The Review 2017-2018

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Review The Royal Logistic Corps Foundation


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Introduction A very warm welcome to the 2017 Review. Following on from last year’s coming-of-age 21st anniversary edition, I am delighted to introduce the 2017 Review. It is worth remembering the original aim of the Review: ‘to improve the staff writing of captains and majors in the Corps’. This narrow aim reflected an era in which British Army logistic structures and processes were directly traceable back to World War 2 and beyond and in which, arguably, junior officer thought and opinion was not necessarily encouraged: No mention of professional competence, still less excellence, or encouragement to debate. Perish the thought our soldiers, NCOs and warrant officers should be able to both think and write! Of course, it is important that our people write with clarity and brevity but we also need them to be technologically savvy, operate in a joint, multinational and multi-agency context and, increasingly, be commercially aware. When the Review began the information technology revolution was just starting to affect both commercial and military logistics, mobile phones were a rarity and social media did not exist. Industry’s reach remained remote from everyday military logistics as we camped in Germany facing the Soviet threat. The context within which the RLC now operates is substantially different, with the tempo of regimental life remaining brisk and budgetary pressures, further technological changes and future doctrinal challenges continuing to provoke rapid evolution of our structures, systems and processes. The fiercely-competitive commercial logistics world is both driving the pace of innovation and is a critical component of our defence support network. The RLC Foundation was created to help military logisticians, and RLC personnel in particular, grapple with the challenges of this context. It’s core purpose is promoting professional excellence, primarily through enabling the wider military logistics community (including our industry colleagues) to interact and share knowledge and experience in this rapidly-changing, complex and diverse environment. The Review is an important medium for this and this year’s contributions cover a breadth and diversity of subjects

Security: This Review contains official information. It should be treated with discretion by the recipient. © Crown Copyright: All material in this Review is Crown Copyright and may not be reproduced without the permission of the Regimental Association of The Royal Logistic Corps. © Cartoons are copyright. Disclaimer: No responsibility for the quality of the goods or services advertised in this Journal can be accepted by the publishers or their agents. Advertisements are included in good

unimaginable 22 years ago; some pick up previous ideas and thoughts; some are factual and historical, and through them we trace the trends and issues we grapple with today. Some articles show a healthy appetite to challenge the status quo and others point to the future. The snapshot they provide is important: with each edition of the Review we create an ever-richer repository of RLC historical, personal and professional reflections. MGL strategy for an outward-looking RLC at the forefront of thinking, and doing, in military logistics is reflected in this year’s Review, which is as eclectic and outward-looking. It captures thoughts, ideas and experiences from those both in the thick of Corps activity and those circulating in wider defence, industrial and academic environs. We have views a-plenty on what is good, less good and what could be different. I would like to say, on behalf of MGL and the RLC Foundation, a huge thank you to those who have contributed. As I have written previously there are no ‘right’ answers in military logistics. The more we can stimulate the widest thinking and interaction across the military logistics community, and learn from others, from history and from adjacent sectors, the more our resilient and effective our future solutions and structures will be, and the better equipped our people will be professionally to plan and operate them. So – we hope you enjoy the articles. We look forward to a lively social media follow up. Major General (Retired) DJ Shouesmith CBE Chairman of the RLC Foundation

faith. The contents of this Journal and views of individual authors or units does not necessarily reflect the policy and views, official or otherwise, of the Corps or Ministry of Defence. Cover photographs are from The Sustainer magazine Compiled by: Miss Anne-Marie Causer BA (Hons) Miss S C Waller BA (Hons) Graphic Design: David Blake Printed by: Holbrooks Printers Ltd.

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Contents Operations and Training 7: Big Data Driven Logistics: The RLC leading the way in Defence - Brig N Allison et al 11: Observations of a Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Company Commander (RMAS) - Maj S Jones 14: The Joint Air Mounting Centre and life after Operation HERRICK - Lt C Lavendar 16: Theatre Entry and Enabling – Do we understand what it takes? - Maj M Player 20: The Digitised Supply Chain of the Future Maj N Roberts 24: Fujitsu and the future of logistics - Maj R Saunders 34: Autonomous vehicles: Barriers to the future - Lt J Tran

History 38: The importance of logistics to the development of the conduct of war 1816 – 1945 - Maj A Cox 42: Ammunition supply operations during the 1982 Falklands War - Lt L Edwards 46: Poppy Politics: The symbolism of the Flanders poppy - Lt J Harrop 51: Why did the Dieppe Raid prove such a disaster and what was learnt from it that led to the success seen on D-Day? - Capt A S MacLaverty 55: Pack Transport – Regenerating an old capability Maj D Puckey 59: Military Landing Officers (MLOs) on the Gallipoli Beaches - Some lessons from historical logistic enablers - Maj C Taylor

69: To what extent was the outcome of the Lebanon war of 2006 a consequence of Israeli military failures, rather than Hezbollah’s military effectiveness? Maj M Tyers 75: Based on a critical analysis of relevantleadership theories and models, evaluate Indira Gandhi’s effectiveness as a leader and, as a result of that analysis, identify lessons that have utility for the Army - Maj M Tyers

Professional Development 82: Continuous professional development and the Army Reservist of the 21st Century - Maj A Aitkin 85: Why setting a good example is essential to leadership - 2Lt N Halliday 89: Professional Development – Achieving long term career goals in the Army - LCpl L Smith

General Interest 92: The Case for 3D Printing in Defence - Maj AA Cox 97: Nelson Mandela and the ‘Invictus’ Theory of Leadership - Maj B Ekman RLC 103: The value of sport and AT to retention in the Corps Lt S Greaves 107: The British Army in Nepal – Surviving a fuel crisis and delivering logistics in the land of uncertainty Capt A Griffiths 11 : The Corps at 25 – Where to next? - Lt Col A Griffiths 121: Lessons from Coca Cola’s 2012 London Olympics Sgt C Musicha 125: How important is Morocco as a stable and secure partner in North Africa? - Lt R Smith 130: Military outsourcing: Opportunities and threats Capt M Wright

Review Prize Winners – 2017-2018 Professional Development Best Article – LCpl Lewis Smith Runner Up – No Award due to limited submissions in this category History Best Article – Capt Alexandar MacLaverty Runner Up – Maj Andrew Cox Operations and Training Best Article – Maj Richard Saunders Runner Up – Maj Mark Player General Interest Best Article – Lt Ryan Smith Runner Up – Lt Col Adam Griffiths


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*Third Place- Lt Sam Greaves *Additional Award due to strong competition in this category

Best Contributions Best Article – Capt Alexander MacLaverty Runner Up – Maj Andrew Cox Best contribution by an Officer – Capt Alexander MacLaverty Best contribution by a warrant officer or senior non-commissioned officer – Sgt Chimwemwe Musicha Best contribution by a junior non-commissioned officer LCpl Lewis Smith Best contribution by a junior Officer – Lt Ryan Smith Best contribution by a private soldier – No entries received.




3-D A1 Echelon



Three Dimensional Squadron/Battery or Company Support Vehicles Regimental or Battalion Support Vehicles Army 2020 Transformation Adventurous Training Army Force Generation Articles in Use Ammunition Processing Building Armoured Personnel Carriers Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Artillery System 90 - Self-propelled Artillery Gun 155mm Ammunition Technician Ammunition Technition in Control British Broadcasting Corporation British including the Commonwealth Bachelor of Science - Degree Qualification Command and Control Confederation of British Industry Career Employment Group [colloquially Trade] Chief Executive Office (Civilian) Complete Equipment Schedule Long Range Penetration Group in Burma 1943 Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply Chartered Manager Commanding Officer [E4] Commander [E5 and above] Communication Zone Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive Credit Purchase Card Continuos Professional Development Comprehensive Preparation of the Operating Environment CHALLENGER 2 Main Battle Tank(s) Crisis Response Planning Contractor Support to Operations Combat Service Support Deutsche Bahn (German Railway established 1994)) Defence College of Logistics, Policing and Administration Defence Code of Practice Number 2 Deputy Chief of Staff [G1/G4/G5] American Defence Condition 3 Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Defence Explosive Munitions School


Department for International DevelopmentLFP Deutsche Handlung Logistik Defence Line of Development Defence Logistics Staff Course Defence Supply Chain Operations and Movements Defence Support Group End to End Expeditionary Air Wing Effects Based Operations European Convention on Human Rights Enhanced Learning Credits Equipment Redeployment Hub Forward Equipment Support European Union Fighting Echelon (Cavalry/Infantry/Artillery) Federal Aviation Authority Foundation Degree Science [Logistics Management] Force Elements At Readiness Failure Mode Effect Analysis Forward Operating Bases Future Reserves 2020 Formation Skydiving Qualification [Level 1] Gross Domestic Product Good Friday Agreement for N. Ireland Ground Line of Communication General High Explosive Heavy Equiment Transporter(s) Host Nation Support Handover/Takeover Headquarters Isreali Air Force Inter-Continental Ballistic missile Israeli Defence Force Israeli Naval Ship Irish Republic Army International Standards Organisation Junior Non Commissioned Officer Joint Supply Chain Joint service Publication Joint Service Parachute Centre, Netheravon Joint Task Force German manufactured transport aircraft from Junkers, 1932-1952 King's Royal Hussars Lead Armoured Battle Group Lance Corporal Late Entry Officers Logistic Focal point Limited Conflict Logistics and Management training Squadron - RAF Cranwell Logistic Support Suppliers THE REVIEW 2017-2018 3



Materiel Handling Equipment National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad MOD Ministry of Defence MSc Master of Science - Degree Qualification NAC National Aeronatical Centre NAMI National Additive Manufacturing Institute NAO National Audit Office NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCOs Non Commissioned Officers NEM New Employment Model NICRA Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association NORAD North American Aerospace Defence Command NSN NATO Stock Number OC Officer Commanding [E3 and below] OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer(s) Op BANNER Counter-Terrorism operations in Northern Ireland 1969-1998 Op GRITROCK UK Operation to eradicate Ebola in West Africa 2014-15 Op HERRICK Operations in Afghanistan 2006-2014 Op MANTA French operation in Chad 1983-84 Op SERVAL French counter-terrorist operation in Mali 2013 Op TELIC Operations in Iraq 2003 -2012 ORBAT Order of Battle (colloquially structure of the organisation) ORPs Operational Ration Pack(s) PDT Pre-Deployment Training PIC Person in Charge PIRA Provision wing of the IRA PLMs Protected Logistic Movements POGO Proof of Good Order PPE Personal Protective Equipment PTG Port Task Group PVDC Poly-Vinyl QOGLR Queen's Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment RAF Royal Air Force RAOC Royal Army Ordnance Corps RAPA Rhine Army Parachuting Association RDCs Regional Distribution Centres REC Recruitment and Employment Confederation REME Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers


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Royal Fleet Auxhilary Request(s) for Information The Royal Logistic Corps Rail Load Supervisor Royal Navy Rear Operations Group Remotely Piloted Aircraft System Risk Priority Number Rough Terrain Handling Equipment Royal Ulster Constabulary Royal United Services Institute American Strategic Air Command Senior Ammunition Technition Supply Chain Supply Chain Pipeline Time Strategic Defence and Security Review Squadron Headquarters Subject Matter Expert Sydney Morning Herald Special Operations Force Strategic Roll-on Roll-off Staff or Squadron Sergeant Major Terms and Conditions of Service Troop Commander's Course Theatre Entry Standards Top Level Budgets Top Level Budgets Theatre Logistic Group Theatre Redeployment Pool Total Support Force Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Ulster Defence Association Ulster Defence Regiment United Kingdom United Nations Urgent Operational Requirement(s) United States United States of America Ulster Volunteer Force Vehicles and Major Equipments Visibility In Transit Asset Logging Vehicle Supply Specialist Whole Force Concept Whole Force Iniative Women's Royal Air Force World War One [1914-19] World War Two [1939-1945]


About the RLC Foundation Army Logistics The Logistic effort required to support a modern Army (and Defence Force) requires a combination of internal military capability and support provided by British and International partners in both peace and war. With a supply chain that can stretch half way around the world for years at a time, for example in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is critical that both military and civilian partners understand each other’s role. The Royal Logistic Corps provides the bulk of the Army’s Logistic experts from strategic level planning in the Ministry of Defence to Logistic Specialists (Supply) in front line units supporting combat soldiers. What is the RLC Foundation? The Foundation is a conduit to develop understanding of military and civilian logistic capabilities for both the RLC Logistician and our partners It provides the focus for officers and soldiers in the Corps to engage with industry and academia throughout their careers and beyond. In particular, we aim to facilitate the Corps’ relationship with industry so that our people can understand and experience aspects of the commercial logistics and support world. This is, in essence, informal professional development; by organising and facilitating events and encouraging and enabling networking with our industry members we provide the opportunity for our people to learn from and understand the commercial logistics world. This means they can better understand the military logistics world, and strive to continually improve it. In an era where our commercial colleagues both innovate at a rapid rate, and play an increasingly critical role in military logistics, we now more than ever need our professional military logisticians to understand what lies beyond the barbed wire, logistically-speaking. Now in our third year, we have established strong working relationships with a wide range of Industry and Academic organisations. The Foundation also provides a portal for RLC personnel no longer serving to retain their professional contact with the Corps. There are also obvious benefits for those in career transition and our website has links to career opportunities with our corporate partners. Where is it? The RLC Foundation is based at the Regimental Headquarters of the RLC in Dettingen House, Deepcut, Camberley, Surrey until the end of 2019 (before moving to Worthy Down in southern Hampshire, the new home of the RLC). What does it do? The Foundation runs a series of national events as well as supporting an increasing range of regional events delivered by our Regular and Reserve regiments. Our main events for 2018 are: • Thought Leadership Event co-hosted by Ernst & Young and Lincoln University. – *February 2018

• Military Leadership Event for Corporate members – *March 2018 • DHL Round Table Event – *April 2018 • PA Consulting Round Table event – *May 2018 • Seminar and Exercise Log Safari – 18 June 2018 • Military Planning Event for Corporate Members – *July 2018 • Autumn Lecture - *October 2018 • Awards Dinner - 7 November 2018 *Dates to be confirmed. Why should I join the RLC Foundation? As can be seen above the Foundation offers a number of events throughout the year. These events provide exposure to the RLC and its people, an opportunity for joint thinking, examining evolving logistic capability and networking between the RLC, Industry and Academia. We have already attracted a wide range of members from Industry and we are actively seeking new members. The benefits of the three levels of membership for our can be seen below: Event

Friend Supporter Partner £795 £1995 £3995 Autumn Lecture • • • Corporate Round Table Events • • • Log Safari and other Military Events • • • Magazine Adverts • • • RLC Foundation Awards and Dinner • • • Regiment/Trade Affiliation • • • Regional Events • • • Web Advertisement • • • Work Experience Opportunities • • • Career Mapping • • Case Studies • • Speaker Opportunity • • Web Editorial • • Advisory Board Involvement • Article Submission to annual RLC Review • Bespoke RLC Tailored event • Branded Case Study •

Our website address is with links to and from the Corps website We are also on Facebook or contact Alan Woods on email Tel 01252 833389 THE REVIEW 2017-2018 5


Military Contribution

Big Data Driven Logistics: The RLC leading the way in Defence With the return to contingency and an ambition to redefine the Expeditionary Mindset, the exploitation of big data within the Supply Chain is essential to deliver value in the strategic base and improve support in the deployed space. By Brig N Allison, Mr Justin Siglow, WO1 G Emmerson and Mr Zain Arora Background In an era of constant strategic competition, the British Army must deliver the broadest range of political choice, including options offering greater strategic agility. The rise of the so-called ‘Islamic State’, a resurgent Russia and the Ebola outbreak are just 3 high-profile examples with which the Army has had to contend over the past 3 years. Having previously operated in Afghanistan and Iraq with relatively stable demand signals, storage requirements, an established Supply Chain and a known threat, the Army is having to change the way it thinks about its Supply Chain to support the needs of its troops in any future operating environment. The Army-wide push for developing an ‘expeditionary mindset’, deploying with just what is truly needed, relies on accurate and intelligent data interrogation in order to ensure our people continue to receive what they need to conduct activities on a day to day basis whilst reducing the logistic need. The newly established Army Inventory Control Tower (ICT) has enabled us to maintain visibility of Inventory Management practices across the forward held inventory and identify a number of financial and operational opportunities to improve how we provide logistic support. This article seeks to provide an overview of how the ICT is delivering value; the impact of its findings on the RLC, and how this will continue to add value as it becomes business as usual for Inventory Management.

potential reductions in inventory have been identified as a result of: • Risk aversion at unit lines, driving up stock holdings that had not moved in over 24 months and were reaching shelf life • Inadequate materiel accounting policy, whereby items were double counted contributing to an inflated inventory position • Obsolete/ obsolescent stock continuing Up to to be held forwards despite equipment being superseded • Limited opportunities for RLC personnel to practice their trade and become inventory accustomed with managing inventory reductions prior to deployment. Through the exploitation of the abundance of available data to the Army, the implementation of an ICT has enabled the Army to quantify the true impact of these activities on the Army’s inventory position and enabled more informed, data driven decisions on proposed remediation activities.


What is an Inventory Control Tower? Organisations across the public and private sector are grappling with common supply chain challenges, including fragmented supply chains, uncoordinated supply chain functions and increasingly unpredictable customer demand trends. Organisations must be able to identify opportunities to manage their supply chain complexity quickly to gain a competitive edge – this is particularly relevant in a military context. One of the principal areas of focus is the exploitation of vast pools of data being generated in the current digital age through an ICT capability. A leading ICT capability provides a cerebral brain function that enables management of a performance based Supply Chain, with

Army Inventory Management Status Quo The Army’s inventory was widely perceived to be excessive, totalling in excess of £11Bn across assets and available stock. A number of key drivers were identified through the ICT. Many of these justified Larger the Army’s inventory position, inventory than with £10.4Bn of vehicles, main equipments and helicopter (£9Bn) spares. Despite this, £286M of THE REVIEW 2017-2018 7

Military Contribution


performance metrics monitored over time to pre-empt any forthcoming issues. Many organisations have looked to exploit available data through off-the-shelf analytics suites. However, to truly leverage value from data analytics requires a robust governance structure that considers the people, process and systems elements of the capability delivery model. A number of key dependencies exist in order for a control tower function to deliver benefits to an organisation: • Integrated, flexible data analytics system tailored to particular organisational challenges • Stakeholder engagement across the supply network • Accountability and incentivisation, with logisticians actively encouraged to improve activities Systems: The Army’s ICT Data Analytics Capability Through MJDI and JAMES, the Army has had access to vast swathes of data for the past few years. However data tables alone are nigh on impossible to deduct any meaningful conclusions. Only recently have we developed the ability to exploit this asset and start to make informed decisions. The underpinning SAS Visual Analytics (VA) software is the key enabler of the ICT capability. SAS VA forms the platform upon which a bespoke Army data visualisation tool has been developed to depict the Army’s inventory data in accordance with a set of defined Inventory Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The wealth of data available enables the central function to monitor inventory performance across all Army Divisions, with the ability to drill-down to any one particular Division, Brigade or unit’s inventory performance to identify the key drivers of performance breaches. As well as inventory performance metrics, the SAS VA dashboard enables the Army to geo-spatially map exactly where inventory holdings are both in the strategic and deployed space. This, combined with consumption rates, 8

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enables the Army to pre-empt where likely shortfalls in inventory could occur and manage materiel proactively across the Supply Chain. Process: The ICT Monthly Battle Rhythm The presence of an analytics capability is worthless in the absence of robust processes defining consistent data capture, analysis, resolution actions and underpinning governance. The ICT follows a recurring monthly drumbeat during which five key stages are completed. Importantly, the process is designed so that all levels of the chain of command are engaged, whereby decisions are only taken subject to unit review and approval through a “root cause report”. This framework follows the “5 why” methodology and enables the units to interrogate the true driver of any identified poor performance and resolve if appropriate. Any escalations or issues unable to be resolved by the Division due to underpinning training, policy or actions out of the control of the Division are discussed in a monthly board meeting, attended by key logistics decision makers. A summary of the five stage ICT approach is depicted in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: ICT Process

People: Developing RLC Inventory Management Expertise Maintaining the currency and competency of our people is at the heart of the RLC professionalisation objectives. With the return to readiness for contingency, there will be an


emphasis on short notice deployments that require logisticians to be individually ready to provide support on demand. Only by ‘training as you support’ will our supplier trade develop the knowledge, skills and experience to be able to meet this requirement. The ICT provides the perfect opportunity for suppliers at 1st and 2nd line to become familiar with best practice inventory management procedures and manage the inventory proactively. The central ICT function interacts with units via new brigadelevel Inventory Management Cells that are in the process of being rolled out across the Army. Staffing RLC suppliers in these Inventory Management Cells enables full time vocational suppliers to practice their trade on a day-to-day basis, managing unit accounts effectively to continuously meet the needs of the Army. Impact on the RLC: Truly going back to basics The successful deployment of the ICT relies fundamentally on RLC personnel having a strong grasp of the inventory for which they are responsible. Engagement with the ICT process provides an opportunity for all Supply Chain managers to get back to doing what they do best; managing inventory to provide flexible and agile support to units. As can be seen in the case study, following the start of the ICT, clear changes in supplier tradesmen behaviours can be observed within 3 (UK) Div with improvements in all bar one inventory KPIs. This will, over time, translate into improved Supply Chain Confidence and support the Field Army intention of returning to an expeditionary mindset. The ICT is working in parallel with the wider Army Supply Chain Initiative which seeks to reinvigorate a 2nd line Brigade Fulfilment Centre Network that will see more logisticians going back to basics; suppliers returning to supplying; drivers driving; the inventory optimised and end-to-end supply chain visibility. As RLC personnel become familiar with routine ICT business via the newly formed Inventory Management Cells, it is anticipated that the pool of Suitably Qualified Experienced Personnel (SQEP) to support contingent operations will increase significantly. Within this pool of vocational logisticians, the next tranche of motivated RLC leaders will emerge to coordinate strategic, operational and tactical Supply Chain activities in both the strategic and deployed space. In parallel, the continued development of the Inventory Management SAS VA Logistic Information System (Log IS) will provide the tools for our personnel to minimise time extracting and manipulating data and more time applying logistic intelligence to analyse and interrogate findings and determine the optimal inventory holdings and flow of materiel through the supply chain. The Army is constantly striving to strike a balance between an improved financial position and delivering operational effect, with critical decisions needing to be taken on where to accept risks. In the presence of limited inventory,

Military Contribution


The Army is constantly striving to strike a balance between an improved financial position and delivering operational effect, with critical decisions needing to be taken on where to accept risks”

personnel and equipment resources available to the Army, the ICT capability provides the ideal opportunity for the RLC to identify and exploit opportunities to optimise the inventory, whilst allowing personnel to become increasingly resource aware on the financial implications of any demand being placed on a system. This directly relates to the D Support Sub-Strategy of “Providing optimised and agile support to a more adaptable, deployable and persistently engaged Army, whilst reducing logistic need, and exploiting a highly productive Whole Force” with the ICT enabling each of the four goals identified below: • Readiness: RLC familiar with inventory and Deployment Stock (including PEP) management will expedite the time taken to break-out stores promptly and effectively to support operational deployments. Exploiting available information enables faster, more accurate decision-making reducing the Notice to Effect. • Reducing Logistic Need: The return to readiness for contingency relies on a consolidated inventory to preserve commanders’ operational and tactical freedoms and options for in-theatre activity. Improved inventory management through the ICT capability can enable proactive analysis of in-theatre consumption, build enduser confidence in the Supply Chain and encourage the development and sustainment of an expeditionary mindset throughout the course of an operation. • Efficiency: Optimised inventory holdings in the strategic and deployed space supports efficient handling of materiel through the supply chain, encourages improved cost awareness, and helps to reduce overstocks of items not consumed in the previous 12-24 months. • People: Investment in RLC knowledge, skills and experience goes hand-in-hand with the successful adoption of ICT capabilities across the Army. It should be noted that organisations across private and public sectors are investing heavily in deploying ICTs to better manage what is often viewed as a burden on the balance sheet. The Army’s ICT is widely perceived to be an industry-leading capability on the cutting edge of supply chain innovation. However the impact on the RLC will only truly be realised if there is full buy-in to the process and time and resources are committed to building and retaining the currency and competency of our people. THE REVIEW 2017-2018 9


Military Contribution

The Future: A Supply Chain Control Tower Whilst the ICT has identified and realised a number of financial and operational benefits, these can be magnified substantially by improving visibility of the end-to-end Supply Chain functions; specifically transport opera-tions, warehousing, movements and operating a digitally-enabled, interconnected Supply Chain. Over the next year, the Army is implementing an integrated Supply Chain Control Tower that combines inventory management with warehouse and transport decisions in the strategic and deployed space.

