The RLC Review 2023

THE RLC

REVIEW

Bringing together logistics professionals from Defence, Industry and Academia

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6 RLC Foundation Book Club book reviews

8 RLCF SPECIAL

10 Think Tanks, Think Defence: An interview with Maj Gen Darrell Amison CBE

15 Op WINDFIRM: The UK’s largest asbestos decontamination operation

20 Consultants: What are they good for?

8 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

26

By Cpl Sam Webster (6 Regt RLC)

28 Deception in the CSS Space:

By 2Lt Thomas Flint (6 Regt RLC)

36 Landing Craft: Key considerations for the Lt Ash Peckham (17 P&M Regt RLC)

40 Future Generalists: The primacy of soft

By Capt

Christian Reedman (10 QOGLR)

45 Op PITTING: Providing movements and

By Sgt Dominic Simmons

8 GENERAL INTEREST

50 Net Zero: Reducing the environmental Erica Fuller (PA Consulting)

52 Inland Waterways: A viable option

By Lt Christopher Hodgkiss (6 Regt RLC)

56 DM Kineton: Inspiring and challenging the Sgt Craig Saunders, (DM Kineton)

8 HISTORY

60 Hollowed out logistics: An analysis of the German Army’s logistic failure France Maj Colin Taylor (25 (Trg) Regt RLC)

70 El Alamein: To what extent were superior logistics a critical factor? By Maj Sam Foster (6 Regt RLC)

74 Verdun: The Voie Sacrée and By Maj Andrew Cox (Army HQ)

8 PERSONAL & PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

80 Outside The RLC: Career opportunities in

By Sarah Wilmot (DHL Supply Chain)

82 Reservists: Digital collaboration

By Col Nov Nanovo & Lt Jack Mason (2 OSG and 6 MI Bn)

84 Glossary of Terms

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Welcome to the 2023 RLC Foundation Review, in this the Corps’ 30th anniversary year.

The past year has, yet again, presented some extraordinary events and challenges for both the

towards the efforts to meet these challenges, of having celebrated our monarch’s Platinum Jubilee in June 2022, it was a great shock and sadness to

The State Funeral was performed to the highest of

What these events prove is that the future remains largely an opaque guessing game – one that demands we are to make credible assumptions for military

The RLC Foundation Review plays a small, albeit, vital span a very broad spectrum of corporate and military that our panel of military judges were particularly impressed with the standard of submissions from

and a cost of living crises sparked by concerns over against the backdrop of war in Europe, following the despicable invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February logistics, the war in Ukraine has developed into a relationship and resolve now being closely analysed envisaged twelve months ago war in Europe, NATO galvanized against a common threat, the Russians weaponising energy and food, and the brave Ukrainian nation demonstrating that the moral component of warfare – ‘the will to win’ – is more important that just hardware, people and organisation?

analysis from the roles of management consultants to environmental assurance of the supply chain, to the potential novel use of inland waterways, to the UK’s future ability to prosecute operations in the Foundation Book Club section, focusing on the core theme of strategy – many who have served in

Finally, congratulations to all those authors and their units who have been recognised with awards from the RLC Foundation Review – I look forward to receiving your

Major General Angus Fay CB

RLC Foundation Review 2023 Prize Winners

Best contribution by a Soldier – Cpl Sam Webster –

THERE’S SO MUCH MORE TO SSAFA

We are SSAFA, the Armed Forces charity. We have been supporting the Armed Forces family for more than 135 years and not just during times of conflict. We help those currently serving, veterans and their families to regain their independence and dignity. Our services are diverse, and so are the people we help. Whether practical, emotional or financial we can get them the support they deserve.

LEARN MORE ABOUT OUR SUPPORT SCAN HERE

What is it?

The RLC Foundation was established in 2015 to provide the focus for engagement with industry and academia, for the purpose of professionalising

eighth year, we have established strong working relationships with a wide range of industry partners partners, supporters and friends continue to enable

One of our main objectives is to enable members of the Corps (regular, reserve and veterans) to follow a professional career development path which is recognised with credibility as logistic professionals

regional events in support of the RLC’s Regular and hybrid of live and virtual events and these have both been well supported by the Corps at large and our

24 Jan

leavers Transition event

28 Feb

East Midlands Gateway Logistics Park, Kegworth

07 Mar – ‘Women in Logistics’ event at Theatre 1, Worthy Down

26 Apr (tbc) – Unipart Supply Chain Management event

24 May (tbc) – WS Transportation event and site visit

01 Jun Worthy Down

Jun (tbc) – Joint Services event on ‘People Programme’

18 Jul – Ex LOG SAFARI, Barton Stacey Training Area

27 Sep

Planning event, Colchester

19 Oct – Logistic Leaders Network Awards Dinner, Malvern Suite, St John’s Hotel, Solihull

29 Nov – RLC Foundation Awards Dinner, Combined Mess, Worthy Down

Why Should I join the RLC Foundation?

We offer a wide range of events throughout the year, giving our corporate members exposure to The RLC over evolving logistic capability and promote best

We are actively seeking new members and the three

free to contact us if you need more information about

Where is it?

The RLC Foundation is based at 101 Log Bde,

What does it do?

The Foundation runs a diverse range of national events with industry and academia as well as supporting

8 RLC Foundation Director, Alan Woods and Business Support Manager, Marti Jerrard

The Army & Navy Club, one of London’s most prestigous private clubs has a 180+ year long history. roster of facilities including:

• • Access to a Health Club

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The RLC Foundation Book Club – It’s Tough at the Top: Or the Fall and Fall of the West?

An expansive Foundation Book Club in this edition, with a smorgasbord of new publications and others that deserve re-reading. The nexus between command, politics, economics, culture, defence and security are reviewed in seven books with some recommended additional reading. The overarching Book Club theme analyses Western high-level decision making, how strategy and policies are formulated to support the adoption of liberal democratic values, what factors impinge on those in positions of executive authority and the role

Afghanistan, the golden thread running through these chosen publications is an assessment on whether Western dominance over the Rest has been, and continues to be, eroded. What can, or should, be done to alleviate this decline is also examined, highlighting how military force can

Strategy; A History by Freedman, L., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013 Few would have argued with Freedman when he posited that, “Everyone needs a strategy” (Strategy, states however, where strategies (sometimes referred to as grand strategies) were carefully formulated to overcome economic, religious and/or military respecting organisation (government, commercial or military) survives in the 21st Century without a pithy deliverable milestones a whole industry has grown up supporting its study

1Exacting and expensive consideration is paid to the basics of its formulation, its slick advertisement metrics in an effort to qualify the achievement of adopted political ideology, staff colleges, academia, businesses, government departments and even unprecedented universal adoption and the seemingly structured and obviously achievable from their outset

Freedman’s Strategy provides a masterly historic overview of the discipline, using carefully selected case studies to explain how strategic thinking has you categorise, risk assess and plan, then outcomes can, to a large degree, be predicted and managed – disappointedly, the opposite seems true and the evidence suggests that the reality is somewhat

are a victim of chance (or is it luck?), is discussed readers will know that hindsight is the historian's necessary vice but what Freedman suggests is that successful strategic plans have a loose pattern at designed to generate opportunities (admittedly are open to recognising changes in circumstance, possess the courage to alter strategic direction, can communicate their amended intents and sustain credible support bases (domestic and foreign), then they can place themselves in a position to deliver

Possibly only Freedman (perhaps Kissinger also) has the intellect and worldly experience to recognise and explain all the multifaceted elements that contribute recent history suggests that few others in positions of

Blood,

Metal and Dust; How

Victory Turned into Defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq by Barry, B., Oxford, Osprey Publishing, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2020 At the operational level, Barry’s Blood, Metal and Dust (2020), offers readers two contemporary examples of how coalition strategies were formulated explains the initial successful US led military response Government in Kabul and the subsequent eviction and successful way of conducting wars of choice, espoused by an optimistic Donald Rumsfeld in 2001 (the then US Secretary of Defence), using a weapons and enhanced situational awareness, ultimately gave a false reading of the coalition’s capabilities on the ground in Afghanistan and debated and fabricated to convince a domestic electorate of the need to invade (or was it liberate?) the operational levels in both wars (Barry’s own the dissemination of fragile strategies formulated in Washington, London and other coalition capitals, with their variable operational effects over time and Barry’s observations with Fairweather’s commentary in The Good War (reviewed by the RLC Foundation in 2022) or Stewart’s Occupational Hazards (2007),

makes no real difference to his well evidenced and served in either, or both, theatres, Barry’s narrative makes for compelling, albeit, depressing reading

The author explains that the focus on military force, rather than a multidisciplinary approach where embedded command economics, diverse tribal politics and regional complexities were intertwined, of these omissions, a hastily constructed and overly simplistic Western strategy that offered no credible local solutions post the initial regime change was Afghanistan, Barry offers some parallels with Iraq conclude that a lack of a comprehensive strategy for the region, where various national heads and the heads of the military) were either reluctant to adopt promising, albeit unorthodox, initiatives, or

how solutions to these wicked problems were being attempted against a backdrop of each war’s growing

Perhaps Dominic Cummings’ (cited in The Times, are appropriate here, where he offers an insider’s hierarchies because, “Most educated people are not set up to listen or change their minds about politics,

measure either Iraq’s or Afghanistan’s actual strategic end states as successes, it seems that the adopted strategies could not be translated into

carefully crafted Western coalition narrative explaining the imperative for the invasion has been exposed by

evidence, one can only assume that nothing good is

When the generation of decision makers from both wars have passed, is it likely that a true, unsentimental it stands, Mantel’s (Bring Up the Bodies history is likely to dominate the debate where, “Unless truth is pleasing…and easy to like, she is condemned

what was fabricated and what has been deliberately left out has been revealed, can lessons be learned of how strategy can be better formulated and distilled Blood, Metal and Dust are that no amount of team/individual courage and initiative at ground level can make good a

Civilization: The Six Killer Apps of Western Power by Ferguson, N., London, Penguin Group, 2012

Once the initial effects of the coalition’s shock and awe had petered out, strategies fabricated on weak foundations were prostrate to stinging international assessments which ultimately not only questioned

This particular challenge is covered obliquely by Ferguson through his magisterial examination of why the West has dominated the Rest in Civilization; The Six Killer Apps of Western Power of the 600 years of history which Ferguson examines focuses on the idea of democracy in which he posits that, “Some people make the mistake of calling that idea ‘democracy’ and imagining that any country can at Freedman and Barry, it seems that Ferguson’s ‘some people’ are the ones formulating strategy,

the Industrial Revolution, communicating largely in a common language (English) and utilising the printing press to facilitate global trade, the exporting of liberal democracy through coherent strategies continues to Occupational Hazards) explains how painful it is to view Western governments trying to shoehorn their democratic principles into something called a foreign strategy, only to witness ineffective operational actions having crippling consequences on the people who apply them and those others Stewart writes from a unique position as the former Provisional Authority in the provinces of Maysan and

and contemporary notes, the author explains how, despite the commitment of the largest concentration of foreign money, manpower and determination over three decades, Iraq was a make for a persuasive argument, especially when he posits that, “The invasion was crippled not by what we did but by who we were where chaos and contingency was shaped by the stubborn character

oscillating Western strategy swinging from toppling Saddam and leaving immediately to creating a full liberal democracy after eight months into the invasion, then once again reverting to exiting as civilian insider view of what was going on during the early phase of the operation, Stewart summarises that one of the major weaknesses of the Western strategy was that, “Our very presence was

was the only legitimate form of government yet

Stewart, one may be left wondering if democracy can be exported, at least in a cohesive piecemeal one of the takeaways is that it is better to nurture or economics for example, assuming of course that Western cultural attributes and economic policies are

The Ledger: Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan

by Kilcullen, D., & Mills, G., London, C Hurst and Co Ltd, 2021

Stewart’s experiences are mirrored in David Kilcullen’s and Greg Mills’ The Ledger; Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan (2021), in which Stewart experience in regional wars, Kilcullen was a senior counterinsurgency advisor during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and Mills served in Afghanistan with COMISAF (Commander International Security

The Ledger highlights the lack of a coherent strategy, citing Joe Biden, who, as a Senator in 2001, stated that, “Our hope is…a relatively stable government [which] provides the foundation for future reconstruction of that

an expansive policy to avoid a human catastrophe

the policy had mutated again and in August 2021 he summarised that, “Our mission in Afghanistan was Unsurprisingly, at the operational level, Kilcullen and Mills identify that the theatre goals changed where, “the plan evolved organically, through iteration, subject to changes in personalities of ambassadors,

Whilst there must always be room for recognising evolving situations on the ground and incorporating operational plan, there must also be a recognisable relationship between the strategic and operational

The Ledger suggests that observations from Iraq where they believed that Western institutions (the World Bank, IMF, NATO and the UN to name a few) were unsuited to delivering The Ledger however broadens the debate and analyses regional fracture lines and

For the future, the authors predict that, “The failure is likely to increase the attractiveness of the Chinese alternative…sharpening its competitive edge, including demonstrates that regional challenges are likely to The Ledger’s conclusion where, “In the future, in Afghanistan, the best the West can work for is a moderate, inclusive Afghanistan

what has happened under the Taliban’s governance

Command; The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine by Freedman, L., London, Allan Lane, 2022

If Book Club members want to go deeper and directly impinge on military operations, then Freedman’s latest work, Command; The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine (2022), could be the next logical step for further

with dilemmas because of the strategic policies of is the UK command in the Falkland’s War, where history of the Falkland War), highlights the less than This is followed by the perplexing relationship which developed between General Mike Jackson in Wesley Clark, and Clark’s military/political superiors how strategic end states can be confused to a point of chaos across the operational level – made more challenging in a divergent multinational chain of differences between command approaches under posits that while mistakes are frequently made by both ideologies, only a democratic regime has the assured gearing to recognise its mistakes and learn Afghanistan, some readers may believe that the jury

Masters and Commanders; How Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall and Alanbrooke Won the War in the West, by Roberts, A., London, Allen Lane, Penguin Books, 2008 All told, when studied together, these six quality publications offer a fascinating insight into how challenging formulating and Perhaps readers will want to supplement their study with an example of where grand strategy, although constantly debated at the time, generally delivered the end states that the victorious belligerents desired – if so, look no further than Roberts’ Masters and Commanders the global circumstances, freedoms of action and scale of risk were unprecedented in the second total and contemporary geopolitics continue to provide parallels where belligerents struggle to translate argued that, even compared to the last global war, state actors, WMD, environmental issues, inequality and a plethora of other competing factors all butt up against the enduring human considerations of

The umbrella takeaway from all of these books is that we should not make too many assumptions; do not assume democracy can work everywhere and where it might work, do not assume it can be pursued atmosphere of Western capitals under the temporal world outside of the West wants democracy, never mind how much we in the West are convinced that, despite its imperfections, it is the least bad option of

export as a complete package, it has to be built incrementally over a long period of time – the

problem, highlighted in these reviewed books, is that the West does not seem to possess the patience

Iraq, and Afghanistan may all be used to demonstrate the West’s lack of resilience, but correspondingly there are also examples where there has been

Japan, Malaya, Cyprus, Korea and Sierra Leone are

To use a sporting analogy, if you are only as good as your last game, then some may argue that, based on the recent evidence, it might be better for the West to

Considering all of the challenges and failures examined in these seven books, how the Integrated Review will be operationalised remains an area of debate, especially when regional interventions with strategy may not be the outdated foreign country that many believe it is – perhaps it is better to hedge and request at least some of the seven books reviewed here on a long loan from Prince Consort’s

La 317e Section, Foxit, by Schoendoerffer, P.,1963 (republished 1979)

not currently published in English (although still

La 317e Section (The 317th Platoon), a publication

and referred to by General Bernard Barrera, the commander of French forces on Operation Serval in about a second lieutenant, Torres, who is captured by the Communist Viet Minh in French Indochina and manages to escape with a few NCOs and a platoon against the enemy and the jungle and the series of tough low level command decisions that Torres has hardships and the environment having parachuted enduring takeaway however is one that looks into the psyche of contemporary French soldiers – so anyone about to serve with the French or be posted to their

why the French excel at serving in hardship, in small argue that Western forces have been forced to adopt such a stance, in unison with a mission command philosophy which does not rely on mass, the narrative explains why soldiering is perhaps the last vocation

may wish to consult, Michael Shurkin’s (reference below) detailed book review which describes why La

Reviewed Books:

Metal and Dust; How Victory Turned into Defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq, Oxford, Osprey Publishing, Civilization: The Six Killer Apps of Western Power, Strategy; A History, Oxford, Oxford University Command; The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine, The Ledger: Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan, Masters and Commanders; How Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall and Alanbrooke Won the War in the West,

Occupational Hazards: My Time Governing in Iraq,

References:

The Good War: Why We Couldn’t Win the War or the Peace in Afghanistan, London, Johnathan

Bring Up the Bodies, War On the Rocks, Us About The French Army, Mission Command And The Romance Of The Indochina War, 20 September 2017, 1Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Chatham House and the Centre for Defence Studies

Think Tanks, Think Defence

An interview with the Director Army Sports Control Board, and former Director of the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Major General (Retd) Darrell Amison CBE

theatre, General Amison led the restructuring and redeployment of 102 Log Bde from Germany to

the joint appointment of Head Concepts at the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) was selected for promotion and the role of Director DCDC but completed a tour in Army HQ as the Director Capability Combat Service Support before the Regular Army in Nov 22 he was appointed

RLCF - Before we focus on the role and outputs of DCDC, it may be worth exploring how you were selected for the Director’s post –recognised as one of the key joint appointments across Defence. Was it a natural area within Defence that you were encouraged to pursue by the career management regime and how well prepared did you feel before assuming the appointment?

Many across the Corps and wider Defence will know Major General Darrell Amison from his time as CO of 4 Logistic Support Regiment RLC (20072009) or as Commander 102 Logistic Brigade and or Afghanistan. The RLC Foundation asks one of Defence’s pre-eminent strategic thinkers to share his experience of future horizon-scanning, to produce the next concepts and doctrine.

