more non-traditional methods, including in their pursuit of sources of funding. The evolution of weapons used, such as the increasing use and proliferation of missiles, is another challenge. The threat posed by extremist groups is global, and increasingly urbanised. The fact that terrorists are going underground – sometimes literally – to counter Western surveillance underlines the need to adapt quickly.

Participants also discussed how local grievances and movements gather momentum and merge into a grand struggle – a phenomenon which is sometimes inadvertently fuelled by Western rhetoric – and suggested ways to counter this: through intelligence, strengthening civil-military partnerships, and revising and consolidating governance and economic structures. In particular, the speakers discussed the terror threat in Egypt’s Sinai province, and the need for sensitivity towards local traditions in combatting it.

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The discussion also raised the question of just how effective the campaign’s supposedly comprehensive approach has been, and whether it has continued to place too much emphasis on the military aspect of the strategy. There was also a call for political leadership to act quickly on the issue of extremism on the internet, perhaps by means of legislation, and the question was raised of whether militaries and coalitions alike are adapting quickly enough to deal with the cyber threat.

(l-r): Khalid Al Rumaihi, Chief Executive Officer, Bahrain Economic Development Board, Bahrain; and Dr Rola Dashti, Chairman, Higher Planning Council, Faro International; former State Minister for Planning and Development, Kuwait

Special Session 4: The security imperative of economic reform This special session considered the scale of the risk of economic insecurity in the region; the reforms most critical to avoiding insecurity and the appropriate pace of reform; and the role of external partners.

The discussion began by focusing on the decline in oil prices, and the demographic dynamics – namely the region’s rising population – which have rendered existing fiscal and economic models untenable. For years, the Gulf states have used oil and gas rents to create a salaried middle class of Executive summary

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(l-r): Dr Karen Young, Senior Resident Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institute, US; and Alia Moubayed, Director of Geo-Economics and Strategy, IISS

public-sector workers; this can no longer be sustained. Neither can states continue to hoard labour and resources. Across the Gulf states, the private sector accounts for just 35% of GDP. While private wealth in the region amounts to some US$2 trillion, it is concentrated among a small proportion of society and is invested externally.

Because fiscal pressure is not uniform across the region the pace of economic reform will vary between countries. Some will need to introduce reform more quickly than others; the elasticity of social discontent, which likewise varies across the region, will also be a key determinant. Yet in all cases reform fatigue is unavoidable, a fact which should inform planning.

Social safety nets, in the form of cash transfers, will be indispensable and must be well targeted. Finding a sustainable economic model is difficult because the global and regional economies have become post-industrial. This complicates the challenge of restructuring economies on the basis of rising productivity, a flourishing private sector and reduced reliance on the oil and gas sectors. Improving infrastructure is likely to be part of the solution; this is one of the positive lessons from China’s emergence over the last 20 years and its success

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in raising millions of its own citizens out of poverty. Highquality phyiscal infrastructure lifts an important constraint on business development. The financial sector is one potential growth area, given the accumulated wealth in the Gulf, and it accords with global trends that favour the shift to emergingmarket financial-sector hubs.

Reform

always

creates

winners

and

losers.

Telecommunications liberalisation, for example, has lowered prices, created jobs and increased the quality of service for customers. Yet liberalisation has also deprived the state of a profitable monopoly. Mediating these trade-offs will not be easy.

Planning transition is far easier than its implementation.

Communicating plans for reform, to reassure and gain the confidence of publics and foreign investors, will be vital to the success. Without this, there is a danger that privatisation and other changes will be regarded by suspicious publics as a scheme to transfer the wealth of the state into the hands of a select few. At the macro level and at the company level, it will be important for leaders to ensure that the public interest is being protected – and to communicate that clearly. Effective corporate social responsibility and governance will be critical for the success and public legitimacy of the reform effort.

A particular challenge facing policymakers is the youth bulge, and the imperative to find work for school-leavers over the next five to ten years. At present, the region is overly reliant on expatriate labour: this will have to change. Wage policies, too, must adapt, to encourage and reward productive work. The region’s youth is a treasure that, if not properly utilised, could become a liability for regional peace.

Subdued growth and high youth unemployment, compounded by the presence of armed conflicts are key causes of economic insecurity in the region. Moreover, future trends are worrying, such as the deletrious impact of high populationgrowth rates on food security in low-income countries, and water stress, which will be particularly acute in the Middle East.

Executive summary

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13TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 8–10 DECEMBER 2017

The IISS Manama Dialogue

CHAPTER 3

Press coverage Selected IISS publications

Amr Moussa, Head, Committee of 50; former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egypt; former Secretary-General, League of Arab States

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Press coverage

BBC News 8 December 2017

Trump Jerusalem shift puts counterterror efforts at risk The recognition by US President Donald Trump of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital has triggered more than just criticism from America’s allies.

Here in Bahrain, at the annual Manama Dialogue security conference, there is an almost universal concern that the announcement will be a gift to the region’s twin adversaries - Iran and the jihadists of al-Qaeda and so-called Islamic State (IS).

“The president has lit a fire and left his Arab allies to deal with the blaze,” said Elisabeth Marteu, Consultant Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

A former UK Special Forces officer, who asked not to be quoted, compared the announcement to “throwing a hand grenade into a room with the pin removed”.

Officially, the Arab Gulf rulers have always supported the Palestinian right to a homeland, recognising it as a longrunning source of grievance for the whole region and a popular pan-Arab, pan-Islamic cause.

Privately though, older members of the ruling families have never fully forgiven the Palestinian Authority for siding with Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Soon after that country’s liberation I saw a piece of graffiti daubed on a wall in Kuwait City that read: “Jerusalem is the eternal home of the Jews and I am a Kuwaiti writing this.”

That was in 1991 and things are different now. Most of the Arab world’s populations are too young to remem-

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ber, or even care about, the invasion of 1990, but they do care about Jerusalem.

It is the third holiest site in Islam, after Mecca and Medina, and it holds a special place in many people’s hearts.

What does this mean for counter-terrorism? It means a risk on two counts.

The first is the risk that people who might not be well disposed towards the West but were not planning to translate this into violent action may now think again.

Hediya Fathalla, an expert on Gulf security and a former Bahrain government official, told the BBC: “There are dormant jihadist mentalities who are sitting there thinking ‘I’m not operational but I have jihadist feelings’ so will this push them over the fence?”

The second risk is on the other side of the equation, namely that someone previously co-operating with US government agencies may now be less inclined to do so.

They may well have an excellent working relationship with, say, their counterpart at the CIA or NSA. But at the back of their minds there could now be a pervasive doubt over whether a US administration that has acted in this way actually has their interests at heart.

Even at the very top of a country’s hierarchy, in the Royal Court of Saudi Arabia, there must now be concerns that Saudi Arabia has chosen to work so closely with a White House that has just infuriated so much of the Arab world.

Then there is Iran.

The Islamic Republic continues to rival Saudi Arabia for power and prestige

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across the Middle East. It has long supported the twin anti-Israel militias of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian Territories. The overseas arm of its Revolutionary Guards Corps is called “the Quds force”, meaning “the Jerusalem force”.