There is of course a direct interdependency between each of these control tower functions, whereby efficient inventory management is inherently dependent on efficient warehousing and transport activities and vice versa. Often the root cause of poor performance will fall outside of the supply chain function experiencing a particular issue as shown in Figure 5. By leveraging big data and maintaining a connected Supply Chain brain function, critical decisions can be taken, with all RLC personnel within the Army Supply Chain becoming an Intelligent Customer.

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Military Contribution

Observations of a Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) Company Commander I have had the privilege to serve at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, as both a Company Commander and Chief Instructor on the Regular Commissioning Course, since early 2015. During this time, I have been fully involved in the process of recruiting and preparing Officer Cadets for service in the Corps and indeed the wider Army. It is from this vantage point that I offer a number of observations on the perceptions held regarding the course, the recruiting challenges we face, and the ways in which we might mitigate them. By Maj S Jones

The aim of this essay is to: 1. Explain the current Regular Commissioning Course, what it consists of, and how it has changed under Project MCNAMARA. This will include consideration of the output of the course; the Young Officers themselves. 2. Identify the key recruiting challenges and lessons learned during my time in role, along with possible future work strands. 3. Advertise the opportunities to instruct at RMAS and outline what this entails. 4. Seek to gain the buy-in of the chain of command to ensure that recruiting activity is fully supported at all levels.

The Regular Commissioning Course and ‘Fit to Commission’ Before I go further, it is incumbent on me to state that the standard of Young Officer the Academy is turning out is, on average, the same or higher than it has been before. Despite rumours to the contrary, Project MCNAMARA and its immediate predecessor have not, in my opinion, eroded the course or adversely impacted on the quality of Young Officer produced.1 Having served as a Squadron Commander immediately prior to my current role, I have seen the ‘product’ from both

ends of the pipeline, and I am entirely satisfied that the mean average is very high despite overall RMAS recruiting figures being below the annual quota (last year the course was on average 40 Officer Cadets short each term – a company’s worth every year). The standard has not been lowered; indeed, the average Second Lieutenant is fit and robust, inquisitive and intelligent, mentally agile, keen, able to deal with complexity, highly motivated and entirely professional. The road to commissioning involves a number of hurdles and is, in many ways, more difficult than it has ever been. Prior to arrival at Sandhurst the Officer Cadets undertake a rigorous recruitment process that involves the pre-Army Officer Selection Board (AOSB) briefing, the main AOSB, the Pre-Commissioning Course Briefing Course, and often a number of Regimental visits. This is after the Capita recruitment process, which can take months to complete, has been negotiated. For some this entire process can last a year or more. On arrival in either September, January, or May, the Officer Cadets complete a 44-week course broken down into three terms; all fairly standard so far to those who have been through the system. However, the mechanics of the course have changed considerably over the last two and a half years and although a number of exercises will be familiar to many young Captains, the course structure and approach taken is fundamentally different. It has been modularised and time is specifically set aside for reflection, programmed study periods and personal development. Gone are the long hours of ‘black economy’ drill and late night boot-bulling sessions, along with much of the nugatory activity that arguably added little tangible value. Academic studies are ring-fenced and lead to recognised civilian qualifications. Women have been integrated fully into platoons with Physical Training (PT) now streamed at company level. In line with OFSTED direction, each module begins with an introduction, followed by a teaching phase; a formative (non-assessed) exercise; a summative (assessed) exercise; and then a summary and reflection period. Most pronounced of all, the approach to the delivery of training has fundamentally changed. The emphasis is very much focused on coaching and mentoring and it is aligned with the Army Leadership Code. Each Officer Cadet owns a Personal Development Plan and time is programmed for remedial training and further development. Rumours of a decreased PT regime from days THE REVIEW 2017-2018 11

Military Contribution


of yore are correct; but what remains has been designed to build overall fitness progressively whilst keeping injury rates down: the junk miles are out; and an emphasis on functional fitness is in. The young men and women are taught to think for themselves, and to thrive in complexity. The RMAS mantra is ‘train in, not select out’, and the staff are selected and trained to teach and develop the officer cadets in a progressive, encouraging manner. The main effort is very clearly on developing leadership rather than tactical excellence. Whilst a certain level of military knowledge is obviously important, the focus has sharpened and the officer cadets are fully tested in many other ways. Whilst this may be anathema to some, it has proven to work. The output is a cohort of Young Officers who are genuinely fit to commission.

The recruiting challenge and lessons learned RLC Officer recruiting is in a relatively good place. Although historically the Corps has not always achieved its recruiting targets (currently set at 58 Second Lieutenants each recruiting year) this must be understood within the context of under-recruiting across the Army as a whole and the lack of Officer Cadets starting the Regular Commissioning Course each term. Although we are now raising three companies per intake, they are small (circa 80-strong) in comparison to those of a two company intake (95+ cadets). One of the companies will often have two rather than three platoons. Compounding this is a failure to adjust cap-badge quotas which are based on liability rather than actual course attendance. This has resulted in some of the more popular cap-badges (primarily the combat arms) hitting their cadet recruiting targets routinely at the expense of the supporting arms. Unfortunately this is the case even where the individual is not particularly well-suited to the role in question. For some of the smaller Corps, this is becoming a major problem. Yet in spite of this situation, the Corps is getting a lot right in terms of its recruiting. Much of the activity organised and conducted by the CRLO team and others within the Academy has had a very positive impact and is well supported by most units. This is reaping dividends as the recruiting figures continue to rise and we, as a Corps, are well on track to hit our annual target for this year. Notably, over a rolling 12 month period, the Corps is recruiting cadets at 20% over target. However, this success must be sustained: recruiting is not purely a ‘recruiters’ sport, and is something in which every Officer and soldier within the Corps should engage. Every interaction that we have with potential officers and Officer Cadets is an opportunity to influence. I do not underestimate the resource bill underpinning formal visits and social functions, and other priorities will always exist. But significant value can also be added through getting the basics right; for example sending the very best soldiers and officers to recruiting events – those who look the part and are able to converse and sell the Corps with passion. Of most importance is the need to instil the right attitude towards recruiting to all ranks. This must be driven by the 12

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chain of command. It is exactly what our competitors in other cap-badges are doing, and it is crucial to ensure our enduring success. The approach to recruiting taken at RMAS and within the CRLO team relies on subtlety. Unlike other cap-badges we avoid the hard-sell and emphasise the family feel of the Corps, the outstanding soldiers that make up our Regiments, the variety offered in terms of career and educational opportunity, and the sport, travel, and adventurous training available for all. However, many of the Officer Cadets have limited experience of the Army and the majority arrive at RMAS intending to join the teeth arms and engage the Queen’s enemies directly. Changing opinions and winning Officer Cadets over is a constant struggle with no easy solution. A focus on the opportunity to command large troops consisting of outstanding soldiers; deploying on operations wherever they arise; and engaging in a range of operations from the combatant to humanitarian adds flavour and appears popular. Likewise releasing Young Officers to attend arduous courses (Special Forces selection, parachute or commando training etc.) and other training opportunities might be painful at unit level in the short term, but it is a marketable product well regarded amongst the target audience. The offer must be attractive and relevant, and we must continue to deliver upon our promises.

Influence within the Academy – Potential instructors A crucial area in which the Corps influences Officer Cadet recruiting and retention at the Academy directly is through its selection of personnel to instruct at the Academy, particularly at the Captain and Staff Sergeant level. The value of an RLC instructor within an intake must not be underestimated; they demonstrate that we are a competitive cap-badge that can offer a full and rewarding career, whilst breaking down the myths associated with service support and the role the Corps plays within Defence. Recent staff instructors have proven to be excellent role models who have enticed many wavering Officer Cadets to transfer their allegiance to us. Through their competence and professionalism, diligence and interpersonal qualities they have helped to sell the Corps whilst dispelling much of the ‘G-snobbery’ attached to the supporting arms. However, this will only remain true if we continue to send our best to the Academy. It is crucial that the Corps is represented by only the highest calibre personnel it can muster from its ranks. Unit commanders must identify suitable candidates and be selfless in encouraging and incentivising potential instructors to apply. Once into the selection system, it is vital that potential instructors be supported in their endeavours to reach the instructor cadre: investment is needed at unit as well as personnel level. During term time, life at the Academy is pretty full-on for the permanent staff, although the reward is well worth the effort. Stability, guaranteed periods of leave, and outstanding camaraderie are important; yet more so is the opportunity to work with a group of incredibly capable and motivated young people. The Officer Cadets are like


sponges; soaking up knowledge and challenging assumptions constructively through a genuine desire to be the best that they can be. For the staff, it’s not for the fainthearted. Yet likewise the staff are all of a high standard, fully committed to the cause. It’s also a great place to work with an active social calendar and real family feel. In terms of the course itself, each term consists of 14 weeks of almost continuous activity including sports, military training, and chapel on weekends with a large number of nights out of bed. Time flies by due to the pace of life and a two year assignment is gone in the blink of an eye. Utilising the Light Infantry model to teach and develop leadership, each term builds in complexity from basic section level skills and drills in junior term to a battle-group attack during the final exercise in senior term. Fitness is built over time and the staff are expected to lead from the front. They should also be confident with the Combat Estimate and Orders process, and be able to instruct to a high standard whilst always setting the right tone through personal example. It is not always easy, but watching the cadets develop from civilians to Young Officers is a hugely rewarding process. Captains and SNCOs who are interested in the role and want to play a part in shaping and developing our junior leaders should approach their chain of command to express an interest. No other environment provides the opportunity to have such a direct personal impact on the future commanders of our Army, some of whom will rise, ultimately, to become the generals of the future. It is a demanding and high-profile role that offers tremendous intrinsic motivation for those who want to make a difference.

Potential future workstrands Whilst recruiting is gaining strength there are a number of areas for development that could add value. Whilst it is outside the scope of this paper to provide answers to these issues, consideration should be given to the following areas: • Creating a beat-up course for RLC officers to ensure they arrive able to compete on equal terms with their Infantry brethren. • Finding a way to incentivise SNCOs to attend the RMAS Cadre. The reward must be sufficient to entice the very best and provide them with a tangible advantage – a positive influence on their MS profile (whether successful or not); with close talent management for subsequent postings etc. • Give consideration as to our ‘offer’ to the Officer Cadets, including working towards chartered status as a professional logistician (in the way that the RE and REME recruit).

Military Contribution

Summary In summary, I have thoroughly enjoyed my time at the Academy. Working closely with intelligent and motivated Young Officer Cadets – the future leaders of our Army – has been incredibly rewarding. To that end, I can recommend an assignment to RMAS to anyone wanting to make a positive difference; and particularly to the high quality Captains and SNCOs who may be considering the role. I can also offer assurance that the standards remain very high despite the changes made under Project McNAMARA. The junior officers coming through the system are outstanding. It is also vital that the Corps treat every contact with potential officers and Officer Cadets as an opportunity to influence. Whether it is a formal recruiting occasion or a chance encounter, we must sell the brand – our posture, confidence, and pride will go a long way to achieving this – and it must be led by the chain of command and built in to everything we do. Crucially, recruiting is the business of every officer and soldier in the Corps; not just that of the recruiting teams. We must get more instructors into RMAS, and they must be of the highest quality. Outstanding Captains and Staff Sergeants act as force multipliers in the recruiting role, providing exposure to the Corps which we would otherwise not achieve. But linked to this, if we want the best instructors the Corps must invest – encouraging, incentivising, and supporting our future instructors. Finally, success breeds success. In order that we continue to get a sufficient number of quality Young Officers joining the Corps we must be prepared to pay for it. Quality instructors, proactive recruiting, and a culture that sells the Corps brand are a great place to start.

Footnotes 1

Instigated for the first time in January 2015, the current Regular Commissioning course programme is based on the findings of Project MCNAMARA. In outline: the programme has become modular and is structured in line with OFSTED guidelines; academic work is ring-fenced and builds towards a PG Certificate or points towards a BA degree; and female OCdts have been fully integrated into the Companies with PT streamed. In terms of approach, greater emphasis is placed on coaching and mentoring than on previous iterations of the course.

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Military Contribution


The Joint Air Mounting Centre and life after Operation HERRICK Unless travelling as an individual augmentee or as part of a relatively small group, anyone deploying on operations or exercise from the UK in recent years ought to have staged through the Joint Air Mounting Centre (JAMC).1 By Lt C Lavendar Based at South Cerney in Gloucestershire, some 30 miles from RAF Brize Norton (BZZ), the JAMC acts as a remote terminal, manned and operated by 29 Regiment, its purpose is to process passengers, baggage, unit freight, and vehicles. By doing so it eases the burden on BZZ, which does not have the real estate or facilities to deal with direct reporting of large groups of people or equipment. Figure 1 provides a layout of the JAMC within South Cerney Station (aka Duke of Gloucester Barracks).

The JAMC also acts as a staging area, allowing errors to be resolved prior to arrival at BZZ. An alarming number of passengers and freight arrive at South Cerney in a state which would cause either aircraft delays, personnel simply being unable to deploy, or rejection of freight by the RAF.2 The majority of these errors are, however, rectified with the assistance of JAMC staff, meaning that flight delays are minimised. And, in the unfortunate event that airframes are delayed, the JAMC can provide feeding and transit accommodation for up to 1200 people. What many are less aware of, however, is that the JAMC has two additional key functions. The first of these is the mounting of contingent (unforeseen) operations for High Readiness Joint Forces. In this instance, in addition to the air processing function, the JAMC acts as an operational staging area on which all elements of deploying forces (manpower, equipment and sustainment elements) can coalesce. It provides a plethora of resources: a focal point for the receipt of attachments and augmentees; ammunition

Figure 1


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Military Contribution

Figure 2

storage facilities; shelter for the storage, breakout and issue of Deployment Stocks, including Priming Equipment Packs (PEPs). It facilitates movement control check points on vehicles and freight – essentially an assurance check to confirm that kit and equipment is prepared to the standards required for air travel. It has limited training facilities within the infrastructure, but provides opportunities for low-level continuation training at tactical level (basic skills etc.) for troops in transit. Vitally, it has a command and control suite which affords deploying headquarters connectivity to Defence communications infrastructure. This allows commanders to remain connected with their force and higher headquarters whilst in transit. The second additional function is perhaps even lesser known, which is hardly surprising as the JAMC has rarely been used in this capacity: recovery. It can be used as an area for the post-tour decompression process, as was recently seen following Operation GRITROCK in Sierra Leone.

Post Afghanistan, less busy? As we move away from a campaign footing in Afghanistan and into an era of readiness for contingency, one might be forgiven for thinking that the JAMC is now a relatively quiet place. Without the need to support and relieve-in-place significant forces (in excess of 9,000 troops at the height of Operation HERRICK), one might assume there are now fewer flights, with fewer passengers and less freight being transported. However, this is simply not the case. Despite a brief lull in 2013 – a reduction of 12% in passengers and 18% in freight – the JAMC has been as busy as ever since then. Indeed, while the number of flights per year has remained relatively consistent since 2012 – hovering around 300 flights annually – the number of passengers and volume of freight being transported have actually gone up. Annual

freight volume has increased by over 37%, for example: some 200 tonnes.3 Interestingly, there has been a vast increase – over 400% in terms of annual tonnage – in air transport of Dangerous Goods (DG) freight.4 This is very much the result of an increase in the number of destinations served by UK Defence output; the prevalence of short-term deployments with higher frequency rotation; and the rise in Defence Engagement activity. Figure 2 (below) provides an overview of the throughput of the JAMC (2012-15). The move to a readiness posture to cater for contingency has significantly increased the call upon the JAMC to help in the validation of the deployability of High Readiness (HR) units. From 2005 to 2015, the JAMC facilitated no more than one Deployment Test Exercise annually. In 2017 it has seen 3 deployment tests already, with 33 Field Hospital, 1 Armoured Infantry and 16 Air Assault Brigades being assessed, with more highly likely. So despite there being no large-scale enduring operation in progress, Defence is as busy as ever. During the campaign era of Ops TELIC and HERRICK, the day-to-day running of the JAMC was more predictable, with peaks in activity in sync with Reliefs in Place. With contingent operations and Defence Engagement on the rise in recent years, the JAMC is running hot. The only fair bet might be that December could prove blissfully quiet!

Footnotes 1

Ordinarily groups of 49 pax or fewer may report directly to RAF Brize Norton. Over the three-month period of Jun to Aug 15 for example, the JAMC processed 47 pax flights. 35 of these flights had issues which could have caused aircraft delays. 3 Measured between 2012 and 2015 4 Measured between 2012 and 2015. 2

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Military Contribution


Theatre Entry and Enabling – Do we understand what it takes? 104 Logistic Support Brigade maintains an Interoperability Partnership with the 16th Sustainment Brigade (16 SB) a US Army formation based in Baumholder, Germany and responsible for logistic support to US Forces across Europe. Through this partnership and mutual interest in Theatre Enabling, UK observers were invited to study the Reception, Staging, Onwards Movement and Integration (RSOM/I) of the 3rd Armoured Brigade Combat Team of the 4th Infantry Division (3/4 ABCT) undertaken by US Army forces within the OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE (OAR) JOA in January 2017. By Maj M Player Whilst the US RSOM process will be familiar to many readers and has many similarities with UK doctrine the execution of the operation in question provides a number of signposts for UK planners.1 The aim of this article is to inform readers regarding considerations for Theatre Setting/Enabling activities and is based on both US lessons and UK observations.2 The operation was intended as a proof of concept for theatre enabling within Europe to generate a force ‘ready to fight’ within 14-20 days in order to demonstrate speed of assembly (Hodges, 2016). This was a test of the US’s ability to assemble forces at pace in a time and location of its choosing. As a test of the ability of a theatre to cope with the demands associated with the large scale administrative movement of military forces, it can be argued that this exercise has few recent parallels. In evaluating the third pillar of deterrence it was also conducted with STRATCOM messaging to Host Nations, other NATO Allies and potential aggressors firmly at its heart.3

Scheme of manoeuvre Although US Army Europe (USAREUR) maintains a sizeable pool of equipment for training use by visiting forces, 3/4 Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) brought its own Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) from the Continental United States (CONUS). The force comprised approximately 2600 vehicles, main equipments and ISO containers plus 4000 personnel. Having outloaded from Fort 16

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Carson, Colorado on 18 Dec 16, the inload was conducted from 3 ships over 5 days beginning on 4 Jan 17. The inload of vehicles and materiel was conducted through a single Sea Point of Disembarkation (SPOD) at Bremerhaven (Picture 1) which also acted as an Rail Point of Embarkation (RPOE) with a Logistic Support Area (LSA) established nearby at Garlstedt.4 Airports at Hamburg, Szczecin, Poznan and Wroclaw were used as Air Points of Disembarkation (APODs), with personnel arriving ahead of Strategic Air freight. A secondary LSA with RPOE was established at Bergen-Hohne on direction of the Commanding General 21 Theatre Sustainment Command (21 TSC) to add capacity to rail operations. USAREUR forces established Tactical Assembly Areas (TAAs) at 7 locations within western Poland, each with access to a Railhead at existing Polish military installations adjacent to areas/ranges for integration training, notably at Drowsko Pomorskie (DPTA) and Zagan. Op IRON RIDE consisted of 60 wheeled vehicles in a convoy of 2 packets self-deploying over 730km from Bremerhaven to the Zagan Tactical Assembly Area (TAA). Led by Commander 3/4 ABCT over a period of 3 days, the convoys transited through the LSA at Bergen-Hohne and 2 Convoy Support Centres within Germany established by sub-units from 16 Sustainment Brigade (SB).

US Forces assembling in dockside Marshaling Area at Bremerhaven Port

Observations Mission Command. The Germany Area of Operations (AO) was controlled by the 21 TSC (2*) Forward Command Post (FCP) deployed in Bremerhaven, supported by elements from 4th Sustainment Brigade conducting Port Clearance alongside contracted capabilities. 16 SB was responsible for sustainment operations and support to Staging and Integration training on the Polish side of the border. They were deployed alongside the Mission Command Element (MCE) of 4th Infantry Division (4ID) under the 1* Deputy Commanding General (DCG). The


MCE was responsible for 3/4 ABCT forces during staging and was tasked with planning the post-RSOM activity with NATO Allies. The handover-takeover of responsibility for direct support (2nd line) from 16 SB to the 64th BSB was conditionsbased; hence no firm date was established in advance for the redeployment of 16 SB back to its base. Liaison and Local Engagement. At the direction of CG 21 TSC, 24-hour railhead (RHD) operations were established at most TAAs (Picture 2). Local contractual changes had to be made to enable such operations at certain locations. Insufficient enduring demand to capitalise upon this capacity was found to exist at certain locations. The US invested heavily in relationship with stakeholders at key organisational nodes and deployed personnel to the National Movement Control Centres (NMCCs) in Germany and Poland well ahead of the operation.

Night time Rail unloading operations

Balance of Effort. USAREUR forces relied extensively on enabling contracts for several key activities across both countries. These were let through a number of mechanisms including bi-lateral Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) with the German and Polish authorities and Logistics Civil Augmentation Programme (LOGCAP) calloff contracts, similar in aspects to the Operational Support Capability Contract scheme at PJHQ. Personnel from 16 SB conducted pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS) in Sep-Oct 16 ahead of drafting SORs to inform the ACSA and LOGCAP processes. With a recommended total of at least 50% of personnel to be in place before the arrival of equipment into the TAAs, the transit camps had to be well-found and fit for purpose over the Polish Winter. The (anecdotal) value of

Military Contribution

these contracts gives an indication of the scale of activity, though the total cost is likely to be significantly higher: $20m for Real Life Support (RLS) services through KBR under LOGCAP, $5m through ACSAs and $2.7m for LSA and RPOE operations at Bergen-Hohne alone. One of the biggest expenses was in subsistence and associated payments to personnel costing upwards of $470K to support personnel whilst providing the agility required to execute the mission.

