RLC The Review 2019

Review The Royal Logistic Corps Foundation

2019-2020

Bringing together logistics professionals from industry, the Army and academia

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THE REVIEW 2019-2020

Introduction A very warm welcome to the 2019/20 RLC Foundation Review.

This Review not only sees The RLC enter its 26th year since formation, but also the 75th anniversary of D-Day, Arnhem and, starting in December 1944, the Battle of the Bulge. For logisticians there is a golden thread connecting these anniversaries – ultimately, even with technological innovation, the tenets of logistics remain largely the same.

These tenets can be found in many of this Review’s articles which span from selected ancient distribution challenges, to the superb efforts currently being demonstrated by members of the Corps on operations in Sudan today.

I am delighted that this 2019-20 Review demonstrates both an expanding contributor base - from officers, soldiers to industry partners - and an increased breadth and depth of subject matter. This is an appropriate reflection of the evolution of The RLC into a broad-based organisation, with multiple military and commercial touch points and a substantial and growing, experience base.

After more than two and a half decades of publication, I believe the Review has surpassed its original focus to, ‘Improve the staff writing of captains and majors’. The reason for this evolution is twofold; the broader contributor base has successfully delivered a rich mix of experiences from both officers and soldiers from which we can all learn and, our RLC Foundation partners have given us an insight into the commercial/industrial sector with which Defence is increasingly integrated. In some small measure, I believe this Review supports our aspiration to ensure The RLC remains at the forefront of military logistics thinking and doing.

It is undeniable that we live in an increasingly complex and unpredictable world. The stability of the international system, which the UK has supported since the end of WW2 is being continually challenged. The growth of the fastest developing nations now has a profound effect on global markets and the assumptions underpinning historic alliances are also being challenged. It is within this complex and Security: This Review contains official information. It should be treated with discretion by the recipient. © Crown Copyright: All material in this Review is Crown Copyright and may not be reproduced without the permission of the Regimental Association of The Royal Logistic Corps. © Cartoons are copyright.

Disclaimer: No responsibility for the quality of the goods or services advertised in this Journal can be accepted by the publishers or their agents. Advertisements are included in good faith. The contents of this Journal and views of individual authors or units does not necessarily reflect the policy and views, official or otherwise, of the Corps or Ministry of Defence.

Data Privacy: We distribute The Review using mailing data held in a secure contacts database within RHQ The RLC. Your inclusion on this database is by virtue of the fact you are serving in the military, or you are a current member of the RLC or Forming

dynamic environment that The RLC and our industry partners must be able to design, plan and operate. We know that failure on operations is not an option; some of the articles in this edition amply demonstrate there are no second chances to get it right. Under these challenging conditions, the relevance of The RLC Foundation is key, as we promote professional excellence through training and education across all ranks, while simultaneously blending our skills and experience with the very best ideas from our industry partners. The broader context of rapid technological development plus budgetary constraints reinforces why this military-civilian logistics relationship is so important and again, many of the articles in this Review reflect this.

The RLC remains largely reliant on the quality of its people and, encouragingly, the range and depth of articles in this edition of the Review reflects the talent we have, as they encompass the myriad logistic functions that the Corps is asked to perform. They also provide strong evidence that MGL’s strategy to encourage an outward-looking Corps is working. I congratulate the authors who have won an award for their article, but also thank everyone who has contributed.

Each author, in their own way, has helped create a record of RLC thinking at a moment in time.

Enjoy the articles; I hope they will encourage more members to contribute in the near future.

Major General (Retired) DJ Shouesmith Chairman of the RLC Foundation Corps Associations. The RLC Foundation only uses your personal data for the purpose of sending you the magazine. The mailing data is treated in the strictest confidence, is password protected, is only shared with our printer and is deleted after each use. If any serving RLC personnel have concerns with regards to the storage and use of their personal data they should contact RHQ The RLC's Data Protection Officer is Maj Carnegie-Brown. Email: Alistair.Carnegie-Brown100@mod.gov.uk Members of the Associations should contact RHQ The RLC's Personal Information Risk Manager. Email: RLC RHQ-RegtSec-SO2-Asst@mod.gov.uk Cover photographs are from The Sustainer magazine Editor: Mr Peter Shakespeare Assistant Editor: Miss Anne-Marie Causer BA (Hons) Graphic Design: David Blake Printed by: Holbrooks Printers Ltd.

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Contents General Interest 7: Can women be good leaders? - Capt G Cole 11: Do liberal principles justify British interventions under conditions such as those encountered in Libya?

- Lt A Baldwin 14: Technological advances in economics, industry and transport: Implications for The RLC - Lt J Martin 19: Are we the baddies? A critique of Britain’s relationship with Saudi Arabia. - Lt B Ryde 24: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is there a solution? Lt J Turner 30: Discuss the relevance of NATO today as a deterrent against potential aggressors, particularly Russia. Lt A Wilkins 34: Are unmanned vehicles a viable concept for logistics and if so, in which timeframe could this capability be integrated into the Field Army? - Lt B Wray

Professional Development 40: The development of British Army core values and leadership through Nordic Skiing. - LCpl D Ryan 43: Should we be more focused on physical training rather than physical assessments? - Lt T Gardner 46: The best of both worlds? - WO2 A Eke

History 51: What role did the US play in the European theatre of the Second World War? - Lt A Johnson 57: Were the strategic aims of Operation MARKET GARDEN realistic, given the constraints on Allied logistics in the autumn of 1944? - Lt R Abernethy 63: Supply over Speed: The importance of logistics in the Afrika Korps’ North African Campaign of 1940-1943.

- Lt A Gale

69: (Best Essay Winner) Expeditionary Logistics in Antiquity or… What have the Romans ever done for the JEF LB? - Lt A Rootes 77: To what extent was Napoleon’s march on Russia doomed to fail from the beginning? Lt A Phenix-Norman 82: Lessons from British Commonwealth rear operations during the invasion of Sicily (9 July – 17 August 1943). - Maj AA Cox 88: British logistic challenges during campaigning in North Persia and the Caucasus 1918-19. - Maj C Taylor 95: 905 Company R.A.S.C. – World War Two History. Mr S Lane

Operations & Training 103: From the Punjab to the top of the world: The role and development of Pakistan military logistics from 1947 to the present day. - Capt B Parsons 111: ARRC Support Battalion on Exercise RATTLESNAKE (USA). - Capt H Suff 116: Operation AGILA and the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia - Lessons for the training of The Royal Logistic Corps Troop Commanders. - Capt S Brodie 120: In the context of STRIKE, using examples from other national forces, discuss the merits of forming CSS Regiments. - Lt E Scott 126: Lessons in STRIKE sustainment from the South African Border War 1980-89. - Lt G Kaar 133: Rum Doodle logistics: Lessons from the exploratory era of Himalayan mountaineering. - Lt S Smith 139: Logistics and rebasing - The Defence Estates Optimisation Programme. - Maj C Taylor 144: How the Operating Environment Influences Styles of Leadership. - Lt B Tysoe 146: (Engineer and Logistic Staff Corps article) Supporting the world‘s newest country, The British Army in South Sudan. - Col G Sullivan OBE 148: A G4 Practitioner’s View of Operation TANGHAM. WO2 A Blissett

Review Prize Winners – 2019-2020 Best Contributions Best Article – 2Lt Alex Rootes Joint Runner – Up – Lt George Kaar Joint Runner – Up – Lt Benjamin Ryde Best contribution by an Officer – 2Lt Alex Rootes Best contribution by a Warrant Officer or SNCO – WO2 Antony Blissett Best contribution by a Junior NCO – LCpl Darci Ryan Best contribution by a Private soldier – No entries received General Interest Best Article – Lt Benjamin Ryde Runner-Up – Lt Alexander Wilkins

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Professional Development The REVIEW assessment panel decided that no article was worthy of a prize.

History Best Article – 2Lt Alex Rootes Runner-Up – Maj Andrew Cox Operations and Training Best Article – Lt George Kaar Joint Runner-Up – Capt Scott Brodie Joint Runner-Up – Lt Simon Smith

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Abbreviations 1 RGR A-CJEF A1 Echelon A2 Echelon AASR AATF AFM AFORGEN AFT AinU APB APCs APOD AQIM ARRC AT BATUS BHC BRITFOR CADMID CAEC C-IED CC CCWG CEG CES CFA CILT CMO CO COA Comd CommZ COMZ COPD CPD CPOE CRP CSO CSS CSSRs CSUPs DCLPA DCOS DEC DEFRA

1 Royal Gurkha Regiment Airborne Combined Joint Expeditionary Force Squadron/Battery or Company Support Vehicles Regimental or Battalion Support Vehicles Air Assault Support Regiment Air Assault Task Force Army Field Manual Army Force Generation Annual Fitness Test Articles in Use Ammunition Processing Building Armoured Personnel Carriers Air Port of Departure Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Ammunition Technician British Army Training Unit Suffield (Canada) Bosnia & Herzegovina Command British Force Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacture, In-Service and Supply Committee on Arms Export Controls Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Commissioning Course Cold Chain Working Group Career Employment Group [colloquially - Trade] Complete Equipment Schedule Commander Field Army Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport Contract Management Organisation Commanding Officer [E4] Course of Action Commander [E5 and above] Communication Zone Communications Zone Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive Continuous Professional Development Comprehensive Preparation of the Operating Environment Crisis Response Planning Contractor Support to Operations Combat Service Support Combat Service Support Regiments Combat Supplies Defence College of Logistics, Policing and Administration Deputy Chief of Staff Defence Estates Optimisation Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

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DEMS DHL DROPS DSCOM EBO ECHR ELC ERHF EUFOR F Echelon FMEA FOBs FOC FRT FTC GDP GLOC HADR HET HMMWV HQ ICBM IFOR IR ISAF ISO JADTEU JLTV JEF LB JMC JNCO JOFS JSP JTF KFOR LFP LSR LTNA LW(AP)RC MHE MIV MLET MOD MSc MSP NAC NAO NASA NATO NCOs NEM

Defence Explosive Munitions School Deutsche Handlung Logistik Demountable Rack Offload and Pickup Systems Defence Supply Chain Operations and Movements Effects Based Operations European Convention on Human Rights Enhanced Learning Credits Equipment Redeployment Hub Forward European Force Fighting Echelon Failure Mode Effect Analysis Forward Operating Bases Full Operating Capability Forward Repair Team Forces Troop Command Gross Domestic Product Ground Line of Communication Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Heavy Equipment Transporter High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle Headquarters Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile Implementation Force International Relations International Security Assistance Force International Standards Organisation Joint Air Delivery Test & Evaluation Unit Joint Light Tactical Vehicles Joint Expeditionary Force Light Brigade Joint Helicopter Command Junior Non Commissioned Officer Joint Operations Fuel Systems Joint Service Publication Joint Task Force Kosovo Force Logistic Focal point Logistic Support Regiment Long-Term Non Attender Lightweight (Air Portable) Recovery Capability Materiel Handling Equipment Mechanised Infantry Vehicle Modified Light Equipment Transporter Ministry of Defence Master of Science - Degree Qualification Medium Stress Platform National Aeronatical Centre National Audit Office National Aeronautics and Space Administration North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non Commissioned Officers New Employment Model THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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NORAD

North American Aerospace Defence Command NSE National Support Unit NSN NATO Stock Number NT Non Taskworthy OC Officer Commanding [E3 and below] OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer Op BANNER Counter-Terrorism operations in Northern Ireland 1969 - 1998 Op GRITROCK UK Operation to eradicate Ebola in West Africa 2014 - 2015 Op HERRICK Operations in Afghanistan 2006-2014 Op MANTA French operation in Chad 1983-84 Op SERVAL French counter-terrorist operation in Mail - 2013 to date Op TELIC Operations in Iraq 2003 -2012 OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries ORBAT Order of Battle (structure of the organisation) ORP Operational Ration Pack OTX Overseas Training Exercise PDT Pre-Deployment Training PFT Personal Fitness Test PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters PLMs Protected Logistic Movements PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation PPE Personal Protective Equipment PPTK Portable Petroleumn Test Kit PSI Permanent Staff Instructor PTG Port Task Group QOGLR Queen's Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment R-WMIK Revised Weapon Mounted Installation Kit RAMC Royal Army Medical Corps RAOC Royal Army Ordnance Corps RCT Royal Corps of Transport RDC Regional Distribution Centre REME Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers RFA Royal Fleet Auxhillary RFIs Request(s) for Information RLC The Royal Logistic Corps RLS Rail Load Supervisor RMAS Royal Military Academy Sandhurst RN Royal Navy ROG Rear Operations Group RPAS Remotely Piloted Aircraft System RPN Risk Priority Number

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RSOI RTCH RUSI SAC SADF SAT SC SCPT SDSR SFOR SHQ SME SOF SPOD SRR STURM SV(R) Tac AT TACOS TCC TES TLB TLG TPTF TRP TSF UAVs UK UN UNHCR UNMISS UNPA UNPROFOR UORs US USA USAAF UNSCR VaME VITAL VSS WFC WFI WW1 WW2

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration Rough Terrain Handling Equipment Royal United Services Institute American Strategic Air Command South African Defence Forces Senior Ammunition Technician Supply Chain Supply Chain Pipeline Time Strategic Defence and Security Review Stabilisation Force Bosnia Herzegovina Squadron Headquarters Subject Matter Expert Special Operations Force Sea Port of Departure Strategic Roll-on Roll-off Sustainable Training and Operational Readiness Mechanism Support Vehicle Recovery Tactical Air Transport Terms and Conditions of Service Troop Commander's Course Theatre Entry Standards Top Level Budgets Theatre Logistic Group Tactical Petroleum Tank Farm Theatre Redeployment Pool Total Support Force Unmanned Aerial Vehicles United Kingdom United Nations United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Nations Mission in South Sudan United Nations Protected Area United Nations Protection Force Urgent Operational Requirement(s) United States United States of America United States Army Air Force UN Security Council Resolution Vehicles and Major Equipments Visibility In Transit Asset Logging Vehicle Supply Specialist Whole Force Concept Whole Force Initiative World War One [1914-18] World War Two [1939-1945]

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THE REVIEW 2019-2020

About The RLC Foundation What is it?

The Royal Logistic Corps Foundation is the focus for engagement with industry and academia, for the purpose of professional development. Now in our fifth year, we have established strong working relationships with a wide range of industry and academic organisations. Our corporate partners, supporters and friends enable the Foundation to continue its work and development. Our main objective is to enable members of the Corps (Regular, Reserve and Veterans) to follow a professional career development path and to be recognised with credibility as professional logisticians, both within defence and across industry. The more we can achieve this, then the greater the benefit to the individual, the Corps, defence and to industry. There are obvious benefits for those in career transition and our website www.rlcfoundation.com has links to career opportunities with our corporate partners.

Where is it?

The RLC Foundation is co-located with 101 Logistic Brigade based Wellington House, St Omer Barracks, Aldershot, Hampshire, GU11 2BG. What does it do?

The Foundation runs a series of national events as well as supporting an increasing range of regional events, using the national footprint of our Regular and Reserve regiments. Our main events for 2019 are: • Winter Lecture at The Bell, St Omer Barracks, Aldershot – 29 January • TVS Solutions ‘transition event’ for service leavers at Abingdon - *February • General Dynamics’ round table event, Oakdale, Wales - *March • DHL round table event - *April • Pearson TQ Digital Assessment seminar - *May • Wincanton seminar and tour of distribution centre - *June • Exercise Log SAFARI - *July • Military planning event, Colchester - *September • PA Consulting round table event - *September • Ernst & Young thought leadership event, London - *October • The RLC Foundation Awards Dinner – 4 November *Dates to be confirmed

Why should I join The RLC Foundation?

As can be seen above, the Foundation offers a wide range of events throughout the year. These events provide exposure to The RLC and its people; an opportunity for joint thinking, examining, evolving logistic capability and networking

between The RLC, industry and academia. We have already attracted a wide range of members from industry and we are actively seeking new members. The benefits of the three levels of membership can be seen below: Event

Friend Supporter Partner £795 £1995 £3995 Autumn Lecture • • • Corporate Round Table Events • • • Log Safari and other Military Events • • • Magazine Adverts • • • RLC Foundation Awards and Dinner • • • Regiment/Trade Affiliation • • • Regional Events • • • Web Advertisement • • • Work Experience Opportunities • • • Career Mapping • • Case Studies • • Speaker Opportunity • • Web Editorial • • Advisory Board Involvement • Article Submission to annual RLC Review • Bespoke RLC Tailored Event • * ‘Friend’ is now an SME company package only [Employees <150 Turnover <£5M] Both these conditions must be met to take a Friend package.

Our website address is www.rlcfoundation.com with links to and from the Corps website www.Royallogisticcorps.co.uk We are also on Facebook. Contact Alan Woods at: Alan.Woods195@mod.gov.uk. Tel 01252 347709.

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Can women be good leaders?

Gender stereotyping and its effect on how leaders are perceived in the military This article will discuss the effects of gender stereotyping in a male-dominated environment, focusing on the military and explore how it can affect both men and women in leadership positions.

In conclusion, some suggestions on how to combat these effects in workplaces, such as the military will be discussed.

By Capt Gemma Cole

Opinions of women in the military have drastically changed in the last few decades. Only 18 years ago, DeGroot (2001, p.23) described women as ‘Weak, both physically and emotionally’ and cited it as a known fact that women do not make good soldiers. A study by Boldry et al. (2001, pp. 689-705) found that American military college trainees held the opinion that women are less suitable for military work than men.

There is a difference in how men and women are perceived, particularly in leadership positions. It is a fact that stereotyping, whether conscious or unconscious, affects the way in which we perceive both ourselves and others. Certain behaviours are expected of a specified group of people and when people defy these expectations, it can result in a negative perception of that individual.

What is gender stereotyping?

Stereotypes can be defined as an attribute or set of attributes that are believed to be typical of a certain group (Kanahara, 2006, p.306). Gender stereotypes can be described by social role theory, which describes expected attributes of men and women (Harrison and Lynch, 2005, p.227). Men are expected to be assertive, controlling and confident, whereas women are expected to be helpful, nurturing and gentle; the effect of gender stereotyping is that when someone acts in a manner that doesn’t fit with what is expected, they are evaluated negatively (Johnson et al., 2008, p.40).

The origins of gender stereotyping are thought to be from when male dominance was caused by superior strength and constraints of women carrying or caring for children, leading to men having an advantage in gaining influence in everyday situations (Ridgeway, 2001, p.651). It seems logical that these stereotypes would no longer exist, given that physical strength is now rarely seen as a leadership trait and mothers are now just as able to have a full and successful career as

men or women without children. However that tends not to be the case.

How gender stereotypes are embedded in childhood Many professions are typically seen as favourable for either men or women and these innate beliefs are planted into our heads from an early age. Children’s toys show female princesses, male action heroes, baby girls in pink and baby boys in blue. Most girls grow up idealising Disney princesses and playing with doll houses, whereas most boys grow up with construction sets and cars. Children’s decisions on the type of toy that is right for them and therefore informing the type of career that they should be pursuing when they grow up, is focused by just three year’s old (McNeill, 2017, p.4).

Although much of the discussion in literature and the media is on how gender stereotyping in early childhood is negatively affecting girls, the effect on boys is earlier and harsher, with tighter boundaries (Sadker et al., 2009, p.2).

The result of this is that, whereas girls will consider both feminine and masculine career options, boys are far more likely to consider only traditionally male occupations, further exacerbating the stereotypical nature of these career choices (Raffaele Mendez and Crawford, 2002, p.96).

These gender stereotypes that are embedded into us at a young age continue to inform our perceptions of people throughout life. Tasks that are seen as stereotypically masculine will be viewed as more competently completed by a man than by a woman. Even those who don’t believe that this is true can be affected by the knowledge that this is how others are thinking; a woman’s performance can be affected by the belief that others are expecting them to perform poorly, leading to biased assessments of ability for non-stereotypical gendered tasks (Correll, 2001, p.1696).

Similarly, a man performing a task that is perceived as stereotypically female will face the same problems.

Gender stereotyping in leadership in male-dominated environments Management and executive positions are generally seen to necessitate stereotypically male characteristics, such as assertiveness, confidence and influence (Ridgeway, 2001, pp.644-645). Men are expected to possess these characteristics and women are not. This leads to men participating and voicing opinions more, being more confident in leadership positions and having more influence than their female counterparts. This is simply because this behaviour is expected of them.

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GENERAL INTEREST

status group, such as certain ethnicities) to be considered highly capable in a specific setting, she must outperform men in a similar position; in a male-dominated environment, women are held to a higher standard to prove a high level of ability. This effect leads to men being more likely to be selected for leadership positions. Even when women are in positions of leadership or management, these same stereotypes cause her to be perceived as less capable than a male counterpart.

The characteristics required for leadership are seen as less typical of women than of men, however they are also seen as less desirable for women than for men. Women who prove that they possess the traits such as confidence, assertiveness and competitiveness are viewed as competent and capable of leadership, however they are also viewed as socially inept and unlikeable by both men and women. The ways in which many female leaders are described, ‘battleaxe’, or ‘dragon’, are testament to this way of thinking (Rudman and Phelan, 2008, p.64).

Gender stereotyping in the military A reason that gender stereotypes are exacerbated in the military and other heavily male-dominated environments, is due to ‘token status’, where a token is a very small minority.

The only way to improve gender stereotyping is to increase the proportion of women in the military

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Tokenism is a marked disadvantage for women in the military; it results in undervaluation of the token group. A study by Pazy and Oron (2001, pp. 689-702) revealed that positive evaluation of women’s overall performance increased as they became a higher proportion of the group, as they lost their token status.

Token status also attracts more attention, heightening pressure on individuals to perform well (Boldry et al., 2001, p.690). In a military context, a mistake made by a man can often be described as a drop in the ocean, whereas the same mistake made by a woman can be likened to a brick in a puddle.

Is this one of the reasons why far fewer women apply for military careers than men? Stereotypical opinions on the right type of career for men or women, learned early in childhood, mean that most women won’t even consider such a masculine occupation. This isn’t just a female problem; the same effect is seen in occupations traditionally seen as feminine, such as nursing and teaching. In 2015, 91% of registered nurses were female and 82% of school-teachers were female at primary and middle school levels (Elkins, 2015). These huge disparities in gender balance aren’t caused by women being better nurses, or men being better soldiers. The main issue is that the untraditional occupations just aren’t attractive options for young people making their career decisions.

How do we change this?

How can we combat these unconscious gender stereotypes in the military? One way of lessening the effects of the issue could be gender-free reporting, where non-gender specific pronouns are used to describe individuals, removing any conscious or unconscious bias from the minds of those reading and evaluating an individual’s performance. A study of US Naval Academy students’ performance evaluations (Smith et al., 2018, pp. 159-171) showed that women received far more negative attributes than men, despite their average gradings and rankings being almost identical.

Of course, the reporting officers, those writing the reports, knew the gender of the individual. However, it has been shown in several studies, (Baron, 1984, pp. 70-73), (Heilman et al., 1989, pp. 935-942), that gender role stereotypes surrounding female managers disappear once subordinates have worked for them and they are then viewed on their own individual merits. This is likely to also be true of managers evaluating female subordinates, once they have had a chance to get to know them as an individual and evaluate their performance against their peers.

Reducing token status would also reduce the effects of gender stereotyping. The only way to improve this is to increase the proportion of women in the military. With the increase of job opportunities available to women, this may result in a greater number of women applying to the military.

This certainly isn’t something that can be achieved quickly, or possibly even not at all, but hopefully an increased awareness of the effects of gender stereotyping, coupled with the greater acceptance of unconventional career and

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with a changing view of societal norms, hopefully this will be the natural progression over the coming generations.

References

Far fewer women apply for military careers than men

life choices in society today, will lessen the gender bias towards the military as a career choice.

Conclusion Gender stereotyping is long established and difficult to overcome. In occupations where one gender is the overwhelming majority, the minority group is subject to automatic poor evaluation as a result of conscious or unconscious gender bias, exacerbated by token status. The reason for this is that the minority gender is simply not expected to perform well in their chosen occupation, as they are not expected to possess the characteristics required for success. An individual can overcome these initial barriers, but only with managers and subordinates who know them personally, which is not helpful for recruiting, job application and promotion boarding and therefore overall career success.

Increasing awareness of the effects of stereotyping is the simplest way to lessen the effects. However, with such a deep-rooted and socially accepted stereotype, this is still not a complete solution. Gender stereotyping is lessened with an increased proportion of that gender in the workplace.

Again, increasing the number of male nurses or female soldiers is not something that can or should be forced, but

Baron, A. (1984). The achieving woman manager: So, where are the rewards? Business Quarterly. 49.

Boldry, J., Wood, W. and Kashy, D. A. (2001). Gender stereotypes and the evaluation of men and women in military training. Journal of Social Issues.

57(4).

Correll, S. J. (2001). Gender and the career choice process: the role of biased self-assessments. American Journal of Sociology. 106(6).

DeGroot, G. J. (2001). A few good women: gender stereotypes, the military and peacekeeping. International Peacekeeping. 8(2).

Elkins, K. (2015). 20 jobs that are dominated by women. Business Insider.

Harrison, L. A. and Lynch, A. B. (2005). Social role theory and the perceived gender role orientation of athletes. Sex Roles. 52(3-4).

Heilman, M., Block, C., Simon, M. C. and Martell, R. F. (1989). Has anything changed? Current characterisations of men, women and managers.

Journal of Applied Psychology. 74(6).

Johnson, S. K., Murphy, S. E., Zewdie, S. and Reichard, R. J. (2008). The strong, sensitive type: effects of gender stereotypes and leadership prototypes on the evaluation of male and female leaders. Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes. 106(1).

Kanahara, S. (2006). A review of the definitions of stereotype and a proposal for a progressional model. Individual Differences Research. 4(5).

McNeill, A. (2017). Girls, boys and their gendered toys: Exploring the role of toys in shaping career choices later in life. Chwarae Teg. Pazy, A. and Oron, I. (2001). Sex proportion and performance evaluation among high-ranking military officers. Journal of Organisational Behaviour.

22.

Raffaele Mendez, L. M. and Crawford, K. M. (2002). Gender-role stereotyping and career aspirations: a comparison of gifted early adolescent boys and girls. Journal of Advanced Academics. 13(3).

Ridgeway, C. L. (2001). Gender, status and leadership. Journal of Social Issues. 57(4).

Rudman, L. A. and Phelan, J. E. (2008). Backlash effects for disconfirming gender stereotypes in organisations. Research in Organisational Behaviour. 28.

Sadker, D., Sadker, M. and Zittleman, K. (2009). Still failing at fairness: How gender bias cheats girls and boys in school and what we can do about it.

New York: Scribner.

Smith, D. G., Rosenstein, J. E., Nikolov, M. C. and Chaney, D. A. (2018). The power of language: gender, status, and agency in performance evaluations. Sex Roles. 80.

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Whilst it is difficult and will always be difficult, to ascertain the true reasons for state involvement in conflict, there is still scope to understand likely causes and justifications. Applying different international relations (IR) theories can engender many perspectives, but for this essay liberalism is the lens that will be applied; liberalism being based on ‘The moral argument that ensuring the right of an individual person to life, liberty and property is the highest goal of government’ (Meiser, 2018, p22).

By Lt Ashley Baldwin This essay will begin by explaining the context behind the intervention in Libya, followed by a look at the reasons why Britain became involved whilst other states opted to take a back seat, especially those of such great power. With these reasons for intervention, the essay can look at whether they are in line with Immanuel Kant’s framework towards a ‘pacific federation’, the widely accepted idea that the way to collective security is through democracy, economic inter-dependence and international institutions (Russet, 2016).

With an idea of whether the intervention was based on liberal principles, it is then crucial to determine whether intervention always extols liberal values and cannot be tainted with another major IR theory, that of realism. With this comparison it will become clear that liberal principles justified Britain’s involvement in the British and French led intervention of Libya in 2011 under the then Prime Minister David Cameron.

The context of Libya Libya was one of many conflicts arising in the Middle East in 2011. The region saw the beginning of the Bahraini Uprising, the Egyptian Crisis, Yemeni Crisis and Syrian Civil War, which all contributed to a much wider phenomena termed the ‘Arab Spring’. These uprisings began as a struggle between an anarchic government and a nation who fundamentally disagreed with their ruler. Libya began similarly, an oppressed nation pushing back against its ruler, but in Libya’s case, it was Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.

Credit: joepyrek/Wikipedia CC BY-SA 2.0

Do liberal principles justify British interventions under conditions such as those encountered in Libya?

A tank graveyard resulting from the Libyan conflict in 2011

Libya had invoked UN interest since the 1950s through a variety of agencies and programmes which, after failed attempts to come to a diplomatic resolve, ended in clashes between rebel protestors and pro-government forces, resulting in the request of military intervention from the United Nations (UN). The request was backed by the Arab League and eventually amounted to military action, but why was British military action not seen before?

Britain had two main reasons for not acting earlier. Firstly, Britain was riding a significant lack of public support off the back of failed military endeavours in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Secondly, the financial crisis in 2008 that drained Britain, as well as a lot of Europe, of its defence budget. Cuts were made nationwide across all government sectors and another military intervention would have been the least favoured way to spend tax-payers money under a government pursuing a doctrine of ‘austerity’.

So why did Britain intervene?

As stated in the opening sentence it is difficult to know the true reasons for state involvement, but there are reasons explanations that came to light in the build-up to the intervention that would suggest why Britain acted. The best place to start is with David Cameron’s explanation in an interview he gave the evening before the engagement on 18 March 2011. After all, it was his decision to act and he is arguably therefore going to provide the truest reasoning. In the interview, Cameron (2011) says: “What we are doing is necessary, it is legal and it is right. It is necessary because with others we should be trying to prevent him using his military against his own people. It is legal because we have the backing of the UN Security Council and also of the Arab League and many others and it is right because I believe we should not stand aside while this dictator murders his own people.” This statement starts to explain liberal values as the rationale for his reasoning.

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A basic understanding of liberalism is explained as, ‘The moral argument that ensuring the right of an individual person to life, liberty and property is the highest goal of government.’

(Meiser, 2017, p22). Using this concept as a basis for comparison shows a clear link between Cameron’s statement and liberalism. Cameron’s “Necessary” is supported by the idea that an individual has a right to life, state violence being a clear threat to life. “Right” is supported by the idea of justice, where an individual has a right to liberty.

Cameron’s ‘legal’ statement is more pertinent because it shows a different, yet still fundamental principle, of liberalist theory as explained by J.D Bowen (2011). He states that: ‘(Liberals) are not opposed to war or the use of force but (liberals) want to exhaust absolutely every other opportunity first,’ which is what occurred. The UN, which could be considered specialists in the region, requested military intervention. The request, which was supported by the Arab League, came after Gaddafi failed to comply with an agreed ceasefire and unleashed new offensives on 18 March into Misrata and Ajdabiya, that looked to end in a massacre of the Libyan people (Chivvis, 2012). Only at this point did military intervention proceed with coalition forces striking armoured units south of Benghazi. This was evidently a last resort as all other means had been exhausted. The idea of exhausting all possibilities prior to military intervention reflects a strong liberal approach and is further supported by Meiser’s expression of an individual right to life, liberty and property.

Evidently, Cameron provides liberal reasoning for British intervention, but this was both a British and French led intervention. It is important to look at how French involvement and back-seat bandwagoning from other states, in particular the US, might or might not have affected the British decision to act; as this could change the slowly emerging idea that intervention was based on liberalist principle.

Other state Involvement There were three reported reasons for French involvement which were enough to entice it to take the lead with Britain.

Firstly, that Sarkozy could use this high but legitimate risk to bring about political support ahead of the French elections in 2012. Secondly, that Gaddafi was the ideal villain whom all democrats wished to see defeated and thirdly, that the regional context is important. The regional context being that successful intervention could lead to a positive view on Western democracy, which could lead to adopting more democratic practices in turn developing regional security (Moisi, 2011). Arguably all three of these points can be seen as liberal because all would result in the ability to further spread democracy, fundamental to democratic peace, if the intervention was successful.

The US however was not so willing to act militarily. The US Army was significantly drained after Iraq and Afghanistan, both in terms of public support and finance. ‘Any future defence secretary who advises the President to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined’, was the advice given by Eisenhower (2011, cited in Chivvis, 2012). Whilst Libya would 12

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The Libyan civil war began with Libya pushing back against its ruler, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi

not be the grounds for a ‘Big American land army’, it was advice that was still initially listened to. That was until 15 March when Obama sought the UN Security Council Resolution ‘authorising the use of force to protect Libyan civilians’ UNSCR 1973 (UN, 2011). The reason was due to the ‘Imminent threat Gaddafi's forces posed to the civilian population of Benghazi’ (Chivvis, 2012). The US reluctance to intervene was similar to that of Britain’s delay. The liberal concept that all other means should first be exhausted and that each individual has a right to liberty is again astute. There is a picture building of a liberally principled approach, not just by Britain, but by the two other major powers at the forefront of the intervention. The reasons for intervention must be looked at in even great depth using Immanuel Kant’s perspective of a pacific federation. A perspective that is widely recognised as a framework that achieves democratic peace.

The Kantian Approach The world that Kant envisaged was that of a pacific federation where its member states retain their sovereignty, but are linked harmoniously through three tenets that would ensure collective security. The three tenets are that of democratic peace, economic interdependence and international organisations (Russet, 2016).

Democratic peace stems from the idea that democracies are much less likely to go to war with each other and so a spread of democratic law will lead to security across states.

This theory is supported by studies into the end of the Cold War, showing that as democratic states rose, the number of conflicts across the globe fell (Marshall, M and Cole, B, 2014).

In Libya, the UN was aware of the theory and attempted to instill democracy. However, after arms embargos, targeted sanctions, preventing travel and freezing assets were imposed through UNSCR 1970 (UN, 2011), there were continued military efforts by Gaddafi’s regime which were deemed a direct threat to the life and liberty of its people. At this point, Cameron was right that intervention is ‘Necessary, legal and right’, and this is two-fold. First, because the initial democratic approach had failed and second because intervention would allow the UN to continue to promote peace once Gaddafi had been ousted; a clear liberal approach.

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Economic inter-dependence offers more than just commercial exchange and inter-state trade may result in greater mutual understanding, empathy and mutual identity (Russet, 2016, p.76). Whilst this has a less direct impact on the UK, it still has strong importance to the region.

Improving democracy in the state will likely open opportunity for trade agreements which is another arrow to the democratic peace bow. Crucially however, economic interdependence arguably did not play a role in the decision-making process in British Foreign Policy, but indirectly British action was causing a liberal effect.

Of the three tenets of Kant’s peace federation concept, ‘International organisations’ is the most prevalent. Look no further than the two organisations already mentioned, the UN and the Arab League. Add to those the organisation that Britain and France led the intervention through, NATO, and there is a clear liberal approach to intervention in Libya regarding British foreign policy. Britain is a member of the UN and NATO, two different international institutions and it has the backing of another international institution. The initial approach was through an international organisation and military action was also through an international organisation, backed by another international organisation.

British foreign policy evidently dictates that the way forward in an approach to improving global security is through international organisations.

Kant’s framework is prevalent throughout, but let’s be clear, British policy makers did not use it as a basis for planning intervention in Libya. As discussed, two of the three tenants of the framework are reflected in the intervention so the approach is arguably based on liberal principles. This is easy to say though as liberalism is the only lens that’s been applied so far. International relations theories are varied and contested and liberalism is only considered popular following periods of conflict and Libya was directly after Iraq and Afghanistan. Liberalism is often referred to as antithetical to realism (Russet, 2016) with realism being the most prominent IR theory among scholars. So, could the Libyan intervention actually be based on realism?

Do realist principles justify British intervention in Libya?

Realism has developed into two independent strands with differences in the way in which the resulting play of powerpolitics is achieved, but they are ultimately the same. They both carry a pessimistic view that explains the ‘reality’ of international politics in which a state will seek to overcome the security dilemma Realism carries three core assumptions regarding the international system; that of statism, survival and self-help. Statism denoting that the primary actor in the international system is a nation-state. A state’s primary aim is the means of survival through the pursuit of power, and self-help, that there is no higher authority to rely on to prevent force on the anarchic global stage (Dunne, 2001).

British intervention does not to align with any of these assumptions. International institutions are prevalent in the intervention, both before, during and after, which rules out the core assumption of statism. There is not a pursuit of

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power in Libya, as supported by Cameron’s reasoning for the intervention being necessary, far from hegemonic-like state action that realism implies, which rules out the core assumption of survival. Whilst liberalists agree that the global stage is anarchic, in this situation there are higher forms of authority to rely on to prevent force, NATO which rules out the core assumption of self-help. With a glance at realism it is evident that realist principles do not justify action in Libya as the core realist assumptions do not apply to British intervention which supports the notion that intervention was liberal; liberal in intention but a poor outcome for liberal values.

Conclusion Cameron’s justifications of being “Necessary, legal and right” provoked the initial thought that liberal principles justified British intervention in Libya. These reasons were supported when exploring French and US involvement, showing that all parties, including the UK, chose principally a democratic approach, using force only as a last resort, albeit intervening at different times. Kant’s three tenets to a ‘pacific federation’ developed the liberal approach further as all three strands show just reasoning for British intervention, all of which were non-power driven. Finally, a comparison to the popular IR theory of realism showed that the intervention could not have been of realist agenda because there was no state on state-on-state power politics play. Using evidenced reasons and a look at liberalism and realism, it is clear that liberal principles did justify British intervention under conditions such as those encountered in Libya.

References Bowen, J. (2011) ‘Theory in Action: Liberalism’. Available at: https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=tZbDMUaqwE8 [Accessed 13 March 2019].

Cameron, D. (2011) David Cameron: ‘Action against Libya is 'necessary, legal and right'’. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/ world/video/2011/mar/20/cameron-statement-action-against-gaddafilibya [Accessed 13 March 2019].

Chivvis, C. (2012) ‘Libya and the Future of Liberal Intervention’, Survival, 54, (6).

Dunne, T. (2014) ‘Realism’. In: Dunne, T and Schmidt, B. (eds). ‘The Globalization of World Politics’. 6th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marshall, M and Cole, B. (2014) Global Report 2014: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility. Available at: https://www.systemicpeace.org/vlibrary/ GlobalReport2014.pdf [Accessed 13 March 2019].

Meiser, J. (2017) ‘Liberalism’. In: McGlinchey, S. (ed). International Relations Theory. Bristol: E-IR, p22 Meiser, J. (2018) ‘Introducing Liberalism in International Relations Theory’.

International Relations Theory. Available at: https://www.eir.info/2018/02/18/introducing-liberalism-in-international-relations-theory/ [accessed 12 March 2019].

Moisi, D. (2011). ‘France had a Duty to Intervene in Libya’. The Guardian.

Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/23/ france-libya-sarkozy [Accessed 13 March 2019].

Russet, B. (2016). ‘Liberalism’. In: Dunne, T. (ed). International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. 54, (6) p69.

Senior Administration Official. (2011). In: Cooper, H and Myers, S. (eds).

‘Shift by Clinton Helped Persuade President to Take a Harder Line’.

UN Security Council Resolution 1970. (2011). S/RES/1970. (26 February 2011). Available at: https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1970 [Accessed 13 March 2019].

UN Security Council Resolution 1973. (2011). S/RES/1973. (17 March 2011).

Available at: https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1973 [Accessed 13 March 2019].

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Technological advances in economics, industry and transport: Implications for The RLC The economy, industry and transport are sectors which are rapidly evolving due to advances in technology. Changes in any one of these sectors are likely to have a profound impact on UK Defence.

By Lt James Martin

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In order to remain globally competitive, the British Army, particularly The RLC, must adapt and become more efficient. This essay will discuss technological advancements in economics, industry and transport, reflecting on the potential consequences for The RLC. In the next 30 years, the world’s economy is likely to have doubled in size, largely due to growth from the seven largest emerging economies (E7); Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p.

84). The growth of these economies will likely lead to a shift in the global economic centre of gravity towards the East (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p. 85). Although Western financial centres such as New York and London are likely to remain influential due to their time zones, it is expected that Asia, in particular China, will become more dominant, resulting in an increase of soft power and global strategic influence from the East (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p. 85).

Implications for the wider British Army include a perceived decline in global influence and lack of recognition as an effective fighting force. In this environment of uncertainty, it will be key for The RLC to prove its effectiveness and ability to support global operations. In emerging economies, populations are likely to gravitate towards cities for increased job prospects and better standards of living (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2018, p. 4). It is estimated that 68% of the global population will be living in cities by 2050 (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2018,

Drones have been considered as an alternative method of frontline delivery. With the expansion of such technology, counter-drone defence systems are also being developed

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p. 10), suggesting that future global conflicts will integrate more urban environments. To operate in urban areas, The RLC will need to focus on developing new methods of supplying British and coalition forces in this complex terrain.

Global trade is an important factor in international relations, ultimately effecting how the British Army operates.

With the growth of Asian economies, it is likely that the UK will increase trade with the East (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p. 170). This is particularly relevant with the prospect of Brexit, and the UK looking to negotiate trade deals outside the influence of the European Union (Joe Owen, 2017, p. 46).

The MOD may look to outsource a larger range of materiel and equipment procurement to countries in Asia, where the cost of production is relatively low. Contracts like this may fall in line with potential trade deals that the UK is looking to secure from outside the EU (Joe Owen, 2017, p. 46).

Outsourcing to the East does however create a security risk, where other nations would potentially have direct influence over the production of MOD inventory. Additionally, the supply chain back to the UK would potentially become vulnerable to political disruption from trade disputes and sanctions, this is relevant today with ongoing trade disputes such as between the US and China. If the UK were to outsource further production to the East, there would be an increased need for UK strategic influence in order to help secure the supply chain from disruption.

The UK could follow a similar model to China; investing in international infrastructure projects in order to increase its influence over an area. This has proved a successful strategy for China in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa (Vivien Foster, July 2008, p.2). The Asia-Pacific region remains the largest infrastructure market globally, with investment in ‘gateway infrastructure’ such as ports and airports needed to support projected future growth (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p.95). Investment in regions such as the Asia-Pacific could lead to increased strategic influence for the UK, strengthening supply chains and potential trade agreements.

However, bold investment strategies such as this can be perceived as ‘empire-building’ and draw heavy international criticism, for example: Chinese state majority-owned telecommunications company Huawei has received strong criticism from the US over security risks associated with rolling out its 5G network across the EU. Currency may also have an important future role in how The RLC operates. The dominance of the US dollar as a global currency is likely to reduce over the next 50 years, with the rise of alternative currencies such as the Chinese Renminbi (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p.87). Alongside the fall of the Dollar, the use of British Sterling in international transactions is also likely to decline. The growing use of digital currencies may become an alternative method for

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Industry Technological advances are the main driver for industrial progression. This is as true today as it was during the industrial revolution. Key industrial processes which are likely to affect the future operation of The RLC include; automation, manufacture and human-machine interaction.

Automation has been one of the fastest growing industrial processes. The number of jobs that machines are able to do more effectively than humans is on the rise; it is estimated that more than 50% of jobs, particularly in sectors like transport and manufacture, may become automated (PwC, 2017, p.7).

Technology will become cheaper and more efficient (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p.37), driving down costs and fuelling further development of machines to replace humans in many job sectors. This could also be the case for The RLC, where many current job roles, for example driver or supplier, are based on manual skillsets. As technology develops, we may find a trend towards increasing automation. DSCOM has started to adopt automation into large-scale operations.

DSCOM is automating the Defence Fulfilment Centre (DFC); a warehouse containing a retrieval system designed to manually handle and store items (Wheeldon 2019). This speeds up the process of storing and accounting for items, reducing the need for manpower in the warehouse. With recruitment and retention an ongoing concern for the British Army, a similar DFC-style automation system could be implemented into Regt’l and Sqn stores. Increasing automation within these departments would reduce the required manpower, allowing for the redistribution of personnel from jobs in supply to other key areas.

This kind of automation will significantly affect how The RLC works in the coming years; favouring personnel with skills such as creativity, innovation and intelligence (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p.93). This change in perceived skillset resonates well with the Army’s current ‘Your Army Needs You’ advertising campaign, aimed at recruiting personnel with diverse skillsets and backgrounds (Sadler, 2019). This diversity will be key in the development of new skillsets required in the modern RLC. A secondary effect of automation and manpower reduction for The RLC is the potential for the amalgamation with other corps and cap badges. As part of the Army 2020R, 1 Close Support REME is likely to merge with 1 Regt RLC, forming a joint RLC-REME unit in support of a STRIKE Brigade (Fallon, December 2016). Similarly, 27 Regt RLC will

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international transactions. If digital currencies were to become regulated and internationally adopted as government-backed legal tender, this may prove useful for the MOD. If adopted, digital currencies could be used for completing large-scale international purchases, by-passing the costs associated with currency exchange. Alternatively, on a smaller scale, digital currencies could be used to procure local in-theatre contracts on operations, where the true value of the currency is understood by both sides involved in the transaction.

The new purpose-built Defence Fulfilment Centre in Donnington relies on automation to speed-up retrieval of items

merge with 2 Close Support REME in support of another STRIKE Brigade (Fallon, December 2016). It is also likely REME will be more widely ‘rationalised’ in a bid to redistribute manpower (Fallon, December 2016). As further mergers take place it may be the case that The RLC becomes part of a wider CSS Corps, combining with REME, RAMC and parts of the AGC to provide integrated service support. This could have the effect of reducing cost with units working closer together, this may lead to a more efficient supply chain.

Technology is also likely to have a significant impact on the manufacturing processes of industry. The development of 3D printing technology could be used to streamline production lines, reducing the need for multi-stage assembly and rapidly speeding up production (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p.91). Manufactured products could be made to exact specifications and should 3D printers become easily transportable, manufacturing could be made possible anywhere in the world, significantly reducing the need for transport and distribution. This would have a huge impact on how The RLC operates, cutting the need for supply of material such as mechanical spares which are often required as high priority. Spares for repair could be made on-site, to the correct specification and in a reduced timeframe (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p.91). 3D printing technology is however unlikely to reduce the need for manufacture of items such as CSUPS, which are designed to be produced relatively cheaply in bulk and distributed within a ‘just in time’ logistics model.

With ongoing developments in technology, humanmachine interaction will become increasingly common.

Current technology supports ‘assisted intelligence’, where computers are used to support humans with tasks (Rao, 2016). Examples of this include autopilot settings in aviation and licence plate recognition software in traffic cameras.

This sort of technology is starting to be widely used in The RLC, with systems such as VITAL being used for stocktaking and inventory checks. This could reduce the use of paperwork and speed up the overall process.

The next stage of technological assistance is called ‘augmented intelligence’. This is where humans and machines collaborate to make decisions, learning and THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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developing more efficient methods through human-artificial interaction (Rao, 2016). An Austrian logistics company called KNAPP has equipped staff in its warehouse with a headset that uses augmented reality to help workers select items, this is combined with a camera which captures serial numbers for real-time inventory tracking (Cornelius Baur, June 2015). As a result of this technology, the company has recorded a reduction in error rates during production of nearly 40% (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p. 91).

‘‘

Use of autonomous intelligence in The RLC could potentially lead to further reductions in required manpower, alongside reductions in cost and time

This technology has the potential to be adopted by The RLC, where inventory checking could take place in real-time, reducing the need for more manual recording processes such as VITAL scanning. Augmented intelligence could be used to complement existing technology such as TAV- to create clearer tracking in the supply chain. Modernising current processes in the supply chain would bring them in line with the automation of the Defence Fulfilment Centre.

Augmented intelligence does not completely remove the human component and because of this, a level of control and responsibility can be retained by SMEs. This would be advantageous in chaotic environments where uncertainty or mechanical failure would require human intervention.

The most advanced level of artificial intelligence is referred to as ‘autonomous intelligence’ (Rao, 2016). This refers to machines which have the ability to think and act on their own and is a technology likely to be developed by 2050 (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p.93).

Use of autonomous intelligence in The RLC could potentially lead to further reductions in required manpower, alongside reductions in cost and time. Autonomous intelligence is fundamental in the development of new technologies such as driverless trucks (Bishop, Feb 2000).

There are areas of The RLC which could benefit greatly from autonomous intelligence, however this technology is unlikely to be adopted universally. Over-reliance on autonomous intelligence could lead to catastrophic failure, which would have catastrophic consequences in war. An example of this can be observed in the fire and subsequent destruction of the autonomous Ocado warehouse in Andover in January 2019, where the autonomous nature of the warehouse hampered firefighters (Gibbons, February 2019).

Reliance on autonomous intelligence is also of particular concern when you consider the growing threat of cyber warfare (National Cyber Security Centre, 2018). Increasing reliance on autonomous intelligence goes hand in hand with an increased vulnerability to cyber-attack.

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Transport If current trends in vehicle ownership were to continue, it is estimated that the number of private vehicles globally could double to more than 1.6 billion by 2050 (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p.95). This would cause a problem of overcrowding and congestion on the roads where advancements in infrastructure would be unable to keep up with future demand (OECD International Futures Programme, 2011).

The impact for The RLC would be having to deal with choke points and reduced efficiency of road movement as a direct consequence of congestion. This effect would be amplified in densely populated urban areas.

Despite this, it is likely that attitudes towards car ownership will change (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p. 95).

Green government incentives and growth of on-demand transport services such as Uber are likely to drive a decrease in vehicle ownership in urban areas (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p.95). Additionally, the ability to work, shop and socialise online may reduce the need to travel and commute (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p. 96).

Populations are likely to increase their use of public transport, with improvements in rail and aviation vital to support the demands in this growing sector. With further investment rail may grow to become a more viable transport option for The RLC; it provides an option for rapid, efficient movement of materiel across great distances. The potential for rail transport into Europe for the MOD is a real prospect; with the route having been proved by sending a Challenger II MBT through the Channel Tunnel in 2017 (Forces Network, January 2017). If rail transport were to be re-adopted as a preferred method of transport by The RLC, it may lead to the reinstatement of trades such as Railway Operator and could open the door to large scale deployment across Europe without relying entirely on foreign port infrastructure.

Technological advances are set to make significant changes in global transport in the coming decades, with logistic and delivery companies at the forefront of development. The United Parcel Service (UPS), a global parcel delivery service, delivers on average 18.3 million parcels a day (Berman, 04 Feb 2017). In order to be cost effective, they are required to find the fastest, safest routes

The concept of driverless vehicles to provide frontline delivery has been tested on Salisbury Plain

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for delivery. As such, UPS has discovered that left hand turns across traffic are a problem; increasing the risk of accidents and wasting fuel whilst idling in traffic (Berman, 4 Feb 2017).

Using navigation technology, UPS delivery trucks can now calculate routes which keep left hand turns to a minimum which has resultantly saved annually 10 million gallons of fuel, 20,000 tonnes of CO2 emissions and increased delivery output by 350,000 parcels (Berman, 04 Feb 2017).

Navigation technology such as this could be developed for The RLC and resultantly save fuel, time and prove for safer, cleaner transport. Technology such as this will become more relevant with increased global urbanisation and the growing likelihood of future urban warfare.

To bypass problems such as congestion entirely, many delivery companies are currently looking skyward for alternative methods of delivery. Amazon is in the process of developing Prime Air; a future secured delivery system designed to get packages to customers within 30 minutes using unmanned drones (Amazon, 2019). These drones are autonomous and guided by GPS. Testing in January 2019 has proved the concept works in a rural setting; with successful trial deliveries taking place across Cambridgeshire (Amazon, 2019). Aviation laws concerning drones are yet to be fully clarified so it is unclear how this technology may develop as a method for delivery, particularly in urban areas.

The use of drones or UAVs within Defence is already well established for ISTAR, with examples such as Desert Hawk and the development of Scavenger (MOD, 2019). This technology could be further adopted as a supply method where drones could be utilised for delivery in hazardous environments, reducing the manpower at risk (MOD, 2019).

The use of drones has several advantages over truck-based resupply, including speed of delivery, reducing the number of personnel exposed to danger and delivery over any kind of terrain (MOD, 2019). Drones do however require more development before they can be adopted as an effective method of delivery by The RLC. Drones are limited by the weight of what they can carry, the weather they can operate in and their battery life which currently lasts around one hour.

An alternative method of autonomous delivery could be the use of ground-drones. Starship Technologies is a company developing the use of self-drive robotic delivery vehicles (Starship, 2019). These vehicles are currently aimed at small local deliveries and are designed to drive on pavements at walking pace (Starship, 2019). Should this technology develop an off-road capability it may prove effective in Defence for frontline deliveries of ammunition and CSUPS. Hybrid and electric motors are likely to be the source of power for most personal vehicles by 2025 (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p. 96). Despite this, commercial vehicles, as well as military vehicles, are likely to remain dependant on heavy duty fuels such as diesel unless batteries become significantly cheaper and more powerful (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p. 96). With ever increasing numbers of electric vehicles on roads, infrastructure will have to develop to incorporate electrical charging points for vehicles. This

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has the potential to develop ‘smart grid’ systems where electric vehicles can act as batteries and provide power back to the main grid during peak usage (Ministry of Defence, 2018, p.96).

The use of smart grid technology has great potential for use in Defence. During Op HERRICK power within FOBs in Helmand province was provided by diesel generators, working on average at 40% capacity with very low fuel efficiency (Army Innovation Team, 2019). The cost of this was around $19 per kWh, compared with the UK where we pay on average 4p per kWh (Army Innovation Team, 2019).

Developing a smart grid system would allow vehicles to plug in to the network, providing power when not in use or charging the battery if required. Helmand province additionally has a high potential for solar power, boasting 340 days of sunshine a year (Army Innovation Team, 2019).

Despite this, during Op HERRICK the British Army developed virtually no solar power solutions. Sources of power for the British Army on operation are required to be robust and reliable. Due to this the British Army has become dependent on diesel generation. For future operations it may be beneficial to develop a hybrid power source which could support the demands of any operation. Incorporation of diesel generation with solar power and a smart grid system would improve versatility as well as decreasing costs and energy wastage.

‘‘

In this current climate of political uncertainty, particularly with the approach of Brexit, it is more important than ever The RLC is prepared to face the changing nature of warfare

Conclusion In this current climate of political uncertainty, particularly with the approach of Brexit, it is more important than ever that The RLC is prepared to face the changing nature of warfare. By following global trends in economics, industry and transport UK Defence has the opportunity to be at the forefront of development, pre-empting change to become a proactive force. Within The RLC, it will be important to integrate new technology into this development in order to remain globally competitive and nurture manpower to encourage diversity, leadership and innovation. This will be key to our success.

References Amazon, 2019. Amazon Prime Air. [Online] Available at: www.amazon.com/primeair [Accessed Feb 2019].

Army Innovation Team, 2019. FOB resupply in the past. s.l.:s.n.

Berman, R., 04 Feb 2017. The Science Behind Why UPS Trucks Avoid Making Left Turns, s.l.: Big Think.

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Bishop, R., Feb 2000. Intelligent vehicle applications worldwide. IEEE Intelligent Systems and their Applications, 15(1).

Cornelius Baur, D. W., June 2015. Manufacturing's next act, s.l.: McKinsey & Company.

Fallon, S. M., December 2016. Strategic Defence and Security Review - Army: Written statement, s.l.: Parliament.

Forces Network, January 2017. British Army Exercise Sees Tanks Moved Through Channel Tunnel. [Online] Available at: https://www.forces.net/news/tri-service/british-army-exercisesees-tanks-moved-through-channel-tunnel [Accessed Feb 2019].

Gibbons, K., February 2019. Ocado robots at Andover warehouse ‘hampered’ firefighters. [Online] Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ocado-robots-at-andoverwarehouse-hampered-firefighters-gwtj0zqd7 [Accessed Feb 2019].

Joe Owen, A. S. J. R., 2017. Trade after Brexit: Options for the UK’s relationship with the EU, s.l.: Institute for Government.

Leidos, 2017. Modernising the UK Defence Supply Chain. Defence Business, Issue 17.2.

Ministry of Defence, 2018. Global Strategic Trends: The Future Starts Today Sixth Edition, s.l.: Ministry of Defence.

MOD, 2019. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: present strengths and future capabilities. [Online]

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Available at: https://www.contracts.mod.uk/blog/unmanned-aerial-vehiclespresent-strengths-and-future-capabilities/ [Accessed Feb 2019].

National Cyber Security Centre, 2018. Annual Review, s.l.: National Cyber Security Centre GCHQ. OECD International Futures Programme, 2011. Strategic Transport Infrastructure Needs to 2030, s.l.: s.n.

PwC, 2017. UK Economic Outlook, s.l.: s.n.

PwC, February 2017. The Long View - How will the global economic order change by 2050?, s.l.: s.n.

Rao, A., 2016. AI everywhere and nowhere part 3 - AI is AAAI (AssistedAugmented-Autonomous Intelligence), s.l.: PwC. Sadler, C., 2019. 'Your Army Needs You': Army Unveils Latest Recruitment Campaign, s.l.: Forces Network.

Starship, 2019. A revelation in local delivery. [Online] Available at: https://www.starship.xyz/company/ [Accessed Feb 2019].

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2018. World Urbanization Prospects 2018, s.l.: United Nations.

Vivien Foster, W. B. C. C. N. P., July 2008. Building Bridges: China's Growing Role as Infrastructure Financer in Sub-Saharan Africa., s.l.: The World Bank.

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Are we the baddies? A critique of Britain’s relationship with Saudi Arabia “A revolution is sweeping the world – a revolution of democracy” (Kober, S., 1990). This short article aims to examine current British foreign policy from a strategic perspective, focusing particularly on two concepts. It will scrutinise Britain’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and try to determine if our alliance with them is worth the cost. By Lt Benjamin Ryde

The vagueness of politics ‘Idealpolitik’ is the political philosophy that states: That through a belief and moral-based framework, political goals can be achieved. The quote in the title is from the journal Foreign Policy and contextually posits that democracy will prevent states from pursuing a philosophy of realism in its outlook and policies. It means to say that political dissent and the practice of democracy, will be enough to pressure states into having to commit, in practice as well as speech, to the values that they claim to uphold.

‘Realpolitik’ on the other hand, in its most basic terms, is pragmatic, stoic politics. It is, in its purest form, a logical analysis of a situation, followed by the most practical solution. It does not allow for morals or principles to dictate action, but rather acknowledges unavoidable hardship and hatred in the world and accepts, that one may not have the power to eliminate these things and may have to decide on the lesser of two evils.

Of course, there are issues with these definitions. For one, much with anything, they are highly nuanced, rather than uncompromising systems. This short article will only be able to explore a limited facet of geopolitics and these political theories. It will be looking at politics and strategy, to the extent that governments enact them and strive to highlight the potential gap between; the likely reasoning behind this strategy and the public justification given.

You may be thinking: ‘Why not strike a balance between the two?’ However, the idea that a state could pursue its national interest and uphold international order, all while abiding by a strict code of ethics is obviously unattainable in the current, or arguably any global climate and I will come back to this point at the close of this article.

Focusing particularly on the above two concepts, I will now scrutinise Britain’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and try to determine if our alliance with them is worth the cost.

Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia is a state with which the UK has held a longstanding relationship. The foundations of this relationship are rooted in security, though this particular concept of security is multi-faceted. One must look at the security and stability of Saudi Arabia in a regional, and a global context, and one must also look at the security of the United Kingdom. For the purpose of this discussion, security will cover a broad spectrum; I will look at our credibility in the sphere of global politics, our internal and social affairs and our actual strategic strength (Stares, P. and Ighani, H., 2017).

Saudi Arabia remains one of the most stable countries in the Arab world (Stares, P. and Ighani, H., 2017). It holds just under 20% of the world’s proven crude oil reserves and is currently the world’s largest exporter of petroleum. Half of its GDP is accounted for by oil and gas and 70% of its export earnings are in these industries (OPEC: Annual Statistics Bulletin, 2018).

Saudi Arabia has been a true opportunist in using these resources to gain global influence and develop ties with stronger states; whilst the United States is the principal involved party, we cannot ignore the ties that the UK has.

One cannot blame Saudi Arabia for behaving the way it does, with regards to its fuel industries. It is rational behaviour to pursue economic and national development, through using what a state has access to and in this example, Saudi Arabia has transformed from a fragmented, tribal and largely undeveloped land, to a major player on the global political stage. A modern case of this influence would be the reaction of the West during the 1990-1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, where the United States, the United Kingdom and France committed military to the enforcement of ‘international order’. The scale of the action taken was monumental and a monumental testament to our longstanding reliance on keeping the region stable… And on-side (Stares, P. and Ighani, H., 2017).

Yemen The Yemeni Civil War is the ongoing conflict between the Houthi rebel faction and the government of Yemen, the latter being supported by a Saudi-led coalition. The conflict has gained a huge amount of press, due to the West’s direct and indirect involvement, the alleged and likely breaches of international human rights and the fact that the UK is a major exporter of arms to Saudi Arabia (Van Rij and Wilkinson 2019, p. 4). These combat aircraft and associated munitions have contributed to the coalition airstrikes, that have killed in the region of seven thousand civilians (ACLED Data, 2019; Human Rights Watch, 2019; Reisener, M., 2019). To worsen the matter, the veritable chaos that has THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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Credit: Shutterstock

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Dozens of civilians dead after a Saudi-led airstrike in Yemen, in September

followed in the wake of Yemeni societal collapse, has led to a hunger crisis causing, at least, the deaths of 85,000 children, a cholera outbreak killing thousands and the displacement of over 3 million. The UN has also reported that a further 14 million Yemenis are at a severe risk of dying of starvation (UN, 2019; Watson, B., 2019).

It has been shown on multiple occasions over the past four years, that the UK Government is acutely aware of the harm it may be causing to its credibility, through indirectly supporting the Saudi-led coalition through arms sales (Stone, 2016; Brooke-Holland, 2018). However, on the surface they have acted with prudence, urging Saudi Arabia to adhere to the same laws of armed conflict and human rights that we follow. Moreover they won the High Court case looking to see: ‘if there is a clear risk the items might be used in the commission of a serious violation of International Humanitarian Law’. However, as of 20 June 2019 that ruling has now been overturned, with the High Court finding that a clear risk exists. The UK Government has stated that it intends on appealing against this decision in the Supreme Court (Danssaert, P., 2019).

The UK Government’s (UK Parliament, 2016, p.4) response that British liaison officers: ‘Are not involved in carrying out… are not involved in the Saudi targeting decision-making process’, is arguably a weak attempt to appear blameless and will likely prove to be an untenable stance, when scrutinised in years to come. All it does is draw attention to the fact that we know and have known that the Saudi-led coalition do not conduct themselves in accordance with our Laws of Armed Conflict (UK Parliament, 2016, p.5; Wilcken, 2018). The fact that we are not directly involved in the military action, does not absolve us of the immoral wrongdoing of inaction.

The court case mentioned above, was embroiled in controversy and doubt and the renewed effort to bring a new High Court case to a successful conclusion goes to show the lack of behavioural change made by the UK Government 20

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since 2015. Perhaps the most damning piece of evidence for the ongoing indecision of our ruling bodies, was when the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) was dissolved after splitting a vote to suspend arms exports to Saudi Arabia, following an official government investigation. The Defence Committee, one of the four committees comprising CAEC, ‘did not associate itself’ with the conclusion of the inquiry thereby undermining any findings of wrongdoing (UK Parliament, 2016, p.3; Brooke-Holland, L. 2018). One cannot help but ask, why an inquiry was carried out if the resulting report could be ignored?

Condemnation, condemnation, condemnation! Unfortunately, if it is deemed a necessary evil by the key players involved, then there is not much beyond condemnation that can be done about this matter. In November 2018, Germany put into place a moratorium on arms exports to Saudi Arabia after mounting public pressure. However, that has been criticised and exceptions have been made in the name of supporting NATO’s credibility. Jeremy Hunt (Wintour 2019) was slightly less subtle when he wrote to the German Foreign Minister that, ‘I am very concerned about the impact of the German government’s decision on the British and European defence industry …’. Yes, our economic interests have a role to play in this, as has been made evident by the discussion of petroleum, however; where do we stand in comparing the moral cost of the destruction that is being caused with the £4.5 billion earned through arms sales? (Brooke-Holland, L. 2018, p.2).

I would argue that having this concrete figure makes this appear worse; it almost allows us to quantify what people’s lives are worth. Saudi Arabia makes up nearly 50% of the UK’s arms exports, so suspending sales would inevitably cause a loss of livelihoods back home (Brooke-Holland, L. 2018, p.2). This is the point where the UK Government needs to justify the sales beyond financial gain, because as indirect supporters of the Saudi-led coalition, we are undeniably influencing the suffering that the people of Yemen are experiencing (UN, 2018). This is evidently

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The illusion of choice

A political cartoon contrasting the fundamental ‘differences’ between ISIS and Saudi Arabia

realpolitik in practice, as the UK Government has concluded that both the unsavoury perception and very real consequences of its arms exports, are not enough to prevent them from continuing.