Post unit command, General Amison was a member of the directing staff at the Advanced Command and Staff Course (Shrivenham), was selected to attend the Higher Command and Staff

by the preparations for or on operations in Iraq and

and he then assumed command of 102 Logistic Brigade with a focus on deploying as the functional lead in Joint Force Support Afghanistan (JFSp (A))

combat operations), JFSp (A) continued to support

role as I’d already spent more than three years as attendance on the Advanced Command and Staff Course, Higher Command and Staff Course and Royal College of Defence Studies, when combined with

reading, thinking and talking about our profession; albeit nothing beats the privilege of leading and working with our soldiers of course – particularly

absolute key requirement for any incumbent is the need to have an open mind – to be willing to listen to different perspectives, new ideas, to be collaborative trumpet too loudly, I believe these qualities are a strength of mine; rest assured there are plenty of weak spots too!

a period spanning 12 years between 20032015, your command experience has been focussed this relatively long period, you would have spent

training or even designing aspects of it and much during this time, did you utilise the products of DCDC?

a brigade commander than as a squadron

you move from the tactical to the operational and of the Iraq/Afghanistan campaigns was Countering Insurgency (COIN) and, after a slow conceptual start, a great deal of thought and effort was committed to revising UK COIN doctrine across strategic to context of the NATO/US led campaign in Afghanistan and the ISAF phases of stability: Shape, Clear, Hold, Afghan COIN Centre and associated doctrine and

We also had the advantage of our close relationship with the UK staff embedded in the Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters in Camp Bastion (a staff led by my friend and ‘battle buddy’, Maj Gen (Retd) Rob Thomson) and within the US led HQ the doctrinal C2 laydown is, you can only go far if you develop effective personal relationships – ‘handshake con’ remains the most important command status!

great strides in ensuring our doctrine, as far as it of more NATO doctrine publications than any other the importance other NATO nations, particularly the needed reminding, of the importance of the Alliance and the need to ‘think NATO’ far more so than has extent, we need to go ‘back to the future’ as far as NATO is concerned and recognise it is the only Alliance with the credible conventional and nuclear

It was COIN doctrine, plus joint logistic doctrine, that provided a handrail during a period of operations spanning squadron, regimental and brigade

recognising the need to adapt as the context

profession, learning from the experience of those that

RLCF - You seem to have adopted a self-taught regime of concepts and doctrine to enhance your formal periods of personal development. Looking back at the various staffs that worked with you, how aware do you think they were of these doctrinal principles that you talk of?

shouldn’t be surprised as the British Army, and UK Defence more broadly, is blessed with world class

in Headquarters Joint Force Support (Afghanistan) philosophy and principles was good, but we had to work really hard during our force preparation activity and procedure – there was a lot of nuance here which

in Southern Afghanistan we worked closely with our US colleagues in Helmand province and Kandahar Not only were there differences in approach between the UK and US forces at times, but there were also

Bernard Shaw, we risked being two forces divided

RLCF - If we can return to DCDC and its outputs, what was it designed to do, and what does it actually deliver?

doctrine, Concepts, Futures and Strategic doctrine, concepts and futures spans from today out commanders, staffs and ‘whole force’ colleagues,

capability development choices on the assumption it’s probably better to have thought about future threats, technology, opportunities etc before investing in next Critically, we must think about the future workforce too – what size of force and what skills do we need on analysis of what is likely to endure and what ‘warfare’s enduring nature and changing character’, with much of the latter driven by evolving threats,

war’s enduring nature: fear, chaos, death, destruction, mindful of past and current lessons of warfare, but also the threats and opportunities that lie ahead, as forecasting ahead through the tracking of trends threats to guard against and opportunities to explore the further one looks ahead the more uncertain the importance of strategy:

of the challenges we face requires integrated and comprehensive responses that can only be navigated through collaboration

• We can have the best doctrine, people, training and equipment, but employing force devoid of sound

than Iraq and Afghanistan where for years we and our partners failed to convert tactical gains into a clear strategic purpose combined with Afghan government corruption and Pakistani support to the insurgency

• Beware, particularly in terms of concepts, of relentless pursuit for consensus dilutes ideas and be decided on the strength of evidence, noting the makers along the way; so Aristotle’s ethos, pathos and logos are all required!

• Let’s not pretend consent and evade is dead; assuming the evidence is robust, we must continue to challenge any remaining shields of

RLCF - With regards to doctrine and emerging technologies, there have been some publications (The Changing of the Guard and RUSI's Necessary Heresies) which either posit that the UK has failed to identify operational emerging technological threats to construct a affairs. Do you believe the naysayers are well off the mark or should we be worried? The latter

technologies to weave a threat narrative or they do not understand how the technologies work – would you agree?

picked aspects of technology in a deliberate attempt to construct an investment argument in an

those that lack utility and should be divested of; and those emerging capabilities that could help provide course, and I am yet to mention the elephant in the room – politics!

in your question, whilst I don’t agree with all they have to say, I do think they have rightly challenged Operating Concept (published in 2021), amongst other things, establishes the need to compete below the threshold of war and distinguishes between importance of integration with allies, with other levers up to and including declared war in a NATO Article probably went too far in suggesting forces, except for the Reserve, should be structured to operate and highly unlikely we’ll have the warning time for such an approach, and we can’t afford to be ‘late to the

RLCF - There seems to be a dichotomy with an expanded strategic thinking space in physical structure of UK Defence shrinks in real terms. The UK still has a network of civilian thinktank organisations, each claiming to help shape British security policy. In 2019, the RN launched its Strategic Studies Centre which is advertised as, “a hub for the very latest thinking and ideas surrounding the Navy’s contribution to defence and security in the 21st-Century." Foundation members might be a little confused over why single services are not pooling their intellectual thoughts into a joint thinktank – like… DCDC! Part of DCDC’s remit is to undertake strategic analysis – do you criticism that Defence is not catering for complex single service issues and, given what the public has been told is Defence’s optimum structure, do you think the single services still have the spare resources to sustain single service strategic think tanks?

the discussion on its head, we need our politicians, threaten our evolution and adaptation and to risk being prepared for the last war rather than what

exploring the potential of data and new technology to sustain high intensity operations at scale (think helpful to think about current and future threats and the balance between the capabilities that should

integrated force, we also need to maintain domain expertise within the three single Services and Strategic Command for cyber/EW and aspects and limited resources, we should be investing more time and effort in thinking deeply and broadly about action, but sometimes we need to stand back and profession of arms – the conceptual component context within which we will be operating and

land with allies and from the land in support of other partners from across government, industry, and our international allies; some refer to it as the ‘power of strength is the power of its network – a global brains

RLCF - We have covered a lot of ground with regards to doctrine, concepts and futures, all What publications are sitting on the bedside table of the former director of DCDC or do you utilise a hybrid information approach using a mixture of

Raynor Winn; it’s a reminder of the fragility of our lives and the healing power of the natural in book during my time at DCDC was the late Colin and reminding us that state on state warfare was alive and well at a time we were in the thick of two

COIN campaigns – I’m not sure we were prepared to read books, I’m also an avid fan of radio and enjoy favourites include The Rest is Politics with Alastair Podcast with Jake Humphrey and Prof Damian Hughes, and The News Agents with Emily Maitlis, Jon

explore your transition from the Regular Army to your new Director’s appointment. Are have found particularly useful in leading your new organisation?

attitudes and behaviours acquired during my Army career have proven to be just as relevant and useful in my new role at the Army Sport Control

Army, I am convinced the leadership skills we develop can be transferred and adapted to any situation complacency or hubris, I do hope readers of this

THE ROYAL LOGISTIC CORPS STRATEGY

We will professionalise and value our people, strengthen our ethos and maximise talent:

• We will promote pride, ethos and belonging

• We will maximise the full potential of our diverse talent

• We will encourage innovative, inspiring leaders at all levels.

PEOPLE

We will embrace the opportunity for data-led technology enabled transformation:

• We will drive forward professionalisation including education and accreditation

TECHNOLOGY

• We will accelerate trade modernisation to exploit cutting-edge technology

• We will professionalise contract management becoming Defence’s recognised experts.

We will improve links with allies and partners to learn from others and the Corps, and wider stakeholders including society:

• We will develop our integration with the Defence Support community

INTEGRATION COMMUNICATION

• We will enhance our relationship with industry and academia through the RLC Foundation.

• We will showcase who we are and our enduring utility to the nation

• We will improve how we communicate binding together the whole of the Corps and wider RLC family.

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Students who attend the boarding school provision exceed their predicted outcomes and consistently reach, and further, their potential OFSTED

Op WINDFIRM

Why making the British Army’s immediate and strategic reserve of military vehicles safe to use, required the largest asbestos decontamination operation ever undertaken in the UK.

By Peter Shakespeare

In February 2020 a response to a freedom of

their contents) at the MOD’s 140-acre vehicle storage depot at Ashchurch - near Tewkesbury in Gloucestershire - were contaminated with asbestos1.

Stored in most of these buildings were around 7,500 military vehicles, including everything from Quad bikes to Challenger 2 main battle tanks; the UK’s immediate

stored combat bridging equipment, box bodies, trailers, construction plant and a range of other vital war 2

At the time of the public declaration by DE&S, a joint military and civilian operation – code named their contents had been underway since summer

of bounds to military and civilian personnel for the duration of the operation, excepting those asbestos licenced contractors and the specialist military personnel who had been trained to take part in the decontamination

Crucial to this, vehicles and equipment in the MOD’s decontamination had been completed and the HSE agreed testing protocols and standard operating

In its February 2020 FOI response, DE&S estimated

Construction of the Central Vehicle Depot Ashchurch, commenced during World War Two, with The buildings vary in their type of construction, but common to most are their corrugated asbestos

In its FOI response, DE&S published an extract from an HSE letter written after its initial inspection that compliance with asbestos management health and were areas, based on evident risk, where you appear to be taking measures far in excess of what the law

Banter on military Internet forums suggests that the condition of the shed roofs at Ashchurch

Spiers is a Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineer occupation to work full time on UK resilience plans planning and management of Op WINDFIRM on the :

“Steady deterioration caused by a combination of moss growth on the roofs and a massive seagull colony, pulling bits off the roof and guttering, plus strong winds, degraded the asbestos concrete roof sheets to the extent that they were crumbling, raining

debris had got into every nook and cranny of the

8 Stored AFVs following decontamination

8 Challenger ARRV

decontaminate all these vehicles and equipment was 2,000 vehicles of all types, which forms the Field controlled environment and is normally serviced and maintained by a team of technicians and mechanics from defence contractor Babcock International5

could decontaminate the vehicles and get the Babcock team back in to work on the SEF vehicles once they had been decontaminated and tested without asbestos roofs, so these were cleared out,

We had a civilian environmental services contractor MSS Group who did the cleaning and contamination removal, a contractor who undertook monitoring and sampling and provided assurance that the decontamination was complete and an Army ‘Force Generated’ a team of Royal Logistic Corps (RLC) Vehicle Support Specialist (VSS) to do all the vehicle movements on site and off site, as vehicles were

“It quickly became apparent that the stored vehicles needed mechanical work, just to move them out of their sheds to the decontamination area, due to dead batteries, rotten oil and fuel seals, or missing components and assemblies, where parts had been bringing in a team of REME

Vehicle Mechanics

Recovery Mechanics and a recovery vehicle to drag vehicles out of the sheds, because they couldn’t be full asbestos PPE with respirators, which was very

be used as the Army does not have enough resources is not maintained and is not stored in a controlled working and storage spaces established, so we

“When we started, we had limited equipment and resources and my command team, which included a had to manage the project on the ground as we went managing the civilian contractors, the site staff that

“The tempo for the project was to clean around 20 allowed to be used in the decontamination process, and the vehicles could not be brushed; so the vehicles were cleaned using wet wipes and specialist vacuum

September6

clean was in excess of 7,500 and in addition there were around 270,000 items of other equipment, down to individual electrical cables, that had to be moved out

towards the mammoth task of decontaminating

12 Royal Engineers, who moved the REB into newly

“As you can imagine we continually worked under from MSS Group7

and Royal Engineer (RE) personnel had to keep the their normal units don’t get anything near the level of exposure to their trades as they did on Op WINDFIRM

8 Over 30,000 vehicle moves were executed by the RLC VSS team

8 Personnel working on the vehicles wore full asbestos PPE

even managed to get them further trade training

“The Op WINDFIRM team manged to complete the the decontamination line, they had to be moved onto transporters and then taken to other sites or parked the course of the operation there were in excess of

“The REME Recovery Mechanics faced challenges could not be started and moved under their own power, the vehicle depot’s elderly Liebherr tracked 100 AFVs its rubber track pads wore out meaning it transpired that Liebherr had discontinued production of the tug (a converted bulldozer) so the MOD had

This meant I had to request assistance from Army HQ to get Challenger Armoured Repair & Recovery Vehicles (CRARRV) and crews to rotate through Op WINDFIRM from an REME Battalion and source a heavy aircraft tug from the RAF, so movement of the

Major Spiers said the main lesson in terms of project management he took away from Op WINDFIRM was you can plan a project at desk level; but without a

This means using the experience of the subject matter experts on the ground, being supremely agile and each stage of the process was worked through, and was to have good managers and an excellent team intelligent and highly motivated soldiers to deliver the

Maj Spiers added there were a few safety related incidents, during Op WINDFIRM, but given the and the fact the majority had to be pushed or proportion of vehicle moves and there were no Thanks to the impact of historic construction and the elements had on them, the situation DE&S Given the scale of the decontamination operation and the amount of materiel placed in a controlled it begs the question whether the UK’s contingency

8 A heavy RAF tug was used to drag armour that could not be started

8 The depot Liebherr tracked tug pushing AS90

8 Working in full PPE during the hot summer months was exhausting

lead times to mount a divisional level commitment were compromised? There is no doubt this would have been a concern for MOD planners and senior

The successful completion of the project to rectify the situation must have been a huge relief for the MOD and HQ Field Army and was undoubtedly a triumph for the Royal Logistic Corps, REME and contractors, who ultimately successfully planned and delivered the biggest asbestos decontamination

Considering the amount of old infrastructure the MOD still owns, there must be considerable potential

news is that if Defence can form a team of SMEs and manage out a risk the size of the DE&S Ashchurch, then it is probably in a good place to manage future

Endnotes

1

regarding_the_MOD_s_vehicle_depot_at_Ashchurch_in_

2

8 Some of the REME and RLC soldiers who delivered Op WINDFIRM

All images by kind permission of Maj T Spiers unless credited otherwise

Consultants - What are they good for?

An analysis of the increasing use of consultants by Government and Defence.

MOD and sooner or later you will experience the

The use and abuse of consultants is on the rise, so… If you are going to survive contact and gain from the experience, you'd better arm yourself. Knowing what consultants are, how their business models work, what the contemporary views are of their performance, what they declare they can do – and what they actually do – will furnish you with at least a basic grasp of what you are dealing with. If you already believe that you have a clear idea of who they are, what they will deliver, what value for money they offer and how you can get rid of them if they fail to perform, you are likely to be in a minority, and you need read no further. If, on the other hand…

One is not the same as the other

the HMG growth trend of spending on consultancy services which, according to Preez, jumped from

on consultants from across Whitehall and devolved

Whilst there are invariably differences over what constitutes ‘consultancy services,’ for our purposes, a contracted outsourcing for a specialist skill which cannot be found from an organisation’s permanent workforce consultants are the prime focus of this article (who UK, Departmental Resources, 2022) and whilst they

it will be argued that other consultancy organisations and their services tend to follow the same commercial be recognised that there is a huge variation in the The Economist estimated to have doubled its revenue over the last The Times the other end of the scale there are some niche, yet

and jealousy, especially in the maelstrom of a global

So ubiquitous has the employment of consultants become in the business of UK Defence that, unsurprisingly, there is a wide spectrum of opinion over their outputs, performances and long term value

who Defence migrates to when a department immediately know them, they are wearing the Rarely will they overtly display their true employer, if you have to ask for a business card then you are need to ask, they are part of the team – supposedly! Generally, they scribe with Montblancs and wear the standard uniform of the high achieving; MaxMara they sport boutique wear more expensive than

of Harvard Business School graduates went into consulting in 2021 (cited in The New York Times, 2021)), they seem to have unfettered access to the upper echelons of your organisation’s hierarchy, they the boss (providing updates on milestone delivery), they are permanently attached to Bluetooth devices, technology several generations ahead of what seldom exhibit ‘the common touch’ and are generally mercurial in nature; their phantom presence often seems omnipresent through every corridor of a headquarters, despite the fact that they normally

(everything’s relative) from the consultancy sparrow the same business traits but not automatically from a Russell Group university and they are likely to display digital technologies only two generations ahead of more or less, advise the world’s largest companies and governments, so relax, you are in safe hands –

Modus Operandi and End Products

If you remember nothing else about them, remember this; consultants are not into altruism but nor are they few passing similarities, they remain fundamentally they are about, primarily your organisation’s funds and procedures, which directly underpin their cash highly motivated – and therein lies one advantage

They thrive on tribulations, from global pandemics to external consultants in preparation for leaving the EU (cited in Hart, Procurement Public Sector, 10

2021 was regarded by industry analysts as a bumper year for consultants, especially when the likes of the

The Economist

always smug about beating the French at anything, can boast that HMG and public bodies spent double

grinding people into a downward economic spiral and the threat of a global recession, the business demand for consultancy services looks like one of the few sure growth areas on top of an established upward clients, if not happy to pay such large sums, at least compelled to?

The reason consultancies are doing so well is Firstly, consultants offer solutions to problems –old consumer products to expanded markets, to restructuring a department of government, to

8 In 2020/21, UK MOD spent £110M on consultancy services

8 Consultants are fundamentally different to you. Money and information is what they are about, primarily your organisation’s funds and its procedures

developing new foreign policy strategies for a brave they have the skills, tools and capacity – the MOD (actually HMG in general) is short of in all of the

These reasons explain why business is booming – so now you know why the MOD employs them as a with and surviving consultants, there is now a problem is that this view is also complicated and

At the negative end of the opinion spectrum are the doubters, summed up by Hastings whose take is that, “if McKinsey is the answer, the question is wrong, as well as grotesquely expensive” (The Times, Comment that Hastings is using McKinsey to make a point, to understand his stance you need to acknowledge that the parachuting in of consultants as a desperate effort to deliver perfect solutions, whilst attempting

The Economist list were made of the most reviled species in the professional world, management consultants would goes further, suggesting that leaders who seek the immediately” (The Times, Comment is made of some of the controversies that have

dogged some large consultancies Hastings’ view is still are) embroiled in some troublesome questions, ranging from a US opioid crisis (The New York Times, Dealbook Newsletter, 25 February 2021) to criticism of the mismanagement of a vaccine rollout in France, costing millions of euros (The New York Times, bells have also been ringing within HMG, with Lord advisors wastes taxpayer money and undermines

was a determination by UK central government to maximise the expertise of the public workforce and

house digital capability (Preez, Diginomica, 2022), overall government structures have proven to be too within government organisations, the doubters’ views employs consultants and overlaying this reasoning with leadership traits, a clearer picture emerges as to

Most military headquarters simply do not have the en masse to deal with the ever whirring Whitehall random initiative generator that spits out little or no SMEs available, the not unreasonable conclusion is to pay someone else to get things

8 Consultants offer solutions to problems –almost any problem, big or small

this instinctive reaction but the elephant in the room remains a lack of skilled capacity, so employing then that consultants do not have special powers of convert masses of qualitative data into quantitative that powerful arguments (often referred to as inconvenient truths in the military) can be constructed The doubters, such as Hastings, somehow seem to your workforce with some SME consultants, what do you get for your money? Well, in a nutshell, what you receive (the product) is contingent on how well you

You can guarantee one thing when you get a consultant’s report (part of the standard product range) that has not been closely managed; it will receive insular management speak with tracts of fabricated narrative, littered with buzzwords and a language is designed to identify some consultants as members of an elite – a standard practice, routine outpouring of MBA speak is sometimes

optimising, redundancy is rightsizing and savings are restructuring baroque in nature that the relationship between the consultant’s recommendations and the reason for the

not the consultant’s fault, they are reverting to type fault lies with the customer, who, despite what you avoid receiving a product written in consultancy hieroglyphics, you have to be clear in stipulating how

closer to being subjected to a formal code of conduct – aligned perhaps with the judiciary services or bankers (The Economist

Whilst there may be time for the industry to continue operating outside of formal rules, the threat is likely to be enough to keep consultancy CEOs awake at night and conscious of losing their laissez faire system of operating, they should have a heightened

a City and Guilds Diploma in plumbing to know when

You do not need to know how the software works but you do need to understand how the evidence base was constructed, what metrics were used for risk analysis and what priorities were applied to scoring most of these things, you will be able to verify the consultants and your own hierarchy, both of which want to push on and meet deadlines.

How do you get the best out of them?