Rail operations Although there were frictions in execution, the inload of vehicles was planned to go directly from ship-to-rail. This inferred a high degree of risk to the schedule, but was necessary to generate and maintain tempo. In the event, this aspiration was not met, but DB Shenker subsequently conducted 36 programmed rail movements to outload vehicles and equipment from the SPOD in Germany directly to the TAAs across Poland (Picture 3). LOCSTATS were provided through contractor reporting and use of real-time web-based asset visibility systems attached to containers. Rail offload operations were conducted by DB Cargo contractors, KBR-provided facilities and services such as warming tents and a unit reception team of officers and vehicle crews. Each Railhead was supported by a 100T crane and 40T FLRT (Contractor), Bulk Fuel vehicles and an Equipment Support Detachment from 16 SB, with only minimal presence from movement control staff. Although planning was months in evolution, operations were not without friction. Infantry Fighting Vehilces (IFVs) arriving with unregistered ancillary systems such as Remote Weapon Stations (RWS) were treated by DB Cargo as outof-gauge. These had to be moved from the SPOD by road transport instead. A failure by stevedores to properly close down armoured vehicles after loading meant that the majority of MBTs arrived at the RPODs in Poland with flat batteries requiring replacement or charging. Offloading occasionally took longer than planned after some trains arrived backwards into the railheads, requiring vehicles to be reversed off. Additional concerns over CONUS-sourced vehicles complying with European ADR regulations continued to be managed as forces flowed into theatre. Despite these difficulties, a pragmatic attitude, well-resourced support and contingency plans and sufficient flexibility within the timelines allowed the schedule to be kept and rail to be proven as a means for operational deployment at scale.

US M1A2s Abrams MBTs arrive by Rail at TAA

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Military Contribution


Contracting Support. Almost all RLS services (catering, ablutions, laundry, refuse etc.) were provided through the LOGCAP contract, with a coordination team of 20-35 personnel headed by a Company Commander from 16 SB (the ‘Town Mayor’) and a Contracting Officer Representative-qualified individual in place at each TAA. Contracted facilities included tented accommodation, heated covered hard standing within Motor Pool areas, field catering and (limited) recreational facilities. The very limited in-place welfare facilities were enhanced through AAFES trailers in each TAA and in due course contract-provided WiFi. Transport. DB Schenker were the primary contractor for all Rail and Surface Transport movements, aided through support and assets flexed from US Forces based in Germany. ACSAs were primarily used to facilitate access to Host Nation (HN) infrastructure and facilities (Picture 4). Cargo frustrated at the SPOD was surface-moved directly to the TAAs using existing contractual provisions through Theatre Logistics Support Command Europe (TLSC-E) costing approx. $320k. Locally-arranged contracts for 24hr coach services from APODs in Poland totalling at least £60k were let by 16 SB personnel (at SFC-equivalent level). It recommended strongly that each location should be afforded an authorised Local Purchasing Officer and Force Cashier within the Mayor’s cell to ease local issues in the TAAs. Military Effort. 16 SB were responsible for provision of Class I, III and IX supplies throughout the TAAs and

providing all necessary support to 3/4 ABCT Units until echelons were established.5 Supply Support Activity (SSA) locations were set up within TAAs and the US has since established a consolidated laydown in West Poland and further East in order to support subsequent operations.6 Class V loads were transported by 16 SB from US depot installations in Miesau, Germany and signed across to Units on arrival as the JOA has insufficient mature infrastructure for long-term storage of Ammunition. Class III consumption was reported as between 45,500-76,000 litres per day at the time of the visit, noting that the inload was less than half complete.7 16 SB brigaded 18 bulk fuel vehicles across the AO, with third-line replenishment conducted at DPTA through Defence Logistics Agency contracted providers operating from Germany. Military Role 1 medical facilities were established at all locations, with Role 2 coverage being provided through HN arrangements.

Summary – What does ‘it’ take? In conclusion, there are many parallels between the US operation described above and UK aspirations for forces including the VJTF(L) or the VANGUARD AI Bde and lessons are readily identifiable. ‘It’ demands unified effort - from the Army Service Component Command (ASCC), Host Nation(s), TSC and Sustainment Brigade(s) and the Supported Commander in order to deliver the centralised planning and decentralised execution required to achieve speed of assembly. In a combined NATO operations, this complexity would be magnified. ‘It’ takes time - to plan to the necessary

Example breakdown of contracted services within the TAAs by ACSA, LOGCAP and local agreements


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degree of precision, to communicate and to reach agreements both internally and with the HNs. ‘It’ takes resources – in money, persistent presence and the marshalling of material and equipment (whether military or civilian) under a unified and coherent coordination structure that spans the Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels. Contracted capabilities will form part of the solution and indeed can do a great deal of the heavy lifting, but for a price that may be unaffordable at the preferred level of assurance. ‘It’ requires freedom of action and delegation of authorities, whether financial, administrative or command to a level that affords the agility and speed of action required to enable many activities across multiple locations without referring every decision to higher authority. ‘It’ requires trust between commands, allies, commercial partners and subordinates; established over months of networking and training in order to build relationships between actors. Ultimately ‘it’ takes institutional commitment to overcome the innumerable challenges and issues that accompany even the most meticulously planned operation and execute it on the ground. With the end state firmly in mind, USAREUR forces pushed the boundaries of what the European theatre could provide in its still relatively unaligned state, whilst delivering reassurance and deterrence as the purpose of the exercise (Picture 5). Since the operation described above, 3/4 ABCT has dispersed in an Onwards Move across Eastern Europe and will remain in place until relieved by 2/1 BCT in Sep 17. Europe will again see its capacity and coordination abilities tested as the incoming Brigade Combat Team (again, complete to MTOE) conducts it RSOM/I before assuming the mission in the first of an enduring pattern of heel-to-toe

Military Contribution

US Forces Integration Training

rotations, following which 3/4 ABCT will conduct a reverse RSOM process to redeploy to CONUS.

References: 1. Hodges, B (2016). US Army Europe and its role in deterrence. Available from 2. JDP 4-00. Logistics for Joint Operations. 4th Ed. 3. Vanguard Enabling Group Force Support Handbook. V1.

Footnotes 1

JDP 4-00 Logistics for Joint Operations. OP ATLANTIC RESOLVE RSOM POST-VISIT REPORT dated 20 Jan 17. These observations also provide the basis for Annex M of the Vanguard Enabling Group Force Support Handbook. 3 Speed of Recognition, Speed of Decision and Speed of Assembly. 4 Three loading spurs. 5 ES Material. 6 Log RVs / Logistic Support Areas. 7 20,000 (US) gallons at conversion rate of 1:3.785. 2

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Military Contribution


The Digitised Supply Chain of the Future moving as a single entity as if joined by electronic tow bars, around 20% can be saved on fuel usage.1 Safety is also improved due to this autonomy, as previously over 90% of road accidents had human error as a contributory factor.2 The autonomous capability is scalable, using the leader-follower model when the tactical situation or road layout warrants having a soldier in the lead vehicle to intervene if required.3 The defensive weapons system that protects the convoy is one aspect where, although available technology permits full automation, the law doesn’t. The nature of the final part of the delivery, known as ‘lastmile delivery’ in the civilian sector, will be determined by the situation on the ground. To keep the distance travelled by the SAC to a minimum, where possible, small fully autonomous vehicles – be they self-driving robots or drones – will complete the last stage of the delivery, although these have no self-defence capability. In non-permissive environments, the SAC would navigate directly to the location being resupplied.

By embracing the Digitised Supply Chain in the future, the Royal Logistic Corps will increase efficiency, reduce manning liability, whilst providing a better service. By Maj N Roberts The rapid evolution of the Digitised Supply Chain (DSC) over the last 20 years has dramatically changed the way in which the RLC operates. This article describes the impact on the Army’s logistical processes resulting from technical innovations such as scalable-autonomous vehicles, a fully integrated network covering the whole Supply Chain, real-time tracking, stores automation, 3D printing, and different energy sources. It is written as a description of a fictitious operational deployment set in the year 2037.

Scalable-Autonomous Convoy (SAC)

(Image: National Retail Federation)

A SAC has just left the Main Logistics Base (MLB). Its 15 vehicles and four crew are on the 14-hour round trip to resupply in the furthest corner of the Area of Operations (AOR). The only breaks will be during refuelling and making deliveries. The crew will rest, or even sleep, whilst the convoy travels through the permissive regions in which human involvement is not required. During these times the SAC will be operating in its fully autonomous (driverless) mode, employing optimised braking and accelerating, and using the ‘platooning’ effect that has become so familiar on the motorways back home. By driving bumper to bumper and

‘Last mile delivery’ with drones

(Image: U.S. Army)

Monitoring and Communication with the SAC

Autonomous vehicles platooning


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The vehicles have a suite of sensors and the ability to communicate with numerous sources. The vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication allows sharing of information about speed, direction and position within the convoy. Vehicles also communicate with the Digitised Supply Chain (DSC) network to transmit real-time updates not only about their location, but also their performance and maintenance needs. This allows remote diagnosis and immediate communications with the REME in an emergency, whilst also informing the routine scheduling of servicing to keep the vehicles taskworthy. Additionally, the internal data capture system transmits information about available space and weight within each


Digitised Supply Chain (DSC) Network The siloed logistics information systems with limited interoperability that used to characterise the Supply Chain have now been banished to the RLC Museum. All aspects of the current DSC are connected and integrated, giving full transparency and visibility. All stakeholders from manufacturer, to the store, to distributor, to end user are linked in a collaborative network overseen by a central control centre. A spike in demand from the deployed battlegroups can be seen by the manufacturer, who can increase supply accordingly. Additionally, stakeholders can be alerted to external factors impacting anywhere in the Supply Chain, such as inclement weather affecting demand or shortages in raw materials affecting supply. The DSC is also enriched with inputs from external sources such as traffic, weather, newsfeeds, and the enemy situation to help anticipate supply and demand fluctuations; this information is available to all stakeholders in the network. Even social media is considered and analysed for relevant intelligence to enrich the DSC picture. For instance, the strike that shut the port at Los Angeles could have been anticipated four weeks before it happened if Twitter feeds had been examined.4 By considering a multitude of external factors, the Supply Chain has become responsive and resilient, and allows timely contingency planning for ‘what-if’ scenarios. Real-time tracking of their consignments is a further means of providing genuine value to the Battlegroups at the end of the Supply Chain.

Real time tracking Real time tracking allows the status of a consignment anywhere within the DSC to be viewed, regardless of the mode of transport. It employs different tracking systems: A radio frequency identification (RFID) tag is fitted to each unit of stock. This contains relevant information about the stock and can be read remotely by an RFID reader without human involvement. Meanwhile, the Global Positioning System (GPS)

provides location information in the outdoor environment.5 For items such as ammunition and medical supplies that require special treatment, the tracking system can also capture environmental information along the route, thereby recording the exposure to temperature, humidity and vibrations. The finer granularity in tracking individual items has been facilitated by improved battery technology: The smaller size and longer life has resulted in the rapid growth of miniaturised tracking devices. The RFID is particularly crucial for tracking and processing stock within the store which now benefits from substantial efficiencies through automation.

Automation of the store The manpower required to run the MLB store is 75% less than needed two decades ago, due to automation of all the conventional processes. As delivery vehicles arrive, they communicate their arrival time to the stores management system, which selects and prepares a docking bay. RFID readers detect which items have been delivered, uploading this information to the DSC network for all stakeholders to see. Next, the stores management system allocates storage space for the delivery before assigning the appropriate autonomous equipment to offload it and then convey it to the chosen location. Regular stock-taking is carried out by flying drones, assessing the stock location and quantities by detecting the RFIDs fitted to the items within the store.6 When goods leave the store, the autonomous equipment selects the products and places them on pallets, taking into account the size and packing requirement, which it receives from the RFID.

(Image: CNN)

vehicle. The updates from these inform the plan for backloading stores, which is modified and adjusted whilst the SAC is underway. Information also flows the other way, with the SAC receiving feeds from various sources to assist planning the journey. Heavy traffic or intelligence about the enemy’s intent govern the route selected, speed travelled, and even whether to halt until the atmospherics are more favourable. The human factor is not forgotten, and the crew are monitored remotely through wearable technology in the form of sensors embedded in their vests. Fluctuations in the hormones in their sweat combined with blood pressure details are used to assess whether the crew are tired, stressed, hungry or thirsty. This information is monitored by the Regimental Operations Room, which is based in the UK, and also fed back to the crew so that they can respond accordingly to ensure that they are performing at their peak. To maximise the value of information from the distribution aspect of the DSC, it needs to be fully integrated with the rest of the DSC network.

Military Contribution

Drones conducting stock taking

With the ability to work almost continuously, it is estimated that one robot can perform the work of nine people.7 Humans do still have a part to play in trouble shooting and maintaining the automated systems. To assist during these manual interventions, smart glasses navigate the wearer within the facility to the desired location. This automated store is found at the MLB where a smooth floor has been laid and there is room enough for the robots to manoeuvre. At unit level, however, where pressures of space mean that the stores are cramped and located on uneven ground, just the smart glasses and stock-taking drones are used, with items manually (or with manually-driven equipment) placed within and removed from the store. THE REVIEW 2017-2018 21

Military Contribution


3D printers are held at the MLB, allowing spares to be made and delivered within hours of a demand being raised. Drones are the preferred means of delivering the smaller items, as they provide the fastest and most efficient means of reaching the destination.

(Image: DRDC)

New energy sources

Smart glasses to navigate the user around the store

Much in the same way that MLB stores are fully automated, so too are the similar processes within maritime operations. Cargo ships self-navigate across the seas, and are then unloaded by the automated port operations system. Communication with the DSC network is maintained throughout. Within the whole stores system, another concept that has brought substantial efficiencies is 3D printing.

Three Dimensional (3D) Printing

(Image: Dave Rocker)

On-site 3D printing has dramatically reduced the quantity of stores that need to be held in theatre. Previously, a huge inventory was required to cope with the erratic and difficultto-predict usage of the vast range of spares for the sizeable fleet of equipment held within the AOR. Admittedly, the sensors within the vehicles and equipment that allow predictive maintenance has alleviated this issue to a degree. However, 3D printing has been revolutionary, where spare parts are manufactured locally when needed. Blueprints for most spare parts are held, and where they do not exist, they can be created using the 3D laser scanner which translates the code into a format readable by the printer. Since 3D printing became mainstream firstly in the aerospace industry and then in the automotive sector, the cost of 3D printers has reduced significantly whilst the speed of printing has increased. Even metallic objects, which used to be almost unacceptably slow to make, can be produced in a fraction of the time compared to a few decades ago. The

The final factor being examined is the different sources used to provide energy to support life within camps. Gone are the days of the continuous gentle hum of the diesel-guzzling generators that used to be a characteristic of operational deployments. Solar panels now produce most of the in-camp energy needs, occupying every roof as well as swathes of open ground, thereby providing a self-supporting energy supply. Modern panels operate at over 50% efficiency due to the concurrent use of multiple layers of photosensitive materials, each absorbing different portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. The concept of combining cell types was brought to the mainstream with the tandem use of metal halide perovskite photovoltaic cells with commercial silicon photovoltaic modules, and has been evolving ever since.8 The efficient storage of the solar electricity has been accomplished by Dyson Technology after establishing a research centre over 9 Regt’s former AFT route on Hullavington’s airfield. Although initially focused on powering small handheld devices, the breakthrough Dyson had in battery technology has subsequently revolutionised energy storage throughout the motor industry and the off-grid power market. The electricity made during daylight hours can now be captured and retained until needed with minimal wastage. The need for bulk and packed fuel has withered, with a corresponding easing of the logistical burden.

(Image: Skiaky Inc)

Solar panels providing energy for the camps

3D printing spare parts


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Improved battery technology has also transformed the Army’s vehicle fleet. All vehicles confined to camps within the AOR are electric, and of course most have autonomous capability. It won’t be long before the large trucks used in the SAPs are electric too, but the longer-lasting batteries needed to support the distances travelled are currently too big to be practical. Dyson’s team is working on this. The expected delivery date of this technology is likely to coincide with the sad withdrawal of the DROPS fleet, which has been retrofitted with autonomous technology. The DROPS are


nearing the end of their most recent life extension, and 3D printing of spares can only achieve so much!

Conclusion The logistical processes of 2037 have provided many ways in which efficiency has been improved. Central to the improvements is the fully integrated Supply Chain: digitised at every step; networked to integrate a wide range of digitised technologies; and transparent to provide visibility to the seamlessly connected stakeholders. Courage has been needed to stray from the comfort of the familiar to embrace the benefits offered by innovations such as autonomous vehicles and 3D printing. The end-state goes beyond efficiency and an improved service to the end user. Importantly there is reduced risk to life as fewer soldiers are put in harm’s way as a result of increased automation.


Military Contribution

Green, M. and Senders, J., 2004. Human error in road accidents. Visual Expert. pp.2005. 3 McNally, D., 2014. Army focuses on autonomous system development. Available at: (Accessed on 19 Apr 17). 4 Schrauf, S, Berttram, P., 2016. Industry 4.0: How digitization makes the supply chain more efficient, agile, and customer-focused. Available at: (Accessed on 19 Apr 17). 5 Prasanna, K.R. and Hemalatha, M., 2012. RFID GPS and GSM based logistics vehicle load balancing and tracking mechanism. Procedia Engineering, 30, pp.726-729. 6 Schrauf, S, Berttram, P., 2016. Industry 4.0: How digitization makes the supply chain more efficient, agile, and customer-focused. Available at: (Accessed on 19 Apr 17). 7 Johnson, K., 2017. Automated Robotics: The Logistics Revolution. Logistics & Transport FOCUS. pp. 23. 8 McMeekin, D.P., Sadoughi, G., Rehman, W., Eperon, G.E., Saliba, M., Hörantner, M.T., Haghighirad, A., Sakai, N., Korte, L., Rech, B. and Johnston, M.B., 2016. A mixed-cation lead mixed-halide perovskite absorber for tandem solar cells. Science, 351(6269), pp.151-155. 2


Bonnet, C. and Fritz, H., 2000. Fuel consumption reduction in a platoon: Experimental results with two electronically coupled trucks at close spacing (No. 2000-01-3056). SAE Technical Paper.

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Military Contribution


Fujitsu and the future of logistics From the science and technology perspective, identify an innovative logistic opportunity and explain why, how and when it would deliver benefit across the Defence Support Network. Given the delegated Defence Operating Model, how would you ensure rapid and successful implementation? By Maj R Sanders “A Transformed Defence Support Network that delivers globally-agile logistics support to the Joint Expeditionary Force and Joint Force 2025, maximising the freedom of action of operational commanders.” (Defence Logistics Vision 2016) Technological innovation offers a vision of machines executing logistic processes cheaper, faster and better, freeing logisticians to focus on enabling the commander’s intent. In reality, technological innovation presents both opportunity and risk. Progressing from an imperfect present to an envisioned future requires strategic insight and leadership, and balanced trade-offs in disciplined execution of change programme management. Few technologies originate in the defence sector, the rate and direction of technological change cannot be controlled by defence, and it is often a combination of technologies that leads to real innovation.i Integrating sufficiently mature technologies across the Defence Support Network (DSN) will involve processual, organisational and cultural change, requiring time and sustained effort to become securely embedded. This essay will examine the opportunity for the DSN to gain information superiority through the integration - and risk mitigation - of five technologies, within the overarching governance of the delegated Defence Operating Model. The five technologies in question are: Artificial Intelligence (AI); the Internet of Things (IoT), Human Machine Interfaces (HMI), Platform Based Architectures, and Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT). The essay is structured in four parts: • The opportunities of change – why technological innovation in the DSN is non-discretionary; • How corporate governance should enable delegated implementation of this change; • Descriptions of the innovative technologies, with attendant opportunities and challenges; • Summary - bringing together technological, organisational and cultural change. Why change is essential for the DSN The DSN is a complex, adaptive, socio-technical system 24

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of systems, generating data and information exchanges of such volume and diversity that challenge human capacity to exploit fully. These information exchanges often occur within constantly altering physical and informational networks, often in austere and violent environments. Time and effort is wasted in finding and validating information, and information security issues add strain to delivery and assurance systems. Humans are prone to error and bias and are largely blind to underlying patterns and trends in big data sets. This leaves them poorly equipped to anticipate and forestall logjams, bottlenecks and other emergent phenomena, or to manage the resultant feedbacks that tip the system toward failure, prompting emergency interventions which inevitably add to systemic disorder. Information overload can easily arise, impacting human cognition and thereby ability to make optimal and timely decisions, impeding and adding cost to flows of materiel, services, information and money across all stakeholders and core functions of Defence.1 Buying out such risks by optimised stockpiling and materiel flow processes requires dynamic, systemic understanding of how DSN architectures will respond to highly variable demand signals generated by putative and actual military operations. Political imperatives of value for money, and adversaries’ assaying of UK sustainability compel the Defence Logistics Enterprise to deliver value for defence. The DSN could benefit greatly from innovative change, if technological reach and organisational grasp could be well aligned. Whether the enterprise business driver be geopolitical strategy, or shareholder value and profit, value travels both ways across the private/public divide. The fundamental nature or ‘physics’ of logistics are shared by defence and private sectors, as shown by MoD’s adoption of the DefSCOR model and DLF, yet the DSN compares poorly against industry benchmarks, as shown by Table 1.2 The existing, largely ‘mandraulic’ systems and ways of working have probably squeezed out as much benefit as they ever will; Defence needs a logistical information force multiplier if it is to deliver order of magnitude improvements.

Table 1 - MoD Supply Chain benchmarked performance (from EY Support Chain Improvement High Level Business Case dated 3 Jul 15)


Potential benefits of innovative technologies Innovative technologies may help reduce information overload and exploit information as a strategic asset across the DSN, reducing overheads and maximising outputs. The opportunities to do this are broadly characterised as follows: • Reducing transaction time and process error end-to-end; • Enhancing trust and security across a decentralised, federated and franchised support network through demonstrable assurance, provenance and distributed encryption; • Improving ‘what-if’ and real-time inventory and asset demand/availability forecasting and spend and fulfilment options across concurrency sets and DSN configurations; • Maintaining higher asset availability and fidelity through assured component acquisition, provenance and throughlife management • Contracting agilely across the Defence Industrial community, especially benefitting SMEs. In an enterprise as complex as the MoD and DSN, how might change be planned, executed and controlled to deliver these benefits?