“Iran has always used Jerusalem as a sort of narrative when stirring up Arab masses, it’s what helped it align with Hamas... so I think it will definitely play into the hands of Iran,” said Hediya Fathalla.

Commenting this weekend in the online edition of IISS Voices for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which organises the Manama Dialogue, Elisabeth Marteu also believes the announcement will help Iran’s interests.

“This would be a great boost to Tehran, which is trying to repair its image after the Syria and Iraq conflicts,” she writes.

Over time, the damage to US relations with its Gulf Arab partners will be repaired. Washington is simply too big, too powerful and too important an ally to ignore.

The US Fifth Fleet patrols the Gulf, providing a counterweight to Iran, while sophisticated US weaponry makes up much of the region’s arsenals.

But the recent US announcement is a reminder to rulers here that this White House administration is still capable of causing them intense embarrassment. ©BBC News Reprinted with permission

The National 10 December 2017

Iraq has defeated ISIL but there are formidable challenges ahead Iraq’s future following its victory over ISIL simply cannot be isolated from Iran’s designs.

ISIL’s fall has been as swift as its rise.

The self-styled “caliphate” which claimed in 2014 to be invincible lost a succession of battles in Iraq and Syria over the last few months. On Saturday, the Iraqi prime minister, Haider Al Abadi, announced on television that the territory of his nation was now completely free of ISIL. “The dream of liberation is now a reality”, Mr Al Abadi declared. The Iraqi military has held a victory parade in Baghdad and, henceforth, December 10 will be celebrated as a national holiday across the country. No one should begrudge Iraq its moment of glory.

Military operations have reached an end, but as these pages have previously warned, the fight against ISIL is likely to rage on in different forms. As Gen Joseph Votel of US Central Command has cautioned, ISIL’s residual forces may regroup and operate in smaller cells. ISILrelated suicide bombers remain a persistent threat, as the horrifying attack on a Sufi mosque in Egypt’s north Sinai region last month showed. In addition to the immediate security challenges, there remains the climate of economic and

political dispossession that enables extremists to thrive. As long as this climate is left unaddressed, the ugly ideology of ISIL will continue to corrupt minds and find converts to its nihilistic cause.

Iraq has also now to confront the urgent challenge of revamping the paramilitary forces that were mobilised against ISIL. What does Iraq now do with the forces beholden to Iran? Now that combat operations against ISIL are at an end, can these militias be prevented from becoming instruments for the advancement of Tehran’s interests? The future of Iraq following the fall of ISIL simply cannot be isolated from the designs of Iran. The priorities of the former, after more than a decade of war, revolve around the need for economic prosperity and political stability; the objectives of the latter are focused on establishing its own control over the region by breeding instability and spreading terror.

Speaking on Friday at the 13th Manama Dialogue in Bahrain, Sir John Jenkins, who has closely observed the Middle East for nearly four decades, noted that the dominant theme of the region during that period has been Iran’s rise on the wings of “radical and violent” ideologies. Iran, he said, has spread its influence by feeding on the “discontents” in this region. ISIL is defeated, but the prospect of such groups re-emerging cannot be discounted. At the same time, the threat from Iran and its proxies remains ever present. The victory against ISIL must not prompt anyone to overlook this danger. ©The National Reprinted with permission

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Reuters 9 December 2017

Palestinians to snub Pence during visit over Jerusalem move Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will not meet U.S. Vice President Mike Pence during Pence’s visit to the region this month in a snub over the U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the Palestinian foreign minister said on Saturday.

Violence erupted for a third day in Gaza in response to President Donald Trump’s announcement on Wednesday, which overturned decades of U.S. policy towards the Middle East.

Israeli air strikes killed two Palestinian gunmen on Saturday after militants fired rockets from the enclave into Israel on Friday, which had been declared a “day of rage” by Palestinian factions.

Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem has infuriated the Arab world and upset Western allies, who say it is a blow to peace efforts and risks sparking more violence in the region.

Late on Saturday, Arab foreign ministers urged the United States to abandon its decision and said the move would spur violence throughout the region. The Arab League, in a statement issued after an emergency session in Cairo, called Trump’s announcement a “dangerous violation of international law” which had no legal impact and was void.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reacted to critics in a statement before meetings in Paris on Sunday with

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French President Emmanuel Macron to be followed by a meeting with European foreign ministers in Brussels.

“I hear (from Europe) voices of condemnation over President Trump’s historic announcement but I have not heard any condemnation for the rocket firing against Israel that has come (after the announcement) and the awful incitement against us,” Netanyahu said.

Israel maintains that all of Jerusalem is its capital. Palestinians want East Jerusalem as the capital of a future independent state.

Most countries consider East Jerusalem, which Israel annexed after capturing it in a 1967 war, to be occupied territory, and say the status of the city should be left to be decided at future Israeli-Palestinian talks.

The Trump administration says it is still committed to Palestinian-Israeli talks, that Israel’s capital would be in Jerusalem under any serious peace plan, and that it has not taken a position on the city’s borders. It says the moribund negotiations can be revived only by ditching outdated policies.

Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki said the Palestinians will be looking for a new peace talks broker instead of the United States and would seek a United Nations Security Council resolution over Trump’s decision.

“We will seek a new mediator from our Arab brothers and the international community,” Maliki told reporters in Cairo before the Arab League meeting on Trump’s Jerusalem decision.

A Turkish presidential source said Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan and

French President Emmanuel Macron will work together to try to persuade the United States to reconsider the move.

A possible meeting with Pence has also been turned down by Egypt’s Coptic Church, MENA state news agency reported.

White House and U.S. State Department officials did not respond to requests for comment. Palestinian officials said Pence had been due to meet Abbas on Dec. 19.

Trump’s adviser and son-in-law, Jared Kushner, is leading efforts to restart negotiations, though his bid has shown little public progress so far.

ROCKETS, AIR STRIKES Palestinian militants launched at least three rockets towards Israeli towns from Gaza after dark on Friday and Israel said it responded with air strikes that targeted a weapons depot, a military compound and two weapons manufacturing facilities.

Hamas, which controls Gaza, confirmed the two men killed in the predawn strikes belonged to the group, which has urged Palestinians to keep up the confrontation with Israeli forces.

However, Palestinian protests on Saturday were less intense than on the previous two days. About 60 Palestinian youths threw stones at Israeli soldiers across the Gaza-Israel border and the health ministry said at least 10 were wounded by Israeli fire.

In the occupied West Bank, Palestinians set fire to tires and threw stones and firebombs at Israeli troops, who responded with tear gas, water cannons,

rubber bullets and, in a few instances, live fire. The Israeli military said one protester was arrested.

In East Jerusalem about 60 people demonstrated near the walled Old City, where paramilitary border police and officers on horseback tried to disperse the crowd with tear gas. Thirteen demonstrators were arrested and four officers were lightly injured by stones, police spokesman Micky Rosenfeld said.