The current crisis in Yemen aside, Saudi Arabia is no stranger to controversy. It has carried out assassinations and breached international human rights on a harrowingly regular basis, through comparatively medieval executions, such as beheadings and crucifixions (Ministry of Interior, Saudi Arabia 2019). At the risk of sounding extremely righteous, they do not conduct themselves in a liberal manner; they are currently ranked 172nd of 180 countries on the World Press Freedom Index (2019). However, the monarchy is attempting to better the country’s image through anti-corruption drives and the slow empowerment of women. The killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi undid a lot of the positive press the country had worked hard to receive (Strobel, 2019).

The United Kingdom’s energy consumption has been decreasing over the last few years and the share of that energy being produced through renewable means is increasing (Office for National Statistics, 2016). The less we rely on Saudi Arabian exports, the less we need to placate them through political means. However, it could be argued that regardless of our economic ties to the country, Saudi Arabia offers us the best chance of a more stable Arab world and from a realpolitik perspective, that is enough justification to overlook the morally questionable behaviour of its government.

The Foreign Secretary said at the United States Institute For Peace that: “The strengthening of our credibility in support of a rules-based international order, must become a central goal of foreign policy.” (Hunt, J. 2018). It can be argued that he is advocating realpolitik through our need to be a state that can be relied upon to support and maintain the international order, regardless of the moral ambiguities that may be present at that time.

The greater good What would happen if the West stopped supporting Saudi Arabia? What would happen if Saudi Arabia collapsed? We have seen on numerous occasions the danger of a power vacuum in the Middle East and in this case, we are looking at a state of numerous Muslim tribes held together by an alliance between the religious authorities and ruling House of Saud (Riedel, 2017). The Houthis wave a national flag that states "God is the Greatest, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam" (Reidel, 2017). Were they to come to power, there would be numerous secondary and tertiary effects both regionally and globally. There would now be a minority sect in power, which disagrees fundamentally with the majority of religious Muslims already living in Saudi Arabia (Riedel, 2017). Certain countries such as Iran would be content, as it will have realistically gained a client state.

Saudi Consulate Istanbul 2018

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However it is a reasonable assumption that Jordan and Israel, amongst others, would not be happy with these tumultuous events happening just across a tenuous border.

Crispin Blunt, the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, puts it rather well. He states that: ‘Saudi Arabia is a key partner of the United Kingdom...I am yet to hear any persuasive argument for how we better secure our many strategic objectives in the region…It is crucial that the UK does everything in its power to ensure full compliance with international humanitarian law by the Saudi-led coalition’ (Blunt, 2016). With this, he acknowledges the reality of the situation in the peninsula; that regardless of the scruples we may have over allying ourselves with Saudi Arabia; it is wishful thinking to believe we can otherwise achieve stability and security there (Fallon, 2017). Unfortunately, his implicitly defeatist second sentence, signals that we are at a dead-end when it comes to pressuring Saudi into changing its ways for our sake.

In 2011, Borg wrote that: ‘Balancing realpolitik with idealpolitik is the only way forward’. This is nothing groundbreaking, in fact it is the opposite. It is a painfully obvious solution that renders this entire discussion void, if only it were, as he states, ever actually possible to balance the two concepts equally.

The reality I conclude, is that for the UK… Realpolitik will almost always be weighted more heavily than idealpolitik; this is principally due to our strategic interests so often being aligned with what our seemingly global interests are. Thus the consequence of not intervening would be far more damaging to the international order and likely lead to increased human suffering (Borg, 2011; Van Rij and Wilkinson, 2019, p.25). It is here that I would argue that in the case of the Yemen crisis, maintaining stability in the region is more crucial than holding Saudi Arabia to account for breaches of international law. One should not condone inaction, but there is very little space for idealism in this conflict.

Although tongue-in-cheek and very brief, this article has made it evident that a realist-based approach to politics is recommended if you want to avoid disappointment. Whether the UK Government should be more honest about its behaviour and be more open with the public about why they are supporting certain regimes or taking certain questionable measures is a different question, and perhaps one for next year’s Review.

References ACLED Data. (2019). ACLED Resources: Yemen War | Acled Data. [Online] Available at: https://www.acleddata.com/2019/04/17/acled-resourcesyemen-war/ [Accessed 10 May 2019].

Borg, F. (2011). ‘No realpolitik without idealpolitik’. [online] Times of Malta.

Available at: https://app.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110828/ religion/-No-realpolitik-without-idealpolitik-.382175 [Accessed 3 May 2019].

Brooke-Holland, L. (2018). UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia: Q&A. [online] Available at: Briefing Paper, 08425. House of Commons Library 2018 [Accessed 05 May 2019].

Danssaert, P. (2019). UK Court Ruling on Arms to Saudi Arabia. Arms Trade Bulletin May-June 2019 [online] Available at: http://ipisresearch.be/ publication/arms-trade-bulletin-may-june-2019/ [Accessed 05 October 2019].

Fallon, M. HMG, Ministry of Defence. (2017). ‘New agreement strengthens UK-Saudi Arabia defence relationship’. News story. 19 September 2017.

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Google.com. (2019). the greater good hot fuzz - Google Search. [online] Available at: https://www.google.com/search?biw=1536&bih=754&tbm= isch&sa=1&ei=DK_SXJvQO52ajLsP_5WGkAg&q=the+greater+good+hot +fuzz&oq=the+greater+good+hot+fuzz&gs_l=img.3..0i67j0j0i24.1278.4 029..4085...0.0..0.116.2033.20j4......0....1..gws-wiz-img.uUJAdBmMRko [Accessed 4 May 2019].

Human Rights Watch. (2019). World Report 2019: Rights Trends in Yemen. [online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/countrychapters/yemen [Accessed 10 May 2019].

Hunt, J. (2019). Foreign Secretary's speech at the United States Institute For Peace. [online] GOV.UK. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/ government/speeches/foreign-secretarys-speech-at-the-united-statesinstitute-for-peace [Accessed 6 May 2019].

Kober, S. (1990). Idealpolitik. [online] Foreign Policy. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1148674.pdf?seq=1#page_scan_tab_co ntents [Accessed 3 May 2019].

Ministry of Interior. (2019). General/Implementation of the death penalty and the establishment of the end of the war in a number of perpetrators. [online] Available at: https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang ar&newsid=1916236. [Accessed 7 May 2019].

ONS. (2016). UK energy: how much, what type and where from? - Office for National Statistics. [online] Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/ economy/environmentalaccounts/articles/ukenergyhowmuchwhattypeand wherefrom/2016-08-15 [Accessed 1 May 2019].

OPEC: Annual Statistical Bulletin. (2018). OPEC: Saudi Arabia. [online] Available at: https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/169.htm [Accessed 10 May 2019].

Rahma, N. (2018). Saudi-led coalition to probe Yemen air raid, Houthis report 40.... [online] U.K. Available at: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-yemensecurity-un/saudi-led-coalition-to-probe-yemen-air-raid-houthis-report-40children-dead-idUKKBN1KV0N3?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews [Accessed 1 May 2019].

Reisener, M. (2019). America Must Question Ally Actions in Yemen. [online] The National Interest. Available at: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/ middle-east-watch/america-must-question-ally-actions-yemen-45112 [Accessed 4 May 2019].

Riedel, B. (2017). Who are the Houthis, and why are we at war with them?. [online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/ 12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/ [Accessed 2 May 2019].

RSF. (2019). 2019 World Press Freedom Index | Reporters Without Borders. [online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/ranking [Accessed 10 May 2019].

Stares, P. and Ighani, H. (2017). How Stable Is Saudi Arabia?. [Online].

Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/expertbrief/how-stable-saudi-arabia [Accessed 1 May 2019].

Stone, J. (2016). Britain’s arms control committee can’t agree what to do about selling bombs to Saudi Arabia. [online] The Independent. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/saudi-arabian-armssales-uk-row-ban-vote-committee-arms-export-control-senate-a7309291. html [Accessed 10 May 2019].

Strobel, W. (2019). Saudi-Commissioned Report Contests U.S. Finding About Khashoggi’s Killing. [online] WSJ. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/ articles/saudi-commissioned-report-contests-u-s-finding-about-journalistskilling-11549498605 [Accessed 1 May 2019].

UK Parliament. (2016). British courts should decide legality of Government arms exports to Saudi Arabia - News from Parliament. [online] Available at: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/ commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/news-parliament-2015/yemenreport-published-16-17/ [Accessed 30 Apr. 2019].

UK Parliament. (2016). Use of UK-manufactured arms in Yemen inquiry publications. [online] Available at: https://www.parliament.uk/business/ committees/committees-a-z/other-committees/committee-on-armsexport-controls/inquiries/parliament-2015/uk-arms-yemen-15-16/publicati ons/ [Accessed 10 May 2019].

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2018). OHCHR | Bachelet urges States with the power and influence to end starvation, killing of civilians in Yemen. [online] Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/ Pages/ DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23855&LangID=E [Accessed 10 May 2019].

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Van Rij, A., and Wilkinson, B. (2019). Security cooperation with Saudi Arabia: Is it worth it for the UK?. The Policy Institute. [online]. Available at: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-institute/assets/uk-saudi-arabia-report.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2019].

Watson, B. (2019). The War in Yemen and the Making of a Chaos State. [online] The Atlantic. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/ international/archive/2018/02/the-war-in-yemen-and-the-making-of-achaos-state/551987/ [Accessed 28 Apr. 2019].

Wilcken, P. (2018). Britain and the US must stop fuelling the bloody Saudi war on Yemen | Patrick Wilcken. [online] The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/20/yemenarms-saudi-arabia [Accessed 10 May 2019].

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Wintour, P. (2019). Jeremy Hunt urges Germany to rethink Saudi arms sales ban. [online] The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2019/feb/20/jeremy-hunt-urges-germany-to-rethink-saudi-armssales-ban [Accessed 3 May 2019].

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See success in action To book a personal visit or for further details, please contact the Registrar: Tel: 01283 559222 Email: registrar@repton.org.uk

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The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is there a solution?

Over the past 70 years, the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict has taken the lives of roughly 75,000 people1 and there is no clear sign of it ending. A ‘Two state solution’ has been backed by much of the international community and is seen as a popular mainstream solution, however, it has failed to gain any significant traction.

This essay will examine the origins of the conflict, the ongoing peace process as well as what a two state solution looks like in theory, with a critical examination of its merits and an overview of the alternatives. By Lt Jack Turner Origins For the most part, the conflict is based on claims to land that both sides state is theirs by historic right. Though both Jews and Arab Muslims date their claims to the land back approximately 2000 years, the current political conflict began in the early 20th century. Most of the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust were unable or unwilling to return to eastern Europe due to postwar antisemitism and the destruction of their communities. ‘Many of those who did return feared for their lives’2. As a result, according to Vox, Jews fleeing oppression in Europe wanted to: ‘Establish a national homeland in what was then an Arab and Muslimmajority territory in the Ottoman and later British Empire’3. The Arabs resisted, seeing the land as rightfully theirs. The United Nations had a plan to give each group part of the land, however this failed4.

The resulting fallout saw Israel and the surrounding Arab nations fight several wars over the territory and today's territorial lines reflect the outcomes of two of these wars.

The latter of these two wars occurred in 1967 and is known as the Six-Day War in which Israel defeated Syria, Egypt and Jordan and occupied the Golan Heights, east Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank which they still do today5. This war resulted in the complete annexation of the territory by the state of Israel, the effects of which can still be seen today.

It was around the mid-1990s that the two-state solution acquired some momentum and gained favour across the international community6. There has been much debate over what this would look like, but the general idea is that each state would be given independence and from an international perspective, appears to be the solution that 24

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Central Israel next to the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 2007

makes the most sense. Whether such a resolution is politically possible however is another matter and something this essay will seek to explore.

Settlements and their impact Settlements are communities of Jews that have been moving to the West Bank since it came under Israeli occupation in 1967. Some of the reasons settlers move there are for religious purposes and some because they want to claim the West Bank territory as Israeli land. Settlements are generally considered to be a major impediment to peace and there are about 130 scattered around the West Bank. There are approximately 500,000 Israelis living in these settlements with roughly 75 percent of settlers living on or near the West Bank border with Israel.

Settlements split Palestinian communities apart and weakens their connection to the land, while Jewish communities put down roots in territory meant for Palestinians which blurs the boundaries of any future Palestinian state. For some settlers, this is exactly the reason that they are developing these settlements. The military occupation required to defend the settlements makes life challenging for the Palestinians as there are Israeli-only

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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pledged in September 2019 to: ‘Annex all Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank’

roads forcing Palestinians through a variety of security checkpoints. It can be argued that settlements violate the Fourth Geneva Convention which prohibits the transfer of population into occupied territories. Despite this, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pledged in September 2019 to: “Annex all Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank’, likely using incendiary statements such as this to bolster his standing with the right-leaning electorate but also countering concerns over contravening the Geneva Convention citing ‘Security needs and biblical, historical and political connections to the land”7.

What happens if the peace process fails?

It could be argued that the current state of the peace process looks dire with some commentators describing the two countries as ‘Paying lip service’ to the negotiations8. In East Jerusalem in July 2019 and under the guise of ‘Security’, Israel began demolishing Palestinian homes much to the chagrin of the international community9. This demonstrates a flagrant disregard for the rights of the Palestinian families that were evicted in the large-scale operation which one might argue is part of a wide-ranging strategy of displacement by Israel to take control of greater swathes of land.

If the peace process fails, we could end up with a single state that encompasses Israel, Gaza and the West Bank.

With the absence of any form of legal agreement to separate or segregate, a single state could be the undoing of either side. As at 2019, the Palestinian population in Israel, in occupied East Jerusalem, the Occupied Gaza Strip, and the Occupied West Bank combined is now estimated at over 5.3 million which is 100,000 greater than their Israeli counterparts10. Thus, operating under one state would result in the continued hypothetical second-class citizen status of the Palestinians or they could be afforded equal-status and thus vote to cease the existence of the Jewish state.

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However, if Arabs outnumber Jews and are not allowed to vote, then Israel will no longer be a democracy. These situations take on a South Africa analogy that commentators have used, with the Jewish state oppressing an Arab majority looking very much like that of apartheid. Much like South Africa’s racial regime was, Israel should be troubled by the international boycotts and sanctions that could be levied their way.

Based on the above, a solution could take the form of a coalition government that allows two parties to work together. This would enable the views of both Israelis and Palestinians to be voiced within the government and solutions to issues that each side faced to be debated and resolved. However, given the disproportionate power that the Israeli’s hold within the current status quo, this is an unlikely outcome.

The population statistics are contested by Israeli conservatives who argue that Palestinians, for political reasons, overstate their numbers and that the Israeli population is growing faster than experts think. Despite this, the leading theory is that Israel’s demographic problem is a real threat and that Israel faces a choice between three outcomes: a two-state solution, a non-democratic state governed by a Jewish minority, or the end of a Jewish state.

Two states versus One To create an independent Israel and Palestine would require a two-state solution. This solution is built upon the premise that Israelis and Palestinians want to run their countries differently. Because neither side can get what it wants in a joined state, the solution that appears to satisfy both parties involves separating the two. This is reflected in poll results which shows that the people of Palestine and Israel support the two-state solution11 and this route is also the one preferred by the international community; it is easy to see why. By separating the two states each would enjoy sovereignty and political independence which would likely restore some element of peace and security to the area, as well as end the needless bloodshed. One could even suggest that there is somewhat of a template for this solution, seen in Ireland to prevent sectarian violence.

Evidence of progress towards this solution can be seen by both the UN according Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status12 in 2012, as well as the Arab League voicing their approval of a two-state solution again this year13.

However, in order to take real steps forward there needs to be an end to ‘Illegal Israeli settlement activity’14 that pushes out native Palestinians as well as a stop to the destruction of the West Bank. Such actions continue to erode the trust that is required for the two nations to come together and agree on a solution. Furthermore, this pushes the Palestinian group Hamas even further from a peaceful solution. Hamas is a: ‘Palestinian Islamist political organization and militant group’ that ‘governs Gaza independently of the Palestinian Authority’15. What this means for the peace process is that when seeking a solution to the problem, Palestine technically has two major factions that need to be appeased; the THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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The history of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict began with the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948

Palestinian Authority (run by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation) and Hamas. This adds an extra layer of complexity to the peace talks as the appeasement of one faction will not necessarily be accepted by the other.

To enact change, you need the participation of both Israel and Palestine. In 1967, UNSC Resolution 242 was adopted which: ‘Called on Israel to give up the territories it occupied in exchange for a lasting peace with its neighbours’16. The outcome from this should have been a significant move towards a two-state solution, however, there has been littleto-no commitment by Israel to hand back the territory it annexed in the Six-Day War. Ghada Karmi, a British-Palestinian author and lecturer at Exeter University's Institute of Arab and Islamic studies, argues that Israel had no intention of ever giving back the land and stated that Israel has used Resolution 242 to continue the occupation of the territory17. It could then be argued that Israel has an appetite for the continued occupation with no intention of relinquishing this land.

Indeed, it might even be suggested that there is no interest in pursuing a solution at all and why would they? As it stands, they occupy a majority of the land, they control the Palestinians and the Israeli settlements continue to expand.

Conversely, is there an incentive for the Israeli government to give back any land? After Israel withdrew settlers and their army from the Gaza strip in 2005, Palestinians rioted, destroying assets they could have used, and then voted in Hamas, a terrorist organisation, who then used Gaza as a staging point for rocket attacks18. This highlights an opportunity for a third party to be involved next time to prevent a similar outcome from occurring. Land that is given to Palestine by Israel could be slowly introduced or a method agreed by both sides but policed by a separate entity to ensure a peaceful transition.

The ‘One-state solution’ would merge Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip into one big country. It comes in two versions. One, favoured by some leftists and Palestinians, would create a single democratic country. We would then see, as outlined previously, Arab Muslims outnumber Jews and thus ending Israel as a Jewish state.

The other version would involve Israel annexing the West Bank and either forcing out Palestinians or denying them the right to vote. This would be seen as an unacceptable human 26

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rights violation by virtually the entire world and would face international condemnation.

A strong argument against the two-state solution can be drawn from the above point. If the international community sets its sights solely on a two-state solution, then arguably no progress can be made whilst Israel and Palestine accuse each other of wanting to solely control the region. Therefore, alternative routes need to be explored. One solution is to pursue a secular one-state solution that gives equal rights to both sides. This is not a radical idea. In fact, it can be argued that the two sides already function as a single state.

Michael Tarazi, a Palestinian-American lawyer and former adviser to the Palestine Liberation Organization, wrote that: ‘They share the same aquifers, the same highway network, the same electricity grid and the same international borders’19. Those of the same disposition as Tarazi hope the secular single state would still retain a Jewish presence and culture in the region.

Why might a one-state solution not be a viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? One of the main reasons is because the Palestinians would become a majority. An Israeli demographer and statistician, Sergio Della Pergola, states that as a result of an influx of Palestinian refugees as well as the high fertility rate amongst Palestinians, Jews would become a minority20. Such a result would mean Israel would cease to exist as a Palestinian majority would undoubtedly push out the Jewish leadership and there is no guarantee of Jewish culture being retained. Despite this, growing condemnation of Israel’s apparent apartheid state as a result of oppression the Palestinians are being subjected to, has resulted in a growing body of Jews that are seeking an end to the exclusively Jewish state21.

Conclusion Arguably, the two-state solution presents the most viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From the evidence presented, it offers the fairest result with each side gaining the independence they want and the right to govern their own territory. However, an issue that arises is where would the land lines be drawn if they pursued this solution? Does Israel withdraw settlers and settlements to the lines drawn in the UN Partition plan of 1947? Or does it agree a point somewhere between 1947 and the present day, with the latter years demonstrating the erosion of Palestinian land by Israel?

What this idea points to is more an issue of communication. A truly viable solution can only be sought when the two sides wish to enter honest discussions that will be mutually beneficial and not approached like a zerosum game. As it stands, a two-state approach appears to be the only realistic solution as a one state solution would likely see the end of Israel with the dominance of the Palestinian people likely coming to the fore not long after unification. It is highly unlikely that the Jew’s would vote to eradicate the first and only Jewish state. Despite this, it may be the only way that ends the oppression of the Palestinians and produce harmony in the region. In summary, I believe that

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John Kerry: “If the choice is one state, Israel can either be Jewish or democratic, it cannot be both and it won’t ever really be at peace.”

two states for two peoples is a viable solution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict and the only one that both parties will be interested in pursuing. To quote John Kerry: “If the choice is one state, Israel can either be Jewish or democratic – it cannot be both – and it won’t ever really be at peace.”22 References DellaPergola, S. and Lévy, M. (2003). La démographie dans le conflit israélopalestinien. Commentaire, Numéro104(4), p.941.

General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in United Nations | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. [online] Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ ga11317.doc.htm [Accessed 14 May 2018].

Goldberg, J. (2018). Why Would Israel Give Up Territory, After Gaza? [online] The Atlantic. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/international /archive/2011/09/why-would-israel-give-up-territory-after-gaza/244995/ [Accessed 6 Jun. 2018].

History.state.gov. (2019). Milestones: 1993–2000 - Office of the Historian. [online] Available at: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo [Accessed 10 Oct. 2019].

Lustick, Ian, Yousef Munayyer, Jeremy Ben-Ami and Ahmad Samih Khalidi.

“Two States of One? The Future of Israelis and Palestinians.” Middle East Policy 20 (4) (Winter 2013) Mfa.gov.il. (2019). [online] Available at: https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/ maps/pages/1947%20un%20partition%20plan.aspx [Accessed 10 Oct. 2019].

Mosaicmagazine.com. (2018). Do Palestinians Want a Two-State Solution? [online] Available at: https://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/2017/04/dopalestinians-want-a-two-state-solution/ [Accessed 11 Jun. 2018].

Najjar, F. (2018). Why there can never be a two-state solution. [online] Aljazeera.com. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017 /11/state-solution-171119093352403.html [Accessed 15 May 2018].

Powell (2018). Arab leaders: Two-state solution best option in IsraeliPalestinian conflict. [online] Fox News. Available at: http://www.foxnews.com/ world/2017/03/29/arab-leaders-two-state-solution-best-option-inpalestine-israeli-conflict.html [Accessed 14 May 2018].

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Tarazi, M. (2018). Two Peoples, One State. [online] Nytimes.com. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/04/opinion/two-peoples-onestate.html [Accessed 7 Jun. 2018].

The Guardian. (2018). Israel is 70 – is hope for a two-state solution gone? | Letters. [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2018/may/14/israel-is-70-is-hope-for-a-two-state-solution-gone [Accessed 15 May 2018].

The Hindu. (2018). The Israel-Palestine conflict — 100 years of history. [online] Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/theisrael-palestine-conflict-100-years-of-history/article19954348.ece [Accessed 13 May 2018].Un.org (2018).

The Independent. (2019). Israel begins demolishing Palestinian homes in east Jerusalem. [online] Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/ news/world/middle-east/israel-palestine-demolitions-east-jerusalem-westbank-sur-baher-bulldozers-a9015276.html [Accessed 10 Oct. 2019].

ThoughtCo. (2019). What Is the Current Situation in Israel? [online] Available at: https://www.thoughtco.com/current-situation-in-israel-2353137 [Accessed 10 Oct. 2019].

Un.org. (2018). Two-State Solution, Ending Occupation Remain Only Path to Lasting Peace, Says Deputy Secretary-General, Marking Day of Solidarity with Palestinian People | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. [online] Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/ dsgsm1117.doc.htm [Accessed 14 May 2018].

Ushmm.org. (2018). Postwar Refugee Crisis and the Establishment of the State of Israel. [online] Available at: https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/ article.php?ModuleId=10005459 [Accessed 13 May 2018].

U.S. (2019). Netanyahu repeats pledge to annex Israeli settlements in occupied West Bank. [online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-israel-palestinians-settlement/netanyahu-repeats-pledge-toannex-israeli-settlements-in-occupied-west-bank-idUSKCN1VM10D [Accessed 10 Oct. 2019].

Vox. (2018). What are Israel and Palestine? Why are they fighting? [online] Available at: https://www.vox.com/cards/israel-palestine/intro [Accessed 13 May 2018].

Vox. (2018). What are the "two-state solution" and the "one-state solution"? [online] Available at: https://www.vox.com/cards/israel-palestine/twostate-one-state [Accessed 14 May 2018].

Vox. (2019). What is Hamas? [online] Available at: https://www.vox.com/ 2018/11/20/18080058/israel-palestine-hamas [Accessed 10 Oct. 2019].

Worldpopulationreview.com.

(2019). [online] Available at: http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/palestine-population/ #targetText=Palestine%20Demographics&targetText=The%20number% 20of%20Palestinians%20in,is%20projected%20to%20reach%2046%25.

[Accessed 10 Oct. 2019].

WRMEA. (2019). THE ORIGIN OF THE PALESTINE-ISRAEL CONFLICT. [online] Available at: https://www.wrmea.org/the-origins-of-the-israelipalestinian-conflict.html [Accessed 8 Apr. 2019].

Footnotes 111

Lustick, Ian, Yousef Munayyer, Jeremy Ben-Ami and Ahmad Samih Khalidi.

“Two States of One? The Future of Israelis and Palestinians.” Middle East Policy 20 (4) (Winter 2013) 112 Ushmm.org. (2018). Postwar Refugee Crisis and the Establishment of the State of Israel. [online] Available at: https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/ article.php?ModuleId=10005459 [Accessed 13 May 2018].

113 Vox. (2018). What are Israel and Palestine? Why are they fighting? [online] Available at: https://www.vox.com/cards/israel-palestine/intro [Accessed 13 May 2018].

114 Mfa.gov.il. (2019). [online] Available at: https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/ aboutisrael/maps/pages/1947%20un%20partition%20plan.aspx [Accessed 10 Oct. 2019].

115 The Hindu. (2018). The Israel-Palestine conflict — 100 years of history. [online] Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/theisrael-palestine-conflict-100-years-of-history/article19954348.ece [Accessed 13 May 2018].

116 History.state.gov. (2019). Milestones: 1993–2000 - Office of the Historian. [online] Available at: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo [Accessed 10 Oct. 2019].

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U.S. (2019). Netanyahu repeats pledge to annex Israeli settlements in occupied West Bank. [online] Available at: https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-settlement/netanyahurepeats-pledge-to-annex-israeli-settlements-in-occupied-west-bank-idUSK CN1VM10D [Accessed 10 Oct. 2019].

118 ThoughtCo. (2019). What Is the Current Situation in Israel? [online] Available at: https://www.thoughtco.com/current-situation-in-israel2353137 [Accessed 10 Oct. 2019].

119 The Independent. (2019). Israel begins demolishing Palestinian homes in east Jerusalem. [online] Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/ news/world/middle-east/israel-palestine-demolitions-east-jerusalem-westbank-sur-baher-bulldozers-a9015276.html [Accessed 10 Oct. 2019].

110 Worldpopulationreview.com.

(2019). [online] Available at: http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/palestinepopulation/#targetText=Palestine%20Demographics&targetText=The%2 0number%20of%20Palestinians%20in,is%20projected%20to%20reach %2046%25. [Accessed 10 Oct. 2019].

111 Vox. (2018). What are the "two-state solution" and the "one-state solution"? [online] Available at: https://www.vox.com/cards/israelpalestine/two-state-one-state [Accessed 14 May 2018].

112 Un.org. (2018). General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in United Nations | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. [online] Available at: https://www.un.org/ press/en/2012/ga11317.doc.htm [Accessed 14 May 2018].

113 Powell (2018). Arab leaders: Two-state solution best option in IsraeliPalestinian conflict. [online] Fox News. Available at: http:// www.foxnews.com/world/2017/03/29/arab-leaders-two-state-solutionbest-option-in-palestine-israeli-conflict.html [Accessed 14 May 2018].

114

Un.org. (2018). Two-State Solution, Ending Occupation Remain Only Path to Lasting Peace, Says Deputy Secretary-General, Marking Day of Solidarity with Palestinian People | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. [online] Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/ dsgsm1117.doc.htm [Accessed 14 May 2018].

115 Vox. (2019). What is Hamas? [online] Available at: https://www.vox.com/ 2018/11/20/18080058/israel-palestine-hamas [Accessed 10 Oct. 2019].

116 Najjar, F. (2018). Why there can never be a two-state solution. [online] Aljazeera.com. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/ 11/state-solution-171119093352403.html [Accessed 15 May 2018].

117 Najjar, F. (2018). Why there can never be a two-state solution. [online] Aljazeera.com. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/ 11/state-solution-171119093352403.html [Accessed 15 May 2018].

118 Goldberg, J. (2018). Why Would Israel Give Up Territory, After Gaza? [online] The Atlantic. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/ international/archive/2011/09/why-would-israel-give-up-territory-aftergaza/244995/ [Accessed 6 Jun. 2018].

119 Tarazi, M. (2018). Two Peoples, One State. [online] Nytimes.com. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/04/opinion/two-peoples-onestate.html [Accessed 7 Jun. 2018].

120 DellaPergola, S. and Lévy, M. (2003). La démographie dans le conflit israélo-palestinien. Commentaire, Numéro104(4), p.941.

121 the Guardian. (2018). Israel is 70 – is hope for a two-state solution gone? | Letters. [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2018/may/14/israel-is-70-is-hope-for-a-two-state-solution-gone [Accessed 15 May 2018].

122 Mosaicmagazine.com. (2018). Do Palestinians Want a Two-State Solution? [online] Available at: https://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/2017/04/dopalestinians-want-a-two-state-solution/ [Accessed 11 Jun. 2018].

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Discuss the relevance of NATO today as a deterrent against potential aggressors, particularly Russia

Forged in the aftermath of two World Wars, NATO has since presided over 70 years of relative peace in mainland Europe, a fact many point to as indicative of its enduring political success. However, for this to have been achieved, NATO has had to continuously adapt across the decades to overcome an ever changing and more complex world. It requires only the briefest glance at Lord Ismay’s original ideology to reveal the seismic global shift that has taken place since the signing of the original accord.

The Soviet Union is now long extinct, America is perhaps closer to leaving NATO than ever before and Germany has cast off the trauma of its 19th Century past to become an integral member state. This nigh on inversion of the status quo therefore raises the serious question of whether NATO still serves a purpose in the modern-day world, or whether the global table (MOD, 2018, pp. p.212-241) has now altered so significantly that it is no longer fit for task.

As the Council on Foreign Relations think tank surmises: ‘If NATO did not exist today, there would be no push to create it.’ (Goldgeier, 2007, p.3). To answer this effectively, one needs to assess the contemporary success with which NATO is performing in its principle format as a military deterrent and equally evaluate the progress NATO is making in offsetting those new challenges facing it in the 21st Century.

With regards to the former, it is firstly important to place NATO within its historical context. At the time of its inception in 1949, the organisation was unilaterally employed as a demonstration of overt Western cohesion, counterbalancing the might of the Soviet Union and its forces massed across Eastern Europe. The principle of ‘collective defence’, outlined in Article 5 of the treaty and a cornerstone of the pact in both its original and current guise, stipulated that, ‘An attack 30

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“To keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in and the Germans down.”

These famous words uttered by Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, the first Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, neatly encapsulates British sentiment, the predominant Western zeitgeist and the unofficial founding principles upon which the council was built on 4 April 1949. By Lt Alexander Wilkins

Lord Hasting Lionel Ismay, First Secretary General of NATO

against one Ally is considered as an attack against all,’ (NATO 2018) and was conceived specifically to deter Soviet ambitions beyond the ‘Iron Curtain’.

Despite fluctuating tensions over the next half century, this stand-off would ultimately maintain the uneasy equilibrium.

However, the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 precipitated the end of the Soviet era. The subsequent collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 saw the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the demise of NATO’s singular purpose for fifty years. Nonetheless, NATO as an entity persisted and its stated aim to this day remains: ‘To guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means.’ (NATO, 2018). This then raises the question as to where or whom has it subsequently shifted its attention?

Equally, armed predominantly with a blunt hard power strategy like military deterrence, is it able to counteract this entity as effectively as the one it was purpose built to nullify?

The most obvious candidate for NATO’s contemporary attention is a resurgent Russia, intent on re-establishing itself as a predominant global power. NATO has taken swift action to limit this, proactively assimilating former Warsaw Pact nations into the treaty, including Poland, Slovakia,

Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the Czech Republic. It was hoped that with the territorial integrity of these border nations secured under the protective umbrella of Article 5, Russian potential for aggressive Westward expansion would be curtailed, along with any notion of a Soviet Union for the modern age.

Whilst this tactic has been largely successful in constraining Russian hard power within its traditional geographic borders, it has proven undeniably antagonistic in equal measure. Russian relations with the West are now at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold War and their subsequent incursions in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine could well be viewed as a bout of retaliatory ‘muscle flexing’ in response to external pressure. NATO’s strategy has also been unable to prevent Russia from exerting influence abroad. The successful defence of its Syrian ally Bashar AlAssad and the provincial interests he secures, signalled Russia’s re-emergence in a region dominated by contemporary Western activity, and more importantly as a player within a wider global context.

However, despite Russia’s growing influence, NATO can no longer afford to fix its gaze solely in one direction and indeed must now look beyond its traditional sphere of interest to see those additional challenges that have arisen with the turn of the 21st Century. Complex and irregular entities are constantly emerging to challenge the Western values that NATO seeks to protect. The rise of Islamic extremism in particular has spawned a sudden prevalence of these factions, including terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Daesh, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, rebel groups like the Al-Nusra Front and fundamentalist political organisations, such as the Taliban. These clandestine, isolated and geographically fluid non-state actors, operating predominantly out of failed or failing regimes, present an unorthodox challenge to an organisation established to constrain a static and perceptible super-state.

With the emergence of such diverse contemporary threats to NATO, it is important to examine the pressures, both traditional and innovative, that these entities are capable of exerting and to understand how NATO is manoeuvring to realign itself to cope with these.

What is undeniable is that the challenges facing NATO today are infinitely more dynamic and complex than those of the previous century. This can be attributed in part to the continual long-term success of the super-block’s deterrent strategy in preventing large scale conflict, forcing protagonists to pursue more subversive means to achieve their aims. What we see consequently is described by Former U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates as: “The categories of warfare blurring and no longer fitting into neat, tidy boxes.” (Glenn, 2009, p.1). The predominant terminology that has come to encapsulate this is that of ‘Hybrid Warfare’. First described during the Chechen insurgency of 2002 and yet only gaining traction in Western military thinking following the Second Lebanon War in 2006, the intent of hybrid warfare is to obscure the traditional parameters of what can legitimately be defined as conflict,

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Does a resurgent Russia pose a threat to NATO security?

constructing paralysing grey spaces in the policies of states and institutions that can be exploited for political gain.

Russia has been at the pioneering forefront of this revolution. Still shackled by the Cold War constraints on overt military action that NATO successfully imposes, Russia has had to find alternative and innovative means of achieving her objectives. This emerged in the form of Russian General Valery Gerasimov’s revolutionary military doctrine for ‘Non-linear warfare’ in 2013 (Popescu, 2015, p. p.1). Subsequent subversive Russian actions in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine have demonstrated the effective capabilities of asymmetric conflict at a state level, allowing Russia to achieve its political objectives whilst neatly sidestepping NATO’s conventional restraints. This is not to say that NATO has been blind to Russian actions. General Julio Miranda Calha of the NATO Defence and Security Committee drafted a report in 2015 entitled, ‘Hybrid warfare: NATO’s new strategic challenge?’ In this he examined Russian activities in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, describing how they ‘Exploited domestic weaknesses via non-military means (such as political, informational, and economic intimidation and manipulation), but backed by the threat of conventional military means…while remaining concealed and below the threshold of a conventional response.’ (Miranda Calha, 2015, p. p.6).

Multiple NATO reviews and publications have since been forthcoming and in October 2017, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats was established.

In conjunction with this, NATO has outlined its strategy: ‘To assist any Ally against hybrid threats as part of collective defence.’ (NATO 2018). This includes a collective agreement for greater inter-state cooperation to counter hybrid threats and propaganda, as well as the inception of a ‘Hybrid Analysis Branch’ within NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division and the formation of ‘Counter-hybrid support teams’ in 2018 to provide: ‘Tailored targeted assistance to Allies upon their request, in preparing for and responding to hybrid activities.’ (NATO, 2018).

These new tools, redefining the remit of NATO’s original Article 5, have played an influential and effective role in the localised response to Russia’s asymmetric actions in Eastern Europe. Buffer states such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland now hold a permanent NATO military presence, armed with the means to defend themselves not only THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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Tackling terrorism is now one of NATO’s main concerns

against the trials of conventional hard power, but the tribulations of soft power as well. In conjunction with these actions, NATO is making concerted efforts to tackle the problem at source, taking proactive measures to limit what technological and infrastructural weapons Russia holds in its ‘hybrid arsenal’. The debate surrounding the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, planned to run under the Baltic Sea between Russia and Germany, is a prime example of how contemporary East-West attitudes are shifting. Despite the $11 billion project receiving provisional approval from German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2015, dissent within Germany and amongst her Western Allies, particularly from President Trump, who declared at a NATO Summit in July 2018 that it held Germany “Captive”(Donahue 2019), have forced Chancellor Merkel to acknowledge the ‘political dimensions’ of the venture beyond its commercial benefits.

As the US ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, succinctly summarised it: “There is not only Russian gas coming through the pipeline, but also Russian influence.”

(Donahue, 2019).

NATO’s evolution of its counter-Russian methodology is pronounced, but what of those aforementioned nongovernmental groups against whom its conventional response is impractical? Whilst it is true that on occasion, such as the declaration of the Islamic Caliphate by Daesh in 2014, a physical ‘state’ might emerge against which the unwieldy concept of military deterrence can be brought to bear, the geographically fluid and clandestine nature of these groups mean that they are frequently able to circumvent NATO’s conventional military capability, thus allowing them to sustain aggressive action despite comparatively inferior resources.

This problem is compounded with technology altering the face of everyday life at a pace not seen since the Industrial Revolution. We live in an ‘information age’, with social and conventional media, the internet, television, smart phones and a host of other outlets providing more connectivity and exposure among populations than ever before. For these smaller non-state groups, such innovative interconnections have allowed for the creation of a ‘Powerful propaganda machine’ (Gaub, 2015, p.2) that has been used to disseminate ‘Alternative narratives and realities in cyber space and on the ground’ (Miranda Calha, 2015, p.8), their 32

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ideologies reaching a much wider audience than they could ever have achieved conventionally.

At no point was NATO’s necessity for change driven home more acutely than during the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001. That it was the actions of a minor terrorist cell acting out of the Near East, not a predominant superpower, that forced the council to enact Article 5 for the only time in its history, signalled the need to adapt.

In order to combat this new and globalised threat, NATO has constructed innovative strategies and methodologies, as well as expanded its horizons to act beyond its traditional theatres of operation. The deployment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan in 2003 marked a new chapter in NATO policy, signalling the instigation of several proactive NATO endeavours beyond Europe. Its brief was to: ‘Build the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces to provide effective security, so as to ensure that Afghanistan will never again be a safe haven for terrorists.’ (NATO, 2018). What transpired was a longstanding and costly counter insurgency operation with mixed results, followed shortly by another in Iraq.

However, lessons from these two conflicts were learnt and NATO protocol is adapting once again. In its own words: ‘NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Policy Guidelines now focus Alliance efforts on three main areas: awareness, capabilities and engagement.’ (NATO, 2018). As such we are now seeing the implementation of so called ‘Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiatives’. These were launched in 2014 with the aim of: ‘Helping partners improve their defence and related security capacities, as well as their resilience, therefore contributing to the security of the Alliance.’ (NATO, 2018). Already in action across Iraq, Georgia and Tunisia amongst others, Libya is soon to be added and marks a further shift in NATO policy towards the upstream reinforcing of fragile states before they have a chance to fail, thereby denying irregular groups the natural habitat in which to flourish.

Given how the world has so drastically altered over the 50 years since NATO’s inception, it remains finally to ask what

Photo: Wikipedia/Michael Foran CC BY 2.0

Photo: www.nato.int

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The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 tragically highlighted the need for NATO to evolve

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imminent challenges lie ahead which might serve to undermine NATO’s relevance over the next half century. The answer to this lies not with the obvious arms race in modern technology, but in the drastic social, economic and political fluctuations currently manipulating the long-established world order. Globalisation and mass migration have seen a surge in Western Populist sentiment, evidenced by events such as Brexit, the rise of right-wing political entities across Europe, and the election of US President Donald Trump. The latter in particular has pursued a confrontational policy toward NATO ever since his inauguration. Dogged by alleged Russian links and constantly bemoaning his allies’ failure to reach agreed defence expenditure levels of 2% GDP, his negative perception of “Freeloading” NATO members have sparked rumours of a US withdrawal. Indeed, as recently as 17 Jan 2019, President Trump was forced to publicly pledge his commitment to NATO after stories repeatedly emerged of his frequent exasperations (Morin, 2019).

All of this has fermented internal strife within the organisation, weakening the integral alliance between the United States and its fellow council members. This in turn could be exacerbated by the economic, technological and militaristic rise of China in the East, drawing the United States’ interests ever more towards the Pacific. China’s economy is scheduled to outstrip that of the US by 2030, whilst huge infrastructure projects like the belt and road initiative, global investment programmes like those across Africa and accusations of hybrid threats such as those trailing Huawei or the Hinkley Point Nuclear Power Station, speak of a nation whose ever greater external ambitions could begin to threaten US dominance.

In conclusion, NATO’s relevance as a contemporary deterrent to military aggression is one that mustn’t be glibly discounted. It performs its traditional role as a check on the East-West status quo as effectively today as it ever has, whilst its self-awareness and propensity for change in the face of modern methodologies has been commendable. As Col Jones of the US Army describes: “It has evolved from a collective defence of alliance members to a collective security.” (Jones, 2012, p.26).

Whilst new threats will undoubtedly emerge over the

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coming decades, no challenge has yet to undermine the principle that a collective response is more effective than a solitary one. Indeed, when considering the trend towards hybrid methodologies of terrorism, misinformation and propaganda, it is through isolationism that one leaves oneself most exposed. As such, in the face of a shrinking and ever more complex world, it should be said that NATO and its cohesive inclinations are in fact more relevant now than ever before. Therefore securing, maintaining, and expanding the organisation, perhaps even beyond its traditional locales, should be at the forefront of each member states’ ambitions, thereby ever more securing the future of those fortunate enough to be sheltered beneath its umbrella, and strengthening its capacity to deal with future pressures.

References Donahue, P., 2019. Bloomberg. [Online] Available at: https:// www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-07/germany-wobbles-onrussian-gas-pipeline-as-trump-pressure-tells Gaub, F., 2015. Hybrid Tactics: ISIL & Co. [Online] Available at: https:// www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_47_hybrid_ISIL.pdf Glenn, R., 2009. Thoughts on 'Hybrid Conflict'. [Online] Available at: https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/188-glenn.pdf Goldgeier, J. M., 2007. The Future of NATO. [Online] Available at: https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2009/12/NATO_CSR51.pdf Jones, C. J. K., 2012. NATO's Relevance in the Twenty-First Century. [Online] Available at: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a561352.pdf Matallana, L. C. C. L., 2017. Maintaining NATO's Relevance in the 21st Century. [Online] Available at: https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/ pubs/3465.pdf Miranda Calha, J., 2015. Hybrid warfare: NATO's new strategic challenge?.

[Online] Available at: https://www.nato-pa.int/sites/default/files/ documents/2015%20-%20166%20DSC%2015%20E%20BIS%20%20HYBRID%20WARFARE%20-%20CALHA%20REPORT.docx MOD, 2018. Global Strategic Trends. [Online] Available at: https:// assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att achment_data/file/771309/Global_Strategic_Trends__The_Future_Starts_Today.pdf Morin, R., 2019. Politico. [Online] Available at: https://www.politico.eu/ article/trump-we-will-be-with-nato-100-percent/ NATO, 2018. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. [Online] Available at: www.nato.int Popescu, N., 2015. Hybrid Tactics: Russia and the West. [Online] Available at: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_46_ Hybrid_Russia.pdf

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Are unmanned vehicles a viable concept for logistics and if so, in which timeframe could this capability be integrated into the Field Army?

In the following essay, I will focus on whether unmanned vehicles are a viable concept for logistics and subsequently review the time frame expected to integrate these unmanned vehicles into the Field Army. By Lt Bevan Wray “The sounder theory, which accords more closely with the facts of modern warfare, is that logistics is not something distinct from strategy and tactics, but rather an integral part of both; that an understanding of the problems inherent in creating and, even more important, in maintaining forces in fighting condition in the theatre of operations is essential to high command.” - Duncan S. Ballantine, (Ballantine 1998, p.6).

No two conflicts are the same and none retains a fixed character. Each conflict is the product of its era and of the particular conditions which apply at the time. The everchanging character of conflict is influenced by global political, economic, social and technological factors. British Army Doctrine states that the most significant impact to the character of conflict has often been from changes in technology, such as gunpowder, the internal combustion engine, wireless communications, powered flight, nuclear weapons, computers and the Internet (Service.Gov, 2019).

The next technological advantage will be within autonomous vehicles and the integration within the Field Army, whether it be on the front line, the rear echelon or the supply link between the two.

Before we look at these areas, I will discuss the brief history and uses of autonomous vehicles within warfare. It is important to understand that the term ‘unmanned’ covers a wide spectrum of technology that is constantly evolving.

Therefore, in this essay I will be looking solely at militaristic autonomy vehicles that are used for supporting both military hard and soft effects, such as surveillance and logistic activities.

The first “drones” were originally balloons, first deployed

by Austrians in 1849 (Bart Everett, 2015, p.27). As these balloons were unstable, they were unpopular. However, by the 1910s, the USA began connecting unused warplanes with autopilot systems that the military could control remotely. It was during the First World War that one of the first logistics applications of unmanned systems was implemented. This was called the “electric dog”.

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The electric dog was a three-wheeled vehicle designed to carry supplies to the trenches by following the light of a lantern (Singer, 2009, p.45). Without any doubt, it was borne from the necessity of transporting essential logistical assets in the deadly environment that was created due to the employment of trench warfare. In the years since then, both logistics and unmanned applications have become increasingly important to militaries. They have steadily developed into top of the range precision vehicles, which can be controlled from a central location anywhere in the world.

In more recent times, the CIA has been flying unmanned drones over Afghanistan since 2000 as a consequence of the now infamous September 11th attacks. In more recent times, large logistic firms have begun experimenting with the use of drones within their supply chain.

Within the civilian sector, unmanned autonomous means of transport are steadily becoming more employed and is seen as the next phase in which civilian logistics will be conducted within the coming years. However, there are vast differences between civilian logistic companies and the military and the challenges the military faces. For instance, often the military are located within arduous environments such as the desert, the arctic or even disaster recovery conditions - generally places where most civilian companies do not operate. These are often areas in which the infrastructure where the military are required to operate is of poor quality and often require more robust vehicles, with recovery capability.

These are just a few of the basic challenges that the military need to overcome before considering the use of autonomous vehicles. Therefore, the question of unmanned vehicles being a viable fieldable concept for military logistics, and in what timeframe, is not as straight forward as it may initially seem.

Due to the Field Army’s current budget deficiencies and limitations, one of the bigger contributing factors is whether or not the British Army is willing to spend its restricted budget on autonomous vehicles and how much of a priority it is within Defence. In total, defence expenditure in 2016/17 was £35.3 billion. The UK therefore spent £538 per person on defence in 2016/17 (the third highest in NATO) (ContractsMOD, 2018). An example of the military allocating expenditure to the introduction of new vehicles are the AJAX fighting vehicles (Figure 1). In September 2014, General Dynamics was awarded a £3.5 billion contract to deliver 589 AJAX vehicles to the British Army for its new Strike Brigades.

This is a controversial vehicle which many detractors argue has been delayed and is seen to have many “Teething

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issues”. This equates to 10% of the total defence expenditure being allocated to one fighting vehicle; a platform on which countless issues have arisen.

Understandably, this cost is spread across many years, however, the point still stands. Not only will it cost an incredible amount of money to introduce, it will also take several years to introduce and integrate into the Field Army.

With the Army’s focus on the AJAX vehicle and current setbacks, the Field Army may limit the backing of autonomous logistics until a sounder understanding of how it fits within the Army’s achievement goals is clarified.

Figure 1. AJAX fighting variant

As mentioned, the AJAX fighting variants are being primed for the Army’s new Strike Brigades. These are built around the concept of disaggregated operations across a large area where forces concentrate at points in time and space to deliver a range of meaningful effects.

The AJAX is based on a collection of ‘medium weight’ tracked and wheeled vehicles, none of which can exploit the mobility advantages of support helicopters because they are too heavy. It therefore may be a more viable option to introduce autonomous support vehicles into a Strike Brigade, as an integrated force.

The pure nature of Strike means that vehicles are required to travel over much larger distances in a shorter time period to achieve effects. In logistical terms, this means delivering items further and quicker than ever before. There are setbacks to this. The first is the constraint of so-called drivers’ hours. The limitations to drivers’ hours mean that soldiers (by legislation) must have a minimum rest period within a 24hr period and a set rest period within a two-week period.

However, if Field Army vehicles are autonomous, then doctrinally they could continue for days without stopping, dependant only on servicing, fuel, oil, and lubricants.

Humans in control of a vehicle add more risk to that vehicle, which in military logistic terms suggests that supply may not get to the intended target and as a consequence, mission failure. The causes of motor vehicle collisions are complex, but broadly depend on the standard of drivers you command. Skill level (McGwin & Brown, 1999, pp 181-198), inexperience (McCartt et al., 2003, pp 320-331) and risktaking behaviours (Rolison et al., 2014, pp 870-80) have been implicated in the collisions of young drivers compared to drivers in other age ranges.

Investigations of vehicle collision records have also

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attributed excessive speed (Gonzales et al. pp 140-146, 2005; Lam, 2003, pp 913-920), driving recklessly (Lam, 2003) and traffic violations (Gonzales et al., 2005) to the issue. In contrast, the collisions concerning older more experienced drivers involve driver error related to complacency (G. McGwin, 1999), as well as age-related decline in visual, cognitive and mobility functioning that are more commonly experienced by older individuals (Hu et al., 1993; Janke, 1991, pp 183-188).

A wealth of research has identified poor performance in visual functioning and cognitive abilities as risk factors for older driver involvement in road traffic collisions (Ball et al., 2010; Ball et al., 2006; Owsley et al., 1991; Owsley et al., 1998). Although there is a lack of research, it would suggest that removing the driver and eliminating driver error would account for fewer road traffic incidents. This reinforces the argument for a viable transition to unmanned vehicles within the supply chain.

The counter argument, however, is that what robots do lack is driver and ethical judgment. Being able to make a judgement in an ever-changing situation in possibly a short period of time is something that the Field Army invests in its soldiers. Soldiers can make decisions on the ground (almost instantaneously) that artificial intelligence cannot match.

In an article published by Frontiers in Behavioural Neuroscience, Bergman stated that when faced with driving dilemmas, people show a high willingness to sacrifice themselves for others, making decisions based on the victim’s age and react by (for example) swerving onto sidewalks to minimise the number of lives lost (Frontiersinorg, 2019). A median level of automation could however be the answer to these problems. A situation in which a vehicle is not completely controlled by software or by humans, but by both depending on the situation.

Figure 2 (below) shows that automation can be broken down into five levels: 1. Level zero: No automation. When driver performs all the tasks, i.e. what we currently have in the majority of military vehicles.

2. Level one: Driver assistance. When the vehicle assists minimally with basic functions.

3. Level two: Partial automation. Where most automotive companies are currently operating. Some automation happens; however, the driver must always still be ready to take control.

Figure 2. Levels of automation

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4. Level three: Conditional automation. The vehicle controls all monitoring of the environment. Driver assistance is still required but can disengage for safety critical functions such as braking.

5. Level four: High automation, where the vehicle is in complete control, but cannot determine between more dynamic driving situations, such as traffic jams or merging onto motorways.

6. Level five: Complete/ full automation. The autonomous vehicle system controls all critical tasks, monitoring of the environment and identification of unique driving conditions, such as traffic jams.

In an ideal sense, the military would need level five autonomy to completely eradicate soldiers from danger.

However, a more viable means would be a happy medium between level 2 and level 3 automation, where a vehicle is able to transport supplies without the full attention of a soldier, however if human judgement is deemed necessary, the soldier can take over and control the vehicle.

The timescale to introduce unmanned vehicles into the supply chain may well be incredibly long. Although there is very little research on duration, experience of new vehicles such as the AJAX have shown that this could be a drawnout process. When the military decides it wants to invest in a new piece of equipment it must go through an acquisition cycle made up of: Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacture, In-Service, and Dispose (CADMID) cycle (GOV, 2019). Figure 3 (below) shows this cycle and the sort of complications any piece of equipment may have in the lead up to its deployment.

With a complicated piece of equipment such as an autonomous vehicle, it is impossible to forecast how long this would take. From experience of the CADMID process as well as the development of unmanned vehicles in the civilian sector, this would most likely take in excess of a decade.

The length of the CADMID cycle is not only dictated by how the vehicle is manufactured and its own technological maturity, but also by its implementation within doctrine in the wider Field Army. A further consideration is the interoperability with our closest allies, i.e. US, France, and Germany. The vehicle cannot simply just be put into theatre without years of research and testing and understanding

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‘‘

The timescale to introduce unmanned vehicles into the supply chain may well be incredibly long

how best to implement such a vehicle. However, when discussing cost over length of time, we cannot sacrifice soldier’s safety for time as this will have human as well as political ramifications.

With recent incidents such as the Western Ukraine power grid attacks and the supposed hacking of US elections, foreign forces have shown the world that in the age of IT, arguably our next biggest threat is cyber warfare. Many companies across the world have shown that UAV’s can be hacked. This is a huge chink in the autonomous vehicle’s armour.

One could argue that less or no drivers in a patrol vehicle means less risk to life. However, as a Logistic Regiment our main effort should be the delivery of goods be it from the 4th line to the 1st, or more intrinsically between the A2-A1 Ech. If the British Army were to implement autonomous vehicles into the logistic chain it would need to investigate the defence capability, whether it be towards cyber warfare, soldiers or more unconventional warfare, as seen in recent conflicts where supply operations were attacked with IEDs. Possibly one of the bigger setbacks to autonomous vehicles is if the Army would be willing to discard any damaged vehicles on the ground and continue with the mission; or even how these vehicles would be recovered.

Current Battle Craft Syllabus training requires soldiers to be able to fix basic level 1 vehicle damages autonomously.

Within a Strike concept, an embedded organic REME section could possibly repair level 2 damages. If the Army was looking to implement a level five full automation vehicle, there would be no resources on the ground to assess and fix the vehicle were it to become unserviceable. Once again, possibly a level two or three partial automation would be the solution, where the vehicle is in full control, but if there is an issue, a soldier is able to assess the situation and find a solution for any problems that arise.

Figure 3. CADMID Cycle

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The majority of this essay has discussed autonomous vehicles on the ground. However, would it be viable for the Army to adopt unmanned transport by air?

It has been assessed that aircraft may not be ideal to carry large loads over long distances, but civilian logistic companies such as Amazon and UPS have started to test drones for their own logistic movements. The difference lies with the size of the package and the distance travelled.

These civilian companies talk about ‘last mile delivery’. A concept in which small essential items are able to be delivered over the last miles of the journey. This could be small essentials, food or water from the A1 Echelon to the front line, albeit limited by weight restrictions.

With autonomous aircraft there is the increased risk of air defences which have implications for using UAVs to extend strategic capabilities. These risk limitations restrict UAV use to missions in regions where air defence threats have been eliminated. Even in recent times in the tribal regions of Pakistan, where there are virtually no air defences, members of the Taliban claimed to have shot down several CIA drones over South Waziristan. Even when not facing enemy fire, the Predator crashes due to mechanical error 43 times per 100,000 flying hours. This dramatically increases Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) when compared to typical manned aircraft that crash two per 100,000 hours (Callam, 2010, p.2). The high attrition rate of UAVs in the face of enemy fire makes it unlikely that they will soon serve as a replacement for manned aircraft.

‘‘

Unmanned vehicles could be integrated within the Field Army’s logistics, the question is to what level of automation the Army is willing to accept

One of the British Army’s main roles is to deal with disaster and I believe that this is an area in which autonomous vehicles could best be used. Peter Tatham (2009) addresses the uses of UAVS in drones providing aerial surveillance and reconnaissance in areas that need immediate action.

As M. C. Christopher, from Logistics and Supply Chain Management (cited in Tatham, 2009.) asserts, “There is broad agreement that timeliness of delivery is a key orderwinning criterion,” before expanding on how this is especially crucial to disaster zones (Tatham, 2009). Tatham himself believes that drones can provide earlier and better-quality aid to areas suddenly struck by a disaster. Therefore, we should not completely discount the use of autonomous vehicles being a viable concept within logistics.

In summary, unmanned vehicles could be integrated within the Field Army’s logistics, the question is to what level of automation the Army is willing to accept. I believe there are too many variables to adopt full automation, such as

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‘‘

One of the British Army’s main roles is to deal with disaster and I believe that this is an area in which autonomous vehicles could best be used

reasoning, cost and ethical decision making, which could take over ten years to develop and field.

However, conditional automation may be achievable much sooner, where soldiers and autonomous vehicles are able to operate in a hybrid formation. A scenario of level 2 or 3 automation is better suited in terms of short-medium term time, risk and expense factors.

Unmanned vehicles could be introduced within the next two years to aid humanitarian situations, as recently seen in the Mozambique floods or outbreak of Ebola in Sierra Leone.

This could dramatically increase the ability to save lives, where unmanned drones could deliver food, water and lifesaving equipment to areas that are challenging to reach.

References Ball, K, Edwards, J.D, Ross, L.A, McGwin, G. (2010). Cognitive training decreases motor vehicle collision involvement of older drivers. pp. 2107-2113 Ballantine, D.S. (1998). US Naval Logistics in the Second World War. [Online] (4th ed.). Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press.

Available at: https://archive.org/details/usnavallogistics00ball/page/6 (Accessed 1 May 2019) pp. 6 Callam, A. (2010). Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

[Online]. 18(3), 2. [3 May 2019]. Available from: https://capapu.ga/nh.pdf# Contractsmoduk. (2016). MOD-DCO. [Online]. Available at: https://www. contracts. mod. uk/do-features-and-articles/ajaxboosting-uk-land-capabilities/ (Accessed 1 May 2019).

Contractsmoduk. (2018). MOD-DCO. [Online]. Availble at: https://www. contracts.mod.uk/blog/breakdown-planned-defenceexpenditure-2018/ (Accessed 1 May 2019).

Everett, H.R. (2015). Unmanned Systems of World Wars I and II. (1st ed.).: The MIT Press. pp.27 Frontiersinorg. (2019). Frontiers. [Online]. Available at: https:// www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnbeh.2018.00031/full?utm_source =G-BLO (Accessed 1 May 2019).

Gonzales, M.M, Dickinson, L.M, DiGuiseppi, L.M, Lowenstein, S.R. (2005). Student drivers: A study of fatal motor vehicle crashes involving 16-year-old drivers, Ann.Emerg.Med., 45 (2) (2005), pp. 140-146 Hu, P.S, Young, J.R, Lu, A. (1993). Highway Crash Rates and AgeRelated Driver Limitations: Literature Review and Evaluation of Databases. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Report No. ORNL:TM-12456 Washington, D.C McCartt, T, Shabanova, V.I. (2003). W.A. LeafDriving experience, crashes and traffic citations of teenage beginning drivers.

Accid.Anal.Prev. 35 (3), pp. 311-320 McGwin, G, Brown D.B. (1999). Characteristics of traffic crashes among young, middle-aged, and older drivers pp. 181-198 Rolison, J.J, Hanoch, Y, Wood, S, Pi-Ju, L. (2014). Risk taking differences across the adult lifespan: A question of age and domain, pp.

870-880

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Tatham, P. (June 2009). An Investigation into the Suitability of the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems (UAVS) to Support the Initial Needs Assessment Process in Rapid Onset Humanitarian Disasters International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management 13(1). Process in Rapid Onset Humanitarian Disasters - International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management 13(1).

Available at: https:// www.researchgate.net/publication/321488276_Last_Mile_Delivery_Using _Drones (Accessed 1 May 2019).

Sciencedirectcom. (2019). Sciencedirectcom. [Online]. Available at: https://www. sciencedirect. com/science/article/pii/S0001457518300873 (Accessed 2 May 2019).

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Servicegovuk. (2019). Servicegovuk. [Online]. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uplo ads/attachment_data/file/605298/Army_Field_Manual__AFM__A5_Master _ADP_Interactive_Gov_Web.pdf (Accessed 3 May 2019) Singer, P. (2009). Wired for war. New York, NY: Penguin. www.gov.uk.2019.GOVUK. [Online]. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/ government/organisations/ministry-of-defence/about/ procurement (Accessed 1 May 2019)

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“Whether a child comes from a supported

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(U HKKP[PVUHS ILULÄ[ VM [OPLY IVHYKPUN JVTT\UP[` MVY WHYLU[Z PZ HJJLZZ [V Z[HɈ [OH[ OH]L ºZLLU P[ HSS ILMVYL» 0U HU HNL ^OLYL social media bombards teenagers and many WHYLU[Z MHJL H NYV^PUN TPULÄLSK [OYV\NO ^OPJO [V UH]PNH[L IVHYKPUN Z[HɈ HYL [YHPULK [V LUZ\YL [OH[ H JOPSK»Z ^LSMHYL HJHKLTPJHSS` and emotionally, is their number one priority. The happiness of the boarding house depends upon the happiness of individual boarders and the strength of the relationships they build with each other.

Most pupils will report that spending time with friends is the best part of attending a boarding school!

More often than not, the achievements, friendships and interests cultivated at boarding school will stay with a child forever.

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The development of British Army core values and leadership through Nordic Skiing The sporting opportunities accessible through the British Army and the Royal Logistic Corps (RLC) are vast. Sport is a key aspect that aids building the vital foundations on which the Army works at its best. It builds the foundations of teamwork, healthy competition and leadership. It is widely known that team sports like football develop natural comradery as the team work together to win. It’s this comradery and group competition that resonates into everyday life at a Regiment. By LCpl Darci Ryan More specifically, one of the most notably demanding disciplines offered by the Army is Nordic Skiing, also known as ‘cross-country skiing’. The sport involves racing on skis across hilly terrain1 in a combination of sprint races, biathlon and longer distance races. Nordic skiing involves a mixture of skill, fitness and specialist conditioning. But alongside these factors, individual and team determination are vital.

Figure 1: Showing an Olympic cross-country race2

The sport in itself has extensive correlations to the core values of the British Army: Courage, Discipline, Respect for others, Loyalty and Selfless commitment.3 If a solider ensures they are the embodiment of these core values, this is what contributes to them not only being a good soldier, but consequently developing their leadership.

Shining examples of these values are shown in Nordic Skiing throughout every element of preparation and competition: Courage – This can be both physical and moral. Within skiing, physical courage is at the forefront. The races are demanding 40

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Figure 2: Explaining the core values of the British Army4

on the entirety of your body and the distances are gruelling.

However, if a skier draws on their physical courage within, they can be successful and complete races, even when they didn’t think they could. In addition, certain aspects of a particular course may prove challenging, so an individual skier has to develop the attributes to overcome these more demanding elements through courage and training. From personal experience I found it daunting to ski down steep hills, but I had to use courage to do this in order to complete the race.

Discipline – The biathlon aspect which involves skiing round the racecourse with a rifle and shooting targets requires immense discipline. A soldier should already be aware of range discipline, but they must ensure that it transfers into skiing when using a biathlon rifle. Whilst the biathlon rifles are not as powerful as an SA80, they are still a loaded weapon. Other aspects of discipline are centred on training. When you are training you must discipline yourself to train in each session to the best of your ability. It may be tough both mentally and physically, but you must always remain switched on. You must attend every training session and ensure you listen to the coaching advice you are given.

Respect for others – The combination of training and races in Nordic skiing is tough and exhaustive and as a result, it can be tiring and people can become short tempered. Tensions do become raised in high pressure situations such as races, but the skiers/soldiers should always remain respectful to each other. In addition, you should always be respectful to your coach, their aim is to develop you in the discipline and by taking on the knowledge they give you this can be achieved. Respect should also always be shown in a race to fellow competitors around the course. In essence, ‘treat others as you wish to be treated’.