Corporate governance and the delegated Defence Operating Model Corporate governance is the way in which organisations are directed, controlled and led, defining relationships and the distribution of rights and responsibilities, rules and procedures for achieving objectives and managing performance. A strong corporate framework takes an evidence based approach to achieve outputs and hold those responsible to account. The Defence Operating Model, (at Figure 1) does this for core Defence functions amongst the MoDs Top Level Budget (TLB) holders. The Defence Board and Head Office direct strategic capability requirements and priorities in accordance with which the FLCs (including JFC which includes ACDS (Log

Military Contribution

Ops) the logistics process owner) generate and develop capability through resource agreed with Financial and Military Capability Planning (FinMilCap). The ‘Operate’ function lies with Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), Joint Force Logistics Command (JFLogC) and a range of joint capabilities under JFC. Delivering the ‘Enable’ core function to FLC requirements are Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO), Science and Technology (S&T) and Defence Business Services (DBS). Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) acquires materiel from industry to fulfil FLCs requirements. Information Systems Services (ISS) (part of JFC) has a crucial cross-functional role across the DOM in that the Chief Defence Information Officer (CDIO) Directs IT policy across Defence and acts as skills champion in generation and development of information capability across all TLBs and FLCS. ISS acquires information systems, acts as delivery agent for Joint enablers, and delivers day to day for customers in the ‘operate’ function. The CDIO owns the MoD Information Strategy (MODIS) which mandates Enterprise Architecture and Network Rules3 to be applied to all Information and Communications Technology (ICT) that will contribute to or consume Defence network resources. The MODIS is central to realising the technological opportunity for DSN and has 3 principal thrusts: • Defence as a Platform (DaaP); • Placing customers as the central ISS focus; • Agile procurement in information systems and services.

Challenges of change Change programmes must be in phase with the conceptual, future and funded capability planning horizons, in which technology maturity level is a major factor. Technologies must be capable of integration within future systems, whilst permissive of operating and migrating legacy systems and programs. Evidence-based evaluation processes de-risk potentially promising but immature and doubtfully scalable

Figure 1 - Defence Operating Model (2015)

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Military Contribution


Figure 2 - The Gartner Hype Curve (Gartner 2016)

technology solutions. Innovation must advance as fast as necessary- but no faster - maintaining coherence in governance and across DLoDs is key.4 A glance at the Gartner curve at Figure 2 shows where these technologies currently sit on the maturity horizon. Innovative technologies are best tested in the crucible of commercial competition - the deployed space is no place for immature, ‘bleeding edge’ technologies. Which of these innovative technologies are most likely to enable logistics information superiority?

Artificial Intelligence (AI) Artificial Intelligence is an overarching term for computer programmes that take a group of examples, work out a pattern that explains the examples, then uses these patterns to make predictions about new examples. The programme can thus find significant trends and patterns across big data sets and so aid timely and better human decisions. Min (2010)ii argues that AI in a logistics context has several subfields demonstrably suited to supply chain management, four of which are summarised below: • Machine learning provides computers with the ability to learn without being explicitly programmed. The computer acquires knowledge directly from data and learns to solve problems.5 A DSN platform application using machine learning could enable data from equipment usage, component resupply and platform repair to be conflated probabilistically and update the enterprise reference data warehouse. Such contextualised information would inform future support chain spend, configuration and operations 26

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management decisions for planned or actual circumstances at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. • Expert systems emulate human cognitive skills for a defined context using rules and heuristics6 provided by human experts. A human-machine interface (HMI) makes process workings comprehensible and therefore trusted by the user. Expert systems have been used to solve multiple echelon inventory control problems, scheduling and inventory optimisation in manufacturing, and vehicle repair and maintenance scheduling. • Genetic Algorithms (GA) are stochastic techniques that search for solutions in ways that mimic natural evolution.7 They have been successfully applied to problems such as vehicle routing and scheduling, delivery and pickup, transportation network optimisation, and locationallocation problems. • Agent-based systems sub-divide and then solve a decision problem using independent programme entities called agents which can compete and cooperate with other agents whilst pursuing their own goals. They have been used in supply chain management to augment or partially replace human decision making in demand planning and forecasting, production planning, supply chain coordination, strategic e-procurement.

The Internet of Things (IoT) This refers to the potential connectivity of any item to be connected to the internet with unique identifiers or codes that can transfer any operating data collected (such as by Health and Usage Monitoring Systems) over a network,


without human involvement.8 With the appropriate architectures in place, and enabled by AI (e.g. ability to interpret data such as excessive vibration or heat), devices perform on the edge of the enterprise, co-ordinated from centralised or decentralised hubs. The systems interrelations deliver synergistic benefits such as smarter deployed operational infrastructure, maintenance, materiel and repair management, or transportation.

Military Contribution

will also provide a platform for customers to build and operate their own Line of Business applications and ICT capabilities, integrated and interoperable with other platform services. A representation of the DaaP concept is in Figure 3. Descriptions of what the core platforms do (DaaP version 2.0 hence slightly different from shown in Figure 1) are shown in Table 2

Platform based enterprise architectures An Enterprise Architecture (EA) is a structured approach to the capture of information about the business in order to In Defence, EA spans all IT systems under development and in use across the delegated Defence Operating Model.9 The platform based approach is a new aspect of information architecture. In this context ‘Platform’ means a group of technologies that are used as a base upon which other applications, processes or technologies are developed or used, with enablers that turn technology platforms into a coherent ecosystem including third party developers.iii Congruent with the Government as a Platform (GaaP) initiative, DaaP aims to deliver Defence ICT services with shared sets of components and infrastructure (e.g. compute, network, storage) supporting all mission and enabling services/applications (e.g. logistics). Each platform has fully integrated sets of corporate and specialised ICT services that FLC and TLB customers can procure easily through an Information Systems Services (ISS) service catalogue. DaaP

Table 2 - Description of DaaP 2.0 core platforms (MoD ISS 2016)

A representation of how these may develop and evolve, with ‘Logistics as a Platform’ alongside other community of interest platforms (such as HR, Medical) is shown in Figure 4. These technologies will find their expression in the DaaP ‘New Style of IT’ (NSOIT) (Base) and NSOIT (Deployed). Technology maturity risk means that DaaP (Base)

Figure 3 - The DaaP Concept (MoD ISS)

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Military Contribution


Figure 4 - Possible evolution of DaaP V2.0 to 3.0 platforms. MoD ISS (2016)

architectures should first be established before ‘Logistics as a Platform’ begins to emerge in the deployed space. Concurrently, the People and Training Doctrine DLoDs would need to produce logisticians culturally attuned, indoctrinated and trained to help develop and exploit the new services.

Towards logistics as a platform The DSN (Transformation) Information Services Spiral 1 Programme (Figure 5) manages migration from legacy logs IS to new Services In the timeframe 2017-2021.12 The following services will be hosted on DaaP (Future) open architectures:

Figure 5 - DSN(T) Information Services Spiral 1 Overview


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• An Integrated Shared Service Layer enabling transformation through a ‘plug and play’ approach to the integration of legacy and new services. • A stable Enterprise Data Warehouse (EDW) holding data from transactional systems, operational data stores and external sources suitably aggregated for data analysis and business reporting. • Master Data Management (MDM) processes and tools defining and managing non- transactional data) in consistent format and of assured provenance. Any horizon scanning by ISS for new IT solutions must


accord with technology maturity policy and scrutiny by the Chief Scientist’s S&T department. Piloting and experimentation includes such initiatives as the Innovation Accelerator (administered by Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl)) which provides opportunity for small and medium industry players to prepare technology demonstrators. Evidence based on realistic and robust use cases confirm proof of concept sufficient to take the capability to initial gate and gaining funding for the assessment phase of the acquisition cycle, including questions of scalability, integration and cross-DLoD capability development.

Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and smart contracts Highly centralised systems represent a single point of failure and are more vulnerable to attack than distributed systems. The difference between centralised, decentralised (e.g. ‘fog’) and distributed (e.g. cloud) computing is shown in Figure 6. Distributed ledgers have the potential advantage of moving much of the security processes into the background, making systems easier and cheaper to use on cloud-hosted, platform based architectures.

Figure 6 - Centralised, decentralised and distributed databases. (CSA 2016)

In non-financial contexts, it is possible for such distributed ledgers and their encryption mechanisms to be partially private or ‘permissioned’, such as accredited stakeholders to the DSN and their networks of suppliers, as shown at Figure 7. Sometimes described as ‘Block Chain’, this technology was developed to underpin the Bitcoin virtual currency hosted on a fully public ledger. A ‘blockchain’ is a distributed and encrypted consensus system that maintains a permanent and immutable record of

Military Contribution

transactions on the web, incapable of being falsified after the event and not requiring third party validation. A blockchain is a list of blocks, each one referring back cryptographically to the one that went before. From the starting block being verified by multiple computers distributed around the network, successive transactions add to the block creating simultaneous multiple copies creating an indestructible record of an accounting ledger alterable only by falsifying every single copy of the distributed ledger. Each party throughout the chain has access to the complete and non-falsifiable transactional record going back to its origin. Another potential benefit of such technology is that information assurance can be largely automated, allowing the audit and inspection regime more focused human attention.

Smart contracts On the back of DLT, smart contracts represent computer programs that automatically validate and execute conditions that have to be realised to complete a transaction. These would be auditable records that should fit well with DaaP and could apply to physical goods and services as well as financial transactions. The technical code embedded in the contract obviates the need for a third party and assures compliance with the conditions of the contract, or will not execute all activities if all stipulations are not met. Smart contracts employed in DSN services could, for example, govern the manufacture, regulatory and licensing provenance of assets or their components, from raw material to major sub-assemblies and finished product. The item’s life cycle, through-life properties such as configuration and upgrade, its progress through the supply chain – all could be recorded as per Figure 8 whilst updating the data warehouses and Master data registers of the DSN. As a result the usage data captured on the analytics platform can be assured as to its currency, accuracy and verity, engendering trust and simplifying the assurance process, as well as performance and usage information, with trends detected and options offered to the human decision maker through AI embedded in workplace and analytics platforms and applications. The same principle could apply to any other good or service based contract, enabled by IoT connectivity, executed by AI assisted applications and hosted on platform based services and architectures.

Figure 7 - Permissionless and Permissioned DLT Systems and possible DSN scope (modified from CSA, 2016)

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Military Contribution


Figure 8 - The Blockchain and IoT enabled supply chain

Smart contracts may make transactional or low value contracting, fulfilment and payment for goods and services more agile and readily accessible, to the benefit of taxpayers and the wider economy, especially the SME sector. Other foreseen benefits of DLT and smart contracts include transparency and traceability in how UK money obtains value for defence from contractors in support to operations, Host Nation Support or to or from alliance partners in strengthened interoperability. Estonia is a lead nation in applying DLT across the private and public sector, and represents a good start point to begin scoping the feasibility and scalability of any such approach. The NATO Communications and Information Agency is evaluating areas of blockchain technology relating to military logistics as part of the 2016 Innovation Challenge, and the results are as yet awaited. On the risk side, the application of contract law alongside technical code would not be straightforward to implement if legal, ethical and social complications are to be minimised. The rigour of technical code would need to be at least as good as for legislative regulations. The ‘people’ questions of governance, doctrine and training surrounding implementation could be as complex as the technological aspects. The scalability of the technology with an alliance context would need extensive piloting and experimentation 30

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before its technological, regulatory, cultural and operational risks became acceptable.

People – the human machine interface For the human logistician to understand enablement of the supported commander’s intent and management of logistics risks, the basic ‘physics’ of the DSN must be understood, in terms of its EA and desired ends, enabling ways and means. Also understood must be the taxonomy of decisions, ranging from those which should be fully automated, through those partially delegated with options for human decision, to those political/policy aims and values which remain inherently human and cannot be left to machines without ethical hazard. The more AI systems learn, and the more humans learn to trust them, the higher up the decision hierarchy AI will climb. We do not yet understand where the technical or ethical boundaries of AI might lie. In fashioning the informational views needed to support human decisions, logisticians will need to reflect on their logistics C2, problem structuring, and decision making methodologies. The translation of commander’s intent via a logistics concept to an automated and recognisable logistics picture will require collaboration between enterprise architects, logisticians, data scientists and computing


specialists. The machine-human information flows are only as useful as the capacity of human cognition to understand and act upon them. Professional logisticians will need to reflect and imagine what logistic informational views will be needed by decision makers across the enterprise. One cannot manage what one does not understand. A conceptual representation of the interrelations between the technologies and elements of the DSN, and how they complement each other, is shown in Figure 9.

Military Contribution

The parallel migration from legacy architectures and services, and the cultural, doctrinal, procedural and organisational changes attending, are at least as challenging as the technological problem. They also present an opportunity, whereby practitioners may reflect on the information needs for decision making, and the manner in which this information needs to be presented to enables commanders’ understanding of the logistically feasible. Technologically aware, professional logisticians, collaborating with data scientists, human science specialists and computing developers will exploit IoT generated, blockchain assured, AI-supported decision making, and thereby delivering information superiority across the DSN.


Figure 9 - Interrelationships between technology elements in the DSN (Author)

Conclusions The combination of emerging technologies will, over time, add significant benefit if properly integrated. Such integration requires S&T-led and evaluated pilot studies, such as the UK Innovation Accelerator and NATO Innovation Challenge programmes. The scalability of a given technology would need to be systematically evaluated; what works in a small or medium enterprise may not scale up to alliance level. Technical and organisational de-risking (such as processes and culture change) would have to be assessed on the basis of lessons learned from established practice in industry and the base before being extended into the deployed space. The delegated Defence Operating Model as a meta enterprise architecture ensuring coherence between functions, will enable Defence TLBs and FLCs to advance together, as quickly as is possible and desirable. The Defence IS strategy and ISS cross-functional role are central to the coherent development of DaaP, upon which innovative technologies will be hosted to meet customer requirements. The secure connectivity of devices through IoT requires robust bearer platforms and security and assurance regimes. Until the DaaP architectures in place, IoT connectivity and AI incorporated into applications and services, smart contracts and DLT cannot be connected through distributed and decentralised computing, leaving an infeasible computational and infrastructure burden. The DaaP and the DSN IT programmes are subject to resource constraints, as are all Defence programmes, and implementation of DSN(T) may well slip beyond current timeframes.

UK Government and MoD Sources HM Government Office for Science (2016) ‘Distributed Ledger Technology: beyond blockchain’ a report by the UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser. HM Government Office for Science (2014) ‘The Internet of Things: making the most of the Second Digital Revolution’ A report by the UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser MOD Defence Information Strategy 2016 (DCIO) MOD JSP 604 – Defence Architecture Principles MOD ISS (2016) – ‘CIO Note on the Enterprise Architecture to deliver Defence as a Platform’ (unpublished draft) accessed via ISS MOSS Site MOD ISS ‘Designing for the future: Defence as a Platform (DaaP)’ presentation dated 4 Jun 2015 MOD (2016) ACDS (Log Ops) Defence Logistics Vision 2016 - Presentation MOD ACDS (Log Ops) Logistics Network Enabled Capability Strategic Direction Jul 2011 MOD JFC DSN(T) IS Presentation dated 20 Jun 2016 MOD (2015) ‘How Defence Works’ Version 4.2 Internet Sources Kilshrestha S (November 23 2016) ‘Military Applications of Blockchain Technology’ hosted on Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) website accessed 02 May 2017 at 20:08 hrs. Financial Times CapGemini ‘What blockchain can do for government’ accessed 15/04 2017 The-Fujistsu-Global-Defence-Initiative- breakingdown-logistical-stovepipes- and-shaping-global-solutions. Accessed 04 Apr 17. Chain blockchain is a game changer for supply chain management transparency. Accessed 04 Apr 17 Chain your supply chain business networks with blockchain technology. Accessed 05 Apr 17 article: Blockchain: the Next Evolution of Supply Chains Business Articles Raconteur series #0434 dated 23 02 2017 ‘Supply Chain Strategies’ accessed via on 03 Apr 17 Raconteur series #0443 dated 19/04 2017 ‘Artificial Intelligence for Business’ accessed via on 03 Apr 17 Raconteur series #0446 dated 25 04 2017 ‘The Future CIO’ accessed via on 03 May 17 MAinelli M and Smith M (2015) Sharing ledgers for sharing economies: an exploration of mutual distributed ledgers (aka blockchain technology) Global Financial Services Institute Winter 2015 Volume 3 - Issue 3 Academic Articles Min, Hokey (2010) ‘Artificial intelligence in supply chain management: theory and applications’, International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications, 13: 1, 13-39, First published on: 24 March 2009 (iFirst)

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Military Contribution


Badzar A (2016) Blockchain for securing Sustainable Transport Contracts and Supply Chain Transparency MSC Thesis Lund University Abeyratne, S.A. and Monfared, R.P. (2016) Blockchain ready manufacturing supply chain using distributed ledger. International Journal of Research in Engineering and Technology, 05(09) pp 1-10

Endnotes i

Dstl presentation to DELIVERING INNOVATIVE DEFENCE RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY Dr Bryan Wells Defence Science and Technology, UKMOD Chair, EDA R&T Steering Board Amsterdam, 25 April 2016 ii Min, Hokey (2010) ‘Artificial intelligence in supply chain management: theory and applications’, International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications, 13: 1, 13-39, First published on : 24 March 2009 (iFirst) Available from: _Artificial_intelligence_in_supply_chain_management_Theory_and_applica tions [accessed Apr 30, 2017]. iii MOD ISS: (2016 ) Draft ISS paper ‘Defining the Enterprise Architecture to deliver Defence as a Platform’ Author: Wallis, K. V0.1

Footnotes 1

Under the Defence Operating Model the six core functions are: Direct; Acquire; Generate and Develop; Enable; Operate; and Account. 2 DefSCOR is the enterprise methodology for DSN(T), a defence-focused adaptation of the industry standard Supply Chain Operations Reference Model. The Defence Logistic Framework (DLF) is a digital codification of the Support Chain processes formerly covered by JSP 886 (The Defence Support Chain Manual).


Defence Enterprise Architecture and Network Rules are covered by JSP 604 The 8 Defence Lines of (Capability) Development are considered under the headings: Training; Equipment; People; Information; Doctrine and concepts; Organisation; Infrastructure; and Logistics. 5 Min (2010) identifies five machine learning approaches: 1. inductively based concept learning; 2. decision tree learning; 3. perceptron learning (an algorithm for deciding whether an input belongs to some specific class or not); 4. Bayesian learning based on increased probability of an inference as more data becomes available); 5. reinforcement learning that trains the computer to perform at high levels by giving constant rewarding feedback. 6 Heuristics are mental shortcuts acquired through experiential learning in a given context. 7 A stochastic process (such as the Monte Carlo technique) uses randomly generated instances within a given mathematical distribution to provide a probabilistic range of likely outcomes for a given input. This contrasts with a deterministic process which provides a given numerical output for a given input. 8 Connected through technology such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID). 9 The structure or EA in UK Defence is the NATO Architecture Framework, supported by The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF). 10 It is anticipated that there will be a need for additional specialised applications which may evolve into community of interest owned platforms. 11 This may extend to specialised focus (e.g. logistics, medical) applications that may evolve into community of interest platforms - of which ‘logistics as a platform’ (LaaP) is one 12 Spiral 2 (not yet funded) is an engineering through life support capability. 4

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Military Contribution


Autonomous vehicles: Barriers to the future In the year 2032, Police Sergeant John Spartan was cryogenically unfrozen in order that he might pursue escaped super-villain Simon Phoenix. But in the forty years of his sub-zero detention, the world had advanced terrifically. Waking up as a relic, he was dumbfounded by the new-fangled technology surrounding him: biometric implants, cyber-sex headsets and computerised swear jars were the new reality. By Lt J Tran Although many aspects of Stallone’s 1993 actionthriller, Demolition Man, appear far-fetched and objects of science fantasy, one concept is rapidly becoming a close reality: autonomous vehicles. Autonomous vehicles, automated vehicles, self-driving cars, unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) are all terms that define a single, brilliant technology which allows a motor vehicle to move from A to B with no input from its passenger. Although driverless cars seem like the next scientific advancement to automotive engineering to the layman, scientists and engineers have been tinkering away on autonomous cars as early as 1920s. But only in recent years, with large investments from tech giants such as Google and Tesla, have autonomous vehicles been slipped into the public eye through the media to popular culture; for example, the new Fast and Furious 8 movie. However, it isn’t the technology per se which grabs the headlines, but unfortunate accidents which result from its use. In May 2016, the driver of a Tesla Model S vehicle was involved in the first known fatal traffic collision involving the use of automated vehicle technology. The Tesla was driving in an automated mode, but failed to identify a white truck and trailer against a bright sky backdrop. In carrying out an automated manoeuvre, the vehicle collided with the truck; the resultant incident leaving the vehicle’s ‘driver’ dead.1 This incident sparked an investigation and much public speculation and discussion as to who was to blame. This reaction is indicative of how innovative technologies which possess the capacity to endanger lives affect public perception and can create fear. And fear can stifle progress. From computers, Large Hadron Colliders to ‘designer babies’, there have been supporters and naysayers of all such forms 34

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of technology. The author of this article is an advocate of autonomous technology. It has the potential to revolutionise transport whilst being absolutely achievable and almost inevitable. The aim of the article is not to discuss the technology, its pros or cons; but to highlight the possible barriers to its implementation; and more specifically, its implementation within the Royal Logistic Corps.

Scope BMW, Google, Uber and Tesla are amongst the largest and most popular brands investing in the autonomous engine, hoping to get their cut of the market. But that sample of firms demonstrates the wider-interest of the industry. Although it is dominated by bigger automotive companies, it presents so much opportunity that it has captivated the attention and investment of an internet search engine, an app-based taxi service and Elon Musk’s eco-friendly, entrepreneurial endeavour. With so many actors looking to answer the autonomous question, the answer can take many forms. Different companies may use different technology, or very closely aligned technologies portrayed under different banners. The most common image is the semi-autonomous car, where a human ‘driver’ continues to occupy the ‘driving’ seat. Some companies envisage the solution in a manner more analogous with the military’s use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs or drones), with the vehicle unmanned and the operator some distance away. The technology this article will focus on is ‘truck platooning’. Imagine a convoy of 4 vehicles. Now imagine those 4 vehicles had only one driver. A driver will operate a lead vehicle, and the 3 vehicles behind will follow the route set by the master vehicle. The author has not chosen this system due to the military connotations of its name, but its compatibility for logistic operations, both civilian and military. In 2016, the Netherlands issued a challenge to the various firms developing automated trucks.2 Six companies – DAF Trucks, Daimler Trucks, Iveco, MAN Truck and Bus, Scalia AB and Volvo Trucks – had their vehicles travel in ‘platoons’ on public roads across Europe. The US Army has already begun to put its own research projects in place, having already trialled a truck platoon on the streets of Michigan. The 4 trucks – each with a driver as backup – followed the lead vehicle using short-range radio communication between one-another and received signals from specialised infrastructure installed by the Michigan Department of Transportation for the trial.3


The US Army sees the potential for using such vehicles as they can remove soldiers from dangerous protected logistic manoeuvre (aka combat logistic patrols); enabling soldiers to be retasked to force protection or other duties. They may be utilised so that convoys can travel further and more safely in peacetime under the confines of drivers’ hours by careful management of drivers. The possible benefits for these vehicles in the military are immense.

Military Contribution

Another important function of the British Army’s vehicles is to provide safety for its occupants. A simple form of safety is protection from the external environment, whether that is the elements or from enemy ammunition or ordinance. But a more computer-reliant system opens a larger possibility of electronic warfare. In the new Fast and Furious 8 film, Charlize Theron’s character Cipher, hacks into every autonomous vehicle in New York City and drives them in order to steal a nuclear football. Although the plot to an adrenaline-fuelled film isn’t much to go by, a similar story happened in 2015. Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek, 2 elite ethical hackers – both working for the autonomous vehicle industry – gained access to a Jeep Cherokee and stopped it dead in its tracks on a motorway. They achieved their goal and sent a message to the industry: autonomous cars are not secure.5

Figure 1 - US Army Self-Driving Trucks (Source: US Army TARDEC)

So what are the barriers to implementing autonomous vehicles in the RLC? Money is the obvious answer, from the research of systems, purchase of systems, training users, money is generally the biggest block to any new technology in any organisation, and the Army is no different. This article will avoid the argument of finances; although it is undoubtedly the biggest obstacle to any technology. Instead it will focus on 3 areas: technological limitations, social behaviours and media scrutiny.