On Friday, thousands of Palestinians took to the streets in protest and two Palestinians were killed in clashes with Israeli troops on the Gaza border. Scores more were wounded there and in the West Bank. Across the Arab and Muslim worlds, thousands more protesters had gathered to express solidarity.

The Turkish presidential source said Erdogan and Macron agreed during a phone call that Trump’s move was worrying for the region and that Turkey and France would make a joint effort to try to reverse the U.S. decision.

Erdogan also spoke to the presidents of Kazakhstan, Lebanon and Azerbaijan on Saturday, the source said. On Wednesday, he called an urgent meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Turkey next week.

A senior United Arab Emirates (UAE) official said on Saturday that Trump’s move was a “gift to radicalism”.

“Radicals and extremists will use that to fan the language of hate,” Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash said at the Manama Dialogue security conference in Bahrain. ©Reuters Reprinted with permission

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Gulf News Bahrain 10 December 2017

Bahrain’s King Hamad: Dialogue only way to resolve differences, build security We face multiple threats, but our resolve is stronger, says King Hamad.

Bahrain’s King Hamad Bin Eisa Al Khalifa has stressed the significance of dialogue as the best way to resolve differences and achieve peace.

“Individual nations can have the most formidable armed forces and the most impressive intelligence services, but it is only through dialogue that we can understand one another better, resolve our differences and forge the path to lasting security,” King Hamad said as he received senior participants in the Manama Dialogue, an international security conference held annually in the Bahraini capital.

“For the past 13 years Bahrain has been proud to host the Manama Dialogue, bringing together leading policymakers from the Middle East and beyond. We do so in the belief that ultimately, dialogue is the answer to the challenges we face,” King Hamad said.

King Hamad said that the event was taking place at a crucial moment for the region and the world.

“We meet at a time when discussion and dialogue are needed more than ever. The Middle East faces challenges which are profound and wide-reaching, from the fallout of the conflicts in the

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Middle East to cyber warfare and piracy to extremism and terrorism,” he said.

“This is a difficult chapter in the history of the Arabian Gulf. We face multiple threats. However, I believe they are more than matched by our resolve to overcome them.”

King Hamad said he hoped the conference would help to lay the foundations for all to come together in a spirit of unity and ever deeper collaboration.

“This is the place to form new partnerships, to engage in genuine debate and to enrich our understanding of one another,” he said as he wished the success of the conference “for the sake of peace and prosperity in the Middle East and in the wider world.” ©Gulf News Bahrain Reprinted with permission

Le Figaro 18 December 2017

Le retour du réalisme en politique étrangère Après la « victoire » en Syrie contre Daech, Emmanuel Macron est prêt à dialoguer avec Bachar el-Assad.

Il n’a pas peur des mots et ne craint pas les ruptures, si elles permettent d’épouser la réalité. Une fois finie la guerre contre Daech, «Il faudra parler à Bachar et à ses représentants», composer avec le régime de Damas pour construire une solution politique. Plus qu’une fracture, le commentaire d’Emmanuel Macron sur France 2 est en fait une in-

flexion de la diplomatie française au Levant. Le tournant avait déjà été esquissé par François Hollande et Laurent Fabius en 2015. Après avoir exigé le départ de Bachar el-Assad, ils avaient assoupli la position française, morale et courageuse mais inefficace car rendue caduque par les interventions de l’Iran et de la Russie auprès du régime syrien. Emmanuel Macron n’a pas renoncé aux principes de la France puisqu’il voudrait que le président syrien rende compte de ses crimes devant la justice internationale.

«Bachar est l’ennemi du peuple syrien, Daech est notre ennemi.» La phrase, déjà prononcée par Jean-Yves Le Drian lorsqu’il était ministre de la Défense, va comme un gant au nouvel occupant de l’Élysée, qui veut bâtir sa politique étrangère sur le réalisme et le pragmatisme, débarrasser la diplomatie française de ses illusions et de ses idéologies.

Il faut parler à tout le monde», affirme Emmanuel Macron. À Vladimir Poutine, qui a soupiré d›aise après avoir été reçu sous les ors du château de Versailles. À Donald Trump, qui a exhibé un sourire ravi et enfantin en assistant à son premier défilé militaire sur les Champs-Élysées, le 14 juillet. À MBS, le prince saoudien Ben Salman, à qui le président français a sauvé la face en extrayant le premier ministre libanais, Saad Hariri, de Riyad, où il était retenu. Il faut aussi parler franchement. Effacer les relations malsaines de la Françafrique en s’adressant aux jeunes générations du continent et en assumant un discours direct. Aller au contact avec la Pologne. Rappeler à Vladimir Poutine l’attachement de la France aux droits de l’homme et à la démocratie.

En huit mois, la méthode a déjà porté ses fruits. La France s’est imposée sur la scène internationale, où elle est attendue avec espoir et soulagement. «Dans les milieux de la Défense américains, la France est aujourd’hui considérée comme le principal allié des États-Unis.

C’est la première fois que ça arrive», assure le conservateur américain Dov Zakheim, un ancien du Département d’État, pendant le Dialogue de Manama organisé à Bahreïn par l’International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

Alignement des astres Il est vrai qu’Emmanuel Macron bénéficie d’un parfait alignement des astres grâce à l’effacement international de la Grande-Bretagne - dévorée par son Brexit -, de l’Allemagne - accaparée par sa politique intérieure - et de l’Amérique, décrédibilisée par le caractère déroutant de Donald Trump. En quelques mois, la France a rempli le vide laissé par les hésitations des puissances occidentales. Elle l’a fait d’autant plus aisément qu’Emmanuel Macron est servi par une personnalité ambitieuse et déterminée, à la fois «empathique et dure, qui aime la complexité», selon les mots d’un des nombreux experts qui l’ont accompagné pendant la campagne. Il veut «prendre le leadership» sur les dossiers, «retrouver le destin français», redonner une dimension «héroïque» à son pays.

«Il veut que la France soit là, qu›elle soit entendue, qu›elle soit présente à la table, qu›elle retrouve sa grandeur», décrypte Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, directeur du bureau parisien de l’European Council on Foreign Relations.

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Cette semaine, le magazine britannique The Economist lui a trouvé un surnom: «Le lapin Duracell de la diplomatie». Lorsqu’il ne dirige pas, le président français se pose en médiateur. Il s’invite dans la dispute entre l’Arabie saoudite et le Liban, profite de sa bonne relation avec Donald Trump pour tenter d’influencer la Maison-Blanche sur le climat et sur l’accord nucléaire avec l’Iran. «De nombreux pays nous demandent de jouer les intermédiaires avec le président américain», affirme un haut diplomate français.

Politique de Défense ambiguïe Cette présence très affirmée sur la scène internationale comporte cependant des risques. Le principal? «Emmanuel Macron a créé de très fortes attentes sur la scène internationale. Or si le pilote est excellent, il est aussi très seul à l’Élysée.

Saura-il répondre à tous les espoirs qu’il a suscités? Transformer la parole en résultats ?» résume un diplomate.