If you let consultants do the consulting ‘to’ you, then of their product, it is too late, there will be no Lazarus

Secondly, if you adopt an approach more akin partnership, more a mix of counselling with a you are likely to receive something closer to a

Once you have got past the Us and Them and arrived at We, associated relationship can be created, then each organisation is likely to habitually assist in protecting increased regulation of responsibilities over supply chains where, according to Thomas (Ranconteur,

the MOD whose supply chains are complex and contractors and ensure environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) is being assured? Part of the answer is provided by an article on the food supply chain in this edition of The Review where

8 Unmanaged consultants reports will not be easy to read

baselining of the status of the ESG needs to be

everywhere in the UK and whilst there is an economic exacerbated by reports that work related training

but it is unlikely that it can cover the full breadth and

As an organisation, the Army is pretty good at assurance – think about it, if we could match our cynicism with an equivalent level of oversight, we could probably work in closer cooperation with dispensations from Government regulations due

training regimes to transport operations on the public highway, the Army is good at managing risk whilst upholding special regulations and delivering desired rationale for employing consultants but in the niche areas where the Army has maintained assurance

discussed, the Army does not have the capacity to cover all the skills shortages that consultants a credible degree its ability to assure consultants’

a tool for driving value for money from consultants (and into the business), the stakes have been raised to a level with many consultancies offering a wider

for solving some of the acute challenges thrown up by an increasingly competitive and polarized international system that continues to undermine based on whether consultants are good or bad but how to create the opportunities for getting the best understanding each consultant’s business approach organisations to help consultants gather evidence, analyse options, produce products that are widely understood (and trusted) and with the expertise to assure and conduct due diligence is the way to adopt the position of doubter, upskill and be a trusted Paul Smith attire and posh university background, you might just be on your way to helping overcome some of your organisation’s acute challenges – which

References

The Economist, ‘Do McKinsey and other consultants do anything useful?’ Online, London, 5 October 2022, https://

be naive to create that would their reputation be at risk but if

– remember their business

that this is consultancies squeezing more from an already underfunded MOD but an optimist’s counter would be that if a credible assurance regime be incredibly naive to create options that would their reputation be at risk but if the deliverable were aligned with rewards then their bottom lines would be in jeopardy – remember their business

consultancy should be accepted as a pledge to deliver – the MOD just needs to have the

to manage any risks and guarantee it gets what it

Summary

cons n ultancy as a to deliver – the MOD needs to have the Summar y after all is said and the civil service, them – in some cases, are the

So, after all is said and done, whilst some of the attributes of consultants maybe an anathema to the military and civil service, the fact is Defence needs them – in some cases, they are the only credible option

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Op STONESMITH: The roles and responsibilities through the eyes of a Section Commander

Corporal Sam Webster details the processes undertaken as a Section Commander deploying on Operation STONESMITH in support of Ukraine’s war against Russia

This in itself took us a few late nights to achieve, trucks packed with stores, we also had fuel operators driving fuel tankers and members of the Light Aid a busy period, working around the clock to ensure we could roll out in good order when deployment

Days into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as a contingency, a Pre-Positioning Force (PPF) to deploy as a forward element into Poland and establish an operating base to provide humanitarian aid to those affected by the war. Operation STONESMITH was unlike any other and severity of the situation in Ukraine, there was

On previous roulement tours you knew you would be deployed for six months and receive a Rest and Recuperation (R&R) period at some point, but from the start of Op STONESMITH, right up until a few days before the end of the deployment, we were

with questions from my soldiers and the majority of the time I would have to reply to them without being able to provide a full response: a command challenge that could have seriously undermined morale should I feeling I had never encountered before in my 16 years

we took on the mammoth task of loading up the

down to Bulford where we would team up with a From there we made a short trip down to Marchwood where the vehicles were loaded onto a ferry, the next time we would see them was when it docked in the so I needed to ensure they had the right clothing and equipment to help contend with the freezing conditions we were going to encounter in eastern excitement amongst the troops, the uncertainty of the whole operation may have seemed daunting at the time, but my section and I were raring to go and do the best job in whatever capacity we were going regiment, so it was always really important to me that the troops acted professionally to safeguard the On arriving at Gdansk port, it was as if the the ferry, revealing a sea of military vehicles and troops, ensuring load security was checked and were governed by strict timelines to make it to the overnight stops to ensure drivers hours were adhered to, breaking down was one thing, but

After countless miles, a few days later we arrived

Credit: All images author’s collection

this time that we gave the vehicles a good overhaul after covering such a large distance as they were in drivers of each vehicle would again check their loads themselves, the more technical jobs were carried out well as vehicle maintenance, we made use of the time and humanitarian presentations on the role we familiarisation with members of the Household Cavalry which made us more operationally effective

Days later, we once again mounted up and hit the road with a couple overnight stops where the Polish couple of minor mechanical problems and a fuel stop,

The weather had taken a turn for the worse and it with temperamental kerosene heaters which would were equipped with plenty of warm kit so we got by (this reinforces the importance of thorough kit checks

Once settled in, it was a case of awaiting further orders from the hierarchy so it appeared we had a soldiers it is important to stay physically and mentally robust, so we kept the same regime as we did at camp and conducted PT at least three times a week, usually physical training instructors to facilitate this, myself think outside the box to deliver this as we had no armour, so besides cardio vascular sessions, we utilised our body armour on circuit training by using them as

With PT done it was then to the vehicle park to

revise lessons on things such as vehicle recovery

to B2 upgrades, helping them develop within their individuals to read back on what they had been

to basics and plotted a route for small packets to order to test their navigational skills and command presence, we picked the more senior privates to be

Towards the end of our time in Poland, we also managed to organise a study tour of Auschwitz horror that went on there and I encouraged the troops

We also had a cultural day out in the city of Krakow;

Operation STONESMITH was a worthwhile and

Although we never actually got tasked to support humanitarian operations, we made the most of the situation, focusing on People, Operate and

8 6 Regiment RLC PPF

Credit: All images author’s collection

Credit: All images author’s collection

Credit: All images author’s collection

8 Left: Study tour to Auschwitz Above: Wheel change with the aid of the recovery vehicle

Deception in the Combat Service Support (CSS) Space: Theory and Practice

In this article, 2Lt Thomas Flint examines the use of deception in the CSS environment, considering the development of the theory of deception in land warfare with a focus on selected case studies from the contemporary operating environment. He concludes with a consideration of techniques

“The Battle of Kulikovo was one of the most victory of the Russians was ensured when soldiers lying in ambush attacked the approaching Tatar cavalry from the rear.”1

“When capable, feign incapacity, when active,

the enemy a bait to lure him, feign disorder and strike 2

“One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war would be to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the

what he should do himself, if he is ignorant of what his adversary is about?”

What is deception?

information that could assist the enemy’s situational loop

we disrupt the enemy’s effective uptake of accurate data?’, needs to be asked at all times and at all

doubt or misinformation? How can we control the misinterpret or misread the situation?

In Friedman’s On Tactics,

“The manipulation of the enemy’s understanding of the situation to achieve a situation more

scope of deceptive tactics, from information warfare to

This article will examine the uses of deception

in Ukraine since February 2022 will be analysed in detail, with an examination of how NATO may have to counter Russian aggression towards the Baltic Deception can encompass a variety of activities, ranging from policy initiatives to tactical SOPs for the level of the individual, from intelligence agencies to the combatant at the tactical level, deception is at

In the Information Age, deception must be a key out to achieve a DECEIVE effect on an enemy (to

facts’, or false narratives can be spread online in order to subvert, spread doubt and undercut the enemy’s politics, and in so doing his freedom of information management, classifying documents and

Deception is one of the oldest, and most widely The Iliad the role of deception, guile and cunning has The Art of War, Sun Tzu expounds the virtues of deception, intelligence and 5

Other writers since have carried on the discussion of deception in warfare Clausewitz is perhaps the least convinced on such matters, but he does

Frederick the Great’s campaigns where, at the Battle altering during the night, a position which he had just surprised and lost 70 pieces of artillery and 10,000 6 linked to his critical view of intelligence, which he considered unreliable and unsuitable for feeding into decision making, where he determined that:

“Plans and orders issued for appearances only, false reports designed to confuse the enemy…should of action at the disposal of the commander”7 enemy force can never assemble and advance so could only feel very sorry for him” reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain”

It is also worth noting that the crux of Clausewitz’s principles of warfare focus on the concentration of force; moving as much of one’s strength into one place to focus all of one’s power on the point where it understandable that he saw such manoeuvres as prioritised concentration over dispersal, strength reliable means of communication or effective transport, dispersal then reconcentration of the Army at the crucial point would have been that the tactics rejected by Clausewitz mirror the tactics used by Napoleon; speed, dispersal and the advocate for security over deception purely because he had seen how generals had been undone by

Clausewitz advocates strength in one place and avoids spreading forces or placing them at undue opponents to do so too, yet crucially he does value even Clausewitz favoured at least one dimension of Jomini similarly adds caveats to his approach

General wrote some years after Clausewitz, when the Industrial Revolution had begun to improve command the use of deception than Clausewitz, which Handel command and control, and the effectiveness of How

is Deception used?

Perhaps more than any country, deception is central in battles against the Mongols such as the Battle of Kulikovo, cunning and trickery played such a vital role that it became closely bound up with modern the role of deception to the most granular, formative mir, a

points to Mongol military culture, present in Russia well into the European Early Modern period, which also favoured utilising deception against the nomadic On

Tactics, Friedman describes the Battle of Sa’ari Steppe, when Ghengis Khan, outnumbered by his enemies, one night had each of his soldiers build

used by several soldiers rather than just one and misjudged that his army was in fact several times caused allowed the Mongols to improve their position

The appreciation for deception, Butts argues, carried all the way to the court of the Tsar10 Russian Army had an academy devoted to deception

minutemen of the United States, the brave and destiny, outfoxing the invader before charging forward to evict him from Mother Russia, became

Just as deception is pivotal to the Russian way of than in Western democracies, controlling peoples’ understanding is a longstanding policy of Russian control of the KGB, narratives and realities have been State deception created an incubator for modern

Whilst domestic security forces manipulated narratives inside Russia, the Comintern spent decades studying Western information operations the Cold War, Russia has equally been unsettled by that have swept its ‘near abroad’ with varied levels of home to the Kremlin the importance of contemporary remarkably successful, due to what Besemeres not simply dismiss Russian narratives, they had to

inception of this strategy until 2022, this played into Russian hands11

This has all fed into the concepts of Hybrid, Information & Grey Zone Warfare and the techniques that Russia used up until February 2022 to hide their activities, showing a deft understanding of how narratives are received and weaknesses of Western

showed that the GRU grasped the basics of deceiving anyone, but rather to leave enough space for doubt to give leaders a way out of having to take action they was invading Ukraine but did not want a war over their enemies could feasibly hesitate over what to do next, Putin gave them the route they needed to avoid taking action until he had achieved a

Deception therefore is not always a question of is visible appear to be something else, something

British Army Field Manual entry on deception where: “The purpose of deception is to mislead and confuse the enemy thus persuading them to adopt or continue with a course of action that is to their disadvantage is achieved by reinforcing the enemy’s existing

12

“Deception activity must target behaviour, as opposed assumes understanding of enemy commanders’

it is dangerous to assume we have a deep insight National Characteristics the doctrine guides commanders: “Most nations exhibit distinct characteristics which result from their history, geography, ethnic system, economy, class structure and a myriad of indicate the enemy’s susceptibility to deception…and

This places a huge burden on research and cultural

not rule out increased survivability through deception

Finally, deception may not be possible when The AFM lays down no nineteen accepted categories of deception and ten Combined with the knowledge of the ‘myriad of factors’ mentioned above, deception becomes a slow,

This is not to say deception cannot be effectively executed out but highlights the differences between

deceptive practices break down into two approaches: Dezinformatsia and Maskirovka

Dezinformatsia

false or misleading information intended to confuse, Maskirovka involves, “a means of securing the combat operations and daily activities of forces; a complex of measures designed to mislead the enemy as to the presence and disposition of forces and various military objects, their condition, combat readiness and operations and also the plans of the commander…Maskirovka contributes to the achievement of surprise for the actions of forces, the preservation of combat

The rest of this section will deal more closely with Maskirovkaquintessentially Russian and universally employed is a mindset rather than a doctrine, which always promotes undermining your opponent’s perception of

By contrast, British Army doctrine offers a more ezinformatsia. The UK doctrine does not have an equivalent to Maskirovka and concealment

doctrine is closely tied to effects, to be drawn out of in COA development, it is not to be used without a end in itself, while the AFM says, “Deception is not an intellectual battle of wits for its own sake, neither is it a capability merely to confuse the enemy – the object of deception is to convince the enemy to take 15

is important to keep returning to the role of deception or setting decoys to undermine an enemy’s sense of perspective is a successful Maskirovka, with or uncertain, unable to completely trust his own intelligence and unwilling to totally commit when engaging is the basis of Maskirovka. This is not to say

Butt quotes Marshal Zukov: “The Mission of Operational Level Deception is to disguise operations preparations and mislead the enemy about the However, as Layton wrote in an article for The Wavell Room: “Overall, the Russians place much greater stress in their operational concepts on attacking an 16 He

This is supported by Dougherty who posits that:

military thinkers view information and its cognitive and psychological impacts as the central object and information confrontation as the overarching umbrella that covers cyber, space, electronic warfare, denial and deception (Maskirovka), and psychological 17

On examination of Russian deception tactics, deception appears to be far less tied to singular involving, according to the AFM, up to one third of Maskirovka positions until the role rested on the overall commander of the role, and the understanding of the whole battle end of WWII, commanders would direct a wartime Maskirovka Control Group, responsible for overall

Regulations the following guidelines for the practice of Maskirovka:

5 Mask an increase or redeployment of forces that the enemy has spotted

5 new weapons

5 Distract his attention

5 Overload the enemy’s analytical skill

5 Give the illusion of strength where none exists

5 Look weak where there is strength

5 Use patterns of behaviour so the enemy will not recognise offensive

5 Preparation

5 Confuse enemy expectations, leading him to

Maskirovka may be achieved in the following ways:

5 By concealing real objects from enemy reconnaissance and observation

5 By changing the external appearance of objects

5 By setting up dummy objects and by feints

5 By spreading false rumours

5

5 By masking operations of radios, by setting up

This guidance on deception, while written and developed during WWII, remained largely unchanged in Ukraine

Crawford, in his article 'Macro Lessons from the War in Ukraine' draws interesting conclusions as

He notes that despite heavy losses, where Russia was able to manoeuvre, it was successful, due to

calls ‘the need for stuff’ and in particular the need for artillery ammunition, is crucial to maintaining Maskirovka more vital

second is that while the Russians have been lacking for example ISTAR satellites becoming targets and deception, in NATO and in Russia, and the contemporary theory and practice of its execution?

not equipped or trained for prolonged contact with the enemy, techniques should be explored that improve survivability without demanding such

had a disproportionate impact on ground close has become far more dangerous for logistic troops, and that advances in ISTAR and strike capabilities, combined with a manoeuvre strategy at the forward line of own troops makes targeting CSS assets, excellent ‘value for money’ in the context of resources

The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), based out of the US Army’s Combined Arms Centre, currently employing Command Posts (CPs) that are one report, “Current US Command Posts at battalion

tomorrow in Europe many, if not most, CPs would be SAMS attributes the high casualty rate among Russian Generals to the poor survivability of CPs, despite Russian CPs being smaller with a lower electronic signature; NATO casualties would

insights on the topic where, “Deployed US formations in the EUCOM AOR cannot wait for ongoing US formation commanders [at] brigade and above must take immediate steps to restructure CPs to operate dispersed; only position CPs within buildings or underground; reduce signatures and employ

This is an urgent call for a rethink on how C2 locations are managed, and it argues deception is backwards to take a step forward: the thinking of War’,

is it time to relearn the fundamental skills

and

For another example, we might consider Russia uses strength in exploiting the information space as the crux of their deceptive tactics, it follows

Although this may be easier said than done in

been unsuccessful in their use of Maskirovka so far in

8

insight of the Ukrainians to guide decision making, For example, one area the West has already made While normally seen only in the context of being environmentally friendly, it is in fact becoming vehicles make them attractive for use on the modern

and hybrid engines to a variety of vehicles, including 20

Encryption is another area which could be game compromised, the choice for Russian units is reduced to communicating on open, insecure radios or not unencrypted comms systems in use with both

highlights better CP sites also advocates the use of analogue encryption in order to mislead or mask level deceptive practices to hide or misdirect enemies

systems should fail, as systems do, there needs to robust plan to minimise the risk of information being in urban regions of Russia, so it is beholden to us to

There are some steps happening already toward

for the Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank, based on 21 designed to: “Hide, deceive, and survive on the adapting it for support vehicles, would potentially There are more ways than one to enhance vehicle

The context in which CSS operates presents unique challenges for deception, survivability, and

involve myriad health concerns, crime and factions medical care of the local population will be critical to ensuring continued support in the face of competing narratives, rumours and enemy information warfare, sustainment will create its own challenges as the enemy, unburdened by humanitarian concerns, seeks to create and then exploit civilian casualties to subvert

There are other threats that arise from operating digital space and into the hands of enemy OSINT and critical targeting data up to the enemy via encrypted

In tests, MCDCS drastically reduced both detection and recognition in critical short-range (400-1500 metres)

critical threat to forces operating among connected information operations, however the sheer scale of populations living and moving alongside combatants

The modern operating space is presented with to be more infrastructure in these largely urbanised However, there is also likely to be a large amount of building damage, with risks from damage to electricity and gas mains, water shortages, disease, unburied

So where to look for deception in the CSS space? been argued that the landscape of war is becoming Room’s This Means War Podcast: “Modern warfare doesn’t seem to be taking place in countryside, in the 22

Urban areas offer excellent cover, including thermal cover, and plenty of possible avenues in and out tunnels, beneath large bridges and in particular underground car parks could all function as sites shopping centre, warehouse or supermarket, it has a loading bay, usually covered from above, that could

accommodate a number of support and logistic

Glenn point out in The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations, “Deception is a powerful instrument for virtually every type of urban operation, since to succeed nearly everyone will require accurate intelligence, friendly (or at least neutral) news

The British Army, and in particular the support echelons, are more likely than ever to have to operate for vehicles or equipment that look like debris or buildings, disguising movement of vehicles, knocking through walls to create rat runs or digging tunnels, should all be pursued areas of innovation and

how to adapt or improvise debris in order to disguise as well as how to temporarily secure structurally damaged buildings from collapse, or safely dig rat runs between buildings may have to become part of our repertoire of disguising logistic activity from

Use of extant underground structures adds of digging shell scrapes we should be preparing to use cellars and sewers, which both have added advantages of being more durable, possessing greater opportunities for dispersed deployment, and equipment, all of these are within the capabilities of

8 Urban Warfare: Hostomel, Ukraine, April 2022

Credit: Shutterstock

5

and geolocation in Ukraine means the enemy has real opportunities to strike depth positions with a

to facilitate better preparation of dummy positions would not be expensive, compared to the cost to the enemy in systems used to destroy it and the lives it

Finally, how is this to be managed? The employment of a similar body to a Maskirovka Control Group would not be beyond the realms of possibility,

is not unimaginable that, at relatively low cost in time and resources, the British Army could begin to develop broad lessons in deception in the logistic space which are current, relevant and could increase

on Twitter, TikTok or Telegram reveals how drones, artillery or snipers can target the echelons in modern

Maskirovka

Endnotes

1Istoria Rossii

Context of the Collective Imagery Concerning the Battle of

2

On Tactics, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis,

6Clausewitz, On War,

7Ibid, Ibid, Ibid, 10Russian Deception Operations: Another Tool for the Kit

11

12 The Fundamentals, Annex A to The Soviet Military Encyclopaedia

Ibid

15 The Fundamentals, Annex A to

16

17

the Battle: Information and Command in a New American Way of War, Center for a New American Security, 2021, [Accessed 15 August 2022]

2022]

pdf [Accessed 10 Dec 2022]

20

and East-Central Europe since World War II

[Accessed 15 August 2022]

21

22 This Means War.

2022

The Role of Deception in Urban Operations. The Art of Darkness: Deception and

[Accessed 15 August 2022]

What are the key considerations for the next generation of UK Defence Logistic Landing Craft?