Technological limitations The advancement of technology and rate of development could potentially be a showstopper to all autonomous vehicles. There are many systems on the road already, but so far the finished product hasn’t been delivered. The British Army demands the highest standards of performance of all its equipment, and its vehicles are no different. Its vehicles must be able to function effectively, reliably and sustainably; whether fighting, supporting or enabling forces in all conditions and environments in which the Army operates. Most road tests completed on autonomous vehicles to date have been conducted on roads, predominantly major highways or well-built roads. But how well can artificial intelligence cope with off-road terrain? Off-road terrain provides countless variables; traction control, small obstructions, ground relief are all variables which must be accounted for in the programming. Whereas driving on wellbuilt roads can be likened to a two-dimensional issue (forwards, backwards, left and right), the introduction to offroading adds a new dimension: moving along the Z-axis. US Army engineers from the TARDEC trials predict that in as little as a decade’s time, fully autonomous truck convoys could be utilised in conflict zones.4

Figure 2 - Hacked cars drive in havoc across NYC (Source: Fast and Furious 8)

Now we fast forward to the 12 May 2017 global ransomware attack in which a piece of malicious software was introduced into cyberspace by malign actors which ‘ransomed’ access to a computer system for payment. Dubbed the ‘WannaCry ransomware’ it shook the world, paralysing personal computers in Poland to 33 health facilities in the UK’s National Health Service. It was only stopped, almost by accident, by a 22-year-old security researcher during his leave.6 A simple piece of technology had terrorised over 150 counties, and has sparked a cyberhunt for the culprits by government agencies, security firms and hacking enthusiasts. One article in the Independent discussed the possible link between North Korea and the attacks, which Pyongang quickly refuted.7 But if the malicious control of autonomous vehicles has been proven easy, and there are potent cyber threats that can cripple governments overnight, is the plot to Fast and Furious 8 all that far-fetched?

Social attitude The author of this article is a troop commander of a Bulk Liquids Troop. The Bulk Liquids Troop has a fleet of 20 or so vehicles, ranging from the MAN 6 tonne Service Vehicle (SV), the MAN Unit Support Tanker, and the OSHKOSH Close Support Tanker and is operated by roughly 40 soldiers. An informal survey of the Troop, whom autonomous technology could provide the most benefit, was met with hesitance and fear. The sceptics raised concerns with the operational effectiveness of the technology, possibly from the fear of the unknown, fear of change, or even fear that they may THE REVIEW 2017-2018 35

Military Contribution


ultimately become expendable. This is echoed in the civilian transport industry, where the Upstate Transportation Association and Independent Drivers Guild are pushing for a 50 year ban on autonomous vehicles.8 Those who have spent a while in the services, having served on operational tours, may consider the possibilities for autonomous technology set within the context of their experiences. Operational tours such as Op HERRICK in Afghanistan saw soldiers endure gruelling conditions in protected logistic manoeuvres which tested their ability to the extremes and forged their attitudes. Perceptions and attitudes forged in adversity may prove hard to debunk: it may be difficult to convince sceptics of the merits of new technologies such as autonomous vehicles when arguments are levied such as ‘...90% of motor vehicle crashes are caused at least in part by human error’.9 When those soldiers become involved in the decision-making processes surrounding the acquisition of capability (procurement), it is clear how perceptions and attitudes shaped by experience will impact upon the adoption of innovative autonomous technologies.

In the limelight ‘Army denied vital equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan, claims former SAS head’; ‘Father's fury at hazing video of Army son being hit with mallet as part of initiation,’10,11 the British Army faces extreme public scrutiny for all its actions from incidents on operations, to the antics of bored soldiers confined to barracks. This is only right: we must always be held accountable for our actions and the media is one such way this is commonly achieved. But the old adage ‘there is no such thing as bad publicity’ does not necessarily ring true, and reports which are sometimes true, sometimes erroneously written or sometimes taken out of context can be damning on any organisation. The Army is no exception. Any Army in a democratic country serves its people, and thus the people have an extraordinary impact on its Army. The North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong were on the verge of defeat in the Vietnam-American War, before opposition by the American public influenced a withdraw which led to the fall of Saigon. Why is this important? It is important because autonomous vehicles have the potential to fail and subsequently cause insurmountable repercussions. In Aldershot, known as the ‘Home of the British Army’, in November 2016, two young girls were killed in a traffic collision by a soldier. The news went nationwide overnight, for weeks soldiers were restricted access to Aldershot town. The reputation of all the soldiers and units based in Aldershot were adversely affected by the actions of one soldier. Now let us revisit the Tesla Model S fatality in 2016. The National highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) investigated the incident and the role of the autonomous system in the death of Joshua Brown. The NHTSA cleared Tesla of any fault, even going to say that vehicles with the auto-steering technology are ‘40% safer than those without’.12 But even though the verdict was incredibly favourable to Tesla, and generally the entire automotive industry, there were huge questions raised on the safety of 36

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the technology, why Tesla were releasing ‘beta’ technologies to the consumer and much deeper debates on the ethics of the industry. If we take a look at the two previous case studies and were to merge them into a hypothetical, what would the fallout be if a military autonomous truck were to cause a traffic incident, and possibly take the lives of innocent civilians? Although the risk of media scrutiny is unlikely to stop the autonomous revolution, it can easily be utilised by sceptics in a risk-adverse Army as something to slow the implementation of robot vehicles. When risks are identified, innovation can be slowed.

Summary Autonomous vehicles are inevitable. They are already a small part of our society and are slowly gaining more traction. It began with cruise-control, and moved onto autoparking and soon enough the world will have autonomous vehicles as a norm. The British Army will no doubt be a part of this revolution, but there will be many obstacles that must be overcome before that happens. Money is the biggest barrier: huge sums will need to be invested in procurement, training and continuous development of the technologies. But in addition, the limitations of technology, social reluctance and liability added to the media scrutiny will have a negative impact on the implementation of autonomous vehicles. The technology is not yet ready for civilian use, and the military makes much greater demands of its vehicles, including the need for protection against electronic warfare. There have been many newspaper headlines in the past that have eroded public confidence in the military, and with such a large potential to go wrong, autonomous vehicles pose a big threat to the credibility of the British Army. Autonomous vehicles are inevitable; this article has only highlighted a few of the issues that will slow its implementation but the obstacles are significant.

Footnotes Sam Levin and Nicky Woolf. 2016. Tesla driver killed while using autopilot was watching Harry Potter, witness says. [ONLINE] Available at: [Accessed 10 May 2017]. 2 Nick Carey. 2017. Peloton, Omnitracs partner on truck 'platooning' technology. [ONLINE] Available at: [Accessed 18 May 2017]. 3 Calstart. 2016. TARDEC and Military Work in Truck Platooning. [ONLINE] Available at: aspx. [Accessed 10 May 2017]. 4 Aarian Marshall. 2016. The Army’s Self-Driving Trucks Hit the Highway to Prepare for Battle. [ONLINE] Available at: 07/armys-self-driving-trucks-hit-highway-prepare-battle/. [Accessed 18 May 2017]. 5 Andy Greenberg. 2017. Securing Driverless Cars From Hackers Is Hard. Ask the Ex-Uber Guy Who Protects Them. [ONLINE] Available at: [Accessed 22 May 2017]. 6 Keith Collins. 2017. Inside the digital heist that terrorized the world—and only made $100k. [ONLINE] Available at: [Accessed 22 May 2017]. 1


Greg Wilford. 2017. North Korean secret cyber unit 'likely behind' NHS ransomware attacks. [ONLINE] Available at: news/world/asia/nhs-ransomware-wannacry-north-korea-hackers-cyberattack-us-south-korea-a7747826.html. [Accessed 22 May 2017]. 8 Jon Fingas. 2017. New York driver groups push for a ban on autonomous cars. [ONLINE] Available at: [Accessed 9 May 2017]. 9 Bryant Walker Smith. 2013. HUMAN ERROR AS A CAUSE OF VEHICLE CRASHES. [ONLINE] Available at: 2013/12/human-error-cause-vehicle-crashes. [Accessed 21 May 2017]. 10 Thomas Harding. 2010. Army denied vital equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan, claims former SAS head. [ONLINE] Available at:

Military Contribution

vital-equipment-in-Iraq-and-Afghanistan-claims-former-SAS-head.html. [Accessed 14 May 2017]. 11 Mike Jaccarino. 2012. Father's fury at hazing video of army son being hit with mallet as part of initiation Read more: news/article-2197025/Fathers-fury-hazing-video-army-son-hit-malletinitiation.html#ixzz4hlVQPYtD Follow us: @MailOnline on Twitter | DailyMail on Facebook. [ONLINE] Available at: news/article-2197025/Fathers-fury-hazing-video-army-son-hit-malletinitiation.html. [Accessed 14 May 2017]. 12 Jack Stewart. 2017. After Probing Tesla’s Deadly Crash, Feds Say Yay to Self-Driving. [ONLINE] Available at: probing-teslas-deadly-crash-feds-say-yay-self-driving/. [Accessed 14 May 2017].

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THE REVIEW 2017-2018 37

History Contribution


The importance of logistics to the development of the conduct of war 1816 – 1945 The article titled ‘The importance of logistics to the development of the conduct of war, 1600-1815’, published in the RLC Foundation Review last year, tells a story that deserves to be expanded upon and developed to take it into modern times. By Maj AA Cox As the conduct of warfare develops over time, it is clear that logistical factors also develop, and in many ways, drive these changes. The advance of technology, infrastructure and society has enabled military logistics; allowing ever larger and technically complex forces to operate in an increasingly rapid and efficient way. It has also enabled those military forces to be sustained ever further away from their supporting base, and if required into increasingly inhospitable conditions. For this article, the definition of logistics is defined as the practical art of moving military forces and keeping them supplied. This definition encompasses naval and air services, whilst limiting the focus to supply, distribution and the movement of forces. This article will examine and evaluate the importance of logistics to the development of the conduct of war during the period 1816 to 1945. It will assess how logistic factors contributed to how the practice of war developed during this period, and will argue that logistics management was a highly important enabling activity that, when aided by advances in technology and infrastructure, was significant in how the conduct of war developed. John Lynn summarises military logistics in the period 1816 to 1945 thus: ‘…rapid technological change brought about by the industrial revolution altered the form of warfare. The basic facts of logistics changed dramatically, both in terms of the faster speed of transportation and the greater need for war materiel’.1 The conduct of war was effectively supercharged by an increase in population and productivity. The first decades of this period saw many nations, especially in Western Europe, adopt citizen armies that had the potential to be mobilised rapidly to an unprecedented size; equipped, supplied and mobilised by industry and an increasingly efficient road and railway infrastructure. At sea, 38

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the gradual adoption of the steamship, with its ability to transit quickly with less dependency on the weather, eventually made sail powered vessels obsolete. However, their mobility came at a large logistic price, and their need for well stocked stations where they could take on coal became an important factor in the laydown and growth of colonial holdings at this time. Places such as the Falkland Islands gained geostrategic significance due to this concern.2 The development of railways over the course of the period had many significant military implications, as they offered the potential to move large quantities of personnel, animals, equipment and stores over land in a way that previously could only be achieved over water. The American Civil War (1861-1865) was the first war to demonstrate the importance of rail travel in moving large scale forces and supporting them over very long distances. Railroads allowed the Confederates to use interior lines to make rapid redeployments to respond effectively to threats, and they ultimately allowed Union forces to amass sufficient combat power to fix the majority of Confederate forces in place whilst the Confederacy was picked apart in other directions.3 Inter-service cooperation in logistics was also critical to the Union strategy as the mobility of the Union Navy was used to both deploy and sustain Union ground forces, such as in the operations in the Lower Mississippi and New Orleans in 1862.4 However, both belligerents also discovered the limitations of railways. Like rivers, rail had great capacity, but did not always run in an ideal direction, and the disparity in speed, capability and capacity between rail and wagon movement was all too apparent if forces strayed too far from the railheads. This would often result in railheads becoming a ‘neck in the hourglass’, where stock would pile up faster than wagon transport was able to move it to the fighting elements. Meanwhile, the fighting forces would move further away from the railheads, further limiting the means of wagon transport to sustain them. This meant that armies would sometimes resort to foraging and pillaging methods that would not have been out of place in the 17th Century. The Union forces under Sherman marching through Georgia in 1864 soon went beyond their means of supply once they advanced past Atlanta, and so conducted a campaign of intentional pillage that was both logistically successful and damaging to the Confederacy.5 Therefore, the logistic implications of rail transport had a significant impact and was critical in how the conduct of what was arguably the


first large scale industrial war developed. As Thompson stated, ‘Frequently… the railway layout dictated the axis of advance and retreat, the siting of defensive positions and the locations of battles’.6 Their strategic importance was underlined further by the considerable effort that both belligerents made to deny rolling stock and rail infrastructure to their enemy.

History Contribution

that the Germans would not have been able to advance far beyond the site of the Battle of the Marne even if they had obtained victory there.12 The Great War presented a number of new logistical problems and saw a number of important new logistic developments. Although the location of the fighting was relatively stable, the sheer scale of the forces involved was without precedent. Quick firing small arms and artillery vastly outstripped the pre-war estimates for ammunition consumption, and offensive action required great stockpiles of artillery ammunition, resulting in a crisis of supply in Britain and elsewhere.13 The inability to logistically support advances over the devastated terrain of the Western Front was a critical factor in the perceived failure of much of the offensive action by the belligerents on that front, right up to the German Spring Offensive of 1918.14

‘The neck in the hourglass’: Transfer from rail cars to animaldrawn transport in the American Civil War

The Prussians encountered similar benefits and issues with rail transport during their wars against Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-1871. A notable development in the conduct of these wars was how rapidly railways, combined with staff planning and long-distance communications, could mobilise and deploy the Prussian forces faster than their enemies; to decisive effect in both wars.7 This hinged on the production and execution of large-scale, highly detailed contingency plans by staff officers who understood logistics. Therefore, the need for logistic planning of this nature was key to the growth of general staffs and the development of more professionalised staff officers in all major armies over this century, as Archer Jones testifies: ‘The significance of logistics…and the complexity inherent in the movement as well as the supply of armies meant that it played a premier role in the evolution of the modern army staff’.8 Mobilisation speeds had increased further by the time of the Great War (1914-1918) due to the development and expansion of double-tracked railway infrastructure.9 Indeed, the rigid practicalities and time lines for executing the plans for the mass mobilisation of troops by railway inflicted a tyranny on key decision makers and was certainly a factor in the declaration of war.10 Despite the development of railways by the early 20th Century, the issue of troops outmarching the ability of wagon trains to supply them remained. Movement and supply issues inherent within Germany’s Schlieffen Plan were a factor in the younger Von Moltke modifying the plan to have a shorter movement distance for the right wing. Despite the change in plan, these factors still manifested themselves in the initial German advance, and the German forces advanced beyond the means of their supply services to sustain them.11 It has been argued by a number of authors that at the high-point of their advance in 1914, the German supply situation was so acute

Logistics in a devastated industrial era battlefield: British Gun Carrier Mk1 Supply Tank, 1918

The relatively static nature of the fighting allowed for a more robust logistic support of that war through the buildup of infrastructure behind the battle lines. However, the need to support the actions of the largest and most technically complex armies seen to that date, particularly in their needs for ammunition and engineering stores, required logistic activity of unprecedented scale and sophistication, not to mention the specialist troops to make it function. It also needed an unprecedented effort to organise and harness the power of civilian industry to maintain the flow of weaponry, ammunition and supplies. This mobilisation of civilian assets in providing an increased scale of logistical support was the greatest enabler in allowing the armies of all belligerent nations to grow in force size and mechanisation to the extent that they did in this war. The Great War saw the first massed use of the internal combustion engine in warfare, and a critical development for logistics was the motor truck. A vehicle of enormous utility, even early versions had the mobility, speed, capacity and endurance to bridge the gap between forces and their railheads, where animal powered wagons had repeatedly failed. During the Battle of Verdun (1916), the French Army were able to support considerable efforts via one road and a THE REVIEW 2017-2018 39

History Contribution


constant stream of motor trucks despite constant disruption by German artillery. The logistic success of what would later be called ‘Voie Sacrée’ (Sacred Way) was made possible by regular supply, detailed organisation and disciplined traffic control.15 The Great War only saw limited strategic manoeuvre at its very end, and was not to showcase the full potential of motor vehicles in aiding the mobility of forces. Organised fleets of motor trucks were to later prove capable of sustaining a significant projection of force, as the Russians proved against the Japanese at Khalkin Gol in 1939. The Russians were able to surprise their enemies by moving and sustaining a force of 57,000 troops, 498 tanks and 396 armoured cars over 500 miles from a railhead over barely inhabited terrain with the use of 4000 trucks.16 Such a projection of force would have been previously impossible, and represents a clear example of a logistic capability enabling a step-change in the conduct of war.

The logistic lifeline: French motor truck convoys to the Verdun battlefield, 1916

Marking the end of the period studied, the Second World War (1939-1945) was a global war to many of the belligerents, and the ability to project combat power at high tempo, over great distance and increasingly hostile terrain became critical. Forces became, as Howard observed: ‘huge armies with massive ‘tails’…demanding considerable logistical ingenuity to keep them moving at all’.17 As in the Great War, the Second World War featured armies of considerable size, but they were generally even more mechanised and sophisticated. On land the Germans exploited the mobility of the motor truck to provide limited integral support to panzer formations to enable their highly mobile combined-arms tactics. These formations formed spearheads that used their mobility to break enemy cohesion whilst the majority of the German forces followed at a more pedestrian pace. These formations, tactics and logistic methods were decisive in the short-ranged, rapid campaigns 40

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in Poland (1939) and France (1940), but eventually fell foul of the distance and seasonal factors of the Russian campaign (1941-1945), which demanded more robust sustainment than could be provided.18 Nonetheless, the speed and freedom of action in which the panzer divisions were able to act was possible only through the rapid and mobile logistic provision enabled by the motor truck. The need to project forces was enabled further by the use of efficient oil fuelled ships which, combined with the provision of fleet support tankers and new techniques of replenishment at sea, were critical to the long-range movement of naval forces. This development effectively released naval forces from the tyranny of having to factor the presence of coaling stations into their movements. The mastering of these logistic arrangements, plus the strategic siting of logistic infrastructure, was decisive for the Americans during the Pacific Campaign, allowing them to contest Japanese advances whilst making their own naval, amphibious and air attacks thousands of miles from their support base.19 With the increase of inter-Service cooperation and mobility options, especially the development of transport aircraft and amphibious assault craft, commanders could project larger forces faster, further and into more inhospitable locations. The enormous and unprecedented alliance and joint-service logistic achievement of D-Day and the subsequent campaign in Normandy serves as a clear example of this, but is far from the only one. The Burma Campaign was one dominated by the need to maintain supply lines over mountainous jungle terrain with little infrastructure, significant seasonal changes and frequent enemy attacks.20 The Allies maintained a supply line to the British 14th Army with a dynamic combination of animal, truck, rail, riverine and air transport, which at one point crossed 990 miles of the harshest terrain between India and Rangoon.21 The fact that a modern army of any size was able to function at all in the adverse conditions of Burma represented a significant stepchange in the conduct of war, and this was achieved only through strict control of logistic capabilities, enabled by detailed joint-service and alliance planning, flexibility, ingenuity and determination.

A fusion of old and new methods: Loading pack animals onto aircraft, Burma 1944


Overall, from 1816 to 1945, the scope of war expanded in all directions and forces grew larger, and more sophisticated. Thanks in part to better organisation, management, and certain technological and infrastructure developments, commanders had an even greater reach, destructive force and strategic opportunity, but they also became increasingly dependent on robust supply. The corresponding advances in logistic staff planning and capability were important in these developments, and combined with ingenuity, enabled the rapid mobilisation of these huge forces. They also provided the equally large amount of supplies that maintained the higher tempo of activity that industrial forces demanded, including the preserved foodstuffs that were instrumental in making warfare a year-round activity during this period. However, planning often failed in execution, forcing logistic improvisation in the field: In Supplying War, Martin Van Creveld cited many examples promoting logistic improvisation over failed preparation, such as the Prussians in 1870 and the Germans in 1914, and questioned the value of detailed logistical planning in comparison to more ad hoc arrangements.22 However, this view has been subject to criticism: John Lynn accused Van Creveld of being limited to the point of selection in his examples, whilst Thomas Kane used the Second World War Burma and Pacific campaigns to support the value of planning.23 24 Whilst improvisation and requisition were frequently used when formal supply broke down, as time progressed, they could no longer supply all the needs of larger and more technical armies. The Germans may have been able to improvise and forage their way out of logistic failure in 1870 and 1914, when the primary items needed were rations and animal fodder. However, as they subsequently learned on the Eastern Front in the Second World War; food and animal fodder may be foraged if the terrain allowed, but suitable motor fuel could rarely be found and all ammunition had to be formally supplied. To conclude, the conduct of war has developed over the period studied in terms of scale, scope and complexity. Military forces have grown in size, professionalism, reach, sophistication and need of specialist support. The effective management and development of the discipline of logistics has proven to be an important enabler in all of these developments, and therefore critical to the development of the conduct of war over the course of this period. However, it should be noted that logistics itself has been enabled by the advance of technology, such as the steam and internal combustion engines, and the development of infrastructure, such as all-weather roads, coaling stations and railways. Also, in the absence of sufficient logistic support, forces typically resorted to improvisation to sustain their efforts, as they have done for thousands of years, and could still gain success. Perhaps the most important lesson a military logistician can learn from this study is the importance of planning, preparation and the exploitation of technological developments, whilst keeping in mind the need for flexibility, initiative and sheer determination to make it all work.