Sur certains dossiers, comme celui de la Françafrique, où le nœud est avant tout psychologique, la parole, si elle est juste et adaptée, vaut pour l’action. Mais la question se pose différemment dans d’autres crises, notamment en Syrie où les acteurs occidentaux, dont la France, ont été marginalisés par les puissances régionales, l’Iran et la Russie. Le Groupe de contact annoncé par la France en septembre n’existe pour l’instant que de manière «virtuelle», reconnaît un haut diplomate. La réponse de Bachar el-

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Assad à la victoire contre Daech laisse peu d’espoir au retour de la paix en Syrie. Le président s’en est pris lundi aux Kurdes soutenus par les États-Unis, qui ont largement participé à la lutte antidjihadiste mais qu’il considère comme des «traîtres». «Attention! La stabilité des régimes n’entraîne pas forcément la stabilité géopolitique», prévient Manuel Lafont Rapnouil.

L’Américain Jérémy Shapiro, chercheur à l’ECFR, voit déjà s’avancer des obstacles. «Le peuple français est très difficile à gouverner. Vous élisez le roi, puis vous l’exécutez quand il applique son programme! Or les réformes en France sont indispensables au programme international de Macron.» Il s’inquiète aussi de ce que la politique européenne française soit «trop polarisée sur l›Allemagne». Non seulement Berlin pourrait être un allié moins solide que Macron l›espérait, mais les autres pays européens pourraient, selon lui, «se sentir rejetés».

Enfin, si Emmanuel Macron s’est investi pleinement dans la diplomatie, il est plus ambigu sur la politique de Défense, qu’il donne l’impression d’abandonner aux griffes de Bercy. Mais sans une défense forte, sans une armée suffisamment puissante pour les rendre crédibles, les meilleures initiatives de politique étrangère risquent de rester lettre morte. ©Le Figaro Reprinted with permission

Business Standard (originally Asian News International) 9 December 2017

MJ Akbar meets Bahrain, Yemen’s Foreign Ministers In an endeavour to embolden the ongoing convergence in trade, investment and culture Minister of State (MoS) of External Affairs, M. J. Akbar met with Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa on the sidelines of the Manama Dialogue.

Continuing support to constructive efforts for peace in Yemen, the minister also met with Yemen’s Foreign Minister Abdulmalik Abduljalil Al-Mekhlafi.

Akbar is on a three-day official visit to Bahrain from December 8 to December 10 to participate in the 13th Regional Security Summit-Manama Dialogue.

He will address the plenary session at the Manama Dialogue organised jointly by the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the Government of Bahrain, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said, in a statement.

During the visit, he will also meet with the Bahraini leadership to discuss bilateral, regional and global issues of mutual interest.

Bilaterally, India enjoys close and multifaceted ties with Bahrain.

This visit will provide a useful opportunity to further cement our mutually beneficial bilateral ties with the Bahrain, the statement added.

©Business Standard/ Asian News International Reprinted with permission

New York Times 30 December 2017

The U.S. Has Pummeled Al Qaeda in Yemen.

But the Threat Is Barely Dented The United States has tripled the number of airstrikes this year against Al Qaeda’s branch in Yemen, one of the deadliest and most sophisticated terrorist organizations in the world. American allies have pushed the militants from their lucrative coastal strongholds. And the Pentagon recently boasted of killing key Qaeda leaders and disrupting the group’s operations.

Yet the top United States counterterrorism official and other American intelligence analysts concede the campaign has barely dented the terrorist group’s ability to strike United States interests.

“It doesn’t feel yet that we’re ahead of the problem in Yemen,” Nicholas J. Rasmussen, who stepped down this month after three years as the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, said in an interview. “It continues to be one of the most frustrating theaters in our counterterrorism work right now.”

Even as President Trump lauds the demise of the Islamic State’s self-proclaimed caliphate in Iraq and Syria, the

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threat of a terrorist attack — with the most commonly feared target a commercial airliner — emanating from the chaotic, ungoverned spaces of Yemen remains high on the government’s list of terrorism concerns. The group formally known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or A.Q.A.P., has dogged Mr. Trump since his first days in office, when the president authorized an illfated raid on a Qaeda hide-out that left one member of the Navy’s elite SEAL Team 6 dead.

The fight against Al Qaeda is a different military campaign in a different part of Yemen than the one helping fuel the humanitarian disaster gripping the country, most visibly in the west.

Yemen, one of the poorest nations in the Arab world, has been convulsed by civil strife since the Houthis, Shia rebels from the north aligned with Iran, stormed the capital, Sana, in 2014 and then ousted the government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, the Americans’ main counterterrorism partner.

In March 2015, Saudi Arabia and a coalition of Arab nations began a military campaign aimed at pushing back the Houthis and restoring the government. That campaign has so far failed to do so and has instead caused the world’s most severe humanitarian crisis, the worst outbreak of cholera in contemporary history and widespread child malnutrition.

Al Qaeda exploited the security vacuum and in 2015 took control of large parts of land in the south, including Al Mukalla, Yemen’s fifth-largest city and a major source of port revenue.

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The Qaeda wing in Yemen remains so nefarious in part because the group has spent years inventing explosives that are difficult to detect, including trying to disguise bombs in devices like cellphones. It has tried at least three times to blow up American airliners, without success. And its most notorious bomb maker, Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, remains at large and is training protégés, intelligence officials say.

“Still the world’s most dangerous man,” David H. Petraeus, the former C.I.A. director and a retired four-star general, said of Mr. Asiri at a security conference here this month.

With no real functioning government in Yemen, the United States does not have the Special Operations forces or C.I.A. presence on the ground that it had before Yemen’s civil war, American counterterrorism officials say, and thus lacks the deeper understanding of the situation there that would give officials confidence about Al Qaeda’s plotting.

“We can’t distinguish between people who are still pretty serious threats and guys who are just working with them because they need help,” said Gerald M. Feierstein, a former United States ambassador to Yemen.

Over the past 18 months, however, American-backed Yemeni and Emirati troops have increased a shadow war in the country’s central and southern regions against more than 3,000 members of the Qaeda affiliate and its tribal confederates, driving them into the rugged, mountainous interior.

Since Feb. 28, as part of President Trump’s intensified campaign against

terrorists, the United States has conducted nearly 130 airstrikes in Yemen — mostly against Qaeda militants with about 10 against Islamic State fighters, according to the Pentagon’s Central Command. That is up from 38 strikes in 2016.

The Central Command boasted in an unusual statement this month that the airstrikes and Special Operations raids had killed several important Qaeda leaders.

The attacks “have put pressure on A.Q.A.P.’s network, severely limiting their freedom of movement, disrupting the organization’s ability to recruit and train, and limiting A.Q.A.P.’s ability to plan and execute external operations,” Lt. Col. Earl Brown, a Central Command spokesman, said in an email soon after the command issued an assessment of the campaign on Dec. 20.

In the south, more than 4,000 Yemeni troops backed by United Arab Emirates forces recently announced the death or capture of several Qaeda militants in Abyan and Shabwa provinces. Yemeni government security forces have been deployed in most of former Qaeda strongholds but the militants still exist in Baydha and Shabwa’s Sayed district.

The Yemenis have also captured some important Qaeda operatives. Their interrogations have given the Yemeni forces and their American and Emirati partners valuable insights into the insurgents’ leadership hierarchy, propaganda plans and local networks, a United States official said.

“We have disrupted A.Q.A.P., but I remain concerned,” Gen. Joseph L. Vo-

tel, the head of the Central Command, said in an interview during the Manama Dialogue security conference here.

“This is an organization that’s proved resilient over time. This is an extraordinarily dangerous element of Al Qaeda.”

Lora Shiao, the acting director of intelligence for the National Counterterrorism Center, told a Senate hearing this month that the Qaeda branch “continues to exploit the conflict in Yemen to gain new recruits and secure areas of safe haven, contributing to its enduring threat.”

Al Qaeda is not the only terrorist group seeking to take advantage of the turmoil in Yemen. An affiliate of the Islamic State there has doubled in size in the past year, according to the Central Command. When asked at the same Senate hearing this month which failed state offered the best location for a terrorist group, Mark E. Mitchell, a senior Pentagon official overseeing Special Operations policy, told lawmakers, “First of all would be Yemen.”

Yemen specialists say it is not at all clear that the escalating use of military force in the country is tied to any wider counterterrorism approach that draws on diplomacy, humanitarian and stabilization efforts, and cooperation on intelligence sharing and law enforcement that can make for sustainable gains against Al Qaeda.

“I’m worried that this is a military effort, however effective it may be, divorced from a broader strategic approach,” said Joshua A. Geltzer, who was senior director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council during the Obama administration.

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Mr. Rasmussen explained that while the military campaign had put pressure on the Qaeda network in Yemen, the lack of a government to work with had hampered efforts. “I still feel we’re lacking a lot of that right now,” Mr. Rasmussen said. “We’ve lost a lot of insight into what happens on the ground in Yemen.”

Just five days after taking office, Mr. Trump approved sending in the Navy’s SEAL Team 6, hoping the raid against a Qaeda compound would scoop up cellphones and laptop computers that could yield valuable clues about one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist groups.

The death of a commando, Chief Petty Officer William Owens, came after a chain of mishaps and misjudgments that plunged the team into a ferocious 50-minute firefight that also left three others wounded and a $75 million aircraft deliberately destroyed. Several civilians were also killed.

American-backed Emirati troops reclaimed Al Mukalla in April 2016, but in recent weeks, military checkpoints have sprouted throughout the city.

The security measures intensified in response to the concerns of government officials that Qaeda militants might infiltrate the large number of families who have fled a Houthi crackdown in Sana on supporters of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was killed by the Houthis this month after breaking an alliance with them. ©New York Times Reprinted with permission

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Pakistan Today (originally Associated Press of Pakistan) 11 December 2017

Envoy affirms Pakistan’s commitment to peace in intl conference Pakistan’s Ambassador to Bahrain Javed Malik on Sunday said that Pakistan would continue its cooperation for peace and stability in the region.

Talking to media persons during the Manama Dialogue held in Bahrain, he said that a durable peace in South Asia was not possible without resolving the Kashmir issue.

Talking about the measures taken by the country against terrorism, Javaid Malik said that the Pakistan Army had rendered countless sacrifices in the war and destroyed the network of terrorists in the country. The operation Zarb-e-Azb had achieved the desired results as terrorists’ backs had been broken, he added.

In response to a question, he said that Pakistan believed in maintaining good relationships with neighbouring countries, including Afghanistan and India.

Civil and military officials from 20 countries participated in the Manama Dialogue, according to a message received from Bahrain. ©Pakistan Today/ Associated Press of Pakistan Reprinted with permission

Reuters 9 December 2017

UAE’s Gargash says Trump’s decision on Jerusalem is ‘gift to radicalism’ A senior United Arab Emirates (UAE) official said on Saturday that U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was a boon to extremists.

“These issues are a gift to radicalism.

Radicals and extremists will use that to fan the language of hate,” said Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash, speaking at the Manama Dialogue security conference in Bahrain. ©Reuters Reprinted with permission

Süddeutsche Zeitung 10 December 2017

Ende der Neutralität Arabische Politiker kritisieren Trumps Jerusalem-Entscheidung: Diese sei ein “Geschenk an die Radikalen”, sagt etwa der Außenminister der Vereinigten Emirate. Eine Erklärung der Arabischen Liga spricht den USA die Rolle des neutralen Vermittlers ab.

Die größte Bedrohung für die Sicherheit in den arabischen Ländern war in den vergangenen drei Jahren zweifellos die Terrormiliz Islamischer Staat (IS). Laut dem jordanischen Außen-

minister Ayman al-Safadi hat sich das nun geändert - mit der Erklärung von US-Präsident Donald Trump nämlich, Jerusalem als Hauptstadt Israels anzuerkennen. Die “fortdauernde israelische Besatzung palästinensischen Landes” sei nun die größte Herausforderung für die Region, sagte al-Safadi am Samstag auf der Sicherheitskonferenz IISS Manama Dialogue in der bahrainischen Hauptstadt. Am selben Tag verkündete der irakische Premier Haidar al-Abadi in Bagdad den Sieg über den IS und das Ende der Militäroperationen.

Safadi beklagte, kein Thema habe mehr Potenzial, die arabische Welt aufzubringen und die Gefühle der Muslime weltweit zu verletzen, als einseitig den Status von Jerusalem zu verändern, der Stadt, die Muslimen, Christen und Juden gleichermaßen heilig ist. Die fortgesetzte Ungerechtigkeit gegenüber den Palästinensern erzeuge Verzweiflung, Wut, Perspektivlosigkeit und Verbitterung, die Extremisten in die Hände spiele und alle Bemühungen im Kampf gegen Terrorismus konterkariere.

Anwar Gargash, Staatsminister für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der Vereinigten Emirate, bezeichnete Trumps Entscheidung als “Geschenk an die Radikalen”: Diese könnten nun die Jerusalem-Frage für ihre “Botschaften des Hasses” nutzen. Gargash kritisierte die US-Regierung dafür, dass sie ihre Entscheidung nicht besser erkläre. UNBotschafterin Nikki Haley hatte ihre Teilnahme in Manama kurzfristig abgesagt. So blieb es an Gargash, die Position Abu Dhabis zu wiederholen, dass Trumps Erklärung zwar falsch sei, aber

Press coverage

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nicht die endgültige Entscheidung über den Status Jerusalems vorwegnehme.

Tatsächlich zeigte sich das USAußenministerium in einem Briefing für Journalisten außer Stande, die rechtlichen Folgen detailliert darzulegen, etwa ob in US-Pässen künftig als Geburtsort “Jerusalem, Israel” eingetragen werde, oder welche Teile der Stadt überhaupt von Trumps Erklärung erfasst sind.

Palästinenserpräsident Abbas sagt ein geplantes Treffen mit US-Vizepräsident Pence ab Für Saudi-Arabien und die Emirate ist die Jerusalem-Frage eine unwillkommene Ablenkung von aus ihrer Sicht schwerwiegenderen Bedrohungen, wie der Rolle Irans in der Region und dem politischen Islam der Muslimbruderschaft. Saudi-Arabiens Kronprinz Mohammed bin Salman und Trumps Schwiegersohn und Nahost-Verhandler Jared Kushner haben mehrmals über Elemente einer möglichen Friedenslösung gesprochen. Riad versucht die arabische Friedensinitiative von 2002 zur Grundlage neuer Gespräche zu machen - sie verspricht Israel im Gegenzug für einen Palästin-

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enser-Staat mit der Hauptstadt Ostjerusalem Anerkennung durch die arabischen Staaten, die den Weg ebnen würde zu enger Kooperation der beiden Golfstaaten, der USA und Israels gegen Iran.

Das wird nun erschwert durch eine Erklärung der Arabischen Liga, auf die sich die Außenminister der 22 Mitgliedstaaten in Kairo um drei Uhr am Sonntagmorgen einigten: Diese spricht Amerika die Rolle des neutralen Vermittlers ab und macht es für Riad schwieriger, sich als Partner Trumps an Bemühungen für neue Friedensgespräche zu beteiligen. Palästinenserpräsident Mahmud Abbas sagte ein geplantes Treffen mit US-Vizepräsident Mike Pence ab.

Irans Präsident Hassan Rohani nahm die Vorlage auf und sagte am Sonntag in einer TV-Ansprache, man könne “gute Beziehungen” zu Saudi-Arabien haben, wenn das Land seine “fehlgeleitete Freundschaft” mit Israel beende und die Bombardierung Jemens. Ein vergiftetes Angebot, aber eines, das in der arabischen Welt auf offene Ohren trifft. ©Süddeutsche Zeitung Reprinted with permission

Selected IISS publications

Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, the Institute’s bimonthly journal, is a leading forum for analysis and debate of international and strategic affairs. Recent articles of interest include: Fitzpatrick, Mark, ‘Iran’s Protests and the Fate of the Nuclear Deal’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 1, February– March 2018, pp. 69–74.

Marteu, Elisabeth, ‘Israel and the Jihadi Threat’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 1, February–March 2018, pp. 85–106.

Byman, Daniel, ‘Confronting Iran’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 1, February– March 2018, pp. 107–28.

Lahoud, Nelly and Jonathan Pieslak, ‘Music of the Islamic State’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 1, February–March 2018, pp. 153–68.

Lahoud, Nelly, ‘How Will the Islamic State Endure?’, Survival, vol. 59, no.

6, December 2017–January 2018, pp.

55–57.

Lewis, Jeffrey and Bruno Tertrais, ‘The Thick Red Line: Implications of

the 2013 Chemical-Weapons Crisis for Deterrence and Transatlantic Relations’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 6, December 2017–January 2018, pp.

77–108.

Posch, Walter, ‘Ideology and Strategy in the Middle East: The Case of Iran’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 5, October– November 2017, pp. 69–98.

Friedman Lissner, Rebecca, ‘Nuclear Legacies of the First Gulf War’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 5, October– November 2017, pp. 143–56.

Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry, ‘Realism, Liberalism and the Iraq War’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 4, August– September 2017, pp. 7–26.

Arsenault, Elizabeth Grimm, ‘US Detention Policy Towards ISIS: Between a Rock and a Hard Place’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 4, August– September 2017, pp. 109–34.

Freilich, Charles D. ‘Chuck’, ‘Can Israel Survive Without America?’ Survival, vol. 59, no. 4, August–September 2017, pp. 135–50.

Ben Israel, Isaac and Deganit Paikowsky, ‘The Iron Wall Logic of Israel’s Space

Selected IISS publications

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Programme’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 4, August–September 2017, pp. 151–66.

58, no. 4, August–September 2016, pp. 113–30.

Simon, Steven, ‘Rollback?’, Survival, vol.

59, no. 4, August–September 2017, pp. 209–12.

Ahram, Ariel I. and Ellen Lust, ‘The Decline and Fall of the Arab State’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 2, April–May 2016, pp. 7–34.

Brands, Hal and Peter Feaver, ‘Was the Rise of ISIS Inevitable?’, Survival, vol.

59, no. 3, June–July 2017, pp. 7–54.

Dobbins, Janes and Seth G. Jones, ‘The End of a Caliphate’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 3, June–July 2017, pp. 55–72.

Carter, Ash, ‘The Logic of American Strategy in the Middle East’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 2, April–May 2017, pp.

13–24.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, ‘An Order of Priorities in Confronting Iran’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 2, April–May 2017, pp. 25–29.

Lacher, Wolfram, ‘Was Libya’s Collapse Predictable?’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 2, April–May 2017, pp. 139–52.

Hannay, David and Thomas R. Pickering, ‘Building on the Iran Nuclear Agreement’, Survival, vol.

59, no. 2, April–May 2017, pp. 153–66.

Rafati, Naysan, ‘Iran’s Revolutionary Guards: Readying Strength’, Survival, vol. 59, no. 2, April–May 2017, pp. 167–76.

Lahoud, Nelly, ‘Can Women Be Soldiers of the Islamic State?’, Survival, vol.

59, no. 1, February–March 2017, pp.

61–78.

Hokayem, Emile and David B. Roberts, ‘The War in Yemen’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 6, December 2016–January 2017, pp. 157–86.

Mousavian, Seyed Hossein, ‘EU–Iran Relations After Brexit’, Survival, vol.

58, no. 5, October–November 2016, pp. 83–94.

Hecht, Eado and Eitan Shamir, ‘The Case for Israeli Ground Forces’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 5, October–November 2016, pp. 123–48.

Chivvis, Christopher S., ‘Countering the Islamic State in Libya’, Survival, vol.

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Larrabee, F. Stephen, ‘Turkey and the Changing Dynamics of the Kurdish Issue’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 2, April– May 2016, pp. 67–73.

Gaub, Florence, ‘The Cult of ISIS’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 1, February– March 2016, pp. 113–30.

Fishman, Ben, ‘Defining ISIS’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 1, February–March 2016, pp. 179–88.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, ‘Iran: A Good Deal’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 5, October– November 2015, pp. 47–52.

Moore, Thomas C., ‘Iran: NonProliferation Overshadowed’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 5, October– November 2015, pp. 53–58.

Avis Bohlen, ‘Iran: An Opening for Diplomacy?’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 5, October–November 2015, pp. 59–66.

Tertrais, Bruno, ‘Iran: An Experiment in Strategic Risk-Taking’, Survival, vol.

57, no. 5, October–November 2015, pp. 67–73.

Hanna, Michael Wahid, and Kaye, Dalia Dassa, ‘The Limits of Iranian Power’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 5, October– November 2015, pp. 173–98.

Fishman, Ben, ‘Could Libya’s Decline Have Been Predicted?’, Survival, vol.

57, no. 5, October–November 2015, pp. 199–208.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, ‘Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Nuclear Rumour Mill’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 4, August– September 2015, pp. 105–08.

Scheipers, Sibylle, ‘Auxiliaries at War in the Middle East’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 4, August–September 2015, pp.

121–38.

Fromson, James, and Simon, Steven, ‘ISIS: The Dubious Paradise of Apocalypse Now’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 3, June–July 2015, pp. 7–56.

Alsayed, Wafa, ‘The Impatience of Youth: Political Activism in the Gulf’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 4, August– September 2014, pp. 91–106.

Ahram, Ariel I., ‘Sexual Violence and the Making of ISIS’, Survival, vol. 57, no.

3, June–July 2015, pp. 57–78.

Ozkan, Behlül, ‘Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 4, August–September 2014, pp. 119–140.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, ‘Relief’, Survival, vol.

57, no. 3, June–July 2015, pp. 219–26.

Freilich, Charles D., ‘Why Can’t Israel Win Wars Any More?’, Survival, vol.

57, no. 2, April–May 2015, pp. 79–92.

Holbrook, Donald, ‘Al-Qaeda and the Rise of ISIS’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 2, April–May 2015, pp. 93–104.

Cheterian, Vicken, ‘ISIS and the Killing Fields of the Middle East’, Survival, vol.

57, no. 2, April–May 2015, pp. 105–18.

Fishman, Ben, ‘Jordan: Caught in the Middle Again’, Survival, vol. 56, no.

6, December 2014–January 2015, pp.

39–48.

Farwell, James P., ‘The Media Strategy of ISIS’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 6, December 2014–January 2015, pp.

49–55.

Hokayem, Emile, ‘Iran, the Gulf States, and the Syrian Civil War’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 6, December 2014– January 2015, pp. 59–86.

Lister, Charles, ‘Assessing Syria’s Jihad’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 6, December 2014–January 2015, pp.

87–112.

Barkey, Henri J., ‘Turkey’s Syria Predicament’, Survival, vol. 56, no.

6, December 2014–January 2015, pp.

113–34.

Dodge, Toby, ‘Can Iraq Be Saved?’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 5, October– November 2014, pp. 7–20.

Fetzek, Shiloh, and Mazo, Jeffrey, ‘Climate, Scarcity and Conflict’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 5, October– November 2014, pp. 143–70.

Roberts, Daniel B., ‘Qatar and the Brotherhood’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 4, August–September 2014, pp. 23–32.

Stevenson, Jonathan, ‘The Syrian Tragedy and Precedent’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 3, June–July 2014, pp.

121–40.

Taspinar, Omer, ‘The End of the Turkish Model’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 2, April– May 2014, pp. 49–64.

Chubin, Shahram, ‘Is Iran a Military Threat?’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 2, April–May 2014, pp. 65–88.

Tanner, Rolf, ‘Narrative and Conflict in the Middle East’, Survival, vol. 56, no.

2, April–May 2014, pp. 89–108.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, ‘Overwhelming Global Vote for the Iran Nuclear Deal’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 1, February–March 2014, pp. 71–75.

Byman, Daniel, ‘Sectarianism Afflicts the New Middle East’, Survival, vol.

56, no. 1, February–March 2014, pp.

79–100.

Gaub, Florence, ‘Libya’s Recipe for Disaster’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 1, February–March 2014, pp. 101–20.

Mina, James, and Serwer, Daniel, ‘Circumventing Hormuz’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 1, February–March 2014, pp. 121–38.

The Adelphi series of books is the Institute’s principal contribution to policy-relevant, original academic research.

Recent publications include: Barry, Ben, Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Changing Character of War, Adelphi 461, Routledge for the IISS, 2016.

Selected IISS publications

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Puri, Samir, Fighting and Negotiating with Armed Groups, Adelphi 459, Routledge for the IISS, 2016.

Hokayem, Emile and Taha, Hebatalla (eds), Egypt After the Spring: Revolt and Reaction, Adelphi 453–4, Routledge for the IISS, 2016.

The Strategic Dossier series harnesses the Institute’s technical expertise to present detailed information on key strategic issues.

Recent publications include:

Fishman, Ben (ed.), North Africa in Transition: The Struggle for Democracies and Institutions, Adelphi 452, Routledge for the IISS, 2015.

Missile-Defence Cooperation in the Gulf, IISS, 2016.

Dodge, Toby and Hokayem, Emile, Middle Eastern Security, the US Pivot and the Rise of ISIS, Adelphi 447–8, Routledge for the IISS, 2014.

Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, IISS, 2010.

Hokayem, Emile, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant, Adelphi 438, Routledge for the IISS, 2013.

Dodge, Toby, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism, Adelphi 434–5, Routledge for the IISS, 2012.

Dodge, Toby and Redman, Nicholas, Afghanistan to 2015 and Beyond, Adelphi 425–6, Routledge for the IISS, 2011.

Phillips, Sarah, Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, Adelphi 420, Routledge for the IISS, 2011.

Berdal, Mats and Wennmann, Achim, Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace: Economic Perspectives, Adelphi 412–3, Routledge for the IISS, 2010.

Hashim, Ahmed S., Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency, Adelphi Paper 402, Routledge for the IISS, 2009.

Fitzpatrick, Mark, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding Worst-Case Outcomes, Adelphi Paper 398, Routledge for the IISS, 2008.

Perkovich, George and Acton, James M., Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, Adelphi Paper 396, Routledge for the IISS, 2008.

Kurth Cronin, Audrey, Ending Terrorism: Lessons for defeating al-Qaeda, Adelphi Paper 394, Routledge for the IISS, 2008.

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Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities: A Net Assessment, IISS, 2011.

Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, IISS, 2008.

Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks: A Net Assessment, IISS, 2007.

Strategic Comments is the Institute’s online source of analysis of international security and politico-mili­tary issues. Recent articles of interest include: ‘Humanitarian implications of armed conflicts in cities’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 42 – December 2017.

‘The repercussions of the Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 38 – November 2017.

‘Al-Qaeda’s evolution since 9/11’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 32 – September 2017.

‘Iran under Rouhani: increasing constraint’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 27 – August 2017.

‘High noon for Libya’s Potemkin government’, Strategic Comments, vol.

23, no. 26 – August 2017.

‘Trump’s erratic Middle East policy’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 23 – July 2017.

‘The Kurds’ precarious balancing act in Syria’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no.

15 – May 2017.

‘The battle for Mosul’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 14 – May 2017.

‘TLAMs in Syria’, Strategic Comments, vol.

23, no. 10 – April 2017.

‘Shia militias in Iraq’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 9 – March 2017.

‘US–Israel relations under Trump’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 8 – March 2017.

‘The urban refugee crisis’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 7 – March 2017.

‘The future of US Syria policy’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 4 – February 2017.

‘The percolating proxy war in Yemen’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no. 2 – February 2017.

‘Social divisions and rising terrorist violence in Turkey’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 40 – January 2017.

‘The Islamic State and Southeast Asia’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 36 – November 2016.

‘The evolution of US–Israel relations’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 32 – October 2016.

‘The United States’ Syria quandary’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 30 – October 2016.

‘Libya’s faltering new government’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 27 – September 2016.

‘India and Pakistan’s evolving relationship with the Gulf’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 25 – September 2016.

‘Turkey: the attempted coup and its troubling aftermath’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 19 – July 2016.

‘Jordan’s pragmatism and current challenges’, Strategic Comments, vol.

22, no. 14 – June 2016.

‘Iraq’s political turmoil’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 13 – June 2016.

‘The tenuous diplomacy of the Syrian conflict’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 8 – April 2016.

‘Turkey’s diminishing policy options in Syria’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no.

7 – April 2016.

‘After Brussels: understanding and countering ISIS’s strategy’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 6 – March 2016.

‘US–Saudi relations: between friction and accommodation’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 4 – March 2016.

‘Confronting failed government and the Islamic State in Libya’, Strategic Comments, vol. 22, no. 1 – February 2016.

‘Turkey’s growing security concerns’, Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 27 – October 2015.

‘Libya’s fragmented conflict resists solutions’, Strategic Comments, vol.

21, no. 22 – September 2015.

‘Iran’s nuclear agreement: the terms’, Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 19 – July 2015.

‘Iraqi Kurdistan: the essential briefing’, Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 7 – March 2015.

‘Iran nuclear talks approach conclusive deadline’, Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 4 – February 2015.

‘Libya’s civil war: the essential briefing’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 50 – February 2015.

‘Turkey’s Syria role risks instability at home, isolation abroad’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 36 – October 2014.

‘ISIS: the threat to homeland security’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 35 – October 2014.

‘Libya’s civil war no closer to resolution’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 31 – October 2014.

Selected IISS publications

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‘Iran nuclear talks extended for four more months’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 23 – June 2014.

‘Rouhani’s re-election and Iran’s regional relations’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. 180–84.

‘Egypt’s economic crisis challenges ElSisi’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no.

22 – June 2014.

‘Saudi Arabia’s new leadership and the Qatar crisis’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. 184–88.

‘Libya: Muslim Brotherhood’s tenuous hold’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no.

21 – June 2014.

‘War in Libya and Yemen’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. 188–92.

‘North Korean lessons for an Iranian nuclear accord’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 18 – May 2014.

‘Syria’s war: Assad gains upper hand’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 15 – May 2014.

‘Israel’s regional outreach’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. 192–95.

‘The evolving threat of ISIS’, Strategic Survey 2016, pp. XII–XIII. ‘Syria’, Strategic Survey 2016, pp. 159–63.

‘Iraq’, Strategic Survey 2016, pp. 163–66.

‘Torn Turkey: more turbulence ahead’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 12 – April 2014.

‘ISIS’, Strategic Survey 2016, pp. 167–72.

‘Elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons stalls’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 11 – April 2014.

‘Iran after the nuclear deal’, Strategic Survey 2016, pp. 178–84.

‘Iraq violence grows ahead of elections’, Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 4 – February 2014.

‘Turkey’, Strategic Survey 2016, pp. 189–98.

Strategic Survey is the Institute’s annual review – and, to a lesser degree, projection – of strategic developments throughout the world.

Recent sections of interest include: ‘Iran’s growing role in the Middle East and Southwest Asia’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. VI–VII. ‘Constitutional change and conflict in Turkey’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp.

XVI–XVII. ‘Syria’s civil war’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. 170–72.

‘Decline of the ISIS caliphate’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. 172–75.

‘Iraq’s disorder and divisions’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. 175–77.

‘Turkey’s descent into authoritarianism’, Strategic Survey 2017, pp. 177–80.

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‘The Saudi–Iranian rivalry’, Strategic Survey 2016, pp. 172–78.

‘Yemen’, Strategic Survey 2016, pp. 184–88.

‘Syria: New Rebel Alliances’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 192–202.

‘Iraq: Battling ISIS’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 203–10.

‘ISIS: Widening Impact’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 211–13.

‘Jordan: Struggle to Preserve Stability’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 213–15.

‘Lebanon: Burden of Syrian War’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 215–16.

‘Israel and Palestine: Hardline Politics and Resurgent Violence’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 217–22.

‘Iran: Nuclear Agreement Reached’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 223–35.

‘Saudi Arabia: Succession amid Regional Crises’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp.

235–40.

‘Gulf States: Tentative Integration’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 241–45.

‘Yemen: From Political Transition to Civil War’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp.

245–51.

‘Egypt: New Political Order’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 252–7.

‘Maghreb: Differing Political Trajectories’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 257–61.

‘Syria: Escalation and Fragmentation’, Strategic Survey 2014, pp. 183–91.

‘Lebanon: Greater Insecurity and Complex Politics’, Strategic Survey 2014, pp. 192–95.

‘Israel and Palestine: Stalled Peace Process’, Strategic Survey 2014, pp.

196–200.

‘Iraq: Violent Insurgency’, Survey 2014, pp. 205–12.

Strategic

‘Iran: Interim Nuclear Deal’, Strategic Survey 2014, pp. 213–24.

The Military Balance is the Institute’s annual assessment of military capabilities and defence economics worldwide. Region-byregion analyses cover the major military and economic trends and developments affecting security policy and the trade in weapons and other military equipment.

Comprehensive tables portray key data on weapons and defence economics. Defence expenditure trends over a ten-year period are also shown.

‘Gulf States: Tensions Between Neighbours’, Strategic Survey 2014, pp. 224–36.

The Military Balance 2018. Routledge for the IISS, February 2018.

‘Egypt’s Revolution Stalls’, Strategic Survey 2014, pp. 238–44.

The Manama Dialogue Report

‘Maghreb: Legacy of the Arab Spring, Strategic Survey 2014, pp. 245–52.

Online access to previous editions is available at www.iiss.org/en/ publications/conference proceedings/ sections/the-manama-dialogue-46e2

Selected IISS publications

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12TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 9–11 DECEMBER 2016

The IISS Manama Dialogue

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13TH REGIONAL SECURITY SUMMIT BAHRAIN, 8–10 DECEMBER 2017

The IISS Manama Dialogue The 13th Regional Security Summit: The IISS Manama Dialogue was held in the Kingdom of Bahrain in December 2017, 12 years after the inaugural Summit.

The Dialogue brought together the national-security establishments of the Gulf Cooperation Council members; other regional countries including Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Yemen; and important outside powers: the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Russia, India, Pakistan, China, Japan, Singapore and Australia. The Manama Dialogue was convened by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), with the support of the Kingdom of Bahrain. The IISS also convenes the annual Asia Security Summit: The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, bringing together in Singapore defence ministers, chiefs of defence staff, national-security advisers and other senior officials from countries that are members of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The IISS, a registered charity with offices in London, Washington, Bahrain and Singapore, is the world’s leading authority on politicalmilitary conflict. It is the primary independent source of accurate, objective information on international strategic issues. Publications include The Military Balance, an annual reference work on each nation’s defence capabilities; Strategic Survey, an annual review of world affairs; Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, a bimonthly journal on international affairs; Armed Conflict Survey, an annual digest of the political, military and humanitarian dimensions of all major armed conflicts; Strategic Comments, a weekly analysis of topical issues in international affairs; and the Adelphi books series on policyrelevant strategic issues.

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