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Lead by example Encourage thinking Apply reward and discipline Demand high performance Encourage confidence in the team Recognise individual strengths and weaknesses Strive for team goals7

Figure 3: Showing Army competitors in a biathlon event5

Integrity – This core value is enduring across all the elements of the sport. Aspects such as being on the range and being cleared off but ensuring you have no rounds in your magazines. If you find later on that you do still hold rounds the skier must use their integrity and make this known. Integrity is often needed in training. You need to be honest with yourself about how hard you’re really working and also how well you are doing. For example, if your coach asks you how many targets you hit out of five and you only hit one, you need to be honest in order to better yourself in the sport and see where you are falling short.

Loyalty – Personally, I feel this core value is highly noteworthy for Nordic Skiing. Most pertinently, the skier needs to ensure they have loyalty to their team. It is just the same as being at work in a regiment or being away on tour - loyalty to those you work with. Referring back to Figure 2, - “loyalty is about supporting your team…”6 so when it comes to events such as the patrol and relay races, supporting the team and the natural comradery that comes from team competition, is what gets the team through. To make sure the team works well together, even if it’s just in day-to-day training sessions, the support for each other always needs to be there.

Selfless commitment – This is a core value with further links to the effectiveness of the team working well together.

If the skier/soldier is undoubtedly committed to their team, then they will always aim to give their best performance at all times, even when it may be difficult. For example, in a 5k relay race you may feel lethargic, but your team is currently first and you need to uphold this position. This commitment to the team sometimes enhances the performance you give compared to an individual competition when only a personal target is at stake.

Moreover, it is important to not only note Nordic skiing’s links to the core values, but also pay regard to links with ‘The Army Leadership Code.’ Natural leaders shine through in the British Army regardless of rank and task, from Lance Corporal to General. This is where ‘The Army Leadership Code’ comes into practice, if the individual follows the seven behaviours listed below it aids them in being the most effective leader they can be (as well as them using the Army’s core values).

Therefore, in the context of sport and Nordic Skiing, if someone is a natural leader, these behaviours are going to be employed.

It is very easy to look at some of them and see how they link to each other. For example, ‘Demand high performance’, this is required from you by your coach every single race. In skiing, the coach will be the natural leader as they have the most experience in the discipline. But in addition to this, more experienced team-mates could also show natural leadership aspects due to their confidence in their ability within the sport.

‘Recognise individual strengths and weaknesses’, this behaviour is instinctively carried out by each member within the ski team. With the amount of time spent training with your team-mates, it will naturally be easier for you to identify strengths or weaknesses in each other that you may not have recognised yourself. This leadership behaviour, along with the others is enhanced through skiing.

Nordic skiing also involves correlations to the Army’s ‘Fighting powers’- moral, physical and conceptual.8 These fighting powers are needed for the Army to work effectively both at home and on operations. Through my experiences of skiing, it is very easy to see these correlations. The moral fighting power for example, involves concepts such as leadership and morale.

Morale is naturally boosted by wins and races and having great training days. This morale gained from doing sport is helpful back at the unit for the soldier to work well in their role.

In summary, many may view Nordic Skiing as a purely recreational activity that you are gifted by the Army. You go away for months at a time training and competing in order to achieve success. But what some may not have acknowledged is that it is evident in both training and competing that the professional development of the soldier is also enhanced, without the soldier even realising.

The core values and leadership code can easily be taught in military surroundings, but for a soldier to truly embody these core values and leadership behaviours it is even more helpful for them to be placed in a challenging situation such as a competitive sport. This is when it becomes clear whether they actually fully understand and live by these core values, as they are repeatedly tested.

References Augustyn, A. (2018). Nordic skiing | History, Events, & Facts. [online] Encyclopedia Britannica. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/sports/ Nordic-skiing [Accessed 29 April 2019].

Apply.army.mod.uk. (2019). Army Core Values | What We Stand For | British Army - British Army Jobs. [Online]. Available at: https://apply.army.mod.uk/ what-we-offer/what-we-stand-for [Accessed 1 May 2019].

Defence Gateway - Army Leadership Doctrine. (2016). Army Leadership Doctrine pg.10-11. [Online]. Available at: https://akxonline. defencegateway.mod.uk/sites/vault/BAeBBDoctrine/AC72029%20%20Army%20Leadership%20Doctrine.pdf [Accessed 6 May 2019].

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Team Canada - Official Olympic Team Website - Cross Country Skiing. (2019).

Cross-Country Skiing. [online] Available at: https://olympic.ca/sports /skiing-cross-country/ [Accessed 30 April 2019].

The Military CEO. (2017). 2017 The New British Army Leadership Code - The Military CEO. [Online]. Available at: http://themilitaryceo.com/2017-newbritish-army-leadership-code [Accessed 1 May 2019].

Ukafwsa.org. (2019). Picture B29- 137. [Online]. Available at: http:// ukafwsa.org/dsciplines/nordic-skiing/b29-137/ [Accessed 1 May 2019].

Weighell, G. (2006). The Queen's Commission: a junior officer's guide. Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

Footnotes 111

Augustyn, A. (2018). Nordic skiing, History, Events, & Facts. [Online].

Encyclopedia Britannica. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/ sports/Nordic-skiing [Accessed 29 April 2019].

112 Team Canada - Official Olympic Team Website - Cross Country Skiing.

(2019). Cross-Country Skiing. [Online]. Available at: https://olympic.ca/ sports/skiing-cross-country/ [Accessed 30 April 2019].

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Weighell, G. (2006). The Queen's Commission: a junior officer's guide.

Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, pp.26-39.

114 Apply.army.mod.uk. (2019). Army Core Values | What We Stand For | British Army - British Army Jobs. [Online]. Available at: https://apply. army.mod.uk/what-we-offer/what-we-stand-for [Accessed 30 April 2019].

115 Ukafwsa.org. (2019). Picture B29- 137. [Online]. Available at: http://ukafwsa.org/dsciplines/nordic-skiing/b29-137/ [Accessed 1 May 2019].

116 Apply.army.mod.uk. (2019). Army Core Values | What We Stand For | British Army - British Army Jobs. [Online]. Available at: https://apply.army.mod.uk/what-we-offer/what-we-stand-for [Accessed 1 May 2019].

117 The Military CEO. (2017). 2017 The New British Army Leadership Code The Military CEO. [Online]. Available at: http://themilitaryceo.com/2017new-british-army-leadership-code [Accessed 1 May 2019].

118 Defence Gateway- Army Leadership Doctrine. (2016). Army Leadership Doctrine pg.10-11. [Online]. Available at: https://akxonline. defencegateway.mod.uk/sites/vault/BAeBBDoctrine/AC72029%20%20Army%20Leadership%20Doctrine.pdf [Accessed 6 May 2019].

Rheinmetall Defence Supporting Material Distribution today and in the future. www.rheinmetall-defence.com

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Should we be more focused on physical training rather than physical assessments?

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Following the Crimean War, the British Army recognised the need to improve its understanding of how physical training could provide benefits in the resistance of disease and increased mental and physical performance.1 This new train of thought led to the forming of the Royal Army Physical Training Corps (at the time the Army Gymnastic Staff) in 1860 and the initial standardisation of fitness. By Lt Tom Gardner Being physically capable is an important part of being in the Army

It will come as no surprise that being physically capable is an important part of being in the Army and so we are required to train three times a week within units, this then gets tested on a regular basis.2 These tests, the Annual Fitness Test (AFT) and the now defunct Personal Fitness Assessment (PFA) (to be replaced with Role Fitness Tests), were meant to represent the minimum standard for personnel but that is a standard some individuals are not content with.

Whilst physical fitness and robustness has been imperative within the military, it is only within the past few decades that the second order benefits are becoming understood. This article will briefly outline the benefits that an increased focus on physical training (PT) can deliver to both the physical and moral components of fighting power and how we can benefit from achieving more than the bare minimum, whilst also improving the long-term wellbeing of our Army.

We often look to our cousins across the Atlantic when it comes to large military issues and they are ahead of us when it comes to physical preparedness. The US Army, with its considerable budget, has already implemented its “Soldier Athlete” initiative, realising that training for combat should be no different than training for competition.3 An all-encompassing approach to PT, nutrition and injury prevention is required and needs to be understood at all levels. If an individual doesn’t understand the damage they are doing to themselves by drinking five cans of Red Bull a day, they aren’t going to be receptive of change. The same can be said for injury prevention and the need to warm up and cool down, or that not every run needs to be of the “I’ll be steady, you’ll be a state” variety. By getting individuals to buy into the big picture, they can start to shoulder some of the burden of physical capability themselves.

Our focus on physical preparedness and injury prevention needs to be increased. From the period 1 April 2013 to 31

March 2018, the number of service personnel to be medically discharged from the Army was 9,782. Of these, 5,388 (57%) were for Musculoskeletal Disorders and Injuries (MSKI). The numbers have seen a year on year decline over this period, with 1,246 discharged in the 2013-14 window coming down to 960 for 2017-18. This could show we are improving in our prevention of injuries or the data could be skewed due to ending of Op HERRICK and the number of injuries sustained on deployments falling. Either way, to be losing close to a thousand personnel each year due to injury is catastrophic whilst concurrently struggling to recruit and retain. Granted that training to the limit is likely to cause injury as the Army prides itself on putting individuals outside of their comfort zone and so some risk will always be apparent.

From 1 January to 31 December 2017, 46,239 MSKI were registered by the Army.4 Not all of these will be avoidable, but if the numbers of those discharged and downgraded (10,059 that’s 13% of the Army as at 1 December 2017) due to MSKI can be reduced through individuals knowing when and how to prevent injury, or seeking treatment before the damage becomes irreparable, then we may see a significant bump in our deployable numbers and physical component.

The knock on from this likely being an increase in morale with another 10,000 personnel available for trawls and taskings, sparing the same individuals going time and again.

Whilst there may be debatable benefits associated to injury prevention, the benefits to long term health and the immune system are well documented. A higher level of cardiovascular (CV) fitness is associated with a lower risk of both cancer incidence and mortality.5 This isn’t the case for all cancers, such as gene-deficient, but for a number of hormone-sensitive cancers it has been shown to reduce the risk. Unfortunately cancer is a vast and varied group of diseases and the exact means CV fitness can reduce the impact will vary for each type and where it is located. GeneTHE REVIEW 2019-2020

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Sport is critically important to the morale, welfare and operational effectiveness

deficient cancers for example are less receptive than hormone-sensitive ones.6 CV fitness does promote the following mechanisms within the body, all of which have an impact on both treatment and mortality of cancers: Elevated antioxidant capacity, apoptosis, cell proliferation, improved DNA repair, improved insulin sensitivity, decreased chronic inflammation and optimised immune function.7,8,9 Regular endurance exercise can also reduce the markers GlycA, C-Reactive Protein and InternLeukin-6, all of which are inflammation markers and signals for cardiometabolic disease, such as; insulin resistance and impairment to glucose tolerance (precursors to diabetes), increased fats and cholesterol in the blood, high blood pressure and likelihood of central adiposity.10 Even a 20 minute jog has shown to decrease these but that shouldnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t be interpreted as a single jog a week having a drastic reduction, for sustained and substantial improvement then regular activity must be undertaken in order to create a cumulative effect.

Whilst preventing major lifestyle associated diseases is a huge benefit, there is an improvement in the immune system at staving off all manner of diseases, infections and viruses from regular medium intensity exercise.11 Whilst prolonged periods of intensive exercise can depress immunity, even single bouts of moderate intensity can improve hemodynamics, improving the hypothalamicpituitary-adrenal axis (one of the body's major neuroendocrine systems), in turn increasing the cell turnover rate, replacing old cells with new ones and making the immune system more alert.

The balance is improved by not only helping to strengthen the immune system but to also regulate it, protecting against autoimmune diseases like psoriasis, celiac disease and rheumatoid arthritis, by treating the low level inflammation that proceed their development.12,13 Other benefits from improving the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis include an increased metabolism, increasing the rate at which the body converts food to energy.

In short, increasing the training we do for CV fitness can decrease the likelihood of both cancer and diabetes, whilst increasing activity within the immune system, not only making individuals more physically capable now, but 44

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safeguarding them for the future and increasing their quality of life.14 In the penny pinching culture that the Army must continuously justify itself, this can be touted as a long term cost saving measure, whilst increasing efficiency through fewer days lost to sick leave.

Whilst the physical benefits of PT are easy to test for and collate, what is much harder to quantify is the impact it has on cognitive ability and the ever-growing problem in both the Army and society, mental health. When looking at the cognitive effects regular exercise provides, it includes an increase in concentration and willpower; improvement in the motor and somatosensory cortex through increased neuron density; alteration of the structure and functions of the hippocampus, improving learning through more efficient memory formation and recall.15 These benefits only seem to occur when the heart rate is elevated to an aerobic threshold, resistance training produces no cognitive improvements and also disappoints when looking at the impact on mental health.16,17 For mental health and wellbeing, the body of literature is constantly growing and all demonstrates the effect exercise has on anxiety, stress and depression. This is achieved through the biochemical mechanisms relating to mitochondria, rapamycin, the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis and endorphins.18 Whilst the stigma of mental health has long been overlooked, it is gaining recognition and the figures demonstrate the growing issue within the Army. The discharge figures from 2013 - 2018 are increasing year on year from 279 to 428 respectively and while the number of those being treated for similar disorders isnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t attainable, it would be a safe assumption that it has increased similarly.19 As the healthcare services are continuing to be overwhelmed by the general population with the explosion of mental

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The benefits of CV training to long term health and the immune system are well documented

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health issues within the country, coupled with a lack of funding, then we should surely be looking at exploring all options to improve the wellbeing of our Army.

In summary, this article has referred to some of the science behind the benefits that an increased focus on PT can provide to individuals and the reasons why it should be implemented by Chains of Command, should be evident.

There is an immediate benefit to be gained from improvements to physical capability, mental agility and dexterity, but also long-term gains to be had in a collective that is more resistant to both mental, short-term and lifestyle illnesses. This could result in a more overall resilient cohort that can deploy more remotely for longer periods of time, with a lessened remedial burden when an individual does fall ill or become injured.

Footnotes K.E. Friedl Body composition and military performance – many things to many people J Strength Cond Res, 26 (2012), pp. S87-S100 112 AGAI Vol 1, Chapter 7, Physical Training 113 Anon (2010) Soldier Athlete Initiative. [Online]. 16 August 2010. www.army.mil. Available from: https://www.army.mil/article/43820/ soldier_athlete_initiative [Accessed: 19 May 2019].

114 FOI 2018/07243. [online] Assets.publishing.service.gov.uk. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uplo ads/attachment_data/file/757249/07243.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2019].

115 T. Li, S. Wei, Y. Shi, S. Pang, Q. Qin, J. Yin, et al. The dose-response effect of physical activity on cancer mortality: findings from 71 prospective cohort studies Br J Sports Med, 50 (2016), pp. 339-345 116 Anon (2017) Molecular Mechanisms Linking Exercise to Cancer Prevention and Treatment. [Online]. 19 October 2017. Cell Metabolism.

117 J.S. Thornton, P. Frémont, K. Khan, P. Poirier, J. Fowles, G.D. Wells, et al.

Physical activity prescription: a critical opportunity to address a modifiable risk factor for the prevention and management of chronic disease: a position statement by the Canadian Academy of Sport and Exercise Medicine Br J Sports Med, 50 (2016), pp. 1109-1114 118 J.C. Brown, K. Winters-Stone, A. Lee, K.H. Schmitz, Cancer, physical activity, and exercise. Compr Physiol, 2 (2012), pp. 2775-2809 111

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R.B. Kiningham Physical activity and the primary prevention of cancer, Prim Care, 25 (1998), pp. 515-536 110 Saljoughian, M. (2017) Cardiometabolic Syndrome: A Global Health Issue.

[Online]. 16 February 2017. U.S. Pharmacist – The Leading Journal in Pharmacy. Available from: https://www.uspharmacist.com/article/ cardiometabolic-syndrome-a-global-health-issue [Accessed: 14 May 2019].

111 Richard Simpson, Hawley Kunz, Nadia Agha & Rachel Graff (2015) Exercise and the Regulation of Immune Functions. [Online]. 5 September 2015.

ScienceDirect. Available from: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ article/pii/S1877117315001842 [Accessed: 14 May 2019].

112 Scheffer, D.da L., Karina Ghisoni & Alexandra Latini (2019) Moderate running exercise prevents excessive immune system activation. [Online].

19 February 2019. Physiology & Behavior Vol 204, pp. 248 255 113 Lira, F.S. & Biondo, L.A. (2018) Nutrients, immune system, and exercise: Where will it take us? 14 October 2018. Nutrition Vol 61, pp. 151-156.

114 Sofia Evaristo, Carla Moraire & Luis Lopes (2019) Muscular fitness and cardiorespiratory fitness are associated with health-related quality of life: Results from labmed physical activity study. 8 January 2019. Journal of Exercise Science & Fitness.

115 Michel Audiffren & Nathalie Andre (2018) Repairing the brain with physical exercise: Cortical thickness and brain volume increases in long-term pediatric brain tumor survivors in response to a structured exercise intervention. 5 March 2018. Journal of Sport and Health Science.

116 Godman, H. (2018) Regular exercise changes the brain to improve memory, thinking skills. [Online]. 5 April 2018. Harvard Health Publishing.

Available from: https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/regular-exercisechanges-brain-improve-memory-thinking-skills-201404097110 [Accessed: 7 May 2019].

117 M.D. Hill, A.M. Gibson, E.D. Flores & L.A. Kelly (2019) The effects of aerobic and resistance exercise on state anxiety and cognitive function.

[Online]. 17 April 2019. Science & Sports, Volume 34, Issue 2 pp. 63–130 (April 2019).

118 Kathleen Mikkelsen, Lily Stojanovska, Momir Polenakovic, Marijan Bosevski, et al. (2017) Exercise and mental health. 7 September 2017.

Maturitas, Vol 106, pp.48-56.

119 MOD (2018) Annual Medical Discharges in the UK Regular Armed Forces Assets.publishing.service.gov.uk. Available at: https:// assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att achment_data/file/723716/20180712-MedicalDisBulletinFinal-O.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2019].

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The best of both worlds?

Man management, defined by the Collins Dictionary is the control and organisation of people who work in a business or organisation (Collins Online Dictionary, 2019). Does being an RLC Warrant Officer in the Army Reserve and an Operations Manager in the food industry give me a unique position and perspective as a man manager? Do I take my experiences from each role and use them to help me in the other? Perhaps first we should look at the different types of management experiences that each role offers.

By WO2 Andrew Eke Within the Army Reserve I have spent three years as a Sergeant Major and two years as a Troop Commander, I have managed training, welfare, discipline, aspirations, careers, parades and social functions - all within a military environment.

There are clear benefits to managing soldiers as opposed to civilians. Soldiers are generally fitter and in the case of the Army Reserve all have the desire to be there as it is a voluntary based organisation. That said, nothing prepares you for when you have planned a training weekend for 30 soldiers and only four turn up on a Friday evening. This is not only a test of management but also of staying positive; this is further compounded when you have booked accommodation and feeding. This has taught me to be flexible and able to react quickly to changing circumstances, this has improved my decision-making skills.

There are clear guidelines for soldiersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; behaviour with tried and tested methods of appraisal reporting, which ensures a fair and balanced view for all members of the unit. There is a clear, simple and robust system to be used if disciplinary action is required. All these systems make the job easier.

Whilst these are excellent, they are very much aimed at the Regular Army and we sometimes find it difficult to make them fit into the Army Reserve.

We are currently being challenged with the required medical reviews. For Regular servicemen this is straightforward, the difficulty for the Reserves is getting the medical professionals required and the reservists in the same place at the same time. Generally, medical professionals work during the week, whereas Reservists work evenings and weekends. The impact is delayed medical assessments that can impact upon training. There is also an increased demand upon the commanders from the CO down to carry out administrative work to enable non-fit reservists to attend 46

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Receiving the BAE Systems Award for Excellence in Leadership presented by Brig M Lowe November 2016 London

some training. These issues have improved my planning skills and shown me the importance of not making assumptions.

Time is not such an issue in the military as we work until the tasks are finished, there is no overtime to worry about and if the work goes on into the evening then we as a team just knuckle down and get it done. Equipment care has become increasingly important over the last five years and this has an impact upon training time in the evenings, typically one night in four is spent on some form of equipment care and ensuring readiness for inspections.

Examples of equipment care within my Squadron are: Weapon cleaning, vehicle checks, equipment checks and so on. Training within the military is always comprehensive and well delivered, however, this can restrict career progression and stifle the unit moving forward as they wait for people to get qualified. In the Army Reserve, this can be difficult as people need to get time off in order to attend courses.

The sheer level of qualifications needed within the Army Reserve can be restrictive. There are the annual basic soldiering skills which take at least three full days to complete, every three years there are local unit presentations to carry out; trade qualifications and tests are also required, such as driving familiarisation. Not only can this be difficult to find the time for, it can also be difficult to

manage. All these tests ensure a safer environment, however, the training time required can be prohibitive. These constraints have improved my time management skills.

The rank structure is clearly defined, everyone knows what level the other members of the team are at and it ensures that respect is shown within and outside the team or unit. Whilst the rank structure is unambiguous, there is also an understanding and professionalism within the Armed Services where senior personnel will happily refer to subject matter experts, for example the Commanding Officer will take guidance from the Quay Foreman during the loading and unloading of ships.

Financial issues and concerns are not really a part of man management within the Army Reserve at my level, there are no requests for salary increases as these are controlled by career progression, similarly there are no capital expenditure justifications required by me.

‘‘

Time is not such an issue in the military as we work until the tasks are finished, there is no overtime to worry about and if the work goes on into the evening then we as a team just knuckle down and get it done

One of the most beneficial things carried out in the Army Reserve is the amount of team building and Adventurous Training opportunities there are. This increases team cohesion and confidence in one another and if we are very lucky, give us a tan. As this article is being written, I am looking forward to two weeks in Cyprus.

There is a huge raft of sports opportunities within the Army Reserve, members from my Squadron have entered martial arts, skiing and rugby competitions. As well as taking part in Adventurous Training and sports, there is the opportunity to get qualifications in these areas, from leading mountain walks to coasteering, to refereeing rugby matches. Travel and team building have challenged me in different environments enhancing my communication and leadership skills.

As a Warrant Officer, there are always peers available that I can talk to if I need a second opinion or advice and, in some cases, they are there with advice if I don’t want or need it. The sheer variety of tasks that we carry out in the Army Reserve also tests management and leadership decisions on a constant basis. What other role gives you the opportunity to be on a firing range in the glorious sunshine one weekend and sheltering from the pouring rain somewhere on a training area the next. Man management in the Army Reserve is challenging simply because of the differing environments in which you are placed. Running a range, exercise conditions, Adventurous Training, military functions, the list is endless and all have their difficulties. In the Army Reserve, I feel that continuous improvement is not

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something that we champion at sub-unit level; this is possibly due to the limited amount of time that we have together as an organisation.

There are initiatives like GEMS which gives the opportunity for individuals at any level to suggest improvements.

However, for effective continuous improvement to be sustained and systematic, it requires a representative group of people drawn from all ranks within the sub-unit to be successful. In my opinion we are not as heavily engaged with the continuous improvement system at Squadron/ Company level as the private sector is. Although I am constantly learning, I sometimes have to remind myself not to get frustrated when lack of time means that I am unable to implement positive changes.

“Be willing to make decisions. That’s the most important quality in a good leader.” – General George S. Patton I have 18 years’ experience as a manager within the manufacturing industry and I currently have direct responsibility for a site, this includes goods in, despatch, manufacture, technical, engineering, health & safety, quality and hygiene. There are systems in place for performance reviews, but these are often overlooked. There are clear procedures for disciplinary and competency issues and this system, like the military’s, is robust and fit for purpose. The one major difference is that the military system allows for a large array of sanctions, whereas the private sector mainly uses verbal and written warnings.

There is a massive range of people employed in the private sector, the major difference from the military is the age range. Sickness procedures are important in industry as people being away at short notice impacts on the team’s ability to function. To manage this, a robust back to work system is required, this ensures that any barriers to people returning to work are removed if possible. It also enables

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An Army Chef in action

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managers to identify any issues within the workplace that may have caused or contributed to sickness.

Time is very important in industry as the longer my team works for the more money they are paid which has economical and efficiency issues. Industry is all about getting a return on your investment and so financial costs are under constant scrutiny. Therefore, meetings within industry tend to be more focussed and professional than ones within the Army Reserve at Squadron level. Agendas and briefing notes are required well in advance of the meeting and staying on topic and to a pre-defined time is important if we are not to waste resources.

‘‘

There is a massive range of people employed in the private sector, the major difference from the military is the age range

Within the food industry we have external audits from accreditation bodies and customers, this means that we have to ensure that we are up to date with all the relevant paperwork and required inspections. This has taught me to be methodical and exacting, whilst being audit ready at all times.

Within industry, an Operations Manager has to have many skills outside of just man management, a good knowledge of health & safety, food legislation and quality standards are essential. Within five weeks of starting at my current company, I oversaw the unloading, installation and testing of a new travelling oven costing half a million pounds, imagine my concern when I was told that as soon as our fork lift drivers lifted the oven sections off the trucks, that the liability was ours.

Thankfully all went well and this piece of kit has revolutionised the way we do business. The project management skills I have learnt allowed me to have the confidence to put myself forward to organise a Battle Field Study.

Training within industry is succinct and to the point, however, previous experience and knowledge is often taken into account. Skills matrices are often used to ensure cover for all the roles within the factory and to highlight any deficiencies within the team. There are always requests for increases in salaries and the pay system is much more ad hoc than in the military. Justifying extra expenditure is also an issue that takes up my time. The respect for costs seems to be definitely higher in the private sector than in the military one at my level. My financial awareness has helped my decision making, both with efficiencies and capital expenditure.

There is a lack of team building activities within the food industry as the pressures to service our customers are always there, as are the needs to keep costs down. The position as the Senior Manager of a factory site can be a lonely one, often decisions must be made and it is not always possible to discuss them with peers from the wider company group. We tend to do the same things day in, day out and so we can become a bit stale as we are not always challenged with new tasks. Continuous improvement is of 48

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huge importance in industry and this ensures that we strive to improve all aspects of the processes within the factory.

This includes things like waste management, quicker turnaround on changeover of products, increased efficiencies of all processes and more efficient storage.

Whilst industry can appear mundane, there are always opportunities to improve all aspects of the site.

“In every business, in every industry, management does matter” (Michael Eisner, CEO Walt Disney Company 1984-2005) The second question I asked will be the first one I answer: Do I take my experiences from each role and use them to help me in the other?

Without a doubt I do, my skills within the private sector and the Army Reserve have made me a clear and analytical problem solver with the ability to think outside of the box and a determination to succeed. I have a very clear can-do attitude and that has certainly helped with both my careers.

I feel that the values and standards and training given to me in the Army Reserve helps with all aspects of civilian management and indeed, everyday life. My experiences in the Army Reserve have given me a different outlook on man management and this has complimented the skills I have learnt within the private sector.

My knowledge of how to organise and lead meetings has led to improved and more time efficient meetings at my local Squadron. My experience of health & safety has been directly transferrable to the Army Reserve. My understanding and respect for costs has also impacted on how I manage the soldiers and equipment in my care.

‘‘

My decision making, planning, time management and communication skills have all been strengthened by my exposure to man management in the military

After 20 years in an engineering company I decided that I wanted to change careers and go into food manufacturing.

Unfortunately, I could not show how I had developed my managerial experience in different companies. However, at the interview for my current role I was able to demonstrate management influences from the Army Reserve, as well as my civilian role. The company directors interviewing me took this as a positive and I am convinced it helped me get the role I am currently in.

So, the first question: Does being a Warrant Officer in the Army Reserve and an Operations Manager in the food industry give me a unique position as a man manager?

Quite simply yes, I am a more rounded and professional man manager due to the two very different management

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styles that I have been exposed to. Both have their benefits giving me a unique perspective.

I am a professional man manager with responsibility for an entire manufacturing site, all of the people that work there, the equipment and the infrastructure, our customersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; expectations and the directorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; aspirations. I am successful because of the skills I have learnt and the experiences I have been exposed to. Both the military and the industry training I have undergone have developed me into the man manager I am today.

My understanding of management principles and my ability to put them into practice has allowed me to get the role of Operations Manager, the ability to manage soldiers in differing circumstances has complimented my skills and has also helped me to succeed.

The Army Reserve has exposed me to different climates and environments, challenged me to lead whilst physically and mentally tired and pushed my limits of endurance. My decision making, planning, time management and

communication skills have all been strengthened by my exposure to man management in the military.

Private sector management has taught me to be methodical, improved my listening skills, taught me the importance of empathy, given me project management and continuous improvement skills and underlined to me the importance of financial planning.

I am a better Operations Manager because of my military training and experiences.

I am a better Warrant Officer because of my man management skills from the private sector.

References Collins online dictionary 2019, definition.

MOD, GEMS online.

General George S Patton, quote.

Michael Eisner, CEO Walt Disney: quote.

(Rick Pendrous, Food Manufacture.co.uk, photo, 31/10/16.

(ACF, photo, November 2016.

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$QG QRZ ZH DUH DOVR RQ ,QVWDJUDP <RX FDQ ILQG XV DW UR\DOORJLVWLFFRUSV

$QG VSUHDG WKH ZRUG

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HISTORY

What role did the US play in the European theatre of the Second World War?

Prior to this date, the US had provided materiel to the UK through the Lend-Lease Act, which was then extended to the Soviet Union later in 1941. This essay shall examine four key fields in which the USA contributed to the European theatre, analysing both the aims of the US in providing such resources and manpower and how this influenced the outcome of the Second World War. The areas are: The supply of equipment to Britain, both before and after the passing of the Lend-Lease Act and later the Soviet Union, as well as the help the US provided the UK in the Battle of the Atlantic; the use of American aircraft post-1941, with a focus on strategic bombing; the use of US military forces from 1942, focusing on the North African, Italian, and Normandy campaigns and American leadership and their steering of Allied strategy.

Prior to its entry into the war, the US’s main role in the European theatre was providing equipment to keep the UK and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union, from collapsing under German pressure. President Roosevelt publicly stated on 17 December 1940 that Britain’s survival was vital to American defence, a concept that had already been promoted by General Marshall, head of the US Army, in October.1 However, the Neutrality Act of November 1939 prevented the US government from selling surplus war materials from its army stockpiles to belligerent countries in a war.2 Henry Stimson, the US Secretary of War, pushed Roosevelt to bypass the Neutrality Act and sell the equipment to private companies who, in turn, sold them on to the British.3 Although most of the weaponry sold was outdated and was never used in combat, it assisted the British Army with its lack of equipment and would have provided some support had Germany attempted to land on the British Isles.4 The Bases for Destroyers deal, which gave Britain 50 obsolete destroyers in exchange for 99-year leases on British bases in Bermuda, also helped in this respect and, more

Photo: FDR Presidential Library & Museum Wikipedia/CC BY 2.0

The European theatre of war saw conflict from 1 September 1939, with Germany’s invasion of Poland and France and Britain declaring war on Germany on 3 September. However, it was not until 7 December 1941, with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, that the USA officially entered the war and begun providing US personnel to the European theatre. By Lt Ash Johnson

President Franklin Roosevelt

importantly to the British, represented a willingness from the US to give military aid.5 However problems arose when, in November 1940, Lord Lothian, British Ambassador to the US, stated that Britain’s financial plight had grown to the point that they could no longer afford American armaments.6 The Lend-Lease Act, passed on 11 March 1941, solved Britain’s problem of funding the production of its arms.

Although Roosevelt had discussed, since November 1940, the idea of leasing ships to the British without the need for them to place the orders and pay immediately, it was not until 17 December that he announced his plans for all armaments to be available to the British under lease terms.7 Once the act was passed, the Britain was able to place a large number of orders for equipment in which it was deficient.

Overall, the British received a total of 14% of their national income in imports during 1941, the vast majority being from the US.8 This can be seen by the number of American aircraft supplied to the British; in September 1940, the RAF possessed no American fighter or bomber aircraft.9 However,

by September 1941, 12% of RAF fighter aircraft and 9.6% of bombers were American, with 1,813 of the 12,949 RAF aircraft originating from the US.10 Even after the US entered the war at the end of 1941, the US continued to provide much of the materiel required by the UK, with Harrison stating that approximately 15% of US military spending throughout the war was in the form of Lend-Lease to the UK.11 The Soviet Union was also provided THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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Photo: Harris & Ewing 1929/Public Domain

HISTORY

Henry Stimson, the US Secretary of War

with equipment as part of Lend-Lease from 7 November 1941, although until 1942, a number of the weapons sent to aid the Soviets had originally been earmarked for the UK.12 Almost one quarter of Soviet aircraft constructed in 1943 were made by the Americans, as well as one fifth of their tank construction in 1942.13 Both the UK and the Soviet’s reliance on American production demonstrates its role before 1942; in Roosevelt’s words, the US was the “Arsenal of democracy,” although it was also supplying a communist state.14 Until its entry into the war, the US possessed an industrial base and population capable of producing armaments for foreign belligerents to fight the potential enemies of America.

Two statements on the 7 November 1940 display the possible aims of the US in the European theatre. The first was Stimson’s claim that Britain’s survival was a matter of “American national defence” and that weapons in the hands of the British could be used to defend American interests.15 The second was Roosevelt’s assertion that Britain should receive 50% of all American-made munitions, with the other half going to the US military.16 Both these statements show how the US viewed Germany as the major threat to American interests and also believed that 50% of its arms were of more use to the British military than under the control of their own. The aim of the US until 1942 was to hinder Germany by giving weapons to the enemies of the Axis, and hopefully bring down the Nazi regime, but without directly involving their own men and jeopardising American lives. They did this by producing and supplying weapons to both the UK and the Soviet Union without providing any manpower towards the front lines. Even once they entered the war, the large amount of American arms provided to its Allies supported the idea of preserving American men, although it must be noted that from 1942 the US military became quickly involved in the European theatre.

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Once Japan had carried its surprise attack against the US on 7 December 1941, followed by Germany’s declaration of war against them four days later, the Americans became actively involved in the conflict. Prior to these events the American military had already debated whether to focus on the Pacific or European theatres, as well as how best to engage the Axis. In March 1941, the American and British military staff had discussed what would occur should the US enter the war, with the final result being that the US stated its aim was to focus on the European theatre and the fall of Germany, over the Pacific.17 The supporting document from these discussions, ABC-1, highlighted that a sustained air offensive against the Axis in Europe was essential in achieving the necessary conditions for an eventual land offensive.18 From this, the Air War Plans Division drew up AWPD-1, an annexe to the war plan Rainbow 5, which called for an ‘Unremitting air offensive’ in order to cripple the Axis’ capability in waging war, with at least 5,000 heavy and very heavy bombers needed.19 Although Roosevelt had campaigned to outlaw aerial bombing by international agreement, he enthusiastically supported the construction of a strategic bombing force, instructing on 4 May 1941, that production of 500 heavy bombers a month should be achieved.20 Harry Hopkins stated in August 1941 that the President went as far as to claim that bombing was the only means of gaining a victory.21 Throughout 1942 to 1945, the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) conducted strategic bombing over Europe, targeting the enemy’s key economic centres and transportation links.22 It is difficult to distinguish the achievements of the USAAF from the RAF in terms of damage to the German economy but, as the number of American bombers present in Europe was over double that of the British by 1944, it could be argued that the USAAF made a sizable contribution to any damage done to the Axis by air forces.23 However, one area can be attributed almost entirely to the Americans; the destruction of the Luftwaffe. AWPD-1 had described the neutralisation of the German Air Force as essential to the ‘Accomplishment of principle objectives.’24 Unlike the British, the USAAF believed that daylight bombing could be achieved without unacceptable casualties and that the securing of strategic air superiority was vital in being able to carry out a full bombing offensive without high losses.25 The USAAF therefore focused on bombing both German airbases and factories that manufactured aircraft components, such as ball-bearing producing facilities.26 By the Sextant Conference, held between 22 and 26 November 1943, the combined British and American intelligence reports stated that 880 single-engine fighter aircraft had been destroyed or rendered inoperable by bombing operations, whilst the production of fighter aircraft in Germany had been reduced by 30% in the months of October and November.27 Furthermore, at the end of 1943, the Nazis expected that, by the end of 1944, Germany’s annual aircraft production should reach 80,000 planes.28 Instead, production peaked at 39,800 aircraft.29

HISTORY

Photograph taken from a Japanese plane during the torpedo attack on ships moored on both sides of Ford Island shortly after the beginning of the Pearl Harbor attack on 7 December 1944

With the development of long-range fighters, first used in November 1943, the USAAF’s role not only became one of destroying the enemy infrastructure, but also of eliminating the Luftwaffe operating over Western Europe. Previously, German fighters, aided by radar, were able to combat unescorted bombers and cause heavy casualties against US strategic forces; long-range escort fighters meant that the Allies could begin inflicting losses equal to the ones they were suffering.30 As Germany’s aircraft production was dwarfed by the US alone, it was only a matter of time before the Luftwaffe lost control over Europe’s skies. The Luftwaffe lost 21% of its fighters in November 1943, 23% in December and by Spring 1944, 50% of Luftwaffe fighters were lost a month.31 Allied air superiority would have a profound effect in June 1944 when the amphibious assaults on Normandy were launched, whilst in Eastern Europe, the Axis had to constantly withdraw aircraft to combat the Allied bombers. At the Sextant Conference, Allied intelligence reported that in October 1942, only 38% of German fighter forces had been located in Western Europe; by November 1943, it was 63%.32 Overy argues that the Americans resorted to using strategic bombing for two major reasons: It was a way of engaging the Axis without incurring serious casualties and the Allies were able to utilise their considerable economic and scientific power.33 Roosevelt did not want the high casualty rates like those being inflicted on the Eastern European front and therefore supported bombing because it promised great effects for little expenditure in American lives.34 Although in spring 1944 the USAAF targeted objectives in France, in order to predicate the Normandy landings by disabling the infrastructure used for German military transportation, for much of the war it focused on economic centres in Germany as it was the only path available to the Allies.35 For the US, the role of strategic bombing was one of distraction. It sought and succeeded in many respects, to draw pressure from the Eastern European front and prevent the Axis from reinforcing their military to the full extent that their economy would allow. Churchill had promised Stalin that bombing would constitute a “Second front” against Germany, but this was only because the Allies refused to

allow their populations to suffer like those in Russia, especially when there was little hope of holding any established beachhead.36 For the spring and summer of 1944, the USAAF supported the Allied ground forces and created the necessary conditions for landings in France.

However, after this, they resumed their targeting of Germany’s military-industrial complex therefore disrupting supply of the front line with minimum casualties.

The American military’s role throughout the war evolved as its forces grew, especially concerning the Army. The issue that faced the US was that, on the one hand, it had committed itself to a “Germany-First” policy and a focus on the European theatre in the ABC-1 talks and the Arcadia Conference, held from 22 December 1941 to 12 January 1942.37 On the other, they lacked the forces (and resources) to launch an assault on Western Europe alone, whilst Ernst King, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, constantly requested resources and men to carry out operations in the Pacific.38 It is obvious that Marshall, and many other high-ranking military officials, viewed the US Army’s role as one of direct action, attacking the enemy in Western Europe quickly and delivering a decisive blow against him.39 Marshall wanted to launch amphibious assaults on France as early as 1942, establishing a bridgehead in the Cherbourg peninsula so as to remove pressure from the Eastern European front and challenge the Germans directly.40 However, as the US army could only muster two and a half divisions by September 1942, the British would have to provide the vast majority of the forces for the landings.41 This posed a problem as Alan Brooke, Chief of Imperial General Staff, refused to support any landings in France for 1942, seeing little evidence that the ten British divisions he could muster would be able to challenge the 25 German divisions in France. This meant that until 1944 when the American forces in the European theatre outnumbered the British and Commonwealth, the US was forced to postpone any direct attacks on Western Europe.

Instead of landing in Northern France, the Americans were persuaded to adopt a role advocated by the British, striking at the peripherals of the Axis empires where they were weakest. Brooke believed that the Allies’ best strategy was one of husbanding their forces for a decisive attack when

Photo: United States Air Force/Public Domain

Photo: Imperial Japanese Navy - Official U.S. Navy photograph/Public Domain

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A B-25C Mitchell bomber in flight over California, US, 1942

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Photo: Imperial War Museums/Public Domain

HISTORY

A shipment of 116 Supermarine Spitfires sent by sea was assembled in just 11 days at RAF North Front, Gibraltar in time for Op TORCH

the enemy was “Over-extended and off their balance,” using Allied supremacy at sea in order to threaten multiple fronts at once.42 As the Americans possessed less forces than the British, they had little choice but to adopt this strategy as well, if they were to uphold their promise to focus on Germany over Japan, assuming the role of cooperating with the British forces in the Mediterranean.43 The first attack by the US Army and the British took place in French North Africa, as part of the Operation TORCH landings on the 8 November 1942.44 It had been decided that American officials should accompany all forces, conducting diplomatic conversations, as relations between the British and Vichy French were low after the British had sunk the Vichy Fleet at Mars-el-Kébir in 1940.45 However, although the operation was conducted by mostly American forces, British naval forces supported all three landing and British forces landed near Algiers.46 Once the operation had been successfully executed, more forces arrived in French North Africa so that neither Britain nor the US had a sizable majority of troops within the area.47 A similar experience occurred over Operation HUSKY, the amphibious invasion of Sicily in July 1943. The Americans contributed three infantry and one armoured division as well as sending a fleet of 87 ships to aid in the landings.48 In comparison, the UK sent four infantry and one armoured division as well as one infantry brigade, along with 105 ships.49 Although Marshall had opposed an attack on Italy on the grounds that it would prevent the Allies from carrying out any landings in Northern France earlier than 1944, the US military was still constrained by the need to act, in order to demonstrate to the US population that they were having an effect on the enemy. The lack of troops and transport available to carry out such an assault proved sufficient reasons for the British to dissuade the Americans from pursuing an invasion of France.50 54

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With Brooke once again arguing against a cross-channel attack on the grounds that the Allies only had 23 available divisions for offensive operations, an amount he argued would be easily contained in France by the present German divisions along with Italian reinforcements, the Americans were persuaded to support the attack on Sicily.51 The US military shared the same role as the British throughout 19421943, launching joint operations over the Mediterranean that alone could not defeat Germany, but would weaken the Axis position for when America had organised enough men and transport for a landing in France. Although this isn’t the role that Marshall wanted the US to take, he did not possess the leverage of more troops nor a sound strategic plan in order to combat Brooke’s arguments.

By the time that Operation OVERLORD, the Allied invasion of the Normandy Coast in June 1944, occurred, the US Army consisted of 200 divisions compared to approximately 85 divisions in the British counterpart.52 As Roberts states, the strength of Marshall’s voice in the Anglo-American discussions increased with the number of armed Americans.53 With this advantage of numbers over the British, the Americans were finally able to change the role of their forces to one of seeking a direct, decisive conflict. The aim of the US Army and their British allies, became the liberation of France and then to advance onto Germany.54 Whereas the British-proposed attacks in North Africa and Italy had, by control of the Mediterranean, forced Germany to relocate a large amount of divisions in Southern France, Italy and the Balkans due to the threat of invasion at any of these points, OVERLORD sought instead to create the opportunity for the engagement and destruction of those German forces.55 It was only once the US had sufficient forces to be able to challenge the German forces in Western Europe, as well as to convince the British that OVERLORD would not be a disaster, that their role could move from one of indirect threat to one of direct action against the enemy’s main strongpoint.

American leadership of Allied forces was a key aspect of the Second World War, with General Eisenhower holding both the posts of Commander of Allied Mediterranean forces and Supreme Allied Commander in Europe between 1942 and 1945.56 Leadership at the highest level of strategy and planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did have an identifiable aim and effect on the theatre, which was to keep Britain focused on the OVERLORD landings and the subsequent offensive against Germany. Although OVERLORD was only carried out in 1944, both Marshall and King insisted that the Allies should ultimately aim for a cross-Channel assault as their primary operation from 1942.57 This had the effect that both American and British troops were gathered in the UK, as well as transports, which may have been used instead in the Mediterranean campaigns, further delaying “OVERLORD,” had the American Chiefs-of-Staff not been so insistent.58 The British constantly sought other operations over a cross-Channel assault and, in 1942 and 1943, were able to convince their US allies to carry out both TORCH and HUSKY with them.59 However, once HUSKY had been carried out,

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HISTORY

Brooke advocated an offensive in the Italian Peninsula.60 Marshall opposed this vehemently, mainly due to a report from Stimson that Brooke and Churchill both hoped to prevent any landings in France by committing Allied troops to an all-out offensive in Italy.61 Although further attacks were carried out in Italy, the US Chiefs-of-Staff refused to release the number of divisions from the UK that the British desired.62 Despite the American Staff Officer, Albert Wedemeyer, claiming that Brooke wanted to avoid a cross-Channel attack at any cost, it is obvious that he did wish to carry out OVERLORD.63 However, both Brooke and Churchill were overly-cautious about OVERLORD and their suggestions of alternative operations did impact on OVERLORD’s execution date.64 It is likely that the Normandy landings would not have taken place by June 1944 had the Americans not forced the British to prepare for OVERLORD since 1942.

The role of the US in the European theatre during the Second World War can be split into two periods: Pre-1944 and the period from 1 January 1944. Pre-1944, its role was to support its major allies, the British and the Soviet Union.

The sheer military-industrial capacity of the US meant that, with Lend-Lease, it was able to provide equipment that both its allies lacked both before and after its entry into the war.

Bombing sought to weaken Germany’s ability to wage war effectively, relieving pressure off the Russians in Eastern Europe. The army and naval forces also sought this effect, attacking the Axis at their weakest points in North Africa and the Mediterranean so as to draw their forces away from the East and force them to defend large amounts of coastline that, with the Mediterranean under Allied control, could be constantly threatened with invasion.

The American leadership focused on keeping the Allies preparing for an invasion of Northern France so as to bring an end to the Nazis, first by destroying their armies in France and then by striking into Germany itself. This was in opposition to the British aim of containment, although it is important to point out that the British would have eventually sought to liberate France and invade Germany. This would have most likely been achieved later than 1944. In 1944, the Army’s role was directed to carry out this attack instead of

merely holding down German forces in Western and Southern Europe, whilst the Russians fought the main conflict. Meanwhile, its industrial capacity focused mainly on supporting their sizable military, rather than providing its munitions to its allies. The role of the Air Force remained focussed on crippling the German economy, but now also included supporting the Army through tactical bombing and through the elimination of the Luftwaffe. By the start of 1944, The US was the dominant country within the Allies in terms of Navy, Air Force and industrial capacity, a large change from only three years before where its military was unprepared for any offensive combat on another continent.

References 76th Congress (1940) Neutrality Act of 1939 in The American Journal of International Law, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Alanbrooke, Papers (ALAB).

Bailey, G. (2013) The Arsenal of Democracy: aircraft supply and the AngloAmerican alliance, 1938-1942, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.

Barr, N. (2015) Yanks and Limeys, Penguin Books, London.

Black, C. (2003) Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom, Public Affairs Publishers, New York.

Bryant, A. (1957) The Turn of the Tide, Collins Clear Type Press, London.

Butler, J. (1964) History of the Second World War, Grand Strategy vol. iii, June 1941- August 1942, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London.

Danchev, A. & Todman, D. (Eds.) (2001) War Diaries 1939-1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London.

Hansell, H. (1972) The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler, Arno Press, Atlanta.

Harrison, M. (1988) Resource Mobilisation for World War II: the USA, UK, U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938-1945 in Economic History Review, Vol. 41 No. 2, Wily & Blackwell, New Jersey.

Langer, W. & Gleason, S. (1968) The Undeclared War, 1940-1941, P. Smith, Massachusetts.

Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London - Field Marshal Lord Overy, R. (1995) Why the Allies Won, Pimlico Publishers, London.

Overy, R. (2005) The Air War, 1939-1945, Potomac Books, Washington D.C. Reynolds, D. & Kimball, W. (1994) Allies at War, Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Roberts, A. (2008) Masters and Commanders, Penguin Publishers, London.

Roosevelt, R. (1941) Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. IX, Random House, New York.

Sherwood, R. (1949) The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, Vol. II, Eyre & Spotiswoode, London.

Stimson, H. (1948) Stimson Diaries, Vol. 31, Yale University Library, New Haven.

Stimson, H. (1949) On Active Service in Peace and War, Harper & Brothers, London.

Wedemayor, A. (1958) Wedemeyer Reports! Holt Publishers, New York.

Werrell, K. (1986) The Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II: Costs and Accomplishments in The Journal of American History, Vol. 73 No.3, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Zeitlin, J. (1995) Flexibility and Mass Production at War: Aircraft Manufacture in Britain, the United States, and Germany, 1939-1945 in Technology and Culture, Vol. 36 No. 1, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

Footnotes Roosevelt, F. (1941), Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. IX , New York, pp.604-605 112 Langer W. & Gleason S. (1968), The Undeclared War, 1940-1941, Massachusetts, p.186 112 76th Congress (1940), Neutrality Act of 1939 in The American Journal of International Law, Washington D.C., pp.50-54 113 Barr, N. (2015), Yanks and Limeys, London, p.91 114 Ibid.

115 Ibid. p.92

Photo: Public Domain

111

It is likely that the Normandy landings would not have taken place by June 1944 had the Americans not forced the British to prepare for Op OVERLORD

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Langer W. & Gleason S., The Undeclared War, p.225 Langer W. & Gleason S, The Undeclared War, p.227 and p.239 118 Harrison, M. (1988), Resource Mobilisation for World War II: the USA, UK, U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938-1945 in Economic History Review, Vol. 41 No. 2, New Jersey, p.16 119 Bailey, G. (2013), The Arsenal of Democracy: aircraft supply and the AngloAmerican alliance, 1938-1942, Edinburgh, pp. 279-280 110 Ibid. pp. 279-282 111 Harrison, M., Resource Mobilisation for WWII, pp.21-22 112 Langer W. & Gleason S., The Undeclared War, pp.798, 819 113 Harrison, M., Resource Mobilisation for WWII, p.22 114 Roosevelt, F., Public Papers and Addresses of F.D.R, Vol. IX, p.633 115 Stimson, H. (1948), Stimson Diaries, Vol. 31, New Haven, 7th November 1940 116 Langer W. & Gleason S., The Undeclared War, p.216 117 Bryant, A. (1957), The Turn of the Tide, London, p.290.

118 Overy, R. (2005), The Air War, 1939-1945, Washington D.C., p.61.

119 Hansell, H. (1972), The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler, Atlanta, pp. 298-304.

120 Overy, R. (1995), Why the Allies Won, London, p.109.

121 Ibid. p.210.

122 Overy, R., The Air War, p.106.

123 Ibid. p.139.

124 Hansell, H., The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler, p.299.

125 Overy, R., The Air War, p.107.

126 Werrell, K. (1986), The Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II: Costs and Accomplishments in The Journal of American History, Vol. 73 No.3, pp.709-710 127 LHCMA, ALAB MSS 6/1/4, Combined Chiefs of Staff Papers, Sextant Conference, Effects of Strategic Bombing in Europe, pp. 121-122 128 Overy, R., The Air War, p.123 129 Zeitlin, J. (1995), Flexibility and Mass Production at War: Aircraft Manufacture in Britain, the United States, and Germany, 1939-1945 in Technology and Culture, Vol. 36 No. 1, p.52 130 Overy, R., Why the Allies Won, p. 122 131 Ibid. p.124 132 LHCMA, ALAB MSS 6/1/4, Combined Chiefs of Staff Papers, Sextant Conference, C.C.S 408, Command of British and U.S. Forces Operating Against Germany, pp.226-227 133 Overy, R., Why the Allies Won, p.128 134 Sherwood, R. (1949), The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, Vol. II, London, p.586

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Werrell, K., The Strategic Bombing of Germany, p.711 Overy, R., Why the Allies Won, p.129 137 Roberts, A. (2008), Masters and Commanders, London, p.68 138 Ibid. p.195 139 Bryant, A., Turn of Tide, p.345.

140 Butler, J. (1964), Grand Strategy vol. III, June 1941- August 1942, London, pp.675-681 140 Bryant, A., Turn of Tide, pp.345-346 141 War Diaries 1939-1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Alex Danchev & Daniel Todman (Eds.) (London, 2001), 9th April 1942 142 Bryant, A., Turn of Tide, p. 340 143 Roberts, A., Masters and Commanders, p.291 144 Ibid.

145 Overy, R., Why the Allies Won, p.144 146 Ibid. p.292 147 Roberts, A., Masters and Commanders, pp.293-294 148 LHCMA, ALAB MSS 6/1/1, Combined Chiefs of Staff Papers, Casablanca Conference, Operation “Husky”, p.61 149 Ibid.

150 Brooke, A., War Diaries 1939-1945, 18th January 1943 151 LHCMA, ALAB MSS 6/1/1, Combined Chiefs of Staff Papers, Casablanca Conference, Meeting January 18th 1943, pp.143-144 152 Black, C. (2003), Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom, New York, p.798.

153 Roberts, A., Masters and Commanders, p.296.

154 Roberts, A., Masters and Commanders, p.511.

155 Reynolds, D. & Kimball, W. (1994), Allies at War, London, p.13.

LHCMA, ALAB MSS 6/1/2, Combined Chiefs of Staff Papers, Trident Conference, C.C.S 234: Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe, p.82.

156 Roberts, A., Masters and Commanders, p.389.

157 Bryant, A., Turn of Tide, p.345.

158 Barr, N., Yanks and Limeys, pp.280-282.

159 Overy, R., Allies at War, p.270.

160 Stimson, H. (1949), On Active Service in Peace and War, London, p.222.

161 Ibid. p.226.

162 Ibid. p.222.

LHCMA, ALAB MSS 6/1/2, Combined Chiefs of Staff Papers, Trident Conference, C.C.S 234: Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe, p.82.

163 Roberts, A., Masters and Commanders, p.582.

Wedemeyer, A. (1958), Wedemeyer Reports!, New York, p.141.

164 Overy, R., Why the Allies Won, p.270.

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HISTORY

Were the strategic aims of Operation MARKET GARDEN realistic, given the constraints on Allied logistics in the autumn of 1944?

The heroic failure at the Battle of Arnhem, is one of the defining battle honours of the Parachute Regiment: nearly forty years after the battle, Major John Crosland would use the memory of Arnhem to rally his company at the Battle of Goose Green during the Falklands War.1

By Lt Rob Abernethy The defeat at Arnhem was no failure of the Paras’ skill at arms, but a failure of combat service support. The advance of British XXX Corps was dreadfully slow, because of the limitations of the road network and a lack of dash on the part of commanders. A severe delay was also imposed by the need to seize the road bridge at Nijmegen; to the point that any chance to seize the Arnhem road bridge had disappeared by the time XXX Corps came within sight of the town. Many justifications and ‘what-if’ scenarios have been offered, to explain the dreadfully-slow advance and Operation MARKET GARDEN’s ultimate failure.

Pointing to the U.S. 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions’ failure to seize the bridges at Nijmegen and Eindhoven by coup de main on the first day, is a particularly popular one among British writers, while the Americans in turn like to emphasise the British habit of stopping in the middle of combat to make tea. Yet the sheer difficulty of sustaining such an advance, which took place along a single road, in difficult terrain, well over four hundred kilometres from the nearest port; meant that the logistics considerations alone, should have been enough to kill the ambition to end the war with a lightning strike into the Ruhr, at the first planning conference.

The plan The MARKET GARDEN plan consisted of two elements: MARKET was the airborne element, where the First Allied Airborne Army, consisting two American divisions, one British division, and one Polish brigade, would seize river crossings at Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem – ‘the airborne carpet’.

GARDEN would see the British XXX Corps reinforce the landings – the link-up operation – by advancing north from Neerpelt, with the XII and VIII Corps guarding the flanks.

After crossing the Rhine at Arnhem, XXX Corps would advance to the shore of the Ijsselmeer, a total distance of nearly 150 kilometres. This would cut off the western

Allied and German dispositions at the start of Operation MARKET GARDEN, with the airborne landing zones marked

Netherlands and trap the German Fifteenth Army against the sea. XXX Corps could then prepare for a turn east to outflank the Siegfried Line on Germany’s border and form a start line along Zwolle-Deventer-Arnhem facing east in preparation for a thrust into the north of the Ruhr industrial region.2 Field Marshal Montgomery’s vision was, this lodgement over the Rhine would allow a sixteen-division thrust into Germany’s greatest industrial area and deliver the prize that suddenly seemed so close after the dramatic collapse of the Wehrmacht in the Normandy Campaign – victory before Christmas 1944.3 XXX Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Brian Horrocks, expected to reach Arnhem after no more than four days. The operation was predicated on the assumption that the Wehrmacht was in complete disarray after the defeat in Normandy and that it would be unable to mount anything THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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A mass airborne landing was not possible due to aircraft shortages

more than a local defence before resistance crumbled.4 Surely, no other assumption would have allowed the otherwise-cautious Montgomery, to accept sustaining 30,000 men and 20,000 vehicles along a single road. Furthermore, the airborne landing was to be conducted in daylight as the Luftwaffe and German ground-based air defences were no longer thought to be effective. The landing had to be divided into in several waves, rather than one massed drop, owing to a shortage of transport aircraft, which sacrificed both surprise and mass.5 The assumption that the Germans were a routed enemy on their last legs, is the root of many of MARKET GARDEN’s failures.

Operational logistics problems up to September 1944 While MARKET GARDEN was ultimately stopped on the battlefield by the Germans; even as it was being planned, the Allies had serious problems in the rear that should have made it clear, the operation could not possibly deliver on its promises. Following the American breakout from the Normandy beachhead in July 1944, the Allies had outraced their own timetables as the German Army fled back to the frontier: the original plan for Operation OVERLORD, had assumed that the Allies would not reach the River Seine until early September 1944, when in fact they were now 150 miles beyond.6 U.S. troops first crossed the German border on 11 September 1944, over seven months ahead of schedule. Such a rate of advance provoked ‘victory fever’ in higher headquarters and generated unrealistic expectations.

The German Army was by no means a spent force and the rate of advance was unsustainable. It had completely torn up the logistics concept made before the launch of OVERLORD, as ground lines of communication could simply not keep up with the advance.7 The problems began at the point of disembarkation.

Despite the capture of Cherbourg, St Malo, and Brest, these ports had either been sabotaged by German defenders, or were too small for the kind of supply capacity the Allied advance needed. Even as late as November 1944, 63% of the U.S. Army’s supplies still came through the small Normandy ports or directly over the D-Day beaches. While the beaches well exceeded their planned capacity, the supplies that were landed at Utah and Omaha were 58

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deposited directly on to the beach as the Mulberry Harbour that had been built at Omaha had been wrecked in the Great Storm of 19 June. The delivery of supplies was thus slowed by bad weather and it was uncertain whether the intact British Mulberry at Gold Beach, could survive through the winter.8 Most other ports on Channel coast were either wrecked, were too small, or were still held as festungen by the Germans. The river port of Rouen fell on 31 August and Le Havre on 12 September. They became the main ports from 6 October, for the British ‘White Ball Route’ transferring supplies to Paris, but Calais required three weeks to be brought into operation and Dunkirk did not surrender until 6 May 1945.9 One of the worst failures of the campaign, was the delay in clearing the Scheldt estuary. The great port of Antwerp had been liberated on 4 September by the British Second Army. However, the German Fifteenth Army was permitted to withdraw over the Scheldt and occupy the island of Walcheren. Here it could dominate the approaches to Antwerp with coastal artillery. After one attempt to clear the approaches by the Canadians, all such attacks were abandoned until after MARKET GARDEN.10 It was not until 28 November, twelve weeks after Antwerp’s liberation, that its port facilities were actually usable.11 The state of the ports and their transport infrastructure was so bad that Marseilles, hundreds of miles to the south on the Mediterranean coast, became one of the most important ports: it handled an average of half a million tons of cargo a month and accounted for nearly a third of Allied cargo delivered to Europe in 1944-45.12 Even when ports could be restored, there remained the problem of distance. Cherbourg and the Brittany ports had been seen as essential to support the planned advance after the breakout from Normandy, but the unexpectedly-rapid German collapse meant that they were now hundreds of miles behind the front line. Ground lines of communication (GLOC) extended to over 480 kilometres from the beachheads.13 By way of comparison, the modern British Army assumes GLOCs of 400 kilometres before it is necessary to establish a new rail, sea or air point of disembarkation. All of these would have to be reconstructed: the French railway network, especially in the suburbs around Paris, had been thoroughly bombed by the RAF and USAAF as part of interdiction efforts during the Normandy Campaign.14 The average U.S. division required 650 tons of combat supplies per day, translating into 27,750 tons of supply per day for the entire U.S. Army in France.15 All this had to come by road and naturally there was not enough transport.

Making matters worse, the roads were not especially suitable.

The Allies found that French road surfaces were generally good, but the roads were not very wide and were unsuitable for mass supply movement. Unlike in Germany, where the Allies would use the nearly 4,000 kilometres of Hitler’s autobahns to speed their advance, France would not begin laying its modern autoroute network until 1955. British logistics in particular, were hobbled by both technical problems and a failure to standardise its vehicles: 1,400

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3-ton Austin trucks, had to be removed from service owing to faulty pistons; a fault that was soon found to extend to every replacement engine. Furthermore, owing to its contract system with a wide variety of civilian manufacturers, the British Army had to service some 600 different types of vehicle, which ensured a quartermaster’s nightmare of having to stock tens of thousands of incompatible spare parts.16 In such circumstances, drastic improvisation was necessary. The Communications Zone (COMZ) combed some 6,000 vehicles out of Allied formations to create a theatre reserve of trucks, which entailed the de-motorisation of all the heavy artillery of the U.S. Twelfth Army Group and two divisions of the British Twenty-First Army Group.17 Three divisions newly arrived in France, were completely immobilised, to supply trucks to the COMZ. Loads were restricted to only the most essential: POL, rations and ammunition. Spare parts, clothing, and engineering stores were all deferred.18 The ‘Red Ball Express’ opened on 25 August. This was a truck convoy system operating on designated one-way highways. Entirely closed to civilian traffic, they delivered supplies from the Normandy beachheads to depots south of Paris. Manned largely by the segregated black soldiers of the U.S. Army’s Motor Transport Service, at its peak the Red Ball Express delivered 12,500 tons in one day, with the average trip taking seventy hours.

The similar British ‘Red Lion Route’ was established explicitly for MARKET GARDEN and delivered 627 tons a day from Bayeux to Brussels from 13 September - 12 October 1944.19 Despite the various colour routes’ remarkable successes, they were not a sustainable solution. At its best, the Red Ball Express delivered 12,500 tons of supplies in one day, but its average supply delivery was only 6,718 tons daily.20 By contrast, after the restoration of the French railway network, in November 1944 the U.S. Army’s Military Railway Service was able to consistently deliver 23,000 tons east of the River Seine a day.21 The Red Ball Express consumed 300,000 gallons of fuel per day in its own right,22 while some 9,000 vehicles were written off in road traffic accidents, largely owing to sleep deprivation. In several cases the advance was so swift that transport aircraft and even bombers were used to resupply front-line formations.23 However, air despatch consumed three gallons of fuel for every two it delivered.24 By early September the advance had faltered. Compared to 19,000 tons per day at the start of August; Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s Third Army and Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges’ First Army, were receiving 3,500 tons per day, approximately half their actual needs. On 2 September, Hodges’ V and XIX Corps were forced to halt for two days, for want of supplies. Montgomery’s Twenty-First Army Group, despite advancing along the ‘inside track’ closer to the Channel ports, was beset by similar problems: General Sir Miles Dempsey was forced to halt VIII Corps on the Seine for two weeks.25 The shortage of transport was so acute, that U.S. XX Corps’ demand signal was greater than the tonnage allocated to the entire Third Army.26 Furthermore, the rate of the advance had been so great, coupled with the COMZ’s decision to restrict deliveries of spare parts in favour

HISTORY

of more urgent combat supplies (CSUPs), that by midSeptember staggering numbers of vehicles had been lost to maintenance problems. The U.S. 3rd Armoured Division disposed of 75 tanks out of an establishment strength of 232, while in a ten-day period the British 11th Armoured Division lost seven tanks to mechanical breakdown for every one lost to enemy action.27

(Dakota) Air despatch consumed three gallons of fuel for every two it delivered

On the eve of MARKET GARDEN, therefore, the Allies were operating at the end of lines of communication that were so over-extended they could barely support an advance by a single corps and the shortage of transport was so acute, it was necessary to reduce newly-arrived formations’ combat effectiveness to keep the supply lines running. Many of its formations were badly understrength owing to maintenance problems that had their root cause in the supply crisis. And yet with this in mind, Montgomery proposed to make a 150kilometre dash to the Ijsselmeer, over three of the great rivers of Europe at their widest points,28 when most of his formations had left their engineering stores behind to free up transport and then turn east with sixteen divisions towards the Ruhr and North German Plain. Throughout this entire period, Antwerp, which could have shortened Allied GLOCs by hundreds of kilometres, would remain unusable.

Tactical logistics problems during MARKET GARDEN For all the glamour of the airborne forces, MARKET GARDEN could not succeed without reinforcement by British XXX Corps, which had to advance up the Dutch Highway 69. Horrocks rather fatuously dubbed this ‘the Club Route’, but it would soon earn the far more appropriate nickname, ‘Hell’s Highway’ from the Americans. The elevated road was only two lanes wide and yet had to accommodate 20,000 vehicles of all types. Cross-country movement was almost impossible. The Netherlands is a famously low-lying country, with much land reclaimed from the sea. The land either side of the road, known as polder, was too soft for armoured vehicles and could only be patrolled by infantry.29 This resulted in a penetration that was only around 16 kilometres wide at the maximum, and XXX Corps had no flank protection as the fuel crisis was so acute that XII and VIII Corps could not keep up.30 THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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Tanks of British XXX Corps crossing the bridge at Nijmegen; the failure to secure the bridge on 17 September delayed the advance by 36 hours

Such problems could have been addressed with a better estimate, though it is more likely that this would have led to the operation being entirely cancelled. A similar scenario was part of the final exam at the Royal Netherlands Army staff college. Any officer who suggested an advance north from Nijmegen directly to Arnhem, was instantly failed. None of the offices of the Dutch army-in-exile’s Princess Irene Brigade, were consulted before the operation.31 In such unfavourable terrain, the advance could only succeed if the enemy was completely unreactive, but the German Army still possessed impressive powers of resistance. Field Marshal Walter Model, commander of Army Group B, took control of the Orstkommandanturen32 battalions of the German occupation authorities in the Netherlands and used them to establish some six battlegroup-sized units in the MARKET GARDEN AO. The 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg was refitting near Arnhem after the retreat from France and saw heavy fighting in Nijmegen. Lieutenant General Kurt Chill’s 85th Infantry Division, had established a defensive line on the Albert Canal on its own initiative and managed to collect a large number of stragglers retreating from France, ultimately reaching a strength of 4,250 men. These men would form the first line of defence against XXX Corps’ advance.33

Waffen-SS taken prisoner by British troops; for all their supply difficulties, the Allies were luxuriously equipped compared to their opponents, who were under standing orders to seize Allied rations and materiel

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With only around 20 tanks and 150 other armoured vehicles between them, such ad hoc forces could not oppose Horrocks directly. However, XXX Corps relied on the American airborne divisions to secure its flanks after its relieved them at Eindhoven and Nijmegen and they proved a serious challenge to the lightly-armed paratroopers, whose primary anti-tank weapon was the bazooka.34 German counterattacks were largely aimed at bridges, in an effort to cut Hell’s Highway permanently.35 On 19 September, an entire battalion of the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment had to be withdrawn from Eindhoven to Son to protect the Bailey bridge there.36 On 20 September, attacks developed around both Eindhoven and Nijmegen, putting Hell’s Highway under direct fire. With supply trucks not getting through, the men of the 101st Airborne Division were forced to forage for turnips after their K-Rations ran out.37 22 September – ‘Black Friday’ – was the start of three days of German counterattacks on Hell’s Highway. These were largely aimed at the town of Veghel - described by Model as the ‘wasp waist’ of the Allied advance - to destroy its bridges over the Willems Canal and the River Aa. On 24 September, Kurt Chill’s Kampfgruppe managed to close Hell’s Highway for 36 hours.38 Major General Maxwell Taylor described his 101st Airborne Division as: ‘weak at every critical point’.39 These attacks had a direct impact on XXX Corps’ leading formations. Horrocks was unable to spare any more forces to reinforce the two divisions that had crossed the Waal at Nijmegen. Only a single brigade could be spared to reinforce the 1st (Polish) Independent Parachute Brigade that had landed at Driel on 21 September. This in turn meant that it was impossible to establish a crossing over the Lower Rhine to reach the wretched remnants of the British 1st Airborne Division trapped at Oosterbeerk outside Arnhem.40 With the Arnhem road bridge lost on 20 September and the 1st Airborne Division no longer a combat effective force, this was the end of MARKET GARDEN as a decisive offensive. Despite Montgomery’s later insistence that the operation had been 90% successful, without the last bridge, it meant nothing.

MARKET GARDEN’s ultimate operational failure While logistics hampered Operation MARKET GARDEN, there were plenty of opportunities where more decisive action might have allowed it to succeed, if success is defined as taking the last bridge at Arnhem. For example, had coup de main parties been landed closer to the bridge at Arnhem, it might well have been secured on the first day. Such an operation had already proven successful at Pegasus Bridge in Normandy months earlier. In the event, a mixed force of less than a battalion reached the north end of Arnhem bridge.

The 82nd Airborne Division also showed a lack of urgency in capturing Nijmegen bridge. On 17 September, the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment did not move for nearly three hours after being ordered to seize the bridge and Nijmegen was not secured by XXX Corps until 20 September.41 XXX Corps itself showed a bizarre lack of perseverance.

Stories about British soldiers pausing in the middle of combat to brew up have been told by Americans since the beginning

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of the Special Relationship, but there are justified complaints about the lack of aggressiveness shown by British formations at this late stage of the war. The Guards Armoured Division made no effort to continue the advance to Eindhoven, through the night of 17 September, under the ridiculous logic that the demolition of the road bridge at Son made capturing it less urgent. Exactly the opposite was true. The 101st Airborne Division had no engineer assets that could reconstruct a bridge capable of supporting armoured vehicles and establishing a Bailey Bridge the next day cost XXX Corps another 12 hours.42 Had the 1st Airborne Division had functioning radios, knowledge of the dramaticallydeteriorating situation in Arnhem might have spurred Horrocks to move faster.

But even if MARKET GARDEN had succeeded in gaining a bridgehead over the Rhine and XXX Corps had succeeded in securing Hell’s Highway, the fact remained that the Allies lacked the logistic capability to sustain the hoped-for, warwinning advance into the Ruhr. Firstly, even a successful MARKET GARDEN would have effectively committed the Allies to the ‘narrow thrust’ option, that Eisenhower had seen the problems with the moment Montgomery proposed the operation:

GARDEN; this cannot be understood to mean that the Allies would have reached the Ruhr if only they made some better tactical choices. The penetration made by XXX Corps was too narrow and too vulnerable. Furthermore, van Creveld’s calculations do not allow for any excess transport capacity, to help reinforce the Main Effort. As we have seen, the Red Ball Express and Red Lion Routes, were barely sufficient to sustain the current number of divisions in North-West Europe.

To keep supplies moving, newly-arrived divisions were being stripped of their transport or forced to leave their artillery behind – any reinforcements would not be fully combat effective. Furthermore, van Creveld notes, that while 18 divisions might, under the best of circumstances, have reached the Ruhr, such a force would hardly have been sufficient to hold, garrison and occupy German territory.48 Throughout the whole of Operation MARKET GARDEN, Hitler had been hoarding resources in preparation for the December counteroffensive through the Ardennes that would develop into the Battle of the Bulge. These 24 divisions instead may well have been employed to crush this lunge for the Ruhr, which could well have left the Allies impotent for much of early 1945. The possibilities that this might have suggested to Stalin do not bear thinking about.

‘What you're proposing is this – if I give you all the supplies you want, you could go straight to Berlin – right straight to Berlin?43 Monty, you're nuts. You can't do it... If you try a long column like that in a single thrust, you'd have to throw off division after division to protect your flanks from attack’.44

Conclusion In conclusion, Operation MARKET GARDEN was a flawed plan at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Tactically, it allowed for insufficient forces to guard the advance’s flanks, which left supply convoys moving along Hell’s Highway dreadfully vulnerable. This ensured that XXX Corps’ advance was halted before Arnhem and left it unable to do anything to reverse the deteriorating situation at Oosterbeerk. Furthermore, lack of dash on the part of certain American units and especially of XXX Corps, allowed the Germans to rally and delay the advance to the point that taking Arnhem was impossible.

This could potentially have been rectified by more intelligent tactical choices, but the dreadful state of Allied logistics in the autumn of 1944 meant that operationally and strategically, MARKET GARDEN could never have succeeded.

The operation’s logistics were wholly dependent on truck convoys moving from ports that were rapidly becoming unusable as winter approached, on bad roads over many hundreds of kilometres. This significantly reduced the number of divisions that could have been committed to the operation and the Allies’ ability to conduct a board-front general offensive. This would not resume until they had restored the French railway network and opened the port of Antwerp. MARKET GARDEN distracted from the essential task of clearing the Scheldt Estuary, which was vital to sustaining an advance deep into Germany in any strength.

It is not enough to assume that the Scheldt would have simply fallen into the Allies’ hands had XXX Corps reached the IJsselmeer and trapped the Fifteenth Army against the sea. While it can be shown mathematically that the Allies could have conceivably reached the Ruhr had they thrown all available transport behind an 18-division thrust, this does

Advancing towards the Ruhr from Arnhem would require the Allies to sustain a single narrow penetration with German armies on both flanks. MARKET GARDEN had permitted some 60,000 troops of the German Fifteenth Army to withdraw over the Scheldt to assist in the attacks on Hell’s Highway.45 Furthermore, the German positions in the Netherlands were substantially reinforced throughout the battle by ‘Blitztransporte’” – high-priority rail transports that at one point relocated a tank battalion from Dresden to Arnhem within 24 hours. Other loads transported by the Blitztransporten included 36 88mm Flak guns, two companies of tank destroyers and the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion, equipped with the mighty 68-ton King Tiger tank.46 These efforts would surely have been redoubled if the Allies had crossed the Rhine and the Allies would have had to slough off a large percentage of its forces for flank security, at the expense of the Main Effort.

The Israeli military theorist Martin van Creveld, has calculated that, had all other offensive operations in Northwest Europe been halted, sufficient transport would have been available to support an 18-division ‘Narrow Thrust’ by two Commonwealth armies and one American, towards the Ruhr. However, van Creveld qualifies his conclusion with: ‘It could have been done, though only just.’47 Given the underwhelming performance of Allied logistics, especially in the face of German opposition, during Operation MARKET

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not consider the likely response of the Germans. Hitler was inveterately aggressive until the day he died and would more than likely have ordered the Fifteenth Army to stand fast and directed relentless attacks on XXX Corps’ salient from both sides. Unlike his nonsensical attempts at counteroffensives on the Eastern Front, in this case, the salient would have been so narrow that Hitler’s insistence on not yielding one inch of ground, would likely have been beneficial to the Germans. Had XXX Corps actually made it to Arnhem Bridge, then the ultimate result of a dead-end salient projecting into nowhere, attacked from all sides, would have been little different, but with far graver consequences for the Allies’ ability to conduct operations into 1945.

References Beevor, Antony, Ardennes 1944: Hitler’s Last Gamble (London: Penguin, 2015) Beevor, Antony, Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges 1944 (London: Penguin, 2018) Caddick-Adams, Peter, Snow and Steel: The Battle of the Bulge 1944-45 (London: Arrow Books, 2015) Creveld, Martin van, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) Hastings, Max, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-45 (London: Pan Books, 2015).

Mallinson, Allan, The Making of the British Army: From the English Civil War to the War on Terror (London: Bantam, 2011) Ruppenthal, Roland G., Logistical Support of the Armies: September 1944 – May 1945 (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1995).

Ryan, Cornelius, A Bridge Too Far (New York: Popular Library, 1974) Wade, Pat, Red Ball Express: Supply Line from the D-Day Beaches, (Hersham: Ian Allen, 2007) Zaloga, Steven J., Atlas of the European Campaign, 1944-45 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2018)

Footnotes Mallinson, Allan, The Making of the British Army: From the English Civil War to the War on Terror (London: Bantam, 2011), pp. 489-90 112 Beevor, Antony, Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges 1944 (London: Penguin, 2018), pp. 29-34 113 Hastings, Max, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-45 (London: Pan Books, 2015), pp. 31-5 114 Zaloga, Steven J., Atlas of the European Campaign, 1944-45 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2018), pp. 144-5 115 Ibid.

116 Owing to Hitler’s refusal to countenance even tactical withdrawals, all German reserves in France had been demolished by the Normandy fighting. Eisenhower had expected to have to fight again on the Seine, but the Germans had simply nothing left that was combat effective to oppose the advance.

117 Zaloga, 2018, p. 134 118 Ruppenthal, Roland G., Logistical Support of the Armies: September 1944 – May 1945 (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1995), p. 53-60 111

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119

Zaloga, 2018, pp. 140-1 Hastings, 2015, pp. 21-4 111 Beevor, 2018, p. 370 112 Zaloga, 2018, p. 130 113 Hastings, 2015, p. 25 114 Zaloga, 2018, pp. 82-3 115 Hastings, 2015, p. 26 116 Hastings, 2015, pp. 25-6 117 Caddick-Adams, Peter, Snow and Steel: The Battle of the Bulge, 1944-45 (London: Arrow Books, 2015), pp.84-7 118 Creveld, Martin van, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 220-1 119 Zaloga, 2018, p. 196 120 Wade, Pat, Red Ball Express: Supply Line from the D-Day Beaches, (Hersham: Ian Allen, 2007), p.150 121 Ibid.

122 Approximately five gallons of fuel consumed to deliver one gallon of fuel to the front.

123 Patton’s Third Army, advancing through one of France’s finest wineproducing regions, awarded hundreds of cases of champagne to their transport pilots.

124 Beevor, Antony, Ardennes 1944: Hitler’s Last Gamble (London: Penguin, 2015), p. 16 125 Caddick-Adams, 2015, pp. 83-4 126 Creveld, 2013, p. 220 127 Hastings, 2015, p. 26 128 The Meuse, the Waal, and the Lower Rhine, to say nothing of four smaller canals.

129 Beevor, 2018, p. 66 130 Beevor, 2018, p. 205 131 Beevor, 2018, p. 66 132 Roughly translating as “district commands”.

133 Zaloga, 2018, pp. 146-7 134 Hastings, 2015, pp. 39 135 One such action, specifically around the town of Helmond, near Eindhoven, on 19 September is represented relatively faithfully in the HBO miniseries Band of Brothers. Other elements are simplified: the series does not show the German demolition of the Son road bridge just as Easy Company approached on 17 September, which held up XXX Corps’ advance for 12 hours, though this is represented in 1977’s A Bridge Too Far. 136 Beevor, 2018, p. 205 137 Beevor, 2018, p. 223 138 Zaloga, 2018, pp. 154-5 139 Beevor, 2018, p. 280 140 Beevor, 2019, p. 294 141 Zaloga, 2019, pp. 150-3 142 Hastings, 2015, pp. 56-60 143 A distance of nearly 500 miles 144 Ryan, Cornelius, A Bridge Too Far (New York: Popular Library, 1974), pp. 85-8 145 Beevor, 2018, p. 369 146 Beevor, 2018, pp. 132-3 147 Creveld, 2013, pp. 225-30 148 Creveld, 2015, pp. 229-30 110

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Supply over Speed: The importance of logistics in the Afrika Korps’ North African Campaign of 1940-1943 This essay will highlight the vital importance of basic infrastructure, whether that is roads or ports, in maintaining the supply chain and ensuring that the correct amount of supplies can be transported to the front in an organised and timely manner. It will also recognise the crucial role that air and naval dominance can have in the movement of supplies, through the targeting of specific vulnerable shipping lanes and road routes. Finally, it will look at characters and personalities within modern warfare and how the vital role that logistics and sustainment have in conflicts cannot be underestimated or ignored. By Lt Alex Gale In his work ‘On Operational Art’, Milan Vego stipulates that: ‘A plan for a campaign cannot succeed if not accompanied with a soundly based plan of logistics…sustainability is often the dominant factor in determining the nature and tempo of operations’ (Vego, 1977: 43).

Specifically, this essay will assert that whilst recognised as an aggressive and widely respected general, as well as a master of battlefield strategy, revered by his own men and admired by opposition forces, Rommel underestimated the level of logistics required to sustain his troops and when combined with poor logistic infrastructure and Allied air and naval superiority, his campaign in North Africa was doomed to fail from the outset.

In June 1940, Mussolini had declared war on France and Britain and in September 1940, Italian forces based in their Libyan colony launched a campaign into Egypt, against a well-established British and Commonwealth garrison defending the Suez Canal. After an initial advance, in December 1940 the British forces numbering only 36,000 men under the command of General Sir Archibald Wavell went on the offensive, pushing the Italians 840km back into Libya and capturing 130,000 men. Having assured Mussolini that he would support the beleaguered Italian forces, Hitler reluctantly sent Major General Erwin Rommel’s troops (soon to be known as the Afrika Korps), consisting of two divisions,

An Afrika Korps Panzer III moving through the desert.

This was Rommel’s main battle tank and his prize asset throughout the campaign, although it required a lot of fuel

to Tripoli in February 1941. From Tripoli, Rommel had been told to form a defensive perimeter near Sirte on the coast of Libya in order to maintain the Italian presence in North Africa. However, at the end of March 1941, with only half of his force yet in country, Rommel usurped both his orders and the direction of the Italian Commando Supremo, General Grazziani, (to whom he was nominally subordinate) and launched an attack to the east (Schreiber, 1998: 4).

This would start a dramatic advance that would see the Allied forces pushed back to the Egyptian border in a matter of days, leaving the 9th Australian Division under siege in the port city of Tobruk. After two failed sieges of Tobruk in April and May, by the end of 1941, the campaign had reached a stalemate with both forces roughly holding the same territory that they had nine months previously.

Crucially, this sudden advance, whilst impressive in its speed, had created a real headache for German forces, as it had effectively added 700 miles to Rommel’s line of supply.

The Germans were not oblivious to the danger of the lines of supply in North Africa. This was described in detail by a contemporary article in Life Magazine (1942, p.74), with Boothe writing that: ‘When the British captured German General Von Ravenstein at Bir El Hamed, near Tobruk on Nov 29 1941, this stiff-necked Prussian aristocrat obligingly supplied them with a pithy martial epigram for their Libyan War.’ Ravenstein said: “The Desert is a tacticians paradise, but a quartermaster’s hell.”

Rommel’s daring mission had put his own forces in a very precarious position logistically and this would come back to have serious implications for the Afrika Korps’ North African campaign as a whole.

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The most immediate factor facing German troops attempting to resupply Rommel’s panzers, was the limited infrastructure of Libya. Despite being an Italian colony since 1934, by the start of WW2 Italy had spent very little money on the country’s infrastructure. This, coupled with Rommel’s tactics of seizing the advantage through speed and momentum using his armoured forces, would have a detrimental effect on the lines of supply and sustainment of the Afrika Korps.

This was clearly demonstrated immediately after Rommel’s rapid advance through Libya in the Spring of 1941. Schreiber (1998, p.9) describes the situation where: ‘Rommel’s forces were extended well beyond doctrinal sustainment range…

This critical fact would not be appreciably altered even when secondary ports of debarkation were opened at Benghazi and Tobruk. Due to the lack of capacity at these ports, their use provided but minor relief to the distribution system dependent on Tripoli and the Via Balbia.’

This assessment on the lack of Libyan port capacity is supported in figures by Vannoy (2018), who writes that: ‘The main port in Libya was Tripoli, capable of handling five cargo ships or four troop transports at a time, or approximately 45,000 tonnes of cargo a month across its docks.’

The Libyan port’s lack of capacity also limited the size of convoys and their speed of discharge. Fewer, larger convoys would have been more economic, pragmatic and defendable, but instead the Italians were having to send many small convoys, which wasn’t cost-effective in terms of fuel and Naval vessels being used.

The single-mindedness of Italian forces in charge of supplying the North African campaign from the Italian mainland was clearly shown by their insistence on using Tripoli as the sole port for disembarkation of supplies, even though other ports, albeit not on the same scale as Tripoli, were available.

Vannoy again uses figures to support this argument when he writes that: ‘The force of seven Axis divisions in Libya, along with the supporting air force and naval units, required a supply of 70,000 tonnes per month. This was significantly more than Tripoli could handle, so a crisis was sure to develop’ (Vannoy, 2018).

On 4 April 1941, the German Forces captured the port of Benghazi, a port only capable of handling 24,000 tonnes a month, and even then, there: ‘Was only enough coastal shipping available to carry 15,000 tonnes a month from

‘‘

The single-mindedness of Italian forces in charge of supplying the North African campaign from the Italian mainland was clearly shown by their insistence on using Tripoli as the sole port for disembarkation of supplies

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Tripoli. As a result, supplies continued to pile up at Tripoli’ (Vannoy, 2018).

Rommel had hoped on utilising Tobruk, where the Australians were still stranded, as another port of debarkation, but his reliance of Tobruk was ill-fated, as the port was rarely capable of handling more than 18,000 tonnes a month, far less than what was required for the Axis troops. This lack of port discharge capacity was exacerbated by the Axis forces who failed to undertake infrastructure developments which could have increased supply throughflow.

‘‘

The significance of Malta in the eventual Allied dominance of logistics in this theatre of operations cannot be underestimated. Air cover from RAF airfields in Malta had initially been ignored by the Luftwaffe, with Hitler not favouring a strike on what would become a vital logistical and strategical base for Allied forces

Poor port discharge facilities aside, the routes into the hinterland also proved to be inadequate. Even if supplies came into Tripoli, there was no quick means and routes of supplying them to the front. As Vannoy (2018) observes: ‘One of the key features of Libya was a lone, all-weather (hard surfaced) road, the Via Balbia, which ran from the provincial capital, Tripoli, to the Egyptian frontier, where it met a British military road leading to Alexandria, the Suez Canal and on to Palestine’.’

This one single coastal road was not enough to act as the sole line of communication for Rommel’s forces. Instead of building a railway that would have run from Tripoli to the front, the German’s continued to rely on truck convoys to sustain the panzer divisions. The lack of infrastructure and persistent use of a single coastal road is inextricably linked with the Allied air superiority, which interdicted truck convoys, unleashing devastating blows to the supplies that had taken so much time and effort to get to Libya in the first place.

The supply issues that were facing Rommel’s Afrika Korps were even further exacerbated by the Allied Air superiority and Naval dominance in the Mediterranean. The majority of these forces were making their outward and return journeys from the vital British-held island of Malta. Respected German General Ritter Von Thoma had been sent to North Africa in December 1940 to investigate the feasibility of the Germans successfully sending troops to support the Italians in their deteriorating campaign. In his report, he clearly identified the issue of Allied naval dominance when he observed that: ‘The supply problem was the decisive factor – not only

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Major General Erwin Rommel. A Master battle strategist, but he underestimated the importance of the line of supply and logistics in the campaign.

because of the difficulties of the desert, but because of the British Navy’s command of the Mediterranean’ (cited in Liddell Hart, 1979: 155).

Schreiber (1998, p.7) supports his assertion, declaring that: ‘The threat represented by the British domination of the Mediterranean, and most specifically by air and Naval forces based at Malta, was preeminent in the minds of theater planners and decision-makers.’

The significance of Malta in the eventual Allied dominance of logistics in this theatre of operations cannot be underestimated. Air cover from RAF airfields in Malta had initially been ignored by the Luftwaffe, with Hitler not favouring a strike on what would become a vital logistical and strategical base for Allied forces.

Vannoy (2018) clearly demonstrates this when he argues that: ‘The Italians were forced to make costly efforts to stray as far away as possible from Malta. As a result, convoys had to either sail to the West along the Tunisian coast or far to the East, not far off the Balkan coast. Such routing doubled the travel distance across the Mediterranean, making it expensive in terms of time and fuel as well as the wear on ships.’

Ultimately, as Schreiber (1998, p.8) stipulates: ‘The decision not to capture Malta built a fundamental, unpredictable flaw into the North Africa campaign.’

Winston Churchill (1950, pp.176-177) wrote of Rommel that: ‘He deserves the salute which I made him — and not without some reproaches from the public — in the House of Commons in January 1942, when I said of him, "We have a

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very daring and skilful opponent against us, and, may I say across the havoc of war, a great general.”

In describing him as daring, Churchill is undoubtedly correct, as few generals in history can be argued to have been so sharp in using initiative, aggression and manoeuvre to their advantage on the battlefield and his title as a great battle strategist are arguably infallible. However, this essay has sought to assess his role as general on campaign, who must surely therefore factor in all aspects of the sequence of battle, including logistics.

Citino (2018) asserts that the lack of supplies was the ultimate factor in Rommel’s halt during his aggressive campaign of May 1942 when he writes that: ‘In reality, it is possible today to see what the great Prussian philosopher of war Karl von Clausewitz once called the “culmination point” – that moment in every campaign when the offensive begins to lose steam, run down, and eventually stop altogether. The Panzerarmee was exhausted, its equipment was worn out and in desperate need of repair.’

Citino aptly titles his essay the ‘Drive to Nowhere’, which in itself is a suitable summary of Rommel’s offensive and push into Egypt, he could advance as far as he wanted to, but without his supplies he would be unable to effectively win any sort of victory.

The Afrika Korps was also getting harassed by the SAS and the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), which were causing havoc deep behind enemy lines by targeting various fuel depots and vulnerable points on convoy routes. Captain David Stirling had come up with the idea of attacking fuel depots, airfields and leaguers of German vehicles through hit and run tactics, which damaged both the German line of supply and the morale of the Afrika Korps. Rommel’s refusal to acknowledge the importance of logistics and supplies in maintaining his troops is a paradox of sorts, as he was

Members of the SAS in specially designed armoured jeeps.

They targeted the Afrika Korps fuel depots and supply routes, causing havoc behind enemy lines

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revered and adored by his troops and widely considered a good leader, yet his own troops were lacking vital supplies to make them operationally effective and keep them fit and healthy.

Similarly, his vehicles were not receiving the repair and maintenance that they required to remain fully functioning, therefore his own tactics were depleting the quality of his attacking forces on which he relied. The rugged terrain of North Africa, as well as sand getting into vehicle engines, damaged his unit’s capabilities and increasingly his troops used captured Allied vehicles as replacements for their own.

To the question of logistics, Rommel seems to have shrugged it off as someone else’s job and consideration. Van Creveld (1977, p.187) supports this assertion when he writes of an instance before El Alamein where an Italian General asked Rommel how he intended to keep his Army supplied.

‘Rommel confessed that he did not know; the logistical services would somehow have to adapt themselves to the tactical situation’.’

As well as this, Rommel’s insistence on more troops for the campaign is inextricably linked with the supply and logistic issues that he faced, as he naively requested reinforcements when he was already dealing with shortages in all areas of his supplies.

‘‘

Rommel’s willingness to ignore the line of supply, coupled with the lack of infrastructure within the theater and the constant threat of Allied air and naval dominance ultimately created a lethal combination which led to the defeat of the Afrika Korps

General Halder, (1977: 84) the Chief of the General Staff, recalled that upon asking Rommel what he required for victory in the campaign: ‘He thought he would need another two Panzer Corps. I asked him: “Even if we had them, how are you going to supply them and feed them?” To this, I received the classic reply: “That's quite immaterial to me.

That's your pigeon.”’ (Irving, 1977: 84).

Rommel’s ignorance of logistics is again highlighted by Citino (2018) when he describes how: ‘The manpower was breaking down. A chronic shortage of portable water had put thousands of soldiers on the sick roles.’

As Schreiber (1998, p.15) concludes: ‘In this regard, the North African desert highlights Rommel's missteps with respect to operational design and the organisation and planning of sustainment for his forces. His failure to achieve a balance between operations and logistics proved his Achilles' heel.’

Therefore, there is now a relatively new counter-argument led by modernist historians that Rommel may have been an outstanding tactical commander, but he was not a well66

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balanced commander, over-emphasising the importance of speed and momentum at the expense of logistics.

Ultimately, as Schreiber (1998, p.1) asserts: ‘Within the North African Area of Operations, Rommel's decision to exceed the scope of his mission and his inability as operational commander to achieve an effective balance between operations and logistics, contributed significantly to the final outcome.’

In May 1942, Rommel launched a fresh offensive, capturing Tobruk and pushing the British back to the Egyptian border, but over-extending his line of supply beyond any practical means. In August 1942, Rommel attempted one last push, but his lack of fuel and supplies quickly became evident and he was halted at Alam Halfa.

After months of preparation, Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery mounted an offensive on 24 October 1942 at El-Alamein and within ten days, the German line was breached and the Allied advance had begun. Tobruk and Benghazi were taken and in March 1943, the crucial port of Tripoli was in Allied control; Rommel had well and truly lost the upper hand that he had enjoyed in his mammoth advance two years previously.

There is no doubt that Rommel was a brilliant tactician and used his panzers to the very best of his ability, gaining momentum and turning what seemed like a hopeless position into an unbelievable advance for the Afrika Korps.

However, with his daring and ambitious personality came serious shortfalls in terms of consideration of logistics for his troops and vehicles, the very cogs in the mechanism that were vital to his success.

Without fuel, his panzers couldn’t make their overambitious and aggressive terrain gains in the battlespace and the means to getting this fuel to the Front was, in itself, incredibly difficult. If it had managed to reach Tripoli, avoiding the British naval threat, the fuel then had to be unloaded into a port that couldn’t effectively process the resources being handled through it and then it had to be transported along the Via Balbia in truck convoys, which were constantly vulnerable to air attacks and ambushes.

Rommel’s willingness to ignore the line of supply, coupled with the lack of infrastructure within the theater and the constant threat of Allied air and naval dominance ultimately created a lethal combination which led to the defeat of the Afrika Korps.

German Field Marshal Albert Kesselring (cited in Liddell Hart, 1983: 278) summarised it by saying that: ‘The supply problem remained as the joker in the pack as far as North Africa was concerned.’

The Allied forces didn’t face the same logistic headache as the German and Italian forces, with General Wavell (cited in Van Creveld, 1977: 123) aptly commenting that: ‘The more I see of war, the more I realise how it all depends on administration and transportation. It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be and when; it takes much more knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there.’

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References Boothe, C. (1942) ‘The Battle for Egypt’, (Online). Available at https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=3E0EAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA74&lpg=PA 74&dq=tacticians+paradise+but+quartermasters+hell&source=bl&ots=k 8e7PoPNgG&sig=ACfU3U2sRXC0aT4TARQrVlFeWCUKeF8CFw&hl=en&sa =X&ved=2ahUKEwiE_Jj7hJziAhXysnEKHflkDWcQ6AEwAHoECAQQAQ#v= onepage&q=tacticians%20paradise%20but%20quartermasters%20hell& f=false (Accessed on 14 May 2019) Churchill, W, (1950) ‘The Second World War, Vol. 3: The Grand Alliance’ London: Orion Citino, R. (2018) ‘Drive to Nowhere: The Myth of the Afrika Korps, 1941-43’, (Online). Available at https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/ drive-nowhere-myth-afrika-korps-1941-43 (Accessed on 13 May 2019)

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Irving, D. (1977) ‘The Trail of the Fox’ New York: Avon Books Liddell Hart, B. H. (1979), ‘The German Generals Talk’ New York: Quill Liddell Hart, B. H. (1983) ‘History of the Second World War’ London: Pan Books Ltd Schreiber, P.K. (1998) ‘Rommel’s Desert War: The Impact of Logistics on Operational Art’ Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Van Creveld, M. (1977) ‘Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton’ Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press Vannoy, A. (2018) ‘North Africa: The War of , (Online). Available at https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/north-africa-the-war-oflogistics/ (Accessed on 11 May 19) Vego, M. (1977) ‘On Operational Art’. Newport, Rhode Island: Milan Vego

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Expeditionary Logistics in Antiquity or… What have the Romans ever done for the JEF LB? In 2018 the British Army exercised the concept of the Joint Expeditionary Force Light Bridge (JEF LB) on Ex TRIDENT JUNCTURE in Norway. The exercise simulated the requirement to deploy a significant force across Europe to provide support and reassurance to an ally facing regional instability. By Lt Alex Rootes About 2,000 years ago, an Armicustos – Roman Army Quartermaster - would have been struggling with a similar problem to the JEF LB. How to move the 5,000 men of Legio II Augusta, from their base in Hispania Tarraconensis (Spain) to Moguntiacum (modern day Mainz) on the Rhine, in order to provide support and reassurance for Rome’s clients and allies along the Germanic border following the disastrous battle of the Teutoburg Forest in 9 AD1.

Both of these events involved the movement and supply of several thousand personnel over a distance of around 2,000 km in order to conduct reassurance operations in support of friendly states. This article aims to explore how our predecessors in the ancient world, faced those challenges and what, if anything, we can learn from their experience? In particular, this article will briefly examine the procedures of the Macedonian Army under Kings Philip and Alexander, before studying the Roman Army starting from the Marian reforms of 107 BC and their evolution over the late Republican era, to the end of the classical period of Pax Romana (approximately 180 AD).

To understand logistics in the age of antiquity, we must first examine a broader spectrum of the history of logistics in antiquity. For the ancients, warfare was a seasonal occupation rarely conducted far from the home base. Ancient empires relied on widely-dispersed forces and hurriedlyraised local levies, to ensure maximum reach of troops and their supplies. States that were able, such as Egypt, made extensive use of inland waterways to move troops and materiel; but this was a solution available only to areas with navigable waterways. Amongst the earliest exponents of what may be termed ‘expeditionary warfare’ were the mysterious ‘Sea Peoples’, who during the late Bronze Age (1200-900 BC), used their seafaring skills to conduct limited raids on littoral states throughout the Mediterranean.

Before going any further, it is important to define what the term ‘expeditionary warfare’ actually means. For the purposes of this article, I will define expeditionary warfare as: ‘The deployment of a state's military to fight abroad, over a distance large enough and a time scale long enough, to

Alexander the Great

necessitate a largely self-sustaining force and the development of long-distance supply networks.’

A short war to the Hindu Kush One of the first civilisations to truly break out from these traditional limitations and conduct complex, long-distance expeditionary warfare, were the ancient Macedonians who, under King Philip II - father of Alexander the Great revolutionised military logistics. Prior to Philip’s reforms, individual soldiers weren’t expected to carry much of their own equipment or supplies. The primary method of movement for ancient armies was the ox cart, hundreds of which would follow an army on campaign. The carts were accompanied by a significant number of camp followers, often outnumbering the number of actual soldiers.

While vital for carrying the army’s equipment, ox carts were also one of the biggest limiting factors for ancient commanders, due to their large fodder requirement and slow average speed; rarely more than 3 kph2. Oxen consumed significantly more fodder than other pack animals. For example, in ancient Roman writings, it was estimated that an ox required 18kg of fodder per day (dry and hard combined) compared to the 8kg required for a mule or the 6.5kg for a donkey3. Even though a typical two-ox cart could carry around 500-650kg4 the fodder requirement alone of an ancient army, necessitated either a significant baggage train or a substantial local supply of fodder. Indeed, campaigns had to be assiduously planned to coincide with the harvests and rarely continued through the winter months. When combined with the teeming mass of families, sutlers, merchants, prostitutes and labourers trailing behind the fighting troops, it is easy to see how hard it would have been for ancient armies to move at anything beyond a crawl.

Put simply; Blitzkrieg it ain’t.

When Philip ascended to the throne of Macedon, he inherited a disunited kingdom, riven by internal conflict with much of its territory under the rule of neighbouring states and petty warlords. Phillip realised that if he could out THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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Macedon Empire

manoeuvre his slow-moving opponents and dislocate them from their supplies, he stood a substantially better chance of securing his borders and expanding his influence amongst the other Greek states.

In order to realise this ambition, Philip took inspiration from the ancient Greek soldier Xenophon (c. 431 BC-354 BC) who, in his work Anabasis, described how when leading an army of mercenaries in Persia, he had ordered all of the wagons of his baggage train to be burnt following the death of his employer, Cyrus the Younger (a Persian prince who hired Greek mercenaries in an attempt to seize the throne of Persia from his brother, Artaxerxes II)5. All vital supplies would be carried on pack animals or by the soldiers in order to allow them to march to the Greek settlements on the Black Sea and from there return to Greece. The move was a success, with Xenophon outmanoeuvring several hostile armies and managing to preserve the main body of his forces whilst marching for several hundred miles through a hostile country.

Given that the events described by Xenophon had occurred within living memory and the Anabasis itself was published only a few years prior to Philip’s accession to the throne of Macedon, it is highly likely that the story would have been familiar to Philip and may well have been the seed from which his ideas grew. Philip banned oxen from the army, organised for supplies to be moved by horse-drawn carts, instructed his soldiers to carry their own personal weapons and decreed all troops were to carry 30 DOS ‘on the man’ in the form of flour6 [author’s note: Probably not Philip’s exact words]. He also heavily restricted the number of people allowed to follow the army. Women and families were banned and each cavalryman or section of ten infantrymen was allocated one servant who would carry their tentage, a grind-stone, guy ropes used both for building shelters and engineering tasks such as fording rivers, as well as carrying any other ancillary items required.

These reforms allowed the Macedonian army to move at 70

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a marching speed which was considered extraordinary by the standards of the day. Shortly after succeeding his father as King of Macedon, Alexander the Great was faced with a rebellion led by the Greek city of Thebes and supported by several other cities. In response he marched the Macedonian Army from Lake Lychnitis in Macedonia to Thebes – a distance of some 500km – in 13 days7. The rebels were so shocked at the speed of the Macedonian advance that many of Thebes’ allies deserted the city and an army sent from Sparta to reinforce Thebes, chose to stop at the Isthmus of Corinth rather than take to the field8.

A final reform added by Alexander the Great was the appointment of a Skoidos, essentially a QuartermasterGeneral, to be responsible for the army’s supply and organisation of the baggage train9. The importance of these reforms is difficult to overestimate when you consider the facts of Alexander’s later campaigns. In April 334 BC Alexander left the city of Amphipolis in Greece and launched a campaign into Asia. By the end of the year 326 BC Alexander’s armies had travelled over 5,500km to the Indus valley and founded the city of Alexandria on the Indus - the modern-day city of Uch in the Punjab10. In any age and by any definition for an army to cover such a large distance, over such a long period of time and to suffer little significant logistic friction, is nothing short of remarkable.

Alexander, aided by his Skoidos, Parmenion11, continued to develop the Macedonian logistic capabilities. This became more important as the army advanced Eastwards, due to the fact that the agricultural societies of eastern Asia, unlike the highly organised and efficient Persian Empire, did not have large food surpluses, centralised planning or transport networks available to them. Alexander’s solution was to send emissaries far ahead of his army to negotiate with the rulers of the territories, which Alexander’s forces would pass through12. Notwithstanding the fact, that a modern British Army Contracts Officer is unlikely to recommend the wholesale sacking of uncooperative cities if they refuse to

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provide supplies, it is true to say that Alexander the Great’s army contained individuals filling roles that would be entirely recognisable to the modern staff officer.

The rise of Rome In 323 BC Alexander the Great died in Babylon and for the next 50 or so years there was little advancement in, or need of, the science of expeditionary logistics. The Macedonian Empire fragmented and turned inwards as the rival generals, friends and family members of Alexander (collectively known as the Diadochi) fought for supremacy. Meanwhile, the young Roman republic was engaged in a series of bloody wars to unify the Italian Peninsula. This stagnation came to an abrupt halt in 264 BC with the commencement of the Punic Wars between Rome and the North African city-state of Carthage.

During the First Punic War (264-241 BC) the majority of the action took place on the island of Sicily, giving the Romans a relatively gentle introduction to conducting expeditionary warfare in what was effectively their immediate neighbourhood. However, when trying to close out the war, the Roman forces suffered a series of bloody noses as they tried to extend their campaign into the Carthaginian heartland of North Africa. Up to this point in history, Rome had been exclusively a land power with no real experience of naval warfare. It quickly transpired that the Roman military took to water more like a rhinoceros than a duck. After losing several fleets-worth of ships to a mixture of bad tactics, bad seamanship and bad luck, the Roman gift for ingenuity began to come through. The Roman fleet finally decisively defeated the Carthaginians at the Battle of the Aegates (241 BC), forcing the Carthaginians to sign a peace treaty and withdraw from Sicily13.

Whilst the First Punic War provided an introduction, the Second Punic War (218-201 BC) heralded a new age of expeditionary warfare on a large scale. Most famously, the Carthaginian general Hannibal, organised and led an army across two mountain ranges to invade Italy, where he stayed for the next 16 years conclusively beating every Roman army sent against him. In response, the Roman Senate decided the best way to beat Carthage was to avoid fighting Hannibal as much as possible and instead to focus on capturing Carthaginian possessions in Spain, slowly blockading Carthage itself with Rome’s increasingly powerful navy14 and convincing allies of Carthage – notably King Syphax of Numidia15 – to defect to Rome.

Throughout the conflict, both Carthage and Rome relied on their armies living off the land rather than setting up supply lines. This was especially true for Hannibal who had to form alliances with the Italian towns he encountered and to forage from the Roman countryside as he passed through, destroying many farms and towns in the process.

Throughout his time in Italy, Hannibal was unable to secure an overland supply route to the Carthaginian territories in Spain. Nor was he able to capture a port from which he could import supplies16. Eventually the Roman army under Scipio Africanus, succeeded in conquering Carthage’s

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Spanish territories and landed in North Africa where, with the aid of the Numidians, Carthage was defeated at the Battle of Zama17.

While living off the land ultimately worked for the Romans again, in the brief and utterly conclusive Third Punic War and the subsequent subjugation of the Iberian Peninsula; senior Roman commanders seem to have become increasingly aware of the inherent limitations involved with this method of supply. It hindered a commander’s ability to manoeuvre, as they had to stay where the food was; move away from their chosen defensive positions in order to collect new supplies or widely disperse their forces to undertake foraging activities, which left them vulnerable to enemy ambushes or a concentration of enemy force. The extended campaigns over the next century in Macedonia, Illyria (modern day Balkans) and North Africa, convinced the Roman hierarchy of the need for reform.

Marius the King (of military reforms) Gaius Marius (157-86 BC) was an up-and-coming military commander who in 107 BC was successfully elected Consul – Rome’s highest political office. Mindful of the Roman Army’s weaknesses, Marius used his position as Consul to reform the Roman Army into the organisation that we see today in film, TV and most school history books.

Prior to Marius, the Roman forces were organised into Centuries (approx. 60 men) and Maniples (approx. 120 men) formed from Roman citizens of the Patrician (aristocratic) and Plebeian (commoners owning property above a certain value) classes. These citizen-soldiers would provide their own weapons and equipment and were subdivided into various further “classes” of soldiery in relation to their wealth and experience. Legions were raised for each specific campaign and would be disbanded when the campaign was over.

Marius abolished the property requirement for prospective legionaries, opening up the army for the first time to the ‘capite censi’ – the landless poor of Roman society18. This marked the transition from what was essentially a citizen’s militia that could be raised and disbanded as required to what we can understand as a professional army19.

Marius, in an echo of Philip of Macedonia, made substantial efforts to shrink the size of the baggage trains

Roman grain storehouse

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ready to beat off any ambushes or fight delaying actions to allow the legion to form up26.

Roman legionaries

attached to his legions. This is reflected in the structure of the post-Marian Roman Legion. Each Legion (4,800 soldiers with 1,200 apparitores) was comprised of ten cohorts (480 soldiers), each with six centuries (80 soldiers) and each century formed of ten contubernia, each consisting of eight Legionaries, one to two mules and two apparitores20.

‘Apparitores’ was a catch-all term for non-combatants, who were attached to the legions and could include legion-owned slaves, some types of civilian support personnel and ‘professional’ military servants. Apparitores were distinguished from the crowds of merchants and camp followers, who trailed any ancient army, by the fact that they seem to have been considered as being on the strength of the legion, entitling them to a grain ration, access to legionissued equipment, but also requiring them to be subject to military law21.

Further emulating the Greeks, Marius ensured that the ordinary legionnaire carried most of their personal equipment and supplies through the adoption of the ‘sarcina’ (soldier’s pack). This was essentially a precursor to the modern bergan, enabling a soldier to carry his equipment and rations with him at all times22. Writing in the 4th century AD, Vegetius reported that the Roman soldier typically carried 20kg in his sarcina23 although this figure didn’t include the weight of his weapons, armour or clothing.

Adding all of a legionnaire’s personal items, weapons, armour and 14 days+ of rations gives a plausible total of 3040 kg per soldier24. As a result of this, the sobriquet ‘Marius Mules’, was commonly applied to legionnaires from the 1st Century BC25.

This transfer of responsibility for the movement of supplies from the baggage train to the individual legionnaire, gave the legions significantly more flexibility in how and where they employed their sub-units. As the Roman Empire expanded over the subsequent centuries, the ability of commanders to detach individual contubernia, centuries or cohorts to operate independently, away from the main camp of the legion for extended periods of time, proved increasingly useful. In order to maintain some manoeuvrability whilst on the march, Roman commanders would have a force of ‘expediti’ - soldiers marching without packs – who would patrol the length of the column and be 72

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The flight of the Eagle While the sub-units of a legion may have been relatively mobile, the legion as a whole required a huge amount of supplies. Vegetius suggested that a legion required 8,200kg of grain, 45,400L of water and 18,100kg of fodder per day in the field27. All of this required transport to the legion, receipting onto the legion’s account, storage and issuing.

This rate of daily consumption means that a distinction must be drawn between the ancient baggage train – where the army’s supplies were carried in their entirety, used until they ran out and the army was forced to requisition, pillage from the local country or retreat – and a supply line - where the army maintained a connection with the source of its supplies throughout the campaign, carried relatively little at any one time and relied on a sophisticated logistic chain continually topping supply levels up as required.

The Roman supply lines relied on a system of, ‘stativa’ usually translated as meaning, ‘operational bases’28. Prior to embarking on a campaign, the legion commander would establish his stativa, often making use of convenient transport routes like rivers or ports and this would function as an easily defensible base, in which the legion (or indeed army) could winter, store supplies, manufacture equipment and maintain a communication link with Rome. Supplies would be imported from across the empire to the operational base, after which they would be transported to the legion marching camp or, if at extended length from the stativa, to a ‘castrum’ (fortified camp) situated further within disputed territory from which supplies could be sent forward. This structure will be familiar to modern military logisticians and is remarkably similar to the British Army’s current system of support areas. Whilst we have a variety of names depending on their exact function (joint, divisional, forward, brigade, etc) they are recognisably links in a similar chain to that which was employed by the Romans.

An interesting example of this system has been studied by the archaeologist A.P. Gentry and detailed in her whiteknuckle ride of a book, “Roman military stone-built granaries in Britain”. In it, she notes that although only seeming to have supported a small permanent garrison, the Roman camp in Arbeia (South Shields) had a granary capable of storing supplies far in excess of its requirements. The granary dates from the period of the Emperor Severus’ campaigns in northern Britain and is substantially bigger than the granaries of other Roman camps from the same period; making it highly likely that Arbeia was built as the stative, to supply Severus’ expedition into Caledonia29.

Around the world in ancient days Although the use of wagons was limited as much as possible within the legions, they still had a vital role to play in the overall supply system. Ancient Rome is famous for its road network which was constructed by the legionnaires as they advanced into hostile territory. The primary use of these roads

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Second Punic war

wasn’t the movement of people as is often supposed, rather it was to facilitate the use of heavy goods wagons carrying supplies to legion garrisons, stativa and castra30. These roads later became a key resource of the ‘cursus publicus’, a staterun courier and transportation service introduced by Emperor Augustus, which became increasingly important as a logistics network for the Roman army and allowed important dispatches to travel at speed across the empire.

The geographic reality of the Roman world, being centred around the Mediterranean, ensured that by far, the preferred method of moving supplies was by sea. Surviving examples of shipping rates demonstrate it was substantially cheaper and quicker to move supplies by sea than by road. There were, however, significant disadvantages for army commanders relying on the sea. Shipping was never without risk, something demonstrated brutally in the First Punic War when 800 merchant ships were lost in a storm off the coast of Sicily. Due to the limitations of ancient merchant vessels, Roman sailors would generally only go to sea between 27 May and 14 September31. There are examples of winter sailings, but almost all end badly for those at sea. During the civil war with Pompey, Julius Caesar ordered his legions

Roman merchant ship

to sail for North Africa on 17 December. Although the majority of his soldiers eventually arrived, the strong winds disrupted the journey and left the legion hopelessly dispersed along the coast in groups hundreds of miles apart so that rather than landing with 15,000 soldiers, Caesar found himself landing with only 3,000 of his legionnaires and 150 cavalry32.

Co-ordination between land and sea, in an age where nautical science was still in its infancy, also created problems.

The Roman historian Livy, wrote of an incident in 169 BC when a Roman army in Macedonia almost ran out of supplies, due to its supply ships landing at the wrong port after the army’s successful campaign had led it to advance beyond its original base33. Clearly these problems constricted military planners and contributed to the development of the statvia system described previously, which in turn required commanders to allocate forces to protect their statvia, usually in the form of auxiliaries rather than regular legionnaires.

Bought and sold for Roman gold No army can supply itself without administration and the Romans were assiduous when it came to record keeping. In the field, the local force commander would have overall responsibility for supply, but he would be supported by a ‘quaestor’. The quaestor was an independent magistrate appointed by the senate with responsibility for accounting the expenditure of each commander and reporting back to the senate any discrepancies. However, in the complex system that evolved to train young nobles for life in the senate, appointments as quaestor were usually in the gift of the senior public officials such as the Consuls. This meant that in practise, the quaestor was a young nobleman with connections to senior senators who would spend a year or two ‘gaining experience’ before going back to Rome. As is common with young noblemen throughout history, spending THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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long hours going through accounts or checking the quality of imported grain was often side-lined in favour of more interesting pursuits. This left most Roman military commanders a free hand when it came to spending the senate’s money, with very little oversight and although the reforms of Emperor Augustus did much to re-centralise spending power in Rome and away from local commanders, there seems to have been a certain level of tolerance towards corruption within the system. Indeed, for much of Rome’s history, being given command of a province and its attendant legions was tantamount to a license to print money and there are plenty of Roman writers who complained about military commanders, selling off military equipment and supplies for cash.

Vindolanda Tablet

Nevertheless, the system, on the whole, appears to have worked reasonably well. There are numerous surviving accounts of the efficient purchase and issue of supplies and equipment on behalf of the army. One such example was discovered in Vindolanda (Bardon Mill, Northumberland)34 detailing the purchase of 5,000 modii (about 43,650kg) of grain for the sum of 800 denarii. Interestingly the tablet also mentions the procurement of 170 animal hides from a tannery in Cataractonium, modern Catterick35 suggesting that even 2,000 years ago soldiers faced the prospect of being sent to enjoy the delights of Richmondshire.

For items that couldn’t be bought, each legion would have ‘sitologoi’ - soldiers who specialised in foraging. Their primary targets would have been water, firewood and fodder.

A continual problem for all ancient armies was the provision of security for foragers who were vulnerable to ambush, especially when burdened and returning to camp. So severe was the problem that Gaius Fabius – one of Caesar’s generals – assigned two legions and all of his cavalry to protect a foraging party before the Battle of Ilerda. In his writings, Caesar notes that this level of protection was relatively normal practice when on campaign36. It is also undeniable that as well as foraging for themselves, the Romans were more than happy to use foraging, or more accurately pillaging, as a weapon of war to disrupt the ability of their enemies to use foraging to sustain themselves in the field. A further point worth noting is, whereas in most 74

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ancient armies, forage or pillage was conducted by the individual soldier who would then keep the proceeds; in the legions all such activities were strictly controlled and anything gathered would be centrally collected, before being distributed by the military authorities.

Journey’s End When summing up the history of ancient logistics, one question becomes apparent: Can I shoehorn any of the modern principles of logistics37 into my analysis, in order to demonstrate that I haven’t just used this article as an excuse to justify watching the HBO series ‘Rome’ on Amazon Prime under the premise of conducting research?

Let us return to the Armicustos, mentioned at the start of this article, preparing to move an entire legion across Europe. He certainly had authority over his own logistics, having been delegated the responsibility and provided with a range of methods to move his troops. These range from using the legion’s internal lift capability in the form of wagons, pack animals and manpower, to the use of local purchase to hire transport ships from the civilian market.

This array of options would allow the Armicustos and his colleagues to guarantee the primacy of operational requirements both in the military and civilian spheres.

Coordination and cooperation would be achieved with the assistance of the civilian authorities in the form of Quaestors, Prefects and the various ranks of regional official that existed within the Roman world. The overall responsibility for this would lie with the senate itself. These hard-working officials would additionally create visibility within the system which, although perhaps not to the standard we would expect now, still demonstrated a desire for officials to be transparent in their dealings and accountable for their actions.

The requirements of assured provision would be met under the Roman system of regional allocation,38 whereby upon commencement of a campaign, the senate would allocate a province of the empire to provide a specific quantity of supplies to support specific legions in the field.

Meanwhile sufficiency would be guaranteed through the efforts of the Apparitores in all their various guises, working to move the correct quantity and quality of supplies to the right place at the right time.

Roman logistics clearly demonstrated efficiency and simplicity, not least thanks to the regular size and composition of each legion and its subunits, giving military commanders standardised tables of victualling requirements to plan from, a method consistent with contemporary military logistics.

It would be hard to deny the flexibility of the Roman approach to supply, allowing both for stringent organisation and spontaneity. At any one time, a legion could have access to supplies stored in a stativa, purchased locally from civilian contractors or foraged from the land. This undoubtedly was one of the key foundations of their astonishing eight centuries of near continual military success.

What does this all mean? As the saying goes, ‘The past is a foreign country’ and indeed it was. It is equally clear though, that ancient logisticians faced many of the same

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Roman personal equipment

challenges that we face today. Perhaps the greatest lesson we can learn from the armies of ancient Macedonia or Rome is that there is one hidden requirement for a successful logistic operation: Willpower.

The true strength of the most successful ancient armies was their sheer bloody-minded determination to find ways around the almost innumerate problems they faced on a daily basis, without recourse to a higher authority. In our current era, where almost any setback is immediately ‘passed up’ the chain of command, using modern communications equipment, perhaps we need to re-learn the ability to face a problem alone and think our way to success. Only by doing this and, crucially, empowering our subordinates to do the same, can we hope to replicate the ingenuity of the ancient logistician.

References Anderson, E.B., 2018. ‘Logistical failure in North Africa: A setback for Julius Caesar’. Ancient Warfare Magazine, Vol VII Issue 4. Rotterdam.

Karwansaray B.V. Connolly, P., 1981. ‘Greece and Rome at War’. London. MacDonald & Co. De Cabooter, T., 2018. ‘True masters of logistics: The Assyrian army’. Ancient Warfare Magazine, Vol VII Issue 4. Rotterdam. Karwansaray.

Dodge, T.A., 1890. ‘Alexander: A History of the Origin and Growth of the Art of War from Earliest Times to the Battle of Issus’ [Online]. Available at: https://archive.org/details/alexanderhistory02dodg/page/n7 [Accessed on 22 April 2019] Elmore, M.J., 2017. ‘Hannibal and Scipio's war: The Second Punic War’ [Online]. Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1349&context=honors-theses [Accessed 23 April 2019] Engels, D.W., 1980. ‘Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army’. Berkeley. University of California Press.

Gentry, A.P., 1976. ‘Roman military stone-built granaries in Britain’. Oxford.

British Archaeological Reports.

Hilts, C., 2017. ‘Roman writing tablets found at Vindolanda’. [Online].

Available at: https://www.archaeology.co.uk/articles/features/romanwriting-tablets-found-at-vindolanda.htm [Accessed 22 September 2019] Hughes, T., 2018. ‘How Did Alexander the Great Sustain His Army?’ [Online].

Available at: http://turningpointsoftheancientworld.com/index.php/ 2018/09/05/alexander-macedonian-logistics-corps/ [Accessed 22 September 2019]

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Iordanidis, A.P., 2018. The Campaign of Alexander the Great in Thrace and Illyria (335 BC): Strategic Aims, Tactics and Logistics [Online]. Available at: https://repository.ihu.edu.gr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11544/ 29124/ The%20Campaign%20of%20Alexander%20the%20Great%20%20%20i n%20Thrace%20and%20Illyria%20%28335%20BC%29%20Strategic% 20aims%2C%20Tactics%20and%20Logistics..pdf?sequence=1 [Accessed 22 April 2019] Jones, A.H.M., 1964. The Later Roman Empire. Available from: https://archive.org/details/JonesLaterRomanEmpire01 Lendering, J., 2019. Hannibal Barca [Online]. Available at: https://www.livius.org/articles/person/hannibal-3-barca/ [Accessed 23 April 2019] Lloyd, J., 2013. Legio II Augusta [Online]. Available at: https://www.ancient.eu/Legio_II_Augusta/ [Accessed 22 April 2019] Lyes, C.J., 1998. From Republic to Empire how revolutionary were the military reforms of Gaius Marius? [Online]. Available at: http://www.anistor.gr/english/enback/CJLyes_Marius.pdf [Accessed 23 April 2019] Mark, J.J., 2011. The Price of Greed: Hannibal's Betrayal by Carthage [Online]. Available at: https://www.ancient.eu/article/290/the-price-ofgreed-hannibals-betrayal-by-carthage/ [Accessed 23 April 2019] Ministry of Defence, 2015. Joint Doctrine Publication 4-00: Logistics for Joint Operations. Swindon. The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre Romm, J.S., MENSCH, P., 2005. Alexander the Great: Selections from Arrian, Diodorus, Plutarch, and Quintus. Indianapolis. Hackett Publishing Company Inc. Roth, J.P., 1999. The logistics of the Roman Army at war. Boston. Brill Academic Publishers.

Scheidel, W., 2007. Roman population size: the logic of the debate [Online].

Available at: http://www.princeton.edu/~pswpc/pdfs/scheidel/ 070706.pdf [Accessed 23 April 2019] Shean, J.F., 1996. Hannibal's Mules: The Logistical Limitations of Hannibal's Army and the Battle of Cannae, 216 B.C. [Online]. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4436417?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents [Accessed 23 April 2019] Siculus, Diodorus, 30 BC. Bibliotheca Historica, Book XVII [Online]. Available at: http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/ Diodorus_Siculus/ 17A*.html#11 [Accessed 22 April 2019] Vegetius, 390. Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science, translated by N. P. Milner [Online]. Available at: http://www.imperium-romana.org/uploads/ 5/9/3/3/5933147/vegetius-roman-army.pdf [Accessed 23 April 2019] Vindolanda Tablet 343 [Online]. Available at: http://vindolanda.csad.ox.ac.uk/ 4dlink2/4DACTION/WebRequestQuery?searchTerm=343&searchType=nu mber&searchField=TVII&thisListPosition=1&thisPageNum=0 [Accessed 24 April 2019] Wake, T., 2006. The Roman Army After Marius' Reforms [Online]. Available at: http://romans.etrusia.co.uk/roman_army_intro.php [Accessed 23 April 2019] White, A., 2011. The Role of Marius’s Military Reforms in the Decline of the Roman Republic [Online]. Available at: http://www.wou.edu/history/files/ 2015/08/andrewwhite.pdf [Accessed 23 April 2019] White, M., 2011. Atrocitology: Humanity’s 100 deadliest achievements.

Edinburgh. Canongate Books Ltd Xenophon, 370 BC. Anabasis [Online]. Available at: https:// sourcebooks.fordham.edu/ancient/xenophon-anabasis.asp [Accessed 22 April 2019]

Footnotes 111

Lloyd, 2013 De Cabooter, 2018 113 Roth, 1999 114 Roth, 1999 115 Xenophon, 370 BC 116 Hughes, 2018 117 Dodge, 1890 118 Siculus, 30 BC 119 Iordanidis, 2018 110 Romm and Mensch, 2005 112

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Iordanidis, 2018 Engels, 1980 113 White, M., 2011 114 Lendering, 2019 115 Elmore, 2017 116 Mark, 2011 117 White, M., 2011 118 White, A., 2011 119 Lyes, 1998 120 Wake, 2006 121 Roth, 1999 122 Roth, 1999 123 Vegetius, 390 124 Roth, 1999

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White, M., 2011 Roth, 1999 127 Vegetius, 390 128 Roth, 1999 129 Gentry, 1976 130 Roth, 1999 131 Roth, 1999 132 Anderson, 2018 133 Roth, 1999 134 Hilts, 2017 135 Vindolanda Tablet 343 136 Roth, 1999 137 JDP 4-00, 2015 138 Roth, 1999

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To what extent was Napoleon’s march on Russia doomed to fail from the beginning?

Over two hundred years later, Napoleon continues to be relevant today.

The bicentenary of his great defeat at Waterloo was marked four years ago, the battle that ended his career and has since become a byword for a final crushing defeat. By Lt Alex Phenix-Norman The Napoleonic era is an important watershed in history with renewed interest in this period. A study of Napoleon is still relevant for policy makers today with its numerous great powers, shifting alliances and battlefield skills which arguably are closer to modern warfare than World War Two or even the Cold War. Napoleon was arguably one of history’s greatest tacticians and strategists. This essay explores his abilities and limitations as a strategist and examines whether his ambitions spurred him to greatness or were a catalyst for taking triumph away from him.

Popular opinion has driven an agenda throughout the historiography of the Napoleonic era. Too much of the information we derive and the sources we examine are controlled by a nostalgic British sensibility. The eternal conflict between the satirically suggested nickname for Napoleon, ‘Tiddy Doll’ and Britain had encapsulated the entirety of Europe for 15 years.1 The question this poses is how the most successful General and Emperor of that age could so foolishly invade Russia when, with hindsight, even the general public realised that it was a clinical error. With a potential conflict stirring in Eastern Europe, a revision of one of the most disastrous invasions of a foreign country, only comparable to that of Hitler 130 years later, is suitably apt. It is essential to examine a multitude of factors that overextended Napoleon’s resources to identify if he was truly doomed before taking those steps from Niemen onto Moscow.

Firstly, the essay will focus on Napoleon’s previous conflicts in order to assess his success prior to the invasion of Russia as prelude to the conflicts of 1812. This will provide context to the strategic decisions he made and goes some way to identifying why Napoleon made the strategic decisions he did when invading Russia. Secondly, by judging the extent to which the war in the Peninsula was affecting Napoleon’s ability to fight a war on two fronts the article aims to contextualise the difficulties Napoleon faced in 1812. Thirdly, by examining the logistical challenge Russia presented for an early 19th Century army including complex lines of logistical supply combined with the jarring weather

The Emperor Napoleon in His Study at the Tuileries By Jacques-Louis David 1811

conditions. This article will challenge the much-maligned view of warfare and logistics in that age. In bringing these points together and analysing the outcome of each, the review aims to challenge and question the popular held belief that Napoleon’s march on Moscow was doomed from the beginning.

Decisive actions shape a commander’s mindset. The most brutal and costly battles can shape military commanders into becoming risk averse or be demonised for their continuation of what appears to be a fruitless waste of life. The Battle of Eylau, Eastern Germany in February 1807 was a costly, unconvincing victory for Napoleon, in which winter conditions on a battlefield facing a Russian force would again become problematic for him five years later. During this battle, of the 75,000 deployed he lost between 15,00030,000 men, which provides a stark contrast to the Ulm Campaign carried out in Central Europe in which he lost a meagre 2000 and secured a crushing victory. Following THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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Napoleon on the field of Eylau

by Antoine-Jean Gros 1807

Napoleon’s victories over Prussia in 1806, he demanded their capitulation; Tsar Alexander could not allow the French to directly threaten him from adjacent territory. In 1807 he raised two armies, one of 60,000 under General Bennigsen and the other under Field Marshall Buxhowden of 45,000.2 Throughout the winter quartering, there had been attempted feints and manoeuvres by the French to lure Bennigsen into a fatal assault on Marshal Bernadottes’ Corps. The intent of this was to surround Bennigsen, cut off from Buxhowden and likely facing defeat. Fortunately for the Russian General, a note he received from a captured messenger gave away the French intent leading to a tactical withdrawal. Fate however was to force the two sides into battle, Bennigsen with his 60,000 had occupied the town of Eylau and Napoleon with 49,000 and a possible 30,000 reserves were stationed nearby.3 On 7 February 1807 at 1500 hours, Napoleon’s Imperial equipage stumbled into Eylau where they were set upon by a Russian patrol who began to plunder the baggage train.4 Whilst Marshal Soult fought off the initial plunderers, both sides mistook this skirmish as the initial strike for a larger engagement and began to pour more and more men into the fray. Two hours of fighting ensued until Bennigsen withdrew his forces with both sides losing 4000 men each.

This provides the perfect case study to give credence to the quality of the soldier in the Russian Army of the time.

Too often the soldiers of Russia are considered to be peasants and farmers, never spoken of in the same breath as the Old Guard of Napoleon’s Army or the Polish Lancers and yet their achievements and martial skill have proven to 78

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be equal to that of the finest French Regiments of the time.

With this understanding, Napoleon could have surmised the Russian determination to fight to the last man as noted by Baron De Marbot: ‘At last our soldiers charged the Russian soldiers with the bayonet, and only when they pierced them could be convinced that they were dealing with men.’5 This would inevitably affect the balance of power between the two forces, however as the article will explore later, Napoleon’s Army and the victories it had achieved placed it well above the Russian Army in terms of martial prowess and therefore simply cannot be evidence of an obvious threat to Napoleon’s invasion. Despite some stubborn Russian resistance, by the end of 7 February, Eylau was in Napoleon’s hands. The following day was one of the bloodiest battles of the age, ‘14 hours of tremendous combat’ and back and forth positioning would end with both sides losing over 40,000 men.6 With continuous artillery barrages and a last-ditch cavalry charge from Napoleon’s leading Cavalry commander Murat, he held the field. The execution and result foreshadowed that of Borodino in 1812 and undoubtedly formed the basis for General Kutozov’s scorched earth policy implemented during Napoleon’s invasion of Russia. Essentially, he had set in motion his own downfall, by creating war hardy men who were more likely to fight than to seek surrender. While it is difficult to assess the battle and how it affected the outcome of 1812, it is clear to identify where Napoleon would have encountered difficulties in Russia. Clearly the strength of the Russian Army could not be taken for granted, Napoleon was facing an enemy in which total victory would come at the

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cost of a large loss of life for the French, which combined with long, unsecure logistical supply lines would lead to an inevitable loss.

There have been very few circumstances in history where a force has been capable of fighting a war on two fronts successfully. Most notable failures draw on a comparison of Hitler during WW2 which is a near mirror image to what Napoleon found himself in 1812.

While this article has so far explored the war in the east of Europe, the situation in Spain during what was known as the Peninsula War was equally as effective in haemorrhaging Napoleon’s resources by 1812. Arthur Wellesley the soon to be Duke of Wellington had been waging an efficient war in Portugal and Spain alongside disaffected Spanish guerrilla fighters to disrupt and dislodge the French from Portugal before turning their attention to Spain. Napoleon had installed his brother Joseph on the throne, an unpopular and incompetent ruler who on more than one occasion would fail his brother in his duty. Napoleon himself only led one expedition to Spain in order to suppress the British in 1809; however, from that point on the British would succeed in multiple battles leading to a response from Napoleon into sending a further 200,000 soldiers to Iberia. This shift of 200,000 from the original 880,000 forced Napoleon to take only 680,000 into Russia, a vast difference and certainly a figure which would have made a significant impact in the East.

Once again, this key factor must be considered when examining the initial planning of the invasion of Russia. With the war in the Peninsula taking a negative turn; in 1811 Andre Messena, French Marshall and overall commander of French forces in Spain, was driven out of Portugal alongside the last of the French garrisons. By this point a war against Russia seemed inadvisable as it would draw France into a complex war on two fronts separated by over 4000km of land, which would take three days to travel with modern transport and 200 days by Napoleonic army standards (during the Ulm campaign the French Army covered 800km in 40 days which was considered a great achievement at the time). What this created - more so than just a drain on resources - was a shift in the makeup of Napoleon’s Army that he took to Russia. His over reliance on his Allies to provide soldiers to fight on two fronts led to the inevitable high desertion rates once conditions became untenable. It is believed that around 60,000 of the men deserted during the campaign which was a higher amount of men than what Napoleon had deployed on the field at Eylau signifying the devastating effect of both the Russian winter and the use of allied forces.7 Overall, by attempting a war on two fronts, Napoleon had set the conditions to fail in both Russia and the Peninsula, never focussing on one campaign and thereby becoming a victim of his own tactic of dividing a forces’ strength between two objectives.

The logistical problem of Russia is one that is divisive, complex, vast and timely. To truly understand if Napoleon had set the conditions for his own demise because of his logistical planning, an appreciation for his system of supply

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is necessary. As with most of the Grand Army, Napoleon had adapted a previous system and developed it into a more efficient logistical machine which he could exploit.

François-Michel le Tellier’s magazine system of the 18th Century required French forts to store supplies for marching armies along their route; supplies would be made available ahead of the main body of the army so they would always arrive with some supplies in advance of them with the rest brought from the rear.8 Napoleon himself utilised this alongside the ordonnateurs who were responsible for liaising with supply magazines along the route of march, for food and supplies for each man and horse. He further improved upon this by increasing the size of the Imperial Equipages wagon to carry further food and fodder.

By 1812, Napoleon had 50 day’s worth of food to supply his Grand Army, therefore the argument that he ignored the logistical challenge of Russia is ignorant of the systems he had already established.9 Having waged successful campaigns across Europe, Napoleon had prepared the largest logistical operation of his career to date and implemented it in his Russian Campaign. The failure in itself was that on the strategic level, the Russians simply did not comply like every other force Napoleon had faced.

At this point it is prudent to note, the outcome of the campaign was not determined. The logistical preparations made by Napoleon and his Logisticians did not set the Army for failure and therefore it should be seen as less of a component of it. Once it began, Napoleon’s ambition overrode his strategic sense and his lack of supply inevitably tore his Army apart. Clearly, he had not provisioned for more than a small invasion, hoping, like all conflicts of the age, that the armies would meet on a decisive battlefield and with a swift victory he would force Russia’s surrender. His previous campaigns in 1803, 1805, 1806 1807 and 1808 had not lasted longer than several months and with ample opportunity to resupply, he did not face a logistical nightmare. However, this did not happen and instead they faced a vicious scorched earth policy. Secondly, by not bivouacking at Smolensk, where they had acquired enough supplies to maintain the Army, he lost a key opportunity to

The Battle of Borodino was a battle fought on 7 September 1812 during the French invasion of Russia, By Louis-François, Baron Lejeune 1822

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Prince Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov was a Field Marshal of the Russian Empire By George Dawe 1828

break and reconsider his strategic position in Russia.

Napoleon instead continued to overextend his supply lines from that point onto Moscow, his horses and wagons unable to move the supplies along the road due to bruised soles, cracked hoofs and laminitis due to not shoeing his horses, meant they could not complete the journey.10 All of these components together ground the Grand Army down to a mere 100,000 by the time they reached Moscow and of these, only 30,000 returned to France. Unequivocally, the breakdown of logistics was the essential element of the French defeat, however this was not set in stone before campaign was launched.

Throughout the research conducted for this article, each historian in turn has examined the failures of Napoleon in a microcosm, whether the logistical chain, the ineffectiveness at successfully drawing the Russians into a decisive battle or simply that the expedition was too grand to execute without a robust logistical system set in place. Yet the picture of the invasion of Russia can only be appreciated with all the elements brought together. There are specific events which stand out more than others and yet in each different piece of evidence they provide are in themselves a fascinating contextualisation of Napoleonic warfare.

If he had considered the bloody field at Eylau before his expedition; before departing from Niemen, would he have been so confident that enticing the Russians into one decisive engagement that could break their spirit? Borodino in 1812 cost a large number of Russian soldiers and yet they fought on due to this renewed vigour and determination to prevent their shame of the past. If he had potentially dealt with the British first in the Peninsular War, Napoleon would 80

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have had little need to invade Russia. A crushed British Army would have little sway on the continent and the reforming of another coalition army against him would seem even more unlikely. However, by placing too much trust in his brother, Napoleon divided his forces and allowed both to become isolated.

Finally, the ultimate logistical challenge, Napoleon provisioned for a force of 680,000, was no mean feat which, in normal early 19th Century wars, would have sufficed. Both armies would have fought in a decisive engagement to decide which was the superior force and following this the prevailing army would have forced the surrender of the other all within a few months. Kutozov however refused to grant Napoleon his war and by stretching his resources he broke the fighting spirit of the French. When each of these vast problems are removed from isolation and laid out on this great and complex problem, the answer appears obvious; with the clear indicators from past engagements that the Russian spirit would not capitulate easily, combined with the Russian approach to not engage in a decisive battle extending Napoleonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s supply lines, the conditions had been set for an unsuccessful campaign. In 1812, with the largest army he had ever assembled, prepared to march to Russia, there is little to wonder as to why he committed to it.

Therein lies the irony of it all. Potentially the most prepared he had been in his military career he faced the most obvious issues and brought upon himself the ultimate devastation of his army, Empire and military prestige.

References David, Saul,. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16929522 (2012) Gilray, J,. www.britishmuseum.org-, 1806, (2018) Smith, D. Charge, Great Cavalry Charges of the Napoleonic Wars, (Kent, England) 2003 https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/military-history/napoleon-vs-russiabattle-of-eylau/ , (2015) https://battlefieldanomalies.com/eylau/ (2014) https://warandsecurity.com/2013/02/11/why-napoleons-1812-russiancampaign-failed/ (2014) www.napolun.com/mirror/napoleonistyka.atspace.com/Russian_infantry.htm (2013) https://ehne.fr/en/article/wars-and-traces-war/movement-timeswar/russian-campaign-french-campaign-1812-1814 (2012) https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1022125.pdf

Footnotes 111

Gilray, J. (2018). www.britishmuseum.org (Accessed on 22 March 2019). https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/military-history/napoleon-vsrussia-battle-of-eylau/, (2015).

113 Ibid.

114 Smith, D., Charge, Great Cavalry Charges of the Napoleonic Wars, (Kent, England) 2003.

115 http://www.napolun.com/mirror/napoleonistyka.atspace.com/Russian_infa ntry.htm (Accessed on 22 March 2019) 116 Ibid 117 https://ehne.fr/en/article/wars-and-traces-war/movement-times-war/ russian-campaign-french-campaign-1812-1814, (Accessed on 22 March 2019) 118 https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1022125.pdf, pp.1. (Accessed on 22 March 2019) 119 Ibid.

110 Morris, GJ., https://battlefieldanomalies.com/eylau/ (Accessed on 22 March 2019).

112

GORDON’S – THE MOST UNIQUE SCHOOL IN ENGLAND Built by public subscription at the insistence of Queen Victoria, Gordon’s School is the national monument to General Charles Gordon and is listed as one of Britain’s outstanding schools by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector.

A co-educational residential and day boarding school, Gordon’s is in the top one per cent of schools nationally for progress at A Levels.

To this end, it’s not just the classrooms where students excel.

Successes are achieved in drama; the arts; debating; public speaking; dance and sport as well as Duke of Edinburgh awards.

While the individual is celebrated, the whole School unites for parades. Since its inception, students have marched and there has always been Pipes and Drums. Dressed in their Blues the students parade around eight times a year and the school is the only one in the country permitted to march along Whitehall – an annual tradition in remembrance of General Gordon.

from an extended school day, allowing day boarders to stay for prep and supper with their residential boarding peers.

Around half of the school’s residential boarders are from service families, attracted by the location and the school’s understanding of military life.

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HISTORY

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Lessons from British Commonwealth rear operations during the invasion of Sicily (9 July – 17 August 1943)

Rear operations is defined in NATO Allied Tactical Pamphlet 3.2.1, Allied Land Tactics as: ‘The largely administrative and logistic activities that occur out of contact with adversary forces, that is, behind the area in which close operations are occurring.’1 It is a very broad subject, which cannot hope to be fully encompassed in the vessel of a Review essay.

Therefore, this essay will start with a brief synopsis of the campaign and then outline some of the key rear operations activity from the British Commonwealth forces perspective; showing some aspects of rear operations in the campaign and identifying some important lessons for the conduct of contemporary rear operations. It will show that despite failures in strategic command, cross-component frictions and a severe operating environment, British Commonwealth rear operations can be considered a qualified success thanks to new techniques, new equipment and the traditional methods of flexibility, adaptability and learning.

Operation HUSKY The Allied invasion began on 9 July 1943 and lasted until 17 August 1943. It was borne of the need to continue putting pressure on the Axis forces in the Mediterranean Theatre, following the conclusion of operations in North Africa. It was a strategic imperative for the Western Allies to open a new front there, as the projected invasion of North West Europe was not considered ready. The campaign was only the second conducted under joint US/UK command and featured many unconventional and new modes of warfare, such as massed amphibious and airborne operations, which demanded an unprecedented level of alliance and inter-service cooperation.

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Such a high level of coordination was quite unfamiliar and even considered threatening to the organisations concerned at the time. Therefore, many frictions were encountered, mistakes made and lessons learned.

The invasion was started with two simultaneous amphibious landings and an airborne assault, supported by massed air and naval attacks. Despite the Italian forces generally not performing as well as estimated, the German resistance was fierce and the operations of the Commonwealth 8th Army in the east of the island soon slowed almost to a standstill around the town of Catania and Mount Etna. The campaign then turned into a series of hard attritional battles which featured set-piece assaults against a succession of highly defensible hilltop towns. Meanwhile, the American 7th Army, after withstanding a determined counterattack against their beachhead, fought a more mobile campaign on the western side of the island and managed to fight their way along the north coast. The remaining Axis forces fought effective delaying actions throughout, using the terrain and demolitions to good effect. The Axis were also able to conduct a remarkable evacuation of their remaining forces from the port of Messina before the Americans captured it and ended the campaign. Both Axis and Allies had to contend with the severity of the mountainous terrain, the intolerable heat of the Mediterranean summer, and the everpresent threat of malaria.2 Source: http://www.desertrats.org.uk/bde/Maps/Sicilymap.jpg

From the rear operations perspective, the Allied invasion of Sicily, known as Operation HUSKY, presented numerous challenges. The Allies had to work out how to supply vast and heavy formations from beaches, whilst maintaining command and control over a multinational, cross-component force of considerable complexity. All of this was conducted over mountainous territory, with both natural and Axis-made obstacles and with a population whose loyalties varied greatly. Maj A A Cox

Campaign map of Operation HUSKY

Administrative planning The administrative planning for the Allied force was hampered from the start for several reasons. Firstly, the overall planning for the campaign was being conducted whilst operations in Tunisia were still ongoing, which limited staff resources for the task and distracted commanders. The discourse and disagreements on the conduct of the Sicily campaign, meant that planning only began in late February

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1943 and the administrative planners had precious little time to react to the plan once it was agreed at the Washington Conference on 25 May.3 Much long-term preparatory work had to be committed to, without full knowledge of the finally agreed plan. This was especially true regarding the prioritisation and loading of cargo and the allocation and movements of shipping. Fortunately, this risk was able to be at least partially offset by the hard work of experienced logistic planners who were able to make well-founded assumptions about the campaign.4 Administrative planning also suffered from the command disagreements and the dispersal of commanders and HQs across the Mediterranean Theatre, the UK and USA.5 A unique administrative problem was caused by the lack of logistic orientated staff and activity at 15th Army Group level.

The 8th Army was administered by GHQ Middle East in Egypt and the administrative chain did not work through 15th Army Group to any great extent. The 15th Army Group Commander, General Alexander, took the view that the role of the Army Group was one of coordination rather than planning and the majority of the administrative spade-work was done at 8th Army level by the staff of General Montgomery.6 Whilst these arrangements allowed logistics to remain a national business, in what was an Alliance operation, it hampered the potential for administrative control, coordination and cooperation. A minor exception to this arrangement was an administrative HQ known as FORTBASE. It was generated out of 8th Army’s administrative staff with direct links to 8th Army, 15th Army Group and GHQ Middle East for the coordination of logistic activity with regard to the management of ports and beaches during the campaign.7 These points make for a clear cautionary tale about the need for unambiguous direction from a clear chain of command, from the outset of a campaign and the value of giving administrative staffs time to work. However, it also shows the practical importance of planning assumptions. If they have a basis in logic and judgement, they are a powerful tool in coping with a lack of operational clarity and the management of risk.

Cross-component concerns Although combined arms operations were developing rapidly at this time, there was only limited coordination and cooperation between the land, air and maritime components in this campaign. This was a by-product of inter-service politics, tribalism, a lack of joint training and virtually no mutual comprehension between the components. This caused some doubling-up of capabilities and the loss of further planning opportunities for logistic coordination and cooperation. One notable exception to this trend, was the organisation of tri-service ‘beach bricks’ for controlling the beach landing areas (see below). Another was a prior arrangement between the Commonwealth land and air components, that ground based commodities common to both components, would be supplied by the land component.8 There were prevalent clashes between the land and air

HISTORY

components when it came to the importance of prioritising personnel, equipment and stores, essential for the maintenance of airfields. The airfields across the south of the island were primary objectives and getting them into action was a matter of the highest priority for the air component in order to ensure fighter coverage for the campaign. This however, demanded that a great quantity of hold space in the assault and follow-up convoys were made up of airfield related personnel, equipment and stores. It also demanded a vast amount of field engineer activity and materiel to make the airfields operational.9 This was capacity that the land component sorely needed for their build-up and breakout, but the air component ultimately got its way. Returning the airfields at Pachino, Cassibile and Lentini, to operational capability became a major rear area operation in itself, which consumed a significant amount of capacity for transport and field engineer assets, early in the campaign. The effort ensured that Allied fighters were flying from Sicilian soil by D+5 (15 July). By D+12 (22 July), all three airfields had fighter squadrons flying sorties from them.10 If the activation of the airfields caused some logistic strain, the benefits to rear operations were equally significant as it translated directly into greater force protection from Axis air attack. Moreover, a system where casualties could be evacuated by air and priority stores could be flown in directly from North Africa, was fully active by the 24 July.11 There are obvious lessons here about the value of crosscomponent interoperability, logistic commonality and cooperation. However, the important point to take from this aspect of the operation, is the need for each logistic component to have an understanding of each other’s environment and how their own activities can impact upon them; for both good and ill. It illustrates the true value of Joint Force Support HQs at the operational level and the consequences of components competing in the rear battlespace, when they need to be cooperating.

The operational plan The administrative plan for the 8th Army landings, leaned heavily on using their eight allocated assault beaches as a primary route of supply. The plan was for the assaulting divisions to initially attack with ‘assault scales’ (equating to 30% of their heavy equipment), and then to be built up to ‘light scale’ (taking them up to 66% of their heavy equipment) and ‘full scale’ in subsequent follow-up convoys.12 The initial assault was to land with 20,000 tonnes of mixed supplies and gradually build up stock to 14 days’ supply, with an additional seven days’ supply as a ‘working margin’ (additional stock held as a contingency against increased demand or supply interruption).13 A key assumption of the plan, was that the ports of Sicily would be heavily damaged and so it was planned to maintain the whole force from the beaches for up to 30 days, whilst the ports were captured and brought back to working order.14 The plan called for the administrative functions to be managed by the Beach Groups for the first five days and thereafter organise the administrative centre of gravity around the port town of THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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Siracusa. This would culminate in the set-up of FORTBASE and 6 Base Area HQ in Siracusa. In the long term, the intent was not to use Sicily as a base depot, due to lack of infrastructure. The already existing and very extensive base depots in Tunisia and Egypt, would continue to serve the Mediterranean Theatre.15 With space within landing craft and cargo holds at a premium, prioritisation of units, equipment and stores became essential. This subsequently caused problems for Commonwealth forces as will be shown later. But with such little time to plan and organise, it is surprising that there were not more acute issues than were actually presented. It is also important to note that for the planning conventions of the time, which believed that amphibious operations depended on the capture of a working port for success, this plan presented significant logistic risk. However, the risk of supplying such a large mechanised force over beaches for such a time period was acknowledged and accepted.16 The key lesson that can be identified from this, is one of effective risk management. The Allies understood the risks involved with a broadly untested model of beach sustainment; but also saw the opportunities that new organisations and equipment offered. They opted for the new model; taking the opportunity with the risks mitigated by technical means. The results, which we turn to now, were remarkably successful.

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Such was their success, that the beaches proved not to be the greatest limiting factor in the in-load of stores: That proved to be the capacity of depots and storage sites, as well as the limited transport assets available.18 A major challenge for any amphibious landing is the bridging of the ‘water gap’ - the stretch of sea between the ships and the beach. The Allies had developed a number of equipment-based solutions to this problem. The first and most high profile, was a series of amphibious landing ships and craft that were able to deploy personnel and heavy equipment directly onto the beach, ready to fight. These ranged from the small Landing Craft Infantry (LCI) to the huge Landing Ship Tank (LST). The LSTs were particularly important assets, of which there were never sufficient numbers. Their provision and allocation could make or break the operational aspirations of Theatre Commanders and LSTs were so important to the overall war effort that they were allocated at the Grand-Strategic level. They proved their importance to rear operations in Operation HUSKY with their ability to inload large amounts of heavy equipment and stores in an organised way, thus enabling a rapid build-up of forces on shore.19 The second, lower in profile but highly effective, was the DUKW. This was a US built amphibious truck which was able to sail from a ship and drive up the beach and go inland with its cargo of up to 5,000lbs, taking it directly to where it was needed without the need for double handling. Between 1329 July, some 38,000 tonnes of stores (around 50% of the total) were handled by the 347 DUKWs allocated to 8th Army.20 Their importance to the rear operations of the Allies cannot be underestimated and this equipment type is lauded in every account where rear operations are covered. The DUKW was deemed to be so key to the success of the amphibious operation, that it had its own Annex in the United Kingdom Official History of the campaign.21 It is worth noting that the Beach Brick concept, the landing vessels and the DUKW, all had their operational debut in the Western Theatre in Sicily. They were the products of hard-won lessons learned

The invasion and setting up the rear operations During the invasion phase and thereafter, the Tri-Service Beach Groups or ‘bricks’ mentioned previously, proved their worth in managing the beaches as a rear operation. These groups not only managed the throughflow of personnel, equipment and stores over the beaches, they also dealt with force protection, security, field engineering, military labour and a myriad of other functions required to keep the beaches running. Despite a challenging and complex task, the Beach Groups were a runaway success. Between them, they were able to process 8,532 vehicles in the first two days of the invasion and between 13-29 July, around 73,000 tonnes of mixed stores were processed over the beaches.17 84

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© IWM (NA 5320)

Commonwealth Beachhead Operations: British Beach ‘Brick’ unloading LSTs at Beach Bark East at Pacino

Bridging the Water Gap: A US DUKW Amphibious Truck taking on stores directly from a cargo ship at sea

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previously in the war and their deployment underlines the need to adequately resource rear operations with the right organisations and equipment to make them successful.

Credit Electric Egg/Shutterstock.com

Enduring rear operations in the campaign The administrative base for the 8th Army was built up rapidly: Siracusa was captured on D+1 with its important cargo port relatively intact.22 The 86, Line of Communication Area HQ, an HQ intended to administer rear area battlespace, arrived on 13 July and commenced setting up an administration area around the town and its port.

Administrative staff from 8th Army HQ, set up in the area on the 15 July. FORTBASE moved to Siracusa on 20 July and a larger area HQ (6 Base Area HQ) took over the area on 21 July.23 Rear area functions built up just as quickly: despite the civilian port operators being generally reluctant to cooperate and many port tasks having to be given over to pioneer units, the port of Siracusa was inloading cargo by 13 July. Between 15-24 July the port handled 25,272 tonnes of mixed stores and 4,741 vehicles.24 A roadhead was set up north of the town and a railhead was set up to the northwest to distribute stores flowing from the beaches and port to the fighting formations.25 Between the beaches and the port, the 8th Army had an abundance of in-load capacity and was able to offer the 7th US Army, 1,000 tonnes of port capacity a day. However, the US forces had been equally successful in opening and expanding the capacity of the ports of Licata and Porto Empedolce. By 20 July the US forces no longer needed this offer and by 22 July, the large cargo port at Palermo (believed to have sufficient capacity for an entire Army formation) had fallen intact into their hands.26 An unexpected success was found in the provision of rail transportation. Despite planning assumptions that rail would only be an option from D+30 onwards, the railways along the south of the island were found more or less intact.

Moreover, they were fully manned with their Italian staff who unlike their compatriots at the port of Siracusa, were more than happy to work for the Allies.27 This opportunity was seized with both hands. With the help of a rapid in-load of coal in the follow-up convoys, the railways were running 1,500 tonnes of stores a day between

Exploiting the railways

Pachino and Siracusa by 21 July. A railhead was also organised to serve 30 Corps at Scordia, 40 miles north-west of Siracusa. As operations progressed, the rail network expanded; culminating at Catania at the end of the campaign.28 This unexpected benefit to the route network was able to, at least in part, offset the paucity of wheeled transport in the rear area during the campaign, which will be covered later. Critical to much of this endeavour, was the work of the Allied Military Governance of Occupied Territory (AMGOT) organisations, which provided a Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) role and smoothed relations with the civilian population throughout the campaign.

The importance of large quantities of military labour to rear operations also cannot be understated. In the 8th Army these took the form of Pioneer Companies and they worked to enable rear operations from the outset. Their critical role in the early running of port operations has already been mentioned and the Pioneers also worked in the Beach Groups as well as in the running of supply depots and in airfield construction. They were also essential in the management of prisoners of war, evacuating the wounded and conducting mortuary work. These hard-working soldiers were recruited from all over the British Commonwealth and included many soldiers from Africa and the Indian SubContinent. Their ability to provide a disciplined work force for literally any task required in the rear battlespace, proved to be a great enabler for the Commonwealth forces.29 The story of the ports, railways and their workers, hold a relevant lesson about the need for civilian infrastructure and capabilities in rear operations. Transportation infrastructure can be a great force multiplier, if it can be repaired or captured sufficiently intact. A civilian workforce is of course required and with that comes the attendant issues concerning their availability and reliability. Modern military forces can typically ill afford the manpower commitment, of providing a flexible and disciplined military labour force as was deployed on Operation HUSKY. This illustrates the value of CIMIC and Host Nation Support (HNS) organisations.

The 8th Army faced a significant challenge concerning lack of transportation assets from the start of the campaign.

Although this affected the whole force, second and third-line mechanical transportation, was in especially short supply due to it having a relatively low priority in being built up from the points of entry. This decision was no doubt linked to the reasonable Allied assumption that there would be a far fiercer battle on the landing grounds, than actually transpired. Between 13-24 July, the Royal Army Service Corps (RASC) transport columns were forced to work with 30% of their capability and they struggled to move the abundance of supply coming over the beaches and port, whilst delivering the transportation needed to drive the rapid breakout of the fighting formations.30 The inevitable result of this, was to curtail the speed of the advance out of the landing areas, as divisions used to moving in vehicles in North Africa, were forced to move on foot. All formations were forced to commandeer any transportation means encountered to aid their mobility, from abandoned Axis THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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British Commonwealth mule teams pass through the rubblestrewn streets of Adrano, 9 August 1943

vehicles to civilian vehicles and animals.31 The latter measure was a source of great resentment amongst an already impoverished civilian population.

The transportation challenges became much greater as the campaign progressed and the interior terrain of Sicily became a factor. Roads of good enough quality to stand constant two-way traffic were at a premium and a combination of rubble and narrow streets in towns caused numerous bottlenecks. The steep inclines, mountainous terrain and many water obstacles, exposed the limitations of many British-made wheeled vehicles, which were typically underpowered and, in some cases, driven from one axle.

The value of the American-built vehicles, with their more powerful engines and four-wheel drive, was made very apparent in Sicily. Further friction was caused by the retreating Axis forces, as they destroyed bridges, tunnels, culverts and roads to delay the Allied advance.

A major aspect of rear operations became the work of the Field Engineer units and the provision of engineer stores to clear and improve routes. Engineers and Pioneers became very heavily committed personnel and equipment such as bulldozers, mobile cranes and bailey bridges, in the rear, became arguably more important than tanks, for maintaining the momentum of the Allied advance.32 These points demonstrate that staff tools such as Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPOE) are just as critical to rear operations as they are elsewhere in the battlespace. It also reinforces the previous lessons regarding the value of preserving or rapidly restoring transportation infrastructure and the nature of battle winning equipment in rear operations.

Sicily presented such a challenge, to a mechanically structured land force, that at times less than conventional means of transportation were necessary. As the campaign progressed, there were many areas of the island where mechanical transport was unable to venture; especially in the areas surrounding Mount Etna. The value of pack 86

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animals in similar terrain had already been learned by the Allies in Tunisia and the provision of six RASC Pack Transport Companies, had been planned for the 8th Army. However, the issue of prioritisation struck again and these only began to arrive towards the end of the campaign. Even more unhelpfully, 8th Army staff signalled on D+7 (17 July) that pack animals were not required.33 This forced the divisions fighting on the Etna Line and beyond to improvise, use their own organic assets or continue to co-opt civilians and their animals. 78th Division was given a pack train of 400 animals of various types and quality, for their operations to the west of Mount Etna.34 In the late stages of the campaign, the extent of Axis demolitions was such that the road was not able to be repaired quickly enough to maintain the flow of supplies to 50th Division, as it advanced towards Messina. The line of supply was maintained by using a maritime flank; sailing Landing Craft Tanks (LCTs) filled with fully loaded trucks around the roadblocks.35 These examples show the true value of a diverse transportation network, as well as the need to use flexibility, cooperation with other rear operations actors and initiative, to overcome logistic problems.

Conclusion The conduct of rear operations by the Commonwealth forces in Operation HUSKY, can be seen as a qualified success.

Despite the disjointed planning stage and significant logistic risk of supporting such a large invasion over beaches, they overcame the significant issues, with dedicated organisations and specialist equipment to make the support of the landings an operational success. The problems in the planning stage were effectively stored up for subsequent rear operations in the interior of the island, where road capacity became a shaping factor in the conduct of the campaign. This is when the low priority for transport assets and lack of appreciation for the terrain of Sicily started to bite. It forced the 8th Army to improvise and adapt their logistic methods to the prevailing situation, in order to maintain campaign momentum.

The lessons from the Sicily campaign are enduring. The effective use of planning tools, the need for cooperation between rear operationsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; actors, the importance of adequately equipping and resourcing rear operations, the critical role of civilians and civil infrastructure and the ever-present need for diverse methods, flexibility and initiative, continue to resonate today. A great deal was learned from this operation about the support of amphibious operations, that was critical to the success of later operations in: Calabria, Salerno, Anzio, Southern France and Normandy. The methods used in the interior of Sicily were used to great effect by the same forces, when they were campaigning in the similar terrain of mainland Italy later in the war, allowing them to overcome greater sustainment problems, in an even more severe environment.

Ultimately the Commonwealth forces benefitted greatly by learning and adapting from their experiences and that is the most important and enduring lesson to be learned from the rear operations of this campaign.

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References

110

Blumenson, M. (1968), Sicily: Whose Victory?, London, MacDonald.

D’Este, C. (1988), Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily July-August 1943, London, Collins.

Fernyhaugh, AH. (1967), History of the Royal Army Ordinance Corps, London, William Claves and Sons Ltd. The Institution of the Royal Army Service Corps. (1955), The Story of the Royal Army Service Corps 1939-1945, London, G Bell and Sons Ltd. Jackson, WGF. (1967), The Battle for Sicily, London, Batsford.

Mickelm, R. (1950), Transportation, No Location, The War Office.

Mitcham, SW, Von Stauffenberg, F. (2007), The Battle of Sicily, Mechanicsburg, Stackpole Books.

Molony, CJC. (1973), The History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and the Middle East Vol V, London, HMSO. NATO Standardization Office. (2018), NATO Allied Tactical Publication 3.2.1 Allied Land Tactics, No Loc, NATO Standardization Office.

Rhodes-Wood, EH. (1960), A War History of the Royal Pioneer Corps 19391945, Aldershot, Gale and Polden Ltd. Shepperd, GA. (1968), The Italian Campaign, London, Arthur Baker.

Thompson, J. (1991), Lifeblood of War, London, Brasseys.

Wilson, HW. (1952), Administrative Planning, No Loc, The War Office.

111

Footnotes NATO Standardization Office, NATO Allied Tactical Publication 3.2.1 Allied Land Tactics, 2018, Para 0229.

112 M. Blumenson, Sicily: Whose Victory?, 1968. This book gives a good, short overview of the campaign.

113 C.J.C. Molony, The History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and the Middle East Vol V, 1973, pp.133-134.

114 H.W. Wilson, Administrative Planning, 1952, p.25.

115 Ibid. See also G.A. Shepperd, The Italian Campaign 1943-45, 1968, p.33.

116 A.H. Fernyhough, History of the Royal Army Ordinance Corps, 1967, pp.230231.

117 The Institution of the Royal Army Service Corps, The Story of the Royal Army Service Corps 1939-1945, 1955, p253.

118 Molony, The History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and the Middle East Vol V, 1973, pp138-140.

119 Ibid, pp.98-99.

111

Ibid.

Ibid, p.138.

112 Molony, The History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and the Middle East Vol V, 1973, p137.

113 Ibid, p135.

114 Ibid, p138.

115 Ibid, p136.

116 Molony, The History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and the Middle East Vol V, 1973, pp138-139.

117 Molony, The History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and the Middle East Vol V, 1973, p.142.

118 Shepperd, The Italian Campaign 1943-45, 1968, p.73.

119 Molony, The History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and the Middle East Vol V, 1973, pp.56-58, pp.578-581.

120 Ibid, p.142.

121 Ibid, pp.140-141. DUKW Annex is at p.147.

122 Mickelm, Transportation, 1950, p125.

123 Fernyhaugh, History of the Royal Army Ordinance Corps, No Date, pp233 124 Molony, The History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and the Middle East Vol V, 1973, p144.

125 Mickelm, Transportation, 1950, p.109.

126 Molony, The History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and the Middle East Vol V, 1973, p144.

127 Mickelm, Transportation, 1950, p109. See also Molony, The History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and the Middle East Vol V, 1973, p.138.

128 Mickelm, Transportation, 1950, p.109.

129 Rhodes-Wood, A War History of the Royal Pioneer Corps 1939, 1945, 1960, pp198-202.

130 Molony, The History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and the Middle East Vol V, 1973, p.37.

131 D’Este, Bitter Victory, 1988, p.324.

132 Shepperd, The Italian Campaign 1943-45, 1968, p.73.

133 Molony, The History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and the Middle East Vol V, 1973, p.132.

134 Ibid, pp.151-152.

135 The Institution of the Royal Army Service Corps, The Story of the Royal Army Service Corps 1939-1945, 1955, p.256.

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During the First World War, the British main effort was fighting the Germans on the Western Front because that was where a decisive victory would be achieved. Concurrently, other campaigns, or ‘side shows’, were conducted to chip away at the central powers supporting Germany. Each campaign exhibited varying degrees of success and presented different strategic and tactical challenges.

This paper will examine the logistic problems of conducting and sustaining operations in the Caucasus (modern day Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), an offshoot of the Mesopotamia Campaign (modern day Iraq). In early 1918, this sideshow involved sending a British special mission (called Dunsterforce) through North Persia (now Iran) to protect the Caucasus from German and Turkish forces. The consequent logistic lessons, which resonate with the present day, provide the subject of this article.

By Maj Colin Taylor ‘…Based only on my optimism and not at all on calculation…’1 Major General Lionel Dunsterville Why might this sideshow be of interest to modern logisticians? Though a century has passed, the Great War is still relevant. General Carter, the former CGS, considered that Op REFLECT has two ongoing aims: ‘To educate modern soldiers about the actions and achievements of their forebears and, perhaps more importantly, to learn lessons that may help to guide our development for an uncertain future.’2 When the Armistice halted the Great War, not every outlying campaign ceased; several morphed into challenging post-war conflicts or peace-support operations. These campaigns should not be overlooked as they still provide lessons in logistics that are still relevant in the modern day. In 1918, as now, British Army logisticians were prepared for the certainty of peer-versus-peer conflict; not the uncertainty of a spectrum of military tasks from combat to training and mentoring, policing, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief.

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Credit: IWM

British logistic challenges during campaigning in North Persia and the Caucasus 1918-19

Armenians being drilled in Baku by Dunsterforce

This campaign concerns British intervention in the Caucasus; this region still occupies a crucial geo-strategic position. The Caucasus provide important east-west transport links and oil pipelines between the Caspian and Black Seas and divide Europe and Asia.3 The region borders three states of particular interest to Great Britain and her armed forces. To the south is Iran; an oil-rich state with nuclear ambitions, whose political leaders have an antagonistic relationship with the West. To the southwest is Turkey, a member of NATO, but with a hard-line leader. To the north is a resurgent Russia seeking to influence its former territories, especially Georgia. The 2008 RussiaGeorgia conflict has left unresolved tension over disputed territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) which might become part of ‘a wider great power competition’ with Russia.4 Another unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan does not increase regional stability.

This study will examine three phases of British operations concerning the Caucasus in 1918; firstly, the preliminary activities of Dunsterforce in early 1918; secondly, operations involving Dunsterforce at Baku in August-September 1918 and, thirdly, British activities after the Armistice.

However, the initial situation facing the Allies in the Caucasus must be examined in order to provide background.

This situation originated in the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in November 1917. In December, Russia ceased hostilities against the Central Powers. Germany used its peace terms to augment its dwindling supplies of food and raw materials which negating the British naval blockade. The Germans needed fuel desperately; Baku was the: ‘All-important centre of the Russian oil industry’.5 According to Sean Kelly; ‘Throughout the first eight months of 1918, London was terrified at the prospect that Germany would exploit the resources of Southern Russia to entrench her mastery of Europe.’6 Stopping the Germans exploiting the Caucasus for resources was the British strategic aim. When the Russian Armies facing the Turks in Trans-Caucasia ceased to exist, this opened the door for Germany. The British were also concerned about Turkish expansion into Persia which might

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threaten India. The Tartars, Georgians and Armenians took advantage of the power vacuum left by Russia and established individual states. The British Government believed that the different groups in the region might be persuaded to fight the Turks if Britain offered financial assistance. However, the Germans might be welcomed by the Georgians if they helped prevent a Turkish occupation of Georgia. The British considered that: ‘All national groups who are determined to continue the war must be supported by all the means in our power.’7 British troops would be needed to train these forces to wage a proxy-war against Turkish expansionism and German resource acquisition.

Credit: IWM

Dunsterforce - initial operations British forces in Mesopotamia had insufficient troops to send to the Caucasus. Consequently, Major General Lionel Dunsterville, a Russophile, was ordered to form a training force. This organisation, known as ‘Dunsterforce’, consisted of about 400 officers and NCOs. It was to move to TransCaucasia and stabilise Russian and local forces there.

Dunsterville was already a ‘boys’ own’ adventure hero whose exploits had inspired Rudyard Kipling.8 Volunteers for Dunsterforce were sought from units in France for an unknown and dangerous mission.9 Turkey controlled the Black Sea making the Caucasus inaccessible from the west and south-west; Russia, to the north, was no longer an ally. The only approach was across the Caspian Sea via Persia. Dunsterforce would travel by sea to Basra; onwards to Baghdad and thence by road across Persia to Enzeli; the force would embark for Baku before travelling to Tiflis (now Tbilisi) by rail. If reaching Tiflis was complicated, sustaining the force from Baghdad would be extremely difficult.10 This was exacerbated by difficult terrain and weather, unknown adversaries called the Jangalis (Persian insurgents advised by German agents) and unknown allies such as Colonel Bicherakov’s Cossacks.

Dunsterville confided in his diary regarding the complexity of his logistical problems:

Major General Dunsterville and an Armenian soldier

‘My brain is full of men and horses, guns, rifles, equipment, ammunition, supplies, petrol, motorcars, aeroplanes, clothing, cold, snow, marches, languages, tribes, politics, information and rumours, spies, pro and anti, finance, routes, tactics, strategy, geography, history.’11

Credit: IWM

Dunsterville and his staff

This implied that Dunsterville did not have a strong grasp of his logistic plan and that his G4 staff were under-resourced or ill-informed. Dunsterville was certainly pessimistic.12 Because his training force had not yet arrived, Dunsterville initially conducted a reconnaissance to establish his route into Northern Persia and the Caucasus. Dunsterville’s column of 41 cars, consisting of his staff and drivers, but without fighting troops, left Baghdad on 27 January 1918. He arrived in Kermanshah where he met Bicherakov. Dunsterforce proceeded to Enzeli having sent Dunsterville’s intelligence officer, Captain Goldsmith, ahead. Goldsmith, through bribery, got his three vehicles shipped from Enzeli to Baku where he persuaded the Bolsheviks to let the rest of Dunsterville’s column through. However, on Dunsterville’s arrival in Enzeli on 17 February, the Bolshevik Committee prevented his embarking for Baku. Dejected, Dunsterville returned to Hamadan and requested reinforcements.

Dunsterville had withdrawn before Goldsmith’s telegram, announcing success, arrived.13 The initial operations of Dunsterforce took the form of a self-contained flying column resembling previous British colonial tactics. Though agile, this approach required guile and luck to succeed. This activity was inadequately planned, resourced and supplied and was unable to deliver force or influence to achieve its effect. This had a disproportionately negative strategic impact. Because no British force arrived, the Georgians sought external assistance from the Germans against the Turkish invasion.14 Despite this setback, Dunsterville’s party had completed the thousand-mile round trip without losing any vehicles, despite appalling roads and weather. Meanwhile, German efforts in the region were also limited by resources and logistics. Though Dunsterville was stationary, the progress by the Turks and Germans toward Baku was equally hesitant as these enemies had conflicting aims.15 THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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Persian labourers repair the road through the Asadabad Pass

The initial operations of Dunsterforce were high risk but had the potential to deliver significant rewards. Dunsterville knew the logistic problems facing his command. In moving quickly Dunsterville hoped to bluff his way through to Tiflis using a self-contained force without an established line of communication (LoC). Even if Dunsterville’s convoy had reached Tiflis, via Baku, the route back to Baghdad might have closed behind him separating his party from sustainment and reinforcement. Dunsterville’s party lacked credibility to his Russian allies and to the Bolsheviks at Enzeli he hoped to coerce. Without sufficient troops supported by sufficient logistics, Dunsterville’s initial effort was a failure.

Dunsterforce at Baku The limitation of Dunsterville’s incomplete training force was evident. Whilst he needed the rest of his men, and fighting troops, to push forward to Enzeli, he needed to build up his LoC to properly sustain this move.16 By 24 March, only a platoon from the Hampshire Regiment had arrived. The Russian General, Baratov, was dismissive; ‘“Dunsterforce!” he snorted, “I know Dunster[ville] all right, but where is the Force?”’17 At one point Dunsterville planned to take all available troops to Enzeli and then the Caucasus and sever supply lines with Persia. Orders from London forbade him from pressing on for Baku and the Caucasus and denuding Persia of troops. Dunsterville’s supply line (running northsouth) also represented a screen of posts, facing westwards, to intercept any Turkish movement into Persia (and India).

Preserving the Dunsterforce LoC and manning this screen absorbed troops that Dunsterville needed to reach the Caspian Sea. A week later, 39 Brigade and eight armoured cars were promised from Baghdad to clear the route to Enzeli.18 Whilst Dunsterville awaited reinforcements his force was drawn into activities that were a distraction from his objective. His men were used to attempt to prevent Christians being massacred and to assist with famine relief.

Whilst this ‘mission creep’ contributed to reducing anti-British sentiment it depleted his supplies which eroded his future freedom of action.19 The expectations of Dunsterforce had been reduced. The British capture of Baku and denial of its oil might prevent Persia falling under enemy influence: ‘Should Baku … fall to the enemy, only the British occupation of Tehran, or an effective resumption of the war by Russia, could prevent 90

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Persia falling completely under the influence of the [Turkish] enemy.’20 On 12 June, Bicherakov’s Cossacks routed the Jangalis at Menzil.21 Dunsterforce arrived in Enzeli for the second time on 1 July, but the Bolsheviks again refused the British transit to Baku. Finally, on 28 July, the Baku situation was resolved when Bicherakov ousted the Bolsheviks in a coup. The city invited British troops to forestall the approaching Turks who almost captured Baku on 31 July, but luckily withdrew prematurely. Dunsterforce arrived in Baku on 4 August and training now began. Success relied on the participation of those under training in Baku who were mostly Armenians. Training and mentoring proved unsuccessful:

‘The position of the unattached British officers was a difficult one in Baku. … their counsel and presence were alike resented by all parties, political and military. Suggestions for a more efficient cooperation between infantry and artillery, for the filling up of dangerous gaps in the line, the better siting of trenches … were usually received in silence and with a disdainful shrug of the shoulders.’ 22 The hard-bitten collection of men of Dunsterforce predominantly comprised ‘teeth arms’ soldiers. Dunsterforce did not contain any logistic instructors to train the ‘tail’ which made any indigenous force formed in Baku unsustainable in the long term. In the absence of any local ordnance storage and distribution system a spare Dunsterforce staff officer was employed to create an organisation from scratch.

Colonel Arthur ‘Toby’ Rawlinson, an artillery officer with no background in logistics, was selected. Armenian munitions were plentiful but were un-recorded and stored haphazardly in dumps throughout the city. Though there were plentiful artillery pieces, there were no means of supplying them with ammunition nor a force to do so. Rawlinson, along with a handful of Russian officers, and a couple of lorries, worked miracles in creating a rudimentary system of supply through the force of his personality alone.23 Deploying a staff of logistic instructors with Dunsterforce might have created better results that might have better sustained any indigenous forces in the long-term.

Meanwhile, the LoC back to Baghdad was tenuous. There were hazards in using the single road, as one officer observed near Enzeli: ‘We soon began to come on signs of the fate of previous convoys – in the shape of remains of cars and lorries, scattered cartridge cases, a few corpses, and all the usual signs of a scrap’24 Logistic force protection was inadequate; armoured cars were protected from enemy fire but accompanying soft-skinned vehicles were vulnerable.

One armoured car commander, Captain Hulls, recorded in one contact:

‘[We] opened rapid fire with our machine guns… I observed a cloud of dust … and to my joy the Ford dashed past [to escape the contact area]. I caught a glimpse of the driver – a gallant youngster of nineteen – his head down to the wheel, driving as

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never before. My relief was short-lived. “The lorry’s stopped Sir and one man’s gone” shouted Sergeant McEwan … looking again I saw the lorry twenty yards behind, and a single [Russian] driver staggering from the seat. … his second driver had been killed. … And then, to my dismay, I saw but a short distance ahead, the Ford, at a standstill … with Castle and the Cossack officer lying down behind it … The driver was still in his seat – dead.’ 25 One officer even created a dummy armoured vehicle using a car and tissue paper; a simple example of improvised deception. Map XX shows the number of troops that securing the LoC in Persia swallowed up.

Sustaining the force in Baku was touch-and-go and required mechanical transport along a long road LoC before transferring loads into ships to cross the Caspian Sea. There were further considerable ‘tactical’ level logistic challenges to be overcome. Fuel became critically short and undermined logistic efforts. In mid-October, convoys were held up at Hamadan awaiting petrol. At one point, petrol grew so short that vehicles were traded for fuel with the Bolsheviks.26 Once exchanged, a convoy with fuel departed to enable more vehicles to ferry troops and supplies forward.

Tyres wore rapidly on the Persian LoC due to the stony nature of the roads and the terrain caused significant damage to suspensions and differentials and generally degraded mechanical reliability. Large numbers of vehicles were often hors de combat, awaiting repair or parts. A lorry of 596th MT Company ran amok when its brakes failed on a mountain pass; the driver had to drive it into a cliff.27 Shortages in ES materiel became critical. Corporal Hopson, an MT fitter with 730th MT Company who later joined Dunsterforce recalled having to recondition spark plugs and tyres, make fan belts; he was also: ‘Given power of “open arrest” for a driver who had been neglectful of his vehicle.’28 RASC fitters were worked to breaking point keeping vehicles on the road, often through the night.29 The terrain was inhospitable for the men of Dunsterforce and the men which supported them.30 Weather also impinged on logistic activities; in early November 1918, heavy winter rain kept convoys at a standstill due to poor road conditions. The same occurred in early December.31 Despite these logistic problems, the British fought to retain

Repairs to Howitzers in Baku

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Baku. A lacklustre performance by local forces trained by Dunsterforce meant that British infantrymen of 39 Brigade bolstered the local troops. Ultimately, the defence almost solely devolved onto the British troops who were unable to hold the city perimeter alone. Consequently, Baku was untenable and Dunsterville decided to withdraw on 14 September leaving the city to its fate; by luck most of his force escaped.32 Dunsterville was recalled to Baghdad on 16 September: ‘I am not offended.…[I have] produced very good results out of nothing in spite of apathy and misunderstanding of [the] War Office and Baghdad.’33 By finally inserting a force into Baku, Dunsterville had taken significant logistic risks and pushed his LoC to breaking point. Supplying his force was a worry from the outset of these operations but he pressed ahead with a potentially unsustainable plan. The rapid deterioration of the situation at Baku and the withdrawal to Enzeli, was not down to stretched logistics. However, had Dunsterville held Baku for a prolonged period the weakness of his LoC would have become increasingly evident. Including a maritime section (crossing the Caspian Sea) in a land LoC was a considerable complication. It is unknown whether Dunsterville’s administrative staff adequately apprised him of the logistic risks of the move to Baku and was over-ruled, or whether they kept the nature of these problems to themselves.

Modern logisticians in formation HQs have a difficult tightrope to walk trying to support their commander’s intent whilst highlighting where logistic shortfalls will impinge on operations. Speaking truth to power in these circumstances is a difficult skill to perfect. If logistic constraints are highlighted too readily, logisticians might be perceived as an anchor holding back planning. The alternative is that where operations are conducted, despite logistic risks, that the commander is informed of the potential consequences. This case study highlights the need to clearly articulate these risks on future operations to avoid a future British force being overly-exposed at the end of a tenuous LoC. Batoum to Baku The Armistice between the Allies and the Central Powers dramatically changed the strategic situation in the Caucasus.

The British policy was to enforce the Armistice terms, secure the line of communication from Baku to Batoum34 (including the oil pipeline) and to maintain law and order in TransCaucasia.35 All German and Turkish troops were to leave the Caucasus; the German and Turkish threat in the Caucasus was steadily replaced by a threat from Bolshevik Russia which coveted Georgia. Under the Armistice terms, on 17 November, British troops re-entered Baku. Logistic problems plagued British endeavours. Shortages of mechanical transport; heavy rains that damaged the roads and feeding Jelu refugees, meant that the existing LoC, via Baghdad, could not sustain the Baku force.36 With Turkey out of the war, the opportunity for a supply route across the Black Sea presented itself. The unreliable LoC across Persia was replaced by a more reliable maritime supply route. 27 Division, from Salonika, was to redeploy to Batoum to secure THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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Troops of 39 Brigade near Baku

Vehicles of Dunsterforce on the road near Birkandi

and reopen the Batoum-Baku Railway and oil pipeline; this would achieve British strategic aims and solve the sustainment problem at Baku.

A composite brigade arrived at Batum on 22 December.

Immediately, troops were sent inland to resolve an Armenian-Georgian border conflict.37 Peace was restored but this flashpoint was one of many peace support tasks for British troops. Georgians fought Russians; Armenians massacred Tartars and withdrawing Turkish troops fought Russians and Armenians.38 Restoring order required wide dispersion of British forces in the Caucasus which presented logistic challenges. British logisticians also organised the evacuation of Turkish forces by sea and road. The German force (approximately 8,000 men) was also ejected.39 In January 1919, 27 Division took over the supply of Baku.

This new LoC required British troops to re-establish and run the Baku-Batoum railway. Though British troops did this successfully and generally maintained security, there were many cases of banditry. The railway was an easy target.

Trains travelling from Batum to Tiflis in March 1919 required a 100-man escort.40 British forces also assisted in administering the oil industry.41 There were 500,000 destitute people in the Caucasus, 200,000 were starving; British troops helped American relief societies distributing aid.42 Whilst the missions were numerous and varied, the strategic objectives for British troops were unclear:

peacekeeping was imperfect but within a year of their withdrawal Bolshevik Russia re-asserted control over an independent Georgia.44 The Armistice rapidly changed British political and military objectives in the Caucasus and immediately changed the strategic situation. This required a considerable ‘Question 4’ moment for British forces. Logistic risks came back to haunt the Baghdad-Baku supply line making it increasingly untenable. This, along with the changed military situation, required a 180-degree change to the logistic centre of gravity in Trans-Caucasia. This third phase highlights the need for the logistic flexibility to meet significant and immediate changes to logistic provision. In the conclusion this study will further examine whether the modern British Army could react as effectively to such significant logistic changes at such short notice.

‘Everywhere was the same uncertainty as to our Government’s intentions … no condition could be less encouraging in the face of the many diametrically opposite political aspirations which were then existent among the various races inhabiting the Caucasus.’ 43 Though British forces were present for over a year, their presence lacked cohesive political direction, their permanence was ill-determined and troop numbers remained inadequate for their missions and tasks. For a modern force under the same circumstances, conducting a politically ill-defined campaign in this way would mean that optimum and cost-effective logistical support would be impossible, resulting in either under-provision or profligacy.

By late 1919, only a brigade remained in Batoum to run the city, until the summer of 1920, when it withdrew. British 92

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Conclusions Though a century has passed since the Great War, the campaign in the Caucasus is still very relevant to understanding logistic challenges in the contemporary operating environment. The three different phases of British operations relating to the Caucasus in 1918-1919 each saw differing challenges which can provide lessons for modern logisticians. The initial Dunsterforce operation highlights the need for a commander to balance risks and rewards. Instead of waiting for his force and for firm logistic backing, Dunsterville took an uncertain course of action which carried too much risk to bring success. Once his coup de main had failed Dunsterville had to reduce his ambitions until his force was sufficiently prepared; he had to cut his clothes to fit his cloth.

The second phase of the Dunsterforce operation highlights the need for the management and articulation of logistic risk to ensure commanders understand the implications of their decisions. This phase also highlights the need to think to the finish. Had Dunsterforce reached Tiflis and had trained an army, it would have failed in the long-term without having trained logisticians to sustain that army. Such training consequently fell on enthusiastic amateurs, like Rawlinson, who could only deliver small-scale, ad hoc solutions. Future modern capacity building missions could potentially deploy a cadre of culturally and linguistically trained logisticians and staff officers to deliver sustainment training.

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There is a further lesson that crosscuts all three phases.

Throughout the campaign, Dunsterforce and 39 Brigade were involved in the full spectrum of conflict (from fighting to capacity building to peace support) at a time when the British Army was predominantly prepared for combat operations. Like the modern British Army, Dunsterforce was under-resourced and unprepared to conduct the myriad of tasks it was actually set. This uncertainty of role, and progressive mission creep, further complicated what was already a complex logistic support plan. On future operations it is likely that commanders may desire to achieve tasks beyond the capability that logisticians can deliver across destination, distance, demand or duration. In these cases, logisticians can either; request further resources, inform the commander that certain tasks may be unachievable or highlight areas of logistic risk that could arise. Dunsterforce highlights what can go wrong when a force tries to achieve more than it was intended to do through mission creep.

The circumstances surrounding the 1918-1919 operations in the Caucasus offer a challenging scenario for an exercise or wargame to stress test modern British Army logistic capability. It could test the reach and employment of the emerging STRIKE concept over a long-distance and complex land LoC. It could also highlight the logistic difficulties of deploying a Specialist Infantry Battalion (SpIB) into a complex environment.

In the modern scenario, Dunsterforce could be replaced by troops from several SpIBs. However, for those training cadres to reach their destination over long distances and against opposition would require assistance from other combat units. Were British forces to deploy training troops en masse to Georgia they would experience similar, or worse, logistic problems to those that faced Dunsterville.

Iran is no longer an access route to the Caucasus and Russian naval power controls large-scale access to the Black Sea. A force could travel overland through Turkey, but Russia is endeavouring to grow closer to Turkey, presumably to help isolate the Caucasus from Western assistance.45 Air travel is no ‘silver bullet’ to avoid these problems. Airspace can be denied by enemy air power or air defence and British strategic air transport capacity may not sustain significant activity indefinitely without a land LoC. How might modern British Army logistics compare to the Dunsterforce scenario?

For simplicity, logistic structures are taught in a linear manner from ‘Purple Gate’ to front line. The case study above highlights a LoC with extreme complexity to which the doctrinal concepts must be somehow applied. In reality, the logistic support to a force may be more flexible in structure and scope and be tailored to that force, its mission, the distances etc. In the Dunsterforce scenario logistic support was very ad hoc and the LoC required considerable troops to secure it; similar forces might be unavailable today. How a force builds up in theatre is generally portrayed as being linear. The Vanguard Enabling Group (VEG) initially deploys and later hands over to follow-on logistic forces, i.e. the Vanguard Sustainment Brigade (VSB) which would provide the LoC and support the deployed force. If Dunsterforce/39

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Brigade was a modern formation deploying into theatre over an extended LoC, it would require both the VEG and the VSB to deploy to reach Baku. Even if it could deploy by air to Baku it would still need a land LoC. However, changes in the strategic situation, like the Dunsterforce case study, might necessitate the deployment of a new force (like 27 Division).

Such changes might turn existing logistic planning on its head. If such changes required a new theatre access point, then a duplicate VEG would need to be regenerated and a new VSB found. If 101 Log Support Brigade formed the first VSB and elements of 104 Log Sp Bde was required for both the first and second VEGs, then a further 1* HQ and units would need to form VSB2. This could be provided by HQ 102LogX, but this is due to disband shortly. In the Dunsterforce scenario this would leave a gap.

It is easy to criticise British operations in the Caucasus as a heroic failure. The first two phases were ultimately unsuccessful, the third was of limited success. However, had the mission succeeded it might have delivered strategic benefits disproportionate to the size of the force. It could be argued of Dunsterforce that despite failure the juice was well worth the squeeze. The temporary holding of Baku did stall Turkish forces and achieved a temporary operational success.

Meanwhile, the Dunsterforce LoC provided the screen to protect Persia which achieved British strategic goals.46 Consequently, in the modern world a similar arithmetic might see a similar force committed to a similar mission. Modern logisticians will therefore have to deliver similar miracles in equally challenging environments to sustain this force.

References Published Sources • Bechhofer, C E, In Denikin’s Russia and the Caucasus, 1919-1920, London: Collins Sons, 1921.

• Bechhofer, C E, A Wanderer’s Log; Being some memories of travel in India, the Far East, Russia, the Mediterranean & Elsewhere, London: Mills & Boon, 1922.

• Donohoe, M H, With the Persian Expedition, London: Edward Arnold, 1919.

• Dunsterville, Major General L C, The Adventures of Dunsterforce, London: Edward Arnold, 1920.

• Dunsterville, Major General L C, Stalky’s Reminiscences, London: Jonathan Cape, 1928.

• Edmonds, J E, The Occupation of Constantinople 1918-1923, Uckfield: Naval and Military Press, 2013.

• Ellis, C H, The British “Intervention” in Transcaspia 1918-1919, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.

• Falls, C, Macedonia, Vol II. From the Spring of 1917 to the end of the war.

History of the Great War based on Official Documents, London: HMSO, 1929.

• Ghambashidze, D, The Caucasian Petroleum Industry and its Importance for Eastern Europe and Asia, London: Anglo-Georgian Society, 1918.

• Hammerton, Sir J, ed., "Ch 106: To Baku and Mosul". World War 1914– 1918, A Pictorial History. London: Amalgamated Press. 10 October 1935. pp.1, 357–1, 364.

• Hopson, F R, My Service to the Crown, Part 2. The Journal of the Royal Corps of Transport, September 1973, pp.234-246.

• Kelly, S, ‘Britannia has ruled here’: Transcaucasia and Considerations of Imperial Defence in Lord Curzon’s Search for a Near Eastern Settlement, 1918-1923, Simon Fraser University, 2003.

• Lawrence, Maj P, Enabling Logistics: Developing the Lines of Communication in support of the Mesopotamian Campaign 1914-1918, The RLC Foundation Review, 2018-2019, pp.42-47.

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• Lim, P, Upon the altar of British prestige: a re-evaluation of Dunsterforce’s exploits and legacy. Caucasus Survey 5:2, 2017, pp.103-120.

• Milne, General Sir GF, Despatch from General Sir GF Milne, Supplement to the London Gazette, 7 January 1921, London, HM Stationary, 1921.

• Moberly, F J, The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914–1918. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, Compiled at the Request of the Government of India, under the Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Part V: The Campaign in Upper Mesopotamia, 1917–18, North-West Persia and the Caspian, 1918, London: HMSO, 1927.

• Moberly, F J, Operations in Persia 1914–1919. History of the Great War based on Official Documents, London: HMSO, 1929.

• Rawlinson, A, Adventures in the Near East 1918-1922, New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1925.

• Smithers, A J, Toby, a Real Life Ripping Yarn, London: Gordon & Cremonesi, 1978.

• Strohn, M (ed), 1918: Winning the War, Losing the War, Oxford: Osprey, 2018.

• Ullman, R H, Anglo-Soviet Relations 1917-1921, Intervention and the War, London: Princeton, 1961.

• Unknown, Global Strategic Trends, sixth edition, The Future Starts Today, Shrivenham: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Cell (DCDC), 2018.

• von Ludendorff, General E, My War Memories 1914-1918, Volume II, London: Hutchinson, 1919.

• Winegard, T, Dunsterforce: A Case Study of Coalition Warfare in the Middle East 1918-1919, The Canadian Army Journal, Vol 8.3, Autumn 2003, pp.93-109.

• Young, M, Army Service Corps 1902-1918, London: Leo Cooper, 2000.

Unpublished sources • 596th MT Company, War Diary, TNA, WO95/5005.

• 706th MT Company, WD, TNA, WO95/4954.

• Dunsterville Diary, 1918; http://www.gwpda.org/Dunsterville/Dunsterville_ 1918.html, accessed 1 February 2019.

• HQ 39 Brigade WD, TNA, WO95/4955.

• Private Papers of L R Hulls MC, Imperial War Museum, IWM Documents 4043.

• Report from Major G M Goldsmith, British Military Agent, Army of Caucasus; account of Caucasus Military Agency, redacted version, TNA, WO95/4960 (un-redacted pages, TNA, WO154/328).

• Russia, Statements of Officer PoWs 1918-1921, TNA, WO158/968.

Footnotes 111

Dunsterville Diary, 1918; http://www.gwpda.org/Dunsterville/Dunsterville_ 1918.html, accessed 1 February 2019. Entry 25 January 1918.

112 Foreword by General Sir Nicholas Carter, Matthias Strohn (ed), 1918: Winning the War, Losing the War, Oxford: Osprey, 2018, p.16.

113 The construction of the oil pipeline commenced in 1882 but it did not start operating until 1906; it stretched 560 miles and required 19 pumping stations. D Ghambashidze, The Caucasian Petroleum Industry, London: Anglo-Georgian Society, 1918, p.14.

114 Unknown, Global Strategic Trends, sixth edition, Shrivenham: DCDC, 2018, p.218.

115 General Erich Von Ludendorff, My War Memories 1914-1918, Volume II, London: Hutchinson, 1919, p.659. Ghambashidze, The Caucasian Petroleum Industry, p.8.

116 Sean Kelly, ‘Britannia has ruled here’: Transcaucasia and Considerations of Imperial Defence in Lord Curzon’s Search for a Near Eastern Settlement, 1918-1923, Simon Fraser University, 2003, p.112.

117 Richard Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations 1917-1921, Intervention and the War, London: Princeton, 1961, p.56.

118 Dunsterville was a colourful character having been at school with Kipling and became the basis of the Victorian childhood hero ‘Stalky’.

119 Dunsterforce included contingents of soldiers from Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

110 Riverine logistics from Basra to Baghdad alone were imperfect let alone transport northwards by road. Maj P Lawrence, Enabling Logistics: Developing the Lines of Communication in support of the Mesopotamian Campaign 1914-1918, The RLC Foundation Review, 2018-2019, pp.42-47.

111 Dunsterville Diary, 23 January 1918.

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112

Ibid, 25 January 1918.

Report from Major GM Goldsmith, British Military Agent, Army of Caucasus; account of Caucasus Military Agency, un-redacted pages, TNA, WO154/328, p.8; Dunsterville Diary, 1918.

114 German troops entered Georgia at Poti in May 1918.

115 CH Ellis, The British “Intervention” in Transcaspia 1918-1919, Berkeley: University of California, 1963, p.37.

116 Dunsterforce was not complete in Hamadan until 25 May. 117 LC Dunsterville, Stalky’s Reminiscences, London: Jonathan Cape, 1928, p.277.

118 39 Brigade consisted of 9th Battalion the Royal Warwickshire Regiment; 7th Bn Gloucestershire Regiment; 9th Bn Worcestershire Regiment; 7th Bn North Staffordshire Regiment; 39th MG Company and 39th Light Trench Mortar Battery.