History Contribution

Bibliography Books: Black, J. Rethinking Military History, (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2004) Boot, M. War Made New, (New York: Gotham Books, 2006) Howard, M. War in European History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) Hughes, M. Philpott, W.J. (Eds). Palgrave Advances: Modern Military History, (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmiillan, 2006) Jones, A. The Art of War in the Western World, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) Kane, T. Military Logistics and Strategic Performance, (London, Portland: Frank Cass, 2001) Keegan, J. A History of Warfare, (London: Pimlico, 1994) Keegan, J. The First World War, (London: Pimlico, 1999) Lynn, J. (Ed) Feeding Mars, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) Macksey, K. For Want of a Nail, (London: Brassey’s, 1989) McNeill, W.H. The Pursuit of Power, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983). McPherson, J. Battle Cry of Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) Sinclair, J. Arteries of War, (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 1992) Strachan, H. European Armies and the Conduct of War, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983) Thompson, J. Lifeblood of War, (London: Brassey’s, 1991) Thorpe, G. Pure Logistics, (Washington DC: National Defence University Press, 1986) Van Creveld, M. Supplying War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004 [1977])

Footnotes J Lynn, ‘Modern Introduction’ in J Lynn (Ed), Feeding Mars, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p183 2 K Macksey, For Want of a Nail, (London: Brassey’s, 1989) p15 3 J Thompson, Lifeblood of War, (London: Brassey’s, 1991), p28-29 4 J McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) p418-421 5 Macksey, For Want of a Nail, p19-22 6 Thompson, Lifeblood of War, p33 7 A Jones, The Art of War in the Western World, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p399 8 Ibid, p645 9 J Black, Rethinking Military History, (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2004) p115 10 J Keegan, The First World War, (London: Pimlico, 1999) p30 11 H Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p132 12 Examples: Thompson, Lifeblood of War, p40. Jones, The Art of War in the Western World, p439-440. M Van Creveld, Supplying War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004 [1977]), p134 13 Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, p136-137 14 Thompson, Lifeblood of War, p42-47 15 Macksey, For Want of a Nail, p73-74 16 Jones, The Art of War in the Western World, p502 17 M Howard, War in European History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p133 18 Van Creveld, Supplying War, p175 19 T Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance, (London, Portland: Frank Cass, 2001). p46-51 20 Thompson, Lifeblood of War, p80 21 Ibid, p97 22 Van Creveld, Supplying War, p236 23 Lynn, ‘The History of Logistics and Supplying War’ in J Lynn (Ed), Feeding Mars, p12-15 24 Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance, p9, 32, 69 1

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History Contribution


Ammunition supply operations during the 1982 Falklands War The British Army has been involved in international conflicts every year since the start of World War II and as such has operated in a multitude of different climates around the globe, involving numerous different units directly supported by a logistic element. The aim of this article is to focus on one such conflict, the Falklands War, in order to explore the execution of ammunition supply and highlight lessons that can be applied to contingent operations today. By Lt L Edwards

Southampton. Only with the RCT and the combined efforts of civilian contractors were forces able to meet the demand, successfully moving all cargo to the various ports on time enabling the Task Force to leave Portsmouth on 5 April.3, 4 Today there is an even greater reliance on contractors as the Army continues to outsource contracts: ‘In 2014/15 the UK MOD spent £19.6 billion with UK industry, on a wide range of products and services. This makes it the number one customer for UK industry.’5 Due to a reduction in troops down to 82,000 Michael Fallon, the former UK Defence Secretary, said in 2012: “There will be reductions in “tail” units providing supply, logistics and transport capabilities. Those capabilities…will be increasingly provided by private contractors and Britain’s international allies,” which means contractors are going to continue to deploy alongside the British military.6

After rising tensions about the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, on 19 March 1982, Argentine scrap metal merchants land on South Georgia, a dependency of the Falklands, and raise the Argentine flag. In response to this, HMS Endurance along with a Royal Marines detachment, who were based on the Falklands, set sail for South Georgia on 21 March and landed on the island three days later. On 2 April 1982 Argentine Troops invade he Falklands and after being overwhelmed, Governor Hunt orders the garrison of 72 Royal Marines to surrender. Meanwhile in Britain, Margaret Thatcher’s government prepared a task force to deploy to the South Atlantic.

Ascension Islands The hurried approach to loading was exacerbated at Ascension Island because pallets were inloaded from aircraft without an audit trail, making it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between ammunition natures.7 The logging of supplies into and out of Ascension was neglected and as such nobody knew where items were, resulting in individuals manually searching through boxes to see if something had arrived or not. This created a large stockpile of unregistered stores and equipment, which was either left behind or needed to be resent as they could not be found by the time the Task Force left on 16 April.

Pre-War Preparations – 2 April 1982 It has often been said that logistics is a hard part of war to get right but it is critical that it is mastered early on. Kress states that, ‘The broadest, the most complex…managerial aspects of warfare is the logistics, the management of combat resources and combat means’.1 Within this logistic sphere, ‘the movement of ammunition is critical in supporting the warfighter during war’, with the Falklands War being a modern day wake up call for the British military and joint ops.2 Nowadays Britain has Priming Equipment Packs (PEPs) which supply troops for 30 days in war, including fuel, vehicles and other supplies. In contemporary 1980s society British Rail would move the stock to ports but in 1982 it became apparent that they could not cope with the quantity of supplies demanded, and so Britain quickly moved onto the second option, road movement, moving out from distribution hubs to harbours at Portsmouth and 42

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Initial landing 21 May 1982 - Onwards Ship loading in Portsmouth and Southampton was uncoordinated with no load plans or importance placed on order of requirement on arrival in the Falklands. Many of the supplies were not tactically loaded which caused large, unnecessary delays after the landings at San Carlos. Valovcin states: ‘Six weeks after the first troops landed, logistic personnel were still unloading cargo’.8 Privratsky supports the above statement stating that ‘[the] Commando Logistic Regiment found itself scrambling to get supplies to units as it struggled to unload ships.’ The result was not catastrophic, but it did slow down the initial assault and hindered the resupply of critical resources, specifically ammunition, to forward troops. One of the most difficult logistic issues faced was the choice of transport to be used on the land campaign once troops landed on the Falklands. Badsey states that, ‘Three Commando Brigade had chosen to take its 76 Volvo BV202


History Contribution

Figure 2: An Eager Beaver Rough-Terrain Fork-Lift

Figure 1: 8000 mile Task Force route

tracked over-snow vehicles, but didn’t take any wheeled vehicles other than nine Eager Beaver Rough-Terrain ForkLifts and ten four-tonne trucks with fuel pods, in the belief that wheeled vehicles could not cope with the rugged and boggy East Falkland terrain’.9 As it turned out, a number of tractors and farm vehicles were acquired from local farmers as the terrain was suitable for their use. Boud states that, ‘experience is the foundation of, and the stimulus for, learning’, so it could be argued that this oversight in planning could easily have been mitigated as a number of servicemen had previously been based there.10 It could have provided an insight into what the terrain was actually like; an oversight by commanders who didn’t include other ranks experience in their planning considerations perhaps? The British had tried to mitigate the lack of ground manoeuvrability, so the contingency plan was enacted to use a helicopter fleet for air assault, but on 25 May 1982, ‘the loss of all but one of the Chinook helicopters being carried by the Atlantic Conveyor…was a severe blow from a logistics perspective’.11 Another friction on the ground which detracted from the commander’s main effort was that,’“troops often ‘hijacked’ [other] helicopters to support

their immediate mission/goal’, so consequently, when other ground troops required 12,000 artillery rounds, commanders soon experienced the reduced speed at which ground troops could be resupplied, placing greater emphasis on road transport to push equipment and materiel forward, compromising momentum in the process.12 The lack of helicopters fundamentally changed the plan and almost jeopardised the mission. The lack of properly configured ammunition during the assault on Port Stanley on 21 May nearly led to a failure of the mission. This added another level of operational logistic complexity that we mitigate today on the front line with 1 LOs and Logistic Support Teams. One of the overriding reasons was, ‘the deficiency of chain wrenches to properly tighten the fuses on bombs, an item of kit expected to be of common issue considering Great Britain’s NATO commitments’.13 As innovative as soldiers are, technical precision and expertise on an issue like ammunition conveyance, storage maintenance and issue becomes paramount in a high intensity conflict. The second and probably more important reason was that the level of expenditure of ammunition, particularly missiles, was much higher than had been predicted. This was high intensity warfare and the expenditure was four times the planned rate on average, with 105mm HE even running out at one point.14 Had the battle continued at this intensity there would have been great problems with resupply which would have left the soldiers of 3 Commando Brigade vulnerable to Argentine attack. Looking to the future The Falklands War was undoubtedly a British success but it was not the desired solution to the Argentine invasion. One view is that ammunition is the backbone to any war fighting operation and without which, one cannot be successful, ‘as wars cannot be fought without ammunition’.15 A central lesson that can be identified from the Falklands War is the importance of ammunition resupplies. Soldiers can survive without food for a couple of days or a week in extremis but the main ability to win a war comes with the ability to kill the enemy, without a sufficient supply of ammunition this becomes impossible which is highlighted in the Principle of War - Firepower. The former UK Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon said that he will make sure Britain's armed forces remain the "best in the World" despite cuts to services but to remain so will THE REVIEW 2017-2018 43


History Contribution

Figure 3: Helicopters were used for a multitude of different tasks

require learning from previous conflicts, ensuring the same mistakes are not made again.16 ‘Truly excellent organisations are those that know how to tap people’s commitment and capacity to learn at all levels of the organisation’, so the lessons learned from the Falklands War should remain relevant to all ranks.17 It may be said that these vital lessons however, are not always remembered and implemented in some more modern conflicts, namely in Iraq during Operation TELIC where there were ‘shortages [and] loss of confidence in the supply chain’.18 The largest and most time exhaustive shortfall was the ‘means of tracking supplies in theatre [as it was] largely ineffective, manpower intensive and was swamped by the sheer volume of supplies.’19 This inability to deal with the large quantity led to huge piles of equipment. Similar to the haphazard loading of ships in the Falklands War it meant that troops in Iraq were still searching for kit weeks after the initial invasion and it ‘led to frontline units sending teams back down the supply chain to identify their equipment or stores and to ensure that it was delivered to them in time.’20 These pieces of kit were vital pieces of protection, ‘including] enhanced combat body armour and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) detection and protection systems’.21 This is equipment which should have been number one priority on load and distribution lists as it concerns the safety of British soldiers, which if jeopardised could lead to political apathy and mission failure and should not have been lost due to inefficient or non-existent consignment tracking. A worrying fact to note is Op TELIC was not the first deployment since 1982 to identify poor asset tracking as a logistic shortfall: ‘Op RESOLUTE (Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995– 44

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1996), Op LODESTAR (Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996–1998), Op BESEMER (Macedonia 2001) and Exercise SAIF SAREEA II (Oman 2001)’ have all been highlighted as previous British experiences where asset tracking was lacking.22 Running concurrently to Op TELIC was Operation HERRICK in Afghanistan which for most of its 14 years (2001-2014) was as inadequately supplied with asset tracking, experiencing ‘sub-optimal storage facilities [which were not up to] the high ambient temperatures and harsh operating conditions’ and again led to degradation and wastage of stock.23 It was not until 2009 that contracts for new Information Systems were made. MJDI (Management of the Joint Deployed Inventory) was ‘implemented in light of the operational shortcomings in the management of deployed assets’ but unfortunately was not fully rolled out across the Army until March 2014, less than a year before the end of Op HERRICK.24 The same is true for JAMES (Joint Asset and Management Engineering Solution) which was ‘designed to provide equipment asset managers, engineers and commanders with the information needed to increase equipment availability and optimise asset usage and maintenance’.25 Both, coupled with VITAL (Visibility In Transit Asset Logging) provide commanders with a much broader and clearer view of supplies and spares across the battlespace resulting in less wastage. Conclusion There were many lessons to be learned from the Falklands War and it is also equally clear that commanders across the Army and throughout the past three decades neither listened to the suggestions of academics nor pressurised the British Government for a budget to implement improvements. It took over 30 years, from the end of the Falklands War to the tail end of Op HERRICK, for a suitable solution to be found to prevent the logistic supply system becoming overrun or failing. Today the UK is in a position to successfully monitor its logistics whilst deployed on operations but there is still need for improvement as we still do not have complete visibility with tracking items. Bibliography Badsey, S, “The Logistics of the British Recovery of the Falkland Islands” 1982, Tokyo, National Institute for Defence Studies (2014). Boud, Cohen, Walker, “Using Experience for Learning”, Buckingham, Society for Research into Higher Education and Open University Press (1993). Burne, Lee, Brooks, Jarvis, “Becoming a Reflective Practitioner”, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell (2013). Cottrell, S, “The Study Skills Handbook”, Basingstoke, Palgrave (2013). Defence Contracts Online, MOD Defence Contracts Online, [Online], available from: [accessed on: 8 May 2017]. Hancock, Lee, “The ammunition supply chain and intermodalism: From depot to foxhole”, Monterey, Naval Postgraduate School (1998). Hellberg, I, “An experience with the Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines”, London (2005). House of Commons, Ministry of Defence: Operation TELIC — United Kingdom military operations in Iraq, London (2004). House of Commons, The Use of Information to Manage the Defence Logistics Supply Chain, London (2012). Jaworski, J, “Synchronicity: The inner path of leadership”, California, BerrettKoehter Publisher (1998).


Kirkup, J, British Army forced to rely on foreigners and contractors, Telegraph Online, available from: [accessed on: 8 May 2017] (2012). Kress, M, “Operational Logistics: The art and science of sustaining military operations”, London/Boston/Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers (2002). Messinger, N, “Ships Taken Up From Trade – STUFT – ‘What they did in the Falklands War’”, Whitehall (1983). Ministry of Defence, Operation TELIC - United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq, Whitehall (2003). Ministry of Defence, LOGISTICS INFORMATION HEARING—SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES: Q9. Stock Deterioration in Op HERRICK, Whitehall (2011). Moon, J, “Reflection in Learning and Professional Development: Theory and Practice”, Hove, Psychology Press (1999). New World Encyclopaedia, “Falklands War”, [Online], Available from: (2013). Oxfam, “STOP A BULLET, STOP A WAR Why ammunition must be included in the Arms Trade Treaty”, [Online], Available from: https:// (2012). Plymouth University, “Reflection”, [Online], Available from: https:// on.pdf (2010). Privratsky, K, “Logistics in the Falklands War”, Barnsley, Pen and Sword (2015). Swinford, Farmer, “Michael Fallon: Britain's armed forces will remain best in the world”, [Online], London, Guardian (2014). Think Defence, “Ship to Shore Logistics – 03 (History – 1982 Falkland Islands)”, [Online], Available from: 2013/07/ship-to-shore-logistics-03-history-1982-falkland-islands/ (2013). Tustin, W, “The Logistics of the Falklands War Part 1”, Army Defence Quarterly (1984). Valovcin, P, “Logistic lessons for the Operational Commander – The Falklands War”, Newport, United States Naval War College (1992). Wilsey, J, “H Jones VC-The life and death of an unusual hero”, London, Hutchinson (2002).

Footnotes 1

Kress, M (2002), “Operational Logistics: The art and science of sustaining military operations”, London/Boston/Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers 2 Hancock, Lee (1998), “The ammunition supply chain and intermodalism: From depot to foxhole”, Monterey, Naval Postgraduate School 3 Valovcin, P (1992), “Logistic lessons for the Operational Commander – The Falklands War”, Newport, United States Naval War College 4 Think Defence (2013), “Ship to Shore Logistics – 03 (History – 1982 Falkland Islands)”, [Online], Available from: 2013/07/ship-to-shore-logistics-03-history-1982-falkland-islands/

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Defence Contracts Online, MOD Defence Contracts Online, [Online], available from: [accessed on: 8 May 2017] 6 Kirkup, J (2012), British Army forced to rely on foreigners and contractors, Telegraph Online, available from: uknews/defence/9315166/British-Army-forced-to-rely-on-foreigners-andcontractors.html [accessed on: 8 May 2017] 7 Privratsky, K (2015, 74), “Logistics in the Falklands War”, Barnsley, Pen and Sword 8 Valovcin, P (1992, 12), “Logistic lessons for the Operational Commander – The Falklands War”, Newport, United States Naval War College 9 Badsey, S (2014, 111) “The Logistics of the British Recovery of the Falkland Islands”, 1982, Tokyo, National Institute for Defence Studies 10 Boud, Cohen, Walker (1993), “Using Experience for Learning”, Buckingham, Society for Research into Higher Education and Open University Press 110 New World Encyclopaedia (2013), “Falklands War”, [Online], Available from: 12 Valovcin, P (1992, 13), “Logistic lessons for the Operational Commander – The Falklands War”, Newport, United States Naval War College 13 Valovcin, P (1992, 14), “Logistic lessons for the Operational Commander – The Falklands War”, Newport, United States Naval War College 14 Hellberg, I (2005), “An experience with the Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines”, London 15 Oxfam (2012), “STOP A BULLET, STOP A WAR Why ammunition must be included in the Arms Trade Treaty”, [Online], Available from: 16 Swinford, Farmer (2014), “Michael Fallon: Britain's armed forces will remain best in the world”, [Online], London, Guardian 17 Burne, Lee, Brooks, Jarvis (2013, 182), “Becoming a Reflective Practitioner”, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell 18 Ministry of Defence (2011), LOGISTICS INFORMATION HEARING— SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES: Q9. Stock Deterioration in Op HERRICK, Whitehall 19 Ministry of Defence (2011), LOGISTICS INFORMATION HEARING— SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES: Q9. Stock Deterioration in Op HERRICK, Whitehall 20 House of Commons (2004), Ministry of Defence: Operation TELIC — United Kingdom military operations in Iraq, London 21 House of Commons (2004), Ministry of Defence: Operation TELIC — United Kingdom military operations in Iraq, London 22 House of Commons (2004), Ministry of Defence: Operation TELIC — United Kingdom military operations in Iraq, London 23 House of Commons (2012), The Use of Information to Manage the Defence Logistics Supply Chain, London 24 Ministry of Defence (2011), LOGISTICS INFORMATION HEARING— SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES: Q9. Stock Deterioration in Op HERRICK, Whitehall 25 Ministry of Defence (2011), LOGISTICS INFORMATION HEARING— SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES: Q9. Stock Deterioration in Op HERRICK, Whitehall

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History Contribution


Poppy Politics: The symbolism of the Flanders poppy On the second Sunday of November, as the clock strikes 1100hrs, society comes to a standstill. The silence is so noticeable and universal that you could hear a pin drop. The observing of two minutes silence has become an important ritual of Remembrance Day since its inauguration in 1919. However, the displaying of a Flanders poppy is arguably even more important. What is this symbol and why has society attributed such great importance to it? These are a few of the questions that this essay intends to answer, but in order to do so, a brief introduction to the history of the Flanders poppy and the rituals of Remembrance Day will be outlined. By Lt J Harrop The Remembrance Day services originated from the Armistice Day celebrations, a day for commemorating those who fell in the First World War. After the Second World War, the need for a national day of remembrance, not solely based on the Great War, became evident. Therefore, the day for commemorating the fallen moved from the day of the Armistice to the following Sunday and became known as Remembrance Day. Typical rituals of this day include attending services at war memorials, observing two minutes silence and wearing a red poppy. The association of the poppy with the Great War was born out of its ability to flourish and cover the devastated landscape of Northern France and Belgium in a blaze of scarlet.1 The sight of wild poppies in a devastated landscape led John McCrae to write the poem 'In Flanders Fields'.2 Although this poem was the inspiration, the origin of the commemorative poppy actually lies with Moina Bell Michaels and Madame Guerin. These two women persuaded Earl Haig, the head of the newly founded British Legion, to adopt the poppy for the Legion.3 The purpose of this essay is to examine modern day political actions and to assess the extent to which these actions have affected the poppy’s symbolism. It will first consider the political factors surrounding the poppy and determine whether these influences have contributed to 46

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politicising the symbol; the Royal family and political figures, the notion of the symbol being personal not political and the concept of 'poppy fascism'. The specific iconoclastic actions regarding the poppy will be answered. The final section of this essay will identify how the symbolism of the poppy is perceived by different groups in an attempt to determine its social constructionist nature. Poppy politics There is no doubt that there has been a fundamental change in social dynamic, demographic and culture since 1921 when the poppy was first used as a symbol for remembering the fallen. This change in culture and thought is one key reason for the perceived change in the poppy's symbolism. The poppy still holds the same core values of remembrance, yet society has attributed to this symbol certain political and nationalistic connotations. This section will therefore consider the modern-day era in an attempt to identify these political and nationalistic connotations attributed to the Flanders poppy. The poppy may be considered a political symbol in itself due to its close association with other political symbols such as the Royal family and Government, however, this connection needs to be explored further. One of the key ways the symbolism of the poppy is associated with the Heads of State is through the Remembrance Day service itself. The main service is televised live from the Cenotaph in Whitehall on the second Sunday of November; it is attended by Her Majesty the Queen, members of the Royal family, leaders of the main political parties, High Commissioners from the Commonwealth and senior members of the Armed Forces, all of whom lay wreaths of poppies in accordance with the service's tradition.4 If a viewer of this event knew nothing about what the symbol of the poppy represents, then due to its association with all these political figures, one could come to the conclusion that it is political in nature. Aside from the national and political icons at the forefront of the service, the very constitution of laying the wreaths is political in nature. The Queen, as Head of the State, will lay her wreath first, followed by the heads of the Government, who is then followed by other political party leaders. It is only after these political heads that the representatives of the Armed Forces get to place their wreaths. The Guardian newspaper states that: “This sombre Remembrance Day ritual is a contemporary display of the dignified part of the constitution: that the military, even when commemorating their dead, come behind politicians�.5 Therefore, although the make-up of the service is largely


unchanged in the years since its creation, the symbolism of the poppy has seemingly become politicised in nature. A factor contributing to this change could be the increase in media coverage of these events and the increase in media technology generally. The increase in social media accounts for a greater ability for collective action and a greater ability of the broadcast media to transmit their ideology and this could have an impact on the way that the symbol is perceived.6 Stanley Cohen in his study on youth culture and the media, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, identified that the media can fuel and amplify 'moral panics' by publicising contentious issues.7 This certainly seems to be true of the media when an episode of vandalism, iconoclasm or breaking with norms and social conventions occur. Some examples of members of society breaking with social conventions which have been fuelled by the media will now be considered. One of the key debates is the right to wear, or rather not wear the poppy, in the weeks leading up to Remembrance Day. In 2011 football's governing body, FIFA, caused uproar in the UK by refusing to allow the England football team to wear the poppy on their shirts, claiming it breached FIFA's decree that shirts should not carry political, religious or commercial messages.8 What ensued was a media campaign denouncing FIFA and it sparked public demand for the right to wear the symbol. However, this denunciation was not limited solely to the press; political figures attempted to intervene including the Prime Minister and Prince William. A compromise was eventually reached which allowed the football team to wear black armbands embroidered with the symbol of the poppy, training tops embossed with the poppy and the FA placed a wreath on the pitch during the national anthem followed by a minute’s silence.9 There are two conclusions to be reached from this information; firstly, that FIFA considers the symbolism of the poppy to be political. Secondly, that this symbol holds such cultural or political importance that the Head of the Government and the second in the line to the throne, would intervene to allow for the symbol to be represented. In the wake of the FIFA poppy controversy, the Guardian newspaper conducted an opinion poll which asked, 'Are poppies political?' 53% of the respondents identified that it was.10 However, it is equally valid to propose that it is not political in the sense of representing any political group but the symbol is political in the sense that its symbolic potency is founded in a patriotic sense of nationalism. Therefore, it begs the question, is wearing the poppy a personal choice, or a political statement? There have been many publicised cases of influential people not wearing a poppy. Examples include HM the Queen, Camilla, HRH Duchess of Cornwall, the Queen's composer Sir Peter Maxwell Davies and perhaps most controversially, Jon Snow the news reader.11 These highprofile cases have been reported in news publications and spun to make the individual seem disrespectful towards the war dead for not paying their respects by wearing a poppy. As a result of the media's scrutiny, cases such as these have created a culture of fear; this fear has led to every

History Contribution

person in the public eye, whether it be a news correspondent or casual visitor to a news studio, being seen to adorn the poppy on their clothing, for fear of some form of reprisal.12 Therefore, is wearing the poppy a personal choice or are members of society being pressured by the media into wearing it? The Times argues that; “If wearing a poppy ever came to feel morally mandatory, the flower will lose its potency as a genuine symbol of the wearers tribute to those who fell to secure our freedom”.13 Whereas Jon Snow, in defence of his refusal to wear a poppy, argued that this culture of fear is turning into 'poppy fascism'.14 The very term 'poppy fascism' has received a lot of attention in the years since it was first coined. Dr Ted Harrison accuses the modern day poppy emblem of becoming trivial, sentimentalised and of glorifying war, citing 'poppy bling', the commercialisation of the 'poppy appeal' and politicians who wear the poppy as a symbol of their own patriotic virility, as reasons for this change in symbolism.15 However, Guy Walters identifies that 'poppy fascism' is part of a wider societal issue which he calls 'grief fascism', whereby a growing culture forces individuals within society to publicise their remembrance and grief.16 It is in this regard that the poppy is seen to be increasingly publicised and as a consequence of this action it is becoming increasingly political in nature. This section has attempted to identify the political and nationalistic connotations attributed to the poppy. Reasons such as the close association of the poppy to other national symbols, the growing culture of fear of being seen to not wear a poppy and the increase in publicity and commercialisation of the symbol, all contribute to the increase in the politicising of the symbol. Iconoclasm It has widely been an assumption that the poppy has a perennial focus, however, this is not necessarily the case. The poppy seems to be most talked about in society when it is associated with specific political actions such as iconoclasm, vandalism or a resurgence in armed conflict. A number of political actions have already been identified therefore it will now address iconoclastic actions in an attempt to determine how these actions affect the symbolism of the poppy. The term 'iconoclast' has been taken from the Greek: eikôn meaning 'image' and klastós meaning 'to break' and was first used in the early 8th century in Constantinople.17 Throughout history, whenever there has been a time of religious or political upheaval, examples of iconoclasm usually follow. In the Byzantine Empire, iconoclasm occurred during the 8th and 9th centuries in response to growing fears of Christian and Islamic idolatry.18 In the upheaval of the Reformation period there are examples of iconoclastic vandalism by the early Protestants.19 Thus the Byzantine and Protestant attacks can be explained by the religious functions that images then fulfilled, just as revolutionary vandalism can find its source in politics, as demonstrated in the French revolution and the British Suffrage movement.20 THE REVIEW 2017-2018 47

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Therefore, iconoclasm is not solely limited to the parameters of religious and political change and could be understood as a tool for attempting to implement social and political change. Richard Davis in his study on a new emerging form of iconoclasm, states that: The new iconoclasm, however, is not a tool for creating religious or political hegemony. More, it appears as a tactic directed against what fundamentalists perceive as the hegemonising threat of a worldwide secular order based on Enlightenment premises inimical to strong religion.21 One such example of this is the extremist organisation, 'Muslims Against Crusades' poppy burning protest in 2010.22 The group strongly opposes British involvement in the Middle-East and has used the symbol of the poppy to facilitate their protest. Another example of iconoclastic vandalism includes an individual, in November 2012, who was arrested for posting a picture of a burning poppy on a social media website.23 This has led to the debate on whether the freedom of expression is being infringed by those who are over-zealously protecting the poppy's symbolism, with some commentators stating that this sort of police action is bordering on totalitarianism.24 Whether it be a group intending to further a political or social agenda, or an individual who haphazardly participates in iconoclastic vandalism, the very nature of poppy burning is a guaranteed way of gaining national media attention. Michael Taussig offers an explanation as to why symbols and icons, such as the poppy, seem to be most talked about when associated with actions such as iconoclasm and vandalism by stating that; “Icons suddenly burst into consciousness and seem to come alive only with their defacement”.25 This would appear true of the poppy which receives little or no media attention outside of the week’s surrounding Remembrance Sunday, except for when the symbol is involved in an act of vandalism. This statement can be demonstrated with the examples of a student who protested against rising tuition fees by 'hanging from a union flag on the Cenotaph' and the 'Muslim Against Crusades' leader, Emdamur Choudhury, receiving his punishment for poppy burning.26 Both of these examples were key stories outside of the weeks surrounding Remembrance Day. Therefore, it is clear that the subject of the poppy's symbolism is very sensitive due to its political and cultural importance. The examples of iconoclasm mentioned previously have demonstrated that iconoclastic vandalism does not have a negative effect on the populace's perception of the symbol, but instead, as a result of the media demonising the perpetrators, galvanises support and reinforces the poppy's values and symbolism. In order for an individual to participate in acts of iconoclastic vandalism, then the icon, in which they are vandalising, must hold little importance to the perpetrator. This statement highlights the subjective and social constructionist nature of symbols such as the Flanders poppy and this subject area must be explored further. 48

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Different meanings The symbolism of the Flanders poppy is socially constructed, it has been created by an institution for the purpose of commemorating the war dead. However, it is apparent throughout this research that the symbolism is prone to change and, as this essay has argued, become increasingly politicised in nature. The way that this symbol has changed leads this study to explore the concept of social constructionism. The ways in which members of a particular society understand the world, does not come from objective reality, but instead from other people, both past and present. Individuals are born into a world where the conceptual frameworks and categories used by the people in our culture already exist.27 This statement explains why different cultures view the symbolism of the poppy differently, for example; the poppy in China is the primary source of opium and can act as a reminder of the Anglo-Chinese Opium Wars of the 19th century. The Chinese would be unfamiliar with the poppies importance in Britain as a symbol for commemorating the war dead.28 According to Jennifer Iles, the poppy, “has a wealth of symbolic meanings which date back to ancient mythology”.29 Therefore, in order to better understand the social constructionist nature of the poppy this study must now look at other groups interpretation of the symbol, which include; the Peace Pledge Union's 'white poppy' and Animal Aid's 'purple poppy'. The white poppy was first introduced by the Women's Cooperative Guild (WCG) in 1933 as a symbol to represent peace and an end to all wars.30 The following year, the newly founded Peace Pledge Union began the widespread distribution of the white poppies and took over the WCG's annual promotion.31 The white poppy, which is a secondary symbol in that it exists only in opposition to the Flanders poppy, has been considered contentious since its first implementation, the symbol has been seen by veterans to undermine their contribution to the war effort.32 However, despite the negative characteristics attributed to the symbol, many pacifists still choose the white poppy over the red to dissociate themselves from the militaristic nature of Remembrance Day.33 The purple poppy, on the other hand, was first introduced in 2007 as a symbol to commemorate animal victims in war.34 The idea was implemented by Animal Aid, the United Kingdom's largest animal welfare group, and although still operating on a small scale, it will be interesting to see the likely impact this symbol will have over the coming years as more people become aware of it. Conclusions Whilst this study has identified a change in symbolism and identified the political nature of the symbol, the questions of how and when these changes occurred still need answering. Therefore, this study has provided a foundation on which future research can build on. The need for future research on this subject is paramount, especially when one considers the sparse level of research in this subject field.


This essay has identified that there are some political connotations attached to the poppy's symbolism. It has also been noted that while the core rituals have stayed the same, the change in symbolism continues as new factors in politicising the symbol take place in an ever-changing culture and society. This essay also set out to identify the extent to which modern day political actions have affected the symbolism of the Flanders poppy. There are a number of conclusions that can be reached from research. First, that the red poppy is political in nature due to its close association with other political and national symbols. Secondly, that the poppy is considered political in nature due to its cultural significance. And finally, by studying the social constructionist nature of the symbol, this study has identified that, not only has the symbolism of the Flanders poppy changed, but it is also likely to continue to change in the future. Bibliography Internet articles 'Are Poppies Political?', Guardian Online, 10 Nov 2011, http://www. - [Accessed, 13/04/2017]. Bates, Stephen, 'Charlie Gilmour, Son of Pink Floyd Guitarist Jailed for Protest Violence'. The Guardian Online, 13 July 2011, http://www. - [Accessed, 13/04/2017. Casciani, Dominic, 'Muslims Against Crusades Banned by Theresa May', - [Accessed, 13/04/2017]. Chapman, James, 'David Cameron Rejects Chinese Request to Remove "Offensive" Poppies During Visit', Mail Online, 10 Nov 2010, - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. Fogg, Ally, 'Arrested for Poppy Burning: Beware the Tyranny of Decency', Guardian Online, 12 Nov 2012, commentisfree/2012/nov/12/arrested-poppy-burning-beware-tyrannydecency - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. Furness, Hannah, 'Poppy Fascism Row Reignites Over Accusations Appeal Has Been Hijacked By Politicians and "B-List Celebrities", The Telegraph Online, 24 Oct 2012, defence/9629864/Poppy-fascism-row-reignites-over-accusations-appealhas-been-hijacked-by-politicians-and-B-list-celebrities.html - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 'History of the Poppy Appeal', shipston/poppy-appeal/history-of-the-poppy-appeal - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 'Poppy Politics', The Guardian, (London; England) Sat 3rd Nov 2007, INTCMP=SRCH%20 - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 'Prince William Demands FIFA U-Turn, on Poppy Ban', BBC Sport, 9 Nov 2011, - [Accessed, 13/04/2017]. Rawlinson, Kevin, "Poppycock": Man's Arrest for Posting Image of Burning Poppy on Facebook is Condemned by Civil Liberties Activists', The Independent Online, 12 Nov 2012, uk/crime/poppycock-mans-arrest-for-posting-image-of-burning-poppy-onfacebook-is-condemned-by-civil-liberties-activists-8306784.html [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 'Remembrance Sunday: Queens Composer Says He Will Boycott Poppies', The Telegraph Online, 14 Nov 2010, uknews/8132185/Remembrance-Sunday-Queens-composer-says-he-willboycott-poppies.html - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. Sportsmail Reporter, 'Cameron gives England Green Light to Defy FIFA Ruling On Poppies for Wembley Clash', Mail Online, 9 Nov 2011, - [Accessed, 13/04/2017].

History Contribution

Travis, Alan, 'Muslims Against Crusades to be Banned From Midnight', Guardian Online, 10 Nov 2011, nov/10/muslims-against-crusades-banned - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 'TV's Snow Rejects "Poppy Fascism", 10 Nov 2006, 1/hi/uk/6134906.stm - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. Walters, Guy, 'No One Should be Forced to Wear a Poppy', The Telegraph Online, 04 Nov 2010, defence/8109510/No-one-should-be-obliged-to-wear-a-poppy.html [Accessed 13/04/2017]. - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. national-launch-of-the-2010-poppy-appeal - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. mbranceday.aspx - [Accessed 13/0/2017]. Secondary sources Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (Verso, 2006). Billig, M. Banal Nationalism. (London: 1995). Bremmer, J.N, 'Iconoclasts, Iconoclastic and Iconoclasm: Notes Towards a Genealogy', Church History and Religious Culture, 88, (2008), pp.1-17. Burr, Vivien Social Constructionism, (London: Routledge, 2003). Cohen, Albert, 'On the Place of “Themes" and Kindred Concepts in Social Theory', American Anthropologist, New Series. Vol.50. No.3. (Jul-Sept, 1948). Davis, Richard H 'Iconoclasm in the era of strong religion', Material Religion, Vol.1, No.2, (July 2005), pp. 261-267. Evans, Martin and Kevin Lunn (Eds.), War and Memory in the Twentieth Century, (Oxford: Berg 1997). Foucault, Michel, A. M. Sheridan Smith (trans.), Archaeology of Knowledge, (London: Tavistock Publications 1972). Fussell, Paul, The Great War and Modern Memory, (New York: Oxford University Press: 1975). Gamboni, Dario, The destruction of art: Iconoclasm and vandalism since the French Revolution, (London: Reaktion, 1997). Geertz, Clifford, The Interpretation of Cultures, (New York: Basic Books, 1973). Gergen, Mary and Kenneth J. Gergen, Social Construction: A Reader, (London: Sage, 2003). Gregory, A. The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day 1919-1946, (Oxford: Berg Publishers: 1994). Iles, Jennifer. ‘In Remembrance: The Flanders poppy’, Mortality, Vol. 13, No. 3 (August, 2008), pp. 201-221. Jones, Nicholas, 'A Question of Conscience', British Journalism Review, Vol.23, No.7, (June, 2012), pp.78-83. King, Alex. Memorials of the Great War in Britain: the Symbolism and Politics of Remembrance, (Oxford: Berg, 1998). King, G.R D. 'Islam, Iconoclasm and the Declaration of Doctrine', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol.44, No.2, (1998), pp.267277. Mosse, George, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, (Oxford University Press, 1990). Ortner, Sherry B. ‘On Key Symbols’, American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 75, No. 5, (Oct, 1973) pp. 1338-1346. Radley, Alan, 'Artefacts, Memory and a Sense of the Past', in, David Middleton and Derek Edwards (Eds.) Collective Remembering, (London: Sage, 1990). Shirkey, Clay, 'The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, The Public Sphere, and Political Change, Foreign Affairs, (January/February, 2011), pp.1-12. Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers, (London: Routledge, 2011). Taussig, Michael, 'Iconoclasm Dictionary', The Drama Review, Vol.56, No.1, (Spring, 2012), pp.10-17. Walter, George, The Penguin Book of First World War Poetry, (London: Penguin, 2006).

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History Contribution


Winter, Caroline. ‘Tourism, Social memory and the Great War’, Annals of Tourism Research, (2009), Vol. 36(4), pp-607-626. Winter, Jay. Sites of memory, sites of mourning: The Great War in European cultural history, (Cambridge University Press: 1998). Winter, Jay; Sivan, Emmanuel (eds.), War and Remembrance in the Twentieth century, (Cambridge University Press: 1999). Widdowson, H.G. Discourse Analysis, (Oxford University Press, 2007).

Footnotes Jennifer Iles, ‘In Remembrance: The Flanders poppy’, Mortality, Vol. 13, No. 3 (August, 2008), p.201. 2 ‘In Flanders fields’ - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 3 'History of the Poppy Appeal', shipston/poppy-appeal/history-of-the-poppy-appeal - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 4 'Poppy Politics', The Guardian, (London; England) 3 Nov 2007. 5 INTCMP=SRCH%20 - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 6 Clay Shirky, 'The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, The Public Sphere, and Political Change, Foreign Affairs, (February 2011), pp.1-12. 7 Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers, (London: Routledge, 2011). 8 'Prince William Demands FIFA U-Turn, on Poppy Ban', BBC Sport, 9 Nov 2011; - [Accessed, 13/04/2017]. 9 Sportsmail Reporter, 'Cameron gives England Green Light to Defy FIFA Ruling On Poppies for Wembley Clash', Mail Online, 9 Nov 2011; - [Accessed, 13/04/2017]. 10 'Are Poppies Political?', Guardian Online, 10 Nov 2011, http://www. - [Accessed, 13/04/2017]. 11 The Queen: 'Ma'am Why Are You Not Wearing A Poppy', The Mirror, (London: England), 12 Nov 1999, p.9. Camilla: 'Islamic Camilla Dumps Poppy', Daily Express, (London: England), Oct 31 2006, p.1. Composer: 'Remembrance Sunday: Queens Composer Says He Will Boycott Poppies', The Telegraph Online, 14 Nov 2010, uknews/8132185/Remembrance-Sunday-Queens-composer-says-he-willboycott-poppies.html - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. Jon Snow: 'TV's Snow Rejects "Poppy Fascism", 10 Nov 2006. uk/6134906.stm - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 12 'Flanders, Football and Freedom: The Wearing Of Poppies Should Be Personal, Not Political', The Times, (London: England), 10 Nov 2011, p.2. 13 Ibid. 14 Jon Snow: 'TV's Snow Rejects "Poppy Fascism". 15 Dr. Ted Harrison, in, Hannah Furness, 'Poppy Fascism Row Reignites Over Accusations Appeal Has Been Hijacked By Politicians and "B-List Celebrities", The Telegraph Online, 24 Oct 2012. news/uknews/defence/9629864/Poppy-fascism-row-reignites-overaccusations-appeal-has-been-hijacked-by-politicians-and-B-list-celebrities. html - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 1


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Guy Walters, 'No One Should be Forced to Wear a Poppy', The Telegraph Online, 04 Nov 2010. defence/8109510/No-one-should-be-obliged-to-wear-a-poppy.html [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 17 J.N Bremmer, 'Iconoclasts, Iconoclastic and Iconoclasm: Notes Towards a Genealogy', Church istory and Religious Culture, 88, (2008), pp.3-9. 18 G.R D. King, 'Islam, Iconoclasm and the Declaration of Doctrine', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol.44, No.2, (1998), pp.267270. 19 J.N Bremmer, 'Iconoclasts, Iconoclastic and Iconoclasm', pp.15-17. 20 Dario Gamboni, The Destruction of Art: Iconoclasm and Vandalism Since the French Revolution, (London: Reaktion, 1997), p.10 and Suffrage movement section in same title, p.93. 21 Richard H. Davis, 'Iconoclasm in the Era of Strong Religion', Material Religion, Vol.1, No.2, (July 2005), p. 266. 22 Alan Travis, 'Muslims Against Crusades to be Banned From Midnight', Guardian Online, 10 Nov 2011, 10/muslims-against-crusades-banned - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 23 Ally Fogg, 'Arrested for Poppy Burning: Beware the Tyranny of Decency', Guardian Online, 12 Nov 2012. 2012/nov/12/arrested-poppy-burning-beware-tyranny-decency - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 24 Ally Fogg, 'Arrested for poppy burning: Beware the Tyranny of Decency', and; Kevin Rawlinson, "Poppycock": Man's Arrest for Posting Image of Burning Poppy on Facebook is Condemned by Civil Liberties Activists', The Independent Online, 12 Nov 2012, uk/crime/poppycock-mans-arrest-for-posting-image-of-burning-poppy-onfacebook-is-condemned-by-civil-liberties-activists-8306784.html [Accessed 13/04/2017] 25 Michael Taussig, 'Iconoclasm Dictionary', The Drama Review, Vol.56, No.1, (Spring 2012), p.10. 26 'The Right to Burn Poppies', The Economist Online, 8 March 2011. [Accessed 13/04/2017]. Stephen Bates, 'Charlie Gilmour, Son of Pink Floyd Guitarist Jailed for Protest Violence'. The Guardian Online, 13 July 2011, - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 27 Vivien Burr, Social Constructionism, (London: Routledge, 2003), p.7. 28 James Chapman, 'David Cameron Rejects Chinese Request to Remove "Offensive" Poppies During Visit', Mail Online, 10 Nov 2010. - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 29 Jennifer Iles, ‘In Remembrance: The Flanders poppy’, Mortality, Vol. 13, No. 3 (August 2008), p.202. 30 - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 31 Ibid. 32 Jennifer Iles, ‘In Remembrance: The Flanders poppy’, p.209. 33 Nicholas Jones, 'A Question of Conscience', British Journalism Review, Vol.23, No.7, (June 2012), p.80. 34 - [Accessed 13/04/2017]. 16


History Contribution

Why did the Dieppe Raid prove such a disaster and what was learnt from it that led to the success seen on D-Day? The Dieppe Raid, codenamed Operation JUBILEE, was conducted on the 19 August 1942 and was an audacious raid that hoped to secure a major German held port and was anticipated to relieve pressure on the Soviet Union in the East. Despite the great acts of bravery, professionalism and heroism of the serviceman, Operation JUBILEE was a disaster. By Capt A S MacLaverty The raid began at 05:00, by 10:50 the Allied commander, General Roberts, was forced to call a retreat. Out of the 6,086 men who landed, 5,000 Canadians, 1,000 British troops, and 50 United States Army Rangers, a total of 3,627 were killed, wounded or captured. The RAF lost 106 aircraft and the Navy lost 33 landing crafts and 1 destroyer.1 The raid achieved almost none of the original objectives which included; seizing and holding a major port, gathering intelligence from prisoners and radar stations, destroying coastal defences and destroying strategic buildings. A lack of accurate reconnaissance, a lack of specialised equipment, failure of communication and a lack of surprise, were all factors that contributed to this horrific defeat on the beaches of Dieppe. However, it is argued that the raid was a necessary evil that eventually led to the success seen on D-Day. Earl Mountbatten of Burma, Vice-Admiral of the Combined Operations Force for Dieppe stated: “The Duke of Wellington said the Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton. I say that the Battle of Normandy was won on the beaches of Dieppe.”2 This essay will explore just what these failures were and the adaptions that were made in preparation for D-Day. The Dieppe raid suffered from a myriad of problems that led to its downfall. Lack of accurate reconnaissance, failure of communications and technical downfalls due to unadapted vehicles, all played an overpowering part. Intelligence on the area was extremely sparse, using only basic air reconnaissance photos and holiday photos to plan the raid. The outline plan for Operation JUBILEE stated that: ‘Intelligence reports indicate that Dieppe is not heavily defended and that the beaches in the vicinity are suitable

for landing infantry and armoured fighting vehicles.’3 However, in reality Dieppe was garrisoned by the German 302nd Static Infantry Division which was made up of 1,500 men consisting of three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, one surveillance reconnaissance battalion and antitank, engineer and signals battalions. Consequently, the allied raiding force was unprepared for such fierce resistance and the casualties showed this. Moreover, not only was the German force underestimated but so was the terrain, especially the suitability of the beaches for landing tanks. Of the 58 tanks that were deployed, 27 made it ashore but they were prematurely stopped on the promenade by concrete roadblocks that were not detected on initial reconnaissance photographs. Furthermore, the steepness of the beaches and the large, loosely set pebbles that made up the beaches were also overlooked. Consequently, the unadapted Churchill tanks, amongst other armoured vehicles, could not handle the terrain and most of the tanks became immobile. This led to the infantrymen on the initial beach assaults going unprotected and the eventual capture of 29 Churchill tanks by German forces, including those that were stranded in the low tide. It is argued that the largest failure of the Dieppe raid was the failure in communication. The initial crossing of the raiding force was plagued by technical troubles when the force ran into a German convoy patrolling the channel. British radar stations picked up the vessels and sent two warning messages to the British vessels but none were acknowledged. As a result, several assaulting crafts were sunk and the surprise of the assault on Dieppe was lost. Robert Arnoldt states that failure of communication was one of the most damaging aspects: “The leaders on the Daimler Dingo armoured car and two Churchill tanks bogged down on the shingle beach, 1942

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History Contribution


command ship Calpe could not successfully direct a battle when they had no information on its progress.”4 Alongside faulty intelligence, the commander of ground forces, General Roberts, was inadequately informed about the situation on the ground by lack of communication and false information sent by rogue groups that had made an initial foothold on the beaches of Dieppe itself. It was some time before the Commanders on the HQ ship, Calpe, realised the true situation on the beaches. This was not before 748 reserves (Fusiliers Mont-Royal and Commandos) were sent into action when they could do little to affect the course of the battle and were subsequently captured or reported missing in action. Due to failure in communication, the unified purpose of taking the port city of Dieppe led to “Dieppe not just being one battle, but eight separate attacks which had only limited effect on each other.”5 Although the casualties were substantial, the losses at Dieppe were claimed to be necessary. The lessons learnt at Dieppe were later utilised and used effectively during D-Day, Mountbatten stated that: “For every man who died in Dieppe, at least ten more must have been spared in Normandy in 1944.”6 Winston Churchill later remarked that: “My Impression of 'JUBILEE' is that the results fully justified the heavy cost” and that it “was a Canadian contribution of the greatest significance to final victory.”7 Hobart “Funnies”, Mulberry harbours, incorporation of new assault tactics and deception operations led to the considerable success seen on D-Day and these were all direct results of the catastrophic mistakes made at Dieppe. One of the greatest lessons learnt at Dieppe was that capturing a major port would result in extremely heavy casualties and even if the port could be taken most of the port infrastructure would be demolished by retreating Axis forces. Other methods would have to be created in order to create an efficient platform in which to launch the invasion of mainland Europe and Mulberry harbours were the solution. Mulberry harbours were floating concrete harbours that could be quickly towed across the channel and scuttled on the beaches to create artificial ports; negating the need to capture a major port. Despite one Mulberry harbour being destroyed by storms, In the ten months after D-Day, Mulberry harbours were used to land over 2.5 million men, 500,000 vehicles and four million tonnes of supplies which was vital in maintaining the momentum of the invasion into Europe.8 A main failure during the initial assaults on Dieppe was that the first waves of infantry and engineers were unsupported by heavy armour. This was due to the inability of the tanks to get off the beaches and led to the eventual destruction of all armoured forces that departed from Britain on the morning of 19 August 1942 as a consequence. Major General Sir Percy Hobart was tasked to develop specialised tanks to deal with every aspect of beach assaults. By June 1944, 79th Armoured Division had a large variety of specialised tanks designed from both the Churchill and Sherman chassis, which ranged from amphibious tanks (Sherman Duplex Drive), mine-sweepers (Sherman Crab), carpet-layers (Churchill Bobbins), and flamethrower 52

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equipped tanks (Churchill Crocodile). These are just a small sampling of the sophisticated fighting armoured vehicles that landed on the Normandy beaches on 6 June. These tanks were generally successful and General Eisenhower stated: “Apart from the factor of tactical surprise, the comparatively light casualties which we sustained on all beaches were in large measure due to the success of the novel mechanical contrivances which we employed. It is doubtful if the assault forces could have firmly established themselves without the assistance of these weapons.”9 Interestingly, the US only utilised Duplex Drive tanks on D-Day, causing more problems and higher casualties on their beaches in comparison to British and Canadian beaches, which utilised the full range of Hobart “Funnies”.

The solution to shingle. The Churchill “Bobbin” Carpet laying tank that was utilised by British Forces on Operation OVERLORD, 1944

The Allies’ experience at Dieppe taught them that a complete overhaul of assault tactics was needed. The value of heavy naval and air bombardment prior to any landings, the use of covering smoke during the initial assault and the importance of landing airborne forces prior to the assault to seize and hold vital positions behind enemy lines and halt or disrupt reinforcements from reaching the beaches were soon realised. Other amphibious operations in Europe post Dieppe also helped cement and refine new amphibious landing tactics for Operation OVERLORD, such as: Operation TORCH (Tunisia), Operation HUSKY (Sicily) and Operation AVALANCHE (Italy). Pointe Du Hoc, a daring cliff assault on D-Day, showed that the allies were turning to much more unorthodox tactics that had high rewards. Ken Ford, a renowned author on the events at Dieppe, states that: “…It is to the credit of the Allied High Command that these lessons were taken to heart and the rewards were reaped a thousand-fold on the morning of 6 June 1944 on another group of Normandy Beaches.”10 Moreover, it was known that a much larger fleet than seen at Dieppe would be vital to enable the Allies to land a strong


enough force to overwhelm the enemy defences and as such 6,939 vessels were utilised to deploy over 160,000 troops over five beaches on the 6th June.11 The lack of surprise and secrecy during the lead up to the Dieppe raid meant that the momentum of the invasion was lost from the start and as such a monumental emphasis was placed on deception and the element of surprise for the DDay landings. Operation BODYGUARD was a high-level World War II deception plan to mislead German High Command to the exact date and location of the invasion. The main Operation within BODYGUARD was Operation FORTITUDE which was the creation of fake field armies, being the 1st U.S Army Group (FUSAG), to mislead the enemy into believing the invasions would happen in Norway and Calais. German double agents within Britain were used to send false information back to the Fatherland, unencrypted wireless traffic from nonexistent units were sent freely and dummy airfields, infrastructure and equipment were established on the SouthEast coast of England in order to further deceive the enemy. The tactics were so effective that in a decrypted message between the Japanese Government and Hitler, Hitler stated: “I think that diversionary actions will take place in a number of places - against Norway, Denmark, the southern part of western France, and the French Mediterranean coast but with the main attack force will invade across the Straits of Dover.”12 Operation BODYGUARD was a huge success ensuring surprise was maintained for the D-Day landings. Hitler was so concerned with the proposed invasion of Calais that he was convinced that the Normandy landing were in fact a deception and delayed sending reinforcements to Normandy which gave the Allies enough time to secure an effective beachhead. General Omar Bradley, Field commander of US Forces in Europe quoted Operation Bodyguard to be “The single biggest hoax of the war.”13 In conclusion, the Dieppe raid was a tactical and operational disaster and suffered from a myriad of problems that led to its downfall. Lack of accurate reconnaissance, failure of communication and surprise and outdated assault tactics all played an integral part in its failings. However, without these failings it is argued that D-Day would have not been the success that it was, New York Times stated in 1943: “…Dieppe, where brave men died without hope for the sake of proving that there is a wrong way to invade. They will have their share of glory when the right way is tried.”14 Without the sacrifice of the soldiers on the 19 August 1942 on a small and unknown beach in France the advances in technology, in regards to Hobart “Funnies” and newly designed assault crafts, new and radical assault tactics, the creation of Mulberry harbours and deception operations could not have been possible. A very negative outcome on the 6 June 1944 on another spot of the French coast could have become a reality. Bibliography Arnoldt R (1981), The Dieppe Raid, a failure that led to success, July-August 1981, Armour Journal.

History Contribution

Dummy Sherman tank and Dummy Aircraft, Douglas A-20 Havoc as part of Operation FORTITUDE, 1943 Atkin R (1980), Dieppe 1942, Macmillan London Limited, London. Ford K (2003), Dieppe 1942; Prelude to D-Day, Osprey Publishing, Oxford. Holt T (2010), The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War, Skyhorse Publishing, New York. Kirkpatrick L (1969), Captains without eyes; intelligence failures in World War II, Macmillan London Limited, London. Latimer J (2001), Deception in war, John Murray publishing, London. Liddell-Hart B (1959), The Tanks, Cassell publishing, London. Maguire E (1963), Dieppe; August 19, J. Cape 1963, the University of California. (accessed 22/04/2017) (accessed 23/04/2017)

Footnotes Figures taken from Ford K (2003), Dieppe 1942; Prelude to D-Day, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, Pg.91 2 Atkin R (1980), Dieppe 1942, Macmillan London Limited, London, Pg.253 3 Atkin R (1980), Dieppe 1942, Macmillan London Limited, London, Pg.24 4 Arnoldt R (1981), The Dieppe Raid, a failure that led to success, JulyAugust 1981, Armour Journal, Pg. 19 5 Kirkpatrick L (1969), Captains without eyes; intelligence failures in World War II, Macmillan London Limited, London, Pg.178 6 Maguire E (1963), Dieppe; August 19, J. Cape 1963, The University of California, Pg. 190 7 Maguire E (1963), Dieppe; August 19, J. Cape 1963, The University of California, Pg. 181 8 Figures taken from harbour.htm (accessed 23/04/2017) 9 Liddell-Hart B (1959), The Tanks, Cassell publishing, London, Pg.332 10 Ford K (2003), Dieppe 1942, Prelude to D-Day, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, Pg. 92 11 Figures taken from (accessed 22/04/2017) 12 Holt T (2010), The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War, Skyhorse Publishing, New York, Pg. 565-566 13 Latimer J (2001), Deception in war, John Murray publishing, London, Pg.238 14 Atkin R (1980), Dieppe 1942, Macmillan London Limited, London, Pg.XIII 1

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Foreland Shipping Limited

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History Contribution

Pack Transport – Regenerating an old capability The environment of the next conflict is, unknown, unexpected and likely to catch us by surprise. Add in to this disaster relief, peace keeping and so forth and we could easily be caught out by an unexpected deployment to a remote jungle, scrub or mountainous region of the world. Historically the unexpected happens, very rarely do we get the war, conflict or aid operation that we thought was coming. By Maj D Puckey For example, if the recent earthquake in Nepal after the initial rescue phase turned into a longer reconstruction phase, (like Op Maturin in Pakistan) Pack Transport could well have utility in reaching remote communities over damaged and blocked roads and tracks in a high-altitude environment, one where helicopter lift capacity is greatly reduced.1,2 Could we currently manage to train 100 Ghurkhas from 10 Queen’s Own Ghurkha Logistic Regiment to operate a Pack Unit using animals and equipment sourced locally or from the neighbouring Indian Army Service Corps? Interestingly, during the initial disaster response operation, civilian rescue groups found moving equipment to be a major problem, one in which Pack Transport would have helped greatly, if available.3 When did we last use Pack Transport? More recently than you might think! Although the last permanent pack transport units disbanded in 1976, Pack saw use in the Falklands post conflict to support patrols and in Bosnia supporting Peace Keeping patrols. In addition, some limited use was made of it in Afghanistan. Prior to this, during the Second World War, Pack was used on a large scale in jungle operations in Burma and Mountain Operations in Italy, moving supplies forwards to, and with patrols and evacuating the wounded on the way back from the front line.4 Is it still relevant and who else uses it? It is still relevant. Germany (Gebirgstrragtierwesen 230) Austria, India and Pakistan still have formed Pack Transport units specifically for use in mountain environments. Exercise BALKAN GRENADIER, conducted by DLW at Warminster, looked at the value and utility of Pack in the mountains,

examining closely the German use of a Mountain Division, using a great deal of pack to outflank the Allied forces by going straight over Mount Olympus during the invasion of Greece during the Second World War. This achieved total surprise as no one had expect a German Mountain Division to suddenly appear from a high snow-covered mountain range. The Russian Army had, and perhaps still has, a Pack Horse Platoon operating in the North Caucasus as part of a Russian Mountain Brigade as recently as 2007-2011.5 Why don’t we use Pack? Mainly due to the fact that the British Army is not operating in an environment that requires it. Add to this an emphasis on current operations that did not include operating in a mountainous environment and any possible Pack usage becomes ‘out of sight, out of mind’. Pack is a difficult capability to operate. It requires skill, experience and training of both man and beast to perform up to its full capacity. Try using a few unfit animals with novice handlers to cover a 20-mile resupply loop in mountains and you would soon learn false lessons in terms of potential capability. If you do this with fit animals and experienced handlers, you would get a very different picture of a real capability than can contribute greatly to operations in such environments. UK capability We only have a residual corporate knowledge and very little kit since the last pack transport unit was disbanded in 1976.6 There is a very large capability gap if ever called upon for which there is no ready solution, outsourced or otherwise. Doctrine say one thing, reality another, i.e. Mountain Warfare doctrine states that The Royal Logistics Corps (RLC) maintains a pool of trained officers.7 Only one is still serving that has done the one-week course (1999) and that was by choice as a Reservist. Unlike many other capabilities, there is no immediate contractor source standing by to provide either capability or training, as Pack is not used to any extent in this country as a civilian mode of transport. There may be a few Highland Estates using a pony to bring culled deer off the hills, and a couple of re-enactors with an interest in displaying the kit on an animal at shows, but no real pool of people who use it routinely to do a real job delivering supplies in quantity. What can Pack Transport do?8 The capability has several advantages over traditional wheeled transport and helicopter lift. Pack characteristics and capability is well illustrated in the excellent SSVC Video THE REVIEW 2017-2018 55

History Contribution


Pack the Local Solution: • It is relatively silent and does not leave a huge signature giving away the location being resupplied like SH or wheeled vehicles • It can move across rough broken ground, through vegetation and up narrow tracks that cannot support even a quad bike • It can move with or close to dismounted units, for example delivering reserve ammunition to a Mortar platoon • Each animal can carry a usable load of 160lbs (74.58 kg) on top of saddlery for up to 22 to 34 miles a day routinely, when fit and trained9 • Loads can easily be dispersed across an area with their handlers to support dispersed positions and units • Pack would be supplementary to other forms of transport, not a replacement. It would have to be integrated into the wider logistic plan in order to add capability Disadvantages Pack is manpower and animal intensive, a typical planning figure was that it took 40 mules to move the contents of a fully loaded four tonne truck. The animals need forage and hard feed, shelter and care to remain in good condition for hard work. However, used intelligently to make maximum use of the advantages use of pack transport can still contribute greatly to successful operations, used where there is no other solution bar man packing. Options • Do Nothing: This is where we hope that if this capability is ever needed it can be created out of thin air, that our residual corporate knowledge has not retired, and that we can do it all in time! This option has a high chance of getting caught out by future operations. • Forming a Pack Transport Unit: This would be the ideal but for it to happen it would require a new deployment or have the current use of Pack as a requirement on an enduring Operation. This is a costly way of keeping a basic capability alive. This was the old solution given up in the 1970s. There are those of us about with the equine and pack experience who could just about resurrect this, the knowledge is not yet totally lost. Unfortunately, this is very unlikely to happen unless required for immediate use on a large scale. • Pack Transport Cadre: Form a Cadre to keep the skills alive. There are people still serving, like myself, who have completed the Animal Transport Familiarisation course and still have good equine experience, and could call in favours from those now retired to get things back up and running. As a minimum this would be 1 x SO2 Animal Transport plus 3 SNCOs, going through a range of configurations up to a training team. This is a simple and cost effective way of keeping a seed corn capability that can rapidly grow into an operational capability if required.10 Their tasks would include: 6 Small permanent staff to keep knowledge available, current, and maintain links with other armies that have a capability. Use of FTRS personnel would ensure continuity 56

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6 Use of Reservists to form an instructor pool, either as their main role or a secondary skill and commitment 6 Specialists such as Vets, Farriers and Saddlers could be called in from Mounted Duties when required to support training and trials activity11 6 Training Regular and Reserve Volunteers, i.e. the RLC Mounted Sports Club could, with limited voluntary training, maintain a pack handler capability and awareness, the training gap and training time would be reduced by using people who know horses to some extent, thereby being able to concentrate on pack specific training 6 Pack horses could be procured when needed, either by having dedicated ride and pack horses stationed at service saddle clubs but with priority use to pack (keeps a fit stock of horses available at no manning cost), or by having a series of agreements with trekking centres to block hire their ponies as and when required 6 Maintain links with suitable civilian volunteers who may be of use; ex pack handlers (Jerry Watkins at Bristol Horseworld), re-enactors etc 6 Maintain International Links- i.e. India, Pakistan, Austria, Netherlands, USA. Scope the possible sources for UOR equipment and training 6 Equipment – at least know where to procure suitable saddlery (ASC in India use Pack GS, Canadian civilians use a similar modernised version etc.) Use of modern lightweight materials may be beneficial but would need trialling. To have any chance of rapid UOR procurement the groundwork needs to be done well in advance and the design and possible manufacturers held ready on file for possible use. This would require a set up with sufficient experience to do the practical work. The team would also need to develop loading schemes for different types of current equipment that are potential loads 6 Maintain up to date course plans and lesson packs for use in training unit pack handlers.12 Periodically practice delivering these courses 6 Integration into the wider logistic system, logically this would be part of the HOC CSS and CD Combat outputs. Issues such as lift for horses and forage would need planning in. Recommended action Pack Transport needs to be more than a capability on paper. The Army needs to take the doctrine and actually make it a seed corn capability that can be grown quickly if need be. The Army needs to start looking at training the capability so that it can be taken from a seed corn to full blown capability. In short, the Army needs to step up to the plate, turn the doctrine into reality and invest in this capability. A small Pack Transport Cadre is the most logical and costeffective way to do this. Bibliography British Army Journal, article ‘With Pack Mules in the Appenines’ by Maj CT Berridge OBE RASC


AFM Vol 2 Part 1, Mountain Operations, Part A Chap 6 AC 70441 RLC Animal Transport 2004 DAC Training for Military Pack Transport Handlers DAC/PACK/CSE/24/003 Apr 17 1997 Horsemastership and Animal Transport 1937 – HMSO Pack the Local Solution – SSVC Video

Footnotes 1

Op MATURIN saw members of 59 Independent Commando RE assist in rescue and emergency shelter rebuilding operations after the Kashmir earthquake at the invitation of the Pakistani Government. 2 Pack for the purposes of this article refers to the use of Pack Horses or Pack Mules, however other animals have and could possibly still be used, from the elephant, to camels, donkeys, goats, and even large dogs. 3 Watkins, Jerry, SARAID volunteer who deployed to Nepal, and has previously completed the Pack course when in the RAVC. 4 British Army Journal, article ‘With Pack Mules in the Appenines’ by Maj CT Berridge OBE RASC.

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History Contribution


Cook, Major James, RA, A New Means of Tactical Mobility for Afghanistan, BAR 151, Spring 2011 6 414 Pack Transport Unit RCT in Hong Kong in 1976, followed shortly after by H Squadron RCT in Aldershot. Up until this time all officers of the RCT undertook equitation and pack training as part of their Troop Commanders Course. The last of these officers would by now be retired, or very close to it. 7 AFM Vol 2, Part 1, Mountain Operations, Part A, Chap 6 8 See AC 70441 RLC Animal Transport 2004; and DAC Training for Military Pack Transport Handlers, DAC/PACK/CSE/24/003, Apr 17 1997 9 See both, Horsemastership and Animal Transport 1937; and DAC Training for Military Pack Transport Handlers, the planning data remains unchanged. 10 ROM cost would be £200K per year. 11 British Army Journal, ‘With Pack Mules in the Appenines’, by Maj CT Berridge OBE RASC, page 79, recommends that farriers and saddlers are essential on the march. 12 DAC currently have a Pack Course on file with relevant documentation.

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History Contribution

Military Landing Officers (MLOs) on the Gallipoli Beaches Some lessons from historical logistic enablers The Gallipoli Campaign was one of many heroic failures during the Great War 1914-1918. The original landings at ANZAC Cove and Helles on 25 April 1915 were followed with a subsequent landing at Suvla Bay on 6-7 August 1915. The campaign was on a scale that is difficult to imagine now; four divisions partook in the initial landings.1 By Maj C Taylor These were not exemplar operations and they comprehensibly failed to defeat the Turkish Army and open up the Dardanelles to allow the Royal Navy to continue to Constantinople. But, as a case-study, Gallipoli has much to teach modern expeditionary logisticians. Much has been written to criticise the concept behind the campaign, its execution and the poor leadership displayed. However, some aspects of the somewhat haphazard 1915 logistic effort do provide opportunities for direct comparison with modern expeditionary logistics structures. Though a century apart these comparisons enable analysis of modern concepts and highlight lessons to aid modern logistic enabling formations. The indirect 1915 equivalent of the modern RLC Movement Control (MC) trade were the Military Landing Officers (MLOs) employed on the Gallipoli beaches. Going further, the MLOs, and the various assets they controlled, closely relate to the modern organisation for enabling theatre entry; the VANGUARD Enabling Group (VEGp). This article will aim to employ research on MLOs from a 2016 battlefield study to conduct analysis on the future employment of the VEGp.2 This will draw out relevant modern lessons from practical experiences of a century ago. Firstly, the role of the modern VEGp will be examined to understanding the organisation that would deliver modern theatre enablement. Next, the 1915 logistic structures, with their limited adaptability, will

Map 1. The Mediterranean Theatre showing the Gallipoli Peninsular and the location of the entrance to the Dardanelles.

be examined in combination with the role of the MLO. Having established clear parallels between the modern and legacy logistic structures this article aims to be historical in nature. The main body of this study will consist of the MLOs from Gallipoli telling their stories in their own words. Several first-hand accounts by Gallipoli MLOs survive, along with much archival documentation. These experiences relate the MLOs closely to their VEGp successors and will be used as a basis from which the VEGp can be analysed and salient logistic lessons identified. Key issues included the modular approach to force-generation; operating in austerity and adversity; ensuring requisite readiness and training; the importance of all-arms, multi-national and joint cooperation; theatre transition and recovery planning. Why are MLOs or the VEGp important? It is generally considered that an army will be stronger if well supplied and weaker if not. Thomas Kane took logistic analysis beyond such binary judgements in asserting that logistics is the ‘arbiter of opportunity’ whereby; ‘Logistics helps determine THE REVIEW 2017-2018 59

History Contribution


Figure 1. The Full Order of Battle of the VE Gp for Exercise SHAMAL STORM 15. This organisation was headed up by RHQ and Force Elements from 29 Regiment RLC.

Map 2 showing the key landing areas (south to north) at Cape Helles, ANZAC Cove and Suvla Bay. Figure 2. Force Elements at Readiness held for the VEGp.

which side will have the most options available’.3 Standard thought on expeditionary warfare, epitomised by Kenneth Boulding in his theory on the ‘loss-of-force gradient’, stated that the greater the distance an army operates from its base the weaker it becomes.4 The ability for expeditionary forces to operate effectively overseas is contrary to Boulding’s ideas. This is explained by Albert Wohlstetter who postulated that increased efficiency of sea transport over land transport made this possible.5 The implication is that the enabling of forces into an expeditionary theatre must be efficient accomplished to support Wohlstetter’s theory. The VEGp is a modular, ‘all-arms’, logistic enabling command based initially around the RHQ of a 104 Logistic Support Brigade (104LogX) CSS Regiment. This RHQ is held at readiness to deploy (R2) and routinely changes. It provides the deployed headquarters to which various modular specialist subunits and detachments are attached to enable the task(s) to be accomplished. Figure 1 shows a sample order of battle for the VEGp deployed on Exercise SHAMAL STORM 15 (ExSS15) to Jordan. This demonstrates the myriad of logistic enablers and attachments bolted together to comprise the VEGp and could include additional components depending on missions and threats. Deployment of the VEGp might see the CO of the lead regiment in command. With increased theatre maturity, and a critical mass of attached assets, the Brigade Commander, 104LogX, and his staff could take command.6 The VEGp might run 60

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theatre entry for ninety days before follow-on forces (the Vanguard Sustainment Brigade (VSB)) could subsume responsibility for force sustainment. The ‘toolbox’ of assets available for the VEGp is shown in Figure 2 along with their individual readiness. The variations in readiness are noteworthy, also that a large proportion of these units reside outside 104LogX during ‘peacetime’. During the ‘roll-out’ of the VEGp on ExSS15 the phrase used to describe the activity was; ‘We are building the ‘plane’ as we fly it’. This suggested a ground-breaking new concept; this article would suggest that similar modular, all-arms logistic structures are not new. In the Great War there was no equivalent VEGp. The MLOs had different ‘arms’ attached for their role. The division was the key building block in 1915 with relatively rigid, horsepowered, logistic structures, intended for open warfare or trench warfare in France.7 They were unsuited to both the constricted terrain and climate on the Gallipoli peninsular. Either these unwieldy structures needed to be crow-barred into the operational environment or an ad-hoc solution sought. The terrain at ANZAC Cove and elsewhere meant that mules and light carts of the Zion Mule Corps (ZMC) