The Review 2025

REVIEW

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22 – Foreword by Maj Gen Angus Fay CB

26 – The RLC Connect interview –Gary Sullivan OBE (Wilson James)

12 – RLC Connect Special: Military Rail… Between the buffers and a hard place.

21 – The Duke of York’s Royal Military School.

22 – The Reserve’s attitude to mobilisation through the lens of the moral component Maj GP Randell RLC

32 – The world of Army Motorsport. By Lt E Booth RLC

40 – Overcoming the logistical challenges of projecting UK Forces into Europe. By Maj SJ Milligan RLC

48 – How should the international community manage emerging nuclear powers? By Capt M Gaughan RA

52 – How will robotics, autonomous systems By Capt A Welch R IRISH

56 – Command & Control in an AI enabled world. By Mr A Ross

60 – An analysis of Moldova’s energy sector before and after 2022. By Ms L Rudd

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264 – Logistics Chain adaptation: Lessons from Ukraine. By Maj H Booth-Millard RLC

275 – Ensuring increased protection of resupply operations in a peer-on-peer Lt G Chadwick RLC

284 – The front line of technical training in modern defence. By Pearson TQ

285 – How does the implementation of By Capt A Shaw RLC, Lt W Luck RLC, Lt T Illidge RLC and Lt G Allen RLC

292 – Operation INTERFLEX, a Commander’s perspective. By Lt Col A Tang RLC

294 – Has the reduction in strategic enablers compromised operational readiness and sustainability? By Maj C McNamara RLC

102 – British logistics at Anzio JanuaryFebruary 1944. By Maj CW Taylor RLC

112 – The RLC Connect Book Club.

116 – Glossary of terms.

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Cover: Bottom: Petro Zadorozhnyy/State Border Guard Service of Ukraine/the Collection of war.ukraine.ua

Top left: Crown copyright Cpl Anil Gurung RLC

Top right: Crown copyright 29 Regt RLC

Editor: Mr Peter Shakespeare

Assistant Editor: Anne Pullenkav

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Welcome once again to the RLC’s annual Review 2025, sponsored by RLC Connect and the RLC Heritage Committee. Unsurprisingly, this year has seen an unprecedented amount of high-quality article submissions from across units, academia and industry. I say ‘unsurprisingly’ as we are living in a period of continual global upheaval which shows no signs of abating and which impinges on nearly every aspect of defence, security, commerce and wider society.

Global power is shifting and a third nuclear age is upon us. The era of state competition, driven by authoritarian regimes who challenge the established global rules and prosecute their intent primarily through geo-economics, has shifted to a resurgence of aggressive geo-politics. This situation may become the new-norm as it will likely last for decades, even generations – so the sharing of ideas through publications such as the RLC Review, has never been so important.

Across this fragile international arena, technological development is moving at an incredible pace. More than half the world’s population (circa 7.4Bn) own a are likely to have access to one. The stark realisation for defence, security and business, is that the world is exposed to information and disinformation – however, the jury is still out on how information is likely to be harnessed and by whom. We are also witnessing AI being embedded ever deeper into the network of global supply chains, impinging on a broad range of commercial and security outcomes. We may argue over whether AI will be the foundation of the next transformative facet in the revolution of military

of co-ordinated one-way attack drones exceeding 2,000 units beyond the frontline in Ukraine, the evidence seems to point to a step-change in military technology. Of course, the war in Ukraine and the complex politics of the Middle East have not only

dominated much of the defence and security debate, but they have, to varying degrees, masked some other

facing. We have to accept for example that we now live in a more challenging natural environment; 2024 was widely reported as the hottest year since records began – meaning the requirement for the Corps (and our allies) to deliver resilient logistics at reach across increasingly harsh landscapes is one of the few uncomfortable knowns.

To allow us to plan for the medium to long-term, we now await the publication of the Strategic Defence

Whilst we wait, we already know that there is concern over how the UK generates an increased tempo in acquisition and mobilisation. When commenting on readiness and mobilisation, Major-General Jonathan Shaw was of the view that ‘we are some way off where we should be…[as] we seem to be ignoring the looming threat.’

1Although General Shaw was primarily focusing on the military, the same can be said for industry and CDS has openly stated that we (Defence) are too slow to reform and that we need wholesale innovation rather than patches of innovation2 – the comprehensive approach that we have long talked about. CDS wants Defence to think and act much more like an investor, willing to take risk (and some failures) in order to obtain reward. Whilst risk taking is likely to be the only way that we achieve a stepchange in capability, it is imperative that the Corps gets closer to industry and academia to help deliver innovative solutions – something that RLC Connect is committed to delivering for MGL.

at long last, be witnessing a scenario where we will see some crisis driven innovation, a theme covered in one of RLC Connect’s book club reviews. We know from RLC Connect’s corporate members that we are already experiencing a desire to safeguard our

complex supply chains through on/near shoreing, but this will be challenging to deliver and sustain, especially in the short to medium term. The alternative is to look to seeking solutions through incorporating improved material science products, greater use of additive manufacturing, the incorporation of AI and improved recycling, whilst cognisant of broader environmental issues which some believe are ‘the biggest risk facing society’.3 All of these potential advances offer the military the competitive edge it

sweet spot somewhere in the plethora of opportunities and risks, but if we can work closer with industry, we might just be able to deliver the doubling of lethality for the British Army by 2027 that CGS is aiming for (even trebling it by 2030).4

Considering all the competing opportunities and risks mentioned, it should come as no surprise that this Review contains a general theme where geopolitics, AI, robotics and data/information feature heavily in some exemplary articles. This year we also have a very frank interview with one of our corporate leaders, which throws light on contracting and risk taking in a highly competitive commercial sector.

We have also extended our reach into academia with published submissions from King’s College London and the Army Higher Education Pathway (AHEP) Programme through Reading University. Congratulations to all the authors that have been recognised with a prize, but also all to those that have been successful in being published. With so much going on across the Corps, I expect that far-sighted

encourage authors to submit their experiences and ideas and help showcase what part RLC units are playing across the Army and Defence.

Angus Fay CB MMAS FCMI FCILT

Chairman, RLC Connect

Endnotes

1LBC News Interview Major-General Jonathan Shaw (late Parachute Regt & SAS)14 Dec 2024.

2The Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, annual RUSI lecture, 4 December 2024.

3The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority –Europe’s top insurance regulator.

4General Sir Rory Walker, CGS, RUSI Land Warfare Conference, 22 July 2024.

The RLC Connect Review Prize Winners 2025

Best Article: Maj Gavin Randall RLC - £200

History Category:

Maj Colin Taylor RLC - £150

'January - February 1944'.

General Interest Category:

Maj Gavin Randall RLC - £150

'How does the RLC Reserves moral component

Operations & Training Category:

Maj Hadley Booth-Millard RLC - £150

'Supply Chain adaptation lessons from Ukraine'.

Maj Gavin Randall RLC - £100

Lt Gethyn Chadwick RLC - £100

'Responding to logistic lessons from the Russia/Ukraine War to insure increased protection of resupply operations'.

Special Merit Award:

Capt Michael Gaughan RA - £100

'How should the international community manage emerging Nuclear Powers'.

RLC Foundation Director, Alan Woods and Business Support Manager

What is it?

The RLC Foundation was established in 2015, and rebranded to RLC Connect in 2024. Our aim is to provide a focus for engagement and sharing of best practices with industry and academia for the purpose and soldiers and the wider logistical community. As we enter our eleventh year, we have established strong working relationships with a wide range of industry partners and many academic institutions. Our corporate partners, supporters and friends continue to enable and academic standing within the community at large. One of our main objectives is to enable members of the Corps (Regular, Reserve and Veterans) to follow a professional career development path which is recognised with credibility as logistic professionals within Defence and across industry. We are already and academia across many on-going initiatives. There our website www.rlconnect.com has links to career opportunities with our corporate partners.

Where is it?

RLC Connect is based at Wellington House, St Omer Bks, Aldershot. Both Alan and Marti work from the at: rlcfwoods@gmail.com or rlcconnect@gmail.com

What does it do?

RLC Connect runs a diverse range of national events with industry and academia as well as supporting regional events in support of the RLC’s Regular and Reserve Regiments. Over the past year we have run many events, and these have both been well supported by the Corps at large and our corporate membership.

Our main events for 2025:

• Wed 12 Feb - Leidos & Kuehne & Nagel sponsored

• Wed 26 Mar – Logistic Leaders Network (LLN) Supply Chain Presentations and Luncheon on Humanitarian Logistics at Leicestershire County Cricket Club (By invite only).

• 14 May – DHL Service Leavers Insight Day.

• 20 May – Visit to Cardiff City Transport Services. Open to Corporate members & selected Service Personnel.

• Jun*

RAF Brize Norton.

• Jul* – RLC Cocktail Party. By invitation only.

• 21 Jul – Ex Log SAFARI at Worthy Down.

• 22 Sep – 13 Air Assault Support Regiment Military Planning Event at Colchester.

• Wed 29 Oct – Logistics Leaders Network (LLN) Awards Dinner at the St Johns Hotel, Solihull. Invitations to RLC Award nominations only.

• Oct* – Return to War Fight, Engaging Better with Industry Forum at the Worthy Down.

• 25 Nov – RLC Connect Awards Dinner at the

Why should I join RLC Connect?

We offer a wide range of events throughout the year, giving our corporate members exposure to The RLC and its people. This is a unique opportunity to interact over evolving logistic capability and promote best practice between The RLC, industry and academia. We are actively seeking new members, and the three levels of membership can be seen below.

Our website address is www.rlcconnect.com

We are also on Facebook and LinkedIn. Please feel free to contact us if you need more information about RLC Connect.

Inspire. Empower. Deliver.

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As a Gold Armed Forces Covenant holder, we’re committed to supporting the Armed Forces and Defence communities. We believe in bringing people and goods closer together by innovative and sustainable business solutions across air, road, sea and contract logistics. Scan this QR code to find your next career opportunity

Wilson James: Teamwork, adversity,

Wilson James is a UK private limited company, with a growing, multifaceted global portfolio. Generating an annual turnover of circa £330M, with nearly 6,000 employees worldwide, the company, which started trading from a humble baseline in 1991, is a valued corporate member of the RLC Connect community. The Chair and Co-Founder of Wilson James, Gary Sullivan OBE, gives a personnel insight into the business, how, in the near future, the commercial environment may change and the work of the Engineer & Logistic Staff Corps

In a nutshell, what is Wilson James and what does it provide to its growing customer base?

The business is made up of four interdisciplinary divisions. None of them operate completely in a stovepipe as there is, by design, a generous overspill to make sure we provide our broad customer requirements.

Firstly, Wilson James is probably recognised as a leading provider of security services. We are not the biggest, although I would contend that we are the best and most trusted security provider in the UK [measured by Infologue.com in 2023 against the top 100 UK security providers, Wilson James was rated in the top 10, a position it has held for some time].

Security is a very broad sector and we specialise in the protection of valuable assets for some very large and some niche blue-chip organisations, museums and galleries, with a few media customers too. After establishing an initial contract with a client, which normally spans 3-5 years, we are invariably asked to stay on to provide similar or enhanced services. We have developed trusted relationships with our

customers, which in some cases now spans over 25 years of continuous business. We take pride in

that our success is down to being good at what we do, we take considerable care to understand our don’t undertake a great deal of personal protection, we can provide this service for customers on request. So, to summarise the core of our security division, we provide a broad spectrum of comprehensive security services to high-value infrastructure for new and crossover from our security division into our other sectors which I’ll circle back to.

We also have a logistics division, which again, I’m very proud of. Our predominant sector is the built environment. I think as a team, we’ve

the knowledge and broad skills required to offer customers comprehensive solutions to their demands.

warehousing and distribution disciplines. Whilst we recognise this, it’s actually a lot more complex and I

multifaceted with a myriad of overlapping and

team provides two complimentary types of service: Last Mile Logistics, which combines ‘Just in Time’ and the movement of Material & Equipment vertically and horizontally to the point of use; and a broader logistics service, which the Army would recognise as a comprehensive suite of combat logistic support, with many attachments and detachments operating or tasks. In this latter area we provide comprehensive services to enable projects to be delivered ranging marshals, control of access routes, overseeing recycling regimes and the operation of ‘common user plant’. This is different from Last Mile Logistics, but the integration of all the aforementioned is where the magic happens. We ensure that the project develops seamlessly and that the two levels compliment and support each other. Designing in the security

the workplace.

The third aspect of our business is the aviation sector, where Wilson James provides a range of Heathrow Logistics Integration Contract, which

required at airports. The largest of our operations within the aviation sector is providing a service to assisting passengers who, because of mobility issues, require support to move through the airport. This service is provided at three of London’s major airports and Wilson James is the largest provider of Passenger Assistance Services in the UK - this is where the overlap occurs with our other divisions. Anybody who needs assistance, be it a wheelchair, buggy etc, we provide a solution which starts at the airport entry point through to the departure gate and onto the aircraft. Considered as a whole, this is a challenging sector of the business to get right every time, but it’s so easy to get wrong. To give readers some appreciation of the scale and tempo of these ‘assistance’ operations, in one day at Heathrow, we could be moving circa 8,000 people who have requested some form of assistance. To understand this aspect of the business and forecast the potential demand, you have to develop an understanding of the relationships, risks and responsibilities.

We not only manage the Last Mile Logistics for Heathrow International Airport on a day-to-day basis, but we also provide broader logistic services to projects on site. This includes a comprehensive security screening regime from the landside to the airside barriers. We operate to a raft of security protocols mandated by the aviation authorities and overseen (assured) by the Civil Aviation Authority and the Department for Transport.

we have developed software using AI and machine learning, which has allowed us to improve our forecasting to the point where our accuracy is now around 98%. This software aids us to inform the airline’s forecasts, with a subsequent increased

schedules. We have to stay agile, as last-minute changes to gates for example, or a change in a

catered for. We believe that as the software develops further, there’s likely to be some room for further expansion, which hopefully will give us a unique opportunity to broaden this important aspect of our business. I recognise that this area is high risk, especially reputationally where we can get 7,999 daily passenger assistances right, but it’s likely that you’ll only hear of the one we got wrong. The nature of the contract is such that we get paid for success and not failure. Whilst others may shy away from this aspect of the business, we believe that we’re pretty

consistently deliver. What I can say, and it applies across all our divisions, is that for various reasons, we may not get everything right all the time, although clearly a 100% success is what we strive for, but we learn everyday how to be better.

Our last division is a hybrid, our infrastructure division. Broadly speaking, it covers the big, complex

projects. The Heathrow Infrastructure contract sits under this division, but we also have projects such as the Nuclear New Build at Hinkley Point C (Somerset) and the construction of a large wind turbine factory in Teesside (Middleborough). This division could be compared with cohering the skill sets of the RLC, RE and REME, plus a few other niche functional areas to deliver a solution. Like the other parts of our business, it’s our ability to design, plan and deliver on the ground that makes us unique, except that the infrastructure team undertakes this at scale.

So on the ground, the services you will see Wilson James providing are the work of our logistics division, but with the operational plan being formulated, amended and executed by the infrastructure team who work on a larger scale and in more complex environments. The way to picture this in action is that when one turns up and is handed a plan, that

to develop it with the customer, other dependencies, public bodies and sometimes the public themselves to deliver a workable solution. Wilson James works on the understanding that when we leave we would have delivered a solution which meets the customer’s expectations – or often, well above those expectations.

QReaders will no doubt be impressed with the success of this multidisciplined and expanding UK business. Companies don’t emerge out of nowhere… Where did it all start?

AWell, from very humble beginnings. It’ll come as no surprise that I didn’t build this company on my own. The backstory is one of teamwork, adversity, at certain times, a large helping of luck.

I have a business partner, Mark Dobson, who I have known since childhood and love like a brother; our working relationship is built entirely on trust, and surprisingly to many, devoid of social contact (out of working hours). When we are in the same room we are only ever going to talk work! Whilst we’re two sides of the same coin, I recognise, and have done from very early on, that the business, and to an

The Wilson James team at Hinkley Point C

extent myself, wouldn’t have succeeded without him. That trust has developed through some tough times in the business. We bring different things to the party – in almost every respect we’re completely different characters, a strength that we both acknowledged early on in our business life. For the record, when I

scene when I admit that between us we have three

astute and calm – much more so than myself. The takeaway here is that the success of Wilson James is built on a team.

So, where to start? I joined the Parachute Regiment as a soldier, reaching the rank of LCpl. Although I didn’t then possess any formal academic

inherent ability to organise, see where improvements that I could make some things better. So, from very early on, I recognised that whilst I didn’t have a

myself – even when stepping into the unknown. This self-belief is likely to have developed from an early age when I had responsibilities thrust upon me. The people I served with then helped me improve, helped me look at life differently - it took a while to sink in, but I’m grateful for the invaluable experience I gained. Although the Army reinforced my organising qualities and gave me some skills, I was always impatient to move on and frustrated with the military structure – rules were for others and anything that restricted my thinking I considered a barrier. Even today, I try and see the rules as a handrail, a guide. I accept I sometimes get that wrong, and sometimes following the rules is right, but if they’re not, I work with people to rewrite them. Long story short, the Army is

later why I joined a specialist reserve unit, when I was serving with the Parachute Regiment I couldn’t see myself having a full career. I subsequently left the Regiment and, like many others, the security sector seemed a natural place to land.

I was initially employed as a driver. Part of a mixed security team transporting high-risk consignments overseas. The biggest danger on the routes was from banditry. We looked at what we were doing and tried to formulate a plan to minimise our risks. The security people’s stock answer was ‘more security,’ but I suggested perhaps we could change our scheduled movement timings and/or identify alternative routes at the last minute without jeopardising our contracted requirements. I was pretty junior and initially the suggestion didn’t gain any traction. Then, slowly, somebody more senior made a very similar suggestion, making the idea their own. I learnt two valuable lessons from this experience; there’s always a different way of doing things and sometimes you can gain agency by getting someone else more senior to believe the idea stemmed from their initiative. The big takeaway from this security experience was that whilst the security specialists routinely want to isolate-to-protect, this often bogs down what you’re trying to achieve logistically. By fusing security and logistics, I’ve found that you can achieve your objective whilst minimising the frictions that security often brings and still be safe.

Taking that valuable work experience forward,

I found myself lucky to be working in security and logistics on a large construction site; a complex development by Stanhope. There were three Stanhope principals working on this project; Paul Lewis, Steve Moschini and Peter Rogers, who I was lucky enough to make my initial pitch to. In those days, the construction industry didn’t really do joined-up site logistics, it was all a little bit ad-hoc, with materials arriving out of sync, various parts of the workforce not communicating and progress dependant on individuals rather than a pre-planned system. In many ways the sites were often over populated because people were stove-piped into

some reworking of my original concept, Stanhope allowed me to hire from within their Tier 1 Contractor base and gave me the opportunity to deliver some coherent site logistics. By and large, the project went really well and proved that through some foresight and pre-planning, synergy could be achieved between logistic and security functions with some

I suppose the business lightbulb moment came because of two factors; one negative and one forced upon me. Firstly, the recession started to hit the construction industry in 1991 and the pressure worked with had moved on to other projects with a new vibrant company; the MACE Group Ltd, but many also went to work at Heathrow. They’d experienced what we’d done on the Stanhope site and thought that the approach we adopted could work on other projects, where physical and security access was severely restricted. To jump forward, the forcing function came when I rewrote my original concept, incorporating some new ideas based on experience I’d gained and presented it to Heathrow. They liked the idea but made it clear that they didn’t want me to oversee the delivery of the work but actually deliver the work myself from within my own resources. That weekend, I went away to think about it, and this is where luck rears its head again, I bumped into Mark at a family gathering. He was only 19 at the time, working as a trainee banker with Lloyds. His father had run a small building company and Mark had and ambitious. We were just having a catch-up and some of the challenges that I could foresee. Mark and administrative aspects that I was being asked to deliver. To be honest, looking back, he pushed me across the line. I left the gathering still thinking that I was taking on too much. Mark was supremely could do it. I thought about it and because Mark could it was an opportunity that I couldn’t pass on. Jumping forward, we pitched for the contract

give us a loan so we manged to scrape together £8,000 – that was the capital seed corn where Wilson James came from. I then wrote what today would be recognised as a single page tender for the contract. I say a tender, that’s gilding the Lily a bit. I still have the one-pager, it’s awful. I was

the work on site. The contract was actually there for the taking, but we needed to persuade the customer that we could meet the criteria – we were eventually awarded the contract. To say we learnt on the job is an understatement. Slowly, and with some serious hard work, we managed to build the business. It’s worth pointing out that the world was different then to what it is now. The commercial regulations and the framework that you have to operate within today were far more laissez faire

were awarded an expanded security contract with some leeway. Mark and I knew what we wanted to offer under an umbrella service. Nobody talked about logistics then or the myriad of related functions that had to be delivered on a single site. I suppose in military parlance, we brought all of the logistic/ security functions together under one command and control entity. If the customer had an issue, instead of reaching down into the site sub areas, they could come to one or two people. I suppose today you could say that Wilson James brought some site synergy managed by a single entity and offered it to hardpressed project managers. Of course, we had help on the way and we were fortunate that we managed to bring in some talented and trusted people that we had previously worked with. A lot of this recruitment was via word-of-mouth, but in London it was a

recognise how lucky we were in being able to recruit some stellar talent. We’re doubly lucky that many of those people are still working for Wilson James.

It’s worth pointing out that very early on the ethos of Wilson James was founded. Mark and I had faith in what we were trying to do, we understood where we wanted to go with the initial business idea, we had

they had which, in-turn, allowed us to deliver what the customer wanted. It’s also worth pointing out that we also had faith that our customer was playing fair with us. Again, that doesn’t mean that mistakes weren’t made, but they were honest mistakes –the sort that you can recover from without losing

The construction industry now seems to be on-point with regards the current government’s domestic infrastructure development policies. There is much talk of partnerships between government departments and the construction industry. What is your view on what the future might look like in construction and the wider infrastructure service industry?

I’ll put our cards on the table. Wilson James does not work directly for HMG and that’s partly through choice. Historically, there is evidence that governments have not proven to be very dynamic with regards taking large infrastructure projects forward. There seems to be a tendency to favour ‘lowest price’ as opposed to long-term (through life) value for money, and they’re not known to be the timeliest at settling their bills. I personally don’t automatically regard the Government as a ‘good’ customer when compared to our private sector clients. Another reason for my reticence is that to

tender for government business is very expensive, as it’s invariably overly complicated. Understanding the peculiar infrastructure environment in the UK helps us to appreciate the stance generally taken by industry. We’re a highly regulated country and my experience is that in almost all cases we’re good at adhering to the regulations. From this baseline, we generally produce high quality solutions. I’d go so far as to say that the quality across the UK construction industry is nearly always good-to-excellent and, by and large, projects are

fact, what I’d say is that we sometimes over design in the UK, and consequently solutions have an inherit quality level of redundancy built in. Unfortunately, you generally only hear of something when it’s gone wrong and even the large, successful national projects, such as the Olympic builds, draw little attention when they come in ahead of time and on or under budget. Now compare the majority of infrastructure project successes against this taught regulatory regime and the congested environment in which private enterprise has to operate. Building something linear like HS2, which has little to zero leeway in route selection, you invariably have to build under, on or through something that already exists and is in itself designated as a vital piece of unmovable national/regional infrastructure. There is also another complex factor which can impinge on large infrastructure developments that we need to consider; national supply chain resilience, or lack of it. As a trading nation and an island, we rely heavily on global trade and the supply chains that sustain it. Geopolitical events affect us, sometimes disproportionately compared to other nations. Material that may have been relatively easy to source can quickly become expensive as a consequence of a global incident. Onshoring options are either very expensive, and drive-in unanticipated projects costs or delays, or, because there has been underinvestment in some British heavy industries, simply not available. Once you appreciate all these factors, you start to understand the variance in metrics between for instance HS2 rail construction costs per kilometre, compared to say France or the Ukraine. For the construction industry, small and congested invariably means complexity, and complexity in any business generally attracts a certain increase in costs.

If we can examine more closely this term ‘partnership,’ it’s often used as a convenient word which means different things to different organisations. It should be noted that partnerships are rarely equal. We’ve experienced various forms of partnership for over a hundred years but what we’re talking about today is a commercial contractual arrangement. Even the very best private enterprises, who have close relationships with all elements of their supply chains, need contracts to make their businesses work. Contracts are incredibly useful when there is a change of requirement. There is sometimes a different understanding between the people who write the contract and those that enter into them and try to deliver them – something that’s attracted extensive media coverage with regards the MOD and its contractors. Whether it’s palatable or otherwise, people need to recognise the simple

premise that in a capitalist system, businesses are you’re not paying tax, you can’t invest and you can’t create an economic cycle where you’re contributing to the wider economy – i.e. you’re not being productive and you’re not creating the conditions for private or

reasonable. Sometimes the private sector can be a matter between the customer and their contractor. To stay in business, you’ve got to be competitive, and therefore the agreed cost structure is invariably based on value-for-money over the longer term in comparison to the broad market. That said, nobody believes that the cheapest option is likely to deliver the best solution – most people naturally default to the principle that they buy the best they can afford. ‘Best’ is closer to a true value-for-money solution, rather than cheapest, which, in my opinion, rarely delivers long-term value and customer satisfaction. Perhaps rather than a true partnership, the Government needs to adopt a working framework that recognises a common intent. Both parties need to agree and recognise what a good outcome looks like for everybody. To set the conditions for recognising this common goal, the Government needs to primepump in areas such as guaranteeing site access (road building) or national workforce training schemes, to ensure the skills are readily available in-line with the project’s deliverables. Historically, this has been done broad-spectrum baseline schemes need a high degree

Successive governments have not generally proven

development in the national infrastructure landscape, I don’t think it’ll be under what many consider as a true partnership regime. The construction industry remains a barometer of the nation’s economy, the Government will likely be keen to show advancement across a broad range of infrastructure initiatives from rail to energy security, but before anyone starts to deliver on prime-pumping investment. If the Government creates these favourable conditions for private businesses,

opportunities presenting themselves. As an example, we’re seeing a private South Korean company, SeAH Wind, investing £300m in a new offshore turbine base factory at Teesside. Whilst this is not public money, the Government did set the conditions which demonstrated to SeAH Wind that it was worth investing in. It’s not a true partnership, it’s a symbiotic relationship.

QYou commanded the Engineer and Logistic Staff Corps (ELSC) (Jan 2019-Jun 2023), part of 77th Brigade. Many readers will be wondering what the ELSC is and what it offers.

AIt’s worth explaining from the outset that with regards the Staff Corps the use of the military nomenclature of ‘Corps’ is a bit of a misnomer. In the Staff Corps’ case, the term Corps refers to something more akin to the Press Corps or a Diplomatic Corps. Whilst the Staff Corps is held under a recognisable

we are, in fact, a collection of individuals with

resources which we can make available to the UK Armed Forces. We’ve been around since 1865 with our provenance established as a result of the logistic chaos in the Crimean War (1853-6). In that war, forming members of the Corps enabled the building of a railway for the expeditionary force by a private contractor. They provided specialist advice, guided the build project and oversaw the military in the movement of troops from their barracks to the coast. Today, we have a pool of expertise on-call, with

permanently on the regular establishment. These are true SMEs in the corporate world from across some very niche areas of civil engineering and logistics – all of them employed at board level. So, you can expect to meet chief executive operating, and/or chief

organised into six advisory groups and a separate specialist group. These groups offer a broad suite of logistic expertise from infrastructure, engineering, IT, digital/data/comms, supply chain, procurement, the health sector and a separate entity that we call corporate support – individuals who don’t fall neatly into the other categories. The one thing we all have in common is that we’re all involved in the running of large organisations and have extensive experience in corporate governance, change management, people,

All of this expertise is freely available on request. To give you an example, during WW1, every member of the Corps was a chief executive of a railway company, and whilst they were competitors in the commercial world, they worked in alliance under the umbrella of the Staff Corps and pretty much ran Infra, the G4 and manufacturing for the Army. The philosophy that we work to today has not changed since the Corps’ establishment; you leave your individual corporate allegiances to one side and work together to deliver a solution for the military using your unbiased expertise. It’s a very British solution, I can’t see the Staff Corps being replicated anywhere else.

To give you some recent examples of the niche

contribution to UK military force outputs, on Operation TELIC, the Staff Corps provided civil

Col Gary Sullivan OBE with HRH The Princess Royal on her visit to 29 Regt RLC in 2021

engineering and petro-chemical advice, oversaw the design and instalment of a unique roll-on/roll-off ramp in Kuwait for the inload of UK forces. When the ammonium nitrate exploded in the port of Beirut in 2023, everybody was searching for information of what had happened. Within four hours of the explosion, the Staff Corps had put copies of the plans of the old port and the proposal for the new port into the hands of PJHQ for them to study the effects and consequences, and ultimately allowed them to make more informed decisions. Another example of how wide and deep the Staff Corps network goes, in the recent evacuation of Sudan, an informed picture of what was going on in the area that the UK was most interested in, was provided by a contact working in one of the national industries. The result was that the UK had one of the most up-to-date and informed pictures regionally. Likewise, when national infrastructure is increasingly a target in regional

the condition of vital facilities, such as power plants. This why it’s important that we maintain an eclectic mix of specialists who not only offer their personal expertise, but also allow access to the network that they’ve developed and work with routinely. Ultimately, due to the unique and expert nature of the advice being offered, the Staff Corps could offer the UK a capability which could be exploited with Allies to gain enhanced international credibility. Whilst much of what the Staff Corps offers can be

requests can be staffed through 77th Brigade for support – if you think we could be of assistance then

give us a nudge through the chain-of-command or RLC HQ.

Finally, you’ve touched on how challenging it was to form Wilson James, and you certainly seem to still have a very full workload, what was your work-life balance like, how did you relax and has anything changed as the company matured?

Well, in the early days I’m afraid to admit that there was no work-life balance. The business took everything, and I mean everything. There just weren’t enough hours in the day to get everything done. Weekends were just two working days to use. It’s taken me a long time to adjust how I work, I almost broke before I realised, I couldn’t continue at that pace. I recognise that productivity is not the same as time spent on work. At Wilson James we encourage a work-life balance, not because it’s fashionable, because it makes good business sense.

out. I’m a big rugby fan, but only watching these days. I indulge myself in Harlequins and England, and I recognise and love the adventurous rugby spirit that they (Harlequins) encourage. Don’t get me wrong, if you’re starting out in developing a business, it’s going to be hard work from the outset, but by taking a breadth every now and then, you may just be able to make a success of it whilst also giving yourself some enjoyment on the way. If you’re thinking of starting a business, I wish you all the best. Find people you can trust, be honest with your customers (and yourself) and hopefully you’ll get some luck on the way – we all need luck in life.

It might be easy to be persuaded that modern wars can only be successfully fought with modern means. It is true that the latest technological energies, fermented as part of the Fourth Industrial Age Revolution (4IR), weave their lethality into the ever-evolving Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). With digitization, the incorporation of an array of AI applications, network enabled defence systems, cloud and cognitive computing technology, fully integrated partner interoperability – take your pick, if defence research establishments and industry are to be believed - the potential 4IR military integration options are seemingly endless, as long as you can pay for them. This broad spectrum of technological enhancements seems to offer a comforting panacea for advanced nations against the volatile frictions of war – but this would be a false premise

Whilst there is no denying that technologies

the inconvenient truth is that if operational and strategic advantage is to be realised, the requirement for incorporating some old technologies stubbornly persists – like rail.

Major General (Retd) Melvin believes that ‘In large-scale continental warfare, only the railways have the capacity to meet the huge and relentless demands of military supply over long distances and duration.’1 General Melvin posited his belief in 2024, supported with convincing evidence emanating from the war in Ukraine. Contemporary evidence from the region is reinforced with the enduring advantages offered by military rail movement, where the solution, according to Biernikowicz, negates the reliance on

‘the poor condition of road infrastructure in Eastern Europe [whilst exhibiting] low sensitivity to weather conditions [and] unrivalled capacity to move heavy and bulky loads, over long distances at relatively high speeds.’2 Whilst there are some adroit applications of the rail network by selected NATO members, the war in Ukraine has exposed some alarming Western European capability weaknesses in this potentially potent mode of transport. Understandably, the war in Ukraine features prominently in our weekly news cycle, but there is also another war being fought across Europe, a pre-cursor war, contested by a myriad of specialist dayglo wearing workers, armed with theodolites, lasers, drones and heavy plant – the war for the rail gauges. To understand this war, a synopsis of rail capability from recent history and its current operation is required.

Before examining the state of European rail, it is worth recognising how potent and robust the capability has remained throughout war in Western Europe – a lesson being repeated in Ukraine today. When many high-paid logistic consultants play bingo-buzzword and promise to ‘build-in resilience’ to and solidity seldom found in other distribution solutions. Recently, many would have read of the exploits of the Western Allies prior to the 1944 Normandy landings, where the highly developed Transportation Plan temporarily paralysed the French rail network transiting in and around the Normandy region. Whilst concentrated Allied air, combined with French resistance activities, did deliver a shortterm operational level dislocation of the regional rail network, the speed at which rail operations were resumed by the Allies was startling. Despite systematic destruction by the belligerents, it was the rail and not the highly publicised unsustainable road distribution solutions, that supplied the lion’s share of sustainment to Allied land and air formations in the liberation of Western Europe. Much could be learnt from the study of the broader Normandy campaign and the resurrecting of the Western European rail network in WW2, and in a ‘compare and contrast’ study with contemporary European rail operations, a surprising parallel evidence base emerges. If one accepts that rail operations remain relevant for any future continental war, then an overview of the state of rail capability in Western Europe raises some serious concerns if NATO members are to achieve mobilisation targets and resilient deployed sustainment. After a brief summary of UK military rail capability, several communiques, academic publications and media reports have been used to provide a synopsis of selected Continental countries, which help explain some broader NATO challenges. Recent rail initiatives in Ukraine will then be explored with passing reference to Russian rail schemes. Finally, a brief conclusion will summarise the challenges that lay before Western countries and the tenuous relationship that exists between military rail requirements, operating competency and the resilience that currently endures in the various national/commercial rail operators.

British Military Rail Capability – A Sleeping Paper Tiger?

For what it is worth, the British invented the railways, they exported their advantages to most of the world, helping to develop, modernise and bring betterment, although admittedly not in equal measure. This year celebrates the 200th anniversary of the birth of modern railways. The Stockton and Darlington railway opened on the 27th September 1825. Carrying mixed freight and 700 passengers on a 25-mile line at 12mph, the technology was a stunning success, much to the numerous naysayers at the time. So successful was the export of the idea that railways were described as ‘England’s gift to the world.’3 As with many technological breakthroughs however, long-term market lead – in fact, for generations, Foster has observed that ‘there has never been a period of prolonged stability in how the [British] railways were structured.’4 To understand how the

that the permanent way was not originally designed and built as a national network. The national railway was not the brain-child of a joined-up central government initiative, but rather the ad-hoc evolution of local/regional entrepreneurs, with little oversight from Westminster. Even when the main lines were connected into a discernable network between 1923-1948 (referred to as the ‘golden age’), they were controlled by a powerful conglomerate of four large private rail companies (the Big Four).5 Under their stewardship, the network developed into a multimodal system, with the Big Four owning and administering inland waterways, harbours, ships, buses, air services and groups of hotels. Even in this ‘golden age’ however, Foster explains that the Big Four structure was far from perfect, with each company in charge of its own passengers, freight, track and the trains that carried them.6 When the Big Four were nationalised in 1948, the network was not fully consolidated and future proofed, but subjected to delays in development by what Bonavia describes as ‘government stop-go policies for railway investment’7 – sound familiar?

In an effort to bring coordination to what had become a strategic capability, after much debate, privatisation was enacted on April Fool’s Day 1994. Whilst generations of passengers have since been

levels, the story of UK rail freight movement – the area military logisticians are likely most interested inexposes an even more suboptimal national approach. In a time of growing environmental concern and the search for greener distribution solutions, it is not only absurd to ignore the economic and societal advantages offered by rail freight,8 but lack of on military contingency options and potentially undermine national security. The system is there to be exploited - after all, Network Rail declares on its advertising that its ‘rail freight is reliable, safe and sustainable’ – so, it begs to question why rail is it not the ‘go-to’ distribution solution in the UK for bulky, heavy loads?

With regard to general mobilisation for a war in Europe, the MOD’s current rail dilemma should be

The British Army last used rail effectively on operations in Kosovo

recognised as a result of two major weaknesses; one is that the UK has not had a multi-modal strategic transport plan since the 1950s.9 The second issue is that the sub-optimal plans that have been developed (by various political parties), have adopted an approach which ignores ‘externality economics’. In basic terms, successive British Governments have planned to run the railways (and other modes of

from public investment in transport.10 This decision is peculiar in that HMG seems happy to recognise and accept, for instance, that education and the NHS (both heavy consumers of the public purse) deliver broad positive externalities, but not the invisible social union offered by the rail system. Whilst there is a domestic governance dichotomy in this approach, when it comes to rail operations, the UK is also at odds with most of Europe.

Whatever the arguments for or against this adopted strategy, many who work in the MOD will recognise the stance taken and its debilitating results. Basically, budget managers in every department are at pains to identify the ‘cost’ of everything. Every nut, bolt, desk, sign and rubbish bin. Humans and all of these combined irritating ‘resources’ that consume money have to be accurately accounted for.

accept – probably because they are challenging to categorise, cost accurately and ultimately bring under tight control within one department. As evidence,

assigned to; the cost of everything will no doubt be calculated and recalculated with an annual summary proudly delivered to your principle written in nerdy anodyne managerial nomenclature. In an effort to facilitate the corralling of department spending, this bespoke language often oppresses initiative. In a concerted effort to balance the books, conform to annuality regulations and justify the following year’s budget allocation, no doubt many would have been asked at Christmas if they have any ideas on how to spend some of the residue budget before April! This language and behavior induces narcolepsy to the

pseudo-science pea soup. The end state is that ‘fully costed’ budgets tame rather than safeguard deployed capability – military rail operations are one of its domesticated casualties.

If one was to look at rail operations as a broad distribution concept, integrated with other modes of transport, then a purer logistic picture emerges, one that has a recognisable broad ‘value’ (economically, socially and in enhanced security levels), as opposed

spreadsheet, but it exists in the wider experiences of social betterment and national security. Defence and security issues aside, the ability to offer safe, long and short distance travel to undertake/participate in a broad number of social activities not only underpins society but can actually act as a driver for the economy. Alas, the budget managers have won the debate, if there was ever a debate. As a military planner you may ask, ‘what’s this got to do with my life?’ Well, quite a lot. Not only have the travelling public been disenfranchised for generations, but rail freight operations have also been pushed to the margins. When examining goods moved,11 according to the UK Department of Transport, 216 billion tonnekilometres of domestic freight were moved in the UK in 2022, of which 81% was moved by road. So, in the same reporting year, 175 billion net tonne-kilometres only 16 by rail.12 15.73 billion net tonne kilometres (9.77 billion net tonne miles) of rail freight were transported in FYE March 2023, a decrease of 6.8% on the previous year.13 Long story short, rail freight in the UK is not in vogue and total net tonne kilometres seems to be going in the wrong direction. Amongst other parties, this does not bode well for the MOD, whose use of the freight rail network follows the national trend. As with many niche support capabilities, it is a case of ‘use it or lose it’. It is true that the MOD has conducted a proof of concept trial14 to move heavy armour from the UK to France via the Channel Tunnel. That trial however, categorised as an ‘administrative move,’ was conducted over seven years ago and consisted

move steel slabs and carried one Challenger 2 MBT, a Challenger Recovery Vehicle and three other armour variants. No doubt valuable lessons were learnt, with GB Freightliner providing the power unit on MOD owned track, loading/unloading experience for

Defence in the successful administrative trial. After a 40-minute return journey of the single train however, no further meaningful trials have been promoted, despite the well-publicised British participation in a frenetic NATO exercise programme. The MOD’s lack of rail freight usage for deployment may be attributed to a belief that strategic/operational movements by rail can be allocated to the commercial sector at limited risk. Whilst annual major exercises have been conducted to hone a broad range of land capabilities, no equivalent joint commercial/military rail rehearsals have taken place.

Compounding the decline in usage/rehearsal, there is also a related developing problem in the lack of organic military rail expertise. Currently, the MOD has no dedicated deployable military rail operating liability

Warwell wagons

on either the regular or reserve establishments. When the MOD does utilise domestic rail freight for routine supply chain tasks, there seems to be a question over the competency of its contractors to operate on the network. A well-publicised15 case in May 2023 for example, investigated by the Department of Transport’s Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB), concluded that there were three underlying factors to this particular incident:

properly manage the risk of rail operations. The second was that MOD did not provide effective

underlying factor was that the level of oversight by safety regulators meant that the lack of safety leadership within MOD rail operations was not 16

incident, given the relatively low proportion of routine rail freight utilised by the MOD, the conclusions could point towards systemic weaknesses in military rail freight capability. If this is the case, it does not bode well for the MOD should they want to ‘ramp up’ freight operations in support of higher tempo mobilisation tasks. There may however be some future relief for the MOD, with HMG’s proposal to expand UK freight services through the Shadow Great British Railways17 initiative.

This central proposal forms part of the strategic reset for UK rail services under the Labour commissioned Rail and Urban Transport Review,18 recommendation is to implement a comprehensive 1955), and link it to a national industrial strategy. Whilst it is encouraging that freight should form a

dichotomy between the current government’s desire to nationalise the railways, whilst seeking private investment to improve the network, will need to be

Transport [has] two challenges. It must convince the Treasury that rail is worthy of continued public sector investment. Then it must design a framework that properly shares risk between public and private sectors.’19 There is little doubt that HMG wants to move quickly with this work strand, but whether the delivery timeframe is geared to UK mobilisation contingency requirements is unknown. What is clear at this stage is that the future of British rail,

many unanswered questions. The UK is not alone in this commercial-public rail development dilemma, although, the military rail challenges across Europe are different.

NATO and the wider European Perspective

Through the ‘Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)’ funding programme, which includes military transport initiatives, the EU has recognised the need to reinforce its security by enhancing military rail carrying capacity. The European Commission has provided €807M for 38 upgrade rail projects spread across 18 member states under the umbrella Trans-

European Transport Network (TEN-T) initiative.20 This initiative includes improving connectivity between airports and rail, strengthening bridges and clearing/ earmarking temporary transit areas which will this investment is likely to be a direct response to risk

activities. According to the Robert Lansing Institute, Russia is aware that ‘European railways are facing a lack of the right rolling stock [where] Deutsche Bahn, for example, is capable of transporting only two armoured brigades simultaneously, as they typically consist of some 85 tanks and hundreds of armored vehicles.’21 The Institute goes on to highlight that mobilisation across Continental Europe could be further complicated by cyber-attacks on infrastructure and restricted unloading capacity in Rotterdam, the main port of disembarkation for US armoured formations, which facilitates and regulates

rail network for military movement is the complex bureaucracy and differing infrastructure standards

Since Fukuyama’s ‘The end of history and the last man,’22 the envisaged ‘peace dividend’ has, according to The Telegraph, generally resulted in defence spending being diverted, and what was left focused on ‘battlegroups and not the less-sexy logistic enablers such as universally compatible rail gauges needed to move them around.’23 Watling explains this post-Cold War blinkered approach where,

‘Culturally, Western governments have spent decades writing long-term strategies and managing small-scale, short-term crises like terrorist attacks. It appears the institutional memory of how to cohere the operational level of war has atrophied. This malady is correctable, but only if we can acknowledge that there is a problem to be addressed.’24

If the Telegraph’s and Watling’s appreciations are correct, the overly bureaucratic rail operating system, which does not provide automatic clearance for military rail across the EU’s Schengen travel zone, might result in military movements taking weeks rather than the required days. As General Hodges pointed out ‘The further east you go, the infrastructure does not support the heavy weight of US, German, British and Dutch tanks,’ yet the requirement is to ‘show we can move as fast or faster than the Russian Federation in the Suwalki Gap (between Poland and Lithuania) or in Romania.25

The situation looks even more precarious when stock,26 combined with reliability/resilience and 27

28 The reality, as Biernikowicz posits, is that ‘the armed forces are one customer amongst many, and …required to reserve wagons in advance for their needs. Germany, for example…typically [takes] 35-40 days [to book wagons].29 Amongst other responsibilities, to alleviate this lack of tempo, the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) was established to facilitate military movement across Europe. Despite initiatives such as the ‘red star’

programme, which has been successful in securing the Deutsche Bahn to make six trains available at short notice for rail movements into the Baltic states and Finland, further inroads need to be made if rail is to offer anywhere near the demands of NATO in a general war.

The Gauge War

dual technology; it has the potential to be rapidly repurposed from commercial/civilian utility to underpin a range of military capabilities. The CEF recognised the commercial importance of linking the European rail network to the Baltic states and has initiated a strategic infrastructure project, which, amongst several other upgrade projects, aims to change the Soviet favoured broad gauge (commonly known as the ‘Russian gauge’) to the western European standard gauge.

This historic ‘gauge war’ is important, as Hodges

tempo to oppose any Russian threat. Stoltenberg, the former NATO secretary general, summarised the Alliance’s dilemma where ‘we are in a race of logistics.’30 The ‘gauge war’ is not being prosecuted by combatants, not yet anyway. It is being fought by project managers, engineers, logisticians and an army of permanent way specialists who are determined to rapidly replace a gauge that the West does not like with one it does. We have been here before, and rail gauge replacement is an old engineering chaos that has been pursued in various theatres and at various scales for over a hundred years. In the Baltic however, it is being prosecuted with a new impetus.

The RailBaltica project highlights the scale of the ambition, complexity, expense and challenges of resetting standard-gauge from broad gauge, and the myriad of other infrastructure projects that are needed to support the permanent way. Planning started in 2016 and, to date, over €4Bn (£3.4Bn) has been allocated31 by the CEF under an initiative that has adopted a business model of combining CEF funding with a commercial PPP structure. The project aims to connect the European standardgauge with through running from western Europe to

double-track railway, designed to offer speeds of 249kph. It is one of the largest and most ambitious European infrastructure projects and is planned to be a cornerstone of the trans-European transit corridor. Whilst, according to the Latvian Government, the worth €6.6 billion and boost GDP growth by 0.5% to 0.7% (adding between €15.5 billion and €23.5

the economies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania),’ it also offers western military planners enhanced land mobilisation capability, a point openly reported by the Latvian Ministry of Transport.32 The ambition

phase of the project (projected at €15.3 billion) is not planned to be completed until 203033 – this might not be in sync with the Kremlin’s plans should the war in Ukraine escalate - time will tell but Ukraine

Ukrainian Ramp Up and Rail Resilience

The Ukrainian government has recognised the necessity for enhancing multi-modal solutions to support not only its armed forces but the burgeoning requirement of its civilian population. Since the beginning of the war in February 2022, the Ukrainian rail authority, the Ukrzaliznytsia (UZ), known as ‘Ukraine’s Second Army,’ has had to operate the network’s 13,670 miles (22,000km) of broad gauge track under war conditions, whilst taking up the slack for the poor condition of the national highway in 34 35 Coupled to this the fact that, according to Latschan, ‘Russia is increasingly targeting rail infrastructure…[due to its] symbol

Train loading during Op TRACTABLE in 2019

A Soviet era locomotive in Estonia

of resistance’36 a credible service is increased exponentially. To

eight months of the war, Jones explains that despite 10,000 UZ workers and their families being displaced, ‘more than four million people and 120,000 pets [were] transported away from the frontline’37 on what are commonly referred to as ‘trains of life.’ With a workforce of between 187,000 – 230,00038 (Ukraine’s largest enterprise), the UZ is the world’s sixth largest passenger carrier and the seventh largest rail freight transporter. According to Jones, despite 3,728 miles of track being damaged, together with key elements of rail infrastructure, the UZ carries 62%

average.39 Another sobering comparator is the reliability of the service, with Vitaliev reporting that ‘94% of all [UZ] trains [are] leaving and arriving on

but even the traditionally punctual and peaceful Switzerland.’40 Whilst these numbers are impressive, the sum contribution of the railway is far greater than its component parts – this is where budget managers lose the plot. Harding explains that ‘the

of Ukraine as a people...across Ukrainian society.’41 In this description, Harding has elevated the Ukrainian railway from an element of national infrastructure to a living-thing – this is where we lose politicians. Every facet of the railway has gained a new importance and is harnessed. A typical example is that even the tea served to travelling customers has been specially selected to fortify spirits while apportioning

military drone programme.42 How one ‘costs’ this phenomenon on a department spreadsheet is unclear, but its overarching value is easy to understand, especially when the network is recognised as possessing a potent political element where prime

stars have all travelled on what has been dubbed the ‘iron diplomacy’ network. In essence, Ukrainian rail is not so much part of the fabric of the nation, but the underpinning thread that holds it together.

To sustain its armed forces, and service the needs of its passengers, Ukraine has adopted a prioritised, phased approach to the rapid repair and improvement of selected sectors of the network and rolling stock. In the Kyiv electrical carriage repair plant for example, they have been operating at 140% of normal capacity, allowing workers to refurbish war damaged rolling stock, repurpose carriages for hospital trains (including ICU carriages) and modify others for wheelchair accessibility.43 The results highlight the potential robustness of a rail network in war, if central government plans and directs resources to its reconstitution and sustainment. UZ’s achievements are impressive, with the development of an approach which ensures the functionality of the network. An example of a typical UZ output is the rebuilding of a strategic bridge at Irpin near Kyiv in 29 days, just one of the 46 damaged bridges repaired by July 2024, together with the restoration of over half of the 1,413km of overhead line equipment.44 Pertsovskyi, the CEO of UZ, summarises the resilience of the network where, ‘the bottom line is that we can continue to operate the system, despite the

45 Larger projects include the building of a substantial rail hub at Sknyliv to standard gauge with the dual aim of connecting it direct to Poland and Romania, whilst inviting development opportunities to EU companies in a program described as ‘the liberalisation of the railway market’.46 So effective is the UZ in maintaining the rail network that Jones highlights that it ‘has suffered only one complete shutdown – for just two hours –over the last two years.’47 Mirroring one of the primary aims of RailBaltica, the UZ strategic transport plan also has at its core, the replacement of the Russian gauge, to better exploit the wider Western rail network.

A 2023 European Commission study assessed

transition, estimating that converting one kilometer of selected Ukrainian broad gauge to the European standard gauge would be in the region of €1-1.1Mn. Full national transition to standard gauge could be up to €8Mn per km. To refurbish the 636km (395-mile) line from Medyka to Kyiv alone could be in the region of €600-700Mn, a substantial amount of money but perhaps real value considering that HS2 could come in at circa €311Mn per km. Even in 2017, the French paid €55Mn per km to build a 322km TGV line.48 To facilitate Ukraine’s rail ambitions, in 2023 an agreement was reached with the EU to access the CEF funding, opening an avenue for investment to improve two of the four operational border crossing points in Yagodyn and Mostyska,49 which handle a combined daily total of over 500 railcars.50 Considered as a whole, Ukraine’s railway network offers a contemporary exemplar of what can be achieved if political and societal will is cohered.

Putin’s Consolidating Initiatives

Despite Moscow’s PR rhetoric, Russia, as General

mobilise, reconstitute, sustain and consolidate its forces in Ukraine. RUSI’s Ferriss posits that ‘More so than any other standing army, and due to Russia’s geographic vastness, the Russian military relies on railways to transport its troops, food and fuel during

the start’ and that Ukraine, recognising the threat, ‘destroy[ed] or sabotage[ed] rail links between Russia and Belarus – tracks that would have been key to the redeployment of large numbers of Russian troops.’51 Such is the focus on railways in the Russian High not only on the basis for its port infrastructure but also as a critical railway hub. With Russia unable to control the railway network in the north of Ukraine, its forces have had to move slowly on roads.52 So dependent is the Russian military on access to rail that its consolidation of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia sectors is anchored to the building of a rail spur to sustain its forces.53 Whilst Russia seems to have the capability to operate and sustain rail movements, those movements are restricted to ‘broad gauge’ and any requirement to operate transhipment

fragile logistics in supporting its forces in exploiting further into Eastern Ukraine or even NATO’s eastern members’ territory. Battle is permanently joined in the

contest over rail but, as the Allies found in Normandy, systematic destruction of any part of a rail network

not have. What Russian sustainment operations have demonstrated is that when their forces are forced to operate at distance from railheads the offensive momentum is often lost. Conversely, when the Russian Army has access to a credible rail network, it proves challenging to permanently interdict and offers a potent form of resilient sustainment. NATO can learn a lot from these strengths and weaknesses. In conclusion, after two years of attritional war in the Ukraine, the West, despite materiel and training support, seems uncertain in how to send a subliminal message of intent to Russia, without imperiling itself to Moscow’s accusations of deliberately escalating

is exacerbated by the fact that while Ukraine has been carrying a lot of water for liberal democracy, the status quo cannot endure. Playing Moscow by its own

can partially set the physical conditions to build-in logistic resilience, allowing the robust sustainment of mobilised NATO forces, should an aggressor be naive

in the conversion of the European rail gauge programme, to deliver a comprehensive standard

gauge network, not only makes long-term economic sense, but it also offers a useful explanatory veneer to the enhancement of a semi-dormant dual-use capability. This latter alternative military application logistic advantage in the land environment. Even the Russian king of spin, Sergey Lavrov, whilst recognising the military advantages of a uniform rail gauge, is likely to have trouble railing against the European states enhancing their rail infrastructure for economic reasons, especially as Putin has openly stated that Russia has no intention of attacking the NATO alliance post the Ukraine war.54 With progress on the various European rail projects boosting NATO mobilisation options, the UK needs to consider if there are any advantages in re-evaluating its ability to utilise the domestic rail network. The executive body in the MOD, the preserve, in the main, of

decision making as a right; a default accoutrement of their elevated rank. This lack of functional expertise (there are no expert military rail advisors to cover the thought vacuum) deprives niche logistic advancement, such as rail. Whatever the methods adopted by NATO members, perhaps Roosevelt’s approach to foreign policy still holds true; walk softly and carry a big stick, in this case, the ‘stick’ is the establishment of a comprehensive European standard gauge permanent way and the embedded skills to manipulate it. To deliver such a solution takes strategic leadership – perhaps this is where the real problem lies. In a war of mass mobilisation and sustainment, where time is everyone’s enemy, deliberate development of latent rail capability may be one of the victims of poor planning, followed

are easy to get wrong.

Endnotes

1Major General Mungo Melvin, CB OBE, Historian of the Corps of Royal Engineers, cited in Christian Wolmer’s The Liberation Line, London, Atlantic Books Ltd, 2024, p. XIII.

2W. Biernikowicz, Rail Transport in NATO’s Logistics System: The Case of Poland, European Research Studies Journal, Vol XXIV, Special Issue 1, 20 March 2021, pp.748 and 752.

3Attributed to Sir Charles Edward Trevelyan (2 April 1807 – 19 June 1886).

4R. Foster, Rail reform has never been easy, Feature History, Rail, 24 July-6 August 2024, p.33

5‘The Big Four’ – consisted of the Great Western Railway (GWR), Southern Railway (SR), London Midland & Scottish Railway (LMSR) and London and North Eastern Railway (LNER).

6R. Foster, Rail reform has never been easy, p.31.

7M. R. Bonavia, The Four Great Railways, David and Charles, 1981, cited in R. Foster, R. Foster, Rail reform has never been easy.

8DB Cargo believes that ‘trebling rail freight by 2050 would

20M HGV journeys off the road’ offering an environmental tonne than the equivalent movement by road.’ Online, https:// freight-belongs-on-rail-10411998 [Accessed 23 Jan 2025].

9P. Bagwell and P. Lyth, 1750-2000, Transport in Britain from Canal Lock to Gridlock, New York, Hambledon and London, 2002, p.209.

10Ibid, pp.199-208.

11Goods moved: the weight of goods carried, multiplied by the distance hauled, measured in tonne kilometres. This is a measure of the total freight activity, accounting for both the distance travelled and the weight of goods carried.

12UK Department of Transport, Transport Statistics Great Britain: 2022 Freight Published 14 December 2023, Online: https:// www.gov.uk/government/statistics/transport-statistics-greatbritain-2023/transport-statistics-great-britain-2022-freight [Accessed 26 July 2024].

The MOD's use of rail is rarely exercised

13UK Department of Transport, Rail Factsheet 2023, Online: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/rail-factsheet-2023/railfactsheet-2023 [Accessed 26 July 2024].

14A. Bunkall, Army moves tanks through Channel Tunnel during secret exercise, Sky News, Online: https://news.sky.com/story/ army-moves-tanks-through-channel-tunnel-during-secretexercise-10733660 [Accessed 10 September 2024].

15Rail, Freight wagon runaway: RAIB reveals MOD failings, Network News, 29 May- 11 June 2024, p.11.

16Rail Accident Investigation Branch Report 04/2024, 16 May 2024.

17Establishing a Shadow Great British Railways, Written statement to Parliament, 3 September 2024, Online: https://www. gov.uk/government/speeches/establishing-a-shadow-greatbritish-railways [Accessed 9 September 2024].

18Rail and Urban Transport Review - An assessment and ambition for a new government, Urban Transport Group, 21 August 2024, Online: https://www.urbantransportgroup. org/resources/types/report/rail-and-urban-transport-review [Accessed 9 September 2024].

19P. Haigh, Can public-private partnerships be made to deliver?, Rail, Opinion, Issue 1017, 4-17 September 2024, p.53. 20 International Railway Journal, Simmons-Boardman Publishing, 2024, Online: https://www.railjournal.com/freight/eu-funds[Accessed 13 June 2024].

21Lansing Institute, Kremlin operations increase risks for European railways, 10 April 2024, Online: https://lansinginstitute. org/2024/04/10/kremlin-operations-increase-risks-for-europeanrailways/ [Accessed 13 August 2024].

22F. Fukuyama, The end of history and the last man, Free Press, 1992.

23The Telegraph Online, German bureaucracy and old gauges: why boosting Europe’s train network is vital to prepare for war; Border delays and logistical challenges are impeding NATO’s ability to swiftly deploy troops in response to potential Russian aggression, Telegraph Group Ltd, 6 April 2024. Online: Gale General OneFile, gale.com/apps/doc/A789178831/ ITOF?u=rdg&sid=summon&xid=ef0c3493 [Accessed 13 June 2024].

24J. Watling, The Ukraine War Has Found the Machinery of Western Governments Wanting, RUSI, Commentary, 8 August 2023, Online: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/ commentary/ukraine-war-has-found-machinery-westerngovernments-wanting [Accessed 13 June 2024].

25Cited in H. Cokelaere and J. Posaner, Europe’s roads and Politico, NewsDefense,8 April 2022, Online: https://www.politico.eu/artcile/ europe-military-budget-slammed-as-almost- nothing-to-tacklerussia-challenge/ [Accessed 13 June 2024].

26 on several inter-related factors; one of which is the availability of specialized rolling-stock to carry heavy and/or out-of-gauge

old) needs upgrading and the small population complicates the and sustainment operations, p. 753.

27As they cannot rent wagons for transporting heavy tanks from the civil market, Poland has purchased 100 rail wagons with 90T capacity. Ibid, p.755.

28B. Jones, Extreme weather: are they coping in Europe?, Rail, Feature Safety, Issue 1017, 4-17 September 2024, pp. 54-57.

and resilience issues which are ‘exacerbated by decades of under-investment in congested rail networks and many other issues familiar to [the] UK.’ These fragile networks are increasingly susceptible to extreme weather events, undermining servicing and maintenance regimes attempting to sustain allweather rail operations.

29Ibid, p.754.

30Cited in A. Dowd, D. P. Jankowski and C. Cook, European

That Europe Has the Fuel It Needs to Fight the Next War, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 June 2023, Online: and-nato-race-logistics-ensuring-europe-has-fuel-i-needs [Accessed 13 June 2024].

31Ibid.

32S. Nigale, RailBaltica continues work on the implementation of a Public-Private Partnership model to lessen the burden on state budgets during construction, Ministry of Transport Republic of Latvia, 15 August 2024, Online: https://www.sam.gov.lv/ en/article/rail-baltica-continues-work-implementation-publicprivate-partnership-model-lessen-burden-state-budgets-duringconstruction?utm_source=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bing.com%2F [Accessed 17 August 2024].

33Ibid.

34T. Latschan, Ukraine: Will the railroad decide the war?, Deutsche dw.com/en/ukraine-will-the-railroad-be-what-decides-the-war/ a-61714831[Accessed 16 September 2024]. Latschan reports that fortunately Ukraine had a pretty modern rail network prior to the war due to a €700Mn investment before the 2012 UEFA European football championship.

35Ibid.

36Ibid.

37B. Jones, Keeping Ukraine’s ‘Iron Family’ safe, Feature Ukraine, Rail, 24 July-6 August 2024, p.35.

38A. Chin, How Ukraine’s Trains are Adapting to War, Foreign Policy, Feature, 27 August 2023, Online: https://foreignpolicy. com/2023/08/27/ukraine-railway-infrastructure-war-russia/ [Accessed 16 September 2024]. Chin’s estimate is that the UZ workforce is 220,000. Latschan estimates that the workforce total is 230,000.

39Ibid p.34.

40V. Vitaliev, A Salute to Ukraine’s ‘Second Army,’ Feature Ukraine, Rail, Issue 1017, 4-17 September 2024. p.49.

41L. Harding, Iron People: Ukraine’s railway network in a time of war – photo essay, Online, https://www.the guardian.com/ artanddesign/2023/apr/20/iron-people-ukraines-railwaynetwork-in-a-time-of-war-photo-essay. [Accessed 13 June 2024].

42A.Chin.

43Ibid.

44Ibid.

45O. Pertsovskyi, cited in Latschan.

46Slawomir Matuszak, Konrad Poplawski, Running on European tracks. Modernising the rail network in western Ukraine during wartime, Centre for Eastern Studies, No. 577, 26 February 2024.

47B. Jones, Extreme weather: are they coping in Europe?, Rail, Feature Safety, Issue 1017, 4-17 September 2024, p.54.

48Cited in Christian Wolmar, Why is HS2 Costing So Much? The Spectator, 27 August 2023.

49Slawomir Matuszak, Konrad Poplawski, p.4.

50Yuriy Grigorenko, Railway gateway to the world: what is the state of freight transportation between Ukraine and Poland, GMK Centre Services, 8 September 2023, Online: https://gmk.center/ en/posts/railway-gateway-to-the-world-what-is-the-state-offreight-transportation-between-ukraine-and-poland/ [Accessed 17 August 2024].

51T. Latschan.

52E. Ferris, The Battle for Odessa and its Railways: Could Transnistria Assist?, RUSI Commentary, 11 April 2022.

53S. Korshak, Russia Begins Construction of Ambitious Railroad Bypassing Vulnerable Crimea Bridge, Kyiv Post, 27 September 2023, Online: Russia Begins Construction of Ambitious Railroad Bypassing Vulnerable Crimea Bridge (kyivpost.com) [Accessed 2 September 2024].

54G. Faulconbridge, Putin says Russia has no plan to attack NATO, dismisses Biden remark as ‘nonsense,’ Reuters Europe, 17 December 2023, Online: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ putin-says-bidens-remark-about-russian-plan-attack-natois-complete-rubbish-2023-12-17/#:~:text=MOSCOW%2C%20 Dec%2017%20%28Reuters%29%20-%20Kremlin%20chief%20 military%20alliance [Accessed 2 September 2024].

References:

Bagwell. P & Lyth. P, 1750-2000, Transport in Britain from Canal Lock to Gridlock, New York, Hambledon and London, 2002. Biernikowicz. W, Rail Transport in NATO’s Logistics System: The Case of Poland, European Research Studies Journal, Vol XXIV, Special Issue 1, 20 March 2021.

Bunkall. A, Army moves tanks through Channel Tunnel during secret exercise, Sky News, Online: https://news.sky.com/story/ army-moves-tanks-through-channel-tunnel-during-secretexercise-10733660 [Accessed 10 September 2024].

Chin. A, How Ukraine’s Trains are Adapting to War, Foreign Policy, Feature, 27 August 2023, Online: https://foreignpolicy. com/2023/08/27/ukraine-railway-infrastructure-war-russia/ [Accessed 16 September 2024].

Cokelaere. H, & Posaner. J, Politico, News-Defense,8 April 2022, Online: https://www.politico.eu/artcile/europe-military-budgetslammed-as-almost- nothing-to-tackle-russia-challenge/ [Accessed 13 June 2024].

DB Cargo, Freight Expectations: How rail freight can support Britain’s economy and environment, Online; https://uk.dbcargo. belongs-on-rail-10411998 [Accessed 23 Jan 2025].

Department of Transport, Transport Statistics Great Britain: 2022 Freight Published 14 December 2023, Online: https:// www.gov.uk/government/statistics/transport-statistics-great-

britain-2023/transport-statistics-great-britain-2022-freight [Accessed 26 July 2024].

Department of Transport, Rail Factsheet 2023, Online: https:// www.gov.uk/government/statistics/rail-factsheet-2023/railfactsheet-2023 [Accessed 26 July 2024].

Dowd. A, & Jankowsk.i D, P, & Cook. C, Resilience and NATO Race for Logistics: Ensuring That Europe Has the Fuel It Needs to Fight the Next War, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 June 2023, Online: and-nato-race-logistics-ensuring-europe-has-fuel-i-needs [Accessed 13 June 2024].

Faulconbridge. G, Putin says Russia has no plan to attack NATO, dismisses Biden remark as ‘nonsense,’ Reuters Europe, 17 December 2023, Online: https://www. reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-bidens-remarkabout-russian-plan-attack-nato-is-complete-rubbish2023-12-17/#:~:text=MOSCOW%2C%20Dec%2017%20 %28Reuters%29%20-%20Kremlin%20chief%20Vladimir,no%20

alliance [Accessed 2 September 2024].

Ferris. E, The Battle for Odessa and its Railways: Could Transnistria Assist?, RUSI Commentary, 11 April 2022.

Foster. R, Rail reform has never been easy, Feature History, Rail, 24 July-6 August 2024

Fukuyama. F, The end of history and the last man, Free Press, 1992.

Grigorenko. Y, Railway gateway to the world: what is the state of freight transportation between Ukraine and Poland, GMK Centre Services, 8 September 2023, Online: https://gmk.center/ en/posts/railway-gateway-to-the-world-what-is-the-stateof-freight-transportation-between-ukraine-and-poland/ [Accessed 17 August 2024].

Haigh. P, Can public-private partnerships be made to deliver?, Rail, Opinion, Issue 1017, 4-17 September 2024.

Harding. L, Iron People: Ukraine’s railway network in a time of war – photo essay, Online, https://www.the guardian.com/ artanddesign/2023/apr/20/iron-people-ukraines-railwaynetwork-in-a-time-of-war-photo-essay. [Accessed 13 June 2024].

International Railway Organisation, EU funds freight capacity International Railway Journal, Simmons-Boardman Publishing, 2024, Online: https:// www.railjournal.com/freight/eu-funds-freight-capacity[Accessed 13 June 2024].

Jones. B, Extreme weather: are they coping in Europe?, Rail, Feature Safety, Issue 1017, 4-17 September 2024.

Korshak. S, Russia Begins Construction of Ambitious Railroad Bypassing Vulnerable Crimea Bridge, Kyiv Post, 27 September 2023, Online: Russia Begins Construction of Ambitious Railroad Bypassing Vulnerable Crimea Bridge (kyivpost.com) [Accessed 2 September 2024].

Latschan. T, Ukraine: Will the railroad decide the war?, Deutsche dw.com/en/ukraine-will-the-railroad-be-what-decides-thewar/a-61714831[Accessed 16 September 2024].

Matuszak. S,& Poplawski. K, Running on European tracks. Modernising the rail network in western Ukraine during wartime, Centre for Eastern Studies, No. 577, 26 February 2024.

Nigale. S, RailBaltica continues work on the implementation of a Public-Private Partnership model to lessen the burden on state budgets during construction, Ministry of Transport Republic of Latvia, 15 August 2024, Online: https://www.sam.gov.lv/ en/article/rail-baltica-continues-work-implementation-publicprivate-partnership-model-lessen-burden-state-budgetsduring-construction?utm_source=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bing. com%2F [Accessed 17 August 2024].

Rail, Freight wagon runaway: RAIB reveals MOD failings, Network News, 29 May- 11 June 2024.

Rail and Urban Transport Review - An assessment and ambition for a new government, Urban Transport Group, 21 August 2024, Online:https://www.urbantransportgroup.org/resources/ types/report/rail-and-urban-transport-review [Accessed 9 September 2024].

The Telegraph Online, German bureaucracy and old gauges: why boosting Europe’s train network is vital to prepare for war; Border delays and logistical challenges are impeding NATO’s ability to swiftly deploy troops in response to potential Russian aggression, Telegraph Group Ltd, 6 April 2024. Online: Gale General OneFile, gale.com/apps/doc/A789178831/ ITOF?u=rdg&sid=summon&xid=ef0c3493 [Accessed 13 June 2024].

Watling. J, The Ukraine War Has Found the Machinery of Western Governments Wanting, RUSI, Commentary, 8 August 2023, Online: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/ commentary/ukraine-war-has-found-machinery-westerngovernments-wanting [Accessed 13 June 2024].

Vitaliev. V, A Salute to Ukraine’s ‘Second Army,’ Feature Ukraine, Rail, Issue 1017, 4-17 September 2024.

Wolmer. C, The Liberation Line, London, Atlantic Books Ltd, 2024. Wolmar. C, Why is HS2 Costing So Much? The Spectator, 27 August 2023.

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to investigate their attitudes toward mobilisation through the lens of the Moral Component of Fighting Power. How do Royal Logistic Corps (RLC) Reservists compare?

This article examines the Moral Component of Fighting Power in the RLC Army Reserve component. It uses a model and data from a wider study that investigated the same aspect within the Army Reserve1 which assessed whether the organisation can meet Defence’s demands,2 using the hypothesis that Army Reserve soldiers will be able and willing to mobilise and deploy if called upon.3 Recognised by some as the pre-eminent element of Fighting Power,4 the Moral Component (or analogous concepts) will have a large bearing on soldiers’ performance and, despite being a contested concept,5 the literature does generally agree that, “when morale is high, good things happen.”6 This is particularly important to UK Reserves because they essentially ‘volunteer twice;’7 initially when they join the Reserves and then when they mobilise.

Firstly, this article outlines the place of the Moral Component of Fighting Power in military thinking before describing the Moral Component Model used to examine the concept. It then outlines the research

RLC. Finally, in summary, the RLC Reserve’s Moral Component of Fighting Power is characterised by a strong Fighting Spirit,8 a desire to mobilise and be involved in operations – a trait typical of the other corps examined in this study.

What is Fighting Power?

Fighting Power is part of the British Army’s capstone doctrine, comprising three interdependent components: Conceptual, Physical and Moral (see Figure 19). The Moral Component of Fighting Power, concerns the leadership, and an ethical foundation.

While the Physical Component can often be quantitatively measured, the Conceptual and Moral Components are usually assessed qualitatively.

Figure 1: The British Army's Model of Fighting Power10

Moral Component

Individual Morale Team Spirit Leadership

Fighting SpiritMoral CohesionPersonal Persuasion

Self-DisciplineComradeshipPersonal Example

Pride Organisational Compulsion

Spiritual Foundation System Enabling

The House of Commons Defence Select Committee called for an assessment of Army Fighting Power considering the A2020 changes,11 though successive reports to Parliament from the Council of Reserve Force’s and Cadets Association External Scrutiny Report to Parliament for 201912 have not mentioned Fighting Power, morale or other related concepts, offering it as a relevant but un-utilised lens through which to view the Reserve.

The Moral Component of Fighting Power can be seen as strong, where reservists are willing and ready to mobilise for operations when called upon. Conversely, if Reserve personnel indicate that they are unavailable or unwilling to deploy on operations, the Moral Component of Fighting Power can be said to be weak. While soldiers may still report for duty ‘under duress’, they may perform less effectively than those who were not compelled.

Literature Review

Fighting Power and the Moral Component is the British Army’s means of understanding military effectiveness. Within academic literature, other approaches are often split into macro (top-down) or micro (bottom-up) perspectives.13

Top-down approaches to effectiveness14 tend to approach moral issues as the ‘intangibles’ that explain the difference between defeat and victory for. Identifying and measuring inter-related factors such as leadership, “discipline and cohesion, morale, initiative, courage and toughness, and a willingness 15 ethics and duty are generally all features in any assessment. Connable et al

characterise as the product of the “disposition to 16

From a bottom-up perspective, socio-psychological approaches tend to look at historical cases for military motivation,17 or look at the contemporary situation.18 Alternative micro views use a workplace relations lens as a means of explaining military performance,19 including Organisational Commitment theory.20 Most recent military motivation studies focussed on the Army Reserve includes Bury, who examined cohesion among RLC reservists during the implementation of Army 202021 and Future Reserves 202022, the Future Reserves Research Programme (FRRP)23 and the MoD’s own Reserves Continuous Attitude Survey (ResCAS).24

There is limited research on the UK Army Reserve’s latent Fighting Power, or its indicators and variables,

External Support

Public Support

Family Support

Employer Support

despite the concept’s place as a capstone of military doctrine,25 although it could be inferred by applying the framework retrospectively. While discrete aspects of morale like cohesion have been recently addressed, albeit in a non-doctrinal sense, leadership and ethics in the Army Reserve have been overlooked and therefore bear further investigation.

The Moral Component Model

Component Model developed to investigate the Moral Component of the Army Reserve’s Fighting availability to mobilise; latent Fighting Power. Using the 2017 British Army doctrine as a basis, the model comprises four indicators: Individual Morale, Team Spirit, Leadership and External Support in an attempt to operationalise the doctrine, to make it researchable and navigate problems of completeness and distinctiveness between the indicators and variables.

Research design

As part of a wider study, which also included an historical survey (of policy and strategy) and case studies (precedent) to understand the requirement or demand placed on Reserve soldiers, data was collected through focus groups, in common with other studies looking at military-moral issues.27 of this method is that it can accommodate group dynamics, appropriate because the Moral Component of Fighting Power includes both individual and collective elements. They also enable topics to be probed in-depth to understand the impact.

weeks (23 February – 1 September 2022), conducted at best effort in terms of time and locations, around the military duties and personal responsibilities of the sole researcher. It took advantage of existing convenient groups (units) rather than probability sampling. Soldiers participated during their training evenings and group size was limited by availability on the day of data collection, providing a control factor, as a comparable period of activity. 13 focus groups,28 comprising 41 participants,29 were conducted within 8 sub-units across 5 units from the infantry, Royal Logistic Corps (RLC) and Royal Signals based in South-East England and the North Midlands/Yorkshire. This was at the lower end of the initial estimate of the participant requirement, in both theory30 and the literature31 to achieve theoretical saturation, where successive groups offered similar opinions on the same topics.

Figure 2: The Moral Component Model26

GroupCodeSub

CompetenceComparison with regular soldiers

CamaraderieWar

Leadership

Intrinsic

Purpose

ControlOpportunity

Uncertainty

Choice

ExtrinsicPay

Medals

Gains and Losses

Participation was limited to Private-JNCO ranks; a group under-represented in ResCAS.32

Fieldwork

Two groups of themes were created from the data: ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic,’ to help explain attitudes toward mobilisation. Underpinning these groups and their themes are the relationships that reservists must navigate, between the Army, their families, and employers, which form the context for their mobilised service. Labelling them as ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ is not to imply that they are necessarily distinct spheres that do not interact.

The general attitude of participants in this research mirrors that found by FRRP, which reported that 33 though as with this study, their method of interviewing only lent itself to accessing soldiers who were actively engaged in the organisation. Notably, Royal Signals participants made proportionally fewer ‘mobilisation positive’ comments and more ‘mobilisation negative’ comments than RLC or infantry participants.

Royal Signals participants perceived in ‘recovering’ from the training disruption caused by COVID-19 and a perceived paucity of up-to-date communications training equipment, which is comparatively ‘hi-tech’ and scarce, when compared with logistics or infantry equipment. Alternatively, it may be partly due to the difference in mobilised experience within the cohorts: of RLC participants 6 of 17 had mobilised before, Infantry 10 of 17 and Royal Signals 0 of 7. Having mobilised before appears to correlate with more positive attitudes toward mobilisation.

Intrinsic themes

inherent to the individual in relation to mobilisation rather than something visible or that only have

value in relation to something external. The theme of Competence derives from perceptions of how soldiers perform their job, their ability to apply their training and their desire to improve as soldiers. Camaraderie34 is related to intra-military relationships, including friendship and interaction with leaders. Purpose encompasses the extent to which mobilisation is seen as worthwhile, including excitement and adventure, feelings of duty, and the worthiness of the task itself. Control describes a soldiers’ desire

labour, through both information and certainty about the future. These themes start to reveal why and under what conditions, mobilisation might be

Competence, Camaraderie, Purpose and Control, are reminiscent of the “autonomy, competence and 35 some face validity because the Army naturally wishes to attract intrinsically motivated people who thrive on teamwork, challenge and comradeship (aspects because the offer, extrinsically speaking, is relatively poor; average pay, potential danger and limited opportunity for acclaim outside of a narrow circle.

Competence

Most participants expressed the view that mobilisation was the integral means by which they did their job. The sentiment of “what is the point groups of all capbadges36 and some went as far as mobilise for operations.37 Many noted that it was the culmination of their training, and was the mark of a competent soldier, and which gave them a sense of Pride38 in a job ‘well done,’39 something that was also shown in ResCAS results.40

competence, and felt ‘ready now’:

D3: We’re already ready. We’re already

D1: So, I think, yeah, as you say, we are there and we are trained to do the task, then we should be able to go anywhere really.

While this mirrors the wider perspective of participants in this study, the tone recorded in 41 gave the sense that this training would be ‘done’ to them, rather than them being an active participant. This suggests that while deployment might be an end goal that is attractive, there may be lukewarm support or incomplete understanding of the important intermediate steps that lead to that. In common with some of Bury’s interviewees,42 some

Figure 4: Thematic Coding Frame

Figure 5: Attitude to Mobilisation against Army corps (% of total references)

completing individual technical training, such as the

part-time soldier, which undermined their sense of 43 but which they wanted to improve upon. This was particularly acute in among Royal Signals participants44

in their basic and technical equipment.

Attitudes of low competence were much less prevalent among the RLC and infantry and were

rather than the participants themselves: self-

L2: Because reservists, we have only two hours at Tuesday night, like once a week like a drill night. We haven’t learned anything at all. So, if we go to, like, the serious one, like deployed, mobilised from one place to another place, we have to learn lots of things and we can see the activities what the regulars are doing. And I think this way we have to learn lots of more things in Army to do…if we go mobilised in my view.

Mobilisation was seen by this logistician, and others,45 as a vehicle to improve as soldiers and as a team.

Camaraderie

Camaraderie is another theme that illustrates a series of positive Moral Component factors towards mobilisation. This relates to reservists’ relationships with each other as well as with their leaders, who are both comrades and agents of the organisation. Social cohesion was central to the Territorial Army that Walker observed in the late 1980’s46 but more recently, Bury noted that different trades might account for different perceptions of cohesion and teamwork between Army Reserve units.47 This study includes infantry, that Bury considered to be a collectivist trade, requiring individuals to work as part of a coherent team to succeed on operations at the lowest level but also RLC drivers (which were also included in Bury’s work) and Royal Signals (which were not), which Bury would see as “individually

data capture highlighted that RLC groups48 had an individual focus to their discussions, whereas the tone of infantry groups49 were noticeably more collectivist which supports Bury’s idea about differences between individual and collective trades.

Social bonding remains important for all Reserve units, which do not have the time or resources to develop or maintain professional bonds, even with periodic collective exercises. Social cohesion can supplement the bonds forged with professional training with additional shared experiences contributing toward Moral Cohesion.50 Both FRRP and Bury,51 note the unique feeling of military comradeship that makes it “easier to [mobilise] with 52 53

of the top reasons for staying in the Army, supporting the importance of Comradeship54 and Moral Cohesion

and can also be reinforced by mobilisation. In the same vein, anecdotal ‘war stories’ of successful or positive mobilisation experiences seemed to develop expectations of Pride and reinforce Moral Cohesion and the Spiritual Foundation,55 supporting mobilisation prospects and Fighting Power. Beyond what reservists hear, what they see of their leaders’ example more than persuasion or compulsion, also has an impact, though this was discussed in more depth by the infantry, rather than RLC or Signals participants. Those leaders who are seen to mobilise have credibility, but this was not a critical or deciding factor in the decision making of their subordinates.

The participants of this study certainly value the Comradeship that comes from prospective mobilisations with their friends from within their own derive from Moral Cohesion including being more

motivator to mobilise; the prospect of being part of a successful and effective force. An indicator of the strong impact of Comradeship and Moral Cohesion offered; that people would be left behind. The ‘Fear Of Missing Out’ and not being part of a shared experience

Purpose

Since mobilised reservists dedicate a substantial part of their lives to military pursuits, potentially to the detriment of other aspects of their life, it makes sense that they do it for ‘something’ that they consider to be worthwhile and that they gain some satisfaction from. The simplest of these is that mobilisation and deployment on operations is seen as an exciting prospect. They may also feel an expectation to

Nevertheless, mobilisation can be recognised as important and worthwhile and therefore still be ‘supported’ even if not necessarily an exciting proposition, especially where it is a task that 56 especially where there is 57 such as humanitarian operations.58 individual was also important to both logisticians and infantiers.59 Serving one’s own people, for instance against COVID or in support of the Olympics,60 was seen as especially worthwhile even if the task was not exciting.

that reservists want to “be, and feel, useful…[and] 61 excitement and making an impact are important motivators. It also aligns with ResCAS results which

rated reasons more widely within the organisation for joining and staying in the Army Reserve, though all these reasons could be achieved without mobilising for operations.

Control

Most of the soldiers in this study expressed the desire

and civilian commitments. Salient components of this include having mobilisation opportunities available

to them and being empowered by certainty and the ability to choose between mobilising or not. The elements of this theme are linked with reservists’ terms of service and are therefore partly within the gift of the organisation to affect, and are also linked with the Reserve’s volunteerist traditions. The need

relationships that reservists must navigate. When they mobilise, they do so after contemplating broader considerations, including making a conscious choice for others as well as themselves.

Across all groups, reservists were in favour of any opportunity to mobilise that could be afforded to them and the disappointment at a lack of opportunity hints at a positive Fighting Spirit and a desire to be involved in operations and military activity. Having opportunities was seen as a good start but there was a clear feeling across all the groups that it was also important for soldiers to be empowered with information about the parameters of the job they might be undertaking. Most soldiers could accept uncertain task parameters, or even found it a matter of excitement or adventure (discussed later) but temporal or administrative uncertainty was a real problem, for instance with an infantry unit’s deployment to the Falklands62 and an RLC unit’s mobilisation for Operation TOSCA in Cyprus.63

describing a situation whereby, through perceived poor planning or rapidly changing circumstances, an order is given only to be swiftly countermanded, epitomises the frustration that participants had about uncertainty. Many indicated that they would commit to the organisation more but for the uncertain aspects of their service that were so commonplace that they expect last minute changes or cancellations that affects not just the soldier but their family and

frustration about the way the Army was perceived to delay issuing call-out papers until the latest possible moment because it deprived them of certainty. This logistician epitomised the view of many participants:

M4: And you lost some good soldiers that way. I can name at least three people that would have had something to offer this tour.

Here, soldiers’ motivation to serve was undermined, meaning that they chose not to deploy, demonstrating the effect that the Moral Component can have on Fighting Power. This was 64 where short notice changes to arrangements, even those less demanding than mobilisation, are inhibitors to service suggesting that limited progress has been made since 2018 in this regard. Reservists’ sense of choice, guided by the ideals of the ‘volunteerist tradition’ baked into FR20,65 is undermined by a lack of certainty.

Reservists perceive that it is within the organisation’s gift to give more notice for operations66

to be mobilised, prima facie a failure of System Enabling67 that undermines Fighting Power. Further, though this scenario also appears to undermine their Spiritual Foundation; their belief in the organisation and the ‘task’ of mobilisation. Their belief in a higher

cause is undermined if the Army is not seen to accommodate their status as reservists because the Army has not shown reciprocal commitment to them; a sense that if the cause were that important and a Reservist contribution were that important, surely the Army would get it right.

There was the sense across all groups that; to be deserving of loyalty from soldiers, the organisation must account for individual personal circumstances.

Extrinsic themes

The next group of themes are extrinsic, comprising three factors that come from outside of the individual.

being the most prevalent method of rewarding work done for a professional organisation, regardless of sector. Pay has both practical and intangible consequences; allowing people to survive within an economic framework but also representing the worth that an organisation places on a person’s contribution. Of note, pay presents as a hygiene factor68 in the data. Another reward that is particular to armed forces is medallic recognition, though again, it is not the intrinsic value of the metal and ribbon itself that is of interest but what it represents. Potential gains,

derived from mobilisation; and losses or perceived costs, like personal inconvenience and risk to civilian

Pay

reward for employment, only four groups from the wider study discussed that pay might be an attractive factor and there was not necessarily consensus in

the participants. Two groups suggested that the pay associated with mobilisation was not a key factor, largely because most reservists earned more in their civilian employment. Most groups concluded that they were not strongly motivated by pay, suggesting that pay might be seen only as fair and necessary recompense for a soldier’s time but not for their wider

Simple positive or negative terms were not used by reservists discussing their pay, suggesting that it does not greatly affect the Moral Component through 69

the recognition of the value of material gains that support mobilisation. However, getting pay correct and on time was seen as universally important. Failing to do so undermines System Enabling in a way that cannot be compensated for by other factors because soldiers simply cannot afford to mobilise, but further, undermines the Spiritual Foundation because the organisation is perceived to ‘not care’. In summary, pay, whilst recognised as important, was also measured in value by its timely administration to the individual. Conversely, delayed payments were generally regarded as a negative measure of a reservist’s worth.

Medals

A factor which was only mentioned organically (unprompted by the moderator) in three groups, of which two were from logistic units,70 was the provision of medals by the organisation to reservists.

medals, rather than gallantry medals for acts of bravery. It may be obvious that militaries would not invest in what are physically ‘trinkets’ of cloth and metal if they were not effective tools for motivation. It is clear from the discussion, that while they are an externally provided physical item, they mean much more to recipients and to the organisation and are a 71 in motivating soldiers. Groups where participants had mobilised before (infantry and logistics) noted that it was a source of Pride. There may be a link between medallic recognition and which operations reservists perceive that the organisation is signalling as being more worthwhile. Furthermore, they have an intangible value, lasting proof of their all to see. They are a mark of shared experience, either between all service people. It is also distinctive to those in the military and a visible symbol which few civilians would have been awarded and consequently acts as a force for Moral Cohesion. The reservists participating here were keen to point out that they factor in attracting them to mobilise. Correspondingly the military awards medals to recognise and indirectly encourage preferred modes of behaviour, repay and acknowledge the debt of service and by limiting their issue to certain areas or conditions, create scarcity, making them more desirable.

Gains and losses

Another tangible factor that was mentioned by less than half the groups72 experience to their civilian or military careers. ResCAS service in obtaining skills and training73 but were career.74 Certainly it was recognised that mobilising military career, but attitudes were more cynical as

factor, though they would fall within the scope of

Greater concern came with perceived tangible costs of mobilising over remaining in civilian employment; that personal development gains from mobilising might be outweighed by ground lost at work. This resources invested in supporting soldier-employer relations.

How reservists manage their desire to serve with their employers in practical terms when they are mobilised is an interesting issue. Even when the policy of Intelligent Selection is followed, while some soldiers said they would be honest with their employers and trusted them to support their military service, most participants suggested that they would not expose this choice to their employers. Employer Support75 presented as an important factor, but one that was very dependent on individual circumstances. This approach may serve to protect the soldier from potential recriminations or perceived losses later, as outlined in the previous theme and in FRRP,76 but also illustrates that while Organisational Compulsion77 does not have a strong impact upon individuals, it

is used as a tool to secure the support of civilian employers for mobilisation. Indeed, some participants would welcome greater compulsion being exerted on employers for the wider elements of Reserve service, not just mobilisation, though this is a complex relationship for Defence to manage; to make Reserve service seem attractive through employer support initiatives78 rather than be coerced into it. FRRP also highlighted that reservists seldom want to present deployment as voluntary to their employers.79 ResCAS reported only 9% of Army Other-Ranks feeling that they had been unreasonably disadvantaged by Army service in their civilian employment.80 lower levels of disadvantage perceived by general service than by mobilised service, or that the potential losses are a fear that tend not to materialise.

Family Support81 was presented in a comparable way to those of civilian employment, though mentioned slightly less frequently as practical concerns. Families are perceived to be more supportive of mobilisation based on the strength of personal relationships and understanding of the value that the service person places in their Army activity. Family demands, and the emotional and practical impact of leaving them, are weighed up against the issues in themselves. ResCAS reported that 49%

support provided during their last mobilisation, with 82 More participants suggested that they would be honest with their families about mobilisation than with their employers and to support these discussions.

Conclusion

conducted with Army Reservists to investigate their attitudes toward mobilisation through the lens of the Moral Component of Fighting Power, using the

the research. The primary focus is on the attitudes of Royal Logistic Corps reservists.

have a Moral Component of Fighting Power characterised by a positive Fighting Spirit and are lack of opportunity; but this is conditional. They get satisfaction from the prospect of mobilisation and military life itself; they have a sense of SelfDiscipline83 and will mobilise to do what they feel they ‘ought’ to do, rather than because they are forced, and they want to make a difference as individuals and as a team. Pride and Self-Discipline are both seen as positive, provided an operation is

serious circumstances where Intelligent Selection might be set aside, soldiers suggest they would mobilise because they ought rather than because they are compelled to do so. This implies a low sense of Organisational Compulsion, that is to say they do not mobilise out of a legal obligation or the risk of punishment, but more out of a moral obligation, though they may manipulate Organisational Compulsion as a tool to negotiate their relationships with employers.

That the prospect of being part of a larger military team is attractive points to positive Moral Cohesion

and there is also a keen sense that they want to mobilise with their comrades and do not want to miss out. The professionalisation of the Army Reserve as an operational rather than a strategic reserve is still in progress; social bonds and Comradeship remain incredibly important for them. There is a feeling that mobilising and working as a team makes the team better, which in turn makes it more attractive to be mobilised, supporting both Individual and Group

cohesion and performance are mutually supporting.

RLC reservists also have a positive Spiritual Foundation, and it is inferred that they serve a higher cause through the Army, though they were not

is fragile. Where the organisation does not provide enough certainty and is not seen to account for personal circumstances, their volunteer ethos or treat them equitably compared with regular soldiers against whom they measure their performance,84 mobilisation efforts may be undermined. While ambiguity of task may be acceptable, ambiguity of timeline is intolerable, especially when combined with confusion over changing requirements at short notice. Practical barriers can often be overcome with

against the Army Reserve may simply be unachievable and are perceived by soldiers to demonstrate that the organisation does not value them or their situation, an 85 Cumulatively this may have created an endemic situation whereby they ‘expect the unexpected,’ or short-notice changes, and soldiers therefore temper their expectations and their Fighting Spirit; their eagerness to volunteer may be lower until full details are known which may simply be too late for some.

This reinforces the importance of giving a choice as an organisational behaviour which supports reservists’ Spiritual Foundation. This is a more positive situation than described by FRRP, where participants felt that attempts to prioritise family or civilian employment led to them being branded as unreliable.86 By implication, this links to the idea of Compulsion, which while it was seldom discussed within the groups organically without prompt from the moderator, was recognised but not dwelled upon.87

The Extrinsic themes further expand upon reservists’ Fighting Spirit and have Pride in their military identity and their membership of a cohesive team through wearing medals, which are also perceived to indicate what worth the organisation places in an operation. System Enabling and which do not necessarily promote mobilisation but could undermine it, especially where the organisation is seen to make it harder for reservists to mobilise than it should be. The organisation is the administration of pay, when poorly executed, has the potential to undermine mobilisation, both practically (if they simply cannot afford to mobilise), or through the Spiritual Foundation (through a loss of trust). They can also form part of the organisation’s lore as stories passed between comrades that could undermine mobilisation in the future.

There was little evidence to suggest that Public Support88

and the impact of Leadership variables, especially Persuasion89 and Example90 was also less than expected, given the premium that the Army places on this aspect of inter-personal relationships. The attitudes of RLC reservists in this study differed from their infantry and signals counterparts in two their competence, they had a more passive attitude toward the training that they might receive than other participants, though this does not necessarily impact on their Fighting Power. Secondly, as with Bury’s research they presented as more individually focussed than the collectivist infantry, which suggests they may have a different relationship with Comradeship and Cohesion. Again this is not to say that the Moral Component of Fighting Power is

Broadly, RLC reservists want to deploy on operations and see mobilisation as an integral part of their service. Whilst they are committed to their service, there is often a practical or administrative aspects of a deployment which has Moral impact, that might undermine Fighting Power. Where these practical elements can be improved upon, the Army the Reserve Force 2030 proposition.

Endnotes

1The research sample comprised RLC, infantry and Royal Signals soldiers.

2Randell (2024). https://doi.org/10.48683/1926.00117407

3Connelly (2018), p34.

4Clausewitz (1989); van Creveld (2017); Kniskern and Segal (2015), p511; Murray (1999), p27.

5Manning (1991) offers a broad summary of these various

6Britt and Dickinson (2005), p157; MOD (2014), p40.

7Firstly, on enlistment and subsequently on accepting an opportunity or an order to deploy.

8 soldiers want to deploy on operations and do not actively avoid mobilisation.

9MOD (2017), p3-1.

10The model presented here is from the 2017, Army Doctrine Publication: Land Operations. It was updated in 2022, after the model comprising morale, leadership, team cohesion and an ethical foundation (MOD (2022), p 1-4 – 1-5), which, independently, aligns with the Moral Component Model examined in this research.

11HOC (2014).

12RFCA (2019).

13Sandman (2023).

14Van Creveld (1982); Depuy (1992); Millet and Murray (2010); Millet and Murray (2010).

15Van Creveld (1982), p3.

16Connable et al (2018), p4.

17Stouffer (1949); Moran (2007); Marshall (2012); Brathwaite (2017); Jones (2006); Sherman (2010), Kellett (1990); Grossman (1996); Williams (2000); Berkowitz (1990); Ignatieff (2000), p186; Bourke (1999).

18 Mantler (2014).

19Mael (1989); Latham (2012); Ben-Dor et al (2008); Britt, Castro and Adler (2005).

20Cotton (1990); Johansen, Laberg and Martinussen (2013); Manning (1991); Allen (2003).

21MOD (2013a).

22MOD (2013).

23FRRP (2018).

24MOD (2022).

25Fighting Power appears in Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (MOD (2014)) and Army Land Operations (MOD (2017), described as ‘Joint Capstone’ and ‘Army Capstone’ Strategic and Operational doctrine in the Army Doctrine Primer (MOD (2011), p5-3).

26Randell (2024), p54. See this reference for full operational

outlined in Randell (2024), pp196.

27 Connolly (2021).

28 Signals – 2 (G and J).

29 30 5-60 (Mason (2010); Guest et al (2006); Crouch and McKenzie

that 31 participants is a mean total number of participants. Matthews and Ross suggest that up to 20 interviews is feasible for a study conducted by a single researcher. (Matthews and Ross (2010), p169.)

31The large scale and well-resourced FRRP involved 188 military participants on a saturation sampling basis, a breadth which was assessed as beyond the resources of this project. Bury conducted 14 group interviews of logistic Army Reserves, a sub-population of the whole organisation, with between 2 and 15 participants, with 7 the average, in each group. (Bury (2016) p50; Bury (2017).) Connelly spoke with 105 regular soldiers in 12 focus groups in only 2 months for his study on regular-reservist integration from the perspective of the former. (Connelly (2021).)

32ResCAS works on the Missing at Random principle which can only amplify or abate data collected. To put this into perspective, in the 2022 ResCAS, a trained Private had a weighting of 34.61 and a Lance Corporal 15.87. (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ media/62c2b1028fa8f54e8aadc70c/Reserves_Continuous_Attitude_ Survey_2022_Main_Report.pdf) This means that one person of

that actually attend training in their location; assuming that most Army Reserve locations are sub-unit sized (a company/squadron of approximately 54 Privates and 13 Lance Corporals at full strength) or smaller (platoon - 18 Privates and 3 Lance Corporals at full strength).

33Catignani et al (2018), p1.

34That this theme is like the Moral Component variable of Comradeship suggests that this may be an important aspect of Reserve service. ‘Camaraderie’ was deliberately chosen as the name over ‘Comradeship’ to avoid confusion.

35Ryan and Deci (2000), p54.

36Groups B, D, F, G.

37Group E, F, G, I.

38

39Group C, F, I, M.

402022 - 53% of Army Other Ranks reported joining the organisation to deploy on operations and 47% stayed in the Army for that reason, among the highest ranked reasons.

41For instance, groups B and D.

42Bury (2016), p211, 216.

43 they could have a positive impact on a deployment.

44Groups G and J.

45E.g. Groups I, L and M.

46Walker (1990), p102, 105-106.

47Bury (2016), p260.

48Groups A, B and D.

49Groups F, H and K.

50

51Bury (2016), p250, 309.

52Group H.

53Catignani et al (2018), p2-3.

54

55 the organization in the broadest sense.

56M4, Group M.

57E1, Group E.

58Groups B, F, K and L.

59Groups B, E, H, J and L.

60Group B.

61Catignani et al (2018), p2.

62Group H.

63Group M.

64Giga et al (2018); Catignani and Basham (2018).

65Edmunds et al (2016), p127.

66Defence policy is to provide a minimum of 28 days’ notice for all operations (MOD (2015)); the Army also seems to use this as a maximum notice period at which paperwork will be issued, which can cause friction

67

68Herzberg, Mausner and Snyderman (1959) – where a factor is not a positive when present but is a negative when absent or

69 mobilisation behaviour.

70

71Keegan (2004), p323.

72Groups E, G, K, L and M.

73

74

75 of their perception of their employer’s attitude toward a deployment.

76Cunningham-Burley et al (2018b), p3.

77 to deploy.

78Edmunds et al (2016), p131.

79Woodward et al (2018).

80MOD (2022).

81 their perception of their family’s attitude toward a deployment.

82MOD (2022).

83

84Bury (2016), p277; Catignani et al (2018), p2.

85Catignani et al (2018); Catignani and Basham (2018).

86Cunningham-Burley et al (2018b), p3.

87Group F.

88 of their perception of the general public’s attitude toward a deployment.

89 organisation, can convince soldiers to behave in a way that supports the Army’s goals – in this case, to mobilise.

90 organisation, inspire soldiers to behave in a way that supports the Army’s goals through their own positive mobilisation behaviour.

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Lt Eira Booth RLC provides insight into the world of Army Motorsport and the ways in which it is an asset to the wider Service. Focusing on land-based disciplines involving four-wheeled and two-wheeled motorised vehicles, the article highlights some of the fundamental principles of the

them.”

- Arthur C Clarke,

Introduction

During his years in Formula One, motor racing icon Ayrton Senna observed that unwavering perseverance in the pursuit of excellence is a cornerstone of successful achievement. He also recognised that having the courage to be creative and take risks in the face of adversity is a critical component of progressive development. In the world of sport, win or lose, true victory lies in giving something your best and knowing that you refused to quit (Ayrton Senna Institute, 2023). Such sentiments ring true in the context of Army Motorsport. Service personnel from all backgrounds come together to participate in a high pressure, dynamic, and rewarding environment whereby reaching beyond perceived limitations is the norm. Whether directly competing in events or providing behind-the-scenes support, individuals know they are continuously also contributing to something much bigger than themselves. The transferable skills are immeasurable and there is a strong culture of self-reliance, prudent resource management, and collaborative working. Army Motorsport plays an integral part in the enhancement of cohesion and capability within the Service, as well as contributing to organisational effectiveness across the wider Armed Forces. It is

given the many similarities relating to transport, supply, and maintenance. From routine manoeuvres

adaptable systems is essential for the movement and conservation of materiel. Furthermore, within the contemporary security environment it is becoming

advancements that many of us once took for granted. Where satellite navigation devices and mobile phones may risk compromising our movements, for instance, it is vital that personnel are competent in the application of traditional tools such as compasses and maps. Under the astute leadership of the British Army Motoring Association (BAMA), individuals and teams have numerous opportunities to develop their skills and abilities in these and so many other areas. This in turn has a positive net effect on their units and other partner organisations, as personnel can apply these skills to their trade whilst also imparting acquired knowledge to their colleagues. In the same way, Army Motorsport itself relies on the existence of functional logistical structures and capable personnel

This article provides insight into the world of Army Motorsport and the ways in which it is an asset to the wider Service. Focusing on land-based disciplines involving four-wheeled and two-wheeled motorised vehicles, the article highlights some of the fundamental principles of the sport and their capability. There is also an analysis of BAMA’s unique and long-standing role in this arena, along with the Association’s continued relevance in connecting working and recreational aspects of the Army. A case study of the author’s own experience in the ROADMASTER 2024 championship has been provided to further highlight the interrelation of these elements and their far-reaching positive impact. Early in 2024, I went from ‘cradle to camber’ by entering the 4x4 and Navigation competition at the conclusion of Land Rover driver training. I was able to apply my newly acquired knowledge and skills, whilst also gaining a deeper understanding of military driving and the challenges personnel can face. Taking all of this into account, this article concludes with a consideration of the tremendous progress BAMA has made over the past sixty years and its realistic optimism moving into the future.

Motorsport and the British Army

The British Army has been involved in motorsport to varying degrees for decades. One of its longest

lineage which can be traced back to the daring displays performed by Despatch Riders in the 1920s. From early on, there was an appreciation for the pragmatic harmony between work and recreational riding. Exhibitions provided novel opportunities to develop and motivate personnel, such as through lengthy gruelling selection and training processes that challenged even the most experienced riders (Macauley, 2020; Royal Signals, 1970). They also enabled the Army to raise morale among existing troops, alongside showcasing its laudable qualities as an organisation to potential recruits and the wider public. Motorcycles had been employed on an industrial scale during the First World War, proving instrumental in areas such as communication and the delivery of detailed supplies. It was not uncommon

and determination was thus required at all times. Although motorcycles were gradually phased out as operational devices, their legacy has endured in the form of displays and competitions. The famed White Helmets of the Royal Signals, for example, provided crowd pleasing, exhilarating performances up until their disbandment in 2017. Meanwhile, other contemporary riders have continued to demonstrate courage, ingenuity, and grit in various road and offroad contests.

can be loosely described as: recreational activities and organised events utilising motorised vehicles for competitive purposes within a variety of settings including off-road, track, sea, and air (FIA, 2024; IOC, 2024; Motorsport UK, 2024). As the British Army’s extensive experience and achievements are a testament to, it can be so much more. Beyond providing an outlet for the insatiable passions of the human competitive spirit, motorsport presents a unique array of challenges and dramas which set it apart from many other sports. At a fundamental level it is both an art and a science. It involves the composite manifestation of dexterity, imagination and

masterful grace applied by drivers as they traverse an apex at speed, or the persistent acuity employed by a team manager as they orchestrate operations under

also the methodical acquisition of knowledge through diligent analysis and experimentation, requiring creativity and precision to get the best out of teams and their equipment. Mechanics and navigators, for instance, continually develop their skills through experience and targeted learning to enhance their problem-solving capabilities and comprehension. Through an inimitable amalgamation of virtuosity, scholarship and creativity, motorsport represents an ardent pursuit of challenges accompanied by an unwavering push to excel beyond perceived boundaries.

The Army recognises that sport has tremendous value for the personal and professional development of its workforce, with its consequential augmentation of operational cohesion and capability (Army Sport Control Board, 2018; Army Sport, 2023; Ministry of Defence UK, 2021). One of the critical ways this

occurs in motorsport is through the enhancement of transferable skills. Also known as ‘portable

improve individual versatility through their relevance across a wide variety of contexts and occupations. Prime examples of transferable skills that can be seen in sport include adaptability, communication, creativity, critical thinking, leadership, teamwork, and time management. Competencies acquired within Army Motorsport, as a case in point, are synonymous in nature to a variety of skills utilised within the military logistic context. Similar to their logistician counterparts, motorsport crews must often collaborate within high pressure environments whilst and equipment may sometimes be limited. Individuals must therefore be able to clearly convey information and ideas, such as with respect to task prioritisation

a management perspective there is also the need to conduct analyses and make decisions which factor in the broader environment within which the team is operating. The complex and interrelated parts exist

teams alike to negotiate a multitude of anticipated elements and unforeseen variables in order to achieve successful outcomes. Akin to operations, the difference between pay-off and failure is a thin line but Army Motorsport allows individuals, at all levels, to practice making decisions in complex and often confusing situations.

Such a positive interchange of skills also extends to the organisational level. From individual competitors and crews, through to the wider team and associations operating around them, Army Motorsport has a lot to offer service personnel and the wider military institution. Reservist BAMA members from STEM55 backgrounds, for example, may provide unique and valuable contributions to the RLC, REME, and

of such arrangements for all parties are also apparent, especially where individuals may require less support or training and would also make good candidates to provide their skills and experiences to others. At the other end of the spectrum, Veterans associated with BAMA can provide equally advantageous opportunities for civilian employers in related areas. All of this helps to foster closer ties between the Army, the private sector and other partners. It should

United Kingdom: British Army Motorsport Association

also not be overlooked that Army Motorsport goes beyond skill development, knowledge acquisition, and increasing personal and professional ties. At its very core are an array of values and dispositions required for success, many of which correspond to those comprising the Army’s central ethos. Courage and integrity are essential for implementing new technologies and opting for routes less travelled, particularly when mistakes are made and lessons need to be learned. Additionally, undertaking endurance

requires a high degree of discipline and respect for others. Furthermore, within the wider motorsport

essential for negotiating the best deals with partners and providing other forms of voluntary support.

2010 by the Army Sport Control Board, predecessor to the current Army Sport Institution which came

recognition brought a myriad of advantages at both the organisational and individual level. Most notably it enabled Army Motorsport to expand its network and reach, to grow in size, and to increase the variety of sub-categories on offer. Army Sport is comprised of many different groups actively involved in sport

subsidiary sport associations including BAMA. Thousands of volunteers assist with the facilitation and delivery of sport at all levels. There is also close collaboration with the Army Sport Charitable Fund,

(Army Sport, 2023). Being part of such an extensive community makes motorsport far more accessible than it would otherwise be. In many respects, it is a high-skilled and technical pursuit which can be too expensive or intimidating for some interested personnel to participate independently. The Army Motorsport sub-category therefore gives everyone the opportunity to join in and experience new challenges that may normally be out of reach. This is in line with Army Sport’s main effort of increasing accessibility and boosting sport involvement (Army Sport, 2024). From inter-corps karting contests to participating in international events, like the World Rally Championship, there is something for everyone regardless of background and skill level.

The Continued Relevance of BAMA

since the inception of BAMA in the 1960s. As the subsidiary governing branch of Army Sport, the Association manages activities relating to motorsport within the Service. Its primary mission is to provide personnel with a chance to become involved through a variety of different opportunities and annual events. Whether it is working behind the scenes or directly competing, interested personnel can easily get involved by contacting BAMA and its branches directly or attending one of the many associated events running throughout the year. Support and guidance are also available for those willing to progress. Moreover, the Association is always on the lookout for upcoming talent as part of the Army’s drive to develop high performing individuals through initiatives like the Army Elite Sport Program (British Army Sport, 2020). With membership of BAMA being a prerequisite for participation in events, over the years the organisation has successfully expanded in size and its achievements. It currently boasts hundreds of members from across the Regular, Reserve and Veteran contingents, who compete at all levels in a variety of disciplines (BAMA, 2024). Through its ongoing ‘Engage to Recruit’ activities and social media presence, the Association also has an expanding appeal beyond the Armed Forces. This contributes to Army Sport’s net reach which totals in the millions regarding media interactions and views (Army Sport, 2023).

In motorsport, disciplines are distinct forms of competitive categories based on distinguishing features such as the terrain, type of vehicle employed, and task set. There may also be a further sub-set

with their own goals and additional procedures. Both Autocross and Motocross, for example, have many similarities with respect to the fundamentals of motorsport. They are competitive in nature, take place under challenging conditions, and require participants to surmount a variety of obstacles. However, they

separate disciplines. Autocross, for instance, usually involves competitors undertaking individual precisionbased tasks in four-wheeled vehicles. By comparison, Motocross is a two-wheeled discipline which involves competitors collectively traversing across challenging off-road courses alongside their rivals on dirt-bikes. Each motorsport discipline has additional still come under the regulations of the relevant superseding governing bodies. Internationally, this is the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) and the Fédération Internationale de Motocylisme (FIM).

which are recognised by the FIA and FIM, of which Motorsport UK and the Autocycle Union (ACU) are the organisations BAMA is aligned to. The Association and its disciplines are then further connected to other locality, such as Army Sport mentioned previously. No two disciplines within motorsport are the same. In the case of BAMA, there are eight disciplines split across the four-wheeled and two-wheeled categories: Karting, Rally, and Sports Cars (fourwheeled); Enduro, Road Racing, and Trials (two-

United Kingdom: British Army Motorsport Association

wheeled); 4x4 & Navigation and Adventure (two and four-wheeled). The two most nascent disciplines within the BAMA repertoire are Karting and Sports Cars, each having been founded and then formally incorporated into Army Sport in 2011 (BAMA, 2024). Growing rapidly, as with other categories of Army Motorsport, the Army Sports Car Racing Team participate in a range of events against contenders from across the Services, veterans, and sometimes civilians. Novice and Intermediate personnel race in twenty-minute sprint competitions, whilst Advanced drivers undertake endurance contests of varying duration. Additionally, there is the opportunity to participate in relay races. The Army Motorsport Kart Team also competes in sprint and endurance events, including the annual inter-service Armed Forces Karting Championship. In contrast to sports cars, which predominantly rely on engine power and aerodynamics, the vehicles in the Karting discipline approach to be successful. Teams usually win on a nuanced approach within Sports Cars events that factors in individual lap timings and other elements. Moving away from the track in the four-wheeled category, the Rally and 4x4 and Navigation disciplines are among the oldest in the history of Army Motorsport. Since the 1960s the Army has been involved in the world of Rallying, from the early days of providing event support to eventually competing as part of the Armed Forces Rally Team (AFRT). Members of Army Stage Rallying now compete in the annual Army Stage Rallying Championship, as well as having the chance to join the AFRT for more comprehensive ‘special stage’ events (BAMA 2024). As with the 4x4 and Navigation discipline, the Rally genre utilises a mixture of off-road and road-related terrains which pose unique challenges and can be extremely demanding in nature. Both disciplines also provide opportunities for members to use their own BAMA-approved vehicles to compete, although the 4x4 and Navigation category has a distinctive feature which enables service personnel to potentially participate in military Land Rovers and SVs (‘Green Fleet’). Drivers and Co-Drivers within the 4x4 and Navigation discipline may also undertake precision challenges such as Gymkhana, manoeuvring vehicles through a sequence of complex tasks under time restrictions. Teams may be required to skilfully execute moves such as a 360 degree turn before steering into a slalom, culminating with immediate braking to position themselves exactly on a physical particular time limit or stopping over the designated endpoint (BAMA, 2015).

Off-road events are also available for those in the two-wheeled category, within the 4x4 and Navigation discipline and in the form of Enduro and Trials. Enduro events are relatively new to motorsport and can vary in form, duration, and the types of challenges presented to riders. These involve navigating extreme cross-country stages and obstacles under timed conditions, sometimes from downhill starts. The Army Enduro Team competes in UK and international events such as the Welsh Two-Day Enduro contest and the European Enduro Championships, respectively. Equally arduous

is the Trials discipline with many Enduro riders having originally developed their skills in this arena. Comprised of two main forms, timed and observation trials, there are many challenges which riders engage in. The Army Trials Team, for instance, participates in the long-established Scottish Six-Days Trial which entails traversing daily through thirty sections that collectively total approximately one hundred miles (SSDT, 2024). The connection to such an historic event is unsurprising given that, originating in the 1930s, the Trials team is the longest-running within the Army Motorsport two-wheeled category (BAMA, 2024). Finally, in comparison to the Trials discipline, whereby riders may sometimes be required to use public roads, participants in the Road Racing discipline compete on enclosed circuits in Sprint and Endurance contests within their respective cc classes. Substantial in size, the Army Motorcycle Road Race Team competes in events around the year, including the Tri-Service Championship.

Each of the BAMA disciplines offers a wealth of opportunities for people to get involved in motorsport from grassroots upwards. The Association also remains open to adding more disciplines to its already impressive inventory over the coming years. Moreover, the progressive and team-based nature of the sport means that the existing disciplines are continually growing. More and more roles are sought

of the Traction Cities in Peter Reeve’s novel Mortal Engines, having an extensive assortment of dedicated individuals on board is necessary for the continued success and development of the dynamic colossus that is Army Motorsport. From the organisational level through to discipline and team layers, BAMA and its associated groups eagerly seek those interested in support or non-driving roles including

There is also a continual push within the Association to experiment with new ways of working, aimed at further growing the sport and its transferable by the large variety of inter-service competitions across the disciplines, BAMA has a long history of collaboration with its Royal Navy and Royal Air Force counterparts. Such cooperative relationships are especially relevant in the current climate of increased

United Kingdom: British Army Motorsport Association

pressure upon resources and funding, resulting in participants at all levels having to become more partners and associates, in addition to expanding its membership base, has enabled BAMA to continue to move forward as an organisation. This has further enhanced the positive contributions it makes to the Army and wider Armed Forces through the development and maintenance of transferable skills, ongoing recruitment and retention activities, and so many other enriching endeavours.

4x4 and Navigation Case Study: From Novice to “ROADMASTER”

Motorsport in mid-2024 during the second phase of the RLC Regular Troop Commander Course - cohort

tri-service Defence School of Transport (DST) at

in the package was driver training using Land Rovers, comprising a comprehensive education on essential elements related to operational manoeuvres.

lessons on a range of different terrains. The training culminated with a competitive entry as a Support Vehicle (SV) Navigator for the BAMA ROADMASTER 2024 championship, putting our newfound skills to the test. I have had quite a varied experience with driving and navigation over the years, from participating in recreational karting and attending motor shows in my youth, to travelling across a diverse array of terrain once I was old enough to gain a driving license. There have been a multitude of interesting places that I have been fortunate enough to travel to, each presenting their own complexities for the development of driving and orienteering skills. Be it off-roading in the deserts of Egypt, traversing hazardous Rocky Mountain passes in Montana, or cruising along the French Riviera, there have certainly been a combination of wonderful, yet precarious, moments to add to the memory bank. Such mix of vehicles I’ve had in my possession at one time or another: the current three ‘prides and joy’ being a 1995 Jeep Wrangler, an MR2 Mach 3, and a Harley Davidson Sportster Superlow 1200T. All have been given the esteemed name of ‘Christine,’ in tribute to

that feisty and majestic 1958 Plymouth Fury in the Stephen King novel of the same title.

Getting behind the wheel of a Land Rover during the TCC program, then competing as part of an SV team for ROADMASTER 2024, provided excellent opportunities to learn new things about military driving and further developed one’s skills. In both cases, this especially appealed to a part of my nature which continually seeks out different experiences and tries to push beyond existing limits. I also found the technical aspects fascinating, such as gauging the appropriate level of momentum to wade a Land Rover through a deep body of water which has only steep, muddy banks for entry and exit points. The BAMA 4x4 and Navigation discipline encompasses all such elements and more. Linking back to when the Association’s Land Rovers helped with vehicle recovery at the Scottish Rally in the 1960s, it places critical aptitudes required to achieve success under demanding circumstances (BAMA, 2024). Throughout the year, the four-wheeled teams composed of one Driver and one Navigator, participate in various championship events around the UK, including the multi-task and mixed terrain ROADMASTER at

course, crews must carefully negotiate a series of obstacles. Depending on the nature of the contest, they may also need to identify certain features or

have night driving stages, blind driving challenges, and skill tests. In ROADMASTER 2024, for example, there were several timed stages involving our

Gymkhana challenge.

Many of the 4x4 and Navigation competitions also have an historic element. ROADMASTER, for instance, can trace its roots back to 1977 after the over by the Army School of Transport. Almost two decades later, in 1996. it was made into a triservice facility under the current Defence School of Transport. BAMA became more involved shortly after when, in 2003, it acquired authorisation and funding to directly administer the instruction and examination of military driving students. There was also an agreement which afforded BAMA the

This gave trainees a comprehensive package which enabled the development of driving and navigation skills under circumstances analogous to those they may encounter on operations. The implementation of ROADMASTER as a training exercise was the logical outcome of that, owing to the requirement for crews to self-sustain with limited resources and basic equipment such as maps and compasses. Under the temporary title of British Armed Forces and ROADMASTER ran as an Exercise until 2010 when Army Motorsport was formally recognised.

4x4 and Navigation discipline, and DST took over the administration of driver training (BAMA, 2024; Ministry of Defence, 2010).

and has a wide range of road-based and off-road

features upon which personnel can hone their skills. Over two hundred hectares contain tarmacked areas with roundabouts, physical obstacles, woodland

TCC 95 members were certainly put through their paces by DST. The combined wisdom and expertise of an evidently enthusiastic and dedicated team of instructors helped to make it a challenging yet rewarding experience. Among some of the most notable occasions were learning how to negotiate harsh inclines from either static positions or whilst in motion. This included starting the engine halfway up a steep hill then reversing slowly to the base, as well as moving forward at a 45-degree angle

turn the steering wheel downwards into the slope. We also traversed near-impossible routes through asymmetrical scrubland and deep water that almost came up over the bonnet. With the patience and wisdom of my instructor, I mastered the execution of numerous tasks that had previously been unfamiliar. What I had found particularly helpful were the real-life lessons and anecdotes conveyed from his extensive experience in Motorsport and as a member of BAMA. This provided greater context around the tasks I was undertaking during the training. It also helped me to consider things from different angles, for example, when problems may arise whilst in remote or extreme locations. Some of the key learning points I took away even became useful during ROADMASTER 2024, such as the importance of resourcefulness in getting the best out of a vehicle and appreciating the ground’s potential limitations in supporting a given load.

for TCC 95. Everybody was paired with personnel from the RLC Initial Trade Training (ITT) course, which was also being run by DST around the same time. Forming two-person crews, the teams competed against others from around the Armed Forces in the Truck Class. ITT individuals occupied the SV driver’s seat and their TCC counterparts navigated. It was an all-round good effort by everyone, with the opportunity to apply newly acquired skills whilst also having some fun. I had the good fortune to be teamed-up with a Driver who possessed an exceptional ability to examine the ground and skilfully manoeuvre the SV through some incredibly

ability to remain calm under pressure also shone through after our SV struck a concealed hazard. He applied due diligence both in real-time checks on the vehicle and then monitoring the situation for the remainder of the competition. As Navigator, I had to familiarise myself with the tasks allocated for each stage and guide us through the course. The latter was achieved whilst concurrently monitoring the time and our overall progress. One of the things that surprised me the most about the role was the amount of material that had to be analysed and the high level

this would have been possible without the effective collaboration between Driver and Navigator.

ROADMASTER was not only rewarding, but it was quite eye-opening with regards to the unique

challenges posed to military drivers and wider logistical operations. These experiences highlighted just how essential teamwork, ongoing skill development, and resourcefulness is to the Armed Forces. On a personal level, I am keen to get more involved with BAMA because I am fascinated by motorsport and would like to continue developing my driving and orienteering skills. This would include participating in more 4x4 and Navigation championships, and hopefully also providing event support such as marshalling. All of this, I believe, would enhance my contribution to the Army as both a leader and colleague. As a Troop Commander for a Transport Regiment, for example, I now have a greater understanding of the complexities that drivers and support personnel experience in a multitude of settings. Moreover, convoy exercises undertaken with DST provided some excellent ideas for potentially varying the type of unit training implemented. Entering Green Fleet teams within the 4x4 and Navigation category, for example, would economically incorporate preparation and travel time into routine training provision for personnel. The associated opportunities for team building and boosting morale were also evident. Our convoy drive to a traditional coastal particular favourite. In short, given the multidirectional nature of skill transfer, I believe that providing more opportunities and encouraging personnel to get

units and the wider organisation.

Conclusion

Army Motorsport has come a long way since the early 20th as a sport in 2010, it has grown immeasurably in membership size and the variety of disciplines available. Responsible for the multi-level coordination and advancement of the sport, BAMA has provided opportunities for service personnel to engage in a multitude of ways where they may have otherwise faced barriers to participation. Following on from this, the Association enables competitors and support staff to maximise their capabilities at the group and individual level, through an array of training and other opportunities for developing transferable

are clear, especially in terms of enhancement to military capability and cohesion. Moreover, BAMA’s engagement activities have assisted with the Army’s recruitment and retention endeavours by showing individuals the fantastic offer that accompanies dedicated service. Likewise, the Association’s broad social media reach has helped to promote both the sport and the Army even further. It also boosts morale in celebrating the incredible achievements of both the collective and individuals. For participants and spectators alike, Army Motorsport is a fun and unique activity to be a part of. Replete with extraordinary challenges and rewards, there is never a dull moment. Looking forward, BAMA has an exciting journey ahead as it expands as an organisation and continues to develop its people to a high standard. There is only one direction it can head – that of limitless success.

Endnote

1STEM: Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics.

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The below quote neatly surmises the thrust of this essay – to expound upon and offer comment on the logistical challenges the UK military would face if projection of force into Europe was required.

By Maj S J Milligan RLC

With the illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2022 by Europe has increased. Considering this, the issues surrounding the ability and feasibility of the UK’s logistical force elements to facilitate this, demand investigation. Logistical challenges have beset Russian forces during their campaign in Eastern Ukraine due to the failures within the supply chain writ large2. It behoves all NATO members then, to consider their own ability to sustain and essay will analyse.

This analysis will be restricted to exploring a set of logistical approaches against contemporary social, commercial and environmental challenges in Continental Europe. Firstly, the Logistical challenges to be discussed relate to all of the functions of broader logistics; supply, transport, catering, equipment support, provost support and medical support – whilst not all will be explored in depth, all are in scope for consideration. Secondly, whilst the UK will almost certainly operate in a NATO context if deploying to Europe, the unilateral actions that the UK would take in support of this will be the primary focus. Thirdly, the inference of what second and

explored and assessed where appropriate. Fourthly, form of recommendations for how to ameliorate any logistical weaknesses should they arise. Fifthly, the Russian threat; this peer adversary will be the benchmark in terms of feasibility.

Martin van Creveld’s ‘Considerations of Supply’

Finally, the rubrics which will be utilised for the aforementioned ‘Considerations of Supply’ are the three outlined by the military theorist Martin van Creveld: Forage, Magazines, or Lines of Communications3. These three methods of sustainment are synonymous with what could be considered the ‘nature’ of sustainment were

fashion; that which is ubiquitous and ever applicable. To expound on these three types of sustainment, foraging refers to the local sourcing of supplies, either through purchase, purloining or other means4, and is the original form of sustainment. Magazines are the storage in bulk of stores so that they can be on hand, and is usually the remit of ammunition, however other classes of supplies can be stored in magazines. Lastly the Lines of Communication are primarily transport based, moving materiel from the home base to the front line via sea, road, rail and air5. This essay utilises these as a basis for analysis due to the fundamental nature of the categories: all forms of logistics can be placed in one of these groups.

Cross referencing these with the UK principles of Sustainment of Foresight, Agility, Cooperation, 6, there is broad correlation which offers comment on their utility. Magazines are predicated on detailed foresight, materiel. Forage offers agility in the base principle of lack of reliance on established supply networks and

Finally, Lines of Communications provide simplicity to a Commander due to unity of command, and planning simplicity vice the other two options.

Despite the changes in technology, the British military still operates (and plans to operate) in a blended combination of the three: foraging has become contracting and locally purchasing, the UK plans to have some form of magazine system with the Land Regional Hubs7, including NATO Forward Base Sennelager (NFS), and the conceptual model of the materiel moving from the Joint space, through Divisions and subsequently to Brigades and then Units is par for the course. To combine these all together the pertinent focus area is crystallised: which of these methods (if any) is most optimal for the UK seeking to project, and sustain forces on the European continent? A question which has been pondered innumerate

around the Lüneberg Heath in 1945. Since the invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces, attempts have been made to deliver some, or all of the proposed projected force by NATO primarily as a deterrent, but also to learn logistical lessons. The primary example of this is Ex STEADFAST DEFENDER, codenamed Op LINOTYPER by HQ Field Army (Fd Army) and used interchangeably. This deployment spanned circa six months, in terms of UK forces it saw 7 Brigade, 12 Brigade and 16 Brigade deploy to continental Europe, supported by 104 Theatre Sustainment Brigade (TSB) in their role as the Theatre Enabling Group (TEG), and by 101 Operational Sustainment Brigade (OSB), as well as the Close Support Logistic Regiments within the Combat Brigades themselves. Although having the 8, clear opportunities

existed in terms of distilling a variety of lessons in terms of interoperability, but also of logistical viability from a sovereign nation perspective. As such, references to this deployment will be made throughout as the closest yardstick available.

Congested, Contested, Contracted

supply – foraging – modern armies will not ‘live off the land’ as they might once have done; all supplies would be most likely purchased, and it is manifest the 21st Century method of foraging is synonymous with contracting of services from a Host Nation or Partner Nation and simple purchase of goods and materiel. This has been an ever-increasing trend which began in the latter end of the 20th Century and continues to increase9, and one that the British Army will not likely escape in the near future.

In most theatres where the UK Armed Forces deploy, a number of classes of supply10 are purchased in theatre, either as a one off or via an established enabling contract. Beyond this, an increasing trend is for services to be sought in theatre such as vehicle hire, use of logistical networks and repair. Whilst this has worked for operations other than war, and in bounded geographical areas, Europe is well developed and densely populated – the combination of an abundance of services and goods and everincreasing use of contracts strongly suggests that any deployment by UK forces will seek to do this. This is supported by recent experiences of Op LINOTYPER whereby several services and goods were sourced

armoured vehicles, bottled water, fuel and more.

Analysing this, the aforementioned fact that any war in continental Europe will almost certainly involve NATO, the next conclusion is that other nation’s militaries will be the primary competition for these goods and services. How the UK will navigate dealing with nations that embody Ally, Host Nation, and Competitor remains to be seen –particularly as the key logistical nodes required for establishing the logistic network are likely Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) in the eyes of host nations11 hold the greatest of political capital with Host Nation governments seeking to reassure and protect their

is the assessment that NATO nations deliver logistics in support of each other with a variety of caveats or competing priorities which can “hamstring a 12 which inly speaks of national militaries, let alone the indication that there is “no 13

The second aspect of the use of these key nodes – rail ports, seaports and airports or disembarkation (RPODs, SPODs and APODs respectively) – is the ability to procure the services required. The ability to establish a contract at relatively short notice for what would certainly be a lengthy campaign is highly likely to be contested; this would most probably be ameliorated by NATO coordination by Headquarters such the Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG), however the competition aspect of this would be made ever more complex by the inevitable chaos that a land war in Europe would bring to more benign and less historically military-esque needs; requirement

for low-level enablement equipment such as local phones to breach the gap of Tactical Communications (TacCIS), provision of WiFi to facilitate Operational Communications (OpCIS), hired vehicles for initial intra-Theatre movement and procurement of fresh rations in country would become sought after commodities, and ones not necessarily available 14. More

pertinently, this contractual solution would likely be sought for the provision of key capabilities, such as the use of rail heads, power units and railway stock, much of it specialist and therefore unsuitable for military needs. This is an ever-increasing trend within many continental European nations, which ultimately leads to friends and allies competing for

Whilst crudely expressed as the military who possess the largest cheque book would have the greatest logistical freedom, the agency of these service providers cannot be underestimated, and Adam’s Smith’s invisible hand15 would be present no matter how peaceful or contested a given country would be. Early mitigation of this could take the form of establishment of contracts with contingency in mind, however this would mean commitment potential scenarios, a policy that central government has shown some hesitancy in underwriting. Alternatively, further work into the wider NATO coordination (and sub-Article V coordination) could resolve these potential issues through wargaming and contingency planning.

Synthesising these together, it is manifest that the friction experienced in war is not, in this case, limited to the front-line; but the complex system of systems that is logistics becomes further disconnected when agents and stakeholders outside the immediate control and leverage of UK sovereign assets are inserted in the mix – this is a blessing and a curse; such a broad system brings innumerate options for

of those services likely to be either congested, contested or to be contracted becomes beholden on UK sovereign Combat Service Support (CSS) leaders to resolve or plan against. This argument is neatly summarised by the Chief of the Defence Staff during his annual lecture to RUSI, in which he speaks of rd parties who would provide such goods and services16

The Magazine Approach

The second of Van Creveld’s methods of sustainment is the magazine approach, the forward placement of stock likely to be used, conveniently placed close to the it mitigates against the well documented phenomenon of the loss of strength gradient; the proposition that the further forces are from their strategic base, the less military mass (and therefore effect) they will be able to bring to bear17. Building these stockpiles extends this line further, with the ultimate outcome of being able to have effect more quickly, especially as it is quicker to move people in effective mass than equipment and high volumes of stock.

A primary detraction from this approach as what initially appears optimal, is that this approach requires forces and governments to spend resource could be argued that the UK is attempting to take this approach with Land Regional Hubs (LRH). Placed in the regions of the world as a “platform for regional 18 to utilise the hubs as magazines for projection, and reducing the loss of strength. As noted above, one of these hubs is Sennelager – utilised for a variety of logistical reasons during Ex STEADFAST DEFENDER 24; indeed, 104 TSB force elements were based in Normandy Barracks for the whole duration of the exercise, and staged forces both outbound from, and inbound to the UK19

To follow this logic, the next pertinent question revolves around what is optimal to place in such a magazine – whether large equipment, broad materiel are best to place in such pre-positioned hubs. Initial assessment suggests that vehicles are best to place

with speed, and often the most technically complex. The counter to this argument however is that these require a large number of personnel to support and resource such a course of action following reductions cannot countenance vehicles being permanently based elsewhere when primacy for vehicle use is for Operational commitments and training of individuals20

Apropos this decline in capability, the placement of readiness timelines, and to have effect more quickly than deployment from the home-base. This could be linked to the operators and maintainers of any vehicles and equipment sent further forward but will further decline from the moral component; with personnel across Defence report more and more time on deployment and struggling to maintain a work/life balance21, ultimately affecting retention. A clear solution would be the forward placement of a core of logistical personnel forward, which with an established trickle posting system would be able to mitigate the worse of the associated negative, whilst providing the expertise on the far-bank to deliver sovereign enablement from the start.

Following this, materiel can be placed within a Magazine… Not just ammunition but all the classes of supply. Noting the likely inability to be able to contract services and goods as outlined above, the obvious candidate is that which would have been

Primary Bulk Fuel Installation (PBFI) established in Sennelager in support of Op LINOTYPER (2024)

contracted; providing a temporal buffer for that which is challenging to secure in a Host Nation – food and water, fuel and consumables – and these require little to no maintenance except fuel. This fact has been accepted, yet there is no coherent and cogent proposal to deliver the ability to sustain forces across a global network, and those that exist need to be heavily invested in and expanded.22 Finally from the position of placing stock forward, ammunition is one commodity which would arguably have the most utility in being placed forward as it is so intricately linked to delivery of effect. The key issue with this however, is twofold:

terms of maintenance and special handling. Secondly, and most pertinently, strategic UK stocks have been reported as ‘dangerously low’ following support to the Ukrainian Army23. To summarise these arguments, there will always be a trade-off between stockpiling and stock production, with the key factors being the ability to increase production and distribution in pace

In contrast, building stockpiles requires the UK to divest resource now, without guarantee of tangible in a magazine will vary in cost, and the last cost to be explored is the creation and capability of new magazine infrastructure. Use of Sennelager by the UK is optimal from a UK perspective as the costs have already been sunk. The issue revolves around any given magazine possessing a degree of permanency;

no NATO country can use as a yardstick noting Russia’s ‘shaping operations’ in its periphery.24 A classic example of this would be to invest people and materiel into Germany and Poland, only for Russia to site its main thrust in the high north of Scandinavia; a modern day logistical Maginot line which is more

Drawing these disparate strands together, the two pertinent questions for the forward loading of materiel becomes both what and where. These cannot be viewed in isolation as there is a degree of correlation between the two, and there is no primacy between them. The broad principles which underpin the magazine approach still hold true; essentially that of the loss of strength gradient. In terms of the projection of UK force, any location and type of materiel will satisfy this principle; however the degree to which is does can be variable. Ultimately, for the UK CSS network, the recommendation to invest in the magazine approach writ large is a sound argument from a logistic perspective, with investment in existing infrastructure in Germany being viewed as optimal due to threats to Defence budgets25, and with Combat Supplies (CSups – Class I, III & V) being the obvious choice due to the direct impact on the ability of combat forces to be sustained. Following the principle of the magazine approach will have

tempo of initial reaction, and lays foundations for the capacity of the logistic network as a function of the loss of strength gradient.

Planes, Trains and Automobiles

During the initial support given by the UK to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) in early 2022, the preferred method of delivery of heavy vehicles

and bulk items was via rail, a method of transport which the UK (and NATO) has not invested in over several decades.26 This is pertinent as this essay

of Communications (LoCs). These themselves are in four categories of Ground (i.e. Road), Sea, Air and

is counter to that which is found within the magazine approach – namely that a given nation does not need

Turning to the merits of each of the methods, the comparison is framed in crude terms of speed and capacity, rubrics which are often competing, and the 27 Sea offers mass as a function of capacity, yet burdened by relatively slow transit, with Air being the fastest, yet offering little in terms of mass relative to sea. Rail is second to both of these in terms of speed and mass, yet is the least invested in, with road being the poorest performing in any category less cost. To aid in establishing benchmarks, a single Roll-On, Roll-Off (RORO) ship can take approximately two Armoured Battlegroups in a single go, however it will take approximately three days to reach eastern Poland. By contrast, a C-17 can reach Poland in less than four hours but can only take about two Armoured Vehicles. The answer is manifest, and well established – use of sea for heavy equipment, air for people.

Reducing this logic to core tenets, the natural choice is to opt for rail to move UK military capability to mainland Europe, however there remains only one rail link to the continent via the Channel Tunnel; Sea and Air must be a link in the Coupling Bridge for an island nation-state such as the UK. As such, the increase in friction points which comes from transhipment from one mode of transport to another implies using a single mode of transport, noting Ground Lines of

of a Supply Chain. Examples of this were experienced on Ex STEADFAST DEFENDER, whereby vehicles and main equipment (VaME) from 12 Armoured Brigade were moved by sea to Emden, civilian line-hauled to

assembly areas; adding time and adding friction to a NATO plan which is predicated on timeliness.

7 Light Brigade vehicles in Gdansk ahead of their redeployment from Op LINOTYPER (2024)

It can be seen then that the second order effect of these limitations is on the military concept of ‘Notice to Effect’ (NTE), and more nebulously, readiness timelines. This is then compounded by bureaucratic barriers outside of the military sphere, which again impacts on the speed in which a given force can respond to any crises.28 Detractions from LoCs as an answer to the problem of sustainment, point to the vulnerability to adverse forces – a logarithmic function which increases in correlation with the distance covered. This neatly blends with Boulding’s argument postulated above, and perhaps adds a third axis; one which could be considered as strength, distance and vulnerability. Further to this, adverse effects may not just come from adversaries, but any contesting of resources from Host Nations or regional players will be compounded by the aforementioned loss of strength.29

emerges, and one that would likely make the political aspects of state spending more palatable to the UK

UK owns the assets to deliver strategic movement

freedom in planning and execution at the sovereign national level, something that may offer comfort to the UK Government as it has previously allowed a demonstration of political intent, most notably in support of Ukraine30. A critique of this argument

and low numbers deemed taskworthy – a fact noted by Defence Procurement with recent and planned 31; however, a detailed logistical estimate would need to be conducted to ascertain any dent on logistical viability.

Looking at the LoCs holistically, the merits reside primarily in the political sphere as it is more likely to be attractive to any given electorate, but some of the UK capability is lacking when viewed through the prism of time-to-effect. The current model is one of regional readiness, as part of the wider NATO plan32. This seems to imply that, to paraphrase Plato’s Cave allegory; the nose causes the tail; in this case, pre-positioned forces are then followed by LoCs. This serves both purposes and ameliorates some of the weaknesses of both. Ultimately, the key facets

of LoCs is the relative low cost (pre-deployment) compared to other logistic approaches, and its broad – there are no serious restrictions in survivability, and tempo and capacity build in line with the campaign.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The ultimate question, using van Creveld’s three considerations of supply, is which is the most optimal to assist the projection of force into Continental Europe by the UK? An initial assessment might conclude that they are mutually exclusive, however, this may not always be the case. Another temptation might be to view this as solely a logistical issue – it must be remembered that logistics exists only to serve strategy and by extension, political intent.33 The clearest example of this, as outlined above, is one of readiness and notice-to-effect – the speed at which this is to be done is not a logistical computation, but a political gambit.

To return to mutual exclusivity, as mentioned above; blended solutions can be sought – foraging (local resourcing) for materiel in the early stages of a campaign for example can increase the capability ahead of the establishment of LoCs if available in an appropriate magazine. This mitigates against the weaknesses of each approach and is a wellestablished method of logistical support. Re-shifting to strategy; any desire to amend the UK’s approach to sovereign logistic support is the remit of planners at the Defence and Governmental level – CSS formations can recommend, but must support directed intent, basing them in broad terms for better or worse.34

be recommended by such CSS formations are expounded below, noting that the key aspects of each of the three methods of supply can be framed in terms of capacity, speed, cost and survivability; there is variability within each, but broadly each of the methods offer logistical force elements an advantage of one or two of the rubrics when compared in a clear manner.

predicated on the capacity and tempo that is offered,

12 Armoured Brigade vehicles deploying to Poland via Rail (2024)

Figure 2: Assessment of relative strengths and weaknesses of van Creveld’s Three Methods of Supply.

primarily in the initial stages of a campaign, or crisis reaction. As mentioned above, this is contingent on

this can be framed as CSups, but the context of the assumed campaign will dictate additional capability for exponential effect.

Outlined previously, foraging offers only agility

establishment of the LoCs, noting the challenges of competition for contractual services, but provides a layer of survivability when viewed through the lens of host nations and a wider NATO context, but still one that presents risks. This method also provides further

negating any risk that emerge from not knowing the

term, and the political goodwill that follows, as the

in the long term, they have the ability to grow in terms so offers arguably exponential delivery of logistical campaign, ameliorated partially by NATO structures.35 This opportunity for growth will also come with a high cost to the UK – resource which may be better spent elsewhere such as the industrial base.

Distilling these for the base principles, it is manifest that the decision is one based on the topographical and the temporal. Each option offers differing outcomes in terms of alacrity, based primarily on

Given the two optimal factors for tempo are the Magazine Approach in the short term, switching to LoCs as the campaign evolves, the clear conclusion is so as to facilitate the growth of the logistical network as the sum of all LoCs.

Based on this bespoke analysis, the following recommendations offer solutions which could potentially build resilience into UK mobilisation and sustainment operations:

1. Increase capacity within NATO Forward Base Sennelager (NFS) as an already established magazine operated by the UK, with focus on development it as a staging area for people, equipment and materiel. It also is broadly central within NATO’s Area of Operations noting the lack

To further add value, a Logistical Unit or Formation should be permanently assigned to NFS to facilitate projection of force.

2. Key focus areas for NATO engagement are the ability to guarantee Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) in a given crisis, and provision of low level services. Particular attention should be given to RPODs and SPODs within the likely AO.

3. Detailed logistic assumptions should be developed on the availability of Contractual Services and Goods within nations, offering a realistic appraisal of likely availability of capability, providing base

emphasis on the provision of contractual Heavy Lift (including rail) and Fuel purchasing should be prioritised.

4. It is recommended that the focus for materiel to store in magazines (namely NFS) is vehicles, ammunition and vehicle spares, as the key logistical drivers within combat force elements. To conclude, the considerations of supply for the UK projecting force into Europe are clear: some investment in the method of supply, as base principles can help in the development of likely campaign plans. These are being considered at the NATO level36, but it behoves the UK to consider its part of the wider plan, noting that there remains a responsibility to deliver some sovereign aspects – brought particularly into focus on the recent Ex STEADFAST DEFENDER / Op LINOTYPER activity in early 2024. This essay has argued that a logistical foothold on the continent –

the UK projecting into Europe in the early stages of a campaign to counter Russian threats, and beyond.

Endnotes

1 On War, Translated by J.J. Graham (London,

2Bradley, Martin & Barnett, Sean and McCarthy, Dean; “Russian RAND Corporation, 2023, p.12.

3 Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), Ch 1.

4Heintzelmann, Scott; “Operational Reach: Is Current Army Doctrine School of Advanced Military Studies, (2003), p.23.

5Van Creveld, Supplying War, Ch 1.

6 Army Doctrine Publications (ADP) Land Operations Part 6: Sustainment pp.1 – 7.

7 UK Defence Journal, (2021).

8 NATO Website, (2024).

9 RUSI Journal, 145 (5), (2000).

10

11

National Cyber Security Centre.

12 US Army Website, (2020).

13 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), (2023) p 4.

14 Consilium, (2023).

15 The Theory of Moral Sentiments

16

17

UK Government website [transcript], (2024).

18 British Army, 2021.

19 British Army Website, last updated 14 Mar 2024.

20 UK Land Power, (2023).

21 UK Government, (2023) p.14.

22 Logistics 2023) p.20.

23 ivision returns to Germany Financial Times

24 Strategic Studies Institute, (US

25 The Guardian, (13 Mar 2023).

26 European Research Studies Journal, (Mar 2021).

27Carter, Mike; “Using the Gap Reduction Model to analyze Military Army Sustainment Magazine, (Feb 2014).

28 Moving Out: A Comprehensive Assessment of European Military Mobility,

29 Buying Time: Logistics for a New American Way of War 2023).

30 UK in a Changing Europe, (24 Feb 2023).

31 , UK Defence Journal, (03 Feb 2024).

32 Foreign Policy, (13 Jul 2023).

33 Naval War College Review

34 Defense, p.77.

35van Creveld, Supplying War, Ch 1.

36

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[Accessed 04 Dec 2024].

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Zeimpekis, V (Ed); Military Logistics: Research Advances and Future Trends

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Since the invention of nuclear weapons, more and more countries have developed their nuclear capabilities. Capt Michael Gaughan RA examines strategies to curb the nuclear ambitions of emerging countries that pose an acute threat to the West

According to the World Nuclear Association, there are now around 30 countries interested in, planning, or starting nuclear programs.1 With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, military exchanges between Israel and Iran, North Korean ballistic missile trials, and Chinese projection into the South China Sea, the global nuclear geopolitical environment is extremely fragile. To narrow the scope, this essay will focus on the emerging countries that pose an acute threat to Western powers, namely North Korea, and Iran. The challenges these states pose in particular are that of undermining regional and global security, internal political instability, susceptibility to

values, and impacting on the progress made in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the last few decades, Western nations have become increasingly concerned about the emergence of authoritarian regimes developing nuclear technologies.

E countries developing capabilities in either atomic energy production or weapons, and in this essay those practices are used synonymously with the term ‘nuclear proliferation.’ The term ‘international community’ refers to all countries interested in nuclear proliferation, but with a greater emphasis on states that are already nuclear powers. To manage emerging nuclear powers, the international community should assume a multifaceted approach by focusing on diplomacy, non-proliferation, regional cooperation, and proliferation prevention by addressing the nuclear fuel cycle. All of which are areas that will be analysed in more detail. Although

nuclear deterrence is widely acknowledged as a key area of discussion when analysing the role of the international community in managing emerging nuclear powers, it is outside the scope of this essay. Diplomatic channels remain an important part of managing emerging nuclear powers. They provide a space for open communication and dialogue to prevent escalation or misunderstandings that could lead to a military reaction. They are the primary tool for establishing non-proliferation treaties and other agreements which aim to limit the development of nuclear weapons. There are also international organisations that can provide a forum for diplomacy, impose sanctions, authorise military intervention, and conduct inspections to ensure compliance. The two main organisations are the United Nations (UN) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since 2006 the UN Security Council has adopted seven resolutions against Iranian2 and nine against North Korean3 nuclear programs. The UN resolutions and diplomatic efforts appear to be working with Iran, however, recent military strikes by Israel inside Iranian territory have raised concerns of a change in Iranian doctrine from their ‘peaceful’ nuclear program.4 A clear example of successful diplomatic nuclear engagement was during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Diplomacy enabled the two countries to resolve their 5

In June 2019, US President Donald Trump visited North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un in an attempt to stop their development of nuclear weapons. Trump stated the US would cease military exercises in South Korea and that North Korea is no longer a nuclear threat.6 Despite this, since the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022, these diplomatic ties appear to be degraded by the Russian withdrawal from the New START Treaty in June 2023.7 Furthermore, regardless of Trump’s diplomatic efforts and UN sanctions, as of January 2024, North Korea still had approximately 50 nuclear warheads,8 limitations of diplomacy.

Other methods the international community can use to manage emerging nuclear powers is the better utilisation of the NPT, means to conduct inspections, promote peaceful resolutions, and adopt sanctions or incentives. Established in the 1970s, the NPT intends to set the standard at which countries can access peaceful nuclear technologies and instructs nuclear weapons states to make steps toward disarmament.9 The effectiveness of the NPT has weakened in recent

decades. Despite being a signatory of the Treaty and receiving sanctions relief in 2015 to limit their nuclear program, Iran has prevented the IAEA (since February 2021) from conducting inspections at several sites and has expanded uranium enrichment to 60%.10 Furthermore, North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003, four nuclear powers remain non-signatories and Russia has prevented IAEA inspectors enter parts of the occupied Zaporizhzhia power plant. The IAEA is meant to be the leading organisation to

but with an increasing number of nuclear facilities worldwide, the IAEA’s budget is a key constraint to conducting inspections.11 Therefore, reform of the NPT and IAEA is required. The international community should develop more effective ways to tackle non-compliance, strengthen the means to enforce the provisions of the NPT and provide the IAEA with the resources required to effectively carry out its role independently. This will help to promote international cooperation and address the challenges of nuclear proliferation amongst emerging powers. Fundamental reasons that drive emerging powers to proliferate nuclear weapons are the international community’s failures to address root causes and underlying concerns. Regional rivalries, perceived threats, or domestic political pressures are some examples of these. To combat these issues, the establishment of regional security frameworks is essential to facilitate dialogue between regional actors and build trust. An example of a regional security framework is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) consisting of 27 member states. The ARF’s objectives are to foster dialogue around political and security issues

preventative diplomacy in the region.12 This includes work on non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear technology, and disarmament.13 Although there are forums similar to the ARF in the Middle East, the complex geopolitical landscape has limited the effectiveness of these forums in that region. Also, due

of nuclear proliferation in the region, a Helsinki-style accord for the Middle East has been posed as an idea, “to develop norms for regional conduct and

14 These illustrate how a regional forum and addressing root causes can contribute to a more stable environment for managing emerging nuclear powers, but until the entrenched geopolitical issues

for dialogue to take place.

Outside of treaties and diplomacy, another option for a concerted effort by the international community to prevent the proliferation of nuclear material is by addressing the nuclear fuel cycle. The NPT and IAEA implement safeguards to ensure international cooperation in nuclear fuel cycle management so that nuclear materials are used peacefully and responsibly.15 An initiative proposed in 2006 was the establishment of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel banks to ensure nuclear fuel supply to IAEA member states in the event they are unable to source the fuel on the commercial market.16 This idea could be expanded to help reduce the risk of countries seeking to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium on their own. By placing these LEU banks in strategic sites globally

source of nuclear fuel. Additionally, the promotion of alternative energy sources could also help to reduce the reliance on nuclear power and alleviate the risks connected to the nuclear fuel cycle. Renewable energy sources like wind, solar, and hydropower are the most common, with countries like the UK producing 41.1% of their energy in 2023 from renewable sources.17 However, these sources are constrained by geographical location, technological advancements, economic considerations, and environmental impacts. It is also argued that nuclear energy is safer and cleaner than renewable sources.18 By addressing the nuclear fuel cycle effectively, the international community can reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation whilst promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

To summarise how the international community should manage emerging nuclear powers in an environment of global geopolitical instability, this essay has examined diplomacy, non-proliferation, regional cooperation, and proliferation prevention by addressing the nuclear fuel cycle. Diplomatic channels remain the primary means to prevent escalation or misunderstandings that could lead to a military reaction and for establishing nonproliferation treaties and other agreements to limit the development of nuclear weapons. The establishment of regional forums can facilitate dialogue between regional actors and build trust but requires localised geopolitical issues and

effectively. The NPT and IAEA are essential to set international standards regarding nuclear safety and proliferation. They enable the conduct of inspections, promote peaceful resolutions, and adopt sanctions

or incentives. However, their lack of effectiveness due to IAEA budget constraints and the ability of the international community to tackle non-compliance means major reform is needed. Other initiatives explored were the establishment of LEU fuel banks and alternative energy sources. These would provide and energy, therefore, reducing the risk of countries seeking to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium on their own. All of the areas discussed emphasise the importance of a comprehensive and collaborative approach. The potential consequences of failing to manage emerging nuclear powers could lead to authoritarian regimes to act with impunity, protected by the threat of nuclear war should anyone intervene. The management of emerging nuclear powers calls for a sustained international effort and commitment to ensure global peace and security.

Endnotes

1 Association. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country. (Accessed 23/08/24).

2 Iran (Last Reviewed October 2023). https://www.armscontrol.org/ factsheets/un-security-council-resolutions-iran#:~:text=When%20 Iran%20and%20the%20P5,missile%20activities%20and%20 arms%20sales (Accessed 23/08/24).

3 https://www. armscontrol.org/factsheets/un-security-council-resolutions-northkorea (Accessed 23/08/24).

4 Iran warns it will change nuclear doctrine if ‘existence threatened’. https://www. doctrine-if-existence-threatened (Accessed 23/08/24).

5Gottemoeller, Rose (Spring 2023). https:// repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstreams/6ff17dda-d947-469784c2-2c946f4a7bc3/download (Accessed 23/08/24).

6 Armed and dangerous. When dictators get the bomb. Links to an external site. Foreign Affairs, 97(6), 35–43. (Accessed 23/08/24).

7 https://www.state.gov/new-start/ (Accessed 23/08/24).

8Arms Control Association, Last Reviewed June 2024. Arms https://www. armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-control-and-proliferationestimated%20to,pace%20of%20ballistic%20missile%20testing (Accessed 23/08/24).

9 wake-up call for global security. https://www.chathamhouse. org/2023/10/why-stalling-npt-wake-call-global-security (Accessed 23/08/24).

10Claire Mills, 24 April 2024. What is the status of the Iran nuclear deal? cbp-9870/ (Accessed 23/08/24).

11Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4 Apr 2019. https://www.iaea. (Accessed 23/08/24).

12 https://aseanregionalforum. asean.org/about-arf/ (Accessed 23/08/24).

13 Community. https://asean.org/our-communities/asean-politicalsecurity-community/peaceful-secure-and-stable-region/nonproliferation-and-disarmament/ (Accessed 24/08/24).

14Dalia Dassa Kaye, 1 September 22. Fellow, Burkle Center for International Relations, University of California, Los Angeles A cooperative security in a changing region. https://kalam. chathamhouse.org/articles/a-helsinki-process-for-the-middlechanging-region/ (Accessed 23/08/24).

15

https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/

non-proliferation/safeguards-to-prevent-nuclear-proliferation (Accessed 23/08/24).

16 https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2015-10/ features/atoms-peace-iaea-nuclear-fuel-bank#note3 (Accessed 23/08/24).

17Electricity Explained, 9 Jan 2024. Britain’s Electricity Explained: 2023 Review. https://www.nationalgrideso.com/news/britainselectricity-explained-2023-review (Accessed 23/08/24).

18 cleanest sources of energy? https://ourworldindata.org/safestsources-of-energy (Accessed 23/08/24).

Bibliography

https://aseanregionalforum. asean.org/about-arf/ Iran warns it will change nuclear doctrine if ‘existence threatened’. https://www. nuclear-doctrine-if-existence-threatened on Iran (Last Reviewed October 2023). https://www. armscontrol.org/factsheets/un-security-council-resolutionsiran#:~:text=When%20Iran%20and%20the%20P5,missile%20 activities%20and%20arms%20sales

https://www. armscontrol.org/factsheets/un-security-council-resolutionsnorth-korea

Arms Control Association, Last Reviewed June 2024. Arms https://www. armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-control-and-proliferationestimated%20to,pace%20of%20ballistic%20missile%20testing Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4 Apr 2019. https://www.iaea.org/ Claire Mills, 24 April 2024. What is the status of the Iran nuclear deal? cbp-9870/

Dalia Dassa Kaye, 1 September 22. Fellow, Burkle Center for International Relations, University of California, Los Angeles https:// kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/a-helsinki-process-forsecurity-in-a-changing-region/

https://diversedaily.com/nuclear-nonproliferation-treaty-npt-preventing-the-spread-of-nuclearweapons-and-promoting-peaceful-use-of-nuclear-energy/ wake-up call for global security. https://www.chathamhouse. org/2023/10/why-stalling-npt-wake-call-global-security Association. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/ Electricity Explained, 9 Jan 2024. Britain’s Electricity Explained: 2023 Review. https://www.nationalgrideso.com/news/britainselectricity-explained-2023-review

Gottemoeller, Rose (Spring 2023).

https:// repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstreams/6ff17dda-d947-469784c2-2c946f4a7bc3/download

cleanest sources of energy? https://ourworldindata.org/safestsources-of-energy

Inspectors denied access to parts of Ukraine nuclear plant – IAEA. https://www.reuters.com/world/ europe/iaea-says-denied-access-parts-russia-controlledpower-station-2024-01-03/ https://www.state.gov/new-start/ Community. https://asean.org/our-communities/aseanpolitical-security-community/peaceful-secure-and-stableregion/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/ Armed and dangerous. When dictators get the bomb.Links to an external site. Foreign Affairs, 97(6), 35–43. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2015-10/ features/atoms-peace-iaea-nuclear-fuel-bank#note3

https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/ non-proliferation/safeguards-to-prevent-nuclear-proliferation

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Capt Aiden Welch, R IRISH looks at why the advancement in AI and RAS technologies are both an opportunity and threat to the West

(AI) have thrown a long-pursued programme of technological development into the public eye. This paper will explore how warfare since the end of World War II has been shaped by avoiding

Development of more advanced and accurate weapons designed to deliver decisive blows and prevent military response, or public outrage has been key to this. This paper will present that the advancement in AI offers both opportunity and threat to the West: the opportunity for ever more calculated strikes with minimised offensive

harm’s way, contradicted by the risk of rapid and ungoverned proliferation of AI or Robotics and Autonomous System (RAS) which challenge international norms. As this paper will go on to discuss, although there is a huge amount of literature on this topic there is very little consensus,

For now, AI will refer to large language model systems that are able to judiciously process huge quantities of information and produce logical analysis, conclusions, or patterns and RAS networks are automated systems that can operate without a conclude that AI and RAS networks will not shape

development of the global race to reduce the scale of warfare by preventing an aggressor’s attack and achieving strategic aims through sub-threshold activity.

by this technology is understanding how future has been a drive to reduce the scale of warfare by achieving decisive victory quickly. Freedman argues that this drives belligerents to put a premium on 2017) and now, more than ever, states must gamble everything on the initial strike. Whether nuclear armed or not, a state can assume a devastating response if their initial blow does not land. Therefore, synthesis of information and intelligence which enables a state to decide when and where they must attack, to prevent their adversary from striking, is paramount (Jensen, et al., 2022). Further to this is the ability for a state to achieve its strategic objectives (GZC)1. The NATO perspective on this has centred on the use of information exploitation and collaboration with allies or international partners to counter the threat of adversaries (Weissmann, et al., 2021). From a Clausewitzian perspective this paper posits that the

focused on pressurising adversaries without crossing

Information exploitation and military intelligence

strike. The idea of Battle Networks which brings data from multiple sensors across the battle space for analyses and facilitates actionable intelligence, offers a state better situational awareness (SA) and has been understood since WWII (Watts, 2007). The ability for a state to achieve this at a higher tempo them to make quicker, more informed decisions which can enable their decisive blow to have greater effect on their enemy and prevent any decisive attack on themselves… As such, this is a key area where AI presents opportunity. The British Army uses eight principles of intelligence2 (MOD, 2018), and in at least two of these principles AI offers a leap forward in processing capability (Continuous Review and Timeliness). In every race to produce useable/

Credit: Pixabay

timely intelligence the key limitation is the amount of analysis available – AI has the possibility to driven continuous analysis to an AI driven system. In the speed at which intelligence can become available for leaders to make decisions can be undertaken concurrently, giving the strategic advantage of early warning and better SA. Furthermore, there is opportunity in the development of Autonomous Systems to keep limit civilian casualties. This concept conforms to the thinking outlined at the start of this paper, which is casualties. In early March 2022 a 64km long Russian supply convoy heading for Kyiv stopped and was left vulnerable to Ukrainian direct and indirect attacks for many days (The Economist, 2022). By the end of the month the Pentagon released information which indicated that the convoy ‘no longer existed,’ suggesting it had dispersed or been destroyed. The inescapable fact is that while the convoy’s placement was left vulnerable to the human factor of the drivers and commanders on the ground. Were this a supply convoy of uncrewed RAS vehicles, the convoy may have been much more able to sustain bombardment and continue with its mission while freeing up vital combat power for operations in different areas rather

and thus avoid the catastrophic consequences involved, has also driven a behaviour in contemporary

can substitute traditional military aggression with ambiguous actions in pursuit of similar strategic objectives through integrated campaigns without the use of overt military force (Krishnan, 2022). In the right circumstances, RAS can be debated as not being overt military force and therefore are well suited to GZC. In 2019 David Strachan warned the US Navy must prepare for autonomous undersea

on a futuristic concept of undersea warfare that employed “kinetic and non-kinetic means to disrupt, point that the possibility of an uncrewed vehicle or robot disrupting undersea infrastructure could be overwhelming even for a state as powerful as the US as the technology already exists. Should a pattern of using autonomous systems as deniable assets in GZC without a decisive military response emerge, states will begin to face an entirely new and dangerous threat vector that can be utilised by any actor with access to the technology and hence is a growing risk

As with any development that offers the potential from the international community. Likewise, as is often the case with rapid technological development, it offers the potential to outpace the legislative control and governance currently in place. This presents two risks: 1) uncontrolled development of AI and RAS and 2) ungoverned proliferation descending the international community into an arms race (Garcia, 2018). These risks are deemed so dangerous that

Garcia presents an argument that they should be banned entirely and highlights precedent to do so (e.g. laser blinding weapons banned internationally whilst still in development ). However, despite this precedent, it is unlikely that there is any possibility of a ban on future AI and RAS weapons development. Instead, the international community should strive for Minimally-Just AI Weapons (Scholz & Galliott, 2021) – trusted with ethical decisions within tight parameters, rather than highly complex ‘algorithmic morality’ which has a higher chance of failure and introduces the probability of fatal errors. Moreover, is the legal responsibility under the Geneva Convention3 for governance of AI weaponisation. The path to international agreement however is not clear and is therefore unlikely to draw a line irrefutably. But the importance of governance now cannot be and binding agreement. The international community should base regulation, at least for now, on the foundations of International Human Rights (IHR) (Almeida, et al., 2023). Even a basic international agreement on the development of AI weapons, in accordance with IHR, would alleviate international concern about uncontrolled proliferation and set the foundations for more robust agreements in the future,

In conclusion, AI and RAS networks will not shape

towards a less binary state of war and peace into a complex spectrum of grey zone competition. The development of AI and RAS weapons is an inevitable evolution of the intent to reduce the scale of warfare while continuing to achieve strategic means through sub-threshold activity. Whilst the international community should welcome these changes as an opportunity to prevent the likelihood of largescale warfare, it should be recognised that international governance on the development of the technology is key to Western security. Should the West continue to linger on regulation, the greater the chance of uncontrolled proliferation and subsequent arms races beyond which international diplomacy can offer

At the outset of this research paper my initial hypothesis was that AI and RAS networks would be My thinking was based on an understanding of the impact that AI and RAS will have to everyday life and for its military applications, which are vast. I with my hypothesis. However, on reading Will 2022). I began to notice that while there were many no real indication of how it would directly shape it in a different direction. This led me to widen my reading to the changing character of war more broadly and Freedman’s work on the Future of War (Freedman, 2017). Here it became clear that the AI but because of the devastating repercussions of WWII and the interconnected nature of the world reduced, but states still have strategic objectives that are at odds with one another. Therefore, this leads to states exploring new ways in which to achieve those strategic aims without engaging in armed

draw a new hypothesis that AI and RAS networks were not shaping war on their own, but they were being shaped since the end of WWII.

I was surprised to read of the number of scholars who advocate banning AI weapons due to fear that the developments could lead to more damaging weapons of mass destruction. (Garcia, 2018) (Scholz & Galliott, 2021). However, compelling the arguments and whatever precedent already exists, I differ from their assertion that this technology should be restricted internationally. I agree that international governance is important and global cooperation such as the AI Safety Summit in the UK (UK Government, 2023) is a step in the right direction toward ethical development, but I disagree that any practical ban

on the development of this technology in weapon systems would be achievable or enforceable in any credible sense. If the West focused its efforts in pursuit of unilateral AI weapons preclusion it will ultimately fail and leave itself vulnerable to other actors who have embraced the technology.

Endnotes 1

2Principles of Intelligence: Centralised Control; Responsiveness; Objectivity; Systematic; Source Protection; Continuous Review;

3Article 36 of the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions: “In the study, development, acquisition or adoption

Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to

Bibliography

Almeida, V., Mendes, L. S. & Doneda, D., 2023. On the Development of AI Governance Frameworks. IEEE Internet Computing , 27(1), pp. 70-74.

The future of war; a history. London: Penguin Book, pp. 277-287.

Future of International Peace and Security. International studies review, 20(2), pp. 334-341.

Change War?. In: Information in War : Military Innovation, Battle Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, pp. 1-22.

Journal of Strategic Security, 15(4), pp. 14-31.

MOD, 2018.

Minimally-Just AI in Weapons. In: J. Galliott & D. Macintosh, eds. Lethal autonomous weapons : re-examining the law and ethics of robotic warfare. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 57-72. Ocen News & Technology, Issue Oct, p. 44.

stalled north of Kyiv. The Economist, 04 03. UK Government, 2023. AI Safety Summit. [Online] Available at: https://www.aisafetysummit.gov.uk/[Accessed 27 02 2024].

Watts, B. D., 2007. Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and Prospects, Washington : Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

2021. International Relations.

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This essay was originally submitted as part of the King’s College London Initiative, sponsored by Mr Alan Ross

Introduction

named OpenAI published a ‘low key research preview’ titled ChatGPT which became the fastest growing software application in history, reaching over 100 million users in a month (Porter, 2023).

(‘AI’) functionality has been debated, its rapid growth has transformed the technology industry with leaders Google, Microsoft, and Meta dramatically reorientating their strategies to adapt to an AI enabled world (Weise et al., 2023). As the impact of AI expands more broadly, this dizzying pace

specialists and non-specialists alike to understand the implications of the increasing rate of innovation. AI technology is notable because it has the ability of information processing, analysis and decision making by reducing or eliminating human cognitive constraints (Kurzweil, 2024, pp. 22–38). Importantly, AI is a general-purpose technology that can cascade effects via other systems, such as economic, political, and technological, which can result in non-linear outcomes, potentially in orders of magnitude greater than the inputs (Brynjolfsson and Mcafee, 2017).

potential to dramatically change the character of war in unexpected ways, impacting the relative military power of nations and possibly challenging the

existing order (Jensen, Whyte and Cuomo, 2020, pp. 532–533) as has been witnessed in previous military technological transitions (McNeill, 1983, pp. 79–81; Horowitz, 2010, pp. 2–3).

level of interest around AI, but as important as the technological elements of innovation are, the operational, organisational, doctrinal, and training aspects – ‘how’ you use a technology - is often itself (Knox and Murray, 2001, p. 180). Andrew

Net Assessment (‘ONA’), summarised the importance of AI utility where: “The most important thing that we can focus on in the next several years is the investigation of, and experimentation with, novel concepts of operation and new organisations to exploit the technologies available now and likely to

p. 20). Sadly, this essay does not purport to have a ‘silver bullet’ for how to optimise Command & Control

examination will contrast the capabilities and impact of AI on C2 and attempt to further analyse the ‘how’.

Decision Making, Mission Command, and Human Machine Teaming Command and Control has been undergoing decades with Anthony King arguing that digital

awareness and the ability to share this information (King, 2019, p. 290). Lawrence Freedman also notes that ‘new technologies’ around sensing, tracking, and communications have and will continue to transform intelligence gathering and processing (Freedman, Lawrence, 2022, p. 504), but Martin Van Creveld cautions that technology is not a panacea, as a system is only as strong as its weakest link (Van Creveld, 1985, p. 261).

Empirical research into human decision-making shows that the classical rational actor model is unrealistic (Kahneman, 2012, Introduction) and

Zelikow, 1999, pp.10–14, 67–78, 147–62). AI has the potential to improve this human decision-making process by reducing cognitive errors, expanding recall, and mitigating predispositions (Purdy and Williams, 2023). However, this is an ongoing process and AI enabled decision support systems, especially those with military applications, face a variety of challenges (McKendrick and Thurai, 2022).

Before proceeding, it is worth highlighting some of the weaknesses of AI as they pertain to the command decision making process. Importantly, (‘ANI’) systems do not ‘reason’ logically (Hunter, Cameron and Bowen, Bleddyn E, 2024), but instead are primarily statistical correlation engines which lack judgement or contextual awareness and often suffer from ‘black box’ or inexplicable decision making (Goldfarb and Lindsay, 2021). As Anthony King notes, despite the weaknesses and implied overstatement of AI functionality, there are useful capabilities around data gathering, info processing, resource allocation, etc. But the current technology performs better in Anthony, 2023).

Another vulnerability of modern military forces is that like many complex systems their interconnections

be thought of as an interdependent system made up of a variety of elements such as reconnaissance, headquarters, artillery, air defence, logistics, etc. integrate various elements, coordinate actions to achieve a purpose, organise, or self-repair and these how the system functions (Meadows, 2008, p.28). Complex systems are usually resilient to an extent performance is likely to be impaired, potentially

vulnerable in some ways to what the Chinese military refers to as ‘system destruction’ (Engstrom, 2018, p.18). Vulnerabilities like these are one of the reasons some militaries are focused on combining human and AI into more resilient joint teams.

Human involvement is important as commanders make multiple C2 adaptations to the changing environment increases the need for asset dispersal, mobility, and cover to reduce the effectiveness of ever more deadly weapon systems (Dupuy et al., 1986, pp.48–55). A typical modern army company will

therefore need to disperse across a wider frontal zone. For example, Ukrainian companies typically hold a three-kilometre frontal area (Zabrodskyi, Mykhaylo et al., 2022, p.62) which implies one (typically understrength) platoon per kilometre or a typical squad holding the equivalent

Maintaining C2 in this highly dispersed environment where signature management is key, will require adaptation of command and control.

Secondly, mission command is key but will also have to evolve given the vulnerability of unit communications to electronic warfare (‘EW’) effects and cyber (Nilsson, 2020). There is the likelihood load depending on opposing force (‘OpFor’) effects; volatility in comms and data networks can lead to a wide range of C2 scenarios from the ‘strategic corporal’ to ‘tactical general’ in relatively short periods of time (Krulak, 1999; Singer, Peter W., 2009; Bollmann and Heltberg, 2023). AI driven C2 systems networked together by low signature line of sight, mesh networks, or cables could help optimise the trade-off between dispersal and signature management to maximise survivability via strike unattractiveness. Unit commanders may

Foe in this dispersed environment. Ukrainians are there are technological advances e.g., US Army ‘blue force’ trackers (Lafontaine, Dan, 2018). However, the most effective operational models will need to be experimented with and tested under a wide range of real-world scenarios.

Thirdly, maintenance of morale in a dispersed

AI can improve the human decision making process but this brings a variety of challenges

environment will be more challenging. Marshall led early work on army morale and unit cohesion highlighting there is a strong negative impact if troops are overly fragmented (Marshall, 1947, Ch.4). Adding to the traditional impact of isolation on morale will be the risk of contagion from a worsening tactical situation (i.e. being ‘outmanoeuvred’) which, based on Dupuy’s work on 20th Century battles, was a greater cause of retreat than casualty percentages (Dupuy, 1990, p.38). This will enhance the challenges of leadership in an AI enabled world; how did the machine decide, can it be explained, and will troops ‘charge over that hill’ a second time if they lose half

will have to be practised and wargamed with to develop understanding and trust.

In addition, developing a technically literate and entrepreneurial culture which accepts and rewards calculated risk taking will be fundamental to explore ‘how’ to best use the technology (Balis, Christina, 2023). This organisational and entrepreneurial risk-taking approach, especially when facing disruptive technological change, is something that

with and could serve as a useful reference point for militaries. On the topic of organisational adaptation, Christensen in a seminal Harvard Business Review article in 1995 addressed the concept of ‘disruptive technologies’ and how incumbents often struggled to maintain product leadership during periods of innovation (Christensen and Bower, Joseph L., 1995). While Henderson contrasts disruptive change with companies where the failure to innovate was caused by an organisational ‘architectural’ mismatch with the requirements of the new technology (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Both the product innovation and organisational architecture approaches have been utilised in the corporate world to address disruptive change and may be useful case studies for militaries attempting to adapt to AI.

Conclusion

Rapid adaption has had a substantial impact on land warfare operations as AI enabled innovation puts assets at risk across the zone of contention which, given increasing weapon ranges, extends from hundreds to thousands of kilometres from the

front line. The effect on operations by increasing situational awareness and the ability to target OpFor assets at distance has been to shift the relative superiority of offence and defence across the land, sea, and air domains. Notably on land, where AI operations by concentrating mass without being seen and manoeuvring to break through enemy’s lines, especially when facing prepared defences in depth. These shifts in offensive and defensive relative power are ongoing and likely to have important implications in key geographies e.g. Europe (predominately land

Critically the lessons are likely to be different given the differential domain makeup and scarce resources,

burdens shared.

Importantly, this enhanced technology will not be limited to the US/NATO. As with much late 20th Century military innovation, because of the low barriers to entry of the related technologies, they unfortunately also accrue to our potential opponents. These operational trends are compounded by several of the typically unmanned technology vs traditional and expensive Western manned platforms which risk other actors ‘leapfrogging’ legacy NATO military systems. Secondly, the low barriers to entry for precision strike technology based on AI/ML enabled systems, coupled with commercial sensor systems, off the shelf consumer electronics, and attainable commercially available UGV’s / UAV’s. This contagion given the ability to put assets at risk across

Fortunately, Western democracies have valuable societal and knowledge base strengths around technology and AI that can be leveraged as part of this adaptive process. A key focus for Western militaries should be experimenting with operational, organisational, and doctrinal changes to try maximise our strengths, take advantage of our potential opponent’s weaknesses, and hedge unclear potential outcomes. AI and the various structures have vulnerabilities which can be disrupted from fragility and lack of context to information interdependency between various parts of the military system. Discovering the best way to take advantage of our opponents’ limitations will be a key part to optimising operational doctrine.

In conclusion, the increasing rate of AI related technological change creates a wider range of potential outcomes and volatility, which is ironic given some thought that technology would banish the ‘fog’ and ‘friction’ of war. This greater uncertainty makes risk management for Western nations, which have a vested interest remaining at the top of the

create additional risk for the West’s opponents who seek to change the existing architecture and might lead them to be more cautious. While the full impact of AI is unlikely to be clear for some time, to be an effective 21st Century military requires making the effort to adapt to this emerging technology. Leaders will need to understand changes and risks to relevant

The effects of AI on C2 will have to be wargamed and exercised to develop understanding and trust

and possible future scenarios to ensure that Western militaries are learning organisations. Finally, these wide ranging outcomes could lead to scenarios

cognitive perspective may evolve which could change the nature of war itself, not just its character, but then, perhaps it would not be ‘war’.

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This article draws on strategic implications for regional stability in Eastern Europe and was originally submitted as part of the King’s College London Initiative, sponsored by the ARRC. Ms Lottie Rudd

The Republic of Moldova, a small, landlocked country of approximately 2.5 million people, occupies a critical geostrategic position in Eastern Europe. Despite its location between Romania - a member of both the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - and Ukraine - an EU candidate state

Russian Federation - Moldova’s importance in the regional security architecture has often been overlooked. However, its proximity to the port of Odesa and the Black Sea, combined with its potential role as a Russian stepping stone into the Balkans and Europe, underscores its strategic value to NATO.

Described by political scientist Mitchell Orenstein 1, Moldova is caught in the middle of the deepening geopolitical divide between

dynamic has been starkly illustrated in the country’s recent presidential election and referendum on EU accession, both of which highlighted the intensifying competition for Moldova’s future geopolitical orientation. Moldova’s location makes it a focal point for great power competition, and a victim of Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics which span its political,

military, economic, cultural and media spheres, with the energy sector serving as a longstanding pillar of Energy security in Moldova has direct implications for the population and is a key factor on which they vote. The cost and availability of energy, particularly during winter, have immediate and tangible effects on Moldovan citizens, making energy policy a critical lever in the contest between Russian and Western

vulnerabilities is central to addressing its historical dependence on Russian supply and advancing its aspirations for EU membership.

For NATO, supporting Moldova’s energy transition is a strategic imperative that aligns with its overarching objectives of countering Russian hybrid threats, enhancing resilience among partner

energy framework not only mitigates one of Russia’s key instruments of coercion but also reinforces NATO’s collective defence posture by contributing to long-term regional stability. Ensuring Moldova’s energy independence bolsters the country’s capacity to resist external pressure and strengthens its alignment with Euro-Atlantic structures, which is key for NATO.

Historical context

for Moldova since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Often described as Moldova’s Achilles heel2, energy insecurity is rooted in the country’s lack of domestic energy resources which was exploited

Dependence on Russia is closely tied to the post-1944 territorial restructuring of the country, economic realities.

In 1940, the Soviet Union annexed the region of Bessarabia from Romania, and after World War II, it reorganised the region merging it with the existing Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) to form the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR). In a bid to secure control over this strategically important region, Moscow relocated ethnic Slavs, predominantly Russians, to oversee industrial development. Most of which took place in Transnistria, a region on the left bank of the Dniester River in Transnistria, which was deemed “more 3

Transnistria’s demographic composition has further complicated Moldova’s post-Soviet energy around 50 percent of its population holding Russian citizenship and a large majority speaking Russian was collapsing, Transnistria declared independence from Moldova, fearing the latter’s potential in 1992, ending with the intervention of the former Soviet 14th Guards Army stationed in Transnistria. Since then, Transnistria has functioned as an unrecognised de facto independent state hosting approximately 1,500 Russian troops as part of a

A cornerstone of this industrialisation was the development of energy infrastructure, including the Moldavskaya State Regional Power Station (MGRES) built in 1964. Strategically located in Transnistria, this facility was designed to centralise the MSSR’s energy supply, ensuring the dependence on infrastructure embedded in this pro-Soviet region. By Moldova’s independence in 1991, this dependence had left the country’s energy security almost entirely reliant on Transnistria and, by extension, Russia4

During the Soviet era, the MSSR’s economy and energy infrastructure were integrated into the broader Soviet command and distribution system,

a centralised network of state-managed pipelines. This arrangement sustained the MSSR’s economy and has proved pivotal for Transnistria’s industrial hub. However, following the USSR’s collapse, Moldova’s shift to world market prices rendered much of its industrial and agricultural infrastructure economically unviable5. Moldova has since relied on both Russian and Western support to sustain its modest economy and ensure energy security.

Until as recently as 2022, 80 per cent of Moldova’s electricity was supplied by Transnistria6. This was

both sides of the Dniester River who have grown accustomed to cheap Russian gas and, consequently, cheap electricity which further entrenched Russian leverage over Moldova. A resolution to the unsustainable status quo around the concentration of energy supply may ultimately serve as a key factor in addressing the Transnistrian question and therefore the possible future trajectory of Moldova.

Pre-2022 dynamics in Moldova’s energy sector

The issue of energy security for nation states is both a practical matter of ensuring access to energy supplies at the right price and a geopolitical issue associated with foreign policy behaviour in the energy sector. In Russia’s case, its dominance in the global energy sector, underpinned by vast reserves of natural energy resources – including coal, oil, gas and uranium – and reinforced by its military capabilities, forms the foundation of its great power aspirations. Russia’s proper place, as it sees it, on the world stage and its right to play a leading role in global foreign affairs are therefore inextricably linked to its wealth of natural resources and the strategic use of these assets to advance its foreign policy objectives.

Gazprom

In Moldova, Russia has leveraged its dominance in the energy sector through Gazprom. The statecontrolled multinational corporation has been pivotal in maintaining Moldova’s dependence on Russian natural gas and exploiting vulnerabilities such as weak regulatory frameworks and high levels of poverty. By the mid-1990s, Gazprom’s deliberate strategy to foster debt dependence had achieved

US$22 million in 1994 to US$291 million by 19957, enabling Gazprom to secure control over critical infrastructure, including Moldovagaz – the country’s primary natural gas supplier – established in 1999.

cemented through its 50 percent ownership stake, with the Transnistrian Government controlling an additional 13.4 percent, leaving the Moldovan Government with only a 36.6 percent share in the company responsible for its own energy supply and security8. This asymmetric ownership structure has allowed Russia to maintain a dominant position in Moldova’s energy sector, ensuring that Moldova’s energy policies remain aligned with Moscow’s strategic objectives.

Debt

exacerbated the issues caused by Russia’s debtcentric strategy. Gas supply agreements between

debt accumulation, largely due to Transnistria’s unpaid consumption. Gazprom supplies gas to Moldovagaz, which distributes it to both Moldova and Tiraspol-Transgaz in Transnistria, the latter controlled by the separatist authorities. Between 2007 and

2016, Gazprom provided $6 billion in subsidies to Transnistria, propping up its de facto government. By 2019, Moldovagaz owed Gazprom approximately $7.9 billion, the majority of which was attributed to Transnistria’s unpaid consumption9 Although Moldova is nominally accountable for this debt, it exercises no control over Transnistria’s energy consumption, enabling Russia to weaponise this ambiguity. This arrangement not only entrenches Moldova’s dependence but also allows Russia to sustain the separatist authorities in Transnistria, secure Moldova’s sovereignty.

Moldavskaya State Regional Power Station (MGRES)

Moldova’s reliance on Russian-controlled energy infrastructure extends to electricity generation, with the MGRES serving as a key part of this system. Operated by the Russian energy conglomerate Inter RAO and located in Transnistria, MGRES supplied up to 80 percent of Moldova’s electricity as recently a paradoxical scenario in which Moldovan citizens

Parlicov, 2020, p.28).

The economic interdependence facilitated by MGRES extends to Transnistria’s industrial base. Heavy industries such as the Moldovan Metallurgical Plant and Tirotex are reliant on subsidised electricity to maintain their operations. These industries form the backbone of Transnistria’s economy, providing a facade of economic viability that is sustained by Russian energy subsidies. Without access to cheap energy, these industries would collapse, undermining the economic foundation of the separatist regime.

Shifts in Moldova’s energy sector since 2022

Prior to 2022, Moldova’s historical reliance on Russian created a vulnerability that Russia was able to Ukraine in 2022 has represented a critical juncture wanes and in doing so creates opportunities for objectives in Eastern Europe.

Western investments

Russia’s diminished leverage has catalysed an Moldova’s energy resilience. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) spearheaded this effort in 2022 with €525 million invested in 14 projects, a substantial increase from €106 million in 2021 (Mirbabaeva, 2023)10. This included €300 million earmarked for diversifying Moldova’s gas supply away from Russian sources by securing procurement from European hubs. Similarly, the European Investment Bank (EIB) allocated $30 million in 2023 to enhance the reliability of Moldova’s power grid (EIB, 2023)11

US-Moldova bilateral relations have also strengthened, with USAID committing $135 million to support Moldova’s energy and economic security. These efforts are complemented by investments

from the World Bank and UNDP, further reinforcing Moldova’s infrastructure. Notably, Moldova’s trial

impact remains modest and largely symbolic.

Integration into European energy systems

transformation was its synchronisation with the European electricity grid (ENTSO-E) in March 2022.

while bolstering Moldova’s energy independence and alignment with EU standards. This alignment not only aspirations12 but also aligns with NATO’s goals of fostering regional stability and resilience.

Romania has emerged as a key partner in Vertical Gas Corridor extension and the IssacceaVulcanesti-Chisinau electricity interconnector, set for completion by 2025, are pivotal for Moldova’s energy security. Additional infrastructure developments, including the Suceava-Balti and Gutinas-Straseni transmission lines, further underscore Romania’s role in reducing Moldova’s dependence on Russian energy, with completion expected by 202913. In December

severing its reliance on Russian gas through the operationalisation of the Iasi-Ungheni pipeline. The increase in Romanian involvement marks a geopolitical shift away from Russian dominance. For NATO, such projects are instrumental in building a buffer zone of energy-resilient states along its eastern border, directly countering Russia’s ability to exploit energy dependence.

Ukraine-Russia gas transit agreement

Furthermore, the expiration of the Ukraine-Russia gas transit agreement, signed in 2019 and set to end at the end of 2024, presents a key opportunity for the EU to assist Moldova in fully eliminating its dependence on Russian gas. This agreement facilitated the transit of 65 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas in 2020 and 40 bcm annually from 2021 to 202414. Despite the ongoing war, reduced (Corbeau & Mitrova, 202415. Ukraine’s decision not to renew the deal has critical implications, especially for Transnistria, where halted gas supplies could and halting industrial activity16. While short-term destabilisation could serve Russia’s interests, the

likely. Moreover, the conclusion of this agreement a potential prerequisite for Moldova’s EU accession ambitions.

The war in Ukraine has decisively shifted the strategic importance. Moldova’s chronic energy insecurity has long been a cornerstone of Russian vulnerability by ensuring Moldova’s access to reliable and stable energy supplies at relatively consistent prices will be critical to resolving the Transnistrian

Moldova’s sovereignty but also contribute to reinforcing security and stability along NATO’s tactics in the region.

Endnotes

1Orenstein, M, A. (2019). The Lands in Between: The New Politics of Russia’s Hybrid War. New York: Oxford Academic. 2Ronnås, P., & Orlova, N. (2000). Moldova’s Transition to Destitution. Sida Studies. Gothenburg, Sweden, p.32.

3Hill, W. (2012). Russia, the Near Abroad, and the West: Lessons Wilson Centre Press, p.49.

4 FINANCING OF SEPARATISM IN MOLDOVA. The Kremlin’s 5Ronnås, P., & Orlova, N. (2000). Moldova’s Transition to Destitution. Sida Studies. Gothenburg, Sweden, p.10.

6 THE EU CAN ENHANCE ENERGY SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA. European Council on Foreign Relations, p.9.

7 FINANCING OF SEPARATISM IN MOLDOVA. The Kremlin’s p.26.

8Mitrova, T. (2023). Q&A | Can a Pro-Russian Moldova Reduce Its Energy Dependence on Russia? Centre on Global Energy Policy. Columbia University.

9Smith, D. (2023). Transnistria is in a Pickle. Moldova Matters Substack.

10Mirbabaeva, N. (2023). EBRD invests a record €525 million in Moldova in 2022. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

11EIB. (2023). Moldova: EIB Global invests $30 million to modernise electricity distribution grid. European Investment Bank.

12European Council. (2023). Council conclusions on Enlargement. Council of the European Union.

13Enerdata. (2024). Moldova signs deal for the development of a new interconnector with Romania. Energdata.net.

14Corbeau, S., & Mitrova, T. (2023). Russia’s Gas Export Strategy: Adapting to the New Reality. Centre on Global Energy Policy.

15Corbeau, S., & Mitrova, T. (2023). Russia’s Gas Export Strategy: Adapting to the New Reality. Centre on Global Energy Policy.

16 Ukraine will not extend its gas transit contract with Gazprom – the consequences for Moldova. Centre for Eastern Studies.

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Centre for Eastern Studies.

Corbeau, S., & Mitrova, T. (2023). Russia’s Gas Export Strategy: https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/russiasgas-export-strategy-adapting-to-the-new-reality/ EIB. (2023). Moldova: EIB Global invests $30 million to modernise electricity distribution grid. European Investment Bank. https:// www.eib.org/en/press/all/2023-145-eib-global-invests-usd30million-to-modernise-moldova-s-electricity-distributiongrid#:~:text=Moldova%3A%20EIB%20Global%20invests%20%2430%20million%20to%20modernise%20electricity%20 distribution%20grid,-Deutsch&text=The%20%2430%20r%20network

Enerdata. (2024). Moldova signs deal for the development of a new interconnector with Romania. Energdata.net. https:// www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/moldovasigns-deal-development-new-interconnector-romania. html#:~:text=The%20Moldovan%20Government%20hopes%20 that,before%20potentially%20joining%20the%20EU European Council. (2023). Council conclusions on Enlargement. Council of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa. eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/12/12/council-approvesenlargement-conclusions/

EU CAN ENHANCE ENERGY SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA. European Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.jstor.org/stable/ resrep58210

Mirbabaeva, N. (2023). EBRD invests a record €525 million in Moldova in 2022. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. https://www.ebrd.com/news/2023/ebrd-investsa-record-525-million-in-moldova-in-2022-.html Mitrova, T. (2023).

Centre on Global Energy Policy. Columbia University. Orenstein, M, A. (2019). of Russia’s Hybrid War. New York: Oxford Academic. Ronnås, P., & Orlova, N. (2000). Moldova’s Transition to Destitution. Sida Studies. Gothenburg, Sweden. Smith, D. (2023). Transnistria is in a Pickle. Moldova Matters Substack. https://moldovamatters.substack.com/p/ transnistria-is-in-a-pickle

FINANCING OF SEPARATISM IN MOLDOVA. The Kremlin’s

This paper is intended to encourage thinking and has been produced using research from and can be applied wider. The British Army is going through a period of great change after focusing on Counter-Insurgency operations for many years. Our focus is moving to preparing for this. Furthermore, an announcement has been made, detailing the retirement of several vehicles from the Army’s inventory, unveiling prospects for procurement of something new. The RLC must seize this opportunity to establish what is needed to meet the threats of Large-Scale Combat Operations. The Corps must ensure its mission of sustaining the force is made a priority into the future, emphasising protection of capacity and capability. By Capt Hadley Booth-Millard RLC

A statement by the author: “This article is based solely on my views. None of the information within policy. While some overarching documents are I chose to go primarily with open-source comments and articles for this reason.”

Introduction

With the invasion of Ukraine in Feb 22, arguably the current military equipment, there has been a display of evolving ideas, sticking points and unseen risks in World War prescribe the use of overwhelming down. Countering this, Ukraine has innovated new methods for spotting and even striking targets as well as utilising Western equipment for counterbattery use. Both have proved how vital logistics remain to modern warfare and, more than anything

else, have decisively demonstrated the vulnerability of all formations on the 21st paper has been produced to encourage discussion and spark debate, to ensure that all factors are considered as we continuously evolve and improve our capability.

The British Army’s ‘Field Army Threat Handbook’ (FATH)1 FATH highlights the key challenges we are likely

‘Countering the Threat’, six impact logistics actions directly and one explicitly focuses on the resilience of the logistic chain, resistance to attrition and sustainability of the force. These factors will be referenced throughout this document and will reinforce the ideas proposed below.

Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF)

It is critical that the British Army starts to learn the lessons from Ukraine, from both sides. We must consider how we deploy logistic support and how we can better protect it. The threat from Special Operations Forces (SOF), drones, artillery and

movements and actions. This paper seeks to explore the issues faced and to identify solutions for these, from quick doctrinal wins to whole force changes. Implementation could be costly, but it is imperative that we, as an organisation, openly seek to improve. The topics will be as follows:

Theatre Logistic Laydown – Do we need to

the BSA.

Vehicles – Do we need to reconsider what we have?

Protection – Who guards the friendly rear and who protects the convoys?

Training – Current challenges to training at scale and with realism.

Communications – Is there another way?

Palletise Everything.

Lessons From the Past – Discussion of what have we forgotten.

A - Theatre Logistic Laydown: Do we need to

The RLC should theorise and test a multi-line logistic system that encourages independence of logistic units. This would allow large installations to be dispersed further or pushed back, outside of conventional artillery ranges. To affect this, manageable segments and minimising requirement for complex communications would be required. Repurposing an existing BattleSpace Management (BSM) technique to simplify planning of Exchange Points (XPs) and Distribution Points (DPs) will assist with this.

Background

The current Theatre Logistic Laydown, covered in detail in ‘Doctrine Note 20/1, Sustainment’2, gives commanders a good overarching foundation at the Strategic/Operational levels. This model is easily understood and allows a highly adaptable framework, depending on the operation, the threats faced and the size of the deployed force. The latest threats of this laydown. Highlighted are activities such as nodes in the current chain, such as the Brigade Support Area (BSA), would be extremely vulnerable to a peer combatant; air superiority, for example, is not guaranteed to eliminate long range threats on the next section.

Further to the complications brought by a peer enemy to operational and strategic level installations, there is little detail about how tactical logistic functions should be implemented at scale in current doctrine. The ‘Tactical Logistics Support Handbook’3 and the ‘Operational Road Transport’4 handbook both list the tactical actions as individual activities but do not cover their execution simultaneously at the operational level. A way to apply this to the current

or even by company. This would ensure dispersion, reduce the size of mobile formations and thus signature and maintain simplicity, with one logistic

For this method of supply to succeed, prior planning must be thorough and clearly presented to subordinates. Ultimately, the basis of the laydown may need to be understood down to the rank of Sergeant and in extremis even Corporal to ensure success. Mission Command is the foundation that enables this structure as encouraged by the new 5. This is because small formations of logistic callsigns could be given reasonable autonomy to complete their missions, resupplying company sized formations directly. Annex A details an example of this new system. It is important to highlight that Russian failure may

development of leadership has followed a different control via micromanagement.

Command and Control (C2), force protection and

to ensure units can be broken down as much as possible, allowing them to disperse effectively and

against current threats from FATH, namely artillery and targeting of large nodes. The trade-off would be how to implement communications and C2 amongst squadrons and regiments if they’re broken down, potentially as low as section level. This breaking down would certainly increase the strain of safeguarding more and smaller forces, increasing to provide force protection. Ultimately, all formations, not just CSS elements may have to get more comfortable with true delegation to the lowest level possible.

of the BSA

The current Logistic Laydown has the BSA located close to the front. Though dispersed, this would no doubt be a priority target for any enemy considerable range6, could destroy large areas simultaneously. Some effective solutions do exist, and it may be necessary to highlight that protection of the BSA would be a far higher priority for air defence assets. This paper seeks to introduce an intermediary space of RXPs (as per Section A), to move the BSA back and outside of ‘regular’ artillery system’s range or to break it down into sub-BSAs.

places the BSA near the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT)7. As seen in Footnote 7, there are now artillery latest reports for Russian 152mm guns also state an impressive range of 70km8. Whilst there are rocket systems that far surpass these ranges, the primary threat to the BSA, and scope for this paper, will be artillery. Artillery pieces are more readily available (especially in Russian doctrine9), are relatively cost

rounds to cover a wide area. More modern, longerrange guns, thus mean that CSS elements must reconsider their doctrinal laydown of the BSA and perhaps even adjust its placement.

Where, currently, the BSA can be located a reasonable distance behind the FLOT, recent demonstrations by those nations more likely to become adversaries shows that this should be extended. Increasing the distance between an nodes will decrease the likelihood of being struck. However, it will complicate the logistic chain and extend movement timelines. To remedy this, an intermediary XP (theorised here as RXPs) and/or new vehicles (seen in Section C) could be utilised. Both of these would break up the routes between the hub and the dependency or increase the speed to conduct resupply respectively. The suggested distance between the BSA and the FLOT could extend to 150km; ensuring that most artillery systems, including rocket artillery would be out of range.

A different method of protecting the BSA against

Dispersion is already built into the doctrinal laydown of the BSA, with natures being segregated and

spread out where possible. The new suggested method, to further disperse and allow redundancy of stores, would be to break the regular BSA into three sub-BSAs. This would be done by task organising the BSG into three smaller formations, all with the expertise and capabilities to run three smaller BSAs, breaking natures up between them. This would best be done by dependant formation (i.e. Battlegroup) to ensure ease of collection of stores by transport units. The challenges of this method would be

strong institutionalised command and control, at all levels. To move this theory forward, would require wargaming, task organising and eventually testing, to see if this is possible.

Establishing military logistic installations within existing infrastructure in Built Up Areas (BUAs) has proved crucial historically (Marseilles and Toulon during the invasion of France 1944 for example10). Whilst this is still utilised in current operations, it has not been accomplished at scale in serving memory. The employment of these areas, particularly industrial be considered and practiced for where possible. Existing buildings allow for quick employment, offer already have security measures in place. They also grant the user cover from view and, pending the area, can allow for deception and dispersion of materiel to be implemented with ease. The key risks of using BUAs, that should be strongly considered, are impact to local civilians. This is especially the high chance of

C – Vehicles: Do we need to reconsider what we have?

Introduction

British Army logistic vehicles are vulnerable, distinguishable, and easily targeted. Linked to the above section, a new vehicle that is better protected, faster and potentially lighter would remedy these issues. Procurement of a new vehicle, similar or even based on the Ocelot/Foxhound could be the best solution. The British Army already operates the Foxhound, and it could be adapted to carry at least 2 NATO pallets. These vehicles would be issued to Close Support Logistic Regiments, Infantry and Armoured units to enhance tactical logistic operations forward of the BSA. This would mask vehicle purpose, enhance general protection against a variety of threats and allow for mounting of heavier weapons. The crucial focus here, is improvement of interface.

The RLC and dependant units use purpose-built MAN SV cargo vehicles, ranging from a 6T carrying capacity to 15T. These are excellent in role and offer a capable platform both on and off road for delivery of bulk stores. Some facets of their design, however, may not have considered the reality of modern

Ukraine has shown that logistics can be the Achilles Heel of operational and even strategic level activity11 Both Russian and Ukrainian logistic assets have been targeted frequently, to disrupt the chain, having a

component. Considerations must be made to treat this risk, with elements of the survivability onion12

of the Survivability Onion

Utilising a different platform to the MAN SV will to this, previous topics covered will grant further

– Having a logistic vehicle built on the base of an existing combat platform will make it easier to ‘hide in plain sight’. Hostile forces

and thus prioritise targets

Avoid Being Acquired – These platforms are

in with Section B, it ensures that clusters of priority

Avoid Being Engaged – As per Sections A and B, these vehicles would be spread out as much as is practicable. Delegating down to section level harbours and resupply activity, minimising grouped

artillery and missile strikes on these targets

Avoid Being Hit – The Foxhound is more agile, is smaller and is faster than current logistic vehicles. These factors would provide an edge, both while static and when moving

Avoid Being Penetrated

This is all applique however and the base vehicles are not resistant, even to Small Arms Fire (SAF). The Foxhound was built from the ground up to resist numerous threats, providing more effective protection for crews

Avoid Being Killed – Section B highlights some ideas to disperse logistic nodes wider than previous. Whilst individual vehicles and crews are key to future success, the critical factor here is the maintenance of Logistic Effect. Being affected would be greatly countered at the Operational and Strategic level by these means and at the tactical level by spreading stores amongst more vehicles. To enhance this capability and meet the likely

transfer could be devised. Consideration of pallet transfer is hugely important and should be simple,

Adaptation

fast and not require additional assets, such as the Forklift Rough Terrain (FLRT). This would ensure that when conducting DPs, logistic units and dependencies can exchange fresh stores and backloaded or waste stores rapidly. Less time to conduct a resupply grants

drivers’ hours) and may even allow more missions to be conducted per day, where required.

with a need to understand the impact on workforce requirements, movement capacity and cost. These vehicles should be limited from Second Line to A1 echelon support only (the area of high threat). Interface between logistics callsigns and Battlegroup

the transfer of stores. Executed effectively, this would grant many advantages, giving commanders new options and tools to have positive tactical and operational effect. The Foxhound offers a better protected platform, agile, fast and able to mount heavy weapons; all of which could tip the scales in our favour with the latest threats experienced in Ukraine.

illustrative example. Fundamentally, the drive here would be to acquire a smaller platform with a slightly different design philosophy to get ahead of requirements in a ‘peer combat’ battlespace. Procurement and research must be conducted to

as many requirements as possible. Cross-country performance, speed, carrying capacity, adaptability, protection and reliability are all requirements that are essential for this concept but critically must be well balanced. An absolutely crucial point is to avoid ‘Scope Creep’ and to push for simplicity. Though the MAN SV Enhanced Palletised Loading System (EPLS) is an excellent platform, anecdotally, far more soldiers

D – Protection: Who guards the friendly rear and who protects the convoys?

With the British Army steadily shrinking and combat evolving, CSS elements must consider organic protection to a greater extent. Compromise to power; contingency for logistic preservation is vital.

formation will be provided for rear area and logistic node defence, creation or allocation of organic defence capability is necessary. This would be greatly enhanced by Section C coming to fruition, in combination with a Force Protection Troop being raised for each RLC regiment as a minimum. This may

principles in regiments.

Future Soldier13 fundamentally restructured the Army

This restructure, however, may have left few brigades

Furthermore, a recent announcement by the CGS14

force there is a high likelihood that combat formations will be required forward, creating potential for less

important to acknowledge that The RLC must prepare a contingency plan, to ensure formations are able to provide their own protection. With the nature of bypass policy and instances of porous frontlines being an ever-present threat, logistic units must be prepared to respond to enemy attacks.

Creating organic force protection, in tandem with mobile, protected and well-armed platforms, will ensure the RLC can continue to function in numerous potential campaign types. The Troop should be raised in addition to RLC regiments’ existing personnel allocation, so as not to reduce logistic effect.

Regardless of a regiment’s placement in the logistic chain, each one would ideally receive this uplift as

Afghanistan

threats. This troop should have reasonable mass and would be held by the HQ Sqn of the regiment, allowing allocation to missions or nodes as required. This would also allow it to be task organised and restructured as necessary.

The imperative to raise this force as a separate training pathway; bringing back a trade, such as the Pioneers, would be required for this purpose. With the United States Marine Corps suggesting lessons such as “A single tank is the most lethal weapon 15, it is essential all eventualities are considered. Ultimately, this would mean a troop, trained and equipped with heavy weapons system, including Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs), that can pose a credible threat to all enemy ground and possibly even air assets. This would even enhance deception, with enemy reconnaissance formations being less likely to identify a force as a logistic target,

Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) allocation and drone warfare have proven more important Warfare (EW) capabilities (drone jamming, and signal interception) must be prioritised to ensure that niche capabilities are protected. Logistic installations must be considered when forming a defensive plan.

some of the most heavily utilised by both Russia and Ukraine. The British Army should further invest in these and consider their distribution. Logistic nodes,

than numerous other capabilities.

E – Training: Current challenges to training at scale and with realism

Over the past few years there has been a shortfall in Combined Arms Manoeuvre (CAM) training. For The RLC the greatest impact is personnel experience in large installations, such as the BSA. For CSS formations it is hugely important to understand the supply and support chains and to be able to integrate them effectively. CAM training is vital to all, though needs adapting to CSS arms. Therefore, a focused combined exercise for all relevant support formations (RLC, REME, RAMC, AGC and RMP to name a few) could be created, testing the relevant support chains. Director Land Warfare (DLW) has issued new direction16 as an update to the ‘Land Warfare Centre (LWC) Command Plan 2022/25’17. Under the Land the Combined Arms gap’. Creating a CSS combined be an asset and building block to Combat Arms CAM. Following the model of TRADEWIND (trade specialist training), CYCLONE (small unit and special to arm training) and STORM (operational and combined training), exercises can be developed and present opportunities to bring CSS units together.

The new LTS’ implementation will allow for the creation of CYCLONE events focused on rear area operations. Building on concepts highlighted in Section B, STORM could focus on creating training based around a simulated BSA and CYCLONE around a task organised squadron level formation with attached support arms for a dispersed BSA concept. These have been suggested and discussions are under way

consists of troop level DPs for The RLC, with an SHQ element for planning and tracking. The AGC ETS

serials already. Inclusion of other CSS elements could be considered in the future to expand the scope and training value of these exercises.

Whilst a lot of further planning and coordination is required to achieve a realistic degree of BSA level operations, the CSS community must push to shape its own training requirements. With the introduction of the LTS, this is now possible and could allow practice of concepts that have not been enacted

the new forms of training is disseminated and ideas solidify, every effort must be made to inject our requirements. The focus for recent training has understandably been for teeth arms formations, with some support provided by service support units. For

era convoy protection groups, seen here in Mastiff and Ridgeback armoured vehicles. These were organic RLC assets

Star Streak deployed on Dartmoor Training Area. A myriad of systems need to be deployed for the modern threat; this includes close-in weapons systems and Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar systems

US Air Force base. This image shows just a small area, but the sheer scale required on operations for a logistics hub is huge

The RLC, it can be argued that this has not provided as much value, almost being seen as ‘real-life support’ for the exercise. Now is the time to push for bespoke exercises at numerous command levels in which realistic combined training can be focused in the ‘rear operations area’.

One training challenge that would be introduced by the adoption of elements from Section D would be a requirement for infantry and advanced weapon systems training. This training has been completed in the past by RLC formations and could be implemented once more. Provided each RLC regiment understood the protection troop’s capability and its should be attained organically. This would allow the troop to provide its own training. Another means would be apportionment of courses or more of them for CSS elements to join. Pressing the critical need callsigns, which would not be required in as large numbers to defend the rear area, should encourage assistance with training. As discussed in Section D, training on heavy weapons, ATGMs and even light Anti-Aircraft weapons systems is key to making them a credible deterrent.

F

– Communications: Is there another way?

soldiers focuses on minimisation of communications where required. A peer enemy however, is highly likely to have the capability to jam or intercept all communications, rendering a radio network wholly ineffective. Consideration of reversionary methods, and ready in the event radio signals are blocked must be considered. Methods must be robust and capable regardless of conditions.

Runners are the oldest method for communications in the world. The most famous example of this is Pheidippides, who ran from Marathon to Athens to deliver news of victory. In modern warfare this still has its applications in frontline formations, though may be of slightly less utility for logistic callsigns, especially when dispersion is required. Depending on the means of dispersion however and the threat of interception or jamming of communications, there is still potential to use this method. Pairing a ‘runner’ with a horse would be more effective still, where formations are separated by several kilometres, rather than a few hundred metres.

Improving hugely on the runner/with horse concept, would be the reintroduction of dispatch riders on terrain types, this is something the British Army has used before, even recently. For CSS elements, they could be introduced to sit in the RHQ element, being utilised as part of the MT during peacetime or within the Force Protection Troop as per Section D. Few riders would be required but would provide a means of distributing orders relatively safely and easily in the event of communications interference.

The true utility of drones is being demonstrated

dramatic as POV drones, the use of drones for communications is another utility that would be

in Section A and Annex A). In an EW contested environment this method may not function, pending an enemy’s capacity to jam frequencies utilised by drones for control. The advantages of drones, dependent on type, would be low cost, ease of

tracking by an adversary.

Though security and modes of use will have to be assessed, Personal Electronic Devices (PEDs) cannot be ignored as a means of communication. In all recent

and other simple electronic devices are being used operationally and tactically. This use poses its own risks, with demonstrated potential to triangulate phones and target them accordingly18. However, the accessibility of these devices, simplicity and relative ease of procurement assures they cannot be ignored as a last resort. There are other devices available too, such as Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) that

recently the use of these, supplied by Cubic Defence UK, on Exercise TIMBER TRUSS allowed Troop Commanders a secondary means of communication. They found them easy to use, effective and were able to send much more information, far more quickly than via Bowman. This included images and documents.

reintroduced in extremis is the carrier pigeon.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China has committed to this already19 and their interest should

Image of Second World War of Dispatch Rider, though modern examples do exist. The utility of this transport method allows scope for numerous secondary missions on top of dispatch riding British soldier in the First World War with pigeon

encourage the British Army to ask ‘Why?’ Whilst requiring some very specialised personnel to train and look after the pigeons, the UK has one of the more active communities in the world, racing and breeding the type of bird perfectly suited to the task. Immune to EW interference, less commonly targeted and with a degree of commonality in most regions of the world, for a time this could prove an indispensable backup. The most likely employment for The RLC would be for reservist handlers to join larger formations to assist in orders distribution. Which RLC unit would take responsibility for this function must be considered.

G - Palletise everything

movement. Keeping a standardised system allows methods to be applied consistently and ensures appropriate platforms can be developed to transport stores. Perfected over years, the NATO standard pallet20 is the mainstay of this uniform system. These are heavily used in the military for all manner of stores, with pre-created loading plans for numerous natures. There are some critical logistic stores however, that are not typically shipped via pallets. Notably, fuel and water. Highlighting problems with the current system and offering solutions will assist the enhancement of

been sought out for targeting, seemingly above all else21. Fuel supply, particularly for armoured

combat effectiveness of entire formations. Early in the war, Russia’s inability to get fuel to the front and subsequent targeting of its limited assets by Ukraine proved disastrous for their initial invasion plans22. The targeting of water provision is always less clear, though the impact on soldiers lacking clean water is devastating. Redundancy for water provision, whether this be sourced locally, moved in bulk or as packed water must be considered as a critical component. As it stands, fuel and water are carried in purpose-built platforms such as the Close Support

Tanker (CST) or are carried as ‘packed liquids’ in Jerry Cans. The CST is incredibly conspicuous in its purpose and thus is easily targeted to hamper a critical component of logistic support.

A solution that takes advantage of NATO pallets may be the answer. They are 1200mm x 1000mm x Approx 100mm (wooden base) in dimensions and can hold 1814kg (4000lbs) of stores. At present, a specialised, stackable version of this, that holds 21 Jerry Cans known as the Schaefer Pallet, is available for ‘packed fuel’ (fuel carried in Jerry Cans or other small containers). These are effective and give the

are thus exempt from, ‘The Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road’ (ADR) regulations. However, to refuel a larger platform, such as the Challenger 2 which required 1592L, using 80 Jerry Cans to achieve this is impractical. A small bulk container with an integral

Some natures stand out as they are unable to be loaded within the restrictions of these pallets, either for size or for weight. A clear example being munitions for MGLRS which are far too long.

As much as possible pallet loads should remain

or where possible triple. The more the British Army can conform its loads to these standards, the simpler it will be to move stores quickly and more easily. It should be noted however, that not all stores will

stores as possible that can (if they do not already).

Tied in with the lighter, protected logistic vehicle,

could be a bulk fuel single pallet system or better yet a double pallet system. A single pallet could copy the ‘Grey Water’ container, which is already in use as a plastic water carriage solution and would be the simplest answer to this conundrum. The more advanced solution would be a double pallet water/ fuel tank in a safe, rounded container that includes an integral pump. This double pallet tank would be able to hold approx. 1800L of fuel or water (clear delineation between the two required), thus effectively being a small bulk liquids solution in its

model main battle tank from empty. Alternatively, a larger, less conspicuous solution could be a containerised version; using a standard ISO container, with a water or fuel bowser and integral pump constructed inside.

A palletised solution such as this would allow the loading of larger amounts of fuel into all regular logistic vehicles; this includes the current MAN SV

were to be acquired in the future. These palletised fuel containers could then more easily be hidden, covered or stored internally to better mask the movement of bulk liquids. This solution balances dispersion of stores

provision of security. More vehicles would be required to move fuel and water, granting a lower likelihood of being targeted as a result but, as stated, complicating

vehicles less conspicuous, standardise as many stores as possible, suggest a mid-way solution for bulk liquids and speed up exchange.

British Army CST and a destroyed Russian fuel vehicle. Both stand out against other vehicles

Example of possible fuel/water container on a custom double pallet. Ideally able to be lifted by an FLRT (FLRT 524 can carry 2400kg) and able to fit inside vehicle theorised in

H - Lessons from the past – Discussion of what have we forgotten

Throughout history, the British Army has constantly had to evolve to keep up with adapting technology. In some instances, however, we have moved away from tried and tested capabilities to adopt the latest innovation. How much old technology can we still utilise and do we need greater redundancy? This section is intended to stimulate thought and to

particularly in Ukraine, some ‘outdated’ equipment has been re-introduced, seeing huge success. These examples could be discussed as part of a wider Army or even RLC review. There are an enormous array of ‘bygone’ tactics, ideas and technologies that may prove useful in the future.

Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and outcry from the British public, pushed the UK to invest in Protected Mobility vehicles. Whilst excellent in role, there are drawbacks to platforms like the Mastiff, which weighs over 23 tons. Crossing bridges, cross country performance and carrying capacity (which is

limited due to armour protection and vehicle weight) all pose problems when using this generation of vehicles. With persistent improvement in Anti-Tank (AT) technology, such as tandem charge warheads, it could be argued that heavy armour (beyond that which will resist small arms and mine blasts) is ineffective. Much like the West German Army concluded in the 1950s/60s23, consideration of speed as a means of protection may, once again, have come to the fore.

During the Second World War, mechanisation was considered critical by both the British and US Armies. As such, numerous small transport vehicles were built in huge numbers, displaying their effectiveness

engage. The British ‘utility’ vehicle was the Universal Carrier24, of which over 100,000 examples were built. This tankette was a lightly armoured, open topped and adaptable platform capable of a large variety of tasks. Utilised through the whole war it could be converted to carry troops, carry heavy weapons,

stores. As discussed in Section C, a modern version of this concept could be adopted utilising the existing Foxhound platform.

A long-lost art, that periodically returns to warfare is the utilisation of animals for specialist missions; the stand-out example being pack mules. Horses and pack mules have been used in warfare for thousands of years and are a proven method to move personnel, stores and to pass messages. Even at the height of operations during the Second World War, the highly mechanised British and US Armies employed pack mules. The UK used them heavily in Burma and the US in Sicily and Italy. The account of their use in the

Section C

Universal Carrier, used here to move stores. Also, a much smaller vehicle with good mobility

Mediterranean theatre can be found in the book ‘War of Supply’25. Here, they were utilised in the second to

was impassable to tracked and wheeled vehicles. As recently as Operation TELIC, in Maysan Province, Iraq, British Army armoured cavalry formations requested horses for operations, as their heavy tanks could not cross the terrain they were operating in. Could

The British Army has changed its focus in recent experience in processing bodies of those deceased. Doctrinally this is a logistic task. ‘War of Supply’ covers the US implementation of their system for processing and burying the dead in the Italian Campaign during the Second World War (Chapters 5 and 6). They dedicated a regiment to processing and even burying soldiers in theatre, able to process in excess of 150 bodies a day. In conventional warfare this is a critical necessity. Bad management would

Counter-Insurgency operations, have involved low numbers of casualties and an aerial based medivac

Brize Norton. This method is not appropriate for Large Scale Combat Operations. A mixture of enemy air defence, higher likelihood of casualties and the sheer volume of potential deaths on the frontline, may necessitate a return to past methods. It is suggested

Allowing and encouraging innovation is a cornerstone of military success. It could be argued that during peacetime, this ability to innovate is are discouraged from actively thinking on their feet to solve issues. During wartime, this barrier falls away, but its hugely important to ardently invigorate this process. This reminds people that solutions to problems, if effective, will be embraced. A prime example of this is the creation of a ‘Bocage Cutting Device’ for the Sherman tank during the Second World War. Sgt Curtis G Cullin noted that Sherman tanks would rise up to climb over hedge rows, exposing their weak belly armour to enemy AT guns and rockets. He welded scrap metal to the front of the tank, allowing it to plough straight through. The Ukrainians have demonstrated the merits of this more recently, which should be noted as a lesson, moving forward.

during ‘Sandhurst for Soldiers’.

The ‘Combat Shotgun’ is a concept that has come in and out of favour with militaries since the 17th century26. Originally introduced as the ‘Blunderbuss’, these were used to great effect by European cavalry units and for infantry in defence. Towards the end of the 19th century, they had fallen out of favour and did not reappear until the First World War. Reappearing at different points throughout the 20th and 21st centuries,

Trench clearing, jungle warfare and breaching to name a few. In Ukraine, there is some evidence that

troops have successfully used shotguns to shoot down Russian drones27. There is certainly an argument, given their utility through history and the myriad of

consideration once more for use by the British Army.

especially for targeting drones. Modern air-cooled machine guns, such as the GPMG are designed to change during long use for cooling. These modern

many however, would melt the barrel. Initially seen as desperation, it appears the Ukrainian answer to the periods, is to utilise the Maxim water cooled heavy machine gun. This weapon system is vintage to say the

thousands of rounds continuously for long periods of time, may well enhance capability to engage multiple, small aerial targets. This is along with its traditional role as a suppression weapon system.

Each key point highlighted from the above paragraphs are listed below. These are just a fraction of ideas, from a long list of potential insights from the past that could be studied and even renewed. See below this consolidated list of historic thinking points:

It is suggested that practices to process bodies be revisited or contracted to ensure a solution is

‘Sandhurst for Soldiers’.

tied to the renewal of an ‘Air Sentry’ in defensive

Summary

All of the concepts above are put forward, for consideration, by current and future Army and Logistic Equipment Programs to enhance future capability. They have been introduced to inspire discussion and to begin to scratch the surface on what might be required, moving forward. Each section is largely exclusive, and they do not all need to be implemented at once or indeed in concert. The primary aim is to see what may be possible and what may have been missed that could prove a detriment

continues to adapt constantly; it is imperative that we continue to change with it.

Though the paper is heavily targeted at logistics operations, these ideas are not solely for The RLC.

from these points in one way or another. For example, adaptation of a Foxhound style platform could also be used as an ambulance or as a light recovery vehicle or implementation of an Army level trial of communications methods. Many ideas are not new but may be implemented in a new and innovative way to enhance survivability and capability. We must continue to do more, with less and should ensure that as much value can be squeezed from the assets we do have as is possible.

A huge number of threats, both new and old, are materialising and are being seen on a scale that may not have been envisaged for the 21st century. The British

now push to start covering the gaps being displayed in ourselves and our allies. The war in Ukraine offers the opportunity to identify further threats, being developed by both the Ukrainians and the Russians. We must ensure that we learn lessons from others, so that we do not repeat them or have to learn them for ourselves.

commanders options.

theorised system is nothing new; it adapts existing

Description of symbology and use:

The ARA (Artillery Reserved Area) is a space

space, ideally, is to be left clear by other formations to allow artillery to occupy quickly and conduct actions as necessary. Here, this is adapted to the RDP (Reserve Distribution Point). The theory would be to select a number of areas and codify them ahead of operations in order to allow commanders to select locations quickly and communicate it to a dependency. This would enhance security and allow all C/S with access to the map overlay to understand where subunits are working.

The AMA (Artillery Manoeuvre Area) is similar to the ARA in all aspects but is reserved for temporary use for formations to move through. This would be adapted into the RXP (Reserve Exchange Point), to allow formations to exchange stores in an intermediary location before pushing through to

of both is that the space can be allocated as a 1x1km space, for example, with further recce

‘Spot’ as per a spot map. These are points that can be both coloured and numbered, giving a coverage of pre-labelled nodes that all C/S must have on their maps. These can enhance navigation, mission security, reporting and planning. Typical locations for points would be road junctions, bridges and distinct features.

Utilising the above image as an example; correct

to state a mission such as the following: “We will move from our Hbr area at Hbr 003 to RXP 004 to collect stores, via XP, from 17 Sqn, 7 RLC. We will then move via spots 4, 8, 14, 18, 24, 28 and 30 to ESTABLISH at RDP 009. There we will meet our

hold the relevant maps or overlays, this greatly

Using this mapping system all together, most likely at the brigade level, but with input from regiments, encourages simplicity and ease of understanding at lower levels. Though planning initially would potentially be long winded and complicated, management thereafter would be more intuitive and give junior commanders scope to plan more easily. This system would also allow higher formations to track tactical actions more readily, where necessary.

Annex A - Battlespace Management Example

Endnotes

1British Ministry of Defence (2023), ‘Field Army Threat Handbook’, available at: FATH, (Accessed 22/12/2023).

2British Ministry of Defence (2020), ‘Doctrine Note 20/1, Sustainment’, Chapter 1, Pages 1-16 and 1-17, Chapter 2, Page 2-4, Available at DN 20/01 Sustainment, (Accessed 22/12/2023).

3British Ministry of Defence (2015), ‘Tactical Logistic Support Handbook 2015’, Available at TLSH, (Accessed 22/12/2023).

4British Ministry of Defence (2012), ‘Operational Road Transport’, Available at ORT, (accessed 22/12/2023).

5The Telegraph (Danielle Sheridan) (2023), ‘Sandhurst for soldiers’ will be created to boost skills, says Army head’, Available at Link, (Accessed 14/02/2024).

6Defence One (2023), ‘New Artillery Round Shoots Farther Than Some Missiles, Can Hit Moving Targets’ (Sam Skove), available at Link, (accessed 10/01/2024).

7British Ministry of Defence, ‘Doctrine Note 20/1, Sustainment’, Chapter 3, Page 31, Para 3-64, Available at DN 20/1 Sustainment, (Accessed 22/12/2023).

8Defence Express (2023), ‘Russians Announce 2S35 KoalitsiyaThat Make the Whole Development Pointless’, available at Link, (accessed 10/01/2024).

9RUSI (Sam Cranny-Evans) (2023), ‘Russia’s Artillery War in Ukraine: Challenges and Innovations’, available at Link, (Accessed 11/01/2024).

10Wikipedia (Various detailed sources), ‘Operation Dragoon’; inserted for background information, available at Link, (Accessed 03/04/2024).

11BBC News, Claire Press and Svitlana Libet (2023), ‘How Russia's 35-mile armoured convoy ended in failure’, available at Link, (Accessed 08/03/2024).

12DSTL (2023), Posted to ‘X’, ‘The Survivability Onion’, available at Link, image an adaptation of link (accessed 12/01/2024).

13British Ministry of Defence (2021), ‘Future Soldier Guide’, available at Link (Accessed 02/02/2024).

14 at Link (Accessed 02/02/2024).

15USMC ‘The Tactical Notebook’, B.B McBreen (2023), ‘Ukraine, Lessons for Leaders; What should Marines learn from this modern war?’ (Accessed 02/02/2024).

16British Ministry of Defence, DLW (2024), ‘DLW’s_Intent_ Jan_2024-LWC-DLW-OS’, (Accessed 13/02/2024).

17British Ministry of Defence, DLW (2022), ‘Land Warfare Centre Command Plan 22 to 25 Ver 1.1’, available at Link (Accessed 13/02/2024).

18Sky News, Kieran Devine (2023), ‘Ukraine war: Mobile networks available at Link, (Accessed 20/03/2024).

19The Independent, Vanessa Mock and Clifford Coonan (2011), at Link, (Accessed 04/03/2024).

20British Ministry of Defence, JSP886 (2013), ‘The Defence logistics support chain manual’ (Superseded by DLF, though 23/07/2024).

21The Independent, Emily Atkinson (2022), ‘‘Logistical problems continue to beset faltering invasion,’ says MoD’, Available at Link, (Accessed 18/07/2024).

22The Independent, Andy Gregory (2022), ‘UK intelligence suggests invading Russian forces may be suffering ‘acute

23The Canadian Encyclopedia, John Boileau (2021), ‘Leopard 1 Tank’, available at Link, (Accessed 27/02/2024).

24The Vickers Machine Gun Blog (2024), ‘The Machine Gun Carrier and Universal Carrier’, available at Link (Accessed 27/02/2024).

25War of Supply, David D. Dworak (2022), ‘World War II Allied Logistics in the Mediterranean’ Part II, Chapter 4,5,6, (Accessed Dec 2023 – Feb 2024 via Audible).

26Warfare History Network, Christopher Miskimon (2009), ‘The Short-Range Shotgun’, available at Link, (Accessed 04/03/2024).

27YouTube, Warleaks - Military Blog, (2023), ‘Ukrainian Soldiers Shoot Down Russian Lancet Drone With Shotgun - Helmet Camera’, available at Link, (Accessed 04/03/2024).

Bibliography of Images

Image 1: Front Cover – Pexels ‘Military Vehicle Parked Near Houses’ (CC0) No changes were made. https://images.pexels. com/photos/11796771/pexels-photo-11796771.jpeg

Image 2: Survivability Onion– Based on the original, this is redesigned by the Author. Capt Hadley Booth-Millard

Image 3: Logistics Convoy Afghanistan– Sgt Wes Calder RLC, Crown Copyright ‘Mastiff and Ridgeback Heavily Armoured Patrol Vehicles in Convoy (CC BY-NC 2.0) No changes were

fd91c9d832_b.jpg

Image 4: Air Defence Assets – Wikimedia Commons ‘Starstreak launcher on Dartmoor’ (CC BY-SA). No changes were made. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Starstreak_launcher_ on_Dartmoor.jpg

Image 5:

Image 6: Dispatch Rider – Picryl, Imperial War Museum ‘The British Army in North-West Europe 1944-45’ (CC PDM) No changes were made. https://picryl.com/media/the-britisharmy-in-north-west-europe-1944-45-b9868-0ce5e3

Image 7: British Army Pigeon – Picryl, Imperial War Museum ‘The Royal Engineers Signals Service on the Western Front, 1914-1918’ (CC PDM) No changes were made. https://picryl. com/media/the-royal-engineers-signals-service-on-thewestern-front-1914-1918-q11954-623b22

Image 8: British Army CST – Flickr, Crown Copyright ‘Oshkosh Tactical Air Refueller’ (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) No changes were 69f_c.jpg

Image 9: Destroyed Russian Fuel Truck – Rawpixel ‘A Labour strategy for Russia’s war on Ukraine’ (CC0 1.0) No changes were made. https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/ v1/5f913e2f4a89b93e9e4e2b8d/171805185557619IGD91T8Y5PB8JBKVM9/Ukraine_Environmental_War_ Crimes.png

Image 10: Fuel water container, model created by the author for this project.

Image 11: Universal Carrier – Picryl, Imperial War Museum ‘The British Army in North-west Europe 1944-45’ (CC0 PDM 1.0) No changes were made. https://picryl.com/media/the-britisharmy-in-north-west-europe-1944-45-b10134-eaf176

Annex A graphic - Ariel Imagery with Annotations – Google Maps, with additions from the author to give an example of an overlay. Guidelines on use of google captured images: https:// about.google/brand-resource-center/products-and-services/ geo-guidelines/

Foxhound Negative – Military Clipart, Defence Gateway, Crown Copyright ‘Foxhound LPPV Negative’ (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) Changes were made to this image to illustrate vehicle

clipart/?page_id=2

Contributions and thanks

Thank you to the wider DSLA Command Wing Field Log 1 team for providing advice and support throughout the production of this document. A special thanks goes out to Capt Thomas Newman RLC who assisted greatly with ideas and rationalisation of them. Further, a thanks to Lt Col Robert Williams RLC, Maj Matthew Bowsley RLC and Maj James Sanford RLC for assisting with editing and coherency.

Lt Gethyn Chadwick RLC discusses why future logistic operations of NATO forces will face a severe threat from a peer-adversary, if member states’ tactical logistics doctrine doesn’t adjust to

The War in Ukraine is continuing to provide NATO forces with exceedingly helpful information about Russia. This presents every NATO partner with a valuable opportunity to make the required adjustments and preparations to ensure they are The lessons-learned in Ukraine have come at an enormous cost, and it is paramount that NATO absorb these lessons to improve effectiveness and tanks, and security academics are undertaking exceptional work to analyse and comment on the data from Ukraine, identifying some key issues with NATO preparedness and offering carefully considered suggestions. In many cases however, it is to make suggestions at the tactical level. It is often the case that analysis and suggestions sit between the operational and strategic levels but have and adjusted to. Suggestions offered in a range of

defence literature from RUSI, the RAND Cooperation, United States Marine Corps and Australian Army will be examined to develop the discussion of tactical to achieve a higher-level of logistic preparedness.

explaining to what extent rapid changes could be made at the tactical level, and what opportunities should be pursued at higher executive levels. Analysis above the tactical level is also employed throughout to set the context for broader ideas.

Though not a new concept, the increased logistics will be explored. An explanation of how a combination of tactical innovation, combined with a modernised procurement approach can achieve the gold standard of ambiguity will be outlined. Using information from the Russo-Ukraine War, it is becoming increasingly clear that this enhanced standard will be required for a credible level of protection to be realised. The example of the United

study to understand how vehicle and load uniformity can best be achieved. Developing these proposals, the essay will discuss the proposed changes to practices and how they can best be achieved. Based around the essay will also explore how a combined arms approach to logistics and utilisation of more complex resupply methods may ensure a more resilient supply chain and the protection of a deployed force. This

current lack of integration between combat and logistic units, contending that the recommendations, based on lessons from Ukraine, cannot truly be actioned until the level of integration improves. Finally, based on the evidence presented, this essay will summarise by underlining the increased threats that deliberate targeting of high priority logistic loads along logistic’ tasks. Designing logistic vehicles to facilitate hoc localised initiatives will also likely improve the security of loads in transit whilst adopting a combined training doctrine and exercise regime should deliver a force multiplying effect.

Ambiguous Loads

concealing the true nature of cargo is prominent in much of the literature and learning accounts on

nature of cargo carried by their logistic platforms and rightly lauded their innovation in the area. It is paramount that logistic units seeking to protect their materiel adopt this approach, however, there is considerable evidence to suggest that Ukraine’s developed. The concept of concealing the nature of cargo within logistic movements is certainly not new. There are examples of ancient militaries placing goods.1

was more concerned about preventing goods from theft, but the principle remained the same. The threat now faced by Ukraine as it sustains its forces

along interior LoCs is very different to anything

forces can obtain a clear image and understanding of a convoy or single vehicle by utilising affordable unmanned aerial systems. These developments result in the need for ambiguous loads being critical rather than desirable, but, given the availability of

real concealment. Although Ukraine receives the most attention for endeavouring to conceal the nature of logistic loads, much less is said about Ukraine’s ability to remain largely undeceived by Russian attempts to mask its operations along its LoCs. Fuel vehicles are a priority for Ukrainian attacks for several reasons, notably the devastating impact of the Russian fuel shortage on the effectiveness of armoured vehicles

tankers. This is a large number of fuel tankers, given tankers.

considering Russia’s considerable efforts to conceal the nature of these vehicles. Major Robert Gibson

of concealing fuel vehicles as cargo variants . For ambiguous loads, Russia’s failings are extremely concerning. Despite efforts to change the appearance

recognise the attempt at deception. The success rate of concealing fuel platforms seems directly related to the sensor technologies searching for them. Using

made to mask the vehicle’s signature. Clear drone imagery however, provides a much improved chance of identifying any differences to the vehicle model or structure. It is unclear from the current data exactly how long Russia’s attempts at ambiguity of fuel loads can remain successful. It is also important to

militaries will not possess in the realm of deception to conceal loads. Several news reports exist of Russia attempting to disguise military fuel vehicles as civilian trucks. A video is referenced by Defence

refuelling them4’. Defence Advisor Dylan Malyasov

Russian troops trying to disguise their fuel trucks as civilian vehicles. Russian specialists also conducted grain trucks to conceal them from air attack and reconnaissance assets.5’ Clearly, it is unlikely that western militaries would be permitted, or would choose to, disguise their fuel platforms as civilian trucks, at least to the extent evidenced in these videos

The importance of ambiguous loads is undeniable, be it making fuel vehicles appear as cargo variants, concealing certain types of ammunition as rations or

Credit; Pixabay

items less valuable, or achieving complete uniformity

learning accounts portray. Make-shift adaptation of vehicles is certainly a step in the right direction at the tactical level and should be carried out where possible. Soldiers at the tactical level must become adept at these types of adaptations so they can be achieved rapidly and in arduous conditions. The gold standard however calls for buy-in at the procurement level to ensure true ambiguity in the age of clear UAS imagery and ever-improving vision

can only be concealed to a degree by innovative designs and craftsmanship, but militaries aiming to achieve greater protection for logistic assets should endeavour to utilise the same vehicle type for any cargo, especially fuel. This may even involve reducing lift capacity to ensure the same size of vehicle across various fuel and cargo capabilities.

The RUSI article titled, ‘

, offers several proposals as to how sustainment of land forces can be improved on the attention to the concept of ‘load ambiguity’ while recognising some of the challenges. The article offers an explanation as to why vehicle loads are so obviously recognisable, claiming that previous accidents have led to ‘an extended aversion to mixing loads of most kinds in peacetime.’6 This has resulted in fuel-carrying vehicles or packaging having a very distinct signature. As the article rightly points out, it aids logistic movements during peacetime as vehicles are able to meet safety requirements to enable easier training and planning. During a period of war

assets. The increased level of risk that comes with training with more subtle methods of fuel storage and movement must be recognised as an acceptable risk if logistic units are to be prepared to mask fuel distribution in war. More ambiguous fuel storage and movement may also require additional staff work or defence and civil liaison to secure the necessary

The Russo-Ukraine War has made this very clear, and it is a step in the right direction that the ability vehicle appearances to be adapted and manipulated at the tactical level is being recognised. To achieve a greater level of protection however, especially on the changes that prioritise a base-level of uniformity

The United States’ Oshkosh HEMTT vehicle family serves as an interesting example of a mostly uniform

7 are 8 x 8 diesel off-road vehicles which offer a variety of

Engineering organisations boast the HEMTT’s agile design, claiming ‘the underbody protection is stateof-the-art and can withstand even the most severe attacks.’8 Against a modern adversary however, the real selling point for the HEMTT is the ability

logistic requirement while remaining mostly uniform. capabilities including air defence. Although this goes beyond the scope of this article, it does emphasize uniform regardless of use. The vehicle cab looks the same regardless of variant. This is attribute is unique to this platform and is not afforded to the logistic or Germany. It is not unreasonable to assume that could provide a useful tool for differentiating between vehicles in the Russo-Ukraine war. Also

are mostly of a similar height and length, which facilitates concealment of a variety of loads. Unlike other contemporary logistic platforms, the HEMTT fuel variant can be effectively masked as a general cargo vehicle. Even the most unique-looking variants can still be manageably concealed. The M984 A2 Recovery Truck (Wrecker) variant for example, can be made to look very similar to the primary cargo variant when the crane is tucked away. The M1120 A2 load handling system (LHS) does provide some unique challenges considering the higher loading system, but it also provides a much better starting point than logistic vehicles currently being used by Russia or Ukraine. This essay does not necessarily

HEMTT vehicle family or speak to the performance of the platform. The learning point is to use the HEMTT as a general proof of concept for a functioning family of logistic vehicles which can be made to look very similar across variants. Even where there are differences in appearances, the structural similarities could make it considerably easier for soldiers at the tactical level to adapt the appearance to achieve a ambiguous load options is extremely important in the protection of high value logistic assets.

Integrating Logistics

The Russo-Ukraine War has revealed countless issues with the conventional means of performing logistic operations. The importance of logistics on

Credit: Oshkosh Corporation

progress in war in Ukraine is often attributed to failing logistics.’9 Whilst there are certainly many reasons for failures in logistics that do not involve the enemy threat, the need to protect logistics from deliberate targeting has never been higher. A recurring lesson closely connected with manoeuvre formations to ensure the protection of logistic assets. In turn, this will ensure the functionality of the manoeuvre formations is protected. In some cases, it is believed that the disconnect between logistics and operations stems from where logistic units are placed within the command structure of a military organisation. Captain Sean Ford writing in the Gazette takes a particularly aggressive stance on logistic units being positioned outside the command structure of manoeuvre units, stating ‘This practice leads to an insidious mentality of divorcing logistics from operations. Logistics cannot exist without operations. Operations cannot function without logistics. Knowingly disconnecting these elements from each other is asinine.’10 The majority of NATO militaries do utilise logistic formations, such as the United Kingdom’s 102 Operational Sustainment Brigade11 or Poland’s 10th Logistic Brigade.12 If this is going to remain the case, NATO must ensure that logistic formations are thoroughly integrated with partner manoeuvre formations. Beyond improved integrated command structures, there are certainly improvements that can be made to combat arms and logistics interoperability at the tactical level to ensure greater protection of logistics. Watling and Horne recognise the importance of combat arms supporting the protection of logistic assets, particularly in ‘last mile resupply.’ They posit that logistics will ‘require the support of combat arms in some instances, to shape conditions for access. This is especially true of electronic warfare troops and air defence.’13

an electronic warfare capability will enable greater freedom for logistic elements to communicate with their dependencies and achieve a higher tempo of timely resupply. Additionally, depending on the available capability, the support from air defence forces should clearly reduce the threat from air defence are only two examples of capabilities that

may be required to protect logistics in the ‘lastmile’. RUSI’s Preliminary Lessons from Ukraine’s Offensive Operations suggests, ‘last-mile resupply becomes a combined arms endeavour, requiring the engineering support and other measures to create windows of opportunity for movement.’14 Clearly, achieving this will require massively improved levels of inter-operability between logistic, combat, and combat support arms. Understanding the importance of achieving support of this nature is a very valuable lesson from the Russo-Ukraine War, in the training conducted by NATO militaries. Neither air-defence nor electronic warfare assets can be easily plugged into a logistic movement. The planning considerations of utilising these assets and embedding them within a logistic unit must be understood and constantly rehearsed. For example, planners must understand to what extent these capabilities will add to the signature of their convoy and how they are best positioned. It might be necessary for logistic units to create new techniques and operating practices, based on these capabilities. Only by allowing logistic units to train with these capabilities will commanders understand how they can best be employed to achieve the effect of protecting that particular logistic operation. Failure to enable logistic units to train with this type of support will present severe problems if implemented too late upon entrance into a theatre.

Improved technology combined with Russia’s use of mines to channel opposition forces have made ‘last

last mile resupply as, ‘delivery of combat supplies from the forward-most location (such as a physical base or a logistics/infantry vehicle) to personnel engaged in combat operations.’15 It is important to consider ‘last mile resupply’ as a concept, as, despite the name, there is no set distance to describe the importance of swiftness in the last mile, recognising vital supplies in order to maintain operational tempo and enable successful mission outcomes.’16 While there are challenges throughout the supply chain, the to plan deliberately. Although there is progress being

that militaries must still prepare to conduct these resupply operations using soldiers and conventional equipment. Reynolds best summarises why lastmile resupply operations are so complex as, ‘The persistence of surveillance over the frontline, combined with cheap and scalable precision strike using UAVs, poses a particular threat to the resupply of forces on the offence because the available ground lines of communication become constrained to established breaches and are therefore easy to monitor.’17 As last-mile resupply operations have become so high risk, there is a desperate need to adjust how these operations are conducted. The current methodology used by the majority of NATO land forces has become outdated. It is possible that several tested and preferred methods are no longer

viable, meaning logistic soldiers must become more threat. The types of resupply operations that pose the most risk involve both the logistic unit and the combat supply point while conducting a handover of materiel. This is by far the preferred method during peacetime for several reasons, namely that it is fairly simple and ensures the correct items have been transferred and both parties are present to ensure everything is correctly accounted for. The resupply option that appears to present the least risk to personnel on the

The method of placing supplies in a chosen location to later be collected by the dependency is referred to differently depending on the country. The terms resupply’ are the most popular descriptors. This method can be considerably more complex to plan and execute; it also presents a greater risk of losing

positioned resupply however is that it dramatically reduces the signature of a resupply operation, with only one force element being positioned in close proximity to the supplies at any given time. US Army

or other times as appropriate, the platoons will most likely need restocked supplies, also known as

The description evidences an unwillingness to utilise this type of resupply method in the delivery of more

stores and ammunition, but this method would not be used to resupply vehicle parts or medical materiel. If

adversary, as this article recommends, commanders must be willing to elevate the level of risk allowing for all classes of items to be delivered in this manner.

more problems for land forces, all of which can be resupply is considerably more demanding for the for liaison and planning to receive the supply will be substantial. Additionally, without the logistic

commit a larger force to the task compared to more conventional resupply methods. Finally, combat units

of work is conducted by the logistic unit. This will include loading supplies onto vehicles, ensuring their security in transit, and likely using material handling

cordon or having sentry positions at several locations massively reduced signature during this type of operation. RUSI suggests options for providing a level of security to the supplies temporarily stored

remotely rigging a camera and running the feed from it via cable to a hide position.’ Another more troops with overwatch of the site, rather than ringing it.’ This latter option potentially provides a level

signature of the operation. A handful of soldiers in an

of these options are credible, timely and accurate

additional training and practice, potentially reducing time where combat units could be practicing their primary role. In parallel, logistic units must become

positioned resupply should be the preferred method of compromise and targeting by a peer enemy. To units must show willingness to learn the logistic supplies rapidly and covertly. In unison, logistic units anticipating the needs of their dependencies and observation posts and utilise technologies to protect

capability, combat and logistic units must train regularly together at length, enhancing shared skills and promoting mutual understanding. These units must become increasingly connected and operations. The suboptimal alternative is exposed by operations, one is doing their adversary a favour.’

complex supply chain, land forces cannot afford to proceed with the current disconnect between logistics and operations.

Credit: Oshkosh Corporation

In summary, future logistic operations of NATO forces will face a severe threat if the organisation is to enter a war with a peer-adversary, whether this be Russia or another state belligerent. If NATO is to recommendations and lessons from the Russo-Ukraine war with haste. Although some changes can be made relatively quickly at the tactical level, ensuring a level of protection beyond what is witnessed through the innovation of Ukrainian soldiers, will require time and resources. Such is the risk to supply chain operations, striving to achieve ambiguity across a logistic vehicle

level can begin to practice methods to conceal loads

variant. This will likely offer a layer of protection in poor visibility, unclear imagery or an untrained enemy that lacks an understanding of vehicle signatures. clear drone imagery and a trained enemy, militaries must look to modernise procurement cycles to ensure

example of a platform that provides an excellent opportunity for soldiers at the tactical level to achieve nearly complete ambiguity. A small part of achieving ambiguity is accepting an added level of risk to logistic operations during peacetime. Logistic soldiers must of critical materials as regular cargo. The only way to ‘Last-mile resupply’ is becoming an increasingly the necessary level of resupply to sustain intense procedures at the tactical level. Logistic units must immediately begin training ‘pre-positioned resupply’ or ‘dead letterbox’ type operations, striving to reduce the signature of resupply operations where possible. The main learning point for most logistic units will involve improving how the supplies are protected

the establishment of observation points and aim to exploit affordable technology to ensure maximum visibility of supplies and the surrounding area. Based on recent experience, it is certain that creative individuals will develop additional effective methods not proposed in this essay. The main barrier to the success of these operations is the lack of integration between logistic and combat units. Part of this may stem from where logistic units are placed in the command structure, but the main weakness is the lack of integrated and regular training. Resupply operations must be considered of the highest importance, ensuring both logistic and combat units can execute resupply operations swiftly. It cannot be afforded for logistics to be disconnected from operations. Similarly with achieving load ambiguity, an elevated level of risk must also be accepted to allow for these operations to be realistically trained for. Commanders must allow for units to exchange equipment without the extensive bureaucracy required in peacetime. This increased need for prepositioned resupply operations does not mean the conventional methods of resupply are to be totally abandoned, but their viability in a contested area is

reasonable option should the threat picture dictate. In many cases NATO is adapting appropriately to the threat of Russia. Although soldiers at the tactical level must be asked to adapt rapidly, they must receive the proper support at the highest level of Defence. Increased appetite for risk, better integration between combat units and logistics, and a modernised

tactical elements well-placed to ensure the delivery of

Endnotes

1Goldsworthy, A.K. (2023) Oxford: Clarendon Press.

2Mittal, V. (2022) Ukrainian Military is Targeting Russian Fuel and Supply Lines As Winter Approaches. [online] Forbes. Available at: www.forbes.com/sites/vikrammittal/2022/12/11/ukranianmilitary-is-targeting-russian-fuel-supply-lines-as-winterapproaches/.

3Gibson, R. (2022) Logistic Lessons in the Russia-Ukraine War. [online] The Cove. Available at: Logistic Lessons in the RussiaUkraine War | The Cove (army.gov.au).

4Malyasov, D. (2023) Russian Military Disguise Fuel Trucks as Logging Trucks. [online] Defence Blog. Available at: Russian military disguise fuel trucks as logging trucks (defence-blog.com).

5Ibid.

6Watling. J, Horne. Si. (2024).

. London: RUSI.

7Army Technology. (2021) Oshkosh HEMTT Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck. [online] Projects. Available at: Oshkosh HEMTT Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck - Army Technology (army-technology.com).

8Marinescu. D (2021) Rugged and Powerful, the HEMTT A4 Is Best Suited for Demanding Battlegrounds. [online] Autoevolution. Available at: Rugged and Powerful, the HEMTT A4 Is Best Suited for Demanding Battlegrounds.

9Skoglund. R, Listou. T, Ekstrom. T. (2022) the Ukrainian War: Can Operational Failures be Attributed to Copenhagen: Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies. 10Ford, S. (2022).

Virginia: Marine Corps Issues and Ideas.

11Ministry of Defence. (2021) Future Soldier: Transforming the 12Dowd, A. Cook, C. Jankowski, D. (2023)

Has the Fuel It Needs to Fight the Next War. Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

13Watling. J, Horne. Si. (2024). London: RUSI.

14Watling, J. Danyluk, O. Reynolds, N. (2024). Preliminary Lessons London: RUSI.

15Defence Science and Technology Laboratory. (2017). Competition: autonomous last mile resupply. [online] Defence and Security Accelerator. Available at: Competition document: autonomous last mile resupply - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk).

16Ibid.

17Watling, J. Danyluk, O. Reynolds, N. (2024). Preliminary Lessons London: RUSI.

18Army Supply Class 1: Subsistence (Food, rations, and water) Class 2: Clothing, Class 3:Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants, Class

6: Personal Items, Class 7: Major End Items, Class 8: Medical Supplies (Minimal Amounts), Class 9: Parts For Repairs. Class 10: Miscellaneous Supplies/Civil Affairs.

19United States Army. (n.d) Supply and Field Servies. [online] Doctrine Supplement. Available at: Mission Command (army.mil).

20Watling. J, Horne. Si. (2024). London: RUSI.

21Ford, S. (2022).

Virginia: Marine Corps Issues and Ideas.

Bibliography

Army Technology. (2021) Oshkosh HEMTT Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck. [online] Projects. Available at: Oshkosh HEMTT Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck - Army Technology (army-technology.com).

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory. (2017). Competition: autonomous last mile resupply. [online] Defence and Security Accelerator. Available at: Competition document: autonomous last mile resupply - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk).

Dowd, A. Cook, C. Jankowski, D. (2023) E

Has the Fuel It Needs to Fight the Next War. Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ford, S. (2022).

. Virginia: Marine Corps Issues and Ideas.

Gibson, R. (2022) Logistic Lessons in the Russia-Ukraine War. [online] The Cove. Available at: Logistic Lessons in the RussiaUkraine War | The Cove (army.gov.au). Goldsworthy, A.K. (2023) Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Malyasov, D. (2023) Russian Military Disguise Fuel Trucks as Logging Trucks. [online] Defence Blog. Available at: Russian military disguise fuel trucks as logging trucks (defence-blog.com). Marinescu. D (2021) Rugged and Powerful, the HEMTT A4 Is Best Suited for Demanding Battlegrounds. [online] Autoevolution. Available at: Rugged and Powerful, the HEMTT A4 Is Best Suited for Demanding Battlegrounds.

Martin, B. Barnett, D. McCarthy, D. (2023) California: RAND Corporation.

Martin, B. (2022) [online] RAND Corporation. Available at: https://www.rand.org/ pubs/commentary/2023/02/will-logistics-be-russias-undoingin-ukraine.

Michael, L. Myllyvirta, L. (2024) Why Ukraine Should Keep . London: Foreign Affairs. Ministry of Defence. (2021) Future Soldier: Transforming the

Mittal, V. (2022) Ukranian Military is Targeting Russian Fuel and Supply Lines As Winter Approaches. [online] Forbes. Available at: www.forbes.com/sites/vikrammittal/2022/12/11/ukranianmilitary-is-targeting-russian-fuel-supply-lines-as-winterapproaches/.

Skoglund. R, Listou. T, Ekstrom. T. (2022) the Ukrainian War: Can Operational Failures be Attributed Copenhagen: Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies.

Ti, R. Kinsey, C. (2022)

. Abindon: Defence Studies, Taylor and Francis.

United States Army. (n.d) Supply and Field Servies. [online] Doctrine Supplement. Available at: Mission Command (army. mil).

Watling, J. Danyluk, O. Reynolds, N. (2024). Preliminary Lessons . London: RUSI.

Watling. J, Horne. Si. (2024). London: RUSI.

Since its formation in April 2015, the focus of the RLC Foundation, now re-branded RLC Connect, has been to promote professional engagement with industry and academia and share best practice; maintain awareness of innovation and to encourage and facilitate thought leadership.

soldiers, veterans and civilians working for the military, or in the logistics industry and academia, to contribute thought provoking articles to the 2026 Review. The Review is the professional journal of the RLC and is distributed to members of the Corps serving at home and abroad. This includes all NATO

Australia. It is also sent to all RLC Connect corporate partners, supporters and friends.

Articles may be written under the following overarching categories:

• Professional Development

• General Interest

Cash prizes

There are cash prizes for the best contribution in each category. Prizes are also awarded to:

• Best contribution overall

• Best contribution by a private soldier

• Best contribution by a civilian

Rules

Articles must not exceed 5,000 words and must be properly referenced and supported with good quality copyright permissioned illustrations and images. Reuse licence details must be stated.

All articles submitted for publication will be read and marked board. The prize winners will then be selected from the articles they judge as good enough for publication.

The closing date for submissions for the 2026 Review is 3rd October 2025.

Entries are open now and submissions should be sent to Marti Jerrard at: therlcfoundation@gmail.com

The front line of technical training in modern defence

How Pearson TQ apprenticeships are driving diversity and innovation in the Royal Logistic Corps

The Royal Logistic Corps (RLC) leads the way in discipline, creating skilled personnel is critical to its mission. Today, with the rise of advanced engineering and munitions technology, The RLC is taking its commitment to developing its recruits one step further by pioneering new approaches to military training through apprenticeships. Pearson TQ is immensely proud to support the Corps by delivering cutting-edge technical programmes that equip learners with the essential skills and

changing for the apprentices that take them. Recently, Sgt Danielle Thacker, an Ammunition Technician (AT) has become Operational Munitions Engineering Technician (OMET) apprenticeship. Achieving a Distinction, she has not only pushed the boundaries of technical excellence but also blazed a trail

highlights a broader shift across the defence sector - one in which talent and commitment go beyond outdated gender apprenticeship has helped her grow:

that would be employed elsewhere in trade. Later I was able to same pathway.”

Danielle’s accomplishment also highlights how apprenticeships can serve as a bridge between military service and the civilian world. By aligning closely with the technical training requirements for Ammunition Technicians, the RLC’s OMET apprenticeship supports Defence’s core objectives while simultaneously laying the groundwork for a civilian career. This is reinforced by the growing demand for skilled professionals in sectors such as engineering and logistics. Major defence contractors like Thales recognise the value of a technically

In a rapidly evolving operational environment, the need for skilled and adaptive personnel has never been greater. The RLC’s commitment to developing young people like Danielle underscores its forward-thinking culture, one that embraces diversity and champions innovation. Pearson TQ shares this

developed in conjunction with real employers. Danielle’s success story is a powerful testament to what happens when opportunity, ambition, and cutting-edge training meet - paving the way for more service members, regardless of gender, to thrive in modern defence logistics.

Explore Pearson TQ training at: go.pearson.com/TQtraining

Capt Alexander Shaw RLC

space to inform future logistic operations within the peer-on-peer strategic environment?

Introduction

On 24 February 2022, columns of armour baring striking ‘Z’ symbols rolled over the Ukrainian border changing the framework of geopolitics from the relative peace of the modern world and how NATO

What could have been the blitzkrieg of the 21st Century - rapid Russian gains being made towards Kiev quickly grinding to an unresounding halt. The initial slow progress could be attributed to many factors, which will surely be debated by military historians for years to come - from under equipped troops to lack of command and control - but there is one thing that stood above all else in having the single biggest impact on the slow grind of the Russian forces in those early weeks: Logistics. This article aims to unpack what logistics looks like

Insurgency) environment where it is clearer than ever that the logistical chain does not simply happen, and NATO forces are unlikely to have the overmatch and

This article seeks to evaluate this through the eyes of contemporary operations. Lessons will partially be drawn from Op CABRIT (The UK commitment to defending NATO allies in the Baltic States) that could help shape the future of British and NATO Logistics in global operations.

and analyse contemporary peer logistics. This will

The second part of the essay will be an analysis of current logistics in the British Army and NATO, part of this article will look to the future. Using the

like for British forces and how logistics will likely

implications for The RLC.

One thing is for sure, if senior military leaders on the front line have paid lip service to the need for sound G4 in the past, history is proving once again that an army marches on its stomach, battles are won in the rear and even the bravest soldiers will eventually falter when provided with the wrong kit

to perform the task at hand. Simply put, the Army of today needs to watch what is happening on the Eastern front and take notes if it is going to survive

Contemporary Peer Logistics: What are the lessons needed to be learnt from the

a modern, peer on peer, land war and as such, it is imperative that lessons are learnt from the success has proven to be one of the more decisive factors in Ukraine’s successful defence of its sovereign land. Both Ukraine and Russia use different logistical concepts. It is important to understand their strengths and weaknesses and from this we can develop the foundations for successful future logistic operations.

The clearest difference between Russian and on rail1. Due to Russia’s size, rail has long been way of moving a large amount of supplies and because of this Russia limits its logistic doctrine to simple ‘push’ logistics. Push logistics sees large stocks of supplies pushed towards the front and

echelons. These supplies are dictated from the upper elements having little say in what they are receiving2. This form of logistical doctrine is outdated and leaves the concentrated forward supply areas and exchange points, as well as the railways themselves, vulnerable to attack. Russia is however for tunate as the majority of Ukraine’s ability to strike into Russian territory is limited3. Due to concerns of escalation, western supplied long range, precision guided munitions, are restricted to Ukrainian territory. This has allowed Russia to create large stockpiles with impunity within a shorter distance from the front line than would be possible in unrestricted warfare. However, in light of the announcement that Iran will supply long range munitions to Russia, the US indicated that was willing to remove these restrictions4. The impunity that Russian has enjoyed will potentially disappear and will expose a major vulnerability in Russia’s already stressed supply chain. These weaknesses are already being exploited to some degree by the newly emergent FPV drones. These cheap to produce and easy to operate systems have proven to be an excellent tool to interdict large logistical moves and mass storage areas.

Ukraine has adopted doctrine based around NATO ‘pull’ logistics5. This places the emphasis on demands

equipment on time. This requires a more stringent planning cycle, more robust logistic bodies and the dispersal of stores to be readily available to units that require them. Unlike the Russians, Ukrainian logistic nodes are smaller in size but larger in number and spread over a wide area. This has proven challenging target and destroy, but Ukraine’s deception plans have allowed them to disguise normal buildup signs of an impending attack. This can be seen as recently as the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk6. Ukraine has also had to contend with the problem of FPV drones, however their ability to disguise and disperse have lessened the effect of these drone strikes, as well as

Given certain conditions, both systems of logistics work, however they have never been tested to this extent in a modern context or under the strains of modern technological advancements. Neither side has demonstrated an ability to establish aerial superiority or fully dominates the artillery battle. The risk to logistical elements on both sides remain high

but because of their use of deception and dispersion, Ukraine’s logistical doctrine has been more successful. They have proven that the NATO concept for logistics has a basis for success in a peer-on-peer environment, dispersion and deception remain key to survivability. While survivability is crucial for sustained logistical operations, a balance must be struck with operational effectiveness in order to successfully execute missions and tasks while minimising casualties. Flexibility and adaptability are crucial for maintaining survivability and operational effectiveness. Russia has shown a glaring lack of adaptability to the situation they have found themselves in. Russia’s initial plan called for a swift invasion and suppression of the armed forces of Ukraine. Their logistic doctrine supports this type of short-term rapid engagement. During the initial invasion, Russia deployed light airborne forces around major cities and key infrastructure with an armoured thrust from the border in an attempt to link up and capture Kyiv. This was supported by a logistics train along a single axis stretching over 35 miles. The armoured column and trailing logistic column was severely degraded and eventually stopped by Ukrainian counter attacks. Due to this failure and subsequent shift in the war to a slower grinding offensive, rather than a rapid fast paced land grab, Russia’s tactical doctrine has restructured to more 7. Those functions being line infantry, specialised infantry, assault infantry and disposable infantry. Other elements such as armour, airpower and artillery are held at a higher level to be called upon when necessary. This has demonstrated a clear shift in

proving mildly successful against a numerically inferior opponent, the sheer loss of life is staggering and adding strain to an already stretched supply chain. Ukraine has not suffered such problems as it is defending its sovereign territory. It is intimately familiar with its infrastructure and capabilities. While massive storage depots are recognised as being more viable in a defensive campaign, Ukraine has witnessed their vulnerabilities and opted to continue with dispersed, nimble and timely logistics. This has lent into their recent success in offensive operations into the Russian region of Kursk. Ukraine was able to identify weaknesses in the Russian line and successfully muster equipment and forces to not only launch a surprise assault into Russian territory, but also maintain supply to successfully hold the captured territories. The element of surprise was maintained by disguising the mustering troops and equipment as reinforcements for other areas of the line and by faking an exercise within Ukraine. This was accomplished whilst simultaneously supressing massed columns of reinforcements and supplies via FPV drones and 8. Ukraine has found success by not only deceiving the enemy but understanding their likely reaction and countering it effectively.

While the Russian-Ukraine war is a complex and exhibits an ever shifting dynamic, one thing is clear, Ukraine’s mastery of logistics has allowed it to stem Russia’s intent. In contrast, Russia has failed

has relied on rigid outdated logistical doctrine and is failing at disguising its intentions and key assets. Ukraine has not. Ukraine has proven its capability

Russia’s failure to adapt its doctrine has made its logistics an easy target for Ukraine

(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty)/the Collection of war.ukraine.ua

to identify threats, successfully deceive the enemy and adapt to different situations. While this may seem positive for the West, as their logistical doctrine shares similarities with Ukraine, it is imperative that continual development is undertaken to stay ahead of the ever-changing threats of modern warfare. Deception and dispersion are the cornerstones of operational logistic success, increasing survivability and allowing for adaptive operations. Extra emphasis must be placed on these concepts on the modern

be taken to ensure the security of all areas of a theatre and massed concentrations of equipment and supplies are no longer the answer. Better protection of key logistic nodes must be invested in with deception and dispersion being exploited at all levels. An in-depth understanding of current and future threats must be undertaken to employ effective countermeasures in order to secure priority logistical operations. No longer can the West rely upon air

the ability to adapt as the tactical and strategic

needs backed by a rugged, survivable and adaptable logistic force, able to maintain operations over a wide variety of terrains. In comparison to Russian operations, Ukraine has mastered this. Exploiting logistic advantage will be the key to future success and the West must continue to learn lessons from an Army that is doing this in real time, against a modern opposition. Using this hard-won knowledge, the West must continue to implement change to keep pace with an ever-evolving battle space.

Real Life Support or powering the punch: What the Theatre Support Squadron (TSS) reveals about the British Army’s approach to sustainment

From the belligerent’s failures in Ukraine, the British Army must urgently take the lessons and apply improved solutions to their own procurement strategy and doctrine. Some recent evidence suggests the UK is opening its eyes to the threat of foreign forces attempting to undermine democracies and reshape the world order. However, the current limitations of British Defence, in particular sustainment, have NATO’s Eastern border during the latest rotation of Op CABRIT. The question certainly remains whether

to provide only a Real-Life Support (RLS) function to the Battle Group. It could be argued therefore that the TSS cannot be used as an example to

assets. However, there is tacit understanding that, in the event of a foreign incursion onto Estonian soil, the TACOM element of the TSS would initially become the foundation of the CSS group. There are several limitations which would prevent the TSS from carrying out such a function without immediate reinforcement from the UK. This section will therefore

a useful microcosm of the would-be shortfalls of the Field Army if Article 5 is triggered.

A major point of discussion is the TSS equipment table, of which its limitations are a useful barometer across the Field Army. As part of the ongoing effort to ‘WarDev’ (the conceptual development of how

has been dedicated to examining the ‘delta’ between what we have, and what we need. The WarDev conclusions can be viewed as a more focused version of the MoD Equipment Plan 2023-2033,

the MoD’s capability requirements and its budget9 Force Element Structural Charts (FESCs) in the Staff

requirement for all types of unit in the Field Army. Therefore, the logistic element of the TSS, as a would-be Close Support Logistic Regiment to the FLF Battle Group, is concerned with the full doctrinal equipment liability including everything required for between doctrine developed through the lessons learned from wars throughout history, versus the current, real-life logistic laydown for a probable land war likely to be the bloodiest since 1945, the results raise some serious questions over the British Army’s preparedness on NATO’s Eastern border. The bottom line is that we do not have enough organic maintain survivability against a near-peer adversary.

manner, a typical Forward Support Group is composed of thousands of pallets of stores. The British Army must maintain the ability to quickly move this, both forward to the echelons, or sideways away from the enemy’s Direct Fires in a matter of days, not 10, of which only a fraction may be apportioned to the TSS, is

acknowledging that it would adjust, when necessary, defence planners must consider what can be done

The British Army needs large quantities of cheap, simple and reliable logistic vehicles

£57.1Bn available11. Tales of procurement blunders over Ajax and Boxer in the British Army are the prime example of this12. From a logistic point of view, simplicity is the key principle that logistic planners must target moving forward. In the face of such a limited budget, the Army must spend every pound to the greatest effect. As it stands, British Transport equipment is overengineered. The current MAN SV with a decent off-road capability is equipped with multiple electronic sensors and a complex makeup of intricate parts. Such complicated technology

Logisticians must begin to ask themselves whether it is necessary to have such high-tech equipment. It is easy to argue that the British Army would have a stronger footing with twice the number of cheaper, simpler, and more reliable vehicles. Furthermore, a previous CGS, Gen Sir Mark Carleton Smith, pointed

in how we power our next generation of vehicles’.

Foxhound and Jackal vehicles following a £9 million investment.13 This is clearly a step in the wrong

simplicity that The RLC must have facing a war against a peer adversary.

Ironically, the TSS’s lack of Heavy Equipment Transporters (HET) provides an interesting, relatively novel solution to how the British Army could address its equipment woes moving forward. Unsurprisingly, the waning Defence budget has led to a sharp decrease in HET availability over the last few decades. In 2024, the British Army’s HETs do not belong to them, rather, they are leased. This arrangement is not without its faults. Operating under a contract, on platforms owned by a third party, is inherently restrictive. Every demand for spares is scrutinised to every minute detail, often causing delays and keeping vital kit off the road. Qualifying and keeping operators competent has also proven challenging due to the contractor limiting the amount of taskings available to heavy lift squadron. The contract has also proven costly for the Army. With no competitors and no integral lift held by the

Army, the contactors have been able to dictate terms and costings favourable to themselves. However, it provides an imperfect solution which could be exploited Army wide. The arrangement is linked to of national security and defence that encompasses the ‘use and mobilisation of all available societal resources to defend society and state during times of crisis and war’14. To illustrate this point further, the missing HET capability in theatre during CABRIT 14 was supplemented by civilian low-loaders to aid the TSS in moving the BG to the Assembly Area. This could be perceived as logistics outsourcing for armed forces like Operation ‘Dynamo’ during the evacuation of Dunkirk. In recent years, this concept has gained traction in the Baltic regions15 and may prove to be a valuable lesson for the British Army. Some concerns over added complexity from the reliance on civilian

such as that military operations rely on external partners, who are focused on the business market16, however the concept of total war allows for this if the central governance is executed correctly and provides a tangible solution to how the Army can circumvent its budget issues.

In summary, the lack of Defence spending in recent years has left The RLC underprepared for a war on NATO’s Eastern border. Logistic planners, for the meantime, must keep it simple, consider the use of the ‘total war’ model, and begin to arm ourselves appropriately for the decade to come.

Disperse to Survive: The future of the military supply chain

It is not a matter of if, but when. As we have seen during the illegal invasion of Ukraine by Russia, debate and analysis on the resilience of logistic supply chains is circulating around both civilian and military think tanks. Logistics has always carried importance during peace and wartime; “as a profession where logistics accounts for about 60-70% 17 How we deliver logistics therefore

in Eastern Europe. UAV and increasing Artillery capability means that the space between the forward

Figure 1

line of troops (FLOTs) has never been further apart but the ability to target protected logistic manoeuvres (PLMs) has never been closer. As logisticians we must meet the operational need. However, to sustain, we must survive. This part of the article will evaluate to survive, and win, in future wars.

Adaptation, Integration and Survivability will be the three key areas from which we will analyse what

to understand what type of war we are likely to be General Transport and Stores Troops, we will be

Any future war with Russia is likely to mimic many also present many differing factors. Whereas COIN

18

19 The last two decades have seen a large percentage of British closely mimics counterinsurgency, however, we must peer adversary. As quoted by US Army Command Sgt Major, “I have had a fair amount of combat…but

20

Adaptability: “Continuous adaptation is essential 21 No plan

however, despite its common occurrence we should not diminish its prevalence. The gap between technology and weapon capability is growing smaller

no longer dictate who will win the war. We will need to adapt to operate effectively in both urban and rural areas often moving between the two seamlessly, and ensure our equipment, supply technology and interfaces are well-drilled, robust, and portable. The lived experience of over a decade of COIN operations and the doctrine which the Army has adopted needs to be refocused towards the tactical and operation level contest that is being fought in Eastern Ukraine. Logisticians, Suppliers, Drivers, and Medics will be required to be comfortable in the uncomfortable and still produce the output required for an armoured Battlegroup. Ensuring our soldiers are ready for that challenge is as important as investing in the equipment that will take us to these places. Commanders on the ground will need to provide an element of surprise to protect supplies and reduce their footprint on the ground. We can no longer be static and reactive. The ability for a stores section to to a transport troop and then move away is crucial;

The need to apply this deception, to ensure this element of surprise, is beginning to take the forefront of innovation. The Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA)22 this year launched a project on behalf of the British Army, seeking to identity and then invest in novel deception technologies that could be used

how much of these proposals are logistic focused as

the overarching aim is survivability as without the G4 chain there is no survival.

Integration: Our ability to integrate with Battlegroups is vital for mission success. The standard operating procedures need to be fully integrated between the

so that we limit time on immediate replenishment groups, for example. Predicting days of supply, ammunition expenditure and water replenishments is what keeps a Battlegroup moving. As we saw in the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, improper provisioning will stop even the toughest and driven soldiers. Thorough integration between close

we can more accurately assess what will be needed as the combined arms approach becomes a key

our integration with the civilian tech industry has never been more important. The Defence Security and Industry Strategy (DSIS)23 exists to encourage innovation and take advantage of expeditionary developments by harnessing emerging technologies to deliver a competitive edge for the British Army. Belligerents who are slow to adopt modern systems could fail to exploit and may even hinder our long-term

capabilities. However, we must keep in mind that scenarios, simplistic and reliable equipment is likely to offer competitive advantage. We must be careful not to be swept up in aesthetics over substance.

Survivability: The war in Ukraine continues to rage on three years later. This is a stark contrast the initially prophesised lightning speed operation. Using Ukraine as a case study, it seems prudent that the British Army prepares for extended dependency on our G4 chains and accept that a future war with Russia is unlikely to be concluded in the short term. To ensure maximum lethality we will need a robust, means the future of logistics needs dispersion. 2nd hundreds of kilometres back from the FLOT. We need supply teams, that can operate with A2 echelons undetected, deliver supplies, and redeploy. Huge

To ensure survivability we will need to focus on security; “preventing an opponent from discerning 24. As we can see from the war in Ukraine, the targeting of supply chains has been a clear and direct strategy/tactic of Russia and Ukraine. Our ability to keep our opponents guessing is the areas will likely play an important role in keeping our adversaries unbalanced and confused over our future intentions. Whilst they are guessing, they are not able to apply economy of effort. Through decoys we can better assure the security of the main supply effort and potentially encourage our adversary to expend valuable resources. We could see this lesson being learnt in Ukraine where the supply chain was dispersed throughout the country and the main

supply route was masked amongst the noise. Preparing our logistics chain is an area of military strategy that needs investing in with immediate effect. A robust, adaptable and secure logistic chain is the end goal for logisticians and what our teeth arms will expect us to deliver. In an ever-changing world this means taking on board the new advancements in technology. Understanding what capabilities we have to deliver supplies is as important as understanding what capabilities our enemies can deploy. Without appropriate communication and combined doctrine, we will have a chain that is displaced and disjointed. As we have learnt in Estonia on Op CABRIT 14, once the supply lines extend over country borders

Furthermore, the ability for a battlegroup to manoeuvre across the treacherous and weathereffected landscape of Estonia is dependent on The RLC’s capabilities. As stated earlier in this article, our currently do not match the requirements needed for

For our teeth arms to enact the lethality required, we future of logistics will need to focus on dispersion and adaptability to increase survivability.

Summary

It is clear that the unprecedented war in Ukraine has required a frank and in-depth analysis of both British Army and NATO doctrine to understand both its suitability and survivability if the worst was to happen in the future. Although it is a harrowing time

has been afforded a rare opportunity to study and understand its rival’s playbook not just from secondhand information but straight from the endless sources of footage and reports disseminated from the war-torn country.

The Royal Logistic Corps cannot afford to squander the opportunity to fully understand what the future of logistics entails and to readjust its training and processes to match the future threats that it will face. Contemporary evidence indicates that it cannot be assumed that CSS units will be far away from the

the gap between the front line and rear echelon technological advances and subsequently our traditional assumptions over the threat levels experienced in rear areas warrants review as a matter of urgency.

This article has evidenced that the most immediate issues with our own logistic chain are the result of a lack of funding, workforce and arguably appetite for change. Exercises still treat logistics as an after-thought and the concerns of the subject matter experts are too often falling on deaf ears. The focus remains on the exploitation of the battle space rather than a more comprehensive shoring of the resupply and sustainment of battlegroups. The age old saying of ‘logistics just happens’, although untrue has not been contested in a manner that allows for credible integration of logistic planning within the tactical space.

Only time will tell if these lessons will be learnt and if the British Army will truly be ready for what to the problems on the ground are very aware of the survivability of assets and their troops. The days of

The future of military logistics is dispersion

The days of logistics trundling from FOB to FOB are over

great snakes of armoured vehicles with endless force protection trundling from FOB to FOB are over. The inconvenient truth is that the age of dispersal and tactical movement under the shadows of drone and artillery strikes, is now very much routine. Developing robust logistic capabilities to ensure resilient supply chains will ultimately determine the effectiveness of our

opportunity to learn lessons from the contemporary operating environment and help in this development.

Endnotes

1Robert Gibson, The Cove: Logistic lessons in theRussia-Ukraine war. Lessons in t

2Ronald Ti and Christopher Kinsey, Lessons from the Russo391.

3Abdujalil Abdurasulov, BBC News: Will using Western weapons on Russia help Ukraine change the war?

4Isabel Van Brugen, Newsweek: US to discuss permitting Ukraine ATACMS strikes on Russia

5Ronald Ti and Christopher Kinsey, Lessons from the Russo-

6Brad Lendon, CNN World: Kursk: Ukraine’s front inside Russia was the site of key Soviet World War II victory

7Dr Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, RUSI: Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine.

8Isabel Van Brugen, Newsweek: Russian Column 'Destroyed' With HIMARS Near Kursk: Reports.

9House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, ‘’MoD Equipment Plan 2023-2033’’, 3.

10Press Release, Düsseldorf, 06 February 2024, UK MoD Palletised Load System Trucks Contract

11House of Commons Library, ‘’UK Defence Spending’’, p.4.

12Neads, Alex; Galbreath, David J., Tactics and Trade-Offs, p.344.

13

14Nebosja V. Nikolic, ''Logistics outsourcing for armed forces’', 4. 15CHACR, ''Time to Talk Total Defence'', p.1.

16Colonel Msc. Avni Bilbilaj, ‘’Logistics Support for Operations and Future Challenges’’, p.36.

17Imoh Antai, Hellberg, R. and Skoglund, P. (2023). Logistics growth in the armed forces: development of a theoretical framework and research propositions. Defence Studies, pp.1–23. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2023.2249441. 18NATO (2017). COUNTERINSURGENCY A GENERIC REFERENCE assets/pdf/pdf_2017_09/20170904_1709-counterinsurgency-rc.pdf. 19Dictionary.cambridge.org. (n.d.). NEAR-PEER | meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary. [online] Available at: https:// dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/near-peer. [Accessed 3 Sep. 2024]

20The Jedburgh Podcast (2024). Sergeant Major of the Army has Never Been to War. [Online] YouTube. Available at: https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=UTHthmPKXD4 [Accessed 3 Sep. 2024].

21Land Warfare Development Centre Army Doctrine Publication AC 71940 Land Operations. (n.d.). In Land Warfare Development . https://assets.publishing. service.gov.uk/media/5a82e143e5274a2e87dc3705/Army_Field_ Manual__AFM__A5_Master_ADP_Interactive_Gov_Web.pdf. 22Defence and Strategic Accelerator. (2024). Going further for longer: DASA launches new £3.1 million Themed Competition. [Online] GOV.UK. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/ news/going-further-for-longer-dasa-launches-new-31-millionthemed-competition [Accessed 3 Sep. 2024].

23MOD.GOV.UK. (n.d.). Defence and Security Industrial Strategy. [online] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications/defence-and-security-industrial-strategy.

24Land Warfare Development Centre Army Doctrine Publication AC 71940 Land Operations. (n.d.). In Land Warfare Development . https://assets.publishing. service.gov.uk/media/5a82e143e5274a2e87dc3705/Army_Field_ Manual__AFM__A5_Master_ADP_Interactive_Gov_Web.pdf.

Lt Col Andy Tang RLC on OP INTERFLEX Tranche 3 (June – December 2023)

Following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the British Government provided in-country military assistance to train and support the Ukrainian Armed Forces under Operation ORBITAL. This saw over 22,000 Ukrainian personnel trained from 2015 onwards. The subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to the withdrawal of UK forces, however our training commitment evolved into Operation INTERFLEX. This UK-based operation committed the British Government to training up to 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers every 120 days. At the time of writing this article, over 50,000 Ukrainians have been trained by Op INTERFLEX since June 2022.

Upon arrival in the UK, Ukrainian soldiers are provided with basic military training to enhance their lethality, survivability and offensive spirit such

training is scenario-based using simulated casualties recruits to the realities of modern warfare. It is as in built-up areas, and extensive use of drones. Logistic support is a tri-service endeavour with the command element and vast majority of service personnel coming from the RLC. The Handling and Processing (HAP) Facility is the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) focal point for the entire operation. Ukrainian trainees are centrally processed through the HAP where they receive clothing, uniforms, personal protective

From June 2023 the HAP was presented with a 60% increase in demand, increasing from 10,000 Ukrainians every 120 days to 16,000. This remains the largest throughput to date on Op INTERFLEX.

Importance of data

To meet this step-change in demand, the HAP (KPIs) and tracked performance against those metrics. Current stock-counts, forecast demand, forecast supplies, drivers’ hours, kit-issue speed and accuracy, etc. were measured and analysed on a weekly, sometimes daily basis. This allowed data

before they emerged. The effective collection, visualisation and interpretation of data became a vital skill within the HAP, driving continuous improvement in a high-tempo, dynamic logistic operation. Every service person was invested in understanding the data and what it was telling us in terms of performance.

During its busiest periods, 800 Ukrainians transited through the HAP every 24 hours. Alongside transport, movement and move-and-track functions, the kit-issue process represented the main effort. Each day a 200-person course was issued 13,000 items; speed and accuracy became critical to ensure that

and equipment within a set timeframe. The kitissue process follows a repeatable set of tasks and therefore an ideal candidate for time-and-motion analysis. This civilian management technique

changes made to optimise an overall process.

HAP(UK) Kit Issue

Lanes (Aerial View)

Credit:

Cpl Paul Watson

consideration. The HAP workforce represented a microcosm of 3rd UK Division and wider Defence, with virtually every cap-badge and trade represented, not just RLC. After appropriate training and shadowing, a team member became specialised in each section of the kit-issue process (sizing area, clothing kit issue, ACTO kit issue), adopting an assembly-line type approach. Once established, the individual did not move out of their assigned section for the duration of the assignment, so they quickly built muscle-memory. As they built up experience, they could process up to

previously no more than two Ukrainians would be processed by an individual.

The command team would frequently walk the

was the ability to go through multiple observationsolutions tested. For example, every Ukrainian recruit was issued with 65 items of clothing and equipment. Half of these items had to be sized to an individual, especially PPE (body-armour, helmet and boots)

items were not size-dependent (bergen, water bottles, mess tins etc) and could be issued direct to training unit QM staff for issue outside of the HAP process; this saved at least an hour for each kit-issue.

Optimal use of space was another key consideration

recruits moving through the process; previously a number of switch-backs introduced lag. The recruit sizing area was consolidated and doubled in size to increase capacity. This removed two separate bottleneck locations and prevented a large build-up of recruits that got in the way of the kit-issue.

correctly at the start of the process, reducing clothing exchanges at the end. Moving the Exchange Bay away from the kit-issue lanes prevented another build-up of recruits awaiting exchanges (that would also interfere with the kit-issue process).

Small incremental improvements could also yield re-organised so that the physical lay-down matched the order of items on the paperwork. Although saving only seconds per recruit, when compounded over 200

in early, a small proportion of recruits could be taken through the intelligence polling survey the night prior to the kit-issue.

From an initial baseline of 6 hrs 42 mins for the very

an average 94 min reduction in overall processing time by the end of the Tranche. This represented a

Lessons for Army Reserve Mobilisation

Op INTERFLEX has proven the viability of mass mobilisation in the event of war, where 1000s of recruits can be processed and trained within a few weeks. In the event of a mass mobilisation call-out, key lessons from the HAP would be: a. Data exploitation. The Army has access to vast

repositories of data, however the ability to extract

To deliver at pace and scale, all ranks need to visualising and interpreting data and exploiting the information and insight it provides.

b. Feedback loops. Being open to feedback proved

everyone was invited to participate in continuous improvement: from the most junior personnel through to visiting training teams. The best ideas came from the juniors themselves, with all ranks empowered to suggest innovative new ways to

c. Supply chains. The HAP was able to draw upon multiple inventories to ensure clothing and equipment demands could always be met. In the event of mass mobilisation, fast-moving items may quickly become exhausted, probably within weeks. If global supply chains also become disrupted, the stockpiling of essential items either in the UK or near-shore will become mission-critical. Due consideration must also be given to supply chain resilience.

d. Simplicity. and time-constraints, all processes must be

approach minimised confusion when working at pace and reduced errors. It also allowed generalists as opposed to logistic supply specialists to operate effectively from almost day one on the job.

that Ukrainian soldiers had of the British Armed Forces as the processed through the HAP. For many of our people, Op INTERFLEX was a highlight of their professional military careers, where they could directly observe the tangible difference effective logistics can make to operations.

As we enter a pre-war period, the HAP has proven our ability to run a logistic supply operation at pace and scale. In reality, mass mobilisation would likely require several regional hubs opposed to a central logistic node, however the concept has been well

Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine hailed the HAP as a logistic miracle; surely there can be no better accolade for supporting a nation at war.

HAP(UK) Kit Issue Lanes

Maj Colin McNamara RLC explores whether the reduction in strategic enablers within Defence has compromised its operational readiness and sustainability

Over the last few decades, the modern business environment has moved into a ‘just in time, just enough’ mentality when it comes to key logistic and enabling functions. This approach, rooted permeated various industries. This includes the move to just-in time-logistics (JET) (Ozlap, Suvaci, & Tonus, 2010) and JET part supply to the motor industry, optimising inventory by synchronising production schedules with supplier deliveries (Boysen & Bock, 2011). Similarly, the practice of

industry (Yoshinori, 2006). It appears clear that the progress has been towards to leaner and more agile models of enabling functions in broader business management. Given the inevitable a resilient enough system for the military remains a moot point and is open for debate.

This article explores whether the reduction in strategic enablers within Defence has compromised its operational readiness and sustainability. It will assess the proportionality of strategic enablers compared to the size and commitments of the British military from the early 1990s to the present day; although direct comparisons are imperfect when considering the ever-shifting geo-political climate across time there are enough broad similarities to draw lessons and identify areas of vulnerability. Finally, it will propose solutions to better resource the military’s enabling functions, ensuring they meet the demands of contemporary defence operations. It is important to note that this article is written before the

upcoming Strategic Defence Review 2025 which may address some of the issues raised below.

Before delving into plotting the reduction in strategic enablers over time, it is worth clarifying exactly which assets this article will focus on. The three main areas of focus will be the strategic surface movement vessels, strategic airlift platforms and the movement controllers who manage the planning and loading of these assets.

The UK currently has four ‘Point Class’ roll-on/rolloff (RORO) ferries operated by Foreland Shipping Ltd. (FSL). They originally came into service as a (Navy Lookout, 2024). Each Vessel can move a total of 2,600 linear meterage (LIMs) of cargo which is the equivalent of 120 Enhanced Palletized Loading System (EPLS) vehicles (JSP 800). Of the six vessels, four are permanently contracted to the Ministry of Defence (MOD), while the remaining two are available for commercial use but can be called upon by the MOD when necessary (House of

which articulated that defence did not have the lift to move its four at readiness (@R) brigades which formed the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) - 16 Brigade, 3 Commando Brigade and 2 @R brigades (House Of Commons, 1998).

The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)

including eight C-17 Globemaster III, 22 A400M Atlas, and 14 Voyager aircraft (House of Commons, 2015).

Credit: Crown Copyright

around 60%. For instance, in November 2006, out of 75 Hercules, TriStar, and VC-10 aircraft, only 41 were available for immediate deployment, representing

availability of six C-17s, 16 A400Ms, and 10 Voyagers. This reduction in available airlift capacity may strain the military’s ability to respond swiftly to global contingencies, particularly as the demand for rapid deployment capabilities increases.

is the Movement Control (Mov Con) trade, responsible for managing and utilising the aforementioned assets

movement of personnel and equipment by air, road, rail, and sea, supporting operations, exercises, and international relief efforts. However, this trade has

the disbandment of 24 Regiment Royal Logistic Corps (RLC) on 30 June 2014, which halved the trade’s capacity (RLC, 2014).

To evaluate the adequacy of current strategic enablers, it is necessary to compare them across

Gulf War, the 1998 Defence Review’s JRRF concept, and the present-day commitments, such as the UK’s contribution to NATO through 3(UK) Division (3UKXX) and the maintenance of two brigades at readiness. The hypothesis is that the current level

defence commitments, particularly when compared to the more robust posture outlined in the 1998 Defence Review against a lower commitment of the JRRF compared to ARF and 3 UK Division. The

strategic enablers can support the scale and scope of modern military operations, especially in light of increasing global instability and the need for rapid and sustained military interventions. Of note, the UK has recently increased its commitment to NATO, promising to provide a UK Strategic Reserve Corps. A corps formed of a minimum of two divisions, plus corps echelon troops that collectively amount to a third division’s worth of equipment (Watling, 2024).

Gulf War 1991 vs. today

During the 1991 Gulf War, also known as Operation GRANBY, the British Armed Forces were faced with the enormous logistical challenge of deploying and sustaining a substantial force over a vast distance. At that time, the UK did not have dedicated military roll-on/roll-off (RORO) vessels like the Point-class ferries used today. Instead, the MOD relied heavily on chartered commercial vessels1, including civilian RORO ferries and container ships, to transport essential equipment and supplies to the Gulf region (Mason, 1992). This ad-hoc approach, while ultimately

UK’s strategic sealift capability, particularly in terms of availability, reliability, and the ability to rapidly deploy forces in an unpredictable environment.

The reliance on civilian ships posed several risks. For one, commercial vessels were not always available when needed, as they were subject to market demands and other commercial interests. Furthermore, these ships were not designed with

vulnerabilities in hostile environments (House of Commons, 1992). The lack of a dedicated military

other nations and commercial interests for available shipping, potentially delaying the deployment of critical assets.

In contrast, the current Point-class RORO ferries

strategic sealift capability. These vessels, purposebuilt to meet military needs, are permanently contracted to the MOD, ensuring their availability during times of crisis. Each vessel provides the capacity to transport large volumes of military equipment, including vehicles, containers, and other supplies essential for sustained operations (Navy

of these ferries, including rapid loading and unloading capabilities and enhanced survivability features, make them far better suited for military operations than the commercial ships used in 1991.

The strategic airlift capabilities available during the 1991 Gulf War also starkly contrast with those available today. In 1991, the RAF’s primary airlift assets included the Lockheed C-130 Hercules, which had been in service since the 1960s, and the ageing Handley Page Victor aircraft, which were nearing the end of their operational lives (House of Commons, 1992). While the C-130 was reliable and versatile, its cargo capacity was limited, especially when considering the vast quantities of supplies and

equipment that needed to be moved to the Gulf. To compensate for this shortfall, the UK again relied heavily on chartering commercial aircraft, including large cargo planes like the Boeing 747 and Antonov An-124, to move essential items rapidly. However, the use of commercial aircraft presented challenges similar to those faced with sealift. Availability was often uncertain, and these aircraft were not designed to operate in austere or hostile environments, limiting their utility in direct support of military operations. Furthermore, the need to charter foreign aircraft, such as the Russian-built Antonov, introduced additional complexities, including potential diplomatic and security concerns (Mason, 1992).

Today, the UK’s strategic airlift capability has been and more capable aircraft. The C-17, in particular, represents a major leap forward in terms of strategic airlift, capable of carrying up to 77,000 kilograms of cargo over long distances without refuelling. This aircraft’s ability to operate from short and semiprepared airstrips provides the UK with a much greater range of deployment options compared to the C-130s of 1991.

The A400M Atlas, although smaller than the C-17, up to 37 tonnes of cargo, and can also operate from unpaved runways. This is a critical feature for operations in remote or underdeveloped regions where infrastructure may be limited. The Voyager aircraft, while primarily used for air-to-air refuelling, also serves as a strategic transport, capable of carrying both personnel and cargo across long distances. Comparing the strategic enablers available during the 1991 Gulf War to those available today highlights several key differences. In 1991, the UK was heavily reliant on ad-hoc arrangements, chartering commercial vessels and aircraft to meet its deployment needs. While this approach ultimately

ability to sustain operations over an extended period. Of importance the strength of the UK merchant navy was already on the decline prior to Op GRANBY (Ledger & Roe, 1992) and has continued through the British ensign (gov.uk, 2024). This means the UK

would be unable to conduct operations like it did in 1991 if we were called upon to do so such as in a NATO Article 5 scenario.

However, despite these improvements, challenges more capable than in 1991, is also smaller and increasingly stretched. The demands placed on these assets by the UK’s global defence commitments, including its role in NATO and other international alliances, mean that even these modern assets may struggle to meet the requirements of simultaneous large-scale operations. Additionally, the reduced operational factors further limits the military’s strategic mobility.

Comparison of Airlift Capabilities: 1998 Defence Review vs Modern RAF

The 1998 SDR marked a pivotal moment in the evolution of the UK’s defence posture, particularly in terms of airlift capabilities. The review was a response to the changing global security environment following the end of the Cold War, and it sought to create a respond to emerging threats. The SDR proposed the establishment of the JRRF, a formation that required robust strategic airlift to ensure its effectiveness.

included the Lockheed C-130 Hercules and the VC-10 aircraft. The C-130 Hercules was the RAF’s primary tactical airlift aircraft, known for its versatility and reliability however was by now an aging asset. It could carry up to 20 tonnes of cargo and operate from short, unprepared airstrips, making it well-suited for rapid deployments to austere environments. However, the C-130’s relatively limited range and payload capacity meant that it was not ideal for long-range strategic airlift, necessitating additional support from other platforms or commercial charters.

The VC-10, primarily a tanker-transport aircraft, provided some strategic airlift capability, particularly for personnel movement and light cargo. However, like the C-130, the VC-10 was an aging platform by the late 1990s, with limitations in cargo capacity and range. The SDR acknowledged these limitations and emphasised the need for modernisation and the potential acquisition of more capable aircraft to meet the JRRF’s requirements.

Given the reliance on these aging airframes, the UK was also expected to continue augmenting its strategic airlift capability with commercial charters.

particularly in terms of availability and operational security during crises. The SDR highlighted the need for a long-term investment in strategic airlift to ensure that the UK could meet its global commitments without relying excessively on external assets (House of Commons, 1998).

Since the 1998 SDR, the RAF’s airlift capabilities both technological advancements and lessons now includes a mix of strategic and tactical airlift capability than what was envisioned in 1998.

In contrast to the reliance on aging C-130 and

better equipped to meet the demands of both NATO commitments and independent UK operations. The C-17 and A400M, in particular, offer enhanced commercial charters and ensuring that the UK can deploy its forces more independently and securely.

However, it is important to note that despite these by the UK’s global commitments. The reduction in the number of available aircraft due to operational demands, maintenance cycles, and other factors means that the RAF must carefully manage its airlift assets to avoid overextension. The increasing complexity of global threats and the need for rapid response capabilities mean that the RAF’s airlift resources are more critical than ever.

Comparison Between 1998’s JRRF and current 3(UK) Division commitments

In 1998, the UK’s Strategic Defence Review introduced the concept of the JRRF, designed to global crises. The JRRF was composed of four brigades: 16 Air Assault Brigade, 3 Commando Brigade, and two additional brigades held at high readiness. These brigades were supported by a dedicated pool of strategic enablers, including airlift,

allow the rapid deployment of a 10,000-strong force anywhere in the world within 30 days (House of Commons, 1998).

The force was designed to be highly mobile, with ensure its effectiveness. The 1998 Defence Review emphasised the need for a mix of military and civilian sealift, resulting in the procurement of six Point-class Roll-on/Roll-off (RORO) ferries capable of transporting large quantities of equipment and vehicles necessary for such a sizable force. These vessels were central to the JRRF’s operational concept. Additionally, airlift capacity was to be

aircraft, although these platforms were aging and limited in capacity, requiring substantial commercial augmentation (House of Commons, 1998).

In contrast, the current 3UKXX represents the designed to respond to conventional and hybrid threats, primarily within a NATO context. The Division comprises a balanced mix of armoured, mechanized, and light infantry brigades, supported by artillery, engineers, and logistics units. The division’s total

operational mandate (British Army, 2023).

However, the strategic enablers allocated to 3UKXX have not kept pace with its increased size and equipment and platforms, such as the A400M Atlas and C-17 Globemaster III for strategic airlift, the overall number of available airframes is limited compared to the force’s requirements. As of 2024,

but operational availability often limits the number of aircraft that can be deployed simultaneously (House of Commons, 2015). Any shortfall necessitates reliance on commercial charters to meet peak

demand, particularly for large-scale deployments.

The sealift capability, while improved in terms of ship design and availability since 1998, is also limited

ferries under contract with the MOD is smaller than the original six ships envisioned in the late 1990s (Navy Lookout, 2024). This reduction means that despite

constraints in rapidly moving its heavy equipment and vehicles to operational theatres, particularly for largescale operations where simultaneous movement of multiple brigades is required.

The scale of personnel movement required for 3UKXX is also substantial. Given the Division’s larger size, deployment scenarios can involve moving upwards of 25,000 personnel, along with their associated equipment. The reliance on a mix of military and civilian air and sea transport introduces complexity in coordination and increases the risk of delays. In comparison, the JRRF’s smaller size made it more manageable within the constraints of the available strategic lift, even though the resources were still challenged to meet the requirements (House of Commons, 1998).

When comparing the forces it becomes clear that while both the JRRF and 3UKXX were designed to provide the UK with a rapid reaction capability, the latter’s expanded size and mission set have outpaced the growth of its strategic enablers. This imbalance between the force size and its supporting lift capabilities raises concerns about the UK’s ability to sustain large-scale deployments at short notice, potentially undermining its responsiveness in future

3UKXX commitment, however the UK still retains 2 @R brigades in 16 Air Assault Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and 3 Commando Brigade which were an original part of JRRF. So, it is clear the Strat Lift requirements envisaged in 1998 are no longer

What is required for the modern @R forces?

To understand the air and sea lift requirements necessary to deploy 16 Air Assault BCT, 3 Commando Brigade, and 3UKXX it’s essential to consider the composition, equipment, and readiness levels of these units. These factors directly impact the logistics

needed for their deployment, including the number of aircraft, ships, and the time required to move them to a designated area of operations. To illustrate the challenges, the following open-source analysis highlights the requirements:

1. Unit Composition and Equipment

16 Air Assault Brigade:

– Personnel: Approximately 8,000 troops.

– Key Equipment: Light vehicles, artillery, Apache attack helicopters, logistic vehicles, and various support equipment.

– Deployment Mode: Primarily by air, given their role as a rapid response force.

The brigade’s role as the UK’s premier rapid reaction force necessitates a focus on air mobility, with the Apache helicopters and light vehicles being critical to its operations (British Army, 2023)

3 Commando Brigade:

– Personnel: Approximately 7,400 troops, including Royal Marines and supporting elements.

– Key Equipment: Light amphibious vehicles, artillery, helicopters, landing craft, and other support assets.

– Deployment Mode: By sea (amphibious ships) and air, depending on the operation’s nature.

3 Commando Brigade’s amphibious capabilities are central to its operational doctrine, requiring amphibious vehicles and other heavy equipment (Royal Navy, 2024).

3rd (UK) Division (3UKXX):

– Personnel: Approximately 25,000 troops across several brigades, including armoured, mechanized, and infantry units.

– Key Equipment: Tanks (Challenger 3), armoured vehicles (Warrior, Boxer), artillery, logistics vehicles, and support equipment.

– Deployment Mode: A mix of air and sea, but largely dependent on sea lift for heavy equipment.

3UKXX’s mix of heavy armoured units and mechanized infantry necessitates substantial sea lift capacity to move large numbers of tanks and armoured vehicles (British Army, 2023).

2. Deployment Timelines and Constraints

Deployment Timeframe:

– 16 Air Assault Brigade: Rapid reaction force elements could deploy in under 48 hours, with the full brigade operational in 5-7 days (British Army, 2024).

– 3 Commando Brigade: Partial deployment by air within 48-72 hours, full brigade by sea in 7-10 days (Navy Lookout, 2024).

– 3rd (UK) Division: Partial air deployment within 3-5 days, full deployment including heavy equipment in 10-14 days (House of Commons, 2015).

Constraints:

capable, is limited in size. Concurrent operations or maintenance schedules could stretch availability (House of Commons, 2015).

only four ships under MOD contract, may need augmentation through commercial chartering or allied support to meet the scale required (Navy Lookout, 2024).

– Geographical Distance: Deployment times will vary based on the operational theatre’s distance from the UK. Europe would see faster deployments compared to more distant regions (House of Commons, 2015).

3. NATO Integration

NATO Support:

– NATO’s collective logistics could mitigate some of the constraints, particularly through the use of NATO’s Air Transport and Sea Lift Command. Allies could provide additional air and sea lift assets (NATO, 2023).

– Prepositioning of Equipment: In a high-threat environment, prepositioning of key equipment in strategic NATO locations could drastically reduce deployment times, especially for heavy forces like 3UKXX (NATO, 2023).

Deploying 16 Air Assault Brigade, 3 Commando

lift capabilities, stretching the current UK assets to their limits, particularly in a scenario where all three formations are needed simultaneously. The timelines suggest that while rapid elements of these forces can be deployed within days, full deployment of all units would take up to two weeks or more, depending on the theatre of operations. Ensuring readiness and coordination with NATO allies will be crucial for meeting these deployment timelines in a real-world scenario.

Role of the Movement Control Trade in Strategic Movements

The Movement Control (Mov Con) trade within the British Army is critical to the planning, coordination, and execution of strategic and tactical movements of personnel, equipment, and supplies. This trade is primarily housed within the Royal Logistic Corps (RLC) and involves specialised personnel trained in managing the logistics of transportation across all domains: air, sea, rail, and road (British Army, 2023). Mov Con specialists ensure that forces are deployed

operational requirements, logistical constraints, and

transportation assets. They coordinate with various transport agencies, both military and civilian, and often work closely with NATO partners during multinational operations. Their responsibilities include:

Planning: Developing movement plans that integrate air and sea lift requirements with the overall operational plan.

Coordination: Liaising with military units, transport providers, and command elements to ensure synchronization of movement phases.

Execution: Overseeing the loading and unloading of vehicles, aircraft, and ships, ensuring that timelines are met and that all movements adhere to security protocols.

Documentation and Tracking: Maintaining records of all movements and tracking the location of personnel and equipment to prevent losses or delays (Defence Logistics Framework, 2023).

Strategic movements, particularly in the context of deploying large formations such as 16 Air Assault Brigade, 3 Commando Brigade, and 3rd (UK) Division, rely heavily on the expertise of Mov Con personnel. They are responsible for ensuring that the right resources are at the right place at the right time, which is crucial for maintaining operational tempo and readiness.

Air and Sea Lift Coordination: Mov Con teams work with the RAF and Royal Navy to schedule and manage the loading of aircraft and ships. This coordination is vital to maximizing the limited air and sea lift assets available, particularly during high-tempo operations (British Army, 2023).

Multimodal Transport Management: In complex operations, where forces may need to transition between air, sea, rail, and road transport, Mov Con specialists ensure smooth transitions, minimizing downtime and reducing the risk of delays that could impact operational success (Defence Logistics Framework, 2023).

NATO and Multinational Operations: In NATO operations, Mov Con personnel are essential for integrating UK movements with those of allied

use of collective transport resources (NATO, 2023).

In 2014, as part of broader austerity measures and restructuring efforts following the 2010 SDSR, the British Army implemented cuts across several trades, including the Movement Control trade. The the necessity for large-scale, long-term deployments following the drawdown in Afghanistan and Iraq (House of Commons, 2015).

The reduction involved downsizing the number of Mov Con personnel and consolidating their roles, with the expectation that technology and increased for the smaller workforce (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2015).

The reduction of the Mov Con trade has had several implications for the UK’s ability to conduct strategic movements:

Reduced Expertise and Flexibility: With fewer trained Mov Con personnel, the Army has seen a reduction in its ability to deploy large forces quickly. This is particularly problematic in scenarios where simultaneous deployments are required, as the limited personnel must be spread thin across

multiple operations (House of Commons Defence Select Committee, 2019).

Increased Reliance on Technology: While technological advancements have improved some aspects of movement control, they cannot fully replace the expertise and on-the-ground decision-making that experienced Mov Con personnel provide. The reduced human element

complex operations involving multiple transport modes (JSP 886, 2016).2

Impact on Joint and Multinational Operations:

In NATO or coalition contexts, the reduced Mov Con capability has strained the UK’s ability to take a leading role in coordinating multinational movements, potentially diminishing the UK’s on allied capabilities (NATO, 2023).

Operational Risks: The reduction has also increased the risk of delays and logistical bottlenecks, particularly during large-scale exercises or rapid deployments, where the need for precise and

Commons Defence Select Committee, 2019).

It is clear that the Movement Control trade plays a vital role in ensuring that the UK military can deploy and sustain operations effectively, particularly in strategic movements involving large formations. The 2014 reduction in Mov Con personnel, while aimed at

UK’s operational capabilities, especially in complex and multinational environments. Restoring or enhancing this trade could be critical for maintaining the UK’s readiness and its ability to lead and participate effectively in NATO operations.

So What?

To enhance the UK’s strategic sea and airlift capabilities, several options should be considered to address current limitations and prepare for future operational demands. These are not mutually exclusive and together present a comprehensive solution strategic lift issues.

1. Expanding the Strategic Airlift Fleet

in size, with only eight C-17 Globemaster III and 22 A400M Atlas aircraft. Increasing the number of these or similar aircraft would enhance the UK’s ability to rapidly deploy and sustain forces globally. Additionally, investing in next-generation airlift platforms, such as the proposed Boeing C-17 successor or a future variant of the A400M, could ensure that the UK maintains a cutting-edge capability as older aircraft are phased out (House of Commons, 2015).

2. Strengthening the Sealift Capability

The UK’s Point-class Roll-on/Roll-off (RORO) vessels, while effective, are limited in number. Reinstating the two ships that were previously sold or versatile multi-role support ships (MRSS) could These vessels should be designed to accommodate the transportation of large quantities of military to support various types of operations, including humanitarian missions (Navy Lookout, 2024).

3. Increasing the Use of Commercial Partnerships

Another option is to enhance commercial partnerships for both air and sea lift. While the UK already relies on chartering civilian vessels and aircraft during crises, establishing more robust prenegotiated contracts with commercial carriers could ensure greater availability and quicker access during emergencies. This approach would provide a costeffective way to augment military capabilities without (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2019).

4. Enhancing Multinational Cooperation

Working more closely with NATO and European allies to pool air and sea lift resources is another strategic option. By deepening partnerships, the UK could gain access to a larger pool of assets during joint operations. Initiatives such as the NATO Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) program, which provides shared access to C-17s among member nations, could be expanded to include additional aircraft or (NATO, 2023).

5. Investment in Advanced Logistics Technology

Finally, investing in advanced logistics technologies, such as automated loading systems and improved logistics management software, could optimise the use of existing assets. These technologies would operations, reduce turnaround times, and maximise the operational availability of air and sea lift assets (Defence Logistics Framework, 2023).

By pursuing a combination of these options, the UK can ensure that its strategic air and sea lift capabilities remain robust and capable of meeting

the demands of future. It is the recommendation that the UK should prioritise investment in advanced logistics technologies in order to reduce the burden on supplies chains followed increasing both the maritime

placed by the increased offer to NATO. Increased reliance on our commercial partnerships and allies would allow for the UK’s lift needs to be meet but may come with some reputational damage.

Endnotes

1Known as Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT).

2JSP 886 replaced by Defence Logistic Framework in 2016 but is

References

Boysen, N., & Bock, S. (2011). Scheduling just-in-time part supply for mixed-model assembly lines. European Journal of , pp.25-25.

British Army. (2023). Retrieved from British ArmyArmy: https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/ formations-divisions-brigades/3rd-united-kingdom-division/ British Army. (2023). Army.mod.uk. Retrieved from 16 Brigade Combat Team: https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/ formations-divisions-brigades/1st-united-kingdomdivision/16-air-assault-brigade-combat-team/ gov.uk. (2024, march 4). Retrieved from gov.uk: https://www.gov.uk/government/

House of Commons. (1992).

London: House of Commons. House of Commons. (1998). . London: House of Commons. House Of Commons. (2007). . London: House of Commons. House of Commons. (2015). London: House of Commons.

House of Commons Defence Committee. (2015). . London: House of Commons. House of Commons Defence Committee. (2019). The Armed London: House of Commons. JSP 800. (n.d.). JSP 800, Vol 7. JSP 886. (2016).

London: MoD. Retrieved from Movement Control and Transportatiaon Operations: https://www.defence-logistics-uk. gov.uk/movement-control/ Ledger, G., & Roe, M. (1992). The decline of the UK merchant , pp.293-251.

Mason, R. (1992). Operation Granby: The British Deployment to the Gulf War. , pp.45-59.

NATO. (2023). NATO Logistics. Retrieved from https://www.nato. int/cps/en/natohq/topics_61741.htm?selectedLocale=en Navy Lookout. (2024, August 14). Transporting military hardware Retrieved from Navy Lookout: https://www.navylookout.com/transporting-militaryhardware-around-the-world-uk-strategic-sealift/ Ozlap, I., Suvaci, B., & Tonus, Z. (2010). A New Approach in Logisctis. pp.37-45.

RAF. (2024). RAF.mod.uk. Retrieved from Strategic Airlft: https:// www.raf.mod.uk/our-organisation/global-enablement/ RLC. (2014, Jan 31).

Retrieved from Royal Logistic Corps Website: https://www. Royal Navy. (2024). Royal Navy Fighting Arms. Retrieved from Royal Navy: https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/organisation/royalmarines

Watling, D. J. (2024, July 10). Closing the Say/Do Gap for UK Land Power. Retrieved from RUSI: https://uklandpower. com/2024/02/16/why-the-british-army-needs-to-adopt-atwo-division-model/ pp.1-19.

british army veteran?

You’re still part of the team

Maj Colin Taylor RLC posits that the WWII Allied landings at Anzio offer a realistic case study for examining a potential future British land campaign against a ‘peer’ or near peer enemy

Why study logistics for the Allied amphibious landing at Anzio (Operation SHINGLE, 21–22 January 1944) on the West coast of Italy, and the subsequent beachhead operation? Why not just focus on D-Day (Operation OVERLORD)? After all, D-Day was a wellresourced, well-planned, joint, multinational operation that met all the desired operational outcomes. The style and scale of resourcing of D-Day, and the

over-optimistic and improbable, vision for a future operation conducted by modern British forces.

The more modest and under-resourced Anzio landings involved a US Corps (including a reinforced

Gustav Line at Cassino and enable the capture of Rome in early 1944.1 Compared to other historic operational level encounters, in both scale and scope, Anzio offers a more realistic case study for examining a potential future British land campaign against a ‘peer’ or near peer enemy. British operations at Anzio were affected by opaque political-level intent, strategic meddling, muddled mission direction and the complexities of multinational command – all themes likely to arise during any future committal of the British Army.

For wider context, the background to SHINGLE should be appreciated. During early planning for

German defensive lines using amphibious landings. Such landings played to Allied strengths in air and sea power. However, a landing at Anzio, near Rome, was considered impractical until Allied air support was within range. The Allied landing by Fifth (US) Army (General Mark Clark) at Salerno in September 1943 set the mould for these operations, but that beachhead was severely threatened by swift German counterattacks. Over the autumn and winter of 1943–1944 the Allied forces advanced northwards but the terrain in Italy, and the poor weather, favoured the Germans who were conducting positional defence and largely stymied Allied attempts at manoeuvre. Italy has a central spine of mountains interspersed with lateral rivers, which

The German forces could choose their defensive lines in advance to exploit this geography, and they

roads slowed the transportation of Allied supplies. In early 1944 the Fifth Army encountered the Gustav Line consisting of well-prepared German positions anchored on the strong mountain, urban and river defences at Cassino. The Gustav line also blocked the Liri valley, a vital manoeuvre corridor, and thereby controlled the highway to Rome. Concurrently, Clark, and Field Marshal Harold Alexander, his British Army Group commander, were under time pressure to act quickly to achieve success in Italy before the theatre was starved of resources (especially supply and landing ships) in favour of the Normandy landings. To break through the Gustav Line and advance on Rome, a landing at Anzio was re-examined. Allied troops would move inland quickly and cut German supply routes to Cassino and thereby weaken this linchpin of the German defences.

General Mark Clark, commander of Fifth Army, was responsible for planning and directing VI (US) Corps at Anzio. He and his staff planned an American supplied landing and American led breakout. Very much an Anglophobe, and mistrustful of Alexander, he wanted American troops to get the credit for capturing Rome.

Source: The Tiger Triumphs,

Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander commanded 15th Army Group in Italy and was in overall control of operations in Italy

a potential future campaign trajectory, starting with an expeditionary, strategic-level operation that initially exhibits a phase of effective combined-arms manoeuvre with strong, well-resourced, forces. However, as the campaign progressed effective manoeuvre declined as units and resources became depleted whilst enemy resistance increased. Against strong German pressure, the beachhead forces shifted to the defensive and employed artillery and air power, and echeloned reinforcements, to prevent the beachhead collapsing. Plentiful reserves, ammunition and air mastery are not guaranteed for future British ground forces. Anzio highlights the possible problems operation for which they were unprepared and having to adapt rapidly in contact. This is especially

This article will cover logistic activities for four broad phases during the Anzio operation. First, the beach landing in January 1944 will be covered alongside the early expeditionary sustainment activities across ‘Peter’ Beach. Second, will be the support to manoeuvre warfare during the advance inland to the ‘highwater mark’ near Campoleone. Third, the will reveal the transition to attritional warfare. Fourth, the stagnation and stalemate that followed, which provided further logistic challenges.2 These phases will focus on divisional logistics using examples from the Royal Army Service Corps (RASC) companies of 1st Division, 56th (London) Division and 5th Division. These will cover the changing character of the campaign from a strategic level expeditionary landing; via an operational level manoeuvrist offensive; to a tactical attritional battle. The focus on logistics and logisticians will be aided by a case study examining 514 Infantry Brigade Company RASC (168 Brigade, 56th Division) to exemplify the logistic efforts at Anzio and help illustrate the supply and transport problems, and solutions.3 Before getting down to the ‘worm’s eye’ view, the logistics ‘big picture’ must be appreciated.

Expeditionary warfare

The operational planning, and wider resource challenges behind Operation SHINGLE warrant examination when considering the expeditionary phase of the campaign. The administrative staff of 15 Army Group (Eighth and Fifth Armies) had initially argued that SHINGLE was administratively unsound in supplying a mixed (US-UK) force over beaches, due to limited availability of Landing Ships Tank (LSTs), which were needed to support D-Day.4 It was Winston Churchill who argued for strategic-level resources for the Anzio operation and he temporarily prioritised SHINGLE over OVERLORD.

Whilst the RASC and Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) were active at Anzio, the theatre logistic plan was co-ordinated between VI (US) Corps and Fifth Army. After the landings a divisional historian remarked: “The relatively narrow strip between the front line and the beaches was thickly studded with ammunition dumps and other supply points. Most of these were maintained by the US Quartermaster 5 Whilst there was much criticism of the cautiousness of Major General John Lucas, the American VI Corps Commander, there were effective large scale logistic

detailed logistic planning. There was negligible British representation on the Army and Corps logistic staffs.6 During the landings there were shortages of ordnance stores like blankets and stretchers, and key British ordnance force elements were left behind.7 The logistic complications of mixing British and American forces, were simply overlooked at the strategic level.8 Brigadier Alan Fernyhough, the RAOC historian, summarised that; “… the politics of Anglo American cooperation at Corps and Army level prevented the RAOC from being in the operational picture … the familiar pattern of hasty improvisation

9

The infantry landed on the night of 21–22 January and no major opposition was encountered.10 According General Henry ‘Jumbo’ Wilson, Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean; ‘the landings had proved a model of amphibious operations’11 This

“After a perfect landing in enemy territory, almost nothing went right. The roads to Rome and the commanding hills were open – but we did not choose 12 After the successful landings, the Allied troops spent several days occupying defensive positions and stockpiling supplies. To get troops and materiel ashore quickly from LSTs, a pontoon causeway was built from the beach. Larger vessels were unloaded using DUKW amphibious trucks. The ‘expeditionary phase’ of operating over Peter Beach lasted a few days as poor weather prevented the unloading of ships.13 Thereafter Anzio port was used for disembarking troops and supplies.14 days before 5 February approximately 61,000 tons of Allied supplies arrived; about 4,000 tons daily through

observed: “Maintenance of the beachhead forces was carried out entirely by LSTs; loaded vehicles drove into the ships … near Naples, and drove straight off at Anzio [port] to the beachhead dumps … LSTs were 15

According to Whicker; “Upon docking these [trucks] would roar down the ramps, off the quayside and

16 These measures were resource

Meanwhile, the Germans rapidly amassed numerous scratch composite forces and divisions at Anzio; a German paratrooper remembered: “Within

US Army operated DUKW amphibious trucks bringing British 25-pounder field guns ashore at Peter Beach. DUKWs were vital for the Allied logistics effort as they were able to bring supplies ashore from ships either into port or across beaches

Source: The Royal Artillery Commemoration Book 19391945, RA Benevolent Fund, Bell and Sons: London, 1950

a few hours the battalion, fully equipped and heavily laden with ammunition, travelled south… We were told that the enemy had landed at Anzio but that little was known about his strength… There was no 17

The ‘manoeuvre’ phase was about to commence.

companies:

“One meets them where the shells crash into the Port of Anzio, at crowded supply and ammunition dumps, along the scarred roads throughout the Divisional Area, at R.A.S.C. ammunition points where sometimes enemy action sends stacks rocketing into the air, at the gun sites… one sees them too in unfamiliar roles – manning infantry positions, putting

295 Company, supporting 24th Guards Brigade, landed at Peter Beach on 23rd January and suffered th during an air raid.21

On 24 January, 1st Division started moving inland. The Grenadier Guards reconnoitred towards Aprilia, an embryo town (nicknamed ‘the Factory’), where a German battalion was positioned. On the 25th, the Guards, supported by a tank squadron, captured Aprilia and 111 prisoners of . On 26 January, the Guards stopped a German counterattack and took

sharp and successful operations limited in friendly casualties whilst imposing cost on the enemy and

1st Division to advance inland. During this manoeuvre warfare phase 295 Company engaged in transporting combat supplies (CSups) and provided Troop Carrying Vehicles (TCVs). On one occasion RASC TCVs carried

tail boards went down, and the Guards dismounted to conduct a bayonet charge.22 During another detail, TCVs evacuated Italian civilians.

Copyright; US Army

Source: American Forces in Action, Anzio Beachhead (22 January to 25 May 1944) Division, War Department: Washington, 1947

British logisticians loading supplies in the rear areas at Anzio. The limited area of the Allied beachhead required logistic areas to be compressed. The different stacks in this image are close together and multiple stacks would be damaged by a single enemy shell

Source: The Story of the Royal Army Service Corps 1939–1945, Bell and Sons: London, 1955

Manoeuvre Warfare

The Anzio landings were intended to enable a manoeuvrist operation to strike inland against the German rear areas to cut North–South supply routes and ‘unblock’ the impasse at Cassino. The immediate opportunity to advance inland on 22–23 January was ignored due to caution by General Lucas and ambiguity in the operational intent of General Clark who had advised Lucas: “Don’t stick your neck out 18 It was also prudent to ensure that a defensible bridgehead was established.

The manoeuvre phase can be studied by examining the logisticians of the British 1st Division. The Commander RASC (CRASC) presided over the divisional RASC which comprised 7, 42 and 295 Infantry Brigade Companies and 40 Divisional Troops Company.19 An observer described the work of these

culminated before the objective at Campoleone station was secured. 1st Division had become overstretched in a vulnerable salient which invited a German response.

Attrition

Adolf Hitler personally decreed that counterattacks by German armoured and infantry divisions, supported by heavy tanks, air forces, anti-ship guided weapons and remote-controlled demolitions vehicles, would obliterate the Allied beachhead. According to Whicker: “The counter-attack General coming, while we marked time until the enemy 23

followed, the Campoleone salient was recaptured by the Germans, a portent of what deeper Allied advances to the Alban Hills might have experienced. Both sides suffered severe casualties. The Germans subsequently planned to surge towards Anzio during Operation ‘FISCHFANG’.24 A case study examining 514 Infantry Brigade Company provides an insight into how logistic activities were conducted during this

of the unit and men who conducted them.

168 Brigade (56th Division) arrived on 3 February, during the ‘attritional’ phase of the campaign and was directed to reinforce 1st Division, which had been drastically reduced in strength. This brigade was supported by 514 Infantry Brigade Company which was a pre-war Territorial sub-unit that had served in Iraq, Egypt, Sicily and Italy. Like many territorial units,

Map from the US Army history of the battle showing the locations of the British and American landings at Anzio on 22 January 1944

it was manned with a mix of characters with a broad range of experience. It was commanded by Major Hollands… “A civilian soldier, he took his soldiering seriously. He as a strong disciplinarian, utterly fair, lacking somewhat in humour. Hard working, keen 25

Holland’s 2IC was Captain Witchell who had been awarded the Military Cross in 1940 for organising the defence of a village against enemy tanks.26 Captain

platoon alongside Lieutenant Michael Nelson.27 Nelson remembered that Pike: ‘…looked after the day-to-day running of the platoon, exposing himself to shells and s**t with an alarming disregard for his personal safety. After his days or night’s work, he, ensured the safety and comfort of his drivers as far as was

28 The Company Sergeant Major was James Merrills, a former butcher from Worksop and was a pre-war regular. 514 Company comprised three platoons; each of 33 lorries and about sixty lorries) and a platoon HQ. Nelson’s troop sergeants were at opposite ends of the leadership spectrum. Sergeant ‘Smith’ exhibited pre-war ideals of discipline

29 Typical of Nelson’s section commanders was Corporal Ralph Fidler, a former factory foreman, aged thirty, who had three-and-ahalf years’ service. Several men had previous military experience, and a few were Great War veterans. There were some ‘characters’;. Private ‘Lane’, a forty-yearold ex-businessman was scruffy, well-built and a successful black marketeer. Private ‘Jackson’ was an excellent scrounger who could acquire anything. An eclectic mixture of ‘civilian soldiers’, the men of 514 Company would be subjected to a tough and relentless

A 514 Company driver recorded: “… arrived at Anzio, after an uneventful sea trip … we disembarked in quick time; no vehicle being allowed to halt around the dock area. We arrived at an assembly area … then moved into a wood across the way. We started to

30 According to Michael Nelson: “… A few hours after arriving the wood was shelled and we suffered a couple of 31 Another company member, Ernie Whitear, recalled: “… we lived like soldiers of the First World War in foxholes

around the clock …’32 An anonymous driver stated: ‘We had our camp next to some Yank ammunition dump and we were encircled with artillery and antiaircraft [guns]. Jerry [aircraft] came over about three

33

beachhead and British artillery had a voracious appetite for ordnance according to Nelson: “One

guns supplied with ammunition. We delivered directly to the guns. These were lined along a muddy track which ran through the woods … they drew 34 days ashore the men of 514 Company dug their own defensive positions and delivered 4,800 shells. They

which was focussed on the limited routes within the beachhead.35 The main roads were the coast road (‘Piccadilly’), lateral road (‘Watling Street’) and Via Anziate (the road North from Anzio).36 ‘Stonk Corner’ was an aptly named junction. Air attacks were a common occurrence. A working party of twenty RASC men was targeted: “As we were reaching our destination, something made me look up into the sun.

Scatter!’ Out of the sun came six dive bombers. I could clearly see their markings as they came into attack… Anzio was a place where one grew 37 Afterwards, the party continued with laying mines, alongside the Royal Engineers.

Throughout this phase, 514 Company worked under 1st Division. The CRASC for 56th Division, Lieutenant Colonel Fawcett, did not arrive until 19th February (D+29); he was ‘welcomed’ by a German air raid. At Anzio 56th Division only deployed 513 and 514 and part of 491 Companies.38 On 19 February

A 25-pounder field gun position. Versatile, and with a high rate of fire, the 25-pounder was the workhorse of the British artillery and accounted for most of the British artillery ammunition fired at Anzio. The gun position has been built up using shell boxes filled with earth which is testament to the rate of fire of the weapon

The logistic geography of the Anzio beachhead showing the limited numbers of main routes that convoys could use to carry supplies forward. The German artillery was able to focus on key routes and cause attrition to logistic resupply

Source: The Royal Artillery Commemoration Book 19391945, RA Benevolent Fund, Bell and Sons: London, 1950

Source; The Royal Artillery Commemoration Book 19391945, RA Benevolent Fund, Bell and Sons: London, 1950

514 Company was roadbuilding with its Composite Platoon supplying 168 Brigade. 513 Company was supporting the gunners with thirty-six 3-ton lorryloads of ammunition daily. The attrition rate was high, with one source stating that 514 Company had thirty-one casualties over a two-week period.39 56th Division formed a Jeep column to replenish units in Sergeant Tomkins was awarded the MM for good 40

pointed out: “Well, if you can drive a dodgem car at joined the platoon.41

As the German counteroffensive surged down the Via Anziate it was stopped at a feature called ‘The Flyover’. Here the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, supported by the North Staffordshire Regiment, held the line against overwhelming attacks. According to war correspondent Wynford Vaughan-Thomas: trenches, and behind them the men of the RASC and REME had dropped their stretchers [sic] and spanners

42

Though the beachhead area was small, convoys delivering vital supplies could go astray in what was a chaotic situation. On 18 February at about 1600hrs, 514 Company war diary recorded: “6 x 3 ton [lorry],

43 This was Corporal Fidler’s section which was tasked by Nelson who recalled: “I was ordered to send up six lorry loads of mines to one of the battalions that was defending a sector of the perimeter that was hard pressed by German tanks… That was the last we saw of those six lorries.’ Whitear recalled: “One of our sections had set off to report to the REs but, unknown 44 Nelson added that the convoy: “… passed through our front lines and tootled on down the road. There they had paused, I imagine because they realised they were lost, and while in consultation had been surrounded by the Hun. They got back in their lorries and [were]

45 The lorries could easily have been riddled with 7.92mm bullets adding seven logisticians to the 1,038 other burials at Anzio War Cemetery.46 The result of this small-scale action was that the mines were not delivered, and consequently the British positions were not only left unprotected but German engineers would have undoubtedly reused them.47

The ‘touch-and-go’ battle for ‘The Flyover’ involving 1st Division on 18th February eventually helped secure the enemy with many German infantry battalions being reduced to company strength.48 These attacks were costly to repulse but were a morale-boost as one RASC soldier with 1st Division wrote: “I am at a little holiday resort named Anzio, the Fuhrer promised to sweep us back into the sea by 12th February, and although he has about ten times as many [men] as we, he still hasn’t done it. … We are waiting for the day

49 Before that day there would be a lengthy period of stalemate.

Stalemate

After ‘FISCHFANG’ had culminated there was heavy 169th Brigade suffered heavy casualties.50 This

positions being only tenuously held; static positional warfare predominated, with artillery duels, air attacks, patrolling and local offensives. Despite

measuring approximately 20 x 10 miles, the battle for consolidation and expansion was reduced to a stalemate where, an infantry brigadier noted: “We patrolled to the maximum and laid on numerous small offensive operations, all that our meagre [infantry]

with all possible weapons; guns, mortars, machine

51 Heavy losses amongst the infantry required force sorties) in greater quantities to repel German counterattacks. Throughout Italy during February 1944 it became clear that: “We are shooting more

52 The initial policy on artillery ammunition at Anzio was: “No limits had been placed on it, and the policy had been to crack the enemy

53 On average during February about 112 rounds-per-gunper-day (RPGPD) of 25-pounder ammunition were expended.54 his represented a longer-term theatre problem and the solution was rationing artillery ammunition.55 that shell rationing came: “… much to the relief of [the 56

This enabled a stockpile to be amassed by early April.57 Other weapons - 75mm tank guns, heavy and light anti-aircraft guns - which had plentiful ammunition, were employed innovatively as artillery substitutes to bombard enemy positions.58 The Anzio beachhead, being a relatively small lodgement

sapping for both sides according to a London Scottish soldier: “… the Beach-head oppressed us from the start … there was desolation in the air, and we sensed 59 Likewise, Lieutenant Deayton-Groom, an infantryman, recalled: “There

Map showing the layout of logistic areas around Anzio. The Ammunition Supply Points (ASPs) are numerous and are spread out across the area along with sites for US and UK rations, POL and engineer stores. Much of this area was controlled by the US Army Ordnance Corps who ran the inload of supplies via Anzio port. The red square marks the location of Anzio Beachhead Cemetery which was established close to the main hospital in the beachhead that sits just to the north

was no refuge anywhere from the din and danger of the beachhead … every part was within reach of the enemy’s guns. The weather was bitterly cold and wet, and existence was one of permanently soaked

60 Whilst Allied troops at Anzio were subjected to German bombardments, the Allied air forces heavily interdicted German supplies. The Germans were equally unprepared for an attritional battle and the worsening logistic situation led to declining morale amongst many German troops.61 A British pioneer remarked that: “Some of the Jerry POWs say they know they are

62 Another stated: “… I heard one 63 Meanwhile, British soldiers paid tribute to Allied always do in the line, and the rations and rum never 64

The infantry of 56th Division, like 1st Division, had suffered severe casualties holding the beachhead.65

supply lines were short and not every RASC company was needed to deliver supplies. A driver from 514 Company recalled: “We got some pretty sticky jobs to do, such as digging trenches and dugouts for the second line defences and helping the Royal 66 Infantry casualties necessitated that supporting arms formed temporary defensive units to hold quiet sectors. Nelson recorded a typical ‘additional’ task where: “… my mob was called upon to build a defensive line and to man it when necessary. I knew then that the situation was desperate, and so did my men, who set about the task of building a second Maginot Line with much cursing and grumbling. … they hadn’t joined … to 67 situation that infantry battalions combed out their

68 RASC men also conducted patrols and Nelson led a night patrol: ‘… I was loath to commit myself to such a hazardous

the trigger. Indeed it was a prospect that appalled me. I set out not having the least idea what the object of the exercise was but determined that it should on

69 During future

may require logistic soldiers to accomplish more

The 5th Division relieved 56th Division and on 11 March the remainder of 514 Company re-embarked for Naples.70 The men were happy to depart as an RASC driver remarked: “We were told we were leaving the beachhead … and believe me, we weren’t

71 An infantryman wrote: “Believe me, it was

72 Lieutenant Nelson: “… never stopped shaking with fear the

73 5th Division only required a skeleton logistic organisation to sustain

platoons and a Jeep platoon.74 During the stalemate that followed both sides struggled to maintain morale during this hazardous but largely inactive period. To foster morale 5th Division had a successful concert party to boost spirits, football pitches were cleared for inter-unit matches and beetle racing became commonplace.75 A paternalistic attitude by logistic leaders helped foster morale in 40th Company (1st Division): … “I’m absolutely happy in my new Coy.

76 Some of

underpinned by sound logistics as the 5th Division’s historian stated: “The Infantryman knew that the drivers of the RASC would see that he never lacked

77

There were still plenty of rear area hazards dug deeply at Anzio and grew accustomed to a Lord Elwyn-Jones: “Dugouts of all shapes, sizes, situations have been carved out of the earth. Hospital

78 The

constrained space in the beachhead, and large ammunition stockpiles, prevented ammunition stacks being positioned with the correct safety distances.79 On 28 February a stack of 17-pounder anti-tank ammunition was set alight by a German bomb. Despite the danger from the exploding ammunition

Private Jack Balmforth later performed a similar feat; both men were decorated.80 During the night 30–31 March a shell struck another dump near 7 Company

into the area were poor necessitating the British use of extemporised platoons of Jeeps and trailers which could carry supplies across this difficult terrain

Pre-loaded trucks, carrying artillery ammunition, prepare to disembark from a landing ship at Anzio port

A photographic example of the Wadi sector of the Anzio Beachhead which had claustrophobic terrain where the infantry of both sides fought in close contact with each other. Routes

This pile of empty mortar ammunition containers highlights the speed of expenditure of ammunition at Anzio. These are likely 4.2-inch mortar bombs and over 120 have been fired from this position alone. These weapons were later rationed to twenty rounds per tube per day

requiring a similar response.81 This ammunition was vital to defending the beachhead. Such were the constant dangers within the beachhead echelon areas that an infantryman sent to collect blankets from the beaches hurriedly returned to his unit thinking that his forward location was: “… a damn-

82 A member of 434 Company wrote: “My nerves are all to pieces, nine months of this without a break! No 83 There were further explosive safety hazards and fatalities further to the rear in the supply chain, though even these did not affect ammunition supplies.84

This article has covered the spectrum of campaigning, and varying logistic support, from expeditionary warfare with an operational aim, via manoeuvre, to tactical attritional warfare. As interesting as the return to manoeuvre, and the logistic transition which enabled it, is to study, the contributing factors are outside the scope of this article. In short, with the success of the Fourth Battle of Cassino (Op DIADEM) which broke the Gustav Line, the conditions were right for initiating the Americanled breakout at Anzio. Though British forces played minor parts, their logisticians had no rest as 800 RPG were dumped for the intensive artillery barrage. These large quantities of stock had to be distributed within a very short timeframe and 295 Company alone moved 9,000 shells overnight 10/11t May and 11,560 25-pounder shells the next night.85 The breakout which commenced on 23 May 1944 rapidly gained momentum. Rome was liberated on 4 June as the Germans executed a hasty withdrawal. The Allied forces in Italy had achieved a great victory but two days later D-Day eclipsed the efforts of what unfairly become known as the ‘D-Day Dodgers’.

Conclusion

defence lines, Anzio quickly became an ugly attritional campaign resonating with the past and present according to Elwyn-Jones: “The devastation

Shell holes and bomb craters every two or three yards, shelled tanks, burned out lorries … we are cleaning the shambles and are burying the Nazi

86 The similarities to Bakhmut and Avdiivka

in Ukraine are obvious. Denis Healey considered: “… Anzio was a tactical failure. Even if, as armchair critics have claimed, a bolder commander could have

87 The

German forces that were depleted at Anzio were unable to oppose D-Day: “… the Germans made greater strategic mistakes … So Anzio on balance

88 Whilst Healey recognised the strategic effect that Anzio had on the course of the war, many of his contemporaries who fought there only recalled the local ‘picture’ of stalemate and heavy casualties.

The Anzio campaign provides an excellent example of the logistic realities of high-intensity

support required to meet desired end-states. The real estate required; and the logistic stockpiles needed to provide redundancy and contingency, must be considered in any future staff calculations. Large but dispersed stocks, especially artillery enemy and helped restore manoeuvre. Not having campaigns could potentially necessitate premature operational culmination and stagnation whilst stocks

he Fifth British Division 1939 to 1945

5th Division Benevolent Fund: London, 1959

A schematic from the 5th Division CRASC War Diary showing the route improvements made by the Royal Engineers and members of the supporting arms within the beachhead. Though RASC men worked hard with constructing these routes they would benefit from them as increasing route options reduced the likelihood of resupply convoys being hit by German predicted artillery fire

Don’t be there

Don’t be detected

Don’t be engaged

Don’t be surprised

Don’t be hit

Mobility, no pattern setting, battlespace management, understand enemy capabilities, G2.

Emissions control (EmCon) measures; noise, light, heat, electromagnetic spectrum, PED use, OpSec.

Ground, air/UAS and CBRN sentries

Digging in, proximity to hazards (ammunition, bulk fuel).

If hit, minimise casualties (killed/incapacitated) ITRs), prompt evacuation.

If casualties are suffered, don’t fail the mission

If casualties are suffered, maintain cohesion/morale

Dispersion of logistic forces and stocks, redundancy, risk management.

Leadership, welfare and pastoral care, TrIM, mental resilience, rest/relief.

are replenished.89 A logistician from 5th Division

great importance of a divisional column organisation the enormous value of perfect co-operation with the other arms and services in the division; this can only

90 Flexibility must be matched by innovation to employ new, existing or legacy technologies or, occasionally, discarding established pre-existing concepts to meet the unique conditions of a theatre.

Studying Anzio provides an opportunity to apply greater realism concerning human responses

always digging-in, alongside passive and active air defence measures. The ‘survivability onion’ is a concept concerned with armoured vehicle protection. A logistics interpretation of this concept is shown in Table 1 for consideration.

General Charles Krulak coined the concept of the ‘Three Block War’, whereby different types of city blocks. His second concept was the ‘Strategic Corporal’ whereby greater reliance is placed on junior leaders whose actions could win or lose a campaign.91 These concepts also apply to logistics

different interconnected battlespaces in the British sector at Anzio which experienced widely differing and constraints and therefore different logistic activities and force protection postures.92 Confusingly, the ‘character’ of these sectors might change daily, or even hourly. Such a broad spectrum of situational demands placed greater responsibility on junior leaders to apply the correct tactical posture or logistic techniques, highlighting that logistic failure at any 93

The RASC at Anzio also experienced numerous additional tasks that future logisticians may take on; labour, obstacle erection, key point defence and force protection. These tasks were once completed by the RLC Pioneer CEG but these roles will endure

logisticians as infantrymen in emergencies. Finally, Anzio amply demonstrates that effective logistic

support helps underpin force morale and German logistic misprioritisation shows the negative impact

st Division alone

94 The RASC suffered negligibly by comparison.95 However, Anzio had involved a monumental logistic effort and: “Everyone representatives of every Corps: Pioneers, Cooks, men of the RASC. All played their part and shared the 96 The GoC 1st Division wrote later: “The infantry

97 The worm’s-eye view of one logistician

98

Table 1 – An example of the logistics ‘survivability onion’

The human cost of the Anzio campaign; a British infantryman who has lost a foot to an anti-personnel mine is carried away by wounded German paratroops, who have themselves been taken prisoner

Source: Aris, George, The Fifth British Division

Fund: London, 1959

Endnotes

1Later two British divisions, with supporting arms, were employed simultaneously at Anzio.

2The restoration of manoeuvre during the American-led breakout in May 1944 is out of scope of this article.

3Known as the ‘International Brigade’, it comprised the London Scottish, London Irish and 10th Royal Berkshire Regiment.

4J Carter and D Kann, War

5David Williams, IWM: London, 1995, p.86.

6

he had no clerks, staff or transport. A. Fernyhough, History of RAOC: Unknown location, unknown date, p.247. Frank Steer, Pen&Sword: Barnsley, 2005, p.100.

7Though a British Ordnance Beach Detachment was landed to manage supplies, its ammunition section was not initially sent. The 1st Division Ordnance Field Park (OFP) was likewise omitted from movements planning. Steer, p.101.

8 Anzio; ‘…in spite of certain administrative disadvantages which can be overcome…’. Appointments and Promotions, TNA, WO214/49, Alexander Cipher Message, 28 December 1943.

9Fernyhough, p.248.

10Allied forces only faced a widely dispersed German battalion.

11General H Wilson, Report by the Supreme Allied Commander th th HMSO: London, 1946, p.23.

12 Alan Whicker, HarperCollins: London, 2005, p.121.

13 logistics across Peter Beach was Captain Denis Healey. He Healey, Penguin: London, 1989, p.60.

14Carter & Kann, p.199.

15 cyclically and 1,500 pooled trucks. In addition up to eight US ‘Liberty’ ships were unloaded concurrently onto 350 DUKW

between Naples and Anzio carrying special demands for supplies on a 5-day turnaround. Maintenance – Anzio Bridgehead, TNA, WO204/563. P Turpin, th Infantry Divisional RASC Review, Volume1, No5, 1952, p.29.

16Whicker, p.148.

17Joachim Liebschner, Athena, Twickenham, 2006, pp.82–83.

18Lloyd Clark, , Headline Review: London, 2006, p.108.

19One Brigadier thought that 1st and most cheerful unit I have ever seen under active service.’

Generally each of the three infantry brigade companies supplied ammunition, fuel, rations and materiel to their aligned brigade whilst the divisional troops company supplied the supporting arms.

201st Division CRASC War Diary, TNA, WO170/390.

21Corporal Walter Crewe, aged 31, from Worthing, was buried in Anzio War Cemetery. Two lorries were damaged. 22295 Company, TNA, WO170/2482.

23Whicker, p.143.

24Operation ‘Catching Fish’.

25Major Richard Hollands was born in 1905. He was gazetted into the RASC in January 1940 and relinquished his commission in 1960. Michael Nelson, , London: Leo Cooper, 1973, p.102.

26Gerald Witchell MC, served with 12 Troop Carrying Company at Dunkirk. He was formerly a private who was gazetted in 1939. TNA, WO373/16/412.

27Nelson was only twenty and was, by his own admission, an the RASC in December 1941. He was later an author; some of his books, published anonymously, are now considered classics of LGBT literature.

28Esmond Pike was a shoe shop manager who was gazetted into the RASC in 1941. Michael Nelson, London: Leo Cooper, 1974, p.13.

29Luckily ‘Smith’ left the company before it departed for Italy.

30Unknown RASC Soldier’s Diary, Author’s Collection, unpublished.

31Nelson, , p.147.

32Ernie Whitear, Anzio, RCT Journal, September 1975, p.79.

33Unknown RASC Soldier’s Diary.

34Nelson, , p.148.

35On 8 February Driver Bidwell and Driver Hodgson were killed

killed, and Corporal Keith and Driver Fisher were wounded by shells. Private Clatworthy was wounded whilst recovering a damaged ambulance and died soon afterwards. Anzio was an inglorious place as Nelson recorded; ‘I regret that we suffered casualties … What I regret even more is that someone stripped the body of one of my men before we brought him in to bury … watch, wallet, ring, the lot.’ (Nelson, p.148).

Driver Thomas Bidwell, aged 38, was from Cambridge. Driver Thomas Hodgson, aged 41, was from Birmingham. Both were killed on 8 February. Driver Edward Dack, aged 27, was from Sawtry, Huntingdonshire. He was killed on 9 February 1944. The two men wounded were Corporal M Keith and Driver W Fisher. Private S Clatworthy, aged 26, from Palmer’s Green, Middlesex, died of his wounds on 9 February. All were buried in Anzio War Cemetery.

36Now called the Via Nettunense.

37Whitear, , p.79.

3856th Division normally had 491 Divisional Troops Company and 513, 514 and 515 Infantry Brigade Companies. Most of 491 and 515 Companies were not sent to Anzio.

39Six men of 514 Company were killed or died of wounds; six were PoWs; over eight were wounded and at least six were evacuated sick or wounded.

40Tomkins’ citation, TNA, WO373/9/189.

41Whitear, , p.79.

42Wynford Vaughan-Thomas, , Pan: London, 1961, p.189.

43Corporal Fidler’s section comprised Lance Corporals William Keech, Cyril Belk and Sydney Rowlinson, Drivers William Ibbs, Benjamin Barker and William Neal. All seven were captured on 19 February but Belk was killed on this date. 514 Company War Diary, TNA, WO170/2548.

44Whitear, , p.79.

45Nelson, , pp.149-150.

46Had the mines detonated, their names would have been carved on the Cassino Memorial.

47Other vehicles made this error. At 1500hrs on 19 February an ambulance went past the forward infantry posts and the RASC driver and medic were captured. RASC men missing in Italy, TNA, WO361/888.

48A report stated that captured German CO: ‘… pays grim tribute art[iller]y.’ 1/LNL War Diary, TNA, WO170/1429.

49Censorship Summaries, TNA, WO204/10381.

50One infantryman who served in the Wadis wrote; ‘Of course the weather doesn’t help – it’s generally raining … there is a grand spirit of comradeship and determination … against all Jerry attacks – and he certainly knows how to attack.’ Censorship Summaries, TNA, WO204/10381.

51Private Papers Major General Lyne, IWM, Documents.13160, p.24. 52Maintenance – Anzio Bridgehead, TNA, WO204/563.

53Ammunition comprised about 90% of the loads delivered to Anzio. Unknown Author, The First Divisional Artillery at Anzio, TNA, WO204/8240, p.9.

54Up to 300 RPGPD were sometimes expended. American gunners also expended more 155mm ammunition than expected. Carter & Kann, p.200. Maintenance –Anzio Bridgehead, TNA, WO204/563.

55

RPGPD; twenty RPGPD for 4.2-inch mortars, and only seventeen for 81mm mortars. Larger amounts were only for repelling major attacks. 5th Division CRASC War Diary, TNA, WO170/432.

56Unknown Author, First Divisional Artillery, TNA, WO204/8240, p.9.

57Carter & Kann, , p.200.

58A tank gunner recalled; ‘… I handle the nifty 75mm gun and the Browning [MG], I make good use of them. I had quite a good last week; I think I put a stop to quite a few blokes trying to get where they didn’t belong.’ Censorship Summaries, TNA, WO204/10381.

59Keith Spooner, London Scottish: London, 1997, p.130.

60C Deayton-Groom, , BAR No88, April 1988, p.63.

61One German soldier considered; ‘It was ghastly in Italy!

never bothered about the welfare of their troops … The men had no spirit left …’. In men were sent to a punishment company for stealing sheep to supplement their rations. CSDIC Interrogations, TNA, WO208/5509.

62Censorship Summaries, TNA, WO204/10381.

63Censorship Summaries, TNA, WO204/10381.

64Base Censorship Summaries, TNA, WO204/10381.

65After a short rest 56th Division was shipped to Egypt to re-build.

66The roadbuilding was vital and two RASC Platoons were allocated until the task was completed. Two men were wounded died of his wounds three days later. Another man was wounded

at Company HQ the next day. Three men from 514 Company were wounded on 23 February; Driver W Byrne, Driver E Grove and Driver J Cubitt. The soldier who died on 26 February was likely Driver Alfred Cook, aged 38, from Norwich. He was buried in Beach Head War Cemetery. Driver R. Coventon was wounded on 24 February and Driver W Rissen was wounded on 27 February. Unknown RASC Soldier’s Diary.

67Nelson, , pp.148.

68Lyne Papers, IWM, 13160, p.26.

69Nelson, , p.29.

70A simple expedient to smoothly achieve this was for 5th Division to take over the vehicles and equipment of 56th Division and vice-versa.

71Unknown RASC Soldier’s Diary.

72Censorship Summaries, TNA, WO204/10381.

73Nelson, p.146.

74434 Divisional Troops Company and 2, 69 and 80 Infantry Brigade Companies. Turpin, th Divisional RASC, p.29.

75Unknown Author, , Bell and Sons: London, 1955, p.274.

76Censorship Summaries, TNA, WO204/10381.

77George Aris, 5th Division: London, 1959, p.218.

78Lord Elwyn-Jones, Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1983, pp.74–75.

79Fernyhough, History of the RAOC, p.248.

80Both were awarded British Empire Medals. Grassby and Balmforth medal citations, TNA, WO373/68/671 and 672. 81295 Company, TNA, WO170/2482.

82Williams, p.91.

83Censorship Summaries, TNA, WO204/10381.

84At 14 Base Ammunition Depot (BAD) near Bari three logisticians and twelve Italian labourers were killed in two accidents related to the insatiable need for artillery ammunition. All depot efforts were focussed on repairing artillery munitions

Beaton and Whittles, won the George Medal. 14 BAD War Diary, TNA, WO170/2757. Beaton and Whittles Medal Citations, TNA, WO373/68/655 and 656.

85Shell splinters ignited the cartridges on Driver Heath’s lorry. He stopped, jumped on the back and threw off the burning cartridge boxes to avoid the whole load exploding. 295 Company, TNA, WO170/2482.

86Elwyn-Jones, p.75.

87Healey, , p.60.

88Healey, p.60.

89Delays will be greater if new stock needs to come from the factory. 90Turpin, th p.29.

91https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/1999-JanThe-strategic-corporal-Leadership-in-the-three-block-war.pdf, accessed 26 June 2024.

92 static defensive positions on a ‘quiet’ front likened to trench warfare). West of the Via Anziate, in the Wadi sector, troops fought intense local operations in constricting terrain and very close to the enemy (requiring tactical supply by Jeeps). East of the road was a combination of manoeuvre warfare and highly

93The loss of Corporal Fidler’s section is an example of this. 9480% of these losses were amongst the infantry. A Guardsman recalled; ‘The chaps never fought better with such cheerfulness attacks and broken them.’ At Anzio 1st

casualties during the breakout (after 22 May). Of the missing over 1,404 were still unaccounted for in July 1944. The Division took TNA, WO204/8239, Appendix 1, pp.1–2. Censorship Summaries, TNA, WO204/10381.

95The RASC of 1st Division lost twelve men killed and 26 wounded (0.43% of the divisional losses). The First Division in Action, TNA, WO204/8239, Appendix 1, pp.1–2.

961st Division RASC issued 646,260 25-pounder HE shells (22 January–6 June) or 3,231 lorry loads. Unknown Author, History , Ahva Press: Jerusalem, 1947, pp.168 and 173. First Division, TNA, WO204/8239, p.11.

97First Division, TNA, WO204/8239, p.11. 98Whitear, , p.83.

References

Unpublished sources

Private Papers Major General Lyne, IWM, Documents.13160. 5th Division CRASC War Diary, TNA, WO170/432. 1/LNL War Diary, TNA, WO170/1429. 295 Company War Diary, TNA, WO170/2482. 514 Company War Diary, TNA, WO170/2548. 14 BAD War Diary, TNA, WO170/2757. Maintenance – Anzio Bridgehead, TNA, WO204/563. The First Division in Action, TNA, WO204/8239. First Divisional Artillery, TNA, WO204/8240. Base Censorship Summaries, TNA, WO204/10381. CSDIC Interrogations, TNA, WO208/5509. RASC men missing in Italy, TNA, WO361/888. Joseph Grassby medal citation, TNA, WO373/68/671. Jack Balmforth medal citation, TNA, WO373/68/672. Marked Map of Anzio Beach Area, TNA, CAB106/392.

Published sources

Aris, George, , 5th Division Benevolent Fund: London, 1959. Carter, J A H and Kann, D N,

Clark, Lloyd, Anzio, Headline Review: London, 2006.

Darlington, Albert, Laundry Cottage Books: Wellington, 2006.

Deayton-Groom, C W, C British Army Review No 88, April 1988.

Elwyn-Jones, Lord, Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1983.

Fernyhough, A H, , Royal Army Ordnance Corps: Unknown location, unknown date.

Healey, Denis, , Penguin: London, 1989.

Joachim Liebschner, Iron Cross Roads, Athena Press, Twickenham, 2006.

Nelson, Michael, London: Leo Cooper, 1974.

Nelson, Michael, , London: Leo Cooper, 1973.

Spooner, Keith, , Lond Scottish Regimental Trust: London, 1997.

Steer, Frank,

The Story of the RAOC 1918–1993, Pen and Sword: Barnsley, 2005. Trevelyan, Raleigh, Collins: London, 1956.

Turpin, P G, th Infantry Divisional Column RASC in Italy, RASC Review, Volume 1, No 5, 1952.

Unknown Author, , Ahva Press: Jerusalem, 1947.

Unknown Author, , Bell and Sons: London, 1955.

Vaughan-Thomas, Wynford, , Pan: London, 1961.

Whicker, Alan, Harper Collins: London, 2005.

Whitear, Ernie, Royal Corps of Transport Journal, September 1975. Williams, David, Imperial War Museum: London, 1995.

Wilson, General H Maitland, Report by the Supreme Allied th th , HM

Unprecedented is a word that authors and journalists should use sparingly, yet, mainly

the Middle East, it has become a routine adjective for commentators. It is unsurprising therefore that over the last few issues of The RLC Review the focus has been the war in Ukraine, generally positing that we are witnessing something new

broader analysis, outside the scope of most Western studies and single life experiences, often demonstrates some startling parallels and familiar patterns. The brittle nature of Russian supply chains in the Donbas have been heralded as

disconcerting for potential near peer opponents whose sustainment is also likely to come under Chechnya from late 1994 however, the parallels to Eastern Ukraine are stark.

The lack of Russian logistic resilience was witnessed around Grozny where supplies could only be distributed over the last mile in armoured platforms, supported by reinforced all-arms groupings. In scale however, there is a disparity between Ukraine and Chechnya. In Ukraine, Russia is expending circa 10,000 artillery shells every day – in

The elevation of the importance of logistic functions in Chechnya, ranging from fuel/water supply to

repeated in Ukraine, yet perhaps because there has not been a general acknowledgement in the West of the enduring nature of the challenges from other theatres, they have come as an unwelcome surprise (or inconvenient truth). It could be argued that there is no excuse for not recognising what the future is likely to hold. Informative literature has been widely available since the mid-90s, exposing the nature

urban environments. Perhaps the problem is not therefore the availability and access to the lessons

read and study them in depth.

Given the challenging global environment in which Connect members are required to operate, and make sense of, this extended Book Club covers an eclectic mix of publications from mobilisation, industry ramp-up, technology, the power of reading and domestic/geopolitics – somewhere in this literature smorgasbord there may be some insights into how future challenges could be addressed. Supporting this theme of self-education, General Jonathan Shaw opined “don’t wait for the system to educate you –1 His hard won experience seems to chime with the intent of MGL’s Professional Reading List, published in full in the . Some of the publications reviewed below are likely to be considered for the updated 2025 Reading List

and have been specially selected as they are either available free-to-loan to serving members and veterans from the Prince Consort’s Library or are widely available at reasonable prices – of course, you

Legend and Legacy; The Story of Boeing and its People.

Readers may be slightly bemused that this publication, now over three decades old and telling the story of a company that has witnessed its fair share of commercial chaos over the last

in a book review section in 2025. Whilst the author tells an engaging story of the history of Boeing through selected individuals, there are some thoughtprovoking takeaways for contemporary industrial challenges as mobilisation ‘ramp-up’ options are being contemplated across Whitehall and the MOD. Perhaps not what the author planned thirty years ago, Legend & Legacy offers some valuable contemporary insights into the considerations that commercial industry faces when asked to ‘ramp up’ for war. Given today’s ‘lean’ supply chains and comprehensive engineering and ethical/environmental regulations, the tempo and scale of ramp up for

testing was compressed (one prototype received 16 engine changes and 22 carburettor changes in 27 hours) and technology insertion from a broad range of aircraft solutions (the B-29 even incorporated a feature of the Heinkel 111) was monopolised to deliver timely solutions. The importance of quality manufacturing and control is explained where of 750 B-29s which were tested for two and a half hours each (including three take-offs and landings), less than 5% were delayed for delivery for more than two days. Not bad for a production line that completed four aircraft a day, seven days a week. When today’s industrial base together with military and government oversight committees highlight that inherent delays are the result of requirement changes, the B-29 alone ran into thousands of engineering

made because of combat experience. Requirement changes are not new and should perhaps be accepted as the norm rather than a lack of poor acquisition management.

There is one other stark lesson for those involved in ramp up. Immediately after the war, Boeing lost many of its contracts and the whole aircraft industry witnessed a dramatic shrinkage in its contracts and future opportunities. As an example of the pace of contraction, newly completed B-29s were bulldozed offers defence (and other commercial companies) to be accepted to underpin the initial ramp up. It

will be interesting to witness what happens to the Russian defence industry when the Ukrainian war is concluded.

For some contemporary context, Boeing’s six-week strike in 2024 was reported to cost the company an estimated $50Mn a day – a big number, but one that needs to be put in context considering that the net worth of the company was reported as $133Bn on 28 Jan 25. That said, explains that although Boeing has been through some turbulent times, history suggests that it is likely to continue to prosper into the next century. Perhaps Bushey and Georgiadis best sum up the company’s global reliance as “resolving Boeing’s crisis is critical to the future of commercial air travel, as most commercial passenger aircraft are made by it or its European rival Airbus, which has little capacity for new customers until 2 For those struggling to visualise what is worth a read.

The Book at War: Libraries and

After reading this book, you may not look at a library in the same way. Ideas are dangerous, possibly especially if they are recorded and widely distributed - Andrew Pettegree explains why. The written word can be weaponised and, using some thought-provoking examples, Pettegree demonstrates how effective and sometimes dangerous publications can be, through what he terms ‘the mobilisation of

when he wrote on the history of the twentieth century where “The power to follow events and to pass judgement on them had recently come within the reach of all through free education. Popular journals had started to circulate among the masses, swiftly bringing news, good, bad, and sometimes 3 As a weapon (information and dis-information), the written word can be shaped, aimed and released. Provocative

to a huge (often unintended) audience, and they have proven to be challenging to defend against. In

valuable resources. Readers might be surprised that recorded in German journals in 1942-43 and was used by the US Manhatton Project to deliver an operational weapon in 1945. The Germans also made the most of the access they gained from the Axis occupied territories and accumulated an extensive

Barbarossa, the Reich made use of a specialist collection in the Wannsee Institute which offered campaign logistic planning parameters. Although Roosevelt declared that “books of it when it made a night call on Germany and deliberately destroyed the entire 250,000 volumes

of journals in the Berlin Technical University Library at Charlottenburg in 1943. For good measure, a follow-up mission destroyed most of Germany’s publishing capability at Leipzig. These acts perhaps demonstrate how valuable/dangerous the written

formed a research and analysis division in WW2 which linked all the Ivy League universities with the New York and Library of Congress, providing a catalogue of well over 100,000 publications for reference and research.

Whilst there is much more in perhaps to prove the premise of the value of publications, a contemporary example would be Afghanistan – why do you think the Taliban are so focussed on restricting literacy? Perhaps it is because they know that controlling the distribution of the written word is impossible, so denying the skill to interpret it is the last, desperate measure to retain repressive authority. An interesting book which leaves you thinking how lucky we are to be literate and have access to a wide range of powerful ‘benign’ weapons.

Sinews of War and Trade: Shipping and Capitalism in the Arabian Peninsula. Laleh Khalili, London, Verso, 2021. The study of supply chains through shipping routes is something that likely interests a broad logistic audience. Khalili presents these chains as they initially evolved and continue to develop in the Middle East. The reason why ports are located where they are is explained whether it is for the development of the associated hinterlands or as an interim point along the major shipping routes. The personnel who facilitate the supply chains are also studied together with the step changes in the technologies which have driven the global markets which all economies now

the Middle East has is analysed and used to explain geopolitical cause and effects (wars) in the region. Readers are exposed to the fragile links that sustain global capitalism and indirectly the international system. If anyone was in any doubt over how important the Middle East is to global trade then Sinews explains why.

The chapter on war contains thought-provoking historic case studies with many contemporary

often transforms industries, global supply chains and ultimately, national economies. Unintended consequences to shipping disruption are discussed, such as the acceleration of the adoption of containerisation as a result of the closure of the Suez Canal between November 1956 and May 1957 which drove the urgent desire to increase

sea routes. Demonstrating the close relationship between shipping, globalisation and commerce, Khalili explains how, after Nassar closed the Suez

Europe adapted and rapidly transformed its domestic petroleum infrastructure and markets; something

akin to Western Europe’s energy market response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

There is much here for logisticians wishing to understand the often covert complexities of international shipping and where the pressure points persist. Anyone thinking of trading in the region or is likely to be posted to the Arabian Peninsula, will shipping works – and sometimes why it doesn’t!

Battle for Grozny: Vol 1: Prelude and the way to the city, First Chechen War 1994.

Europe at War Series (No.31), Warwick, Helion and Company Ltd, 2023.

The Connect Book Club has previously referred to literature from the Chechen War4 and

readers interested in the Donbas (reading the submissions to this Review, who isn’t?) there are direct parallels between Russia’s battles for Grozny and what is being witnessed in the urban landscape across Ukraine. After planning for a swift capture of Grozny, Russia was forced into a brutal

materiel at an alarming rate. The approach and assault on Grozny in December 1994 (planned to be completed in three weeks) committed 158 tanks and circa 760 other armoured platforms with over troops in all. Several weaknesses in the Russian and control, a lack of integration between tanks and infantry and fragile logistics – sound familiar? The latter challenge is being repeated in Eastern Ukraine, but in Chechnya, platform availability remained low due to lack of spares and maintenance crews, rations were in short supply by as much as 35% of unit demands and water became so low

sanitise captured sources, with the inevitable result of increases in intestinal problems. Once inside the city, every government building was found to be a prepared strongpoint that could only be neutralised with overwhelming force. Careful siting of prepositioned stock supported the skilful use of Chechen casualties.

After three decades, readers may wonder if the Russian High Command in Moscow is now studying the after-action reports from Grozny – if not, then there is every chance that a similar fate for assaulting troops will be widely reported from Ukraine. This slim (78 pages), well-presented volume from Helion offers a valuable detailed bibliography for those wishing to delve deeper and conduct studies with contemporary Ukraine.

The Price of Victory: A Naval History of Britain 1815-1945, N.A.M. Rodger, Allen Lane, 2024.

naval history of Britain trilogy is now available.5 Once in a generation an author comes along who not only explains who, what, when, where and why, but in an

engaging format that often reads like a novel. Whilst there has been some outstanding naval histories published, especially covering WWI and II,6 few have covered the 1,285 year British history with such authority. It is unlikely that the trilogy will be surpassed and every chance that it will become the ‘go to’ source for British naval history.

Much of Vol 3 explains why Britain has such a close

Rodger explains how this legacy has weighed heavy on generations of Britons and the public purse.

The gradual international decline of what Churchill

US ascendancy, is explained, as is the importance of the sometimes challenging development of UK/US maritime cooperation – still an important contributing facet to today’s much vaunted ‘special relationship.’

How policy decisions are aligned to operations is examined throughout, sometimes analysing the misalignment that can occur. The development of air and sea cooperation highlights that true jointery is a relatively new phenomena, underlined by the reoccurring necessity to re-learn vital lessons such as retaining a semblance of amphibious capability. Finally, there are two bonuses for avid readers of history: the maritime glossaries (English and Foreign) and the extensive bibliography. For those that enjoy history, this volume is likely to become a staple in personal libraries.

Your Life is Manufactured: How we make things, Why it matters and How we can do it better, Tim Minshall, London, Faber and Faber Ltd, 2025.

Only really clever people can make the complex understandable – Professor Tim Minshall is one of them. Most Book Club readers will have an interest in manufacturing and supply chains (for ease, referred to throughout in this review as ‘logistics’) but, apart from a relatively small minority who formally study supply chain management, few will have a broad idea of how complex the world of logistics is –the difference between what Minshall refers to as the ‘regular’ and ‘manufacturing’ worlds.

This is not a dry examination of raw material(customer)), rather, this is a carefully selected series of examples which entertain the reader while making you think about the myriad of factors that can contribute to supply success and/or failure. Minshall does a fair amount of myth busting, stripping away the management techno-babble to explain what is really going on under the surface and revealing that there is a phenomena which affects us all, called the illusion of explanatory depth, meaning most people process they are involved in (despite what they might tell you). The case studies open your eyes to the often-fragile world of supply chains. The debacle of the Covid-19 great toilet roll dues-out is explained,

even though only 30% of the world’s population use the soft stuff! The take-away is that in our drive to be supply chain – a point often missed (or ignored) by budget managers until it’s too late.

The beauty of the book is that the reader can superimpose several of Minshall’s case studies governments are now searching for a silver bullet to supply chain resilience, resulting in a position where Minshall believes “70-80 percent of US and

and simple deduction; only it isn’t. Reshoring, nearshoring, friend-shoring and green-shoring all throw up challenges and, ultimately, any retrospective restructuring of manufacturing and supply chains is an attempt to work against the historic commercial grain. Supply chains have evolved for considerable political/cultural effort – something that takes time, time we might not have in an increasingly competitive and challenging environmental world.

Finally, Minshall makes the critical link between manufacturing (and consumption) and the environment. Few would argue with him when he declares that “it is manufacturing that will deliver a more sustainable, more resilient and more equitable

manufacturing.

A great read. By collecting together some ubiquitous case studies, Minshall has thrown light on what largely remains a shadowy other world – the world of manufacturing and logistics. So simple, it makes you wonder why nobody has done it before –then again, only really clever people can see the light.

A must read for logisticians.

Endnotes

1Major General Jonathan D. Shaw CB, CBE (late Parachute Regiment and SAS), Sandhurst Annual ‘Ways of War’ Lecture 2024, Henley Business School, 23 October 2024.

2Bushey, C. and Georgiadis, P. Financial Times, Big Read Aerospace Industry, 26/27 Oct 2024, p.10.

3Churchill, W, S.

The Great Democracies, London, Cassell, 1974, p.288.

4

Operations in Grozny, Lester W. Grau and Timothy L. Thomas, October 1999, Marine Corps Gazette, Online, https://community. apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/243766. [Accessed 16 November 2024].

5 Volume 1, 660–1649 (1997) and , Volume 2, 1649–1815 (2004).

6Whilst there are many naval history with a focus on Britain, some of the best are;

, A.T. Mahan; , P. Kennedy; Business in Great Waters: The U-boat Wars 1916-1945, J. Terraine; Engage the , C. Barnett and P.

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