Through an analysis of Amphibious Warfare, Lt Ash Peckham explores the imperative considerations of the UK in the acquisition of future landing craft which is required to remain a

procurement mistakes if unique capabilities are to be

Prior to the Falklands Campaign, there were questions as to whether the Royal Navy should maintain the only remaining Landing Platform Docks (LPDs); it could be argued that without the LPDs, the Falklands Campaign would almost certainly have and her Allies choose to maintain niche military capabilities such as parachuting and Chemical Biological Radioactive Nuclear, even though they to some of these capabilities, landing craft offer

Maritime power has been a critical part of the UK’s Defence planning since the 17th Century (Fulton, 1914, p.1810) and is well suited to supporting a wide range of contemporary operations, from littoral strike assaults, to large scale logistic sustainment across a beachhead, to the delivery of humanitarian aid. Defence in a Competitive Age domains…beyond the traditional concept of 'joint' to a depth of multi-domain integration that adds up to far more than the sum of the parts.’ (Gov.UK, July 2021, p.12). Defence needs to take a longerterm view with regards to protecting some of its niche capabilities if it is serious about delivering on the Integrated Review (IR) and its associated Command Paper (Gov.UK, July 2021). It is even more important if Global Britain is to be a reality.

The ability to transfer maritime power into land power will require specialist landing capability if HMG is to get across a foreign strandline, establish

are retained, the paradox is that landing craft have proven broad future utility, yet, the OSDs of the wittingly reducing its options to credibly deliver the

According to Britannica online, ‘landing craft are small naval vessels used primarily to transport and tactically deploy soldiers, equipment, vehicles,

landing craft do have the ability to complete all of

Prior to outlining the future platform requirements, it is important to frame the amphibious doctrine under which landing craft are planned to be thought when considering Amphibious Warfare

Group’ on Exercise AUSTERE WOLF 22 in Cyprus, has reinforced the urgent need to act now to update, and uprate, our current landing craft capabilities to

UK Defence’s current Landing Craft capabilities go out of service in the next decade; LCVPs have an Out

8 The Royal Marines Landing Craft Utility (LCU) currently provides Defence a versatile landing craft capability but goes out of service in 2032

8 Royal Marines Landing Craft (LCVP) during Operation Achillean

Wikipedia, Public Domain

Crown copyright

8 MEXEflote has been used in a number of roles since the 1960s but has an out of ser vice date of 2033 with no replacement Crown copyright

in’ logistics effort, where motherships and landing movement of materiel to shore, as employed in the Falklands Campaign, but at a higher risk of attrition

and thus at less immediate risk of attack from ground Over the Horizon operational manoeuvre from the sea these terms will be used interchangeably throughout

Essentially this latter amphibious concept aims to locate naval forces further from shore, protecting strategic shipping from Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) such as those posed by the Exocet missile level of threat posed by precision systems, that the Exocet was considered by Admiral Woodward (the commander of the British Carrier Group in the South

At the time, the missiles were a rare commodity, with missiles completely changed how the British naval threat from modern LRPF combined with drones, contemporary amphibious operations, short of OTH, Moskva

reason OTH operations are more credible is due to the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction forces ashore, threatening the complete annihilation the current potency of modern weapon systems, the scale of the concentrated amphibious combat highly unlikely to be replicated in the contemporary

OTH/OMFTS is more than just an amphibious landing from range however, as it aims to increase

frame AW as a seaward extension of manoeuvre

broader concept can threaten a large area and can

defence, spreading combat power and demanding would be to project forces rapidly over a larger area, allowing them to move inland at selected sites and operate at a higher tempo than traditional beach landings, utilising technological advances to enable higher levels of tactical mobility combined with high

In order to support the desired effects of OMFTS, it is clear that landing craft must be rapidly deployable, will undoubtedly be undertaken in conjunction with air assets, to achieve the desired effect of surprise to react and deploy vessels from their motherships, OMFTS fails to achieve its major advantages over

As the distance between ship and shore increase however, generally, so does the risk of experiencing of traditional landing craft makes them effective for getting in close to beaches, it also makes them

craft at longer distances as the swell further from

simplest way to counter this is to slow down in order to prevent ‘slamming’ of the hull, this undermines the solution could be found in the twin skeg hull style of

SLV has the advantage of being able to move troops and equipment at longer range and across rough seas faster and with much better stability than a traditional landing craft, whilst retaining the ability to beach itself in a comparable manner to a traditional larger carrying capacity than equivalent traditional

The carrying capacity of any future landing craft is also crucial to the effective implementation of OTH increase, it will be increasingly important that any interim vessel has a large carrying capacity in order to reduce the number of loops required between the a craft is able to discharge in a single journey, the less allows fewer landing craft to service a larger force, thus allowing the distribution of landing craft among several deployed forces without the requirement for extra capacity could be used to sustain a number of amphibious forces across a larger area, with an optimised maritime footprint, giving the taskforce

Another key requirement of any future landing landing craft are inherently versatile, they can get closer to shore across a broad geographic range them suitable for a wide range of activities from formations, to the delivery of humanitarian aid where

This latter contingency should not be overlooked as the Integrated Operating Concept (IOpC, 2022) describes this engagement as one of its key tenants stating: “Activities that establish and maintain the human networks…are the foundation on which posture is established and are at the heart of engage”

large, versatile vessels, working in conjunction with specialist, dedicated logistic landing platforms

of humanitarian aid from a sea base to almost any beach in the world and landing craft have should not be degraded with new landing craft

on MENA and the South China Sea region, landing craft could play a substantial role as the majority of the countries in these regions are less economically developed, making them more susceptible to of the population inhabit the coastal regions where

In order to achieve versatility and meet the transit distances required of OTH logistic operations, landing craft must have a credible operational and tactical range, with the ability to sleep, feed and administer themselves when miles away from the shore or their provided, something that becomes even more critical the time that landing craft can be committed from operate as discrete units, separate from a naval task

The penultimate capability consideration is that

8 Falklands Conflict: A Landing Craft ferries troops from SS Canberra to San Carlos on

Crown copyright

a number of logistic, humanitarian and persistent engagement roles, it must not be forgotten that the delivery of maritime forces across a contested defensive measures, such as ballistic protection for the wheelhouse and armour plating on the hull to environment, not necessarily with itself is just one part of a wider system which must

Modern supply chain management advocates that a pull system can be sustained using robust provisioning forecasts, supported by AI and timely

resilience to demand and supply, is maintained without the reliance on large amounts of inventory

the landing craft to remain a versatile platform in threshold outreach; as well as being able to achieve the operational manoeuvre required for OTH/OMFTS capability and work in collaboration to achieve and for money across the Services, hopefully before the

Bibliography

expeditionary logistics: Enabling operational manoeuvre

elements will have to move commodities rapidly and

OTH/OMFTS to work, it is imperative that logisticians have true total asset visibility in order to maintain an optimum logistic footprint ashore and achieve means a single, autonomous system that maintains accurate and real time data on commodity quantity across the amphibious operational area as well as likely to cause delays in an already extended delivery the units ashore and ultimately undermine the entire amphibious operation; as such, landing craft will undoubtedly be a key enabler in building resilience into

Finally, one of the key tenants of OMFTS is its should refrain from acquiring a single landing craft solution, but seek an integrated, and interoperable

in a Competitive Age,

Defence

UK Maritime

Power basing a viable method of providing logistic support to the

a success per se, but the integration of a number of command and control with increased visibility of units control systems, with joint connectivity providing the commander and logisticians live updates will be

In conclusion, the key considerations for the acquisition of future landing craft are speed, stability, capacity, versatility, range, protection and

(2000) “Seabased Logistics,” Marine Corps Concept Paper,

The Guardian, Explainer,

The importance of basic soldiering techniques and ‘soft’ skills for logisticians

Based upon his experience on Operation TOSCA, Capt Christian Reedman explores the value in being a ‘generalist’; highlighting the primacy of soft skills over deep technical backgrounds, as well as the

In a mission underpinned by the maintenance of the status quo, the need for technical specialists is replaced by imperative demanding communications skills, an emotional intelligence and an abundance

making and streetwise common sense – must be complemented with ‘soft’ skills such as empathy, tact and an understanding of the operational, cultural and

Queen’s Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment (10 QOGLR)

Of all the Arms and Services of the British Army, The Royal Logistic Corps can claim to be one of its most diverse bodies of professional talent and capability. Boasting twelve direct entry trades1 and four non-direct entry,2 its thirteen Regular Regiments and eleven Reserve Regiments provide the largest combined workforce in the Army. Such variety and breadth makes The Royal Logistic Corps particularly well-placed to provide specialists for a huge range of tasks and

Enhanced Forward Presence3 in Estonia, it is an enduring truism that The Royal Logistic Corps can be found wherever the Army deploys.

The versatility this range of specialisms affords has an evident positive impact on the Army’s present too: a Mariner or Port Operator often spends their entire careers based out of Marchwood, only may understand their vehicle and its capabilities deployed to theatres which demand entirely different peacekeeping mission in Cyprus, is an example of such a deployment, and sets the focus for this article

TOSCA, the term given to the British contribution to Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) have provided peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Cyprus since coup d’état by political elements supporting union with Greece, Turkey launched a military intervention to safeguard the lives and livelihoods of the minority

was designated to physically separate the military island and was termed the ‘Buffer Zone’: to this day, the Buffer Zone is patrolled by UNFICYP in different The British contingent are responsible for Sector 2, which covers the urban sprawl and rural environs of Nicosia, the capital of both the Republic

8 Gurkha soldiers patrol the central area of the Sector inside the UN Buffer Zone

8 The Buffer Zone is littered with reminders of 1974; many items from that time remain as relics of its past

assumed command

nearly sixty years of unsuccessful attempts to 6 The practised, ‘hard’ technical skills would be of lesser utility than ‘soft skills’ such as negotiation, empathy and tact, rounded out by rudimentary soldiering behaviours and skills learned in basic training and developed in Field Army units throughout their

“politicals” of the northwest frontier during the British Empire’s occupation of India and Pakistan;7 the highly effective, if brutal, counterinsurgency employed during the Malaya Emergency – which was underpinned by human intelligence and deep local knowledge;

highlighted the need for a greater understanding of – the British Army has always demanded more of its soldiers than

The reason for using Operation TOSCA as a case study comes from the unusually high premium placed This stems from the mission’s purpose in maintaining peace and preventing armed escalation; something grounded in understanding the opposing sides’ motivations and frustrations, and the subsequent in peacekeeping in Cyprus is articulated through the monitoring, recording and protesting of ‘violations’ to of bricks to the crumbling masonry of a guard post, to deliberate deployment of Armed Forces forward of point where both militaries were situated on 16

skills the centre of gravity for any British deployment

and associated supporting functions (such as the Quartermaster’s Department), there is a group

act as a conduit of information between the UN and either the Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot military; to investigate allegations of misconduct or escalation from either side; and to be the Regiment’s experts on made in such a department – both in terms of rank and training10 on competent communications skills and cultural skills are inculcated and valued, but across the entire of the ‘Operations Company’ are responsible for patrolling the Sector 2 Buffer Zone in its entirety: their mission is to use their encyclopaedic knowledge of the landscape to monitor both opposing militaries for

This could be a farmer who has worked the land for thirty years; a conscripted soldier with limited training and strict orders to follow; or even irregular migrants attempting to cross from one side of the island to the other – in all three examples, English is not their behaviours the British Army both seeks and instils in

basic soldiering knowledge, skills and behaviours and marks the primary transition from civilian to soldiers – is underpinned by the Army’s Core Values of courage, discipline, respect for others, integrity, 11

Regimental Headquarters, Company Headquarters

10 QOGLR

of Sector 2 on 1

RLC convoys have done on countless occasions in and conviction is required for a young Private soldier

8 This wrecked piano is one of many ghosts of the previously inhabited houses and apartment blocks within Sector 2 of the Buffer Zone

8 The Regimental Headquarters Influence Group, or “Influence House”, signifies the importance of strong communication skills, empathy and patience in the UNFICYP mission

comrades – outnumbering the UNFICYP contingent four to one – in enforcing the integrity of the Buffer

discipline drills, but in Cyprus, soldiers exhibit this virtue through forensic examination of incursions into the Buffer Zone, despite covering the same ground deployment, such patience and attention to detail surveillance of an Opposing Force (OPFOR)12 position patrol capturing photographic evidence of an OPFOR was used to validate the opposing side’s claims of

Such tactical actions, which may seem inconsequential or even petty in any other environment, can have profound implications for between two institutions over six months – yet it underlines any UN effort to persuade either OPFOR the baseline behaviours of a soldier which must be upheld by the soldiers on Operation TOSCA, but the general, basic skills which are taught to anyone

performing repetitive tasks every day, present Rehearsal and practice of techniques, such as deployment training and ‘validation:’ the process used by the British Army to ensure a deploying

However, intangibles such as empathy, emotional intelligence and verbal communication skills are far harder to test and rehearse; yet they are vital to United Nations Police (UNPOL), who have primacy when dealing with civilian incursions into the Buffer

In addition, core skillsets such as driving and vehicle husbandry (the primary method of traversing the set the foundations for any successful peacekeeper in a Corporal or a Major, the familiar hurdles of providing pastoral, career and operational support for a diverse from home in an alien and often stressful environment,

states, the ability to communicate effectively across described above, two are Vehicle Support Specialists with more than two decades’ worth of experience (RLC) with more than double this amount of service; yet, their operational output is measured not in how many litres of diesel can be delivered per day, nor how swiftly a Challenger 2 tank can be manoeuvred gauged through the persuasion of a farmer, who speaks limited English, to stop tilling land which is not theirs; or convincing a heavily armed foreign soldier – whilst unarmed themselves – to stop threatening the opposing side, who are also armed and trained expected to perform in either scenario, both of which Success was found not in technical expertise, but in honed communication skills, patience and the

The purpose of this article is not to dismiss the demonstrate the limitations set by a sole focus on this, given the diversity in operational capability it has has deployed soldiers as professional Drivers, Logistic Supply Specialists and Communications Specialists across the world; but it has also deployed sizeable contingents as dismounted infantry and attached augmentees to frontline combat units – as well as experience and breadth of ability complements the technical skills which dominate a soldier’s trade and career – something which has been demonstrated on Goods Consignor with extensive experience in their for moving equipment and personnel from across different bases on the island, in the event of a sudden and unexpected requirement elsewhere in the supply Operators were dispatched to Sector 1, which is led by an Argentine contingent, to assist in planning for safe and swift retrieval of all fuel assets and equipment from their stations spread across an austere, mountainous

8 Wayne’s Keep Cemetery is a Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery situated in the Buffer Zone. The authorities of Northern Cyprus claim that it lies inside their territory, not the Buffer Zone; such ‘disputed areas’ are common sites for protracted, complex negotiations

communication skills, were pivotal to the effective

These operational achievements demonstrate the importance of combining ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ skills for Operation TOSCA, with numerous operational lessons learned from the past decade15 highlighting the need their environment – both in terms of the ‘physical’ and the ‘human’ terrain – and their ability to navigate it

and the employment of equipment and techniques to achieve this; communication skills, outside of radio procedure or military orders, are consistently ancillary

scenario) can expect to conduct training at escalating levels of scale and complexity – from Troop to this process, training objectives (known as ‘TOs’) lay a conceptual pathway for validating soldiers’ ability to

16 Whilst some do exist for testing communication skills, again these are focused on the articulation of orders rather the onus lies on individual exercise designers to incorporate scenarios which demand these skills, such as refugees attempting to steal stocks of rations or

10 QOGLR’s recent experience on Operation

training in the UK, so that units do not face shortfalls in these abilities in environments like Cyprus where the line between success and failure is marked by

still require soldiers who can communicate effectively necessitating speaking via interpreters, as recent

17 Consequently, the demands placed on modern soldiers are more

also comprehend a variety of foreign cultures and use this understanding to guide their interactions

Controller, whilst interpreting local customs and freight requirements, must communicate across cultural fault lines – potentially through an interpreter

– to facilitate the deployment of large quantities of

the next generation of soldiers, the continuous importance of ‘soft’ skills, basic soldiering techniques and the underlying Values and Standards must be inculcated into every area of military training and

The argument posited here is not novel, nor

Rather, it is to stand as yet further evidence of the enduring imperative to diversify military training

soldiering techniques and behaviours stand as lasting examples of relevant preparation which lead to on Operation TOSCA demonstrates the need for emotionally intelligent and culturally astute personnel; training to further test Service Personnel’s ‘soft’ skills;

down an adversary armed only with their wits and their words; even recent history suggests that it

Endnotes

1Trades which can employed immediately out of soldier

2Niche trades only available after employment in a direct entry trade, such as Army Photographer or Driver Tank

deterrent and early warning of Russian military aggression in 2022, this deterrent assumed an even greater importance and

Originally four sectors, this was reduced to three (confusingly: Sector One, Sector Two and Sector Four) after

5This ‘TRNC’ was declared by Ersin Tatar on 15th November

8 The ‘American Wives’ Club’: Another Buffer Zone phantom which speaks to a soon-to-beforgotten past, accessible only to the peacekeepers who patrols its grounds. Its pockmarked walls pay homage to the violent conflict which took place here

8 View of Sector 1 of the Buffer Zone, monitored by an Argentine-led contingent

7 10

negotiation training at the Royal Military Academy

11

12“Opposing Force”, a common military term for a force other refer to both the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Turkish such as age, build, height and clothing; ‘SCRIM’ is a similar Recently renamed from ‘MATTs’ (Mandatory Annual Training Tests) to ‘ITRs’ (Initial Training Requirements), which

15

16Such objectives are laid out in detail in documents known as a

17

Bibliography

Blood, Metal and Dust: How Victory Turned into Defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq, Osprey

Small Wars, Faraway Places: Global Insurrection and the Making of the Modern World 1945 –1965

Centre for Army Leadership (2021) The Army Leadership Code,

Peacemaking Strategies in Cyprus: In Search of Lasting Peace, Black Hearts,

British way of Counterinsurgency”, Small Wars and Insurgencies.

HM Government (2016) The Iraq Inquiry, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know,

Land Warfare Development Centre (2022) Army Doctrine

Publication: Land Operations

Land Warfare Development Centre (2017) Army Field Manual, Tactics for Stability Operations Part 2: The Military Contribution to Peace Support, Losing Small Wars, 2nd Edition, Yale

Edge of Empire: The British Political

Frontier 1877 – 1947, UNFICYP Headquarters (2022) Force Employment Book, Images:

COVID-19 and Op PITTING: The impacts on the Joint Air Mounting Centre (JAMC)

deployment on Operation PITTING to Afghanistan

Let me cast your minds back to February 2020, just scale deployments to Saudi Arabia (Operation FLORIDAN) and Europe (Exercise DEFENDER), and awaited some well-deserved rest before the inevitable impacts of the global pandemic came in to play. Unfortunately, this was not to be the case. Well-planned and costly exercises to Kenya (Exercise ASKARI STORM) and America (Exercise UWEX MRX) needed to deploy, alongside sustaining operations in Estonia (Operation CABRIT) and Cyprus (Operation TOSCA). No rest period came.

Understanding the constraints

JAMC could see that working processes were going to change with the rapidly evolving effects history of global governance, the decision made on

Lockdown triggered numerous measures that, whilst once alien, became the “new normal”: they included the opening of the Centralised Isolation Facility

brave new world, under direction from HQ Strategic Command (Strat Com) and Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), was to enable a new ‘clean

For the JAMC to facilitate this, a new layout of no more than 15 personnel living together in dropped from 250 to 150, with the JAMC lacking the meet the civilian law on social distancing, transport with the changes faced, the JAMC had processed

Mitigating the risk

With the new layout in place, stricter safety measures were introduced to ensure the protection of Service Personnel (SP) deploying through, or working within

signage was introduced to encourage maximum compliance with these new rules and to reduce the amount of time passengers spent in the JAMC, Postal and Courier Operators were tasked from 50 Sqn to manage baggage (wearing PPE to guarantee

earmarking transit accommodation exclusively for was designated for unit freight parties, as freight was still deploying at a near routine rate, with ensured that the remaining transit accommodation was segregated from the rest of the Unit in case any Health Team conducted a safety inspection of the

Sgt Dominic Simmons, Joint Air Mounting Centre Ops Freight SNCO, provides his perspective

capability as a ‘clean pathway; for passengers bound for operations, with only minor amendments required

key disruptor was, to paraphrase SSgt Alexander, JAMC Ops SNCO, the “COVID dance,” whereby all passengers were asked to approach the desk

been exchanged, the deploying personnel would retreat to a safe distance, allowing the Movement Controller to approach the desk once again and

Because most of the Army took a tactical pause while the COVID situation developed, the number of passengers passing through the JAMC dropped intuitively, the number of tasks the JAMC processed rose, as South Cerney was the only ‘clean pathway’ processed by the JAMC with only a single passenger,

Quarantine facilities

locations were established in August 2020 to ease to open were at Wittering for RAF personnel, were opened for deploying Army personnel at Swynnerton) as well as providing Movement support

In October 2020, just as the JAMC had started getting used to new working practices, it was deemed necessary to associate passengers with their own by disassociated baggage as the passengers could as close to ‘normal’ as they had been throughout the Continuous liaison between JAMC Ops and the booking system (AirCore), passenger numbers were correct for transport and feeding, and any issues

capture and extracting personal details from excel an online app was created to track people deploying

the Defence Academy is now being utilised for inbound passengers only, Capel Curig, Crowborough, personnel to directly report to RAF Brize Norton have been recognised by Commander Field Army (CFA), awarding the JAMC with a CFA’s keep most of us sane and safe, but something always happens to upset the balance of things – in this case,

Operation PITTING

misses (dangerous goods directly reporting to RAF Brize Norton without the necessary documentation, sized freight that required repackaging prior to being allowed access to the aircraft), which later resulted Line Commands (FLCs) seemed to understand the requirement of what equipment and personnel were ranging from Package Alpha to Package Echo (going Movement Control Check Points (MCCPs) were made particularly challenging due to late arrivals of unit freight, with some arriving 12 hours later hours prior to aircraft departure, but with the freight arriving so late, freight was being built to aircraft

The Units were hardly to blame, reduced notice to move windows, so few individuals to support tasks

It is a common misconception in military circles that Defence can just turn up and move anything that in every operation, short of outright war, Civil In the case of Operation PITTING, essential freight entirely; a widespread lack of understanding of Dangerous Goods, which resulted in some items that are forbidden from air transport arriving at the JAMC Formation and Unit planning timelines for all manner

“Normal Jogging”

Everyone knows what is expected of them, how to conduct themselves and that COVID has changed lives and routines on what is likely to be an enduring

As the scale of Operation PITTING became

main effort was now to deploy personnel at short notice if they had shown two negative Lateral Flow

and

rations would not have deployed, with potential

Despite the many frictions of Operation PITTING, Defence showed its true colours: the Services

Mounting Group helped provide the necessary lift, manpower and SQEP to move the unit freight from the

of the Mounting Group, the JAMC sourced drivers and Rations arrived on NATO pallets built too tall for the available transport assets, and occasionally too tall (out of gauge) for the aircraft to which they had been personnel had to reduce the number of rations on each NATO pallet, rewrap and redocument before onward

of great assistance to the JAMC during the second week of the operation, providing assets in Colchester and at RAF Brize Norton to drive, lift and track unit

support meant thousands of Afghans endangered by the Taliban could leave the country to start new lives

During the global pandemic, the JAMC showed its

The team’s efforts have been recognised with a commendation from the Commander Field Army for maintaining constant operational output when most of the Defence was forced to take a tactical pause

Winston Churchill said: “one should never let a often overlooked, despite being a critical enabler of all military activity abroad, showed its strength and looks now to improving processes and providing both generic and bespoke education packages to units

8 SP from 16X deploying on Operation PITTING

8 JAMC Operational Freight Processing Task

8 Operation PITTING: Pte Choi walks arriving in Kandahar Image: Crown copyright

Inspire. Empower. Deliver.

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AN ENTERPRISING APPROACH

Royal Logistic Corps (RLC) to give members of our Armed Forces invaluable commercial driving experience over the summer period

with a select number of other organisations –partnered with the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to offer RLC Service Personnel experience in commercial logistics operations, with the aim of upskilling their HGV skills in urban environments as well as getting them ready for a career after the military.

months from conception to implementation and in June 2022, 12 soldiers from the RLC joined our months, they gained invaluable commercial driving experience, proving themselves to be real assets for

"A win-win for all involved"

As the trial wrapped up on 22 September 2022, Scott McSeveney, Distribution Manager and one of how it all went:

“The Enterprise Approach trial was a real success, took part and our business as a whole. Those taking part took on plenty of responsibility, gaining hands-on commercial experience of our operations to help them to start thinking about careers after the military. During their time with us, our ‘new colleagues’ received training on driving HGVs for a number of weeks, before then buddying up with existing drivers. Then, they fully stepped up to the role of a Kuehne+Nagel driver: they got real-world experience, and we added to our dedicated colleagues, delivering great service to our customers. It really was a win-win situation for all involved! We really hope that this initial trial will be the foundation for further future partnerships between Kuehne+Nagel and the MOD.”

Proving our Gold Standard

Our participation in the Enterprise Approach scheme our continued commitment to supporting members our Defence Employer Recognition Scheme (ERS) Gold Award status, which is a badge of honour for employers looking to support former Service

importance of supporting service leavers as they transition to civilian life and that’s why, along with putting on career fairs and helping with CVs, we’re

Drive your future

Are you a service leaver wondering how we can help

8 The ‘new colleagues’ received HGV driver training for a number of weeks

8 12 RLC soldiers joined the Kuehne+Nagel Distribution Team

A Net Zero Proposition: Reducing the environmental impact of deployed food

By Ms Erica Fuller PA Consulting

By establishing a collaborative network of partnerships with industry and academia, the MOD aligns with the MOD’s Multi Domain Integration (MDI) framework and can reduce the time and likely cost of introducing bespoke solutions where different ideas and perspectives can be shared without fear, setting of a MDI network allows partners to work towards

A straightforward proposition to steer decision and achieve progress towards the UK Government’s to support planning activity for a successful journey

Deployed food is a contributor to the environmental footprint across Defence, with rations procured and distributed to military consumers across the globe. This includes delivery to garrisons as far south as the Falkland Islands, military units in eastern Europe, and Royal Navy ships deployed to the Middle East. This extended supply chain creates the strategy that will guide the future procurement and supply of deployed food.

PA Consulting has a track record of supporting private and public sector clients in transitioning to working with the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to create the Climate Change and Sustainability Strategic Approach1 which sets out the ambition to achieve a range of initiatives relating to platform availability, opportunities for maintaining operational energy,

It also proposes that policy should widen to include Defence Equipment, Support, and Infrastructure within the value chain is either upstream (supply

More recently PA has provided consultancy to the Defence Food Programme, championed by Director Strategy2 published by MOD Defence Support offers the net zero ambition could be achieved in this complex arena with a Reduction of the Impact of

Understanding emissions through accessible dashboards and data

There is a requirement to understand baseline emissions and assess the carbon footprint to identify an easily accessible dashboard, will expose the carbon footprint associated with food supply, transportation,

Analysing each geographic destination may reveal quick wins for carbon reduction with the opportunity to establish supply through secure regional supply hubs as an alternative to effectively shorten the

partners, MOD Commercial teams can capture all

Prioritise the net zero roadmap

The key challenges to achieving net zero are

environmental impact of deployed food include:

• Minimising the environmental footprint associated with food supply and transportation

• Exploring alternatives for plastics and packaging used for food

• Applying circularity principles to reduce waste and

A focus on realistic opportunities and actions and a successful roadmap will immediately prioritise

8 Erica Fuller, a former RLC officer, is a member of Professional Services Team at PA Consulting

rations (and also in group feeding settings), there is an opportunity to introduce innovative packaging PA Specialists are working with a Swedish Research and Development company to develop and scale a proprietary production method at

universal packaging cases across the wider logistics supply chain which will reduce the use of cardboard that needs to be disposed of and allow

resilience and potentially reduce the discard rates of of the current preferences, values, and standards of operational troops will also ensure the rations provided are enjoyed whilst sustaining demanding

Prepare stakeholders for the journey

the operating model and establishing a dashboard recommendations from current suppliers to achieve ‘quick wins’ and industry best practice will also be

Modelling techniques that validate available options

Introducing a sales and operational planning tool will create and automatically update forecasts while extend to stock management at unit level to allow and the creation of digital twins can improve supply

chain visibility, offering powerful tools to navigate the mapping can identify issues before they become resilience, and minimising volatility which will in turn

Implement a governance model process, establishing a Governance Model will strategy, building in all stakeholders together with a performance management and monitoring dashboard will support tracking and reporting of Ongoing consultation with both internal and external key stakeholders and SMEs with experience of introducing a net zero framework will contribute to Reducing the environmental impact of deployed food requires close collaboration between MOD stakeholders and wider industry, creating an an opportunity to take bold steps towards net zero

Endnotes

1MOD Climate Change and Sustainability Strategic and Sustainability Strategic Approach

2

What is a circular economy? | Ellen MacArthur Foundation

8 Mikel Santos and John Knight PA Net Zero Proposition

Should inland waterways be considered as a

Lt Christopher Hodgkiss examines the opportunities for exploitation of inland waterways for global contingency and sustainment operations. The attributes of inland waterways as a credible mode for distribution of materiel and personnel will be analysed together with the advantages offered for transporting bulk/out of gauge loads, assuring environmental targets, delivering value

land domain to dismiss the opportunities presented

Context

internal transportation networks and developed its inland waterways for the transhipment of commercial bulk goods for internal markets and to coastal ports

There are over two million kilometres of inland waterways worldwide.1 Inland waterways are built channels that act as links between ports across a nation, thus creating an internal waterway system throughout a country or continent. Joint doctrine describes this riverine environment as, “an inland, coastal or delta area comprising both land and water, often with limited or non-existent ground lines of communication. The area is likely to have extensive water surface and/or inland waterways (including lakes) that provide natural routes for transportation and communications.”2

founded on them, they have facilitated global exploration and for those that have learnt to harness them, they have provided a robust, reliable, economical

Wehrmacht’s lines of communication into Normandy under the Transportation Plan helped to cripple the Westheer’s Germans established a ferry system centred at Elbeuf

supremacy and for all of their successes in Normandy, the RAF and USAF found it challenging to interdict

Inland waterways remain a robust, albeit latent, mode of distribution in the contemporary operating

England and Wales retain their diversity and comprise 5

and consists of canals and rivers that have been made throughout 20 of the 27 European Union states,

Taken together, inland waterways offer enormous coverage of the UK and continental Europe, and the

Viability of waterways for 6

7 By comparison, the total volume of road

Whilst compared to road transport the proportion of freight moved on UK inland waterways is relatively small, the system

largest European inland networks are found in the tonnes of commercial freight was moved across numbers, especially considering that heavy, bulk

Recent global shocks have demanded a reassessment of how resilience is built in to our

8 Inland Waterway, Province of Utrecht, Netherlands

Image: Shutterstock

latency in the inland waterway systems of the UK and continental Europe, as an army working within a joint framework, we should reassess the viability of inland waterways, not only for distributing freight, but potentially as a transport mode for personnel

gauge the volumes of ferry transportation between Such an unmeasured latency

expansion and attaining value for money from inland

Whilst this represents a relatively small amount of overall freight moved, it could be acknowledged as a reverse proof of concept, as it clearly demonstrates that our domestic

which provides an indication of the latency in the scale of growth for both commercial and military

European inland waterways for military freight, presents several opportunities to build resilience into associated with road transport can be avoided on inland waters; inclement weather, restricted route capacity, platform availability restrictions, mass driver and crew training, bulk capacity envelopes

environmental advantages to utilising inland water announced its Decarbonising Transport Plan, with

10 This supports the UK Government’s strategic environmental plan to bring all greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by

11 With the steps the UK Armed Forces are taking to reduce emissions, we could potentially utilise waterways

moving troops both domestically and for onward

In July 2022, the Transport: Advanced and Modular (TrAM) project developed and launched an electric

12 If a comparable capability could be made available to the Armed Forces, it could accommodate a company/squadron sized group in one craft, transporting them throughout Europe, potentially saving time and money, whilst also moving towards reducing the Department’s

lost, detours and the limited carrying capacity per vehicle, then an investment like TrAM for the Armed

in which we can provide dynamic logistic support to of transport, if only for bulk freight, would make the evidence that the UK has considered the feasibility of expanding its transport contracts, potentially utilising a unit, making the most of the inland waterways, to the closest sea port before continuing its journey

capable of utilising inland waterways could add viable

either an area of operations, in support of scheduled

A similar concept of utilising alternative modes of support from the home base into a theatre or for developed to underpin the UK’s four overarching objectives in the Integrated Review and the approach outlined in the Integrated Operating 15 Inland waterway capabilities could Such an approach, in Africa for example, could exploit the great rivers such as the Nile, Congo, Niger

cheaper than by rail or road and in Africa you can ISO containers, at a lower cost per unit than rail or 16 The transport infrastructure in many parts of Africa is often not well founded, however, the continent is used widely by UK Armed Forces and

potentially be realised across a range of inland water

In the UK, the total amount of domestic waterborne

Where the UK has invested in Africa, such as the Land Regional Hub Kenya (LRH(K)), permanent staff supporting operations across the continent could be further reinforced if inland waterways were

8 Cargo ship, River Rhine, Cologne

Image: Shutterstock

far quicker and responsive logistic option by moving materiel by vessels throughout selected regions of Investment is likely to be needed to develop inland waterways, perhaps dovetailing with broader HMG operations, fabrication and maintenance of domestic inland waterway vessels and training opportunities with indigenous forces, civilians and Allies could be MOD’s persistent engagement initiatives, increase

Ukraine – A contemporary case study for utilising inland waterways Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukrainian Ministry of Infrastructure had commenced a refurbishment program of its extensive between Europe and Eurasia, Ukraine utilised its inland waterways for carrying bulk commodities such as agricultural material, ore, iron and steel products together with river sand (mostly used for navigable rivers, with the main Dnipro or Dnieper 17 Ukraine regards its inland waterways as a strategic asset but

As Russia struggles to sustain its precision air attack on Ukrainian strategic targets, and considering the challenges the RAF and USAF experienced when attempting to interdict the German ferry operations at Elbeuf, Ukraine’s inland waterways offer considerable capacity for sustaining its forces into the east of the could be supported using the latent capacity of

The challenges of inland waterways

is the available range of navigable waterway and and dredging requirements) together with capacity

Regulation is also a consideration and based on a report by the Economic Commission for Europe, it which limit the size of vessel and amount of weight

In many of the regions where the UK and its Allies to be an opportunity to exploit inland waterways

for use by Armed Forces (at home and abroad)

to partner with civilian/commercial infrastructure initiatives would likely alleviate some of these funding underpin overseas persistent engagement missions in support of wider regional security and Defence

Finally, when considering the challenges of inland waterways, the issue of training will need to be operators will not only need to be competent but also agile, as they migrate from domestic to overseas of waterborne experience and knowledge already exists across several functional support and logistics the gift of the Services, should they wish to explore an underutilised facet of domestic and overseas distribution operations which may deliver increased

Conclusion

This article has provided evidence that there is considerable latent potential in inland waterways

There is a vast number of inland waterways that could potentially be utilised for distributing military materiel and personnel, adding resilience to the logistic network and providing increased waterways, such as available range, infrastructure of capacity, persistent engagement, partnering opportunities and environmental gains seem to itself on innovative thinking, dismissing the use of inland waterways from strategic and operational supply chains under increasing pressure, every nation is looking to build increased resilience into their Whilst road and rail transport are likely to retain their dominance as modes for distribution across a broad range of materiel, inland waterways offer a viable form of supplementary transport that is worth considering and may deliver the competitive edge

Endnotes 1

2Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, Edition B, Version

inland waterways for deployment and sustainment could be included in military appreciations as another Some of the strategic and operational planning considerations could be alleviated by extended

The initial cost of building infrastructure solely

The ‘Transportation Plan’, sometimes referred to as the ‘Zuckerman Plan’, was a bombing strategy, developed during the Italian Campaign, which focussed precise attack on Operation OVERLORD) was further developed with the aim of isolating, as much as possible, the Normandy bridgehead

The Right of the Line: The RAF in the European War 1939-1945,

The plan, although not without its critics, proved effective, to a point where the Westheer

The Role of Logistics in the German Defeat in Normandy, 1944

5UK Gov, Inland Waterways and Categorisation of Waters,

6UK Gov, UK Commercial Freight Movements, https://

European Metropolitan Transport Authority Barometer, (July 2022)

Feeding Mars: The Role of Logistics in the German Defeat in Normandy, 1944,

Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine, What is the current status

European Metropolitan Transport Authority Barometer, July

Statista, Percentage of Goods Moved on UK Inland Waterways, Statista, Tonnage/Km of Goods Moved on UK Inland Waterways,

The Right of the Line: The RAF in the European War 1939-1945, What are the Inland Waterways, its Types, Advantages and Applications?

11 UK Becomes First Major Economy to Pass Net-Zero Emissions Law,

UK Gov, The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, 16 March 2021, https://

15UK Gov, The Integrated Operating Concept, 26 October 2022,

UK Gov, UK Becomes First Major Economy to Pass NetZero Emissions Law,

UK Gov, Inland Waterways and Categorisation of Waters,

UK Gov, UK Commercial Freight Movements, 2020, https://

Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine, What is the current status of Inland Waterway Transport in Ukraine?

Waterways, its Types, Advantages and Applications?, https://

References:

Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, Edition B, Version 1, (February 2022)

UK Gov, The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, 16 March 2021, https://

UK Gov, The Integrated Operating Concept, 26 October 2022, Trans African Waterway System

The Defence Munitions Kineton STEM Team: Inspiring and challenging the local community

DM Kineton STEM Team Member, Sgt Craig Saunders, provides an insight into the fundamental voluntary work carried out by The Royal Logistic Corps’ Defence Munitions Kineton STEM Team, helping to educate and encourage critical thinking in young people

As the largest ammunition storage depot in Western Europe, the past year has been immensely busy for Defence Munitions (DM) Kineton. Station Personnel have been reacting to the rapidly evolving situation in Eastern Europe in response to increased Russian efforts to support Operation SCORPIUS and Operation INTERFLEX.

Furthermore, DM Kineton has supported a variety

Kineton was also the host and lead organiser of ATO 100, the centenary celebration of the ammunition technical trade within the British Army, an event that featured a Royal visit and catered for circa consists of the Ammunition Technical Support Group Technicians, Logistic Supply Specialists, Royal Air

the ATSG has been the supporter of STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) activities

STEM educational programmes aim to educate activities encourage critical thinking and problem

them understand a wide range of concepts, setting conditions for them to subsequently thrive in many

STEM Team has had numerous STEM Ambassadors throughout the years, all with the same goal of having a positive impact and inspiring students

STEM Team consists of personnel from The Royal

Despite the demanding work schedule, the DM Kineton STEM Team has been able to pack

HQWM for 2021, and in 2022 the team provided output was achieved by a small but motivated team that have all volunteered for this responsibility over

passion is evident in the numbers of young people they reach out to and by the quality of the education

The impact of these STEM events has increased organisations1 attention of media campaigns ranging from The Guardian (on behalf of the British Motor Museum)

local community, with a of couple examples captured as follows:

“Thank you so much! [It] was a fantastic session with lots of positive feedback.” – Grace Brindle, Producer (Environment and Sciences), Compton Verney Art Gallery and Park

“Thanks again Thor – the kids and staff thoroughly

The team makes an exceptional effort to inspire orientated career, and to place STEM activity at the

people, the team has helped them to apply their classroom education in a practical context and to

have also thoroughly enjoyed conducting the STEM events, as an experienced member notes:

“Being a STEM Ambassador is good fun and hard work. It’s satisfying to provide an activity that young people get excited about.” - AS1(T) Dymond, DM Kineton STEM Team member.

The DM Kineton STEM Team has not only reached out to the local community, but it has also invited Zone classroom has been created which provides a Special Educational Needs (SEN) groups) can develop

With all students, STEM helps them overcome the unique challenges they face that may otherwise prevent them from succeeding and facilitates employability activities to broaden their horizons and provides some experience of activities they may

students have been taught a variety of fundamental powered by a bicycle pump, capable of being Students also competed in an egg drop challenge, learning as they went and developing understanding of key engineering concepts like iterative design projects was that they required little to no specialist equipment, enabling interactive and fun sessions for

STEM event delivery is varied depending on cohort successful event for the audience, the team has used a variety of equipment to demonstrate concepts in

Participation is a key element of STEM outreach, typically involving a problem to be solved with STEM Team members mentoring and tutoring students

the use of a BBC Microbit processor and Python visual code, teaching students the basics of computer science including writing, editing, and running their also been harnessed to design websites and master

A wide variety of other technologies have been

ability to be enabled simply using an iPad, making software that has allowed students to use anything and integrate images with music and additional robots) have been used either to roll through an obstacle course, or to create abstract paintings using

However, not all the sessions have been reliant

Further projects included the use of Kapla blocks (similar to Jenga blocks but longer, narrower and lighter) that aided in developing the students’ understanding of structure, load, counterbalance and such as MTa (plastic girders and connectors) and K’Nex (modular plastic girders, connectors, motors, bearings and mechanisms) encouraged students to build anything from cranes to periscopes, bridges and

used a foam board, aerodynamic principles and their own creativity (assisted by STEM Tutors) to build

With environmentalism increasing in importance at government and industrial levels, the DM Kineton STEM Team has also been integrating an additional of an accelerating urbanised population, degrading agricultural ecosystems and the challenges of limited space, the Vertical Garden Workshop was introduced encouraged the students to consider potential

were introduced to how technology could allow for

Additionally, the DM Kineton STEM Team has partnered with ThinkForward, a charity that works to empower young people in the UK through an have included an Insight Day which offered an

8 STEM Zone classroom at DM Kineton

Shutterstock

Author’s collection

people to showcase what STEM means in a working which helped the students through learning interview skills and teamwork challenges, with activities

DM Kineton STEM Team Ambassadors have assisted articles, produced videos, and created ‘STEM at Home’ have also partnered with local organisations to

The DM Kineton STEM Team has proudly been part of a wider movement committed to a goal of goal of providing a source of inspiration, enthusiasm and knowledge to young people within the local and wider community is growing stronger on a daily

is brimming with ideas for creative, informative, and enjoyable sessions to continue building on the

STEM Team was formally recognised at The RLC

Foundation Awards in November 2022, winning the

Endnotes

1Partner organisations supported by the DM Kineton STEM Team have included the British Motor Museum (BMM), Compton Verney Art Gallery, Warwickshire County Council, Oxfordshire County Council, Coventry Transport Museum, National Museum of Computing, Market Hall Museum, Jaguar Land Rover, Aston Martin, Space Studio, Blenheim Palace, The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Marks and Spencer Distribution – Derby (Logistics STEM Programme), Loughborough University, Birmingham University, Wolverhampton University, Local Churches, Rainbows, Brownies, Cubs and Scout Groups, Cadet groups, ThinkForward Initiative, Special Educational Needs (SEN) Projects including Welcombe Hills School, Evergreen SEN School and Think Forward, and various schools including Kineton High School, Fenny Crompton Primary School, Knightlow Primary School, The Dassett Primary School, Temple Herdewyke Primary School, Bishop Loveday School, Futures Institute Banbury, Warwick School, Eastern Green

I am Rick Jennings, an Independent Silver Consultant based in South Yorkshire. With over 20 years’ experience, I offer a wide range of services including accurate valuations for bespoke military centrepieces, sporting trophies and other pieces of silverware that provide organisations with a unique link to their heritage.

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Hollowed-out logistics and false campaign assumptions: The Westheer France 1944

Maj Colin Taylor analyses the lessons learnt from a study of logistic failure, examining the lessons relevant to the modern RLC

Why is this important? The Heer was a ‘reference army’ for Western combined arms manoeuvre during

6 forces have struggled to sustain combined arms manoeuvre in Ukraine, much of the logistic detail operations can only provide some ‘hot debrief’ lessons but must be balanced with historic studies which can provide more comprehensive adversary detail Westheer logistical effectiveness

This study will assess the Westheer

‘The German tendency to underestimate supplies cost them in blood…’1

The German Army in France, the Westheer, was defeated in Normandy during the summer of 1944 for numerous reasons. An often under-stated cause was a failure in German logistic support. That support was based on false pre-campaign assumptions, poor resource allocation, the manner in which the Westheer operated and negative attitudes to logistics. Several authors have suggested that man-for-man, the German soldier was superior in combat to his Allied counterpart.2

would always win.”3 This study will highlight that in maximising combat performance to achieve that tactical superiority on land, the Heer drastically undercut the sustainability of these forces. Common German reasons for defeat suggest their rivals only won due to poor strategic direction from Hitler and an overwhelming Allied numerical superiority in men, air power, naval power, and materiel.

One soldier considered their fate where they: “… confronted an opponent who had ten times as many troops and 150 times the amount of ammunition

Sound planning and innovations in logistics (prefabricated harbours, undersea pipelines, 5 However, their control, undercut their own sustainability and Westheer failed to adequately sustain their forces to the extent that both mobility and combat power suffered, making defeat

in mobility between divisions and the logistic and The study of published German accounts and archive documents will suggest that the Wehrmacht Likewise, German ad hoc ‘crisis’ solutions to counteract that detrimentally affected combat power and further breakthroughs, fractured their army and dispersed which Germany was operating deserves examination

Three key articles, combined with the study of primary accounts and archive documents, frame this examination of German logistic performance

8 Wehrmacht Versorgungstruppen unload ammunition from wagons at an ammunition dump in France before the invasion

8 A group of Wehrmacht logisticians and one of their vehicles. Such vehicles and men were vital in sustaining German forces in Normandy as part of the Westheer transport pool

poorly equipped, and largely immobile, the Westheer 7

Likewise, Richard DiNardo‘s study of the German ‘Mechanised Juggernaut’ highlights that, even in Westheer relied on horse power over Third, Keith Grint’s work covered the Grint likened the Allies and Germans to the ‘fox’ and The Allied ‘fox’ knew and focused effort to resolve these largely logistical issues and weaknesses; Grint considers this a ‘asset model’ that focussed maximum effort into its approach, ‘cultivated a cult of combat rooted in 10

that could be solved by good management and

11 Grint would consider German logistics complex, seemingly insoluble and required leadership,

respond to an invasion would need duplication of effort, stockpiles and supply structures around the

Seine, lateral movement between them would be

underinvestment in the German Navy (Kriegsmarine) and Luftwaffe meant the Germans were relying on

Strategic situation

The Westheer in Normandy faced systemic strategic supply chain weaknesses; though some constraints were enduring, many were in the gift of German

Despite being engaged in a war for national survival, German industrial output increased steadily until it

12 Losses of territory reduced supplies of natural oil, rubber and other raw materials, which limited German strategic strategic situation and created greater competition

However, the strategic situation, though grave in the long term, was only one of several aspects that

France had been a strategic backwater for many years and had become a theatre for formations depleted on the Russian Front to reorganise and progressed, the task was immense, with defences required for the hundreds of miles from Denmark urgency and preparation for defending France and building up effective residential forces or logistic

Westheer did not have an agreed

factors affecting this; the potential site of the invasion site was problematic in that any logistic planning to

How the Westheer planned to respond to an originated from Generalfeldmarschall Rommel and Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt, which resulted

was aware the Allies would spare no expenditure of combat resources and logistics to secure a

Writing to General Jodl he stated: “Given the anticipated weight mobile units towards the coast will attract prolonged Such moves would

manoeuvrist war in Russia, expected to lure the Allies

logistical planning and divided the focus that was clear direction, any planning for positioning and developing stockpiles, drafting movement plans

Therefore, logistics provision would need to be both defensive campaign and a longer, highly mobile

Rommel’s anticipated campaign was within German logistic resources , it necessitated vast coastal defensive constructions with an enormous

8 A German ammunition dump set out in stacks for different natures

pipeline, despite Allied air interdiction attempts to choke it, would give the Westheer plenty of options

Sustaining the Westheer - German logistic decisions

Any campaign plan is founded on logistic assumptions which must be based on sound Westheer estimated that without the French railroads they defeat an invasion, or more than eight times the then capacity of the French rail system and the existence of canal supply routes, however, convinced the Germans that they could resupply their forces by rail

8 Air interdiction - An RAF aircraft strafes a German transport column. Point 1 shows bomb explosions and 2 German horse-drawn wagons. Such attacks were a major problem for the German forces moving to Normandy

divisions had only two weeks’ ammunition and 15 Without good supply lines to Normandy, the Westheer would drastically deteriorate in mobility and combat power if they

Whether the Germans had a logistical advantage to waste in Normandy relies on a brief study of

16 Though strategically the Westheer operated far from Germany, it had many subsidiary bases and intermediate stockpiles in the French interior to rely on to reduce the ‘force’ lost

Alternatively, the Allies had to transport their supplies by sea and could only stockpile supplies Boulding would consider the Westheer to possess Albert Wohlstetter considered the increased

17 The Allied ‘fox’ had worked hard to reduce German ‘hedgehog’s’ occupation of France for four years gave them considerable time to prepare to repel an invasion, but they began their preparations the ‘arbiter of opportunity’ whereby, ‘Logistics helps determine which side will have the most options If the Westheer had developed and

Westheer wider options on how it could conduct the were polar opposites, the Westheer

Westheer would rely on logistic planners providing a steady stream of supplies and reinforcements to

days of the invasion, bombers had destroyed the majority of Seine and Loire rail bridges leading into Paris destroyed, this railway assumption was quickly essentially pulled the Westheer’s railheads further into the French interior which elongated supply lines reinforcing the strategic motor transport reserve to create logistic redundancy, it had been plundered to reliance on MT supply columns increased fuel consumption with German convoys consuming 20

Though Allied air superiority contributed to their 21 The effectiveness of air power was overblown by the Allies and was exaggerated by the Wehrmacht 22 to the Panzer-Lehr-Division getting to Normandy Zetterling considered that the effects on combat power from Attacks on German forces did degrade them, but attacks on railways and infrastructure had a far greater overall en route

and constrained logistics either directly (air attacks destroying bridges) or indirectly (German vehicles 25 Air attacks on the rail system increased Clausewitzian friction, degraded logistic support and forced supplies and

Getting the two-tier Westheer to Normandy

invested in, the Waffen-SS and Heer panzer divisions which made them highly mobile and potent motorised 26 This was at the expense of wider 27 for these divisions were of limited use to provide

Panzer-Lehr-Division Even

Panzer-GrenadierDivision

panzer-grenadier-regiment Getting these motorised divisions to Normandy quickly would be vital, but they

Fuel trains were backlogged when fuel was stockpiles in Brittany and elsewhere, the problem

Fuel tankers were in short supply supplies entering Normandy meant that stockpiles Westheer Seventh Army had under a day of fuel stockpiled and Far from amassing reserves and logistic stockpiles faster than their Westheer, through a lack of transport redundancy,

a protracted defence in the west if unprecedented levels of supplies could be delivered from the Reich to

There were immediate effects of the logistic

to SS-Brigadeführer ‘Panzer interrogator referring to his 7 June counterattack, SS-Panzer-Division] had made every effort they were unable to operate freely owing to the complete lack of petrol and a certain Generalmajor Feuchtinger of Panzer-Division claimed that this failure, though blamed on fuel, was actually down to the strong

SS-Panzer-Division was unprepared logistically and Panzer-Division

Several panzer divisions got to Normandy relatively quickly and were soon sucked into intense attritional

infantry divisions were urgently needed to relieve the

According to one German panzer general, the Westheer

According to DiNardo, the Wehrmacht was a

The Germans had

Consequently, ‘The German Army’s lifeblood was as a mechanised juggernaut was skewed by Allied and scholarship, a Tiger tank is seen as a more further problems for the Westheer Forage and

According to DiNardo, once at the battlefront, and conditions were static, horsed wagons were not a However, once mobile operations resumed after Operation COBRA, outpaced when moving and supplying divisions over greater proportion of horsed support, and reduced The preponderance in mechanisation by the Allies also highlighted the disparity in support delivered to the Westheer capture, one German soldier recalled: “…we found it

Some infantry divisions were fortunate in having Divisional ammunition stocks could largely not be held on wheels and times longer by rail than by road due to damage

delays, the footslogging infantry had one option, to the glee of Allied intelligence analysts, “Shortage either of transport or of the means to propel it… has

8 Interdiction of German lines of communication – map from May 1944 showing Allied air attacks (green dots) and resistance sabotage (red dots) against infrastructure in France and Belgium

8 A modern re-enactor dressed as a Waffen SS infantryman. He is armed with a belt-fed MG-42 with several extra boxes of ammunition as well as having a secondary weapon and hand grenades within easy reach. For antitank defence he has a Panzerfaust disposable anti-tank launcher

Image: author's collection

8 A section of Waffen SS Versorgungstruppen standing smartly to attention on parade next to their supply lorries

come in of units trudging on foot all the 250 miles

heavy equipment and logistics, meant that infantry

captured American plans showing the securing of Cherbourg were not acted upon because “…further divisions… could not be got to the scene of operations Westheer, getting troops to Normandy was hard enough without

Logistic self-help

and railway troops were redeployed to protect and and late in June the situation improved marginally as Westheer to amass a

were made to further comb out vehicles for convoy They could not be found; the German state was already short and they had been consciously supplies along the Seine or along the Atlantic coast from Brittany to support forces in Normandy; this positive measures affected combat power; one SS

Another measure to solve the operational logistic situation was for German divisional supply columns to travel back long distances to collect their own According to two tactical sources, ammunition and fuel had to come all the way from Return supply loops

50 Demands for fuel

51 The predominantly distribute supplies forward amongst their echelons and units, not reach back to distant

tactical distribution of supplies and the logistic likewise described his division living off the land for 52

disparate system disadvantaged infantry divisions who had fewer trucks, relied on horses and had

columns were unable to concurrently build stockpiles or distribute supplies forward to support mobile Westheer‘s logistic weaknesses gave it few freedoms or options for launching or sustaining a counteroffensive, even if suitable reserves could be

How the Westheer fought in Normandy exacerbated these logistic burdens and further affected that the division is the formation at which combined equipped panzer divisions, they largely chose to forego the tactical and logistical advantages of Kampfgruppen (battlegroups) was a tactical expedient either to

However, often such expediency came at the cost panzer divisions were committed piecemeal to the invasion front in order of arrival rather than regimental groups, detached from divisions elsewhere These measures to plug leaks, though expedient, disregarded the cohesive power of a collectively Generalfeldmarschall Gunther von Kluge replaced Rommel; von Kluge was, “…an expert at breaking Greater numbers of detached and attached units created a logistical nightmare as supply staff had to source unfamiliar ammunition or spares and divisional logistic arrangements had to be Westheer was similarly pragmatic in allocating available supplies to threatened sectors; had both an opportunity cost and failed to resolve forced German logisticians to prioritise their limited supplies of fuel to the Caen area, leaving a corps of It was easier to resupply Panzer-Gruppe-West around

Image: author's collection

Westheer

focus on a decisive counterstroke and, by failing to effectively sustain its forces, when opportunities appeared (the counterattack at Mortain), their forces

Hollowed-out logistics and ‘teeth versus tail’ relations According to Grint, the British worked on about nine supporting personnel per combat soldier; the Westheer

“…the German cult of combat threw huge numbers 55

56 These Heer, rear areas were Hilfswilliger or ‘Hiwis’

questioned the dedication of these volunteers where, “those [Hiwis] employed by Grenadier-Regiment 988 appear to have been at pains to cause their masters as much inconvenience as possible… Russian drivers and fatigue men consistently drove the wrong way, delivered the ammunition to the wrong units, perpetually got lost…”57 This dilution of dedicated Westheer logisticians demonstrates a false economy

differences between ‘base rats’ and Frontschwein materiel must be rigorously prioritised, rationed

At all levels within the Heer there were negative attitudes towards logistics and upper echelons, logistic experience was not highly

Likewise, Mark Mazower considered, ‘the German military caste downplayed the importance of logistics… in The same was

PanzerLehr-Division described the remaining HQ staff and dismissed or derided almost all supporting personnel as being either conceited, disagreeable, unimportant, bureaucratic or otherwise highlighted their negative traits; ‘…closed both eyes whilst looting was going 60

61 German soldiers’ memoirs and biographies, especially from the Eastern Front, are riddled with a deep resentment towards

a literary cliché that exaggerates the dedication suggests a military culture with a wide gulf between Striebritz, an Ostfront veteran, whose brother was Ultimately, the Heer devalued logisticians and there was likely a corresponding disconnect between operational and

the unravelling logistic situation where: “Important

has succeeded in paralysing the supplies for the front conditions from the Eastern Front!”65

Another soldier recalled: “On 16 July…we only had

66

SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division had no Panzerfaust

67

resulted in German forces having to adapt infantry Consequently, anxiety grew in the German High Command regarding logistic issues where it was believed that: “Such a strategy can only lead to the slow but sure destruction of the forces, … the material supplies arriving in almost all areas are utterly inadequate… the burden of defending falls upon the will of the brave troops…” A ‘Hedgehog’ mentality placed too heavy a demand on those German and exploited with propaganda, “… the Americans read, ‘Attacked from the front, Cut off from behind,

8 A German horsedrawn column destroyed in the Falaise Pocket. Horse power was adequate for supporting infantry divisions when operating in relatively static defences in Normandy

would sooner see supplies captured than issued

62 One author even recalled

8 A map showing ‘the Chase’ the area between Falaise and the Seine. No diagram better demonstrates the extent of the defeat of the Westheer; each black rectangle represents a destroyed or abandoned German tank; each dot, a German truck

70 The unsustainable German logistic situation, combined with multiple Allied breakthroughs, resulted in the German encirclement

is amply shown in maps of equipment abandoned 71

Conclusion

In summary, if the Germans were better soldiers, tactically, they did not adequately logistically support both quantitatively and qualitatively, reduced the

materiel to supply an army for static defence, let alone being the arbiter of opportunity, the worsening German logistical situation culminated with the Westheer having few credible operational options

Overwhelming Allied logistics did not win the day Westheer had an unclear campaign plan and failed to prepare the theatre or prioritise resources; underestimated Allied air power; falsely relied on rail

Potentially, some of the systemic logistic weaknesses experienced in Normandy could, to a degree, have been mitigated by the Westheer which would have

This study has shown that the Westheer ‘asset’ model was myopically focussed on combat effectiveness to the detriment of sustaining the

away from logistic support critically undermined the Westheer won many tactical victories, it failed to solve underlying the campaign, logistic and operational staff wrongly diagnosed ‘wicked’ logistical problems as ‘critical’ ‘critical’ logistical problems whilst ‘in contact’ were too

The excessive focus on tactical success of the Westheer ‘asset’ model was a distraction from a

teeth meant that the Westheer compounded the mistake of hollowing out its logistic tail by diluting it teeth arms that marginalised and undervalued logisticians, combined with strained supplies, deepened the already antagonistic relationships between teeth and tail Some behaviour could be uncharitably termed,

‘won badly,’ forcing the numerically weaker but spirited Ukrainian forces back slowly and steadily in however, the Russian forces showed a lack of logistic expertise and seemingly ran out of supplies and

‘reference army’ to operate so far outside its logistic Heer

must avoid similar reputational damage by carefully electric vehicles and automation are all technological ‘hedgehog’ or a ‘fox’ to maintain competitiveness? Should it focus on existing core capabilities, adopting endeavour to harness every new technology and whereby The RLC both maintains core strengths

Bibliography Theory

Maintenance in the Field, Volume II: 1943-1945

Clay, Catrine, (2010) Trautmann’s Journey, Yellow Jersey

Decision in Normandy, Konecky & Mechanised Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? Horses and the German Army of World War II

A Genius for War: The German Army and Staff, 1807–1945

Eckhertz, Holger (2006) D-Day Through German Eyes, DTZ

Victory in the West, Volume I, HM Stationers, Allied Fighter-Bombers. Journal of

facing the Westheer

Like the German assumptions concerning railways, presumptions concerning contractors could rapidly 72

The same is potentially true with the Integrated Review, placing Reserve Regiments in enabling key ensuring logistic redundancy in terms of both logistic units and provision of abundant materiel stockpiles that the Westheer

considered synonymous – posing critical questions over the commercial imperative to ‘optimise resources’ against building in resilience through selective reserve contact battle, it could be argued that a force has a and agility by purposefully designing in resilience, as opposed to continuing to pursue the favoured

In any future war, the British Army will plan for likelihood that any operation may require periods of Ukraine has shown that this is increasingly possible; a combination of both combat power and ‘staying bulk and reserves in supply, transport and logistic 2021 Integrated Review require reassessment, having been made before the Russians invaded Ukraine and before equipment in the Defence Inventory was ensure suitable contingency war stocks are created This article, if it does nothing else, highlights the

The Hedgehog and the Fox: Leadership lessons from D-Day, Panzer Leader, Michael Joseph,

Hargreaves, Richard (2006) Normandy, Death Reaped a Terrible Harvest

Feeding Mars, The Role of Logistics in the German Defeat in Normandy

Overlord, D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944

Isby, David (ed) (2001) Fighting in Normandy: The German Army From D-Day to Villers-Bocage. Greenhill Books,

Fighting the Breakout: The German Army in Normandy from ‘COBRA’ to the Falaise Gap.

Kane, Thomas (2001) Military Logistics and Strategic Performance, Die Entscheidung: Invasion 1944, Mazower, Hitler’s Empire Through Hell for Hitler, Guild Grenadiers

Pimlott, Dr John (ed) (2015) Rommel in his own Words, The Western Front 1944, Memoirs of a Pluto, Shanklin Chine, Review of Mechanized Juggernaut, Panzer Lehr Division 194445

Striebritz, Rudi (2001) Pawn of War, Temple House, Trigg, Jonathan (2020) D-Day Through German Eyes, Illusions of Distance, Foreign Zetterling, Niklas (2000) Normandy, 1944, Fedorowicz,

Endnotes

1

The Western Front 1944, Memoirs of

2 A Genius for War: The German Army and

Staff, 1807–1945

Overlord, D-Day and the Battle for Normandy

1944

The Hedgehog and the Fox: Leadership lessons from D-Day,

Voices from the Third Reich, an Oral History

5

MULBERRY Harbours lacked resilience and PLUTO was too Pluto, Maintenance in the Field, Volume II: 19431945

6‘In this century, only Germany endeavoured to make every

Why the German Example?, Marine

7 eeding Mars, The Role of Logistics in the German Defeat in Normandy

Mechanised Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? Horses and the German Army of World War II, Op cit

10Op cit

11This belies the complexity of prefabricated ports, pipelines

Victory in the West, Volume I, HMSO, Pimlott, John (ed) (2015) Rommel in his own Words, Amber

15Op cit

16

Theory

17 Illusions of Distance, Foreign

Kane, Thomas (2001) Military Logistics and Strategic Performance, Op cit

22During the Mortain counterattack the RAF and USAAF claimed 252 tanks destroyed; the Germans lost nine to Allied Fighter-Bombers.

Zetterling, Niklas (2000) Normandy, 1944, Fedorowicz,

25Op cit

26Generally only one panzergrenadier battalion per

27

Why the German Example?, Marine Panzer-Lehr-Division Op

Op cit

Generalleutnant Bayerlein in Op cit Op cit

Juggernaut

Review of Mechanized

Eckhertz, Holger (2006) D-Day Through German Eyes, DTZ

Panzer Leader, Michael Joseph,

Trigg, Jonathan (2020) D-Day Through German Eyes, Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, Penguin, London, 60Hauptmann Hartdegen interrogation report, 11 August

61

62Clay, Catrine, (2010) Trautmann’s Journey, Yellow Jersey

Through Hell for Hitler

Op cit

Streibritz described his brother’s role as a safe one; ‘…he

Such a position was considered a life insurance in those Pawn of War, Temple House,

65 Die Entscheidung: Invasion

1944, 66Op cit

67

Panzer Lehr Division 1944-45, Hellion,

(2006) Normandy, Death Reaped a Terrible Harvest, Pen &

Decision in Normandy, Konecky & 72The author has recent experience of the dedication of military contractors and the value they add on operations in their employment which uniformed UK Force Elements are

National Archives Open Government Licence or are Crown

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To what extent were superior logistics a critical

factor

at the Battles of El Alamein in 19421?

In this article, Maj Sam Foster conducts a comparative evaluation of Allied and Axis logistic

‘The importance of sustainment and the part it plays in delivering military success cannot be overstated. At the strategic level, wars are often won through supply chain supremacy; at the operational and tactical level, military operations are only possible 2. Army Doctrine Publication - Land Operations Part 6.

Context

The Battle of El Alamein was a series of three distinct engagements which took place on Egypt’s the Italian and German Axis forces of The Afrika th and Commonwealth forces successfully halted the (the Desert Fox) and then transitioned from defensive with the Soviet Operation URANUS at Stalingrad, meant that Germany found itself on the back foot, a position from which it was unable to recover and one which led to the eventual defeat of National

materiel, with Montgomery having, according to Ball, “Massive materiel superiority combined with the sure knowledge of Rommel’s inability to improve his own 5

The fragility of the military supply chain in war

During the battles of El Alamein, both the Allied and lines from the home base, be that mainland Europe, was primarily from Italy to Tripoli and Benghazi via the Italian Navy and Merchant Marine, a force already somewhat degraded following the British attack via shipping transiting Cape Horn and into the Red theatre of operations from outside of the contested Mediterranean Sea, utilising routes that were less German held port of Tripoli was close to the British held island of Malta, rendering German resupply more

It is immediately apparent from the extent of Germany controlled the vast majority of European territory and almost all of the land bordering the conditions, the Wehrmacht was unable to resupply its forces in North Africa effectively, especially in ammunition and fuel to maintain an advantage in both personnel and

It is also noteworthy that the Allies, and Britain in particular, had a long history in North Africa and had access to established colonial bases in Sudan, possessions in Libya and Tunisia were less well

was used extensively by US forces landing as part of The success of the Allied campaign was built resupply by rail, road, sea and later using pipelines for

8 Operation Torch landings

Wikimedia Commons (public domain)

th Army to have a more resilient supply network, whereas the Afrika Korps were almost entirely dependent upon the Italian Navy and Merchant Marine to ship supplies to theatre with onward land distribution provided by limited theatre motor transport assets6 of the logistic challenges in North Africa where the Axis land lines of communication were, “out of all proportion to those of the Wehrmacht [even] in 7 This restricted method of logistics, using a single node and single mode was vulnerable to Allied interdiction and the vagaries of

Even with these transhipment losses, according to Creveld, the Axis’ critical logistical problems were a result not of sea interdiction but because of shortfalls in theatre distribution capacity, a challenge the Allies would

Logistics as a limiting factor on combat operations

A key failure of German planning at El Alamein was that of ensuring that deployed combat forces did not of Tripoli (one of the Axis main PODs) had limited was some way short of the 70,000 tonnes of supplies required to sustain the combined Italian and German Creveld believed

In 2012, the British Army disbanded the only regular capability was completely withdrawn from the order of battle with the disbandment of the reserve element in to no experience of rail operating, and the capability is only maintained through third party contracting with the British Army has wittingly reduced supply chain Support10

11 and Future Soldier12 have reduced the size of logistic units

times due to the limited capacity of the North African ports, which not only determined the largest possible number of troops that could be maintained, but also restricted the size of convoys, making the business of escorting them impossibly expensive in terms of

Indeed, Rommel’s request to reinforce the seven divisions under command to ten was granted, despite the fact that only 60,000 tonnes of supplies were being delivered

15 This could be seen as evidence of a lack of logistic foresight and planning at the design phase of operations, or a disregard translated into a tactical defeat, preventing effective manoeuvre warfare for the Afrika Korps and putting

conditions for operational success; it could be argued that the modern British Army is less well structured

degree, this reduction in the spectrum of available potentially be improved by ensuring that each unit Theatre Sustainment Brigade, particularly around Land Regional Hubs and overseas deployments, working relationships between Theatre, Force and Close Support Logistics could be routinely tested opportunity to forward load classes of supply (less to that experienced by the Allies through their

Afrika Korps estimated that the British had a 500:1

16 This inability of the Axis war machine to sustain operations put them at a distinct disadvantage in an environment which leant itself to manoeuvre comparisons emphasise the importance of logistics in operational design, where the victors at El Alamein ensured that the deployed force was able

A lesson for modern campaigning is that this logistic consideration needs to be applied early

Unfortunately, this has not always been the case with of both Operation CABRIT (Poland) and Operation NEWCOMBE (the UK contribution to France in their deployment to the Serval) have very few logisticians attached, with individual augmentees supporting

8 Abandoned Italian supply vessel PIETRO QUERINI sinking off the Kerkenna Islands of Tunisia after being torpedoed by the submarine HMS UNION

8 British troops unloading fuel drums at El-Alamein during the North Africa campaigns, 1942

©

IWM

C 1913, Imperial War Museum

Britannica Encyclopaedia

unlikely to be optimised unless adequately planned and resourcing phases are likely to manifest themselves in pressures on strategic movements, restrictions on theatre distribution or bottlenecks

Other

factors

which supported

Allied success

all troops, “subsisted on an equally unimaginative diet [where] troops began to suffer from vitamin

20 There is evidence to support Collingham’s claims that all troops were subjected to inappropriate rations but the debilitating effects were proportionally greater in the Afrika Korps which were routinely sustained with rations sourced from Italy containing a high fat content (tinned sausages for example were a staple fragile and overburdened Axis supply chain however consigned Rommel’s command to a higher DNBI

supply regime that, although not perfect, improved South Africa, scarce shipping space was given over to a potato seed scheme for growing programs in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Iraq, the Army established special vegetable farms in theatre and composite rations were 21 supply was not available to the Axis who were forced

The effects of an inferior and/or inappropriate rationing regime in challenging operating environments is enduring and DNBI rates remain

The high DNBI rates suffered in the North African

Alamein Attributing the success of El Alamein purely to superior Allied sustainment misrepresents many weight of Allied numbers was also a crucial factor German and Italian tanks 2:1, also retaining a power17

at El

of his personnel per month to DNBI as opposed Bellamy and Llewellyn force protection where, “Rommel had either never learned to effectively employ his medical staff or was uninterested in the medical aspects of manpower to show [Rommel’s] recognition of the commander’s ultimate responsibility for the health and welfare of his troops, and the ability of military medicine to ”

This oversight could be seen as quite separate from the logistic issues faced, although it does add to the compelling evidence of superior Allied logistic offers an illuminating case study which exposes the comparisons and contrasts of Allied and Axis

febrile supply chain, suffered proportionally higher “the price Rommel and all the rest of them were paying 22

Conclusions

The environmental conditions of the North African campaign challenged both the Axis and Allied fought and laboured under the same environmental modal/nodal supply network which provided a higher for Rommel’s failure in North Africa, emphasised in the battles of El Alamein, were administrative therefore stands to reason that the UK needs to invest proportionally into a broad spectrum of its single the battles of El Alamein emphasise the enduring

received versus that which was required, played a

Lessons for contemporary forces

There are a number of lessons directly applicable to modern campaigns that can be gleaned from El Alamein:

6 Planning and resourcing the supply chain enables its selective persistent engagement doctrine,

8 Field Marshal Erwin Rommel with his aides during the desert campaign

© IWM HU 5625, Imperial War Museum

1

planning, supported with credible resources, has the potential to sustain deployed forces across a broad

6

joint doctrine should emphasise the importance of retaining a broad set of logistic skill sets, including

6 More must be made of extant training serials to engage logistic organisations and units and to

Areas for further study

Two areas which are outside of the scope of this paper but worthy of further consideration are; the effect of logistic support in minimising DNBI, and the force multiplying effect of enhanced logistic support

these areas could afford advantages to the deployed force and should be understood in greater detail to

Endnotes

preventing the Axis forces advancing into Egypt, the second

2Army Doctrine Publication Land Operations Part 6:

The Hinge of Fate. The Second World

Martin Kitchen, Rommel’s Desert War; Waging World War II in North Africa 1941-1943, London, Cambridge University

5Simon Ball, Great Battles: Alamein, Oxford, Oxford

6Although the Axis suffered from a lack of theatre distribution capacity, it should be recognised that Rommel’s Panzer forces were proportionally larger than other German armoured

Campaigns 1940-1942: A case Study, Pennsylvania, US

15Allyn Vannoy, North African Campaign: WWII’s Ultimate War of Logistics, Warfare History Network, https://

16

17 US Army, Early North African Campaigns 1940-1942: A case Study, Pennsylvania, US

Preventable Casualties; Rommel’s Flaw, Slim’s Edge,

20Lizzie Collingham, The Taste of War; World War Two and the Battle for Food, London, Allen Lane, Penguin Books,

21

22Robert Citino, ‘Drive to Nowhere: The Myth of the Afrika Korps, 1941-43, The National WWII Museum, New Orleans,

References

Army Doctrine Publication Land Operations Part 6: Sustainment.

Ball, Simon, Great Battles: Alamein, Oxford, Oxford

Preventable Casualties; Rommel’s Flaw, Slim’s Edge,

Churchill, Winston, The Hinge of Fate. The Second World

Robert Citino, ‘Drive to Nowhere: The Myth of the Afrika Korps, 1941-43, The National WWII Museum, New

Collingham, Lizzie, The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food, London, Allen Lane, Penguin

7Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War; Logistics from Wallenstein to Patter,

North African Campaign: WWII’s Ultimate War of Logistics,

10Army Doctrine Publication Land Operations Part 6:

11Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy: Global Britain in a Competitive Age, issued on

12Future Soldier: Transforming the British Army, issued 25

US Army. Early North African

Creveld, Martin Van, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, Cambridge, Second Edition,

Future Soldier: Transforming the British Army, UK Govt, 25

Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy: Global Britain in a Competitive Age, UK Govt,

Kitchen, Martin, Rommel’s Desert War; Waging World War II in North Africa 1941-1943, London, Cambridge

North African Campaign: WWII’s Ultimate War of Logistics,

The Voie Sacrée, Sustaining the French Army during the Battle of Verdun (Feb–Dec 1916)

Maj Andrew Cox describes the logistic operations which sustained the French forces that fought

into the operational and tactical scheme and an analysis of how these logistic operations were conducted draws out similarities to modern logistic procedures

‘la Voie Sacrée’, or ‘Sacred Way’ (Buckingham, 2016, his description (a minor rail route also contributed to sustainment), this operation certainly represented

What is particularly striking to the military logistician is how similar the operation of this route was to

eastern border which straddles both banks of the as a crossing point gave it strategic importance,

setbacks elsewhere, the successful defence of Verdun took on a strong political and psychological aspect

The French began to believe that Verdun represented

its defences had been somewhat neglected in favour

The conventional historiography of the battle states that the German leadership selected Verdun for a major offensive because they wished to draw France into an attritional battle which they could not refuse, which in turn would materially and morally break the

Of all the battles in the Great War, the Battle of Verdun (21 February to 17 December 1916) stands out for its long duration, intensity and sheer cost in lives and materiel. If seen as a single military event, as opposed to a campaign, it remains the longest battle in history (Black, 2011, p.104). The which Alistair Horne provided a list. This included

the development of the ‘creeping barrage’ by the operations on a large scale. Mentioned almost as an afterthought in Horne’s list was that: “an army could be supplied by road transport,” (Horne, 1993, p.336). This understatement refers to the extraordinary logistic operations performed by the French Army on a single road which was known at the time simply as ‘la route’, but would come to be immortalised as

as it progressed, the battle itself took on this aspect into three phases: the initial German assault on an axis following the east bank of the River Meuse (21 both the east and west sides of the river (6 March – 1 offensives which brought the line back to a similar

The Battle of Verdun tends, like the concurrent Battle of the Somme, to be described in terms of were expended by both sides on a mere 15 miles of battle front, which gives an indication of the logistic effort required to sustain such a battle (Black, 2011, portray the character of the battle, which could

8 Map of the Voie Sacrée

be described as a constant motion of offensives and terrain features; all saturated with direct and The results were indescribable conditions and the heaviest of casualty rates for the soldiers on both and moral cost, the French prevailed in this battle of numbers and managed to successfully defend the

When the initial German offensive commenced up of forces in the salient and appointed General Petain to command the 2nd Army and the Verdun

fought through the mass of stragglers, wounded and his advanced years and a serious case of pneumonia, he immediately energised the defence of the sector;

developing a powerful capability for dealing with

saying that the former depended completely on the

Petain was right to be concerned as the Verdun salient had features which made logistic support particularly fraught; the main road and rail routes

To the east they had been cut by the line of battle west they ran close enough to the battle line that any movement could be observed and interdicted remaining road was a minor one which ran 72km

The road was little more than a dirt track and was the settlements along its route and its soft surface

Once the Germans struck, these were the only routes available to build up and sustain the French defence

Although the French military force within the Verdun salient was never stable, it eventually built up to around 500,000 personnel and 170,000 draught requirement for the salient varies according to source but is commonly summarised as 2,000t per day for the Verdun garrison, plus an additional 100t per day for each additional division in the salient (between out of the salient per day and the requirement to evacuate casualties, civilians and critical goods and

Fortunately for Petain, the French were rapidly

L’Armee Francaise’ (SAAF), the motor transport service for the French Army, was in its infancy at the start of the war with only 170 vehicles (Bruce, However, the French maintained a national census of through commandeering and purchase (Heuzé, performing such feats as the famous movement of the 7th Division by bus and taxi during the Battle of

The vehicles and drivers were organised into groups which were allocated to army formations and

process of developing something akin to movements

resourced, improvised in haste and was making up its ways of operating on the march, the SAAF had all the makings of the organisation required to sustain

Richard, to organise this precarious lifeline along with of the route was such that Petain would maintain which aided greatly when inevitably resources were in capacity was needed, as well as strict regulation

impressive 700 vehicles and could also count on the (later nicknamed ‘Le Meusien’), but it was clear that vehicles were scraped together from the 2nd Army as well as from neighbouring formations and the the Voie Sacrée was based in the High School of

8 French trucks transited the Voie Sacrée day and night for 10 months

operating in the region from all units, including 2,000 build up of logistic forces shows the relevance and

Major Richard designed the route as a circuit, christening it a ‘noria’ (waterwheel) system

were a series of parallel roads organised in a The route terminated at the multitude of depot locations clustered to the southwest of Verdun

practiced and tested on such a scale, echo the sort of regulating details that would be used on a Main Supply Route today and were clearly successful; the route rarely ever halted throughout the battle and typically saw the transit of 6,000 vehicles per

The routine workforce of the Voie Sacrée grew to drivers who made this immense military effort possible endured considerable strain in the discharge of their duties but were under no illusions of the

vehicles constantly, day and night, irrespective of appalling weather conditions and sleeping and eating for drivers to fall asleep at the wheel, and eventually

supported by a small but critically important group of recovery mechanics who worked long and hard to recover and repair vehicle casualties; frequently

driving and maintenance were very rare skills at the time of the Great War, which makes the contribution

The route was maintained by a large number of critical, yet largely unsung personnel who became

was done by Gendarmes equipped with coloured

high demand and limited capacity of the vehicles,

was used and built upon to match the challenge of keeping such a large number of vehicles moving on Sacrée was split into six sectors, each of which were were individually responsible for the maintenance and smooth running of their allocated part of the control, policing, route maintenance and

vehicle

Throughout its length, the route was strictly regulated; speeds were limited to 25 km/h for cars and 15 km/h for trucks with headlamps only ambulances were allowed to drive independently or had to be organised by destination into groups of off together in a manner which echoes the way such vehicular groupings are organised into packets and were immediately pushed off the road (Panel, 2006,

unsurfaced road required constant maintenance which was undertaken by a considerable number of labourers; the numbers of which grew as increased

mentioned, worked in all hours and conditions to keep the road viable; shovelling gravel from specially opened local quarries onto the road in the gaps

number and origin of these important contributors

There appears to have been around 10,000 personnel maintaining the route, made up of personnel from

control and engineers as route enablers remain as critical now as it was then, but such considerations are frequently prone to being underplayed when

The vehicles which serviced the route are

technology of motor vehicles at the time was still reaching maturity; the Berliet CBA, the truck that would become most closely associated with the Voie Sacrée, was a relatively sophisticated model for the

8 Convoy of trucks carrying munitions

time, however it still had a cab which was open to the elements which did little to maintain the endurance capacity, a hard ride and little ability to deal with these vehicles and other similar models that carried vehicles were run constantly with little opportunity for routine maintenance, and the sheer number of vehicle variants also meant that there was a lack of spares, plus the poor road, poor weather and driver fatigue,

monumental effort of all the personnel that worked the Voie Sacrée allowed the French to build up the forces they needed and allowed Petain to successfully

of divisions in and out of the battle which was essential to maintaining their endurance (Keegan, the route would have been transited multiple times by every French soldier involved in the battle, it is not surprising that it took on such a legendary status; to this day it is the only road in France honoured with a name instead of a number, and its route is marked

pride and endurance to the defence of Verdun, and

As the operating system of the route settled into A system of signs was developed along the route equipment support areas and unit concentrations in Likewise, the vehicles themselves took on signage: Transport Groups developed simple unit symbols so that their vehicles could be discerned from the

only helped organisation but also developed ethos parallel between this and the squadron symbology used on vehicles for the same reason by The RLC symbols highlights the importance in such operations of recognising the human need for knowing where you are, where you are going and to whom you

With its primary features of marshalling areas, organised convoys, tactical signage, release points Voie Sacrée had most of the features of a modern such a military operation was seriously attempted missing was the equivalent of a convoy support area, and such facilities would no doubt have improved the endurance of the units and prevented

costs likely precluded such facilities, despite the

cost

The route worked in this manner throughout the ten months of the battle, although the pressure was somewhat relieved by the introduction of an

The amount of personnel and materiel that travelled on the route in that time will likely never be known

instrumental to the French defence and the key

This compelled them to build up and maintain a considerable mass of forces by means of a single logistic challenge by obtaining and concentrating an unprecedented mass of motor transport, and then used great ingenuity in organising, controlling, and This operation was maintained at great effort until a

The way in which the operation was run bears striking similarities to modern main supply route operations on roads, from the key ground features

that the Voie Sacrée was run so similarly to motor transport operations in the Second World War, and that the similarities can be seen in the procedures used to this day, proves that this operation has had a

makes for a compelling case study for anyone who

8 A milestone which marks the Voie Sacrée to this day

References:

The Great War and the Making of the Modern World.

Logistics: The Key to Victory. Barnsley: Pen

French Army and the Logistics of Attrition at the Battle of Army History. Verdun 1916.

Revue des Deux Mondes.

Holmes (ed) (2001) The Oxford Companion to Military History.

The Price of Glory.

The Historian

The War Walk. London: Book Club

The Great War.

You are invited to submit an article for publication in the 2024 Review

Since its formation in April 2015, the focus of the RLC Foundation has been to promote professional engagement with industry and academia and share best practice; maintain awareness of innovation and to encourage

As part of this process The RLC Foundation is inviting or in the logistics industry and academia, to contribute thought professional journal of the RLC and is distributed to members of Articles may be written under the following overarching categories:

• Professional Development

• General Interest

Cash prizes

There are cash prizes for the best contribution in each

• Best contribution overall

Army Logistician.

Volume 1: The Western Front. Verdun.

Revue Historique des Armees.

Image references:

Image 1: Author’s Collection based on diagram at Heuzé,

• Best contribution by a private soldier

• Best contribution by a civilian

Rules

Articles must not exceed 5,000 words and must be properly referenced and supported with good quality copyright

All articles submitted for publication will be read and marked

8 The closing date for submissions for the 2024 Review is 16th September 2023.

Entries are open now and submissions should be sent to Marti Jerrard at: therlcfoundation@gmail.com

On 1 June 2023 The Royal Logistic Corps will formally recognise relocation to the historic city of Winchester to coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Corps, with a Freedom of the City Parade and service of Thanksgiving at Winchester Cathedral.

8 Parade and Service of Thanksgiving 500 personnel from across The RLC will conduct a Freedom Parade. They will be joined by RLC and Forming Corps veterans. Following the parade there will be Service of Thanksgiving at Winchester Cathedral. Tickets should be booked via the QR code below.

8 Reception Events

Following the Service of Thanksgiving there will be a VIP reception at the Cathedral and a Regimental Lunch. Free transport will be available to Worthy Down Camp where food and refreshments will be available including an all ranks BBQ and curry lunch for on duty personnel. Further tickets are available below for veterans, families and friends.

8 Open Day and Concert

From 1500hrs a Community Open Day for 3,000 people will highlight the breadth and depth of the talent within The RLC, promoting the aspects of diversity, sport, STEM and sustainability, representative of the modern Army and The RLC. The open day will transition to an open-air concert following a spectacular firework display commencing at 2200hrs. Entrance will be by ticket only (see below). There is no parking on site.

To register to attend the RLC 30 events scan the QR code and select from the menu of options

For updates on the RLC 30 events go to:

www.royallogisticcorps.co.uk

Logistics outside of The Royal Logistic Corpscareer opportunities and how to access them

By Sarah Wilmot DHL Supply Chain

For anyone leaving a military career, or thinking about doing so, moving into civilian working life can feel like a daunting step. I know this because

myself, after an incredibly rewarding 22 years in the Army. I joined at 19 and spent seven years in the Royal Military Police before moving into the Army Welfare Service (AWS), where my role was to provide welfare support to a broad range of Service Personnel and their families. During my career, I

Ireland and across the UK.

come for me to move on to a new chapter and put Military Recruitment at DHL Supply Chain, a role that wouldn’t have said I’d be doing!

In sharing my personal and professional journey as a veteran I hope to show that leaving the Army doesn’t have to feel like an insurmountable task, and that the skills and experience we develop during our time in service are highly valuable and valued by the

Think about your core skills and passions

For anyone thinking about a civilian career it’s important to really dedicate some time to understanding what your core skills and passions are before you start

really drives you, and what is meaningful work to you,

In my case, I knew from my role in the AWS that

understanding of the breadth of the places that people would be coming from in terms of their military backgrounds, and I knew the issues that people faced

In time, I decided that a new role would help me reach more people and the position at DHL felt like the ideal way of combining my experience from the AWS, which incorporated recruitment, with my desire

It may be that you are motivated by solving complex challenges, so a role with a strong analytical component might be for you, or if working with people is your passion then a team leader role could

responsibility for guiding veterans into the most appropriate role for them, so it’s worth asking about

At DHL we provide coaching for CV writing as well as a tailored recruitment process that looks for individual pathways for veterans; matching skills and capabilities with roles and translating the relevance

8 Military veterans often possess highly transferable skills for supply chain roles

life can be incredibly challenging, so shifting your mindset to thinking about the job description rather than the job title, and talking these through with

Of course, everyone leaving the Service has a different experience, but from talking to many veterans I know there are some common struggles

There is no doubt that the transition from really knowing your role and your trade, to suddenly being asked to place yourself within an unfamiliar how to talk about your skills, whether they’ll be fully understood, how to talk about salary expectations or

The most important piece of advice I can give people is to not be afraid to ask questions, or to military there is no need to talk about salaries, or opportunities for career progression, having these conversations is expected in civilian roles, particularly if you’re speaking to a dedicated recruiter or HR questions as they need to feel equipped to make

Look for the support and networks on offer

The veteran networks that I am a part of have been one of the most valuable parts of my transition into civilian life and were a great way for me to build my

While there will be networks of veterans in the area in which you live, many employers are now starting to

Armed Forces Covenant, we offer support that goes above and beyond to help overcome the challenge some Service leavers face when entering civilian scheme and a dedicated group in DHL’s employee app gives colleagues the opportunity to connect with

The Defence Employer Recognition Scheme (ERS) recognises employers in the private sector that support the Armed Forces community, so looking for an organisation that has been awarded by the ERS is a great way to be sure that any potential employer will

Why civilian logistics roles are the perfect home for RLC personnel

Military veterans often possess highly transferable skills for supply chain roles in transport, analytics and leadership, with the unique experience of applying strong academic and practical capabilities, as well as working with a sense purpose, teamwork, loyalty,

Importantly, many Service leavers might worry that a logistics role might not be as purposeful as one in The RLC, but in reality there are just so many last two years our colleagues have been involved in keeping shelves stocked during the pandemic, providing support to the NHS with the Nightingale hospitals, transporting sensitive medical supplies vehicles and driving roles, there is so much more

Life outside of the Army can seem daunting, but I hope to have shown that with belief in the value of the

and seek support where it’s

on offer, as well

as looking out for employers committed to the hiring of veterans,

In fact, the start of your second career can be hugely exciting, with so many opportunities on offer that allow you to build on the skills built in Service or learn

Find out which businesses and local authorities have signed the Armed Forces Covenant: https://

Find out which employers are supporters and award winners of the Defence Employer Recognition

National Uniform Managed Service

An example of just how diverse the opportunities are within the DHL Supply Chain business is the National Uniform Managed Service (NUMS) contract.

DHL’s NUMS solution was launched in 2015 as an end-to-end solution, providing organisations and individuals in the public sector with a consistent and timely supply of uniform and equipment.

DHL is responsible for all aspects of the supply chain, from the procurement of uniform and equipment, to warehousing and logistics, order

processing, returns, recycling and disposal.

Over the past seven years, NUMS has saved its partner forces and 70,000 individual users an average of 18% on their purchases. Piloted with the Metropolitan Police, the service has now broadened to include the Border Force, UK Visas and Immigration and HM police forces nationally.

including time and cost savings for the organisation through economies

convenience for the consumer, as well as having a positive environmental impact by reducing waste.

In the near future, NUMS plans to roll out the service to the wider public sector, and a ‘light’ version of the service is also in development, allowing organisations needing a simpler but still cost-effective bulk order and delivery solution. As more organisations come on board, the greater the potential savings become for all partners, as the combined purchasing power becomes even greater.

Placing the Reservist at the centre of their bi-fold career

How could a digital solution enable greater collaboration between civilian and military employers to better manage and develop the reservist?

By Col ‘Nov’ Nanovo late RLC, (2 OSG RLC and PA

Consulting)

and Lt Jack Mason

“The Reservist is twice the citizen.” Sir Winston Churchill, 1942

Reserves draws upon a wide swathe of society and employ Service Personnel from a diverse range of civilian careers. As the former MP and Reservist Sir Julian Brazier has written, “a Reserve unit offers… access to skills not available in the regulars,”1 and this has to be well understood across the military. This is one of the key strengths of the reservist model, bringing skills and experience to bear in areas that are scarce within the regular force. The MOD’s Reserve Forces Review 2030 framed these providing, “practical skills…the routine exchanges of ideas (and)…access to networks.”2

From linguists to specialist engineers, supply chain analysts and cyber security experts, the civilian backgrounds of our reservists (who now make up that the Armed Forces can draw upon in an evolving understand the breadth of talent represented by the reservist component and then harnessing it for military of managing the military service commitment of reservists alongside the other individual demands on do not fully recognise the skills and experiences of all reservists; and there is scope to do that alongside which promotes the needs of the individual reservist, enables collaboration between employers and spotlights the advantages of civilian skills would help

Mutual awareness of an individual’s needs

Firstly, an increase in the mutual awareness of a reservist’s needs and workload would allow for better management of their welfare and planning of

sharing of information on reservists’ welfare issues and work patterns would enable both civilian employer and reserve unit to be better informed on is perfectly possible for either a civilian employer or reserve unit to be completely unaware of a welfare

Likewise, reserve units are not necessarily aware of when their reservists are most busy during the

platform would help to facilitate communications and allow reservists to forecast their civilian work some reservists will, quite understandably, choose to keep their two forms of employment separate, opportunity now to improve the user experience to meet individual needs capabilities and place the

Collaboration with civilian employers on personal and professional development

collaborating with civilian employers on the personal

‘soft skills’ or technical, and sponsorship of proposed training, could take advantage of both military Leadership training, such as that provided through the Army Leadership Development Programme, improves the capability of an individual to lead and manage teams in both their civilian and military

recognition of these competencies through a digital framework would prevent duplication of effort on training, generating capability faster and saving the MOD and potentially civilian employers time and industry partners, as well as bodies that have successfully deployed reservists with specialist skills such as the logistics and intelligence communities, in

Taking better advantage of civilian skills

Additionally, reserve units could better take advantage of the skills that reservists have developed in their civilian careers and strengthen the Whole Force

through a new digital framework, national resilience

in unearthing niche commercial competencies that are Feedback from an employer could be captured in an

annual appraisal, facilitated perhaps by an app on

Furthermore, professional accreditation could be recognised through this new digital framework, as well as in the military dashboard of competences way in achieving this, formal recognition of these competencies would make them more visible to career and line managers whilst better enabling force generation of new competencies to support Defence, particularly in a quickly evolving security environment where the cyber and tech domains are a measure represents a form of investment in the reservist which has the potential to deliver a joint this approach would engender greater trust in a

• Design an assurance regime which measures the performance of a new digital solution to ensure incremental improvements are recognised and

Conclusion

At a time of likely resource constraint amidst continuing global insecurity, there is a clear imperative for MOD to better exploit the talent of a digital solution, as outlined above, provide a means for the UK's Armed Forces to take best

Embracing innovation in a digital solution

A digitised framework already exists for regular reservist medical professionals where core competences and accreditations are shared between Defence Medical Services and the National Health which to expand its coverage of reservists across other areas of the three Services; start small and

To move forward we see a need for these next steps:

• Establish a clear pathway integrated in the whole force strategy

• Survey employers and reservists to understand their customer experience and the areas for improvements

• Establish the legal, personal and technical

• Motivate the development of a solution through competition, such as ‘Army Innovate’

• Pilot with industry partners, via organisations like interest by Allied nations in a similar digital solution

This will become all the more essential as the Regulars and Reserves become more integrated, in line with the Whole Force Concept and emergence of more hybrid units such as 2 and 6 Military Intelligence digital approach to reservist career management in order to better meet individuals’ needs, develop and share talent, and contribute to a stronger network for

8 This article will also feature in the Intelligence Corps ‘Rose & Laurel’

Endnotes

1 ‘A Strong Army Reserve Requires Senior Representation’, RUSI, 5 January 2022; available at A Strong Army Reserve Requires Senior Representation | Royal United

2Ministry of Defence, ‘Reserve Forces review 2030 –Unlocking the reserves’ potential to strengthen a resilient and global Britain’, Chapter 5, May 2022; available at MoD:

8 Members of 156 Regt work in a PPE distribution hub during COVID-19

8 Reservists from 151 Regt RLC transhipping NHS supplies, Operation RESCRIPT

Images: RHQ The RLC archive. Crown Copyright

AASR Air Assault Support Regiment

AATF Air Assault Task Force

AFM Army Field Manual

AFORGEN Army Force Generation

APCs Armoured Personnel Carriers

APOD Air Port of Departure

AT Ammunition Technician

BEF British Expeditionary Force

C-IED

CEG

CES Complete Equipment Schedule

CFA Commander Field Army

CGS Chief of the General Staff

CPD Continuous Professional Development

CRP Crisis Response Planning

CSS Combat Service Support

CSUPs Combat Supplies

DCDC Developments Concepts and Doctrine Centre

DEMS Defence Explosive Munitions School

DHL Deutsche Handlung Logistik

DSCOM Defence Supply Chain Operations and Movements

EBO Effects Based Operations

ESG Environmental Social and Corporate Governance

EUFOR European Force

FOBs Forward Operating Bases

FOE Future Operating Environment

FRT Forward Repair Team

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GLOC Ground Line of Communication

GRU Russian military intelligence

HADR Humanitarian and Disaster Relief

HQ Headquarters

IFOR Implementation Force

IR Integrated Review

ISO International Standards Organisation

JAMC Joint Air Mounting Centre

JMC Joint Helicopter Command

JNCO

JSP Joint Service Publication

JTF Joint Task Force

KFOR Kosovo Force

LCU Landing Craft Utility

LFP Logistic Focal Point

LTNA

MACA Military Aid to the Civil Authorities

MBA Master in Business Administration (postgraduate degree)

MOD Ministry of Defence

MSc

MSR Main Supply Route

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NHS National Health Service

NSE National Support Unit

NT Non Taskworthy

Op BANNER

Op CATAN Support to the African Union Mission Somalia (AMISOM)

Op GRITROCK UK Operation to eradicate Ebola in

Op HERRICK

Op MANTA

Op PITTING UK operation to repatriate Afghan nationals 2021

Op RESCRIPT

Op SERVAL

Op STONESMITH Operation to provide humanitarian aid to Ukraine

Op TELIC

Op TEMPERER Government plan to deploy troops in support of the police

Op TOSCA UN Peace Keeping Force Cyprus

OPCOM Operational Command

ORP Operational Ration Pack

PDT

PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters

PLMs Protected Logistic Movements

PPE Personal Protective Equipment

PTG Port Task Group

QOGLR Queen's Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment

RA Royal Artillery

RAMC Royal Army Medical Corps

RAOC Royal Army Ordnance Corps

RASC Royal Army Service Corps

RCDS Royal College of Defence Studies

RCT Royal Corps of Transport

RDC Regional Distribution Centre

RE Royal Engineers

REME Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

RFA Royal Fleet Auxhillary

ROG Rear Operations Group

RUSI Royal United Services Institute

SAC American Strategic Air Command

SAMS US School of Advanced Military Sudies

SAT Senior Ammunition Technician

SC Supply Chain

SJC(UK) Standing Joint Command (UK)

SME Subject Matter Expert

SOF Special Operations Force

SPOD Sea Port of Departure

SRR

STEM Science Technology Engineering Mathematics

TACOS Terms and Conditions of Service

TES Theatre Entry Standards

TLG Theatre Logistic Group

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force

VSS Vehicle Supply Specialist

WFC Whole Force Concept

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

WW1

WW2

LOOKING FOR YOUR NEXT CAREER?

GROW WITH US

At DHL, we’re committed to seeking out the right person for the right position. We’re dedicated to developing your professional skills and abilities. We are proud to have a long history of employing service leavers and veterans. We believe the skills and specializations you have developed in the Forces are what set you apart. Your unique abilities set you up for an exciting and ambitious career at DHL.

Check out our ‘Armed Forces Community’ page through the QR code to see available job opportunities, set up job alerts for future career interests, and to read veterans’ stories and experiences of applying to and working for DHL.

When you’re ready, we’re excited to be a part of your next step.

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