119 FJ Moberly, Operations in Persia 1914–1919, London: HMSO, 1929, p.289.

120 Ibid, p.302-303.

121 They were assisted by a squadron of the 14th Hussars and two armoured cars.

122 MH Donohoe, With the Persian Expedition, London: Edward Arnold, 1919, p.213-4. One observer of Armenian soldiers elsewhere considered that; ‘…the Armenians stood head and shoulders above their neighbours not only in intelligence but also in courage.’ CE Bechhofer, A Wanderer’s Log, London: Mills&Boon, 1922, p.159-160.

123 Some artillery ammunition was even allegedly sold to the Turks. A Rawlinson, Adventures in the Near East 1918-1922, New York: Dodd and Mead, 1925, p.77.

124 Ibid, p.64.

125 79675 Sergeant Albert Castle and 79936 Sergeant Gerald Hilton (both Motor MG Corps) were killed on 26 July 1918 and are commemorated on the Basra Memorial. Private Papers of LR Hulls MC, IWM Documents 4043, p.11-12.

Russia, Statements of Officer PoWs 1918-1921, TNA, WO158/968.

126 Michael Young, Army Service Corps 1902-1918, London: Leo Cooper, 2000; LC Dunsterville, Stalky’s Reminiscences, London: Jonathan Cape, 1928, p.282; Rawlinson, Adventures in the Near East, p.67.

127 This occurred at the Paitak Pass on 27 October 1918. 596th MT Company, War Diary, TNA, WO95/5005.

128 FR Hopson, My Service to the Crown, Part 2. Journal of the RCT, September 1973, p.234-246, p.234.

129 Ibid, p.234.

130 During the summer months in Persia Dunsterforce lost several men to cholera and there were cases of typhus, sandfly fever and many suffered from diarrhoea. Likewise, near Enzeli were found; ‘… every kind of venomous bug which is known to exist on earth, and they all bite, and keep on biting all the time…’. Rawlinson, Adventures in the Near East, p.66.

131 TNA, WO95/5005.

132 The evacuation of Baku was followed by horrific inter-ethnic violence whilst the Turkish Army turned a blind eye.

133 Dunsterville Diary, 1918.

134 Also spelt Batum; now Batumi.

135 Despatch from General Sir GF Milne, Supplement to the London Gazette, 7 January 1921, p.166.

136 Moberly, Operations in Persia, p.421. The newly named North Persia Force (Norperforce) took over command of the screen against Turkish expansion.

137 Despatch from Milne, p.168.

138 Turkish troops numbered 17,000 men with another 13,700 irregulars.

Moberly, Operations in Persia, p.420.

139 The Germans had seven battalions in Georgia and a small mission in Baku.

Moberly, Operations in Persia, p.420.

140 Rawlinson, Adventures in the Near East, p.135.

141 Captain Cyril Falls, Macedonia, Vol II. From the Spring of 1917 to the end of the war, London: HMSO, 1929, p.308.

142 Despatch from Milne, 7 January 1921, p.170. British medical authorities in Baku also combatted a typhus epidemic. The Scotsman, 1 February 1919.

143 Rawlinson, Adventures in the Near East, p.136.

144 Bechhofer, Wanderer’s Log, p.157.

145 Current predictions suggest that Turkey and Russia will not form lasting relationships due to historic rivalry. Unknown, Global Strategic Trends, p.163.

146 Preston Lim, Upon the Altar of British Prestige: a Re-evaluation of Dunsterforce’s Exploits. Caucasus Survey 5:2, 2017, pp.103-120.

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905 Company R.A.S.C. – World War Two History When after the Second World War ex-members of 905 Company of the Royal Army Service Corps wished to form an Association Branch, they were informed that, as they were only drawing members from a single company they would need to be a Sub Branch as they would soon die out. How little they knew!

Given how they came about they should not have been surprised that they continued until very recently. This is their story.

By Mr Stephen Lane At the end of 1938, Major R. J. Venn, an officer on the Regular Army Reserve who had previously been in the Royal Engineers, was invited by the War Office to form an RASC Territorial Army Company in Tottenham. This Company was the re-embodiment of 905 Mechanical Transport Company Army Service Corps, which had first been raised at Bulford in September 1917 and disbanded, as an Auxiliary (Petrol) Company, after service in the Middle East in 1920.

The new company started recruiting in January 1939.

In these early days, two weekend training outings took place a month, the main focus being driver training for new recruits. On 13 August 1939, the Company was embodied and ordered out on a month’s training. When the call up notices were first sent out, a date was given a month ahead for their return, but this instruction had to be hastily cancelled by sending out despatch riders to recall these notices and deliver new ones.

The strength of the Company at this point was seven officers, 209 ORs and the PSI. It is perhaps worthy of note that only one OR was reported as AWOL on embodiment.

Embodiment took place at Company HQ, 689 High Road, Tottenham, at 0800 hours. After an inspection by the CO and a sick parade, the Company moved off in convoy to Oundle, Northamptonshire. A strange convoy it must have been as it consisted of seven private cars, 17 WD Commers & Karriers (3 tonners), one dual control vehicle for driver training, three WD motorcycles and one private motorcycle.

In these early days, a fair proportion of the recruits could drive, particularly those who came from Whitbreads the brewers and London bus drivers, many of whom had joined the Company. At this time, each man was lucky if he even had a uniform and the one set of overalls that were the normal issue, along with a set of webbing and a gas mask.

The benevolent army authorities however gave each recruit 10/- in lieu of an issue of small kit such as vests, pants, socks, etc. Personal arms were non-existant on an individual scale of issue until almost a year or more later. The

convoy run to Oundle was an eventful one; Driver Murphy was injured near Royston whilst leaning over the side of a vehicle, Driver W. (Bill) S. Higgs came into contact with two cyclists at Arrington and near Arrington, one vehicle stopped to put out a fire on a civilian motor cycle and sidecar and at Kimbolton, Driver Miles backed into Captain Bridgeman's car.

However, at 1700 hours and 75 miles later, the convoy arrived at Barnwell Camp. The Company was accommodated in huts which had hot shower facilities and prepared to commence training the next day, 14 August.

The first two days were primarily given over to cleaning up the camp, thereafter, training got under way and the services of a PT Instructor were obtained from Oundle School close by to give instruction daily before breakfast.

Permission was also obtained to use the swimming pool at the school. Indeed, great stress was placed on physical and recreational training. On 20 August, a Church Parade was held, followed by a service at Oundle Parish Church. On the following evening a concert was held.

On 24 August, the company was told to prepare for mobilisation and the strength then was nine officers and 220 ORs. Documentation and a number of pre-planned vehicle details were carried out, mostly in respect of mobilisation stores. Also at this time, thirty-eight contractors’ sand and gravel vehicles were attached to the Company complete with their civilian drivers, to drive them. Each driver had to provide his own mug, knife, fork and spoon and were a constant source of trouble as their vehicles were in an appalling state of repair and their drivers were constantly pinching the unit's petrol!

They were used for transporting stores and petrol and even for towing searchlight generators. To boost the Company's transport resources, a collection of co-operative society milk floats, brewer’s drays and other strange and ancient vehicles were requisitioned. The pride of the van fleet was a "ZUBE" lorry. In fact, it was not until October that the Company were to start receiving WD vehicles.

General mobilisation on 25 August meant a move for the Company to Thetford and they moved in double decker buses from the London Passenger Transport Board.

Once at Thetford, training continued and the Company was billeted in "The Abbey", complete with its ghost, a "Lady in White". At this time the Company had detachments in Nottingham, Grantham and Hull and the main task was providing transport and towing searchlights to make up the defensive ring of searchlights round the East Coast. The Company 3 tonners were therefore modified to carry this searchlight equipment. The drivers henceforth knew more about the lights than the operators who were taking them over, as they had only been trained on earlier models.

On 4 September at 0245 hours, the morning after war was declared, the Company experienced their first air raid warning, followed by the All Clear at 0320 hours.

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The CSM, apparently a sound sleeper, was quite unaware of what was going on and as the troops moved back to their billets is quoted as saying: "What the **** are you up to, nobody bothers to tell the CSM anything!"

Due to the ground being iron hard round Thetford, it is dubious whether the trenches dug as air raid shelters would have offered much protection as they were only one foot deep. It was at about this time that the Company became involved in its first battle and it was all to do with service customs and took place in a Thetford hotel against the 17th/21st Lancers, the deaths head and glory boys. Only those present know the result!

On 3 October, the Company moved from "The Abbey" in Thetford to "The Nunnery" in Thetford, which was duly requisitioned. The Company was carrying out a considerable number of details daily, mostly for the setting up of the searchlight detachments and the provision of transport for other units mobilising. Also at this time, the Company was both receiving and loaning drafts. (Fig 1)

Figure 1: Thetford Guard 1939

It is on record that eight ATS, four from 6th Londons and four from 1st Norfolks, were returned to their units being replaced by eight other ATS from the 5th Middlesex Regiment, the records do not enlarge on this; perhaps the first issue were not glamorous enough! Life, however, at this period had its other brighter moments for it is noted that on 14 October, the Company drew 70 gallons of rum and on 15 October, a large party from the Company went to an ENSA [Entertainments National Service Association] show in Norwich.

On Mobilisation, the Company had a supply section and in the early stages they operated the Supply Depot at Thetford during their stay there. This was, however, the only time the Company became involved in supplies and on leaving Thetford, their supply trained personnel were posted.

In early October, 20 ORs and the CSM left the Company, which at this time was called 40th AA Brigade Company RASC and they formed a new 905 Company at Campden in Gloucestershire. On arrival there, they were billeted in requisitioned buildings, inoculated, vaccinated and despatched on leave. On their return from leave, those initial twenty stalwarts were promoted to the senior NCO 96

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appointments in the Company. Having set out four markers in a field, they fell in the large drafts, who arrived by bus from Matlock and the first stage in organising the Company was completed. So far as possible friends were posted to the same platoon. One platoon, 'D', consisted of volunteers from Eire who had come over en masse to join up.

The Company Officers were received straight from Civilian Life, with the exception of the OC, Major LeCornu, who came from the Channel Islands and was an ex Regular Officer from the Indian Army Service Corps. Itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s recorded that in October alone, some 49,368 miles were clocked up by 905ers.

A period of intensive training ensued, mostly infantry training on foot, as the only transport the Company had were a few three tonne Bedfords to cover their domestic needs. After France fell in 1940, the Company received reinforcements from men who had been in the British Expeditionary Force. At this time, Campden and the surrounding villages in this part of Gloucestershire were an RASC collecting and training area.

The Company was now reinforced by the arrival of Major Gate, nicknamed "Hide my Gates", who stepped up the training and was particularly keen on forced marches.

Indeed, he was a real slave-driver and as a result was slated by the Daily Mirror for driving the Company to hard, however, he had as a result a tough, well trained company, at least in infantry training, which was priority one, as at this time invasion seemed imminent. The Company was responsible for manning road-blocks and guarding strategic points such as water works and railway tunnels. A tale is told of the crews of railway trains being so keen to provide realism for the soldiers guarding the tunnels, that they used to bombard them with lumps of hot coal as they passed!

Rifles at this time were still in very short supply and only those actually on guard were armed. The Company was, however, the proud possessor of some sticky bombs, but not enough to do any training with them and for some inexplicable reason these were stored in a goldfish pond in a rubber casing usually issued for a far more intimate purpose. The orders relating to their storage are regrettably not in existence, for they must have made good reading!

The initiative displayed by the Company, particularly in manufacturing road blocks, knew no bounds and on one occasion, the hapless Company Commander was summoned by a hysterical landowner, who found that a detachment of the Company had requisitioned some priceless and historic remains dating back to the Stone Age, when they were used as pig troughs. These relics were regularly visited by archaeologists and the soldiery had proceeded to make a road-block with them!

Rumours of saboteurs and agents were rife throughout this period and the guard room was invariably full of locals from children on their way to school to the visiting vicar, who were stopped by members of the Company and were found to have forgotten their identity cards.

In July 1940, the Company formed a band and found among its ranks no less than eight highly proficient pianists, a trumpeter and a drummer. In fact, a social life was built

THE ROYAL LOGISTIC CORPS FOUNDATION

up and the Company settled down as welcome members of the local community. Short leaves also started and it is interesting to record that no member of 'D' platoon, all of whom hailed from Eire, was ever AWOL. In the autumn of 1940, the Company moved to a small village outside Saffron Walden, and a new OC, Major Dixon, a regular officer, took over command. The Company was now at last equipped with vehicles, but soon moved again, this time the Company HQ was set up in Chester and the Company was split up in detachments of various sizes at Rhyll, Manchester, Liverpool and Pembroke Dock.

At Pembroke Dock there were more than 2,000 troops at this time and Winston Churchill was expected to make a visit there. It is of interest to note that the Company's detachment was selected entirely for their smartness and soldierly bearing to provide a Guard of Honour. Unhappily the day prior to his visit, the Germans carried out a very heavy raid and the visit was cancelled. The tasks of the Company were extremely varied at this time and included lifting all types of stores, a lot of work on dock clearance and delivering stores and equipment to the Home Guard.

Late in 1940, the entire Company moved to Liverpool, where up to this time only 'D' Platoon was established and it was here during an air raid that Cpl. Gourley obtained a "Mentioned in Despatches" for extracting casualties in a 3 tonner from a bomb site which was inaccessible to civilian ambulances.

In moving to Liverpool, the Company took over from 13 Reserve Motor Transport Company and was only intended to remain there long enough to draw up G 1098 and Mobilisation stores prior to going overseas. The blitz, however, caused a change of plan and the Company remained in Liverpool for two years. Here it undertook a multitude of tasks from carrying POL, ammo and stores and dock clearance, to moving part of the civilian population from the centre of the town each night out to the suburbs and away from the most prominent bombing.

The Company lived in requisitioned houses and billets and the workshops were in a drill hall. At this time the liners and big ships were being stripped of their peacetime luxurious furnishings and there was no room for them to be stored, so the Company managed to obtain some of this furnishing and as a result lived in great luxury.

Another luxury the Company enjoyed was an issue of leather jerkins which had been generously sent from South Africa. In each bundle was one long woolly leather coat which the officers were quick to obtain, however after wearing then for a few days they noticed they were being ostracised and also had to spend a lot of time scratching!

On further investigation it appeared that these coats, glamorous though they looked, were made of uncured skins and they each carried a rapidly increasing population of insects.

While the Company was in Liverpool, its name was changed to 16 Reserve MT Company but then back again to 905 (GT) Company RASC on 15 October.

Sadly, the Company suffered two fatal casualties while in

HISTORY

Liverpool. A Corporal in 1941 when acting as a Despatch Rider, ran into a taxi and another casualty occurred when a booby trap was picked up on the range, handed into the Company Office and there exploded, fatally wounding two of the Cpl Clerks.

The Company was equipped while in Liverpool with the heavy Chevrolet 3 tonners and the Liverpool Tram Co always claimed, rightly or wrongly, that they lost more trams through battles with Chevrolets than they ever lost through enemy bombing!

In 1942, Major J. H. Cocksedge took over Command of the Company, which was then committed to two six-week full stage exercises, fore runners of the subsequent invasion, and the Company left Liverpool and sadly never returned there. During one of these exercises, the Company was attached to a Canadian Brigade and were exercised in a fullscale beach landing and follow up support exercise.

During this time, new reinforcements were received and the Company was brought up to full strength.

After the first big exercise, the Company came to rest for a short time at Houston Bridge and then after the next exercise, they enjoyed a short stay at Gamlingay from where they then moved to Ware in Hertfordshire. Elements of the Company took part in Exercises SPARTAN, KITTEN, JANTZEN and LINK, on one occasion even being attacked by a Mosquito!

On arrival at Ware, they were warned for duty as an Air Despatch Company and many officers and NCOs were immediately sent off on Air Despatch courses. This however came to an early end when a signal arrived stating the Company would collect 120 vehicles from Castle Donnington the next day. The vehicle collecting party duly reported and 120 Macs and Whites 10 tonners from the USA, but built in this country, were picked up by Drivers who had no previous experience of anything larger than a 3 tonner.

The Company was now fully engaged on training and it was the first time it had not been wholly employed on details since it was formed in Gloucestershire. A school was set up, part of which was in an old fireworks factory nicknamed the Ranch, here each of the new type of vehicles was stripped and NCOs and fitters were thoroughly trained.

At Barrack Ford, a mock-up invasion barge was built and by day and night all drivers were practiced in driving on and driving off. Water proofing was another priority and a fivefoot ford was built so that all the drivers got practical experience to prepare them for a beach landing. Air Despatch training too was kept going and the fuselage of an early United States Dakota was obtained and utilised for this.

Individual training and infantry training was not overlooked and courses were run on first aid, mine laying and weapons training as well.

This was a very happy period for 905, morale was high and the people of Ware soon rallied to provide a full social life for the men. In fact, the unofficial Company HQ was soon established in a pub there and the Workshop Officer, Captain Rogers, married the daughter of the publican at the Bay Horse, which after the war, he subsequently took over.

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Dances and socials were regularly held, particularly at the Glaxo's factory. While at Ware, there was a change over of Company Commanders and Major Felix Beresford Goodman took over the Company. (Fig 2) From Ware, the Company moved to a collecting area at Westerham where it was virtually Figure 2: 905 Sign isolated from the outside world and it was here that it was issued with Candys fluid with orders to dye all their towels and underclothing so that they had nothing white. This was a splendid idea but determined to do the job thoroughly, they overdid the Candys fluid and ended up with almost black and very holey underclothes, which caused a day of furious activity in the CQMS stores, as they all had to be changed.

On the morning of 'D' Day, 'D' Platoon moved off from Westerham into Epping and was guided from there by CMP to Purfleet where they had dinner and then in the late evening they were sent to West India Dock, London and were duly backed on to American LSTs, after asking where they should unload the stores they were carrying! They were unaware that they were off to France.

The remainder of the Company moved on D + 4, the first day of the flying bombs and embarked at George V dock.

There they saw a strange object which subsequently transpired to be part of the famous Mulberry Harbour. One or two incidents occurred while embarking, one 15 cwt was dropped over the side when a winch wire snapped and one ship's cat became a casualty to a backing 10 toner. While moving out of the docks one of the landing ships ran into a dock gate and lost the port latrines in doing so and one ship, not happily carrying any of the Company, suffered a number of casualties from a flying bomb which fell on a building alongside the docks which contained Naval Mines.

The Company's vehicles were of course fully loaded for the landing; two platoons being loaded with composite rations and 25 pounder ammunition and the remaining two were loaded with a beach hospital. In fact, the advance and break out was so fast that the hospital was set up at Bayeux and not the beaches, as planned.

The Company HQ spent the night of 10/11 June at sea in a storm on the SS Empire Deeds and then on D+5 their vehicles were transferred to landing craft and from there drove out into 2" of water, not the 5' they had planned for, on to Kipling beach.

The Company Advance Party arrived on the beach at Arromanches embarrassingly at least a day after the rest of the Company arrived due to the fact that the LST Captain flew the wrong signal flags. The ship had to stand-off until the mistake was rectified.

By 15 June, (D+9) all first wave of the Company had arrived and were in location with the exception of one party who arrived on D+10. All available task vehicles were engaged in moving stores, supplies and POL, which had 98

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been brought ashore by DUKWS, from the trans-shipment area at Arromanches, to dumps at Meuvaines, Crepon and Brigade Supply Depot at St. Suplice.

The strength of the Company on D+10 was nine officers, a Medical Officer; Major A. L. Dick, 280 ORs and 117 10 tonners, daily the Company found 100 vehicles for moving stores and continued to do this from 16 until 30 June.

The officers who were with the Company on and after 'D' day were as follows: T/Major F. B. Goodman T/Capt C. L. Rogers T/Capt A. C. Tetley T/Capt J. M. L. Roots T/Capt J. H. Shaw Lt T. D. G. Fraser Lt L. R. Brewer 2/Lt J. B. Wake Lt R. J. Baragwanath

Company Commander OIC Workshops Ammo/Pet/ Supps duties Ammo/Pet/ Supps duties Ammo/Pet/ Supps duties OIC 'A' Platoon OIC 'B' Platoon OIC 'C' Platoon OIC HQ Platoon

Two members of the Company at this time received 'Mentioned in Despatches', Staff Sergeant Jim Piggott for keeping vehicles on the road by cannibalising other vehicles and Sergeant Harry Searle of Leicester, who during a low level bombing attack ran without regard for his own safety to man a LMG and bring it into action against the aircraft.

Throughout the month of July, the Company provided more than 100 vehicles daily, however at the end of the month the number was restricted to 100 to allow for a servicing and maintenance scheme. The vehicles were used to deliver to the L of C and various dumps from the transit area. A memorable day was 17 July 2017 when the Company had its first issue of rations.

During this period, the company received many other demands on its energies and on a number of occasions, all available men were taken down to the beaches to help salvage stores after storms and enemy attacks.

In August, the Company continued to be fully extended and lifted an average of 1705 tonnes a day. They operated from T1 and T2 trans-shipment areas. At the end of the month on 31 August, the Company moved to a new location at St. Martin de Estrees, near Bayeux. Life at this time was becoming more settled and on 15 August, the Company had been entertained by an ENSA show, consisting of George Formby on the back of a cart. On another occasion when the Company was outside Bayeux, all spare men and NCOs were called on to drive ambulances from a base vehicle depot to just short of Falaise, where they were left for freed British Prisoners of War to drive themselves back to the beaches.

Come September, as the L of C became more extended, the tasks became more varied and the distances covered greater. The main task was carrying POL from RMA Bayeux to No. 4 Army road head at L'Aigle. On 2 September, the Company provided no less than 120 vehicles to carry POL to No. 2 Army Cushion Sougens and again on 4 September to No. 4 Army Cushions at Arras. During the month, vehicles went as far afield as Brussels, however the majority were still

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HISTORY

Figure 3: Genval Xmas 1944

moving supplies, ammo and POL from RMA to railhead. 905 at this time came under command of 41 Transport Column.

On 27 September, duty free parcel labels started to be issued.

Members of the Company were among the first troops to enter Paris after the liberation, carrying flour and clothing for the people of Paris. For this detail, drivers were issued with new uniforms for some reason.

At one time during the break through on Falaise, when the Company convoys arrived forward loaded with ammunition, they were surprisingly ordered to dump it in the ditches on the side of the road and return immediately to the rear areas to collect POL, as the advancing tanks had literally come to rest due to a shortage of POL. It was found throughout this period that although the Company was equipped with 10 tonners, they had such good cross country performance, that they were utilised at the front.

October saw a slight fall off in demand for vehicles, but the type of details remained similar to September. On the 8 October, a party of officers and men from 905 went to Neubourg to hear General De Gaulle address the people in the market-place. The weather during the month was rapidly deteriorating and more suitable billets were obtained, though even these were not very palatable. In fact, the main billet was a windowless laundry, with the Sergeants Mess in the outhouse.

During November, there was very little activity, but occasional visits were made by parties to Brussels and one trip was even made there to see a Naval show.

December came and the weather was wet and cold and only limited numbers of vehicles were required daily. On 2 December,

the Deputy Director Supplies & Transport (T) 21 Army Group, Col H T Gilchrist, inspected the Company who were drawn up on parade on Mairie Square. The Colonel was received by, what was reported as, a Guard of Honour. In fact, this was however actually only a quarter guard.

On 4 December, the Company moved yet again, this time to a new location south of Brussels. On Boxing Day, a draft left the Company for transfer to the Infantry. On 27 December, the Workshops building was hit by cannon fire from an enemy fighter. Luckily no casualties occurred. One of the December tasks was to pick up released POWs from one Brussels airport and take them to another Brussels airport for onward transmission to England. (Fig 3) 1945 started with bad weather and virtually no details. In January, the first leave parties left for the UK and Brussels and also a unit dance was held. Throughout February, there were still very few details and on 27 January, the Company went on the range.

In March and April there were again only a few details, mostly for the Royal Engineers, both British and Canadian and for RAF Courtrai [Kortrijk]. The Company continued to improve its marksmanship by days on the range.

An interesting task which at this time had to be undertaken by the Company was to provide transport for a Canadian Forestry Company, bringing wood out of the Ardennes for the construction of Bailey Bridge, and wooden plank bridges, which the Americans used to build.

Sergeant Graham, the platoon Sergeant of 'D' platoon, who moved to Australia, is reputed at this time to have captured a German Prisoner in the Ardennes and he is also THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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Figure 4: Recklinghausen HQ 1945

credited with liberating a German Brewery and "winning" a German Pay lorry complete with contents and Iron Crosses, however this cannot be confirmed.

In May and early June, the Company carried on doing local details including taking stores for the Royal Navy to Bremen and carrying coal and other stores for "Civil Affairs".

Ironically 905 spent VE Day in Waterloo.

On 18 June, the Company moved to Recklinghausen in Germany and came under command of 1 Corps District Troops Munster and was then primarily engaged moving coal being billeted in the local labour exchange. Here a number of questions remain unanswered, such as who used the signs outside the Sgt’s Mess for fuel, or cut the bell rope in the local church? (Fig 4) July and August saw the Company still moving coal and in fact it continued to do this until its disbandment in May 1946.

In September, “Felix”, Major Goodman, left the Company on release and was succeeded by Major E. J. Joy. In December, to boost the coal programme lift, a Belgian platoon was attached to the Company.

On 29 April 1946, representatives from a German increment came to take over the Company transport and the Company disbanded by the 25 May, with all the officers and men being posted to other units. (Fig 5)

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Figure 5: Unit disbanded

So, came to an end 905 Company but not its story, as members, family and friends continued to meet up until the last ex-905er, who was known about had died. However, the 905 “Felix” may have departed but “Felix” has kept on walking with the Felix Fund - The Bomb Disposal Charity.

Given that this history has been compiled mainly from various individual’s stories and interviews over many years particularly from Les Franklin, Bill Higgs and Les (Bunny) Austin (H.Q. Plt.), it is possible that certain events and experiences may have benefitted from the passing of time.

If they have, or any names have been changed to protect an innocent, then the blame must lie ultimately with the storyteller not the author.

References 905 Coy RASC War Diaries - National Archives: WO 166/4897 /4966 /9144 /13204 /2560 / 6379 & /9875

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The most y employed ing ent Russia, O has tak in its unilaterall lanc is a resurg global power. NAT Warsaw NATO with counterba t sation was attention g former the organi Western cohesion, massed across predominan assimilatin Slovakia, in 1949, itself as a , proactively forces of overt d ng Poland, its this ion t line udi and trat out limi incl , e’ demons iet Union action to the treaty, ive defenc of the Sov pact in of ‘collect ions into the might principle ne of the Pact nat ope. The a cornersto that, ‘An attack Eastern Eur treaty and stipulated 5 of the rent guise, in Article inal and cur both its orig 30

LOGISTIC CORPS

Romania , Bul GENERA the Czech garia, Hungary, Lat L INTER via, Lithuan Republic.

EST It was hop integrity ia, Estonia of these ed and border nat that with the terr protective itorial ions sec umbrella ured und aggressive of Article er the Westward 5, Russian with any expansion potential notion would be for curtailed, Whilst this of a Soviet Union along for the mo tactic has constrainin dern age been larg g Russian ely succes . geographi sfu c borders, hard power wit hin its trad l in it has pro in equal measure. ven undenia itional Russian rela bly antago at their low tions with nistic est ebb sinc the West subsequen e the end are now t incursio of the Col ns in the could wel Crimea and d War and their l be Eastern Ukr in respons viewed as a bout of retaliato e to extern aine ry ‘muscle al been una flexing’ ble to pre pressure. NATO’s Does a resu strategy vent Rus abroad. The rgent Rus has also sia from sia pose successful exerting a threat constructin Assad and def to NATO influence g paralys the provinc ence of its Syrian security? ing grey and institut Russia’s ally Bashar spaces in ions re-emerge ial interests he sec Alnce in contempor Russia has that can be exploite the policies of stat ures, sign a region ary Wester alled es d for poli been at revolution tical gain n activity player with dom the ina pio ted . Still sha . , and mo neering in a wider by re importa ckled by forefront overt mili global con However, the of this ntly tary tex Col as a action tha despite Rus t. has had t NATO suc d War constraints longer affo sia’s growin to find rd cessfully on g influenc alternative imposes, achieving must now to fix its gaze sole e, NATO can Russia and innova ly in one her look beyond no obj ectives. direction Russian tive me academiasee those add its traditio Thi and indeed General nal itional cha Valery Ger s emerged in the ans of doctrine turn of the llenges tha sphere of interes asimov’s form of for ‘Non-li 21st Cen t to revolution t have aris near war p.1). Sub tury. Com constantly ary military fare en with the sequent plex emerging subversive ’ in 2013 (Popescu, and Eas to challen and irregular entities NATO see 2015, p.

Russian acti tern Ukr ge the We ks to pro are aine hav ons tect. The capabilities stern valu particular in the e demons rise of Isla es of asymm has spawne trated the Crimea mic extrem that etric conflict Russia to factions, d a effe sud including ctive ism in achieve terrorist gro den prevalence its politica at a state level, allo sidesteppin Boko Har of these l objectives ups such am and Al-S wing g NATO’s as Al-Qaed convention say that habaab, reb Front and whilst nea a, Daesh, NATO has al restrain fun el tly been blin ts. This is Julio Mir Taliban. The damentalist politica groups like the Al-N d anda Cal l org usra se clandes ha of the to Russian actions not to Committee non-state tine, isolate anisations, such . Genera NATO Def drafted a as the actors, ope d and geo l ence and report in NATO’s new failing reg rating pre graphicall Security 2015 ent y fluid dominan imes, pre strategic tly Russian sent an organisatio challenge? itled, ‘Hybrid warfare activities unorthodox out of failed or n establis ’ In this : in des hed challenge the Crim super-state he examin cribing how to constra ea and to an . ed in a static they ‘Exp Eas non tern and -military With the perceptible Ukraine, emergenc means (su loited domestic wea economic e of to NATO, ch as pol intimidatio itical, info knesses via it is importa such diverse con n and ma temporary threat of rmational, traditional nt to exa nipulation) threats convention and mine the , but backed and concealed al pressures exerting and innovative, that by the these ent , both and below military means…w to underst ities response.’ hile rem align itse the thre and how aining (Miranda lf to cope sho NATO is ma are capable of ld of a Calha, 201 with these. noeuvring Multiple NAT convention What is 5, p. p.6). to reundeniabl al O review forthcomin e is that today are s and pub g and in the challen lica infinitely tion s have sinc October more dyn Excellence ges facing of the pre 2017, e been amic and for Counte vious cen NATO complex tury. This In conjun ring Hybrid the European Cen continual than those can be attr ction with tre of long-term Threats was ibu this ass suc ted , NAT strategy ist any Ally established in preven cess of the super-b in part to the . against hyb O has outlined its defence.’ ting larg protagoni lock’s det strategy: rid threats (NATO 201 sts to pur e scale errent ‘To as part of 8). This incl sue more for greate conflict, their aim collective r inte ude subversive forcing s. What we see means to and propag r-state cooperatio s a collective agreem Former U.S conseq achieve n to counte anda, as ent .

Analysis r hybrid thre well as categories Secretary of Defenc uently is describ the Bra ed by ats nch’ wit of warfare e Robert inception Security hin NAT neat, tidy Gates as: of a ‘Hy blu O’s Join Division brid “The boxes.” (Gle rring and no lon t Intellige and the support terminolog ger nn, 2009, nce and formation teams’ in y that has p.1). The fitting into of ‘Count 2018 to assistance ‘Hybrid come to predomina er-hybrid provide: Warfare’. to encapsula nt ‘Tailored First responding Allies upon their te this is insurgency targeted request, that of to hybrid of 2002 and described during in pre activities.’ military thin These new the Che yet only gain (NATO, 201 paring for and chen king follo tools, red ing trac 8).

Article 5, wing the efining the the intent have play Second Leb tion in Western of hybrid remit of ed an influ anon Wa localised NATO’s orig warfare paramete ential r in 2006, resp is to obs rs of wha inal cure the t can legi Europe. Buf onse to Russia’s asy and effective role traditional timately in the mmetric fer be defined actions in Poland now states such as Est as conflict Eastern onia, Latvia, , armed wit hold a permanen Lithuania t NATO h the me and military ans to def presence, end themse lves not only Photo: www.n ato.int

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THE REV IEW 201 9-2020

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You are invited to submit an essay for publication in the 2020-2021 RLC Review Since its formation in April 2015, the focus of the RLC Foundation has been to promote professional engagement with industry and academia and share best practice; maintain awareness of innovation and to encourage and facilitate thought leadership.

As part of this process The RLC Foundation is inviting officers, soldiers, veterans and civilians working for the military, or in the logistics industry and academia, to contribute thought provoking essays to the 2019-2020 Review. The Review is the professional journal of the RLC and is distributed to members of the Corps serving at home and abroad. This includes all NATO headquarters and the exchange officers based in the USA and Australia. It is also sent to all RLC Foundation corporate partners, supporters and friends.

Essays may be written under the following overarching categories: • Professional Development • General Interest • Operations and Training • Historical Cash prizes There are cash prizes for the best contribution in each category. Prizes are also awarded to: • The best contribution overall • The best contribution by an officer

• Best contribution by a warrant officer or senior non-commissioned officer • Best contribution by a junior non-commissioned officer • Best contribution by a junior officer • Best contribution by a private soldier • Best contribution by a civilian Rules Essays must not exceed 5,000 words and must be properly referenced and supported with good quality relevant illustrations and images.

All articles submitted for publication will be read and marked by the senior officers that make up the RLC Foundation Review board. The prize winners will then be selected from the essays they judge as good enough for publication.

8 The closing date for submissions for the 2019-2020 Review is 31 May 2020 Entries are open now and submissions should be sent to Chrissie Ross at: Chrissie.Ross100@mod.gov.uk

More than just a school... a community where individuals matter

MOOR PARK was given the top grades and deemed to be EXCELLENT IN ALL AREAS (ISI June 2019)

The overall effectiveness of the early years provision is OUTSTANDING

The quality of the pupils’ academic and other achievements is EXCELLENT.

The effectiveness of leadership and management is OUTSTANDING

The quality of the pupils’ personal development is EXCELLENT.

The quality of teaching, learning and assessment is OUTSTANDING

TICK TOCK NURSERY was judged to be OUTSTANDING IN ALL AREAS (ISI June 2019)

01584 876 061 www.moorpark.org.uk registrar@moorpark.org.uk Moor Park, Richards Castle, Ludlow, Shropshire, SY8 4DZ Many schools claim a sense of togetherness but Moor Park is more than just a school: it is a community of people working together to create something very special. Children, staff and parents all play their part to deliver a unique feeling of community.

Having just been awarded the highest grade in every category following its ISI school inspection, if you are looking for an excellent prep school education in the fullest sense of the word, then look no further. Tatler magazine describe Moor Park as the ‘holy grail of prep schools’ in their 2019 Education Guide.

assemblies the stillness of their concentration as they listen to members of staff or other TYTMPW MW TEPTEFPI´

where children of all abilities thrive and where children are treated as unique individuals.

Moor Park children routinely transfer to an extremely wide range of schools including WSQI SJ XLI ZIV] ½RIWX MR XLI GSYRXV] Pupils are given every opportunity to JYP½P XLIMV TSXIRXMEP MR XLI GPEWWVSSQ EX whatever level. Encouraging Moor Park children to think independently and creatively in and out of the classroom whilst helping them to avoid a fear of failure is at the heart of the process. The number of scholarships which are routinely won by Moor Park pupils speaks volumes.

Staff pride themselves on really knowing individual children and in providing a huge range of opportunities for them to HMWGSZIV XLI MRXIVIWXW WOMPPW ERH TEWWMSRW that are so crucial in building a rounded young person. As important are the STTSVXYRMXMIW XS WMQTP] IRNS] XLI WTEGI with friends: building dens in the woods and other such activities should be part of every childhood. Boarding enables many children to make the most of their time here and suits many families.

The ISI report highlighted that Moor Park pupils ‘display high levels of resilience, selfHMWGMTPMRI MRHITIRHIRGI ERH WIPJ GSR½HIRGI´ and that the ‘pupils are typically articulate ERH I\XVIQIP] GSR½HIRX [LIR WTIEOMRK XS SXLIVW´ as well as ‘Listening comes easily to XLI TYTMPW XLI] [ERX XS PIEVR RSX NYWX JVSQ their teachers but from each other; and in

A co-educational independent boarding ERH HE] WGLSSP WMXYEXIH MR EGVIW NYWX WSYXL SJ 0YHPS[ XLI] EGGITX GLMPHVIR from 3 months to 13 years of age with boarding available from Year 3. The children EVI TVITEVIH QIRXEPP] IQSXMSREPP] ERH TL]WMGEPP] XS QSZI SR [MXL GSR½HIRGI to their secondary schools. It is a school

Happy children are more likely to learn and HIZIPST XLI TEWXSVEP GEVI MW I\GITXMSREP perhaps an extension of knowing individual children well. Visitors often comment on the openness and enthusiasm of Moor 4EVO TYTMPW -X MW E OMRH WGLSSP VSSXIH MR Catholic principles but welcoming children and families of all faiths and beliefs.

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OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

From the Punjab to the top of the world: The role and development of Pakistan military logistics from 1947 to the present day

The way that logistic operations have been conducted since the Partition of 1947 are both interesting and underpin the logistic institutions and thought that characterise the Pakistan Army’s sustainment today.

This essay will examine the logistical challenges presented by terrain, the performance of logistics in the historical wars of 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999, how current Pakistani doctrine envisages logistic support, the genesis of the military industrial complex in procurement and finally, lessons that can be applied to the professional understanding of logisticians in the British Army.

The focus will be on conventional operations and less so on the military’s role in combating insurgency in the post9/11 world amongst the provinces in the north-west. Finally, while no examination of Pakistani military capability and operational conduct can be complete without considering the political and military inclinations of its great neighbour to the east, India is mainly considered in the context of how it shapes Pakistani thinking.

Terrain A cursory glance at the terrain of Pakistan (Fig. 1) indicates that any military logistician in the region must learn to appreciate very different types of terrain. The provinces of Punjab and Sindh to the east and south are flat, open terrain which makes them both useful for, and susceptible to, largescale movements of armour and mechanised forces. It should be noted however, that the presence of five large rivers, the Indus principally and a plethora of smaller irrigation canals for farming, present obstacles and challenges of their own. 35.2% of the land is devoted to agriculture2, the majority of which is found in the densely populated Punjab. Deserts are common – the Cholistan and Thar deserts in south eastern Pakistan/north western India

Photo: Sadalmelik/Wikimedia CC BY-SA 3.0

Numbering over 650,000 regular personnel1 the Pakistan Army is one of the largest in the world. While such a large fighting force begets a martial prowess of its own, it brings with it challenges of command and control, operational art and of course, a logistic system which much sustain a force of such a size. By Capt Ben Parsons

Fig 1 - Topography of Pakistan

form a natural barrier between the countries - in and where desert does not always exert its influence, marshes often follow suit. The mountains to the north in Azad and Jammu and Gilgit-Baltistan may be some of the largest in the world but that has not stopped both Pakistan and India going to incredible lengths to try dominating these heights in skirmishes that are as much about prestige, as military necessity.

So, while Pakistan shares a 2,900 km border with its eastern neighbour, the relief naturally channels conventional operations into predictable movement corridors for either side. The region stretching from Sialkot to Fort Abbas, just beyond Bahawalpur, is the focus of military planners on both sides. Indeed, during the period of heightened tensions that followed the Pulwama incident in February 2019, it was this region which saw an increase in activity; videos abound on social media platforms showing both sides moving heavy armour and artillery to this region in anticipation of an increase in hostilities.

Pakistan may be a large country in terms of land mass3, but as senior officers are all too aware, at its narrowest it is significantly exposed to being cut in half by an Indian advance of no more than 300-400 km, which is within the capabilities of the Indian Army. Additionally, many of Pakistan’s lines of communication between Lahore and Karachi, such as its motorways and rail network, run parallel THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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to the border and are therefore highly susceptible to being severed by either the Indian Air Force (IAF) or an advance by land. However, right from the birth of the state, terrain was to play an important role in both war and its political considerations.

Kashmir 1947-48 The partition of British India into modern India and Pakistan in 1947 was an undertaking of often incomprehensible political chaos and large-scale migrations. Indeed, it is this movement of entire communities across both countries, often depending on their religious affiliation, by foot or on overcrowded trains which have become the enduring image of this period, to say nothing of the extreme violence that accompanied the foundation of these states.

Accompanying the very visible human dimension to this birth, were issues of an entirely more bureaucratic nature as the state apparatus from the old Raj had to be divided between India and newly created Pakistan. The Indian Army was not immune to such machinations and decisions as to what units, personnel and equipment would go to each had to be made. The Pakistan Army’s own estimate was that only 33% of stores and equipment was allocated to them and that portion was ‘Perishable, unwanted and obsolete’ (Ali Ahah, 2013 p.80); all the ordnance and engineering factories were also located in India.

It is against this backdrop that the first test of the newly created Pakistan Army would take place. As Partition became a reality, the Maharaja of Kashmir deliberated as to which state he would accede to (he was after all a Hindu ruler of a majority Muslim state), eventually hedging that affiliation with India would be in his best interests in October 1947.

Unfounded rumours of a Pakistan Army presence and the very real presence of various tribal gangs seeking to take advantage of the chaos, forced the Indian Army to airlift as many troops as it could to Kashmir to counter the threat.

Pakistan, and its Army, would have liked nothing more than to deploy a large force into Kashmir. Certainly, had they had the presence there in October 1947 that the Indians thought they had, they may well have been able to occupy Srinagar and force the Maharaja’s hand in their favour. But at only two months old, the Pakistan Army simply did not have the capacity to move large numbers of troops at a time when the military was reorganising following Partition. They had comparatively few aircraft compared to the Indians and nowhere near the vehicle lift required to move a large number of troops into such terrain. Even if the vehicles had existed it is unlikely that commanders would have been able to implement a coordinated plan.

Cloghley (2008, p.15) notes that, despite being home to the headquarters of the Army Services Corps, many of the Pakistan officers at the time: ‘Lacked expertise in logistics and the skills associated with managing (as distinct from leading) an army.’ This role had traditionally been conducted

by British officers and the few logistic specialists born in the subcontinent, now served with the Indian Army. Several British officers had remained to serve with the Pakistan 104

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Army, including the Commander in Chief, General Mulvaney, but while their professionalism could not be questioned, their involvement in a war with India was actively discouraged from Whitehall. As the reorganisation continued, Pakistan was able to eventually deploy regular forces into Kashmir in numbers in early 1948, but by this stage any military initiative that may have been gained by a rapid deployment a few months earlier was missed. From early 1948, both India and Pakistan settled into a stalemate that continues to have political, military and social ramifications to this day.

Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 By the mid-1960’s, the Pakistan Army had grown, developed its own cultural idiosyncrasies (as the last vestiges of the British began to disappear) and become a much more organised force than it had been in 1947-48. But there were still logistical and procurement weaknesses that were to be fatally exposed in 1965. The warning signs were there and had been since the early 1950’s. Pakistan imported nearly all of its military materiel and equipment, with the majority coming from the UK and the US. One of these was the M47/48 Patton tank which had been bought from the US. Owing to the lack of availability of spare parts and ammunition, training with the Patton was kept to a minimum.

When India then lost a war to China in 1962, the Pakistan Army was imbued with a confidence that it was more than prepared for any hostilities with its neighbour. But in the event, it was not the Army that miscalculated, but Pakistan’s leadership. Convinced that India was in no mood for a fight, the government authorised support for a guerrilla movement inside Kashmir. India responded fiercely capturing several key points in the region when it became apparent what was occurring. Pakistan was then forced to commit to supporting the guerrillas by deploying its own conventional forces. It launched Operation Grand Slam, attempting to relieve the pressure in Jammu by capturing the vital town of Aknoor further south. The initial thrust was effective and well supported with overwhelming force ratios taking the Indians by surprise, as the Patton and Sherman tanks led the way.

But the Indian Air Force was eventually able to repulse the attack and by failing to capture Aknoor in its initial thrust, the initiative now fell to the Indians.

On 5 September, it launched a full-scale conventional attack across the international border in the Punjab. The flat terrain was more conducive to armour and both sides employed tanks in large numbers, though the irrigation ditches that are found across the Punjab did become significant obstacles. The Patton performed well, owing mainly to the bravery and initiative of the Pakistani soldiers crewing them, but the lack of prior training, added to the heavy terrain, may have been a contributing factor in the battle of Asal Uttar 8-10 Sept 1965, when the Pakistan Army lost over a hundred tanks to the Indian’s ten.

This conventional phase of the war only lasted 17 days but by the end both sides we’re being stretched, or felt they were, and the availability of supplies, or lack thereof, from the US may have been the contributing factor. Wolpert

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(2009, p.235) noted that: ‘In three weeks, the second IndoPakistani War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory.’

Other analyses, however, consider that the reality may have been considerably more precarious for Pakistan than it was for India. Heo and Horrovitz (2003, p.163) noted that by the time the war ended ‘India appeared, logistically at least, to be in a superior position.’ In fact, a study by the Indian General Staff after the war, concluded that the Indians had only used up about 14-20% of their ammunition reserves, whereas Pakistan had expended 80% and probably could have continued fighting for no more than a couple of days (Palit, 1991, p.427).

What probably saved Pakistan in this instance was the absence of any serious thinking on the part of the Indians about distributing or redistributing their ammunition appropriately; while the ammunition was running short where the fighting had been heaviest, there were entire railheads and supply depots near the front that had barely been used. Perhaps the message wasn’t getting through but there must have been a few confused faces in the staff officers of the Indian logistic chain when the Indian Chief of the General Staff, General Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri, told Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri that sustaining the offensive was becoming impossible. Having prepared for a war of attrition, the Indians were unable to sustain it, not for lack of actual resources, but lack of situational awareness and logistical understanding by their senior officers. But Pakistan had lessons of its own to learn.

If the problems of 1947-48 were lack of professional expertise and transport, the problems of 1965 were ones of outright supply of ammunition and materiel. Their overreliance on overseas imports had undermined their war effort as every commodity from rations to clothing, and as mentioned, ammunition, had dried up as international suppliers refrained from supporting either side. As a result, some last-minute perverse procurement behaviour was undertaken:

‘The assumptions led to frantic purchases from overseas junk markets, in total disregard of standardization, or maintenance in peace and war.

For example, in 1965 we [Pakistan] had for light artillery alone, 3.7-inch howitzers, 75 mm French guns, 4.5-inch howitzers, 25 pounders, 105 mm howitzers and 120 mm Mortars. The ordnance depots were choked with millions of items with which the manually operated system could not cope.’

(Riza, 1977, p.274-275) This was to have consequences for the Pakistan state that explains some of the specific features of the modern era.

The economic role of the military in modern Pakistan is well documented (Siddiqa, 2007, pp.131-149). The Army, PAF and Navy all have extensive business interests and holdings

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

across the country. The genesis of this, however, can be found in the 1960’s and the lessons learned from 1965 especially. The state was put in very real danger of collapsing because it could not supply its military formations. The memory of that existential threat transformed itself into acceptance by the state that the military was going to have to pay a larger role in industry and procurement; if Pakistan was to sustain itself in a conflict with India it could not rely on imported ammunition and materiel. It was going to have to establish its own indigenous means of production and potentially look to other partners across the globe for its armaments. Both these strands of thought were to be developed through the next decades.

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 In the six years between 1965 and 1971, the Pakistan Army focused on developing its small arms industry, having suffered from a lack of ammunition in 1965. It also began to align its defence procurement more closely with China and the Chinese T-59 started replacing the US Pattons and Shermans on the battlefield, among other Chinese/Soviet imports (Chawla, 2009, p.123-154).

With its procurement process diversifying and its own indigenous industry beginning to take shape, Pakistan was apparently in a good position to support its Army in a war, but it was about to learn yet another lesson. In 1971, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was separated by over 1000 miles from West Pakistan. Culturally it had always been a distinct entity which and never fully absorbed the identity of the neighbours on the other side of India. The liberation struggle being waged by ethnic Bengalis was already in full swing by 1971. West Pakistan had transferred several divisions in early 1971 but: ‘No armour or artillery was transferred from West to East at that time because it was assessed that internal security duties did not require such equipment.’ (Cloughley, 2008, p.156).

Apparently, the large-scale movement of Indian forces along the border with East Pakistan was not taken as a serious warning that they were preparing to engage in support on the Bengalis. When war did eventually break out on 3 December, the speed and overwhelming force with which the Indian Army advanced was in marked contrast to the attritional strategy adopted in 1965. On the tactical and operational level, there is no reason to assert that the logistical units and supply chain of the Pakistan Army didn’t perform well – they had corrected the failings of 1947/48 and 1965 – but at a strategic level they were fighting a war on two fronts.

These fronts were not only separated by 1000 miles but the ground and airspace between them belonged to the enemy. West Pakistan was distracted with its own problems when it became engaged with Indian forces while trying to relieve the pressure on the East. In the end, overwhelming Indian numbers and equipment, together with a much more aggressive strategy told and East Pakistan surrendered on 17 December. From a political and cultural perspective, the loss of East Pakistan was a devastating blow. But from a THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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Photo:Public Domain

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Fig 2 - The Siachen Glacier is often referred to as the highest battlefield in the world

military point of view, it unburdened Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s top brass from the need to plan for, sustain and support a sizeable force such a distance away from the (military) centre of gravity in West Pakistan (from 1971, simply, Pakistan). The focus for conducting and supplying conventional operations could now solely remain on one international border with India. Lines of communication and supply corridors were not going to require an air bridge over enemy territory.

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1999 Kargil Operation The Siachen Glacier is often referred to as the highest battlefield in the world (Fig 2) and has the distinction of being the only place on earth where the borders of three nuclear powers - Pakistan, India and China, meet. It is a logistical challenge to supply soldiers at heights of up to 6,700m and temperatures of -50C, making the conditions among the most testing for any army in the world.

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Unsurprisingly, resupply is dependent primarily on roads and then on any other assets such as air or rail where available.

Pakistan’s positions, relative to India’s, are nearer to roadheads, but they still rely on mules and porters to cover the final stretches to the isolated outposts dotted throughout the mountains. As the 21st century has progressed, both sides, but especially the Indians, have moved to using helicopters and other air assets, but still rely on a single main supply route (MSR) to forward load most of the materiel and equipment (Baghel and Nusser, 2015, p.24-36). Both sides normally withdraw these isolated outposts as the weather closes in for the winter, and then race to reoccupy them in spring.

In late 1998, a select few senior officers within the Pakistan Army began to formulate a plan to seize Kargil (Fig 3), by occupying the surrounding posts before the Indians returned. In turn this would then cut the only MSR the Indian Army had to the Siachen glacier. This would be done using ‘mujahideen’ based in Kashmir to keep any involvement of the regular Pakistani forces to a minimum and prevent accusations of instigation in the international media. Ostensibly the ‘mujahideen’ were operating off their own accord but in reality it was soldiers of the Pakistan Army; though the exact numbers and ratios of regular Army personnel remain open to debate, it is estimated that 15002400 personnel deployed, of which up to 70% were likely Pakistan Army regular troops (Fair, 2009, p.150).

But the charade that the mujahideen were undertaking the operation also turned out badly and impacted on the supply of the operation from the outset. ‘The nonrecognition of Pakistani troops also placed severe limitations on the deployment of assets, prevented them from opening new fronts and necessitated a measure of imposed clandestineness on logistical operations’ (Khan, 2017). The

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Pakistan Army had pushed itself into a corner with this operation that meant it couldn’t openly support its soldiers.

This would have been fine if the occupation of the posts had gone unchallenged. They didn’t. The operation had been planned based on a flawed understanding of both India’s political will to retake these isolated outposts and their (logistical) ability to do so. Despite being spread across the country, the Indian Army was able to concentrate enough forces, accompanied by air power, to retake the outposts one by one. Notwithstanding the normal difficulties of supplying high-altitude, cold-weather posts, the reluctance to overtly admit to the presence of regular Pakistan Army and the underestimation of the Indian will and ability to respond, meant that once the posts had been occupied there was little further support given. For example, stores and obstacles that could have been pushed forward to build up defensive positions, were never considered a priority.

International media was on the side of the Indians and the war was well-supported by its population, but had the Pakistanis been able to supply their forces to hold out longer, the political will to continue the campaign may have ebbed on the Indian side. Although unlikely, there is a possibility that Pakistan would have been able to dictate terms. As events unfolded and it was clear that the military logistical support was not coming, the Pakistani forces in the region were forced to withdraw by the end of summer 1999. The erroneous assessment of the Indian Army’s capability in the region had directly affected the individual soldiers of the Pakistan Army as they lived and fought in a harsh and unforgiving environment.

Transforming Historical Lessons to the Present Era An understanding of the above conflicts and wider militaryhistorical context explains how Pakistan’s approach to its

Photo: Wikimedia/ Government of India CC BY-SA 2.0

Fig 3 - During the Kargil War, the Indian Army was able to concentrate enough forces to retake the outposts one by one

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Photo: Gut Martin/Wikipedia CC BY 1.0

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Fig 4 - The Al-Khalid is a main battle tank jointly developed by Pakistan and China during the 1990s

logistical system and supply chains were formulated. The problems of ammunition availability and spare parts precipitated by an inability to rely on international suppliers in the 1960’s led to a military system that became entwined with the domestic economy. Today, Pakistan has an extensive indigenous means of production including everything from small arms to aircraft and naval repair and maintenance facilities. Many of these facilities, such as Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) which produces land systems such as tanks and other armour, are chaired by military personnel.

Indeed, HIT was set up in the 1980’s with the assistance of China who became a more prominent partner to Pakistan after the 1965 war. This affiliation with China has continued to the present day and is especially notable in military logistics. Recent high level meetings have taken place between senior logistics officers of both China and Pakistan; in 2013 and 2015 General Zhao Keshi, director of the General Logistics Department (GLD) of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), met with successive Chiefs of Logistics Staff of the Pakistan Army, Lt Generals Muhammad Aslam, then Syed Gilnai, on visits to Beijing (Liang, 2013; Dongmei, 2015). These meetings have served to encourage greater understanding and sharing of ideas at the strategic and operational logistic level. In fact, the Pakistan Army’s current main battle tank (MBT), the Al-Khalid, is a product 108

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of HIT and was built with Chinese assistance in the late 1980’s/early 1990’s (Fig 4). Branching out into other systems, the Pakistan Army ‘Can now additionally deploy over 1,500 Chinese-built Type-59, Type-69, and Type-85 tanks, as well as Ukrainian T-80UDs, Soviet era T-54s andT55s, and US-produced Vietnam-era M48A5s’ (Aguilar et al., 2019, p.30). Note that the link with the US has still been retained, though Pakistan has sought to reduce its reliance on them.

Professional development of logistics staff, an Achilles heel in 1947-48, is conducted at the Army School of Logistics (ASL) in Murree. The flagship course is the Logistic Staff Course (LSC) which is offered to Majors who have completed at least twelve years’ service and is designed to prepare them for logistical appointments at Brigade-level and above operations. The ASL, however, also teaches Junior Commissioned Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers in operational logistics and administration at the tactical level.

In line with many military initiatives in the West, there is a move to professionalise this education by affiliation with universities in Pakistan and the wider region.

Finally, there is the actual operational and strategic approach to any conventional conflict. Recognising the considerable numerical advantage that India possesses, the Pakistan Army currently adheres to a ‘riposte’ strategy. This

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would see two Pakistani Corps strike into Indian territory to shift the momentum of a looming engagement, while the other Corps along the international border hold a defensive position. From a logistical perspective it is a strategy that is sustainable owing to the specific aims and short lines of communication – the Corps would strike no deeper than 50 km into Indian territory (“Cold Start Doctrine,” n.d.) – and only for a short period of time. This strategy envisages an engagement of no more than three weeks before pressure from the international community would broker a cessation of hostilities (or in a worst-case scenario the threat of, or actual deployment of, nuclear weapons by either side would alter the nature of hostilities). This gives the Pakistani logisticians a clear and realistic marker; if they can ensure enough ammunition, vehicle spares and materiel is available to suffice for 21 days, they can facilitate the wider strategic intent.

Conclusions and lessons The Pakistan Army was borne out of the British Army, but it has evolved to become a unique institution in its own right and in how it conducts operations. There are certain features to its military and its way of war that aren’t pertinent to how the UK operates. For example, the position of Pakistan in the world dictates its political strategy, the regional and global alliances it makes and the long land border it shares with a country that it sees as an existential threat. Therefore, in contrast to the UK, which retains an international political and military outlook, Pakistan remains regionally focused.

Furthermore, the political influence the Pakistan Army can leverage over its civilian counterparts, and its entrenchment in the economy, which allows it to rapidly turn the country to a war footing4, would be unpalatable and unfeasible in the UK. Nevertheless, two broad lessons can be identified and applied by the British Army logistician.

The first is to understand not just your own logistic capabilities, but your enemy’s. The failure of Kargil in 1999 was partly due to the belief that the Indian Army did not have the ability to support an operation to retake the outposts. This led to poor preparation and when the operations began, an inability to supply the Pakistani troops.

On the opposing side in another instance, the Indian Army in 1965 failed to appraise the situation of their ammunition, which meant they concluded offensive operations long before they needed to. It is crucial to understand how your supply chain compares to that of an opposing force, especially when pushing them to the limits of their capability.

As the threat of state actors again rears its head, technical proficiency will become increasingly important and enable logisticians to inform the planning process of conventional combat operations at the highest levels. In turn that ensures that a force can fight an engagement within its means, or at least maximise its limited resources. By using the lessons of history and appraising the current balance of forces, the Pakistan Army has seemingly achieved this with its ‘riposte’ doctrine, though it is hoped it will never have to test this hypothesis.

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

A second consideration illustrates how the terrain and seasonal variations in weather can dictate logistic operations.

Objectively, as a Corps, this is one area where we already have an appreciation for environmental factors in planning G4 support. However, taking that one stage further and looking at unique situations where we are unable to use our assets as planned is a worthwhile exercise in professional study. Admittedly, it remains conceptual by nature due to the difficulty of practicing such scenarios, but is worthwhile, nonetheless.

By way of an example, during a visit on 7 May 2019 to the Line of Control in Kashmir by the author, the Brigade Commander of 1 AK Brigade described how logistics were his primary concern during the summer when so-called ‘dumping’ operations occur. This takes advantage of the better weather to spend three to four months moving ammunition and materiel, especially oil, into the various outposts dotted along the mountainous border. This does not just prepare the forces to be sustained through winter, it would be impossible to do during the colder months when snow makes many of the roads impassable.

While vehicles are used to do most of the journey, the last stages are undertaken by pack animals. Barring the availability of an impossibly large rotary wing fleet, which is arguably more vulnerable to enemy action, this is the most efficient means of sustaining operations. It just serves to prove that for all our technological advancements in warfare, mechanisation and logistics, the best solution is still sometimes a man and his mule.

References Aguilar, F., Bell, R., Falk, S., Rogers, S., Peritz, A., Esfandiary, D., Riqiang, W., Lawrence, C., Clement, J., Allison, G., Arnold, A., Bunn, M., Chase, C., Miller, S., Mowatt-Larssen, R., Tobey, W., Nye, J., Aguilar, F., Bell, R., Falk, S., Rogers, S. and Peritz, A. (2019). An Introduction to Pakistan's Military.

[Online] Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs. Available at: https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/introduction-pakistans-military [Accessed 2 May 2019].

Ali Ahah, S. (2013). National Defence University. 1st ed. Lahore: Constellation Plus.

Baghel, R. and Nusser, M. (2015). Securing the heights: The vertical dimension of the Siachen conflict between India and Pakistan in the Eastern Karakoram. Political Geography. 48 (1).

Chawla, S. (2009). Defence Production and Industry. In: Pakistan's Military and Its Strategy. New Delhi: KW Publishers.

Cia.gov. (2019). South Asia :: Pakistan — The World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency. [online] Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html [Accessed 24 Oct. 2019].

Cloughley, B. (2008). A History of the Pakistan Army. 3rd ed. Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press.

Cold Start Doctrine. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/world/india/cold-start.htm.

Dongmei, O. (2015). China, Pakistan vow to enhance military logistics cooperation. Available: http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/ china-military-news/2015-06/16/content_6543296.htm. Last accessed 28 Apr 2019.

Fair, C. (2014). Fighting To the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War. 1st ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Heo, U. and Horowitz, S. (2003). Conflict in Asia. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

India vs Pakistan: Military Strength and Arsenal. (2019). Available: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/india-pakistan-militarystrength-arsenal-190226064227556.html.

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Khan, Z, S. (2017). Impact of Kargil Conflict 1999 on Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Current Security Perspective Available: https://www.globalvillagespace.com/ impact-of-kargil-conflict-1999-on-pakistans-current-security-perspective/.

Last accessed 2 May 2019.

Liang, J. (2013). Zhao Keshi meets with chief of logistics staff of Pakistan Army. Available: http://en.people.cn/90786/8251350.html. Last accessed 28 Apr 2019.

Palit, M. (1991). War in High Himalaya. New Delhi: C. Hurst & Co. Riza, S. (1977). The Pakistan Army. 1st ed. Dehra Dun: Natraj.

Siddiqa, A. (2007). Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy. 1st ed.

London: Pluto Press.

The Military Balance (2010), International Institute for Strategic Studies: London.

Wolpert, S. (1990). India. Berkeley: University of California Press

Footnotes 111

This figure can fluctuate depending on the inclusion of paramilitary forces but 650,000 is the most widely accepted estimate (The Military Balance, 2010, p.367; India vs Pakistan: Military strength and Arsenal, 2019).

112 2011 est. (CIA World Fact Book, 2019) 113 At 770,875 sq. km, Pakistan is the 37th largest country in the world by land mass (CIA World Fact Book, ibid.), though it is still only a quarter the size of India.

114 The author witnessed this first-hand during the tension following Pulwama in February 2019 as the Pakistan Army were able to take immediate and exclusive control of the rail network to move their armour and artillery into position along the border, reserve 25% of the beds in all civilian (on top of military) hospitals across the country and erstwhile prepare the civilian infrastructure across to support a conventional war if it was to be required.

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ARRC Support Battalion on Exercise RATTLESNAKE (USA) The Support Battalion of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) based in Gloucestershire is a lesser known Royal Logistic Corps (RLC) unit. The Battalion has the vital task of supporting the NATO Alliance of Headquarters ARRC in a spectrum of possible deployment options.

In contrast to its normal role, this year the Battalion deployed stateside to take part in Exercise RATTLESNAKE alongside US Forces. This opportunity was unlike anything the Battalion has undertaken, but a vital step in developing interoperability and readiness ahead of supporting Headquarters ARRC as it becomes the NATO Corps Warfighting Headquarters from January 2020. By Capt Hollie Suff

The ARRC Support Battalion Spartan ‘All Of One Company’

ARRC Support Battalion is an expeditionary, all arms Battalion with the primary role to deliver sustainment, force protection and force projection to Headquarters ARRC. Although a Royal Logistic Corps minor unit, it is multi-capbadged mainly consisting of Infanteers, Engineers and Logisticians, plus a full range of supporting arms. It is unlike any other unit in the British Army. ‘All of one Company’ is The Battalion’s moto and it prides itself on its inclusivity and the way that they operate effectively as a team, despite the capbadge variations. A further layer to the Battalion’s uniqueness is the presence of Gurkha soldiers and officers. Approximately half of the Battalion is made up of Gurkha personnel, all of whom complete the Basic Infantry Course in Infantry Training Centre Catterick prior to being selected for their specific Regiment or Corps.

The US counterpart for Exercise RATTLESNAKE was the 187th Airborne Infantry Regiment (Rakkasans); a Regiment of the 101st Airborne Division. The unit is made up of three

infantry Battalions: ‘Leader’, ‘White Curahee’ and ‘Iron’.

There is also a Cavalry Battalion known as ‘War’, an Artillery Battalion known as ‘Red Knight’, a Combat Service Support (CSS) Battalion known as ‘Assurgam’ and an Engineer Battalion known as ‘Solid’.

Regarded as one of the most prestigious Brigades within the US Army, it gained its reputation on its tour of occupied Japan during World War II. The nickname Rakkasans is derived from the Japanese word for parachute for ‘umbrella for falling’. Locals began to call the troopers by that nickname; it soon stuck and became a point of pride. The Brigade symbol is a large red Japanese Tori, these are erected throughout the home base of Fort Campbell, Kentucky and are believed to bring good luck. The Rakkasans are also well-known globally due to their feature in the Band of Brother’s Series set in World War II. The series follows ‘Easy’ Company of the 506th Regiment (White Curahee) and tells the story from their pre-deployment training in Georgia in 1942, to parachuting into France on D-Day, to finally the capture of Hitler's Eagle's Nest at Berchtesgaden.

In recent years, The Rakkasans have been involved in a number of campaigns including the Korean and Vietnam wars. They were also an integral part of the Gulf War, most notably during Operation DESERT SHIELD where they conducted the deepest and largest air assault operation in history. As an Airborne Brigade, it is mandated all soldiers and officers complete the three-week course to enable them to proudly wear the Airborne Eagle and flash. Working alongside this historic and high calibre unit meant that ARRC Support Battalion had a lot to prove. The goals were to show American forces that the British Army are a professional and capable organisation, to build interoperability with our NATO allies and improve our overall readiness.

The Rakkasan’s on operations in Afghanistan

The Rakkasan’s Tori for 3-187th Regiment (Iron)

Exercise RATTLESNAKE is held in Fort Polk, Louisiana in the Joint Readiness Training Centre (JRTC). Annually, the centre trains over thirty thousand personnel on its training area which is referred to as ‘The Box’ and is comparable in size to THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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Salisbury Plain Training area. It is notorious for being challenging to operate in with a mixture of environments including swamps and dense jungle-like forests.

The weather conditions add an additional layer of challenge and are known to be temperamental, characterised with very humid conditions, below freezing nights and impressive storms especially in spring-time when the Battalion deployed. The US soldiers would joke that ‘The Brits’ are coming all this way to experience the worst part of America! In comparison to what the British Army is usually accustomed to in the training areas of Brecon, Otterburn and Salisbury Plain; JRTC has less rain, less terrain and more sun so it was not all bad! Adding further to the arduous conditions is the local wildlife. Unsurprisingly, the exercise is not named Rattlesnake without reason. A number of deadly beasts call Fort Polk their home, these include alligators, black widow spiders and the infamous rattlesnake.

ARRC Support Battalion was to be involved in the rotation which was to be the final phase in testing the Rakkasan’s on their readiness, as they transitioned to deployment on multiple overseas operations. To meet the high-level training requirement, the JRTC rotations are vastly resourced; 26 helicopters and 1300 vehicles were involved in the fight. The enemy force also has to be capable. Known as Geronimo or ‘G Men’, they are near peer with mainly Russian equipment variations matching like-for-like against the US Forces equipment and order of battle (ORBAT). What gives the ‘G Men’ the edge, is that they are based within Fort Polk and serve there for up to four years, meaning that they have often already completed several JRTC exercises and have the home advantage. The combined factors of tough ground, difficult environmental surroundings and a capable enemy set the conditions for a challenging but rewarding experience which would develop all participants.

JRTC training area

The renowned Rattlesnake found at Fort Polk

Prior to ARRC Support Battalion’s deployment, Exercise RATTLESNAKE had been a rotation allocated solely to Infantry Company groups. The Company would then be under the Operational Command (OPCOM) of a US Army Infantry Battalion and function as a light role Infantry Company. The task organisation of ARRC Support Battalion could not match this. Instead two troops and a platoon were formed under the command of 14 Squadron and each would work under the US Battalion specific to their role.

A Mobility Troop was attached to the CSS Battalion and under OPCOM to ‘America’ Company which consisted of Royal Logistic Corps and Queens Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment Drivers. An RLC liaison officer was also attached within the 112

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Battalion Headquarters to provide a command link to the British personnel and assist with logistic planning staff work.

An Infantry Platoon was formed consisting of Royal Gurkha Rifle (RGR) and Queen’s Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment (QOGLR) soldiers. They were OPCOM to ‘Shadow’ Company of ‘WAR’ and would operate in a reconnaissance role.

Lastly, a Troop of Royal Engineer and Queen’s Gurkha Engineer Soldiers would join ‘Solid’ Battalion within a combat engineering role. For the soldiers of ARRC Support Battalion, this would be a unique opportunity to practice their trade skills in conjunction with The Battle Craft Syllabus. A vigorous training program was implemented to prepare.

Confirmation of the US deployment for March 2019 was received by ARRC Support Battalion in Autumn 2018. This left a condensed timeline for the preparation of what would be a large logistical burden of moving equipment and personnel to Louisiana. Most importantly training preparations needed to be made, an above standard of competence in all the soldiers’ individual trade and soldiering skills prior to deployment would be key in impressing the American counterparts. This was vital for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the re-ORBAT for the exercise meant that some soldiers were outside of their particular trade lane. The QOGLR soldiers who were integrated into the Infantry Platoon, now needed to meet the same standard as their RGR colleagues’, although they were all trained as basic infantry soldiers during their Phase One training, for most these skills had faded and needed refreshing.

For the drivers of the Mobility Troop, some had never taken part in tactical manoeuvres, logistic resupply operations and most had limited experience of cross-country driving and driving at night. These would be crucial skills for the exercise where they would be part of the supply chain that transported food, water, fuel and other commodities to over 3000 personnel.

The engineer soldiers would be employed within a combat engineering role and needed to update themselves on demolition training, defensive constructions and force protection duties. These skills are drastically different to their job at ARRC Support Battalion which is to provide the power for lighting, heat and communication systems. Exercise RATTLESNAKE would be focused towards the Cold War days of basic living within forests, in forward locations. This meant it was also important that all the soldiers, despite their role for the exercise, were familiarised with living in jungle conditions. They also needed to have a good grasp of basic infantry skills, battlefield casualty drills and were familiarised with working in an environment that has a threat of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attack.

Luckily, within the Battalion there were a number of subject matter experts qualified to deliver quality training. The RGR are renowned for their jungle warfare skills and this is where the first package of combined Squadron training would be focused. Swynnerton training area in Staffordshire was the venue. Basic jungle administration was taught with lessons including hammock erection and Fighting in woods and forests (FIWAF) serials. Unfortunately, Staffordshire in

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14 Squadron group on combined training package in Swynnerton

January was unable to mimic the humid conditions that Louisiana offers and ironically there was heavy snowfall during some parts of the week. Nevertheless, valuable training was received and all personnel were made more than capable of operating in the JRTC environment.

Specific Troop and Platoon training was also crucial in the preparation for the exercise. The Battle Craft syllabus was used as a handrail to formulate the programmes. Lessons were factored into the Squadron battle rhythm, designed to hone everyone’s individual skills within trade and basic soldiering. A final consolidation package then take place to test and combine all the training that had been conducted over the previous months. For the Mobility Troop, the conduct of tactical logistical resupply was refined which included the integration of vallon clearance drills, driving at night and vehicle maintenance in the field. The Engineer Troop tested themselves on demolitions and combat defences, all of this was also completed in a CBRN environment to prepare for the likely use of chemical attack on Exercise RATTLESNAKE. The Infantry platoon finalised its training with a Live Fire Tactical Training package, offensive operation serials and reconnaissance patrols.

Troop and Platoon cohesion had been formed and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) developed. ARRC Support Battalion personnel were now at the highest standard of training that they had been in a number of years. Even prior to the forthcoming training in America, the opportunity and preparation of Exercise RATTLESNAKE gave focus to go ‘back to basics’, build skills which had been forgotten and then further develop standards.

The Infantry Platoon on LFTT package

Mobility Troop testing their cross-country driving skills

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

For the Squadron, just getting to Fort Polk in good order was a training serial for the Battalion Headquarters and Quartermaster department. Several logistical problems had to be resolved such as issues with sending dangerous goods via air and the unusually large baggage allowance which was required on the civilian flights. This was good practice for the team to understand the procedures, paperwork and lead times for an overseas deployment which may become a valuable lesson moving into readiness, supporting HQ ARRC as the NATO Corps Warfighting Headquarters.

On arrival in America, there was still further training required prior to the start of the exercise which was in ten days’ time. The Squadron underwent an acclimatisation period and finessed its individual Troop and platoon SOPs. The most important part of this period was familiarising everyone with the US Forces’ equipment and meeting the US counterparts. The Infantry Platoon was drilled in the US Army’s procedures of alighting and departing the Black Hawk Helicopter. The Engineer Troop got hands on with the American demolition equipment and trained to drive the US Army’s High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV).

For the Mobility Troop, driver training was the main focus and critical for safety reasons and showing professionalism on the exercise. Driving on the righthand side of the road was a new experience for many which was even more challenging when operating unfamiliar vehicles. The main platform used by the Mobility Troop would be the Heavy Expanded mobility tactical truck load handling system or ‘LHS’ for short. This was the equivalent of the British Army’s Demountable Rack Offload and Pickup System (DROPS) truck and provided a very similar logistic capability of offloading racks via a rear hook arm. Day and night training serials were conducted both on road and cross-country.

A few days prior the exercise start date some of the US Commanders for the exercise were hosted by the 14 Squadron group at their lines for an evening of Gurkha messing and a Gurkha Kukri dance. ARRC Support Battalion personnel were now better trained than ever and good relationships and understanding had been formed with The Rakkasans already. This would continue to develop over the course of the exercise.

The Infantry Troop practicing their Heli disembarkment drills

The Engineer Troop conducting HMVEE familiarisation training

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The rotation was sixteen days in The Box and broken down into two phases; the offensive phase where the Brigade manoeuvred from west to east in an attempt to capture Geronimo territory, followed by a defensive phase where the Brigade tried to hold and defend the ground they had occupied. Throughout the phases both Troops and the Platoon had an integral role.

The Infantry platoon as a reconnaissance capability, was pushed forward into enemy occupied locations and delivered critical intelligence to their unit. This gave the Cavalry Commanders of War Battalion better situational awareness and helped them decide how to best employ their tanks in battle. The Platoon often had to outwit Geronimo’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), if detected the enemy were able to call in fire to exact locations. When casualties were taken, the whole medical chain was tested with air or ground evacuation depending on the severity of the injury.

The casualty would be treated at the varying levels of aid station and would not return to their unit until the time elapsed to match how long a battlefield casualty replacement would take to arrive in theatre. This process was in place to mimic real-life medical procedures and test the unit of its operational effectiveness, in the event of losing personnel through death or injury.

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The Mobility Troop was utilised throughout in a resupply role and tasked to delivered commodities in a variety of different logistical methods. One of these, which was a new experience for all, was air-resupply through underslung loads. Commodities were driven to the landing zone; the nets were built with supplies and then a Black Hawk would come and collect the package and drop it off at a predesignated grid reference. Some of the Troop even got the chance to fly in a Black Hawk over the training area to deliver water and ratios to a section which had been dislocated from their unit and in desperate need of resupply.

Throughout, the British drivers were partnered up with US soldiers in vehicle cabs. This meant they were able to get a real feel of what interoperability is; learning from the American’s but also teaching them the ways in which British soldiers operate.

ENDEX! Mobility Troop pose with their US Colleagues of ‘America’ Company on completion of the exercise

The Infantry Platoon on orders delivery prior to reconnaissance mission

Mass Casualty evacuation within The Brigade support area

The Engineer Troop was employed mainly within a Force Protection role which included the protection of Forward Operation Bases where their skills were used to build combat defences. They were also involved in urban operations and assisted the Infantry Battalion they were supporting, to breach buildings through explosive methods of entry. Their expertise in building defences also proved valuable during the defensive phase when trying to prevent the advance of enemy vehicles and personnel.

The Engineer Troop laying defence wiring prior to defensive phase

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The Engineer Troop on a Force protection mission

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A view in the lenses during a night resupply task

For the Mobility Troop, Engineer Troop and Infantry Platoon, the exercise gave them the conditions and resources to undertake high-level and high-quality training.

Old skills were refreshed, new skills were learned and unity was built. All the US Commanders gave glowing feedback on the involvement of the British soldiers. What was most commented on, was our implementation of Mission Command, giving the intent to the junior leaders and empowering them to deliver the results. Colonel Cogbill, Commander of The Rakkasans, has already requested the involvement of The ARRC Support Battalion in their next JRTC Rotation. The deployment finished on a high after a visit to New Orleans where the Squadron had a chance to visit the renowned National WW2 museum followed by sampling some of the city’s night life!

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After weapons had been cleaned, equipment reconfigured and barrack routine re-established, reflections were made on both the exercise and deploying overseas.

The experience of Exercise RATTLESNAKE offered more than military training to ARRC Support Battalion. The process of deploying to the US tested movement and logistic procedures. The opportunity to go to America enthused all and the training gave a sense of purpose and focus, which helps towards retaining quality soldiers.

Leaders were tested in complex environments and are now better trained and empowered to lead their soldiers.

Without the distractions of normal daily life, team cohesion increased among the deployed group. The Squadron was now accomplished at operating within a US Brigade context.

The future prediction of conflict and most recent examples of conflict show that we will never deploy in a non-coalition environment. The experience has created better prepared, better trained soldiers who are now more equipped in their role to support Headquarters ARRC.

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The Squadron group enjoying some downtime in New Orleans at the National WW2 museum

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Operation AGILA and the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia Lessons for the training of The Royal Logistic Corps Troop Commanders Operation AGILA was the name given to the British-led mission in Rhodesia with responsibility for monitoring the ceasefire agreement between the warring factions of the ZANU and ZAPU1 African nationalist movements (collectively known as the Patriotic Front) and the Rhodesian Security Forces. It successfully monitored the first nationwide democratic elections in February 1980 and subsequent handover of power to the newly elected government, led by Robert Mugabe, in April 19802. By Capt Scott Brodie AGILA was a small and short operation but was remarkably successful. In just four months between December 1979 and March 1980, a 1,500 strong Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) was able to deploy to a vast, landlocked country in southern Africa roughly twice the size of the UK, establish a series of bases across extremely long lines of communication and then process and monitor over 23,000 Patriotic Front fighters, whilst maintaining an uneasy peace between them and the Rhodesian Security Forces (Kaye, 1980, p.7).

As an example of agile and innovative logistic support to operations conducted at short notice, at reach, and in an austere environment, it is almost unmatched. Indeed, 'the efforts made by the logistic staff in meeting the demands and overcoming the problems were heroic' (Kaye, 1980, p.14).

Whilst todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Army is in the midst of a transition from campaigning in Afghanistan towards readiness for conventional division level war-fighting, current commitments in South Sudan, Nigeria, Somalia and others suggest that the kind of small scale, expeditionary operation which AGILA represents, will remain core business for years to come. Army personnel continue to be deployed in small teams, at reach and in austere locations. Some of their bases are at the end of long lines of communication in challenging environments very similar to that which was experienced during AGILA. The operation, therefore, is worthy of examination.

This essay will provide a description and analysis of 116

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Operation AGILA with an emphasis on logistic considerations and operations. It will use this case study to draw out key lessons that are relevant to the training of our Royal Logistic Corps (RLC) Troop Commanders. It will not provide a long summary of the brutal and bloody Rhodesian civil war that led to AGILA, as this sits outside the scope of the essay.

The Rhodesian civil war was concluded with the signing of the 1979 Lancaster House agreement between the Margaret Thatcher-led British Government, the Rhodesian delegation led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the former leader Ian Smith and the Patriotic Front led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. At its heart was an 'agreement on the terms of an Independence Constitution [meaning] elections should be supervised under British authority to enable Rhodesia to proceed to legal independence and the parties settle their differences by political means' (Lancaster House Agreement, 1979, p.1).

This agreement led to the British government resuming its role as the colonial power in control of the affairs of the country and the implementation of a ceasefire agreement between all sides monitored by the British-led Commonwealth Force.

The ceasefire came into effect from midnight on 28 December 1979. It required all Rhodesian and Patriotic Front forces to stop all hostilities and avoid all contact between each side. The main body of the 1,500 strong CMF deployed to Salisbury Airport on 22 December. This early phase of the operation included one of the most impressive feats of the logistic enablers deployed on Operation AGILA, namely, the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) of a disparate force from five different Troop Contributing Nations.

The first reconnaissance into the Theatre took place on 22 November, just one month before the deployment of the Main Body. Later, on 8 December, the advance party deployed. This group consisted of a small team of logisticians who were responsible for organising the RSOI of the CMF. Due to the diverse and disparate nature of the CMF, this process took on even greater importance. Whilst the British force elements were able to deploy via the Air Mounting Centre in South Cerney and were able to link up with some of their equipment and receive some of the required briefings whilst in the UK, the remainder of the force were required to do this upon arrival in Salisbury (Kaye, 1980, p.9).

The deployment and RSOI of a single unit or formation is

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a far less complex undertaking than doing it for a diverse amalgamation such as the CMF. The short notice nature of the task meant that even the British contribution was a collection of units from various brigades. Furthermore, the British status as lead nation (Framework Nation in current parlance), meant that it would take on responsibility for RSOI for each Troop Contributing Nation, without the assistance of individual National Support Elements.

The initial team of just twelve logisticians, therefore, had to arrange for the provision of briefing areas, documentation facilities, accommodation, cash exchange, a range to zero weapons and facilities for troops to link up with equipment, as well as a variety of other important activities. This was achieved by such a small team by leveraging the Rhodesian Forces to provide significant amounts of Host Nation Support in the form of accommodation and other Real Life Support (the Rhodesians constructed a tented camp and converted other buildings, including a nearby school, into accommodation) and by contracting 'a large number of 6070 seater buses [and civilian drivers] from the Salisbury Public Transport organisation' (Kaye, 1980, p.11).

In total, this small team (augmented by RAF movements personnel and a further forty strong detachment from 47 Air Despatch Squadron), was able to process 180 vehicles with trailers, a similar tonnage of freight and a diverse collection of troops including 150 Australians, 75 New Zealanders, 50 Kenyans and 22 Fijians. This was made possible through quick thinking and the development of innovative solutions, such as local contracting by logisticians working with an incomplete picture in an unfamiliar environment. It highlights the requirement to inculcate an imaginative mindset and emotional intelligence in our Troop Commanders to enable them to develop these solutions should they find themselves in a similar situation in the future. It also demonstrates a requirement for Troop Commanders to have some exposure to contracting as they could quite conceivably find themselves leading a small team in a similarly austere environment that would be required to establish similar contractor support. It is important, therefore, that Troop Commanders are given at least an introduction to the subject matter so that they have an awareness of it should they need it.

Whilst the activation of the Theatre was extremely complicated, the operational phase was even more so. The uniqueness of the CMF's mission meant that, 'there were no operational blueprints available for reference [and] planning was largely a matter of imagination' (Bailey, 1980, p.19).

The Concept of Operations for the CMF saw it structured as a series of Rendezvous (RVs) and Assembly Places (APs).

Each RV was manned by a captain or lieutenant and nine soldiers and each AP was manned by a major or captain and 16 soldiers. In total there were 39 APs/RVs which covered vast distances across the country.

The CMF teams deployed to their respective RVs and APs in a three-day period over 26-28 December. They managed to deploy to all of these locations across an area of 580,000 square miles, largely through the use of aviation assets. The

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Figure 1: Sketch map produced by Kaye (1980), p. 8 indicating RVs and APs (pink area added by author to highlight Rhodesia)

roads, often little more than a dirt track, suffered particularly badly from a spell of heavy rain which struck during this phase and forced the pilots to fly for long periods in extremely treacherous conditions.

The design of this operation, the distances involved and the importance of helicopters, illustrates the need for an introduction to aviation operations to be taught to troop commanders at an early stage in their training. Whilst this training would typically be delivered during pre-deployment or mission specific training, the Operation AGILA example shows that a period of build-up training prior to deployment cannot always be guaranteed. Had the members of the CMF, both logisticians and troops in the RVs and APs, not been efficient at operating with aviation, then it is unlikely that they would have occupied their posts according to the tight timeline prescribed to them.

As well as resupply, it was decided that helicopters would be the primary means of reinforcement and casualty evacuation. The distances involved made road means impracticable (one particular convoy travelling from an RV to an AP was on the road for 39 hours (Kaye, 1980, p.13). To supplement this plan, an agreement was reached with the Rhodesians whereby they would assist any CMF outpost which needed support. This plan required great trust between the commander of the CMF, Major General Sir John Acland and his teams out in the APs, as well as an acceptance of a significant amount of risk. Indeed, the CMF was never more than, 'reasonably confident that, even if a few casualties were inflicted, each team would be able to look after itself until the nearest help arrived' (Kaye, 1980, p.11).

Whilst today's generation of soldiers are no longer brought up on an Operation HERRICK-style 'golden hour' and Medical Emergency Response Teams operating out of a dedicated Chinook helicopter, this illustrates the requirement to revaluate our perception of risk and treatment and evacuation of casualties. It is important, therefore, that we continue to emphasise to new troop commanders that THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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Š Crown Copyright. IWM.

dedicated casualty or medical evacuation cannot always be guaranteed and that they could be required to implement creative and well considered casualty plans for operating in an austere environment.

It was initially envisaged that during the assembly phase of the operation the Rhodesian Forces would be responsible for sustaining the PF fighters that occupied the APs, which meant that the CMF initially had the relatively simple task of sustaining their own force of around 1,500 troops. However, this proved to be somewhat wishful thinking. The PF fighters were instructed to report to an RV, at which point they would be bussed to an AP, or to report directly to an AP. Over the course of seven days from 29 December, over 23,000 male and female fighters reported as directed. The sustainment operation for the CMF, 'became an appalling prospect when, almost overnight, their responsibility [increased to include these fighters who assembled] mostly with only what they stood up in' (Sutton et al, 1983 p.365).

The vast majority of the fighters that reported to the APs lacked food and suitable clothing. Most of the RVs and APs had an inadequate water and sanitation system which was exacerbated by a lack of host nation medical support and poor diets (Kaye, 1980, p.14). Furthermore, a far greater than expected number of female fighters meant that the unexpected requirement for female sanitary items became a top priority. This conflation of worsening conditions and pressing demands exposed the possibility of a humanitarian catastrophe and raised the already fractious tensions in the APs.

Figure 2: An example of the conditions and level of support required by the guerrillas in one of the APs

The small team of logisticians were, therefore, required to develop a plan for the sustainment of these thousands of people spread amongst 39 separate locations. Aerial delivery, using a combination of seven C-130 Hercules aircraft and six Puma helicopters, was the primary means of resupply. This was complemented by a mixed fleet of eighty civilian vehicles. In total, over 1000 tonnes of stores including tentage, clothing, medical supplies and food, was delivered to the APs. Logisticians were required to think on their feet and respond quickly to changing circumstances.

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importing beef from South Africa by Hercules after a shortage in Rhodesia reduced the assembling fighters to a diet of maize meal (Kaye, 1980, p.14).

That the logisticians were able to respond with such agility in an austere environment is testament to their skill and tenacity. The range of innovative local purchase options and international imports that they used to meet the urgent requirement of the mission highlights the mindset that we need to inculcate in our junior commanders.

Once the main inload was completed at the end of January, the support to the APs was able to settle into a relatively steady rhythm. The logisticians developed a hub and spoke method for this phase of the operation whereby a weekly "milk run" distributed around 35 tonnes of stores from three main warehouses to fourteen outstations. Again, this was mainly handled by locally employed contractors (Sutton et al, 1983 p.366). This phase of the operation lasted until the peaceful conclusion of national elections on 4 March.

Once the elections were concluded, the CMF was able to handover security and administration of the APs to the Rhodesians and to withdraw to Salisbury. Meanwhile, extra logistic enablers were surged into Salisbury to facilitate the successful redeployment of Commonwealth troops to their home nations. This phase was concluded on 16 March, leaving a small team of headquarters and logistic personnel and a group of around 40 personnel that formed a training team for the nascent Zimbabwean Army. Zimbabwe declared independence on 18 April 1980.

By the end of Operation AGILA, the CMF had successfully supervised the disarmament and reintegration of over 23,000 fighters and the peaceful conclusion of national elections. Despite an often-fractious atmosphere and repeated instances of ceasefire violations which the CMF was required to investigate, the ceasefire held and the country was prevented from slipping back into civil war. There were three noteworthy contacts during the operation; a Rhodesian escort vehicle hit a mine, an RAF Hercules was hit by small arms fire and an RV team was ambushed in the Zambezi Valley (Kaye, 1980, p.11). None of these incidents resulted in casualties although there were five British personnel that died during the operation; two in a road crash and three in a helicopter crash (Bailey, 1980, p.21).

In conclusion, this essay has presented a discussion and analysis of this unique yet little known operation. It has highlighted the immense challenges that the logisticians had to overcome to enable mission success and the lessons relevant to the training of the next generation of young officers that can be drawn from it. Aside from the practical lessons and theoretical knowledge that can be gleaned from Operation AGILA, the most important lesson remains the importance of instilling in our junior commanders an imaginative mindset that is able to develop innovative solutions in unforeseen and challenging circumstances. This is an exciting task with lots of opportunities.

Whilst it is essential that we continue to emphasise our conventional role and divisional warfighting within our

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training syllabus, this case study highlights the need to remember the full spectrum of potential operations that our troop commanders could find themselves in shortly after joining their first units. To ignore this possibility would do them a severe disservice. Whilst the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;cone showâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; and theatre logistic laydown will always have its place, we must continue to stretch our intellectual capacity and imagination by studying examples like AGILA to draw out their lessons.

Whilst the current resource envelope is challenging, there are many ways this could be achieved. Options to be considered include tactical exercises without troops, battlefield studies (real world and virtual), individual academic enquiry and classroom-based table-top exercises.

This is an area which Command Wing will seek to develop in the future.

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References Bailey, J. 1980: Operation AGILA, Rhodesia 1979-80. British Army Review 66 pp 19-26.

Kaye, C. 1980: Mission Extraordinary, Zimbabwe - Rhodesia. British Army Review 65 pp 7-15.

Lancaster House Agreement, Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference held at Lancaster House, London, September - December 1979 Report [Online]. Available at https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/5847/5/1979_ Lancaster_House_Agreement.pdf (last accessed 29 Apr 19).

Sutton, D. (ed.) 1983: The Story of the Royal Army Service Corps and Royal Corps of Transport 1945-1982. London: Leo Cooper in association with Secker and Warburg.

Footnotes 1

Zimbabwe African National Union and Zimbabwe African People's Union.

Rhodesia is the name for the British colony in southern Africa which, upon independence in April 1980, took on the name Zimbabwe. This essay will refer to the country by its name at the time of the operation, Rhodesia.

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In the context of STRIKE, using examples from other national forces, discuss the merits of forming CSS Regiments Combat Service Support Regiments (CSSRs) are not a novel invention. They are regiments or battalions that combine various CSS functions; usually maintenance, distribution and medical provision. They are not uncommon in modern armies, both Canadian and Australian Defence Forces maintain such units, indeed, the British Army had one until budget cuts in 2012 (Simpson 2012).

However, this essay understands the term within the contemporary context of the British Army and in its plans to create CSSRs. Under Army 2020 Refine, CSSRs are being formed specifically to support two new Strike brigades (Fallon, 2016, p. 1).

By Lt Edmund Scott These brigades are designed to project expeditionary capability as a new form of medium weight force (Owen, 2017, p.1). They are intended to be far more mobile and dispersed than a traditional armoured infantry brigade, but also able to centralise rapidly when required (Stenning, 2018, 1:24). In this more specialised role of specifically supporting Strike brigades, CSSRs are a comparatively original idea. The Strike concept is relatively untested, but strong similarities exist with the US Army’s Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) and with the manner in which French expeditionary forces worked in Operation SERVAL in Mali in 2013. By examining the CSS in these instances, this essay will seek to judge the utility of forming CCSRs. This essay will show the merits of forming CSSRs by first explaining how they would support Strike. By understanding the theory of how it would work within Strike, it is then possible to see the unique advantages when compared with, for example, using the standard CSS makeup of an armoured infantry brigade to do the same job. The first section will analyse from a theoretical perspective – as Strike CSSR experimentation trials are in extremely early stages.

Following on from this, to analyse the use of CSSRs to sustain a Strike type operation, two practical case studies will be used to highlight potential advantages; the US Army’s 120

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operational use of SCBTs in Iraq and the French Serval Brigade in Mali.

Fundamentally, this essay will argue that there are significant advantages in forming CSSRs as they offer the potential for a creative and pragmatic solution to sustaining Strike. Designed specifically to support this concept, they should be able to more effectively fulfil this role than the conventional CSS orbat. However, while it will be argued here that forming CSSRs should offer overall merit to the British Army, the way Strike CSS is being designed presents some possible hazards to CSSRs which could hamper their ability to provide unique value. These problems will be outlined below in both the theory and in the practical case studies.

The makeup of CSSRs in STRIKE To investigate the merits in forming CSSRs, it is first necessary to explain how these regiments will look and perform. Under Army 2020 Refine, two regiments will be formed to sustain the Strike brigades. These brigades are designed as a medium weight force, expeditionary in nature, that can deploy ahead of the traditional heavy force at a reach of up to 2000km. To sustain this in CSS terms, a theatre enabling group will provide the Reception Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) phase where feasible and a scalable force support group will provide mobile distribution points along the Ground Line of Communication (GLOC).

Built into this planning is a significant assumption that the majority of this GLOC will be uncontested, allowing for an increased level of host nation support and local resourcing of CSS. Fuel, water and even rations secured this way are envisaged as methods to lighten the logistic load. Intimate support however will be provided by the CCSR (British Army, 2017, p.4). This will be formed of two REME close support companies, one REME field company to provide equipment support and three RLC close support squadrons for transport and distribution. Unlike the American construct, medical support is not included in the CSSR. To be able to sustain four battlegroups across a dispersed area of up to 150km, Intermediary Replenishment Groups (IRGs) and Forward Repair Teams (FRTs) will be detached from the CSSR to each battlegroup.

This conceptual laydown is outlined in the diagram opposite: The key advantages of this design are best understood when considering the constraints Strike brigades will face.

It is asked to travel far further than an armoured infantry brigade, both in the initial reach to the theatre and in dispersing once in the contested space. Thus, it is essential to reduce the ‘logistic tail’ (Owen, 2017, p.3). Reducing the

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Strike CSS CONOPS, 2017

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RHQ element by combining a REME and RLC unit is one obvious efficiency. The other key saving is made in supply.

The ES platoon from the REME battalion can take on the GS burden. Not only is there efficiency in the number of soldiers (and associated chain of command) to fulfil this requirement, but by having ES and GS integrated under one department, the stores experts can have a better understanding of what the actual priorities are to demand. It also removes an element of inter-unit competition.

Reduced logistic need?

While the overarching merits of forming CSSRs are clear, it is worth questioning some of the assumptions that this is built upon. First is the assumption that CSSRs can function with a more streamlined order of battle due to the overall ‘Reduced Logistic Need’ of the brigade. This is based on the premise that by fielding no Main Battle Tanks or Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicles the brigade will be able to travel more efficiently, use less fuel, require fewer spares and suffer fewer vehicle break downs (British Army, 2018, p.5).

In doing this its logistic demand is lessened and as such requires fewer CSS units and sub-units to support it.

However, this is a potentially dangerous assumption to make.

Other armies’ comparative forces, which this assumption is predicated on, solely use wheeled vehicles, to maximise their advantage of mobility. Strike however opts for both, fielding two regiments of Ajax, which are tracked and two of the new Boxer MIV, which are wheeled. This in itself is a slightly

strange decision as the advantages of both (range and speed of the Boxer and all-terrain ability and protection of the Ajax) are slightly nullified by banding them together in a brigade where they so closely support each other.

More tellingly, it vastly increases the logistic need. Tracked vehicles cannot maintain the pace of advance that the Boxers will set and the Strike concept seeks to achieve. With only one Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) Squadron in The RLC, the Army does not hold the capability required to move the Ajax regiments the majority of the 2000 km intended for Strike (Owen, 2017, p.1). The desire to have Strike able to deploy at short notice would also rule out deployment of sponsored reservists under Fastrack or securing a bespoke civilian contract of low loaders in that time frame.

It is also worth questioning whether contractors have the risk appetite to conduct the latter stages of this move. The notion of Ajax conducting an ‘initial march’ through uncontested (and likely friendly space) to the battlespace is also problematic. Heavier than Warrior, transport by road would require immense coordination to clear routes. Many bridges will not support its weight, and like Challenger 2 it would require heavy bridging equipment. If a lighter Ajax engineering variant is not procured, then relying on Titan would further fix the brigade, as it would also require transport.

Tracking across such vast distances is sure to increase the amount of recovery and forward repair required. This both slows the advance and hinders the CSS chain as ES spares are required to be moved forward. Much of the Ajax repairs are required to take place at 4th line by contractors. If the CSSR is expected to be involved in moving these casualty vehicles back to 3rd line that still places a significantly heavier demand than previously expected. It also potentially leaves recovery assets, stores troops, troop carrying vehicles and combat support troops dislocated in small groups across a vast area before any fighting has begun, critically hindering the combat capability of the brigade.

Additionally, this increased and early pressure on a single operations cell, rather than both a REME and RLC one to track these events, could be overwhelming and ultimately

Having tracked (Ajax – left) and wheeled (Boxer MIV – right) vehicle families in the Strike Bde will increase the logistic footprint

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less efficient. Finally, there is the question of fuel. One way that Strike CCS concept seeks to reduce logistic need is increased local resourcing (British Army, 2017, pp.26-27).

However, if the fuel quality cannot be guaranteed this can have a dramatic effect on the Mean Distance Between Failure of the vehicle fleet through premature engine failure.

This would have a knock-on effect on the ES component of Strike, requiring both more repair activity and spares to be transported in.

Clearly some of the problematic CSS assumptions on which Strike is based could reduce the advantage of having CSSRs. There seems little point in having a leaner and more efficient CSS structure in theatre if it has been completely overwhelmed before arriving there. To garner the benefits of having this new kind of CSSR, the wider CSS formation must rely heavily on host nation and contractor support, increased aviation and the force support group to be proactive in facilitating the rear supply chain movement of vehicle casualties. The deductions from the theory outlined here have been shown in practice too - French forces in Mali relied heavily on local resourcing of fuel and water and required allied assistance for vast amounts of aviation support (Shurkin 2014 p.34). If all of these above points are not in place, the CSSR will be set up to fail and as such will not display any real reward.

under the command of that battalion. This allows these manoeuvre units to have increased options and flexibility in how they achieve their mission.

The first BSBs deployed in support of SCBTs on Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003 shortly after the Stryker concept had been adopted. This early operational experience allowed for some clear lessons to be identified. By examining these, it is possible to draw out potential pitfalls CSSRs may face if not configured correctly. Many of the lessons would have an effect on a level of doctrinal detail that has not yet been published on the make-up of CSSRs, but should Strike planners include these, it would greatly affect whether or not they show ‘merit’.

The first of these key lessons focuses on security. Both Strike and Stryker concepts focused on as lean an order of battle as possible, to maximise mobility. In doing so there is the potential to leave CSS troops exposed without any force protection. By nature of the brigade’s design, these troops have further to travel to sustain units and do so over contested terrain, so this vulnerability is increased. However, drawing combat power away from the manoeuvre sub-units can cause friction between support and combat units (Kim, 2016). The solution identified in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was to properly equip, train and man organic force protection and adopt its TTPs within CSS units. Although a very slight uptake in manpower was required in the logistic units, these overall measures allowed the brigade to maintain its leanness while protecting the provision of CSS (Thompson, 2004 p.14). This further allowed the CSS subunits greater flexibility in achieving their mission, no longer depending on other units who had differing priorities.

As operational experience supporting SCBTs mounted in Iraq and Afghanistan, another key lesson was identified that can also be applied to CSSRs supporting Strike. To maintain the dispersal that this type of medium weight force desires, FSCs need to be attached to battalions they support (Fortune and Budihas, 2013, p.30). Initially BSBs acted without FSCs and used much smaller, ad hoc ‘Logistic Support Teams’ in their place. These lacked a critical command presence and as such struggled to impose any of the benefits of mission command that being detached posed. It was also found that

Examples from other forces The plausible merits of CSSRs within a Strike theory context have been laid out above, as have some potential disadvantages. To assess the practical merits of CSSRs, it is necessary to examine very similar formations within other nations’ defence forces, their recent operational performance and lessons identified. The first of these is Brigade Support Battalions (BSBs) and their associated Forward Support Companies (FSCs) which support SBCTs in the US Army.

BSBs are made up of distribution, field maintenance and medical companies and detach FSCs to manoeuvre battalions. FSCs are formed of a headquarters, catering platoon, maintenance platoon and a distribution platoon (Burgdof, 2014 p.19) and act as a form of embedded IRG. Once detached to the battalion they are supporting, they fall

A lack of force protection was a concern for BSBs in the early days of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Seen here: the adapted ‘gun trucks’ units improvised to increase protection on convoys

Heavy Equipment Transporters - seen here with CRARRV in Oman – will be a crucial consideration in the Strike CSS plan

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they were vastly short on vehicle repair and maintenance assets relying on civilian contractor support. Fortune and Budihas (2013, p.29) point out that the easy accessibility of civilian mechanics was a trait that was fairly unique to conducting counter-insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. It may not be so readily available in conventional or future warfare. As such, SCBTs began introducing FSCs in 2014.

Experimentation will be required to find the right balance of equipment and logistic support required in FRTs and IRGs to the Strike battlegroups, but it is obvious from the Stryker experience that this needs to be established in some robust form.

Ten years of operational experience allowed the US Army to adapt its BSBs to better support their dependency units.

For CSSRs to be truly successful in supporting Strike it would be prudent to draw upon these lessons of security and properly resourced IRGS. If these can be achieved then CSSRs, as a new construct, can offer genuine merit. However, if these types of lessons are not absorbed in the CSSR planning, there is a real danger that mistakes will only be identified when lives are lost in an operational environment.

Having examined the US Army’s version of CSSRs, this essay will now look at the way French forces have used similar structures. Operation SERVAL, the French intervention in Mali in 2013, typifies the expeditionary sustainment that CSSRs seek to provide. By examining this operation, it is possible to see how CSSRs can provide real merit in supporting the type of deployment that Strike is designed for. Operation SERVAL is an interesting case study because it was thrown together at speed to counter a fastmoving threat of rebels in Northern Mali. The force the French assembled and the way it operated was similar to the design Strike intends, though this came about more from improvised requirement than a structured design. An initial march of 1200km across largely uncontested terrain, from Bamako to Gao (Laird and Timperlake, 2013), or 3000km for troops based in Dakar (Tramond and Seigneur, 2013), preceded the fighting. To gather the troops required for this task at short notice, the French military combined a number of units based across West Africa, supplemented by units flown in from France. This created a cobbled together task force, but one that was eventually highly successful.

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The French Army trains and is structured to fight in Company Groups (SGTIAs) and Battlegroups (GTIAs) and it was in this format that they deployed to Mali. Similar to SBCTs and Strike, the 3e Brigade mécanisée, later the Serval Brigade, which lead the deployment, was supported by a ‘BATLOG’ (logistic battalion) with further logistic support organic to both SGTIAs and GTIAs. This support was akin to FSCs and IRGs, but with logistic troops even more doctrinally integrated within the group (Delaporte, 2013). Each SGTIA had a logistic platoon while a GTIA had a CSS company (Shurkin, 2014, p.28).

With the company and battlegroup level forces deployed and dispersed at extended reach across the battlefield, this IRG type system was highly effective. Shurkin (2013, p.29) notes that this was partly down to the way that the French task-organise. While other armies also do so at a subbrigade level, the French have adopted it as a system out of budget necessity and enforce it in their doctrine. As such, the troops are accustomed to continuously training in combined arms groups and commanders are comfortable sending comparatively small ‘force packages’ into battle. This is further reinforcement of a key lesson outlined earlier about the US Army’s SCBTs – that elements of the CSSR have to be integrated with the battlegroups they are supporting if the brigade seeks to achieve dispersal and range. Clearly, this is the kind of expeditionary operation that Strike seeks to emulate. In support of this, CSSRs must adopt the lessons of being closely integrated with dependency units, similar to this format, if commanders seek to make the most of having CSSRs over the conventional CSS in an armoured infantry brigade.

Conclusion Throughout this essay the argument has been made that there are real and significant advantages to be had by forming CSSRs. These are a flexible, efficient and bespoke solution to supporting Strike’s CSS needs. Given the unlikelihood of the decision to form Strike being reversed in a particularly challenging financial environment, two new Strike brigades will eventually form half of the capability of the Reactive Force. Evidently there is merit in designing a CSS solution that best supports these new units. As CSSRs have not been formed yet, now is an ideal time to examine the pitfalls the British Army could encounter - either in dangerous assumptions in the theory, or by ignoring lessons identified by the French and Americans. These lessons, drawn out above, present the following recommendations: 5 Strike planners must acknowledge that the assumption of reduced logistic need requires rigorous testing. CSSRs must be protected from performing 3rd line tasks and supporting a line of vehicle casualties on the initial march.

All efficiencies gained using CSSRs will be lost if it gets bogged down enroute to theatre.

5 Contingency must be developed for the lack of availability of local resourcing of combat supplies, host nation assistance and aviation support. None of these are given, yet Strike CSS assumes they can be found. Similar to the previous point, CSSRs will not be able to demonstrate their unique merits if they are tasked to fill this capability gap.

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5 Proper consideration must be given to force protection at the troop and squadron level in CSSRs to allow for freedom of movement across a wide dispersed area in a contested battlespace. This lesson learnt by the US Army in a counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq would be amplified in a contest against a peer or peer-plus opponent.

5 Planners must establish through robust trials the correct amount of both equipment and logistic support to be detached as IRGs to battlegroups in Strike brigades and formalise it. Units can then begin to train and think in this manner, allowing them to properly understand and anticipate each other’s requirements, as experienced by the French in Mali.

If these considerations can be put in place, the evidence that has been set out in this essay shows that CSSRs will be able to provide genuine benefit to the British Army.

References British Army, (2017), ‘STRIKE Sustainment – CONOPS & CONUSE’ [Online].

Available at: https://akxonline.defencegateway.mod.uk/sites/akx/forcedevelopment/strike-experimentation/seg-overview-progress (Accessed on 28 May 2019) Burgdorf, D., 2014. ‘Army Logistics – Quick Reference’, CASCOM Force Development Directorate, US Army.

Delaporte, M., 2013. ‘The Role of Expeditionary Logistics in Shaping New Combat Capabilities: The Case of France in Mali’, Second Lind of Defense, [Online].

Available at https://sldinfo.com/2013/06/the-role-ofexpeditionary-logistics-in-shaping-new-combat-capabilities-the-case-of-fra nce-in-mali/ (Accessed on 26 May 2019)

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Fallon, M., 2016. ‘Strategic Defence and Security Review - Army: Written statement’ - HCWS367 [Online]. Available at https://www.parliament.uk /business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/writtenstatement/Commons/2016-12-15/HCWS367/ (Accessed on 24 May 2019) Fortune, J. and Budihas, C., 2013. ‘Logistics and Sustainment in the Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Logistics-Support Team or Forward Support Company?’, ARMOR, April-June 2013 Kim, C., 2016. ‘Lessons learned from a distribution platoon supporting a Stryker battalion’, Army Sustainment, March-April 2016 Laird, R., and Timperlake, E. 2013. ‘The French in Mali: Shaping the Logistics Element of the Operation’, Second Line of Defense, [Online]. Available at https://sldinfo.com/2013/05/the-french-in-mali-shaping-the-logisticselement-of-the-operation/ (Accessed on 22 May 2019) Owen, W.F., 2017. ‘Explaining the British Army’s Strike Concept’, RUSI Newsbrief, Vol. 37, No.4 Shurkin, M. 2014. ‘France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army’, RAND Corporation, [Online]. Available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/ research_reports/RR770.html (accessed on 19 May 2019) Stenning, Z., 2018. ‘Strike | Experimentation Brigade | British Army’ – [video]. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZDGjYwuO9UE (Accessed on 18 May 2019).

Simpson, M., 2012 ‘19 Light Brigade disbandment marked with Ballykinler service’ [Online]. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northernireland-19751181 (accessed on 6 October 2019) Thompson, D., 2004. ‘Frontline Support of the First SBCT at War’, Army Logistician, Vol 36, Issue 4 Tilzey, D., Kasavicha, G., and Rote, C., 2008. ‘Stryker Brigade Combat Teams Need Forward Support Companies’, Army Logistician, Vol 40, Issue 4 Tramond, O., and Seigneur, P., 2013. ‘Early Lessons From France’s Operation Serval In Mali’, Army Magazine, June 2013

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Lessons in STRIKE sustainment from the South African Border War 1980-89 Between 1975 and 1989, the South African Defence Forces (SADF) fought a complex war along the northern frontier between Angola and Namibia. In the flat, arid veldt that characterises the terrain of much of southern Africa, the SADF pioneered a particular form of mobile warfare that was quite unlike any practiced before. By Lt George Kaar ‘Without sustained logistics a mechanised battalion group is but a corpse and mobility flies out by the back door.’ - Roland de Vries1 The essence of this new doctrine was rapid manoeuvre via a fleet of cutting-edge wheeled armoured vehicles, to bring a guerrilla war to the guerrillas. This wedded the technical and numerical advantages of the SADF, to the speed, surprise, and flexibility of the guerrilla fighter. Once this way of operating was perfected, the war swung decisively in favour of the SADF. The series of campaigns and civil wars known as the Southern African Border War, amongst other names, has much to teach today’s practitioner of light armoured manoeuvre.

The mobile fighting groups which evolved, such as 32 Battalion and 61 Mechanised Battalion Group, were entirely mounted on wheels. The fighting units - accompanied closely by CSS elements - pushed hundreds of kilometres into enemy territory to strike, dislocate, and degrade the enemy. Keeping this fleet-footed and revolutionary army supplied, was a conceptual and practical challenge. SADF supply lines stretched through nominally friendly territory, but at risk of guerrilla and landmine attacks.

This essay will examine what the STRIKE concept can learn from the SADF’s experience in terms of sustaining these battalions during the Bush War. It will draw on firsthand accounts of battalion-level supply operations and academic analysis of the theatre’s logistics. It will compare the efforts of the SADF to the currently available material on STRIKE CSS. While ‘CSS’ is used here and mention will be made at times of ES and medical issues, the focus of this paper is on logistics in the narrowest sense of supply lines and storage. Additionally, it is written very much from the perspective of the SADF, as it is their tactics, which are the focus of study. To avoid confusion for the reader minimal background on the SADF’s adversary is given and they are referred to simply as enemy.

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The Border War was a thoroughly modern conflict. The style of warfare fought was very much of its time and may well be representative of conflicts the British Army can expect to be committed to in the future. It was heavily influenced by international coalition politics, including Cold War rivalry. Domestic political considerations and public perception played a key role, often resulting, in what seemed to the front-line soldier, as absurd restrictions. The enemy employed the entire spectrum of tactics, from conventional to non-conventional; everything from IEDs to Soviet tanks.

The taking and holding of physical and human terrain was not the key objective of the SADF, but rather the destruction of enemy capabilities. During the campaigns of the 1980s, this was achieved by cross-border strikes on foot or mounted, supported from the air.

It takes little imagination to see similarities between this scenario and that which the STRIKE brigades might be asked to undertake. Post-Afghanistan, Britain may have lost the appetite for long wars of occupation and ‘nation-building’, but it retains the ability and inclination to strike foreign powers, such as during the Libyan Civil War and to support NATO commitments. A complex mixture of conventional, nonconventional, host-nation, proxy, guerrilla and civilian actors, can be expected in future conflicts, similar to the SABW. The rapid dislocation of conventional forces as a shaping action, or the decisive defeat of a dispersed nonconventional enemy force, is the intended purpose of a STRIKE brigade. The SADF became proficient at both throughout the fifteen years of war. To quote Gen de Vries ‘To the South Africans, deep operations meant the disruption, dislocation and the binding of enemy forces where the juicy strategic targets lay’. This bears a close resemblance to the NATO STRIKE brigades’ purpose, which is to disrupt and dislocate the enemy and shape the battle space in a divisional battle2. They can also be expected to operate independently in a medium to low intensity conflict, as the French 3rd Light Armoured Brigade did in Mali, between 2012 and 2014.

The SABW primarily took place around the border between Namibia (historically called South West Africa) and Angola. As a result, the SADF’s main logistic base at Grootfontein, in northern Namibia, was more than 1,500 km from Pretoria, while the fighting units penetrated hundreds of kilometres into enemy territory later in the war. For reference 1,500 km is roughly the distance from Calais to the east of Poland. During Operation SAVANNAH, a SADF fighting column advanced 3,159 km in thirty-three days, while conducting a series of raids, ambushes, and attacks.

4 SAI moved from South Africa to Mavinga by road for (Operation) Moduler – some 495 vehicles over 1,900 km in

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Map 2: The Western Sub-Theatre of War

two days and nights - trimmed down to its “combat weight” of around 250 vehicles; after crossing the Angola border with another 450km or so of bundu-bashing (cross-country) before the assembly area.3 These figures chime with the STRIKE Brigades’ requirement to march 2,000 km from the disembarkation point and then operate tactically dispersed over 150 km.4 The most superficial comparison, which can be made between the SADF’s forces and the STRIKE concept, is the reliance on a new wheeled IFV. In the case of the SADF this was the Ratel. An extremely highly regarded vehicle, it mounts a section of soldiers and is armed with a 20mm cannon. The similarity between this vehicle and the Boxer IFV, which will form the backbone of the STRIKE brigades should not be overstated, although the eight-wheeled Boxer is twice the mass of the six-wheeled Ratel. The SADF’s doctrine was adapted to the pressing operational need of the Border War, while STRIKE is currently in development with broad operational requirements in mind. While the SADF’s 61 and 32 Battalions did encounter enemy armour, they were equipped to some degree to counter it; the tank destroyer variant of the Ratel was just capable of defeating T-62s using skill and terrain. The STRIKE brigades on the other hand are not intended to counter a peer adversary’s armour.

Regardless, sufficient similarities between how the SADF operated and how STRIKE is envisaged as operating, exist to make this a valid comparison for the purpose of imagining how logistic operations will enable STRIKE brigades.

Heitman’s5 description of the evolution of military equipment throughout the course of the war, indicates the seriousness with which the SADF took the question of resupply. The SADF’s fleet of Bedfords, was replaced with the purpose-built and locally produced SAMIL vehicles.

These were designed from the bottom up for exactly the kinds of operations conducted during the Border War. They often featured mine-resistant augmentations and armoured cabins and are analogous to the British TES SV fleet, following the end of combat operations in Afghanistan. The fact that the SAMIL fleet is still in service today (though antiquated) says something of their quality at the time they were introduced.

New Boxer IFV

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The vehicle which dominated the Border War, was the Ratel. Its designers exploited emerging material technology and engineering, to create one of the first practical wheeled IFVs, purpose-built for the Southern African bush. The predominance of this vehicle must have helped to drive down the logistic burden, especially once its variants gradually came into service; displacing other families of armoured cars such as the Eland in the anti-armour role.

From a somewhat narrow academic viewpoint, the war ended prematurely and the use of the logistic variant of the Ratel IFV became a necessity. An opportunity to experiment with the use of a purpose-built IFV for logistic operations was lost. However, one result would most certainly have been an increase in cost of the CSS vehicles and the resultant increase in the financial cost in terms of fuel per unit of material delivered. This would have meant more robust and independent logistic vehicles, which did not require force protection, but would have ultimately increased the fuel burden.

The SADF did not always enjoy air dominance. As a result, logistic movements were at certain stages of the war routinely conducted at night. Notwithstanding, air became a crucial method of resupplying ground forces. At every stage in the logistic chain, air freight was crucial. Civilian air freighters, C130s, C-160s, light propeller-driven fixed wing and a variety of rotary aircraft, all played a role. Innovative Helicopter Administrative Areas were established as resupply points as little as 20km from objectives where columns would reorg and refuel before conducting strikes.6 Where possible the SADF also occupied airstrips to further extend their reach. However, the SADF was not properly equipped with sufficient airlift capacity.

STRIKE doctrine, similarly, anticipates operating under a contested airspace. STRIKE CSS CONOPS takes a position very similar to that which the SABW would recommend; aviation is not anticipated as being available for routine support but will play a key role in resupply. In a practical sense this might mean the non-availability of AH for force protection or SH for air CASEVAC but will instead mean the routine use of all forms of airlift and air despatch. It will certainly require practice and training in operating DZs and improvised airstrips by STRIKE logisticians.

Fighting columns were able to carry sufficient supplies to sustain the mission and the maintenance of speed and initiative, meant that units were not bogged down or tied up in longer engagements than had been planned. Major Reinecke, the logistics officer for 61 Mech, describes the methods used, to ensure these short raid-type operations carried out at the midpoint of the war, were sustained.7 At this stage of the war the mechanised raiding doctrine with armoured cars and IFVs was well established and wellpracticed and the later heavier and more conventional operations were still to come. Operations ranged from tenday patrols to six-week operations, with terrain only ever held as an enabling objective. These operations were designed to seize the initiative from enemy incursions across the border and disrupt and destroy enemy capabilities.

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61 Mechâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s logistic planning was intimately tied to broader operational staff work. The nature of the operations allowed complex contingency planning well in advance, with CSS planners fully engaged at all stages. To this, Major Reinecke ascribes the ultimate success of the logistic operations.8 When the operation was launched every commander knew and understood the logistic plan and it was relatively easy to put it into operation. The Battalion Group was closely integrated physically and conceptually. For example, the refuelling and administration of helicopters was the responsibility of the HQ company, rather than the responsibility of a co-located specialist subunit.

While soldiers with different battlefield roles are mentioned, the only sense of identity apparent in the writings left by 61 Mech, is identity with the battalion itself. The shared dangers and hardships, as well as the sense of identity which grew out of the uniqueness and victories of 61 Mech, must have played a significant role in this. STRIKE brigades would be fortunate to be able to emulate the esprit de corps of 61 Mech, but this would require existing cap badge identities to be subordinated to the new brigade identity.

With each operation, the logistic plans improved and became more adaptive as the logistic estimates became more accurate. This included at times dramatically reducing the quantity of ammunition carried per vehicle, a decision requiring some audacity by the commander. This played a key role in reducing the logistic demand for subsequent operations, which reduced drag, vulnerability and waste. Operating for ten days independent of resupply was standard. The breakdown of the DCRs was as follows: Three in the fighting echelon, three with the subunit and five in the battalion. One fresh meal a week was the commanderâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s aspiration, which took the form of either field kitchens at HQ or prepacked barbeque kits with beer.

Several times, Major Reinecke stresses, that kilometres of toilet paper were a greatly valued commodity as a weapon cleaner, cooling aid, and for use as mine tape.9 Water was drawn from local sources and engineers would purify and make it safe. Diesel was largely front-loaded or prepositioned between the first and second line, at friendly outposts in Namibia. The political and security situation allowed diesel to be stored in farms along the Namibia-Angola border, which greatly reduced the need for long convoy operations back to Bloemfontein. Pre-planning, integration and communication and meticulous record-keeping, were crucial to maintaining the fine balance of requirements while even delivering some much-appreciated luxuries.

A central HQ and support node was established, generally at a site usable as an airfield. While for some subunits at certain times stocks were kept entirely on wheels, the battalion maintained a central logistic hub. The battalion itself was never entirely self-sufficient in all commodities and relied especially for spares on a highly reliable chain, reaching back to the second line in Bloemfontein. Air resupply was of course essential to deliver mission-critical spares to tight timescales. The picture this paints is of a more centralised - and therefore vulnerable to enemy fire logistic system than that envisaged by STRIKE.

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To ensure the dispersed force was supplied, a system of dispersed logistic nodes was established. At times commanded by a Second Lieutenant, a series of delivery points were set up, so far-ranging units could replenish themselves when required. The dispersal areas on operations, ranged up to 3,000 square km, with individual units regularly ranging over 400km per day. STRIKE CSS anticipates operating in a radial ‘hedgehog’ fashion, with subunits dispersed broadly over a wide area capable of responding to routine and peak logistic demands. This is somewhat more ambitious that that practiced by 61 Mech, but some similarities remain. Both systems, to some degree, diverge from the linear ‘tree’ model branching out from a large trunk. 61 Mech was less concerned about massed artillery fire than the STRIKE brigades; this enabled it to be more centralised. The speed of movement and fear of landmines meant the avoidance of large daily convoys moving along MSRs. But unlike the STRIKE CSS concept, it possessed a definite centre. Modern communications were vital in facilitating 61 Mech’s logistic operation and will be equally important for STRIKE. Perhaps today’s IT, unimaginable to a force operating in the 80s, could be an enabler to support increased dispersion and decentralised logistics.

Major Reinecke and Commander De Vires10 describe a logistical nightmare scenario and how they overcame it.

During the early stage of a cross-border operation, it became apparent that despite sound estimates and planning, there

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was insufficient fuel to execute the operation and safely return. The terrain was far tougher on the vehicles than anticipated and their fuel consumption simply too high.

Through thorough planning and strict rationing of fuel, the problem was overcome. Major Reinecke, however, credits the flexibility built into the logistic plan with the eventual solution and more importantly credits the exemplary leadership of his senior commanders. The error could not reasonably have been foreseen and though potentially catastrophic for the operation, it received the cool-headed and mature response required from the senior commanders. Major Reinecke describes their supportive and encouraging attitude, as a major factor in his ability to ultimately solve the problem and thus enable the entire operation to proceed.

The STRIKE capping paper (at 5.5)11 warns strongly against attempting to self-sustain anything other than the shortest operations. It demonstrates critical shortfalls in lift capacity in the organic logistic support for a 30-day campaign. The SADF solved this either by reverting to a more traditional ‘tree’ method or by front-loading vast quantities of logistic material. During the later stages of the war the (61) mechanized battalion deployed into Angola with fifty-five Ratels, five Rinkhals ambulances, sixty-two logistic trucks and four recovery vehicles. A contingent of trucks carrying fuel and supplies also accompanied the 126-vehicle main body.12 If the un-numbered contingent of trucks was a mere 25-30, this represents a 2:1 ratio of support to combat vehicles.

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Credit: Shutterstock Grobler du Preez

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Ratel IFV

Later in the war longer-term operations penetrated deeper into enemy territory and stretched supply lines. At the time of the climactic battle of Cuito Cuanavale, lines of communication reached 500km into hostile terrain, the last 150 km of which were off-road. This necessitated the use of airlift and increased the fuel consumption of logistic vehicles.

The terrain halved the payload of logistic vehicles and the ES burden was also high. The mobile groups had organic teams of mechanics attached, who conducted routine repair and engine replacements in the field. But many of the artillery pieces needed to be back loaded to be repaired.

Samil Logistic vehicle

Historically, artillery ammunition has constituted a disproportionate share of the logistic demand on any combined arms formation. For the SADF it was no different.

Unwilling to ground-dump ammunition due to the rapidity of movement required of the artillery, ammunition supplies were kept permanently on wheels. This increased the number of transport vehicles required.

Overall, Morris13 considered logistic support to the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, to have been tenuous but ultimately sufficient. Scholtz’s assessment is more scathing. While the operation succeeded, tempo was frequently lost and soldiers regularly suffered from inadequate supplies of everything and inappropriate timing of that which did arrive. Ultimately, logistic failures caused strategic momentum to be lost, as 130

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Scholtz14 shows, with the cancellation of a large spoiling operation to destroy enemy forces poised to counter-attack the SADF at Cuito Cuanavale.

Thus, Scholtz concludes that inadequate attention to logistics was a serious problem. His response is to warn current SADF planners not to underestimate the importance of logistics. This conclusion is simply too general to be satisfactory. It is worth delving into the workings of his problem to see if more concrete conclusions can be made.

Cuito Cuanavale was the kind of engagement in which the STRIKE Brigades are not intended to become embroiled. It was four months long and included artillery and anti-armour assets above those the STRIKE brigades will have. The additional elements belonging to the SADF forces as outlined above, gave them the ability to decisively engage enemy formations at the right time. Main battle tanks were employed by both the Angolans and South Africans. The later large operations in the war therefore more closely resemble conventional armoured manoeuvre tactics. This does not mean that they are unimportant to STRIKE. STRIKE is intended to operate alongside AI battalions, with each operating in accordance to their own strengths. If STRIKE operates as a ground-based vanguard in the shaping phase of a division-sized operation, consideration must not only be given to how the STRIKE brigade is sustained, but how its sustainment impacts on the decisive and enduring phases of the battle. The SADF may have become complacent about logistic operations as Scholtz indicates, simply because earlier successes were logistically light. Therefore, the logistic planning did not pivot to a ‘conventional’ footing as quickly as the fighting elements did. Although logistic planning was consistently good and well-integrated with operational planning in earlier operations, it is possible that planning data and models for the light and medium weight force, was inadequate for the heavy force that conducted the battle of Cuito Cuanavale; or that the terrain and distances simply precluded supply under the circumstances.

Avoiding this mistake with the STRIKE brigades, should not be as difficult for the British Army as it was for the SADF. This is because in the British Army, the dispersed shaping forces represented by STRIKE, are doctrinally separate from the decisive forces capable of winning in a conventional battle; whereas the SADF was using the same forces for different tasks. The Al brigades will still be operating under well-established and functional logistic doctrine. But two issues remain. One, the link between the STRIKE and AI brigades’ logistic operations must be as seamless as possible. Two, the STRIKE brigades must not allow their logistic concerns to make them ineffective in a conventional scenario. Both of these concerns are about the relationship between conventional and STRIKE CSS. The salient lesson going forward must be that while STRIKE requires its own CSS doctrine, knowledge and practice of conventional CSS doctrine must not be forgotten in STRIKE specialisation.

Also, the ability for the two CSS systems to operate together, seamlessly, either in sequence or parallel must be the focus of further study.

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Russian T55 tank

Another area where the British Army should avoid mistakes made by the SADF, is based on current doctrine on logistic IS and management. Scholtz paints a bleak and confusing picture of the logistic system as a whole. Poor management caused waste, delay and failure; the ultimate cause, being a lack of overall command and control of the logistic system. Given the constantly evolving and adapting state of operational practice at that time, amongst the SADF, it is not surprising that the logistic system failed to keep up.

While it would be hubristic to presume the British Army is immune to these failings, there are some factors in its favour.

Modern IT, decades of operational practice and the forethought currently going in to anticipating such failures, all mitigate against such problems arising.

An unqualified take-away from the SABW, for STRIKE CSS, is the need for CSS elements to be deeply embedded in the fighting units. This will require a substantial change in mindset and culture for CSS units. There can be no safe rear areas for the CSS units retire to after doing their part. They will remain attached to fighting units for extended periods of time. The time and effort required to back-load irreparable equipment or wounded will be have to be finely judged against other tactical considerations. Austerity and personal physical endurance will need to be bywords for enabling units as much as for fighting ones. Without a reserve line or fortified FOB to which to return, these conditions can be expected to lead to combat fatigue among all units. Robust and realistic training will lessen this risk. STRIKE CSS soldiers must also learn to take on the STRIKE mindset of independence, initiative, and innovation. Austerity and hardship will see the fighting arms looking to the enabling arms to solve greater problems with finite resources.

Flexibility, adaptability, and the ownership of problems must become embedded in the cultural DNA of STRIKE CSS units.

Similarly, smaller and more dispersed packets will place a higher burden on logisticians. Junior commanders will need to take on more responsibility and be able to operate more independently. A higher operational tempo will mean less sleep and comfort. Greater dispersion and a higher threat level will demand more agile and creative thinking under pressure, as well as impeccable fieldcraft and navigation.

While the SADF’s mobile combat groups are far from a perfect analogy for the STRIKE brigades, they must be respected as pioneers in light mechanised warfare. Their

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successes against a complex and well-equipped enemy are impressive. The move from a conventional British-inspired doctrine to an indigenous doctrine tailored for the exact terrain and enemy they were fighting, was a bold move by the SADF. This pioneering spirit became ingrained in the mobile battalion groups; they wrote their own doctrine whilst in combat.

The logistic plan was conceived similarly, with equally interesting results. Keeping a light and mobile force sustained requires a great deal. Foresight and planning are key, coupled with deep integration and communication of the CSS plan.

The essential but unglamorous world of consignment tracking, logistic command and control and assurance that if done badly, it can bring an entire battlegroup to a standstill, must be uppermost in commanders’ minds. Techniques such as pre-positioning key commodities, maximising local resources and finely balancing the quantities of ammunition required, must be embraced if STRIKE CSS is to work. Air must be utilised for resupply. A tight-knit culture of endurance, cohesiveness, and problem-solving must be incubated in the nascent STRIKE brigades. Leadership must be robust enough to remain calm and supportive of subordinates in solving problems, while staying aggressive and tenacious in the attack.

References British Army (2017) STRIKE Sustainment CONOPS CONUSE V 0.7 British Army (2016) DSTL/CR099025 V1.0 – STRIKE Capping Paper Summary of Analysis De Vries, R (2013) Eye Of The Firestorm, Helion and Co. De Vries, R. (2015) The Influence Of The Ratel Infantry Fighting Vehicle On Mobile Warfare In Southern Africa Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 43, No. 2, 2015, pp. 174–186.

Heitman HR (2006) Equipment of the Border War. Journal for Contemporary History 31 (3), pp 91–111 Hugo A (ed) Operations, 61 Mech Battalion Group Veterans Association website, http://www.61mech.org.za/operations/, accessed 05/10/2019 Lloyd-Williams, R & Burdett, S (2017) STRIKE CSS Study Report, Analysis Support Construct, Crown Owned Copyright.

Miranda, J. (2016) Border War: South Africans on the Angolan Frontier, Modern War Vol 23.

Morris, M.F. (2000) Flying Columns in Small Wars: An OMFTS Model at. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a526489.pdf.

Owen, W.S. (2017) Explaining the British Army’s Strike Concept, Vol. 37, No. 4 4 RUSI Newsbrief.

Scholtz, L. (2006) The Namibian Border War: An Appraisal Of The South African Strategy Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 34, Nr 1.

Scheepers, M(2014) Striking Inside Angola With 32 Battalion, Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 42, Nr 1, 2014, pp.

139-144.

Stenning, Z. R. (2018) The STRIKE Handbook Version 1.

Footnotes 111

De Vries, R., in Hugo A (ed) Operation Daisy, 61 Mech Battalion Group Veterans Association website, http://www.61mech.org.za/operations/ operation-daisy, accessed 05/10/2019 112 Watling J and Bronk J (2019) Strike: From Concept to Force, Occasional Papers, RUSI 113 Savides T, (2019) Personal correspondence 114 Ibid 115 Heitman HR (2006) Equipment of the Border War. Journal for Contemporary History 31 (3), pp 91-111

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116

Miranda, J. (2016) Border War: South Africans on the Angolan Frontier, Modern War Vol 23.

117 Reinecke M in Hugo A (ed) Operation Mebos, 61 Mech Battalion Group Veterans Association website, http://www.61mech.org.za/operations/ operation-meebos, accessed 05/10/2019 118 Ibid 119 Ibid 110 Reinecke M in Hugo A (ed) Operation Mebos, 61 Mech Battalion Group Veterans Association website, http://www.61mech.org.za/operations/ operation-meebos, accessed 05/10/2019

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111

British Army (2016) DSTL/CR099025 V1.0 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; STRIKE Capping Paper Summary of Analysis 112 Morris, MF (2000) Flying Columns in Small Wars: An OMFTS Model, US Marine Corps Command And Staff College 113 Morris, MF (2000) Flying Columns in Small Wars: An OMFTS Model, US Marine Corps Command And Staff College 114 Scholtz, L. (2006) The Namibian Border War: An Appraisal Of The South African Strategy Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 34, Nr 1.

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Rum Doodle logistics: Lessons from the exploratory era of Himalayan mountaineering The novel, The Ascent of Rum Doodle, is an outrageously funny parody of exploratory expeditions to the Himalayas, in the first half of the 20th Century. Narrated by the reliably under-informed ‘Binder’, the book is a first person account of how a team of seven British men, including: ‘Dr Prone’ (constantly ill), ‘Jungle’ the route finder (constantly lost), ‘Constant’ the linguist (constantly arguing) and 3,000 ‘Yogistani’ porters set out to conquer Mount Rum Doodle; the highest (albeit fictitious) peak in the world, standing at forty thousand and a half feet, above sea-level.

By Lt Simon Smith The Ascent of Rum Doodle, was written by William Ernest Bowman, has long been a cult favourite amongst mountaineers, since its initial publication in 1956; three years after Mount Everest (a mere 29,030 ft in comparison) was successfully climbed by the New Zealander, Sir Edmund Hillary and his Sherpa, Tensing Norgay.

Bowman’s parody is a ‘must read’ and has prompted deeper thought on ‘expeditionary logistics’, both in the context of the fictitious ascent of Rum Doodle and in the context of real-world mountaineering. By using the military principles of logistics (flexibility, agility, cooperation, efficiency and simplicity) as a framework, this article seeks to discuss what military logisticians can learn from the exploratory era of Himalayan mountaineering.

Foresight Logistic foresight is the ability to predict and circumvent critical logistic constraints to the Commander’s freedom of action (RLC Operational Handbook, 2007, p. 25). The following quote from The Ascent of Rum Doodle summarises Binder’s own plan with respect to his predicted logistic constraints: ‘The object of the expedition was to place two men on the summit of Rum Doodle. This necessitated the establishment of a camp at 39,000 feet stocked with a fortnight’s supplies for two, so that in the event of adverse weather conditions the party could wait in comfort for an improvement. The equipment for this camp had to be carried from the railhead at Chaikhosi, a distance of 500 miles. Five porters would be needed for this. Two porters would be needed to carry the food for these five and another would carry the food for these two. His food would be carried by a boy. The boy would carry

First Edition front cover of ‘The Ascent of Rum Doodle’

by W. E. Bowman

his own food. The first supporting party would be established at 38,000 feet, also with a fortnight’s supplies, which necessitated another eight porters and a boy. In all, to transport tents and equipment, food, radio, scientific and photographic gear and personal effects, and so on, 3,000 porters and 375 boys would be required (Bowman, 1956).’

This is of course utterly ludicrous logic. Nevertheless, as the old Sandhurst adage goes, ‘the plan is nothing, planning is everything’ and, of course, the team succeed in ascending Rum Doodle. Binder’s logic was not only flawed, it also did not ‘survive contact’. On arrival at Chaikhosi, the team were not greeted at the railhead by 3,000 porters and 375 boys.

Instead, they were greeted by 30,000 porters and 375 boys; a mishap ultimately due to the similarity of the Yogistani words for three and thirty and ultimately blamed on the team’s inept linguist, Constant. It is easy to criticise Binder’s flawed logic, however, initial expeditions into the most remote regions of the Himalayas did have long supply chains, requiring the extensive use of local porters, guides THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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and animals. Furthermore, Binder’s objective planning mindset, focussing on placing two men on the summit of Rum Doodle, not only draws parallels with real-world exploratory logistical planning as discussed below, but also with the ‘outcome/objective/effect/action’ framework often used within the military planning process to draw out second and third order analysis of a military problem.

There was also an essential requirement to identify constraints and logistic demands as part of an extensive planning and reconnaissance process. In the exploratory era of Himalayan mountaineering, reconnaissance was often the primary means of gathering information to inform planning and enable future expeditions. For example, the objective of the 1921 Everest Reconnaissance Expedition, led by Colonel Charles Howard Bury, was to explore the approaches to Mount Everest and ascertain whether, in Binder’s words from The Ascent of Rum Doodle, the mountain would ‘go’ (Parker, 2013). A year later in 1922, General Sir Charles Bruce, who served with the 5th and 6th Gurkha Rifles, led the first attempt on Everest from the north side of the mountain. His expedition team was informed, prepared and equipped for the challenge as a result of the reconnaissance expedition in 1921. The expedition team comprised of 13 European climbers but was supported by approximately 40 Sherpas, 5 Gurkha soldiers, and 160 Tibetan porters (Parker, 2013); not quite the 3,000 porters utilised in the fictitious Rum Doodle expedition, but still a considerable amount of labour to operate an extensive supply chain.

Image John Henderson

Association, 2017). However, with advances in modern technology and weather forecasting techniques, there is no doubt that the Brigade of Gurkhas’ team had better foresight of the weather and route requirements than their pioneering predecessors over 60 years ago. In 2017, efforts from the official rope-fixing team had repeatedly stalled at the South Col and The Balcony (around 8,500m) and there was no indication when the next effort would be made to fix the route to the summit given the prevailing weather and conditions. Six-time Everest summiteer and widely respected Everest expedition guide, Tim Mosedale, said of his own team’s summit success: “This wouldn’t have been possible without the tremendous effort of the fixing team and the plan that was composed by the Gurkha team. The key element of this was the willingness and strength of the team [of Gurkhas] who forged ahead. They worked relentlessly for the benefit of all the climbers and expeditions here at Everest Base Camp. If the route hadn’t been put in by the Gurkhas, then the next weather window would have been a wasted summit opportunity.’” (Gurkha Brigade Association, 2017). Mosedale’s comments are testament to the Gurkha team’s strength, resilience and flexibility, which will now be discussed under the banner of ‘agility’.

The 1953 Everest Expedition’s Sherpa party loaded with supplies en route for Base Camp; a typical supply chain required to sustain the expeditions of the era

The 1922 Everest expedition team only reached a height of 8,225 metres and, if Binder had been on this expedition, I suspect that he would have said that the mountain did not ‘go’. However, their time spent in recce was not wasted; the team set a benchmark height for consequent expeditions to break through and established the logistic requirements to enable the next expedition to the region in 1924 (which infamously involved the disappearance of George Mallory and Sandy Irvine high on Everest on 8 June 1924).

The importance of foresight can again be highlighted with reference to the Brigade of Gurkhas’ successful attempt on Everest in 2017. The 2017 Everest season was marked as one of the most difficult in recent years, due to difficulties in forecasting the weather; the trend being for short weather windows and marginal snow conditions (Gurkha Brigade 134

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Agility Logistic agility provides Commanders with the ability to respond quickly to the unexpected, maintain sharpness of thought, remain effective under arduous conditions, be flexible in overcoming the unforeseen and adjust rapidly to change (RLC Operational Handbook, 2007). Agility encompasses the attributes of responsiveness, resilience, acuity and adaptability as well as flexibility and is widely used throughout the United Kingdom’s Defence Doctrine (2014, p.50).

I argue that the exploratory expeditions in the Himalayas in the first half of the 20th Century were, in fact, not particularly agile and that this was primarily due to a lack of foresight and knowledge of anticipated routes and logistic constraints. The fact that the first attempt on Everest in 1922 involved a supply chain of some 160 porters and 40 Sherpas highlights the cumbersome nature of early expeditions (Parker, 2013, p.75). However, they needed to be cumbersome due to the vast unknowns; routes were not known, obstacles

Eric Shipton was a pioneer of mountaineering agility. For him small was beautiful when it came to Himalayan expeditions

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were not known, the amount of time required on the mountaineering objectives were not known.

During the first British reconnaissance of Everest’s southerly approaches in Nepal in 1951, the great Himalayan mountaineering pioneer, Eric Shipton, was halted from further progress into the Western Cwm, due to large crevasses and steep slopes at the top of the Khumbu Icefall (Shipton, 1952, p.617). His team did not have the necessary equipment (e.g. ladders) to tackle such large crevasses and with the colder winter weather approaching, they lacked the necessary clothing equipment to stay warm. In a similar vein, the Swiss Everest Expedition in 1952 ultimately failed because they were not logistically agile: their oxygen sets, designed for miners, failed when they crossed into the ‘Death Zone’ above 8000m; and when they reached the South Col, they had insufficient tents and supplies to mount an effective assault on the summit (Parker, 2013, p.107).

Indeed, mountaineering history would have been written very differently had Charles Evans’ closed-circuit oxygen set not malfunctioned during his and Tom Bourdillon’s summit attempt on Everest two days before Sir Edmund Hillary and Tensing Norgay made their successful attempt in 1953.

As a point of interest, Evans and Bourdillon were 90 metres short of the Everest summit before they were forced to turn back due to Evans’ oxygen set malfunction. History has forgotten them, yet their efforts paved the way for success

by Hillary and Norgay, who instead of using closed-circuit oxygen sets, which used less oxygen but were more prone

Sir Edmund Hillary crossed the final large crevasse at the entrance to the Western Cwm in 1953. It thwarted Eric Shipton's expedition in 1951 because they did not take large ladders

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Tom Bourdillon and Charles Evans’ Everest summit attempt in 1953 might have succeeded had Evan’s oxygen set not malfunctioned. Sir Edmund Hillary and Tensing Norgay used open circuit oxygen sets

to failure, used the older open-circuit oxygen sets, which although used more oxygen, were less prone to failure. If Charles Evan’s oxygen set had not malfunctioned, then it would most likely be Evans’ and Bourdillon’s names written into the history books instead of Hillary’s and Norgay’s.

The use of technical equipment during the exploratory era of mountaineering has shown the importance of having equipment that is not only fit for purpose, but also serviceable. If we translate this lesson to a military logistic context, it does beg the question as to why the British Army is still using DROPS, which constantly break down, are dangerously slow and cannot mount or dismount ISO containers that have come to define modern logistics since the ‘Container Revolution’ in the 1960s; a discussion for another article perhaps!

To some extent, it could be argued that the cumbersome nature of early expeditions provided a degree of agility and flexibility in the largely unknown circumstances; yet, as knowledge of the remote regions of the Himalayas grew through reconnaissance, so too did the requirement to adapt a more agile mountaineering and logistic approach. Eric Shipton was an early pioneer of the fast and light mountaineering approach that has now come to define modern Alpinism. ‘Fast and light’ is all the rage in modern mountaineering, with ‘siege tactics’ often scorned at by those in favour of what is colloquially referred to as ‘true alpine style’. By keeping baggage to a minimum and dispensing of the need for local porters during his expedition to the Nanda Devi Sanctuary in 1934, Shipton (1936, p.21) demonstrated that smaller teams could access and be sustained in remote Himalayan regions at a fraction of a cost of the larger, more cumbersome expeditions. Indeed, Shipton led a reconnaissance expedition to the northern aspects of Everest in 1935 at one tenth the cost of a similar reconnaissance expedition to the region in 1933 (Parker, 2013, p.84); his conclusion being, ‘small is beautiful’ when it comes to mounting successful Himalayan expeditions.

I believe that the British Army has been poor to adopt this ‘small is beautiful’ mantra. During 101 Logistic Brigade’s primary exercise in 2019, Ex IRON VIPER, 10 QOGLR were constrained by rigid movement control windows and a desire to create convoys of ten vehicles. Furthermore, both the THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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desire to achieve a deception effect, via the establishment of a second bulk fuel installation and the desire to utilise quad-bikes for internal transport within the DSA, placed a large burden on an already limited lift capability. 10 QOGLR had ‘more loads than lift’ and, as such, it was far from agile.

Perhaps military logisticians could take heed of the ‘small is beautiful’ mantra by enabling more flexibility in terms of movement control windows and convoy size and through a greater consideration of a unit’s own logistic burden (i.e. one quad-bike utilises the same lift as one FLRT, yet the latter is arguably far more useful). By reducing our own logistic need and by creating more freedom of manoeuvre through smaller convoys, logistic units could become more agile in a similar fashion to the fast and light approach that has defined modern Alpinism.

Cooperation It is widely accepted within the UK’s Defence Doctrine (2014, p.50) that team-work and enhanced cooperation can greatly assist in solving military problems. One can draw parallels with the employment of local porters and Sherpas in a mountaineering context, with the employment of Locally Employed Contractors (LECs) throughout the British Army’s modern-day operations. Within a mountaineering context, one may point to the example set by General Sir Charles Bruce during the early Everest expeditions in 1922 and 1924.

A fluent Nepali speaker, Bruce was skilful in bridging the cultural divides between Sherpas and Sahibs and was particularly liked by locals who appreciated his language skills. He empowered porters to work for him during the 1922 Everest Expedition, enthusing them with an esprit de corps and christening the most hardened high-altitude porters as his ‘Tigers’. In a similar vein, young officers serving at 10 QOGLR are required to undertake the Survival Nepali Language Course in Nepal, so that they have a baseline understanding of Nepali language and culture. The

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overall intent of this training is to enhance the cooperation between British young officers and Gurkha soldiers.

In Shipton’s (1938, p.173) account of his remote expeditions to the Karakoram in ‘Blank on the Map’, he comments on how he utilised Sherpas during expedition preparation phases: ‘The Sherpas took a leading part in our shopping [and] would not allow us to buy anything which they considered to be expensive.’ Anyone who has been to the Himalayas, will be able to sympathise with this outlook, given the near constant fear of being ripped off at local markets, simply for being Western. As such, enhanced cooperation with locals can lead to efficiency and financial savings in logistics. Within the realm of military contracting, such enhanced language skills and a good rapport with locals, could enhance the intended logistical effect and bring about efficiency savings.

The recent experiences of the British Gurkhas on Everest in 2017, again point to the benefits of enhanced cooperation within logistical and operational planning. The strong rapport between the Gurkha soldiers, local Sherpas and guides working on Everest for the 2017 climbing season, enhanced the Gurkha team’s logistic and operational effect. In the words of the Brigade of Gurkha’s expedition leader, the Gurkhas: “Pretty much owned the mountain in 2017” (Todd, 2018). This enhanced their reputation as ‘enablers’ on the mountain, by being able to work more effectively with Sherpas and guides during the rope fixing phase and also, as crucial coordinators in the recovery of Ueli Steck’s body, following his tragic fall whilst solo climbing on Nuptse’s north face. Due to the strong rapport between Gurkhas, Sherpas and commercial guides working on Everest in 2017, the recovery of Ueli Steck’s body was conducted with minimal logistic effort; utilising shared recovery assets (including a helicopter to recover the body). In other words, there was an integrated support capability operating on Everest during the climbing season for all climbing parties, not simply one

General Sir Charles Bruce (front row fourth from left) with members of his 1922 Everest Expedition team. He was well respected by locals and a fluent Nepali speaker. His rapport and cooperation with locals were significant enabling factors for his expedition on the northern flanks of Everest. He contracted malaria during the 1924 expedition to Everest and was evacuated from the region, handing over leadership to Lieutenant General Edward Norton (back row third from left).

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team. It must, therefore, be reminded that the principles of logistics are not independent and, instead, are very much interlinked. In this case, enhanced cooperation, led to enhanced efficiency.

Efficiency Logistic efficiency involves achieving the maximum level of support for the least logistic effort and making best use of finite resources, transportation assets and Lines of Communication (LOC) (RLC Operational Handbook, 2007, p.

25). Perhaps the most useful logistic asset in the realm of mountaineering is people themselves; it is people that climb mountains and it is people that are often used to transport loads into remote regions on foot. Perhaps the most eminent mountaineer to recognise this was Brigadier John Hunt. He is most remembered for leading the British Everest Expedition in 1953, which famously resulted in Hillary and Norgay being the first people to return from the summit. We often refer to logistic efficiency with respect to G4 requirements, yet Hunt realised that logistic efficiency could also be achieved via efficient leadership and the delegation of tasks and responsibilities (Parker, 2013, p. 109). Within his expedition team, every Western climber was delegated a particular area of responsibility, in a manner similar to the way Binder formed his team for the ascent of Rum Doodle (i.e. a medic, linguist, navigator, scientist, lead climber etc.).

This arguably resulted in empowered team members who had individual responsibilities, not merely tasks. Perhaps the British Army could learn from this approach. Perhaps the delegation of not just tasks, but also responsibilities (within reason) could be considered as a means to significantly enhance team empowerment at the lowest level, just as Hunt successfully did.

As already alluded to, Eric Shipton was a fantastic pioneer of the fast and light approach to mountaineering and there is perhaps no better example to turn to, when considering how to make G4 related efficiency savings. In his account of remote expeditions in the Karakoram, Blank on the Map, Shipton (1938, p.171) wrote: ‘The first essential efficiency in planning, is to avoid taking any item of equipment not strictly necessary, and to see that every man in the party has his own particular job and that no one is redundant. In determining what clothes and equipment are necessary for the safeguard of health and efficiency and what items are superfluous one must rely on actual experience. One man, for instance, may find that he needs four sweaters to keep him warm at high altitudes; another may find that he is comfortable with two – should he take four, he is burdening the expedition unnecessarily.”

Again, perhaps the British Army could learn from Shipton’s approach. Perhaps the British Army’s obsession with rigid kit lists is at the detriment to logistic efficiency. On a recent exercise to Germany in the winter of 2019, I noted that the amount of warm kit worn by a soldier of Caribbean descent was vastly different to a soldier of Scottish origin, with significantly greater natural insulation; yet both soldiers were required to carry a rigid kit list. This inflexible approach, when

The late Ueli Steck was a modern pioneer of the ‘true alpine style’

replicated across a sub-unit meant that it was by no means ‘fast and light’, with superfluous kit becoming a burden on its logistic efficiency. Perhaps an intent-focussed approach to G4 planning is the solution to enhancing logistic efficiency. This would provide individuals and junior commanders with freedom of manoeuvre within the G4 space. For example, if the intent is that a soldier must be able to stay warm on ‘stag’, then he or she must only carry the warm kit that they know they need. As Shipton (1938, p.171) suggested, this requires both knowledge and experience, which when transposed to a military context, provides a strong rationale for greater training opportunities at the lowest level.

Simplicity In the military, the benefits of being ‘fast and light’ are often self-explanatory, yet we often do not stick to it as a mantra.

In a logistic context, for example, the ‘fast and light’ mantra is often overlooked, with large protected logistic manoeuvres and large, static distribution points commonly being the tactical norm. In light of new potential threats such as longrange mass artillery fires, contested airspaces and drone reconnaissance, it could be argued that a faster and lighter approach, involving smaller convoys and non-static distribution points, not only has tactical advantage, but is also simpler, requiring fewer coordinating instructions.

In the context of Himalayan mountaineering, some of the most notorious ascents have been the simplest, utilising a ‘fast and light’ alpine style approach. There is no better example than the exploits of Maurice Herzog and his French team during the first successful summit of an 8,000m peak, Annapurna in 1950. They climbed the mountain without the use of oxygen in an ‘alpine style’ 24-hour summit bid from a high camp at 7,400m, having not reconnoitred the mountain previously in great detail (Herzog, 1951). In a similar vein, Ueli Steck’s 28-hour solo of Annapurna’s south face in 2014, was arguably the pinnacle of his ‘fast and light’ mountaineering career. More recently, British mountaineer, Tom Livingstone found a new route up the north ridge of Latok I (7,145 m), a much sought-after climbing route for modern pioneers of fast and light alpinism. Such notorious climbs demonstrate how simplicity in planning, preparation, route selection and, ultimately, decision making have been at the heart of ‘fast and light’ alpinism. Yet it is perhaps THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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worthy to end on the caveat, that such simplicity in mountaineering is often not without consequence; Herzog’s team suffered horrendous frostbite during their descent from Annapurna; Ueli Steck died after solo climbing on Nuptse in 2017 and, most recently, Tom Livingstone died in an avalanche on Nanga Parbat in 2019. In a military context, one can learn from this through the implementation of robust control measures and foresight of the potential risks involved, regardless of how simple a plan may seem.

particularly with respect to local populations and accurate forecasting, often informed through ground reconnaissance.

Such concluding remarks are tenable, both in the context of Himalayan mountaineering and military logistics and therefore, I conclude by suggesting that the British Army could do more to enforce its logistic principles, it could increasingly turn to examples from exploratory mountaineering history as inspiration for more innovative thinking within the realm of military logistics.

Conclusion Rum Doodle may be a fictitious mountain, but, for me, Bowman’s (1956) book is a fantastic parody of real-world mountaineering that provokes thought from a logistics perspective on how Binder and his team, could have gone about their expedition in a better way. I have deliberately used the ‘FACES’ framework to discuss examples and potential lessons for each logistic principle in turn, yet if expeditionary logistics can teach military logisticians one thing and one thing only; it is that the principles of logistics are very much inter-linked. The ‘fast and light’ alpine approach to mountaineering expeditions has been a recurring motif throughout this article and simplicity, agility and efficiency are key principles at the heart of the approach. My discussion has also highlighted the need for simplicity in planning, efficient cooperation and leadership,

References Bowman, W. E., 1956. The Ascent of Rum Doodle. London: Vintage Classics.

Gurkha Brigade Association, 2017. Gurkha Everest 2017 – Latest Updates [Online]. Available at: https://www.gurkhabde.com/events/gurkhaeverest-2017/ [accessed 01/05/2019].

JDP 0-01.

UK Defence Doctrine [Online]. Available at: https:// assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att achment_data/file/389755/20141208-JDP_0_01_Ed_5_UK_ Defence_Doctrine.pdf [accessed 01/05/2019].

Parker, P., 2013. Himalaya: The Exploration and Conquest of the Greatest Mountains on Earth. London: Conway.

RLC Operational Handbook, 2007.

Shipton, E., 1936. Nanda Devi. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Shipton, E., 1938. Blank on the Map. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Shipton, E., 1952. The Mount Everest Reconnaissance Expedition 1951.

London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Todd, A., 2018. The Gurkha Everest Expedition 2017. 4 May 2018.

Winchester: Gurkha Museum [Speech].

Digital Transformation of the Support Network

www.tvsscs.com info@tvsscs.com +44 (0)1257 265531

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OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Logistics and rebasing - The Defence Estates Optimisation Programme The Defence Estates Optimisation Programme and more specifically, the Generated Force sub-programme, is a significant activity and should be of great interest to The RLC.1 It will affect the Corps to a considerable degree. This article will highlight this, along with the importance of logisticians being involved in major infrastructure projects of this type; the two should walk hand in hand.

By Maj Colin Taylor Employing some high-calibre RLC SO2s or SO1s into the delivery teams of the DEO(GF) Programme could have a disproportionate benefit to the future of the Corps, whilst reducing the possibility of some negative impacts. Likewise, the current assistance to DEO at regimental level should be sustained. Before elaborating on this, the role of Army Basing and the DEO Programme must be examined.

There are two key strands to activity governed by the Directorate of Basing and Infrastructure (DB&I or B&I), a 2-star Army HQ directorate headed by Major General Richard Wardlaw OBE. These strands are rebasing and business as usual (BAU). DEO is the former. Like the ongoing Army Basing Programme (exiting from Germany) before it, DEO will involve the wholesale movement of numerous units and formations of all cap badges to rationalise the Army estate.

DEO as a programme was created to deliver the Better Defence Estates (BDE) Strategy (formerly Footprint Strategy 2 (FS2)) which was announced in November 2016.2 DEO will also provide new or refurbished infrastructure to deliver the changes for Army 2020 Refine (A2020R).

DEO is ultimately endeavouring to both reduce the running costs of the estate, by reducing the number of sites, whilst benefiting the state by releasing MoD land to meet government housing targets. The programme will also see the co-location of certain Army capabilities at specific sites to enable cap-badge and capability hubs. The costs of reproviding infrastructure to enable the move of units should release sales receipts for land at the vacated disposal sites.

The projects within the programme have been placed into ‘waves’. Initial government funding to pay for the early waves will release disposal receipts to enable those later waves to occur.

As this article concerns DEO, it will look at rebasing. BAU involves the management and more modest changes to the

Better Defence Estates Strategy at a glance

estate, from fixing problems to improving infrastructure. This area has its own significant challenges as very finite infra funding must be employed where it can provide the greatest effect. BAU concerns the standard of the existing estate and this will affect our soldiers and is a daily issue for the quartermasters of our regiments. Perverse logic has been applied to previous strategic infra decisions which have seen false economies and short-term benefits being reaped at the expense of long-term solutions. The situation is starting to improve, but it will not stabilise overnight. DEO will only solve BAU problems where aged or dilapidated barracks are disposed of and units moved to newer sites. DEO is not funded to address legacy issues with retained sites. However, beyond the lived experience of our personnel, BAU will not drastically change how and where our Corps is based.

At the time of writing, the DEO(GF) delivery team in B&I is only 62% manned.3 The GF sub-programme comprises the lion’s share of the whole DEO Programme and is coordinating the delivery by the DIO of a programme worth approximately £4.5Bn.4 Some gaps are slowly being filled by recent board appointees and by FTRS personnel.5 The B&I THE REVIEW 2019-2020

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challenge select B&I on their E2 PPPs. Also, QMs and personnel from RLC regiments affected by DEO should continue to assist and engage with the B&I team.

Impact on the Corps â&#x20AC;&#x201C; The RLC will be significantly affected by DEO(GF) across future locations like Log South, Log North, Strike and Non-Infantry Basic Training. Future changes to the programme have potential to significantly change the siting and grouping of RLC units in the future.

Buckley Barracks, Hullavington

team comprises E2 postings and is a diverse cohort from various cap badges. Though the Sappers are predominant there is also representation from the Royal Armoured Corps, Infantry, Royal Artillery, REME and Royal Signals. The Army cohort is broadly split 50:50 between LE and DE officers and the department comprises both military personnel and civil servants and is the Army intelligent customer interface with DIO. If under-manning continues it will continue to impact on the delivery of DEO projects which will be of detriment to The RLC and wider Army.

The author would recommend that logisticians should be involved in rebasing and infrastructure because of four reasons which this study will examine. First, the delivery of DEO and previous and subsequent infra programmes will impact both on the locations and conditions of our units and capabilities. Second, decisions made by DEO will also affect and set precedents for, the infrastructure our soldiers experience and will affect their wellbeing and morale. Third, rebasing will require the logistic planning of significant transportation muscle moves which cannot afford to fail.

Fourth, officers and warrant officers of The RLC bring beneficial skills with them to B&I that will both enhance the team and improve the professional development and employability of individuals.

The author would recommend that The RLC support the establishment of B&I with E2 posts at SO2 and SO1 level. It is also recommended that individuals seeking an infra

Catterick Garrison and training area

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The RLC has undergone considerable changes under A2020R and much of this involves re-locating units. DEO(GF) comprehensively affects our Corps and will do so for many years to come. On one hand, 1 and 27 Regiments will merge with REME Battalions and ultimately end up in Catterick supporting the Strike Brigades. There has not been an RLC footprint there since the disbandment of 8 Regiment in about 2009. This will also reduce The RLC presence in Aldershot and remove The RLC association with St Davidâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Barracks, Bicester.

Likewise, there will be two other groupings of RLC regiments to provide both northern and southern logistic hubs. It could be suggested that RLC units are

Junior Officer or SNCO Single Living Accommodation standard design according to JSP 315

Junior Rank Single Living Accommodation standard design according to JSP 315

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OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

DEO(GF) underwent a major re-profiling exercise in the Autumn of 2018 to restructure the programme to make it achievable. This has led to the public ministerial announcement of some changes to sites, future locations of some units and delivery delays.8 Future restructuring might also be necessary and might significantly impact the siting and locations of RLC units. This is all despite future changes to the structure of The RLC and the wider Army.

Officers or SNCOs mess bar design from JSP 315 Building Performance Standards

disproportionally affected by DEO because several regiments are on airfield sites which offer significant land release opportunities by moving those units. Previously central sites for The RLC, e.g. Buckley Barracks, Hullavington and Dalton Barracks, Abingdon, potentially disappear under DEO. HQ 11 EOD&S Regiment and 421 Sqn may also move and co-locate with two Engineer EOD Regiments; two 11 Regiment EOD troops must also relocate when their current sites close.6 DEO(GF) also affects the Reserves; Grantham will close in 2024 and the two RLC major units there and a reserve squadron, must be re-housed.7 This project will co-locate Army Training Regiments (ATRs) from Grantham and Winchester into Pirbright which may affect both Regular and Reserve Basic Training for The RLC. Concurrently, under Project WELLESLEY, construction is also occurring at Worthy Down to allow the disposal of Deepcut. This activity does not come under either DEO or ABP; nor is the rebasing move of 25 Training Regiment to Leconfield included under DEO. It must be stressed that B&I will re-provision infrastructure and move all these regiments but it is ultimately delivering strategic decisions from BDES and A2020R. DEO but will be significantly involved in tactical-level decisions on where these units will be sited, what infra they will be provided and how much they may need to share with their neighbours.

The A2020R strategy and the DEO(GF) delivery baseline have stated the receiver sites for RLC units based on both current funding and knowledge of these sites. These projects will be examined by contractors employed as Technical Service Providers (TSPs) to conduct assessment studies (AS) of these sites. These studies will produce costed options for each project to enable an informed decision to be made. The assessment studies will look at infra needed by different units based on unit user requirement documents (URDs).

The results of these assessment studies may invalidate current baseline plans for RLC unit moves. AS results may necessitate a ‘Question Four’ moment and changes to the destinations of logistic units or how their infra is delivered (e.g. refurbishment or new build).

Experience of our soldiers – DEO will not only affect where our soldiers are based but also the quality of the infrastructure they receive. Land receipts might be lower than expected and re-provision costs may be higher; tradeoffs will be required. Making these trade-offs to remain in budget, or ‘value engineering’ as it has been termed, will see compromises over requirements and greater sharing between units. It may require the Army to bend to fit the infrastructure rather than vice-versa. DEO will also set precedents for future infra programmes.

There are complaints that the Army does not understand the needs of the so-called ‘Snowflake’ generation. B&I must predict the needs of un-named future generations who have neither been recruited yet, nor even been born yet, when committing to build infrastructure. What has been important for the lived experience of our soldiers in the past, or present, may not be the case in ten or twenty years. As an ongoing rebasing programme, DEO will set precedents that will affect the provision of new-build infrastructure for years to come.

Some of the main considerations for DEO are the Future Accommodation Model (FAM) and New Employment Model (NEM). Service personnel generally desire to purchase property and provide greater stability for family life. In line with FAM, DEO aims to group together units of the same capability and often the same cap badge. This should allow soldiers to purchase houses nearby and bounce between posts in these co-located RLC regiments as they progress through their careers. When providing future infrastructure, there is also the complexity of weaving in designs to address environmental and sustainability concerns. These concerns will undoubtedly become more prevalent over time. How do we incorporate charging points for electric cars or deliver greener energy for future barracks? Decisions and precedents set by DEO concerning units sharing facilities on sites or garrisons will also further impact The RLC. What is certain is that the future infrastructure will be delivered based on the key drivers of cost and capability.

With ‘capability’ The RLC, or specific regiments, may need to decide on where they believe the priorities for new-build infra should lie, i.e. what requirements can be traded and what are sacrosanct. When conducting such ‘value engineering’ to maximise the capability within the finite funding envelope, the Heads of Capability and units will be involved in making decisions to balance capability and cost.

For example, sharing mess public rooms with another unit might be favourable to shared technical infrastructure.

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offices) might enable a better result to be achieved elsewhere (i.e. better quality accommodation). Ultimately, the lived experience for our soldiers is important but encompasses infrastructure across the spectrum of livework-train; the morale boost of top quality SLA might be undermined by sub-standard office or working facilities.

Many such basing and infra decisions are still to come and will affect our soldiers.

Logistic planning – The major 2019 ABP muscle move is a missed opportunity for a logistic planning team to plan and conduct a complex international logistic move in support of rebasing activities. There are further opportunities for this in future years.

The ultimate, ‘pure’ logistic aspect of rebasing is the physical movement of a unit; the picking up of all of its soldiers, equipment and vehicles and dropping them at a new location in new or refurbished infrastructure. The clear logistic challenge of this physical movement is a definite area in which RLC officers should desire to be employed. By the time this article is published, this year’s movement of circa 11,000 soldiers, civil servants and dependents back from Germany and within UK, should have been completed. Log planning for this large muscle move commenced in mid-2017 within the DEO transition team under Op FARAN. Though this is a complex and significant logistic activity, it has predominantly been planned by a team consisting of a Royal Engineer SO1 and SO2 ably assisted by a Movement Control WO1.9 This plan has delivered the return of 20 Brigade and its supporting units from Germany and allowed the closure of barracks there to commence.

Some topical BrExit contingency planning added considerable uncertainty to this activity; DB&I initially made this a top priority for 2019. For an RLC SO1 or SO2 to have run such a major movement operation would have honed their staff skills and provided them with unique logistic experience. Such experience would be widely employable anywhere in the Corps in peacetime and on operations.

Similar logistic moves and coordination still need to occur in 2020 and beyond as part of subsequent DEO rebasing plans, albeit within the UK. Opportunities in B&I – There are opportunities for RLC staff officers to demonstrate their abilities and enhance their skills and experience in the Capability and Acquisition career stream by serving with B&I. Ex-QMs and those from more technical aspects of The RLC can bring experience and strong analytical skills and their ability to understand and explain complex problems whilst speaking truth to power.

It should be added that individual RLC officers posted to B&I will benefit the team and also themselves. The role will provide individuals with Capability and Acquisition experience and project management qualifications (Project Management Qualification (PMQ)10 and Managing Successful Programmes (MSP)) and experience. Though B&I offers 142

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Prince William of Gloucester Barracks, Grantham

opportunities for civilian accreditation, for wider employability and for networking, it should not be considered an easy ride into civilian employment. Future arrivals should not expect a graceful decline in work into resettlement.

Infrastructure at regimental level is not just QM business.

The RLC produces some talented and capable QMs who already understand the infrastructure aspect of B&I, or who may have been involved in previous site moves by units.

Though a balance is needed between DE and LE posts in B&I, ex-QMs can potentially bring a lot to the party as SO2s or SO1s. DIO civil servants and contractors bring both continuity and subject matter expertise to the programme.

At times, they can require a little patience to work with as they can sometimes work to different priorities and processes to ‘Green’ personnel, but are all part of the diverse B&I team. Generalist and technical RLC staff officers can bring their understanding, experience, planning and problem solving skills to help deliver a complex, multi-faceted change programme; the infrastructure aspect can be learnt along the way. Due to the previous lack of deep infra knowledge across the Army, RLC officers can perform with relative parity with their teeth arms peers, whilst bringing strong analytical skills to the party.

Conclusion B&I is both a challenging and a rewarding place to work where your endeavours will see improvements to the status quo and bring long-term benefits to our soldiers. The Corps should release SO2s and SO1s to B&I. The RLC will benefit in terms of improving the assurance about the future siting of RLC units whilst developing personnel and improving their qualifications and employability.

Some RLC personnel might be reticent about putting Army HQ, or B&I, on PPPs having heard negative comments about the site in the past. In the experience of the author, Army HQ was an enjoyable place to serve and B&I is a good 2* Directorate in which to cut one’s teeth. B&I is also grateful for the support shown by members of units who have assisted with requirements gathering and organising visits for B&I teams, contractors and other parties. Some B&I activities will be sufficiently slow-burning to require future incumbents in many units to similarly engage. All RLC personnel should consider the infra DLOD. Other cap badges may endeavour to lobby on their own behalf.

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The author has been peripherally involved in RLC rebasing activities, though it must be stressed that favour should not be shown to one cap badge over another. Having suitable RLC representation within the DEO delivery team may not see those participants directly working on Corps-related rebasing nor could they work on them at the expense of other DEO activities. Despite this, logisticians should be involved throughout DEO(GF) because the fortune of our Corps within DEO will be affected by the overall health of the programme. Any problems with cost, time and performance elsewhere in DEO(GF) will similarly impact on the delivery of projects close to our hearts. This could lead to compromise over infra provision; greater sharing, reduced flexibility, possible destination changes and a less-desirable lived experience for our soldiers.

Having a greater RLC presence in B&I will therefore benefit Defence, the Corps and its soldiers, whilst also benefitting the individual posted there.

References Army 2020 Refine Warning Order.

Better Defence Estates Strategy announcement 7 November 2016, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uplo ads/attachment_data/file/576401/Better_Defence_Estate_Dec16_Amend s_Web.pdf, accessed 29 May 2019.

Commander Field Army letter providing revised unit move dates out to 2024, dated 28 February 2019.

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Defence Estates Optimisation Programme update, 28 February 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uplo ads/attachment_data/file/782294/Estate_document_for_gov.uk.pdf, accessed 29 May 2019.

Footnotes 111

DEO(GF) has recently been reclassified as a programme in its own right.

Better Defence Estates Strategy announcement 7 November 2016, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uplo ads/attachment_data/file/576401/Better_Defence_Estate_Dec16_Amend s_Web.pdf, accessed 29 May 2019.

113 In the four Rebasing regional teams delivering ABP and GF there should be four SO1s and seven SO2s; there are currently three SO1s and three SO2s with a broadly 50-50 LE DE officer mix.

114 It must be added that information within this article is correct at time of writing in May 2019.

115 There has even been potential for captains to be considered for these roles.

116 Some DEO projects, such as the 11 EOD&S Regiment project, will likely move further into the future due to Army prioritisation.

117 If 102 Log Sp Bde is retained it will potentially be made homeless in 2024 when Grantham closes.

118 Defence Estates Optimisation Programme update, 28 February 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uplo ads/attachment_data/file/782294/Estate_document_for_gov.uk.pdf, accessed 29 May 2019. Commander Field Army letter providing revised unit move dates out to 2024, dated 28 February 2019.

119 WO1 Doughty.

110 Formerly APMP. 112

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How the Operating Environment Influences Styles of Leadership Throughout history, leaders have both been forged in the hostilities of war and moulded in the prosperity of peace. Both create a different kind of burden for leaders to bare, thus creating varied styles of leadership which have been used throughout history. When considering what leadership is, it has been described as an ever-evolving concept which in its simplest form is ‘seeing the good and bringing out the best in other people’ (Bennett, 2016). The focus of this essay will be on how the operating environment influences the style of leadership with reference to both modern and historic case studies and how this is relevant to the 21st century. By Lt Barnaby Tysoe On operations over the last century, there has been a clear pattern of commanders leaning towards a task orientated, transactional leadership style, as it results in direction being easily disseminated to subordinates who must know exactly what is required of them in order to achieve success. This transactional leadership style relies on a strict level of discipline from subordinates putting a far greater emphasis on the mission, (Waddell, 1994) often at the expense of the individual and the team (Adair, 1998).

Transactional leadership was demonstrated by General Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief of United States Central Command and all coalition forces in the Gulf War, during Operation DESERT STORM who took a, ‘When placed in

General Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief of United States Central Command

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command, take charge’ approach to leadership (Keith, 2009). He achieved overwhelming mission success by quelling inter-service squabbles and unifying natural rivals in the chain of command through developing common fear and animosity as a ‘Tyrant’ (Atkinson, 1994). This is a perfect example how transactional leadership is often suitable during active operations and can lead to resounding success.

This contrasts to the leadership styles that staff officers are perceived to have which is often seen as more bureaucratic and participative. This is due to the nature of the staff environment where policy is shaped and plans drafted, as opposed to real time objectives conquered. With some staff work going through many ranks of checking and editing before being published, it can seem as if the original will and direction of the author has been diluted and is out of touch with the reality of soldiering. However, it shouldn’t be assumed that just because a young officer has developed through the staff environment in peacetime that they are ill suited for the challenges of war.

Eisenhower is a textbook case study of how an officer made his appointments. His considerable administrative and political skills were soon noted and weighed heavily in the decision to appoint him as supreme Allied Commander, uniting the Allies and branches of the military (Tillman, 2014) through a bureaucratic and participative style to achieve the best outcome. This resulted in the success of Operation OVERLORD. This illustrates how both leadership styles vary in their approach; they are not mutually exclusive to each other and overuse of one could result in the detriment of the other.

There is a noticeable trend of leaders on operations taking a charismatic approach and creating an emotional bond between the leader and the led; this results in a more informal leadership style which has the greatest effect at a regimental level and below. This style conforms to the historical stereotype of a leader being powerful, omniscient

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Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Jones, VC, OBE, known as H. Jones, and a posthumous recipient of the Victoria Cross

and virtuous with a popular support that verges on dogmatic loyalty helping overcome the leadership difficulty of fear on operations (Janowitz, 1964). Lt Col Jones’ acts of selfless commitment at the Battle of Goose Green is a poignant case study of this, leading the charge on an Argentine trench after he realised the assault was on the verge of faltering. He charged the enemy trenches and was killed just short of the enemy position; this heroic deed inspired the battalion to assault up the ridge to take the enemy position and resulted in Lt Col Jones being awarded the VC posthumously. This emphasises the effect that a leader can have during kinetic operations; inspiring their men to follow them and achieve a tactical victory in a bleak situation. The caveat to this is that there is still an on-going debate to whether this was a true act of valour or a self-aggrandising attempt at glory as it left his battalion without its commander (Wilsey, 2003).

In recent years, the British Army has seen a culture shift post Operation TELIC and HERRICK; where there has been a move towards relationship orientated, visionary leadership, which places a greater emphasis on mission command with a less centralised approach to empower subordinates (Keith, 2009). This is even more relevant in the current era of the ‘Strategic Corporal', an idea that even junior ranks can enact actions that affect the UK’s wider Defence policy and strategic interests. US Marine General Charles Krulak first explored this in the ‘Three Block War’ concept where soldiers may have to change from war-fighting to peace-keeping to humanitarian relief, all within three city blocks (Krulak, 1999). This complex and rapidly evolving environment demands that command devolves to lower ranks to exploit time-critical information

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and apply it into the decision-making process. Ultimately, command must be delegated to JNCOs and platoon commanders for action as they are in the best position to make leadership decisions (Collins, 2004).

Under al-Zarqawi, Al-Qaeda in Iraq utilised this style of leadership far better than US and British forces during the 2003 Iraq war. Having a completely devolved and somewhat chaotic leadership style, this drove low level commanders to adapt to their battlespace and enact their central aims how they saw fit (McChrystal, 2015). As mentioned, this style of leadership is being implemented by the British Army with Short Term Training Teams (STTTs) that deploy around the world at Section level. Operating away from the traditional chain of command highlights the need for leaders to adopt a more flexible style of leadership to be able to adapt to the situation at hand. The caveat being that the chain of command must give clear direction as to their intent and boundaries so many small teams can work in a unifying effort with minimal interaction.

Leadership does not come in one form. This is self-evident when you ask what leadership is or try to express it into one distilled definition. It will adapt to the needs of the situation and is more often required to be flexible enough to react to the volatile and uncertain operating environments we are experiencing today. The rapidly changing nature of conflict suggests that a more traditional command structure and rigid adherence to one style of military leadership would struggle to keep up with the challenges of the modern battlefield. The empowerment of junior commanders and devolution of where command decisions are made is one of the most effective approaches to managing an army through operations or peacetime training. By instilling a doctrine of flexibility at all levels it enables any army to be ready to adapt to the challenges of the modern world.

References Adair, J. (1998). The John Adair Handbook of Leadership and Management.

London: Thorogood.

Atkinson, R. (1993). Crusade. New York: Mariner Books.

Bennett, R. (2016). The Light in the Heart. Amazon Epublished.

Collins, J, J. (2008). Choosing War: The decision to invade Iraq and its aftermath. Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University.

Janowitz, M. (1964). Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Ney York: Free Press.

Keith, S. (2009). Mission Command: Problem bounding or problem solving.

Canadian Military Journal, 9(4).

Krulak, C, C. (1999). The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block war. Marines Magazine, Air University.

McChrystal, S. (2015) Team of Teams. London: Penguin Books Tillman, B. (2014) D-Day Encyclopaedia. Chicago: Regnery History.

Waddell, D, E. (1994). A situational leadership model for military leaders.

Aerospace Power Journal, 3(4).

Wilsey, J. (2003). H Jones VC: The Life and Death of an Unusual Hero.

London: Arrow.

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Last year, you would have read about Op RUMAN and Defence’s contribution to the recovery of the British Virgin Islands after Hurricane Irma (Focus January 2018). Less glamourous and logistically more challenging is the humanitarian aid support Defence is providing to the world’s newest country; The Republic of South Sudan in sub Saharan Africa, under the auspices of Op TRENTON. Declared independent in 2011 by 2013, a political power struggle took the country into the South Sudanese Civil War. As many as 300,000 people are estimated to have been killed in the war and infant mortality runs at 10%. About three million people have been displaced in a country of 12 million.

The British Army’s Engineer Task Force currently deployed to South Sudan is made up of 25 units, over 400 service men and women, including reservists. Leading the Task Force is The Royal Engineers with additional elements drawn from the Infantry, Medical Corps, The RLC, REME, Royal Signals and The Royal Military Police (RMP). To sustain 400 individuals with food and water is a substantial logistics challenge, even before the mission task resources have to be delivered.

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Supporting the world‘s newest country, The British Army in South Sudan Logistics in the British Army never stops. You may be forgiven for thinking that the Army isn’t busy post Afghanistan, but in truth there are twenty plus live deployments around the world that all need supporting logistically.

By Col Gary Sullivan OBE First deployed in 2016, The Royal Engineers (RE) have been serving in Malakal, in the north of the country where the UK troops have carried out significant infrastructure work vital to the UN Mission, including camp construction, building drainage systems and perimeter security structures, as well as helicopter landing sites.

In Bentiu, they have built a new permanent hospital, providing medical care to for the 1800 UN personnel and clinical training to local

medical staff at the Bentiu State Hospital. At Kodok, on the banks of the Nile, the mission is to provide security that would encourage the population to return and reinvigorate the fishing industry that had prospered before the war.

In the rainy season, the roads all but disappear and the engineers have to rely on aircraft to deliver supplies.

To mitigate this single channel logistics route, The RE is building a port to allow the Nile to become a main supply route.

As it often is, the construction task was relatively simple, the working environment austere and the logistics more than a little bit challenging. A war torn, land locked country with almost no infrastructure, it is an impoverished country with limited resources. Add that to mix the bureaucracy of the UN, the national politics of South Sudan and the myriad of NGO’s competing for logistics lift and you need more than process, you need relationships.

The RE had to change the plan several times to adapt to local conditions, in addition to their core skills of construction that had to Op TRENTON is the humanitarian aid support Defence is providing to The Republic of South Sudan in sub Saharan Africa

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The Royal Engineers have been serving in Malakal carrying out significant infrastructure work vital to the UN Mission

Work has included camp construction, building drainage systems and perimeter security structures

All images are Crown Copyright

become diplomats and ambassadors as they integrated into the UN Mission and its many cultural idiosyncrasies.

The complexity of working in a high threat area cannot be understated and requires significant team effort, but as often, it is on the shoulders of the logistician that the responsibility for success rests - no supplies, no operation.

One such individual was Cpl Sam Sellen of The RLC, deployed to work as the sole Movement Controller as part of the Op TRENTON team. In this role he was responsible for planning and executing the movement of multi-national forces, and the facilitation of the supply chain, by land, air and sea.

Understanding the significant environmental and cultural constraints, he made immediate efforts to integrate into the multinational UN movements team.

He quickly developed rapport with the key stakeholders that in turn would allow him to solve problems facing the UK deployment. Through sheer force of character and experience, he was able to create spare capacity in the UN and other nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s transport assets to support the UK supply chain. As his reputation grew, Sellen soon found himself in meetings with the UN Chiefs of Supply and Transport for South Sudan, where he helped offer advice on how to optimise the use of air assets.

The logistics of Op TRENTON include replacing the 400 personnel every six months. Two years in and The RE led task force is making great progress, but their operation is to only to help sustain the UN operation. There is a much larger logistics challenge in for the UN, how

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to bring peace and prosperity to a country where six million people live on the edge of starvation?

8 About the author: Colonel Gary Sullivan OBE is a fellow of the CILT, Chairman of Wilson James Ltd and Commanding Officer of the Engineer

and Logistic Staff Corps (The Staff Corps). The Staff Corps is an Army unit providing advice, support, guidance and experience gained from seniority in Industry.

Col Sullivan would like to thank Captain Alex Martyniuk of 21 Engineer Regt for his support with this article.

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A G4 Practitioner’s View of Operation TANGHAM Operation TANGHAM is the overarching name given to the British Forces mission in Somalia. Within TANGHAM are five distinct Operations1 that account for the British contribution towards a much larger United Nations and African Union effort. The command, control and coordination of the United Kingdom’s activity in Somalia is pulled together by the central headquarters under Op TANGHAM. This is a small team of 13 personnel providing J1 to J8 support and the link back to the Permanent Joint Headquarters. The purpose of this article is to identify practices that could one day be carried over to other theatres and what possible risks have been discovered with this method of deployment.

By WO2 Antony Blissett

Somalia, officially the Federal Republic of Somalia is a country located in the Horn of Africa. In the late 19th century, the British and Italian empires established the colonies of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. In the interior, Mohammed Abdullah Hassan's Darwish repelled the British four times, forcing a retreat to the coast, before succumbing in the Somaliland campaign of 1920. In 1960, the two regions united to form the independent Somali Republic under a civilian government. The Supreme Revolutionary Council seized power in 1969 and established the Somali Democratic Republic, which collapsed in 1991 as the Somali Civil War broke out.

The British contribution is part of a much larger United Nations and African Union effort

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The UK’s activity in Somalia is pulled together by Op TANGHAM

The early 2000s saw the creation of interim federal administrations. The Transitional National Government (TNG) was established in 2000, followed by the formation in 2004, which re-established the military. In 2006, the TFG assumed control of most of the nation's southern conflict zones from the newly formed Islamic Courts Union (ICU).

The ICU subsequently splintered into more radical groups such as Al-Shabaab. By 2012, the insurgents had lost most of the territory that they had seized. A new provisional constitution was passed in August 2012, which reformed Somalia as a federation and the Federal Government of Somalia was formed and a period of reconstruction began in Mogadishu.2 Why are British Forces there?

The British Armed Forces play a key part in the British Government’s strategy for Somalia, namely that ‘an improved security environment in Somalia, ongoing engagement from the international community, including regional players and continuing improvements in government capacity, keeps Somalia on the path to becoming a stable and resilient country that does not provide a base for serious threats to UK interest.’3 The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) has set four objectives: • Develop Somali national security capabilities.

• Develop the Somali National Security Forces to be accountable and professional, capable of providing security in a human rights compliant manner and taking responsibility for security from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

• Develop the capability of AMISOM forces to defeat the alShabaab threat in Somalia and create the conditions for the transfer of security from the AMISOM dedication to the Somali National Security Forces.

• Provide targeted contributions to multi-lateral and multinational organisations.

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OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Defence end-state The Federal Government of Somalia security apparatus can provide a sustained enough security presence such that threats to the UK and UK interests emanating from Somalia are reduced to tolerable levels.

The five missions Op BACKWELL SST (Somali National Army (SNA) support team). The UK has a fifteen-man team focused on training the Somali National Army directly in Biadoa (South West State) at a newly built UN training centre. This is routinely reinforced by elements of the Specialised Infantry Battalion (SpIB). This is the Theatre main effort.

Op BACKWELL MST (Mission Support Team). There is a nine-man team embedded within the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Force Headquarters. Their purpose is to develop and enable effective command and control at the Force Headquarters level.

Op PRAISER (Support to the UN Political Mission).

There are three officers embedded within the UN political mission. They provide staff support and military advice to the Special Representative to the Secretary General. They can influence thinking in the UN and are responsible for several working groups.

Op CATAN (Support to the UN Field Mission). The largest British Army contribution (43) is embedded within the UN Field Mission. These soldiers are largely specialists in logistics, combat medical care, combat engineering, equipment support, and unmanned aerial systems. They are junior soldiers and officers who deliver training to the AMISOM force in these specialisms. This training enables the AMISOM force to be more effective while Somali sovereign capability is developed. The command team facilitates UN co-ordination.

Op MODEST (European Union Training Mission).

There are three officers and a civil servant embedded within the European Union Training Mission in Somalia. The officers regularly travel into Mogadishu, under the Italian contingentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s force protection, where they mentor planning and logistics within the Somali National Army HQ.

The role includes the ability to logistically enable UK MOD activity within Mogadishu International Airport (MIA)

Requirements of the role As the J4 Warrant Officer for Op TANGHAM, I worked directly to the theatre DCOS. The responsibilities of this role were to direct, resolve and coordinate J4 activities in support of UK FEs. This was achieved by providing first line and managing second line logistic support to British Forces. The J4 WO is the logistic SME and as such must be on hand to provide effective advice and assurance to all subordinate operations, while ensuring reports and returns on current and future J4 matters are transmitted in a timely fashion to PJHQ. Working to support the delivery of these aims with existing systems was a challenge. The theatre is at the end of one of the longest, and most fragile supply chains on earth. As a relatively small deployment in terms of personnel, TANGHAM does not attract the same resource of much larger deployments around the globe and due to this, solutions were regularly pulled together at short notice using the power of people and relationships and less dependent on IT or doctrine.

The ability to logistically enable UK MOD activity within Mogadishu International Airport (MIA) and provide advice to PJHQ to optimise the UK logistic footprint in-theatre for this function is essential. This includes liaising with UN and local contractors to maximise use of in-theatre resources; coordinate the movement of all equipment within and outside of theatre; controlling, distributing and resupplying stores and equipment to support Commander British Forcesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; intent and finally, carrying out the duties of Camp Sergeant Major for the main UK base location in MIA. At the time of my deployment, these were the specific support requirements for the individual missions that the J4 WO had to focus on:

Work includes liaising with UN and local contractors to maximise use of in-theatre resources

Op TANGHAM. All logistic activity in the support of the HQ mission had the J4 WO fingerprints on it. This included rented accommodation, real life support, conference bookings, arrivals and departures from theatre, issuing of body armour, med packs, weapon systems and ammunition, accounting and consignment tracking functions and providing J4 advice up, down and across the deployed force.

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Op CATAN. Having the bulk of the British force’s commitment, this mission also had the biggest J4 support requirement. I was required to order, track, receipt and deliver training and Equipment Support (ES) materiel. The training support they conducted used a lot of equipment however, storage media was sparse at the time. Only limited amounts of materiel could be ordered at a time which led to specifically timed orders to ensure a good flow of stock into theatre. This again became difficult with the last of availability in air frames to transport the required items from the UK for MIA. The current UK base now has ten ISO containers for general and ES stores allowing a stock holding level which leads to less strain on the air bridge.

Op MODEST. I had the opportunity to provide a spread of logistic experience and advice to this mission. An example of this involved deployment to an SNA base named Villa Baidoa in Mogadishu City to draft a storage area plan for a new warehouse built in the base. I accompanied an SO1 from the mission and met the base commander who gave me access to the warehouse. I produced a scaled draft on how the space could be best used and was later invited back once the materiel had been sourced. The plan I produced had been followed almost exactly and the base commander was pleased with the result.

Map of Somalia

my usual trade business. I believe visiting the other units prior to deployment is greatly beneficial in gaining the required breadth of knowledge to better prepare for what is needed in theatre. You must become a jack of all trades quickly.

Op BACKWELL SST. The main element of support in this instance was to order, track receipt and move stores and equipment into MIA and then have it transported forward to Baidoa. This proved to be a less than simple task due to a lack of UK owned air movement platforms. The procedure required all the equipment to be manifested in detail and carried by a member of the team acting as a custodian. It would be checked onto the flight as hold luggage and collected by the custodian at Baidoa. This has since been streamlined and improved using an in-theatre transport company contract.

Op BACKWELL MST. This team provide intricate advice and guidance to AMISOM HQ members to improve their planning and control of their multinational forces that are committed from African countries. I would offer J4 experience and knowledge to assist with logistic planning while maintaining their allocated portion of the fleet.

Op PRAISER. Due to this being a political mission, I was only required to provide minimal support. My main support to this mission was to ensure that they had the correct kit and equipment whilst assuring their J4 practices.

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This was one of the most challenging and demanding tours I have deployed on due to the requirement to have a wealth of knowledge across multiple aspects of logistics. I am a Logistic Specialist (Supply) by trade, that however was only one piece of the whole logistic requirement. I soon realised that I had to broaden my knowledge base and understand aspects of the postal, and movements and driver trades as I had to collect and distribute the post arriving and departing theatre, ensure the correct movement clearance for personnel and equipment and manage the military fleet to ensure mobility and transportation remained available. My understanding of finance, local resource management and contracts grew as this theatre didn’t use the traditional means of supply and a lot of what was required had to be sought from local suppliers.

Equipment and vehicles At the time of my tour, the only storage media consisted of two ISO containers to hold all the theatres’ stock. The downside to this was that the stock levels depleted before the next resupply.

The operational account now has ten ISO containers of stores which consist of ammunition, weapons, vehicle spares, medical supplies, valuable and attractive items, oils and lubes, consumables and welfare equipment. This can now hold a reasonable stock level to allow for any issues with deliveries and can maintain the missions between military inbound flight; this typically was a C17 which came in every six weeks.

Within theatre, there is a small vehicle fleet which consists of 27 platforms that form the materiel and personnel lift capability; it is provided by both military fleet and civilian contracts.

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The city of Mogadishu

What worked well During my tour, Op TANGHAM HQ was based out of the International Campus (IC) which provided feeding, accommodation and laundry services. The IC was the base location for multiple national forces and non-government organisations (NGOs), affording the ability for mutual support within the multi-agency and multi-national environment of Somalia and wider Joint Operating Area. The two Op BACKWELL teams and members of Op MODEST were also situated within the IC which allowed ease of communication where the dislocated missions sometimes proved an issue. The British Forces base location (SHAND) was under construction and housed some members of Op CATAN as this was in ideal proximity to the AMISOM forces which they produced training for. This build is now complete with technical and living accommodation better suited to the multiple mission requirements. The vast majority of British Forces in Somalia are now located there which allows for much better command and control while offering a single point of contact for British Forces in theatre.

MIA was not only home to military forces from all over the world, it was also occupied by a range of civilian businesses that offered a range of equipment and services. Being located close to these companies allowed contracts to be negotiated and tendered from a choice of providers.

Contracts providing hire vehicles, catering services, RLS and guard forces were all sourced in close vicinity to the service providers.

Having small teams deployed to specific missions allowed for better command and control while requiring less of a logistic burden. There was minimal demand on movement of stores and personnel leading to lower cost and supply chain usage.

Challenges and constraints As this was a relatively new operation, there were still both large and small issues that had to be addressed during my tour and future tours. Examples of this included command and control; as Op BACKWELL and Op MODEST had already been in theatre for several rotations, it was sometimes

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difficult for them to adjust to the arrival of a theatre HQ. However, this was rectified quickly and harmony between the mission was achieved through Commandersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; O Groups and understanding of the overall intent and main effort.

A further constraint came in the form of financial authority in theatre. Any local purchasing and contractual agreements had to be authorised by PJHQ. This proved to be a lengthy process because operations in Somalia had only been a small piece of the larger picture within east Africa, therefore, other operations were on occasion the priority. When dealing with contractors, time delays can sometimes lead to the contract becoming void. Building a strong rapport reaps benefits down the line when things go wrong.

During my tour, an idea was brought to fruition to create a forward node based in Nairobi acting as a PJHQ detachment that had a J8 operator who was given the authority to agree contracts and local purchasing. This added speed and fluidity to the process. This was proven by the success of hiring eight civilian vehicles from a local company that covered all servicing and maintenance for the duration of the contract.

The biggest problem I faced was the communication link between the J4 cell, the UK Embassy in Somalia and the Somali import/export governor. Any military flights that were due to arrive in Somalia had to be reported to the UK Embassy by the J4 cell to allow diplomatic clearance. The UK Embassy would then send all the relevant paperwork to the J4 cell in Op TANGHAM to allow access to the airhead and arrange lift capability to move the delivery. This was seldom a smooth process. I completed four military air platform deliveries, three of which had difficulties.

The first had issues with lift capability as the fleet at the time was worn and had minimal space for stores to be loaded. The second created import cost issues as it contained ammunition. Although this was declared prior to the delivery, a miscommunication led to charges that needed to be cleared prior to release. The third had two CAV on board which drew the attention of the airport police who argued that the paperwork was incorrect and they impounded the vehicles. After contacting the embassy and having chased the correct signatures, I managed to get the vehicles released after two days. The last flight of my tour went smoothly however, this was only achievable from having built a strong rapport with the UK Embassy, Somali

A satellite view of Mogadishu International Airport

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I would also suggest that meeting points of contact prior to deployment are key. This creates an opportunity to gather contact details, build rapport and understand who is in that role. During pre-deployment training, we had a visit to PJHQ which partially achieved this however, it would have been beneficial to be put in touch with the current deployed personnel. I spent a fair amount of time trying to find the right person and then introduce myself before discussing business activity.

Summary

customs office and the airport security in conjunction with forming a robust communications link between the three departments and the J4 WO. This has since been rectified further by putting a contract in place with a local company, that takes on the whole process from requesting diplomatic clearance through to delivering the stores to a designated location.

Lessons identified Pre-deployment contract establishment with local existing service providers allow the J4 cell to focus on the logistic footprint in theatre. This will create initial deployment resolutions while the logistic requirement is established and grown.

I recommend that if an end to end logistic supply chain is not owned or controlled by Defence, then a service provider that can ensure the delivery of a stable supply chain, should be sought out at the earliest opportunity. This will avoid any incidents across the spectrum that were identified during my tour. This can be reviewed on a regular basis to reduce the requirement as the Defence supply chain thickens and more robust agreements are made between the home and far bank.

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I have explained why the British Forces are in Somalia and what we are trying to achieve. I have also explained the logistic requirement of the deployment and what capabilities are available to achieve the mission.

The challenges and constraints listed are continually reviewed by theatre and resolutions are usually in place quickly and efficiently. Having local service providers and building a good rapport with all agencies is pivotal in gaining these resolutions.

Operations of this manner seem to be the future for British Forces; small operations providing maximum effect. Having a HQ element that guides this kind of deployment has been essential in creating a single point of contact with the home bank and bringing all the theatre together to create a functional effect to the main effort. The HQ ties all the missions up to move forward as a single unit. I believe this model should be used in other theatres where multiple missions are operating without a single HQ in order to bring coherence and establish effective and efficient command and control.

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The World fact book https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_World_Factbook Op BACKWELL SST, Op BACKWELL MST, Op PRAISER, Op CATAN and Op MODEST 313 Colonel John Wakelin, Commander British Forces Somalia Oct 2016 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Nov 2017 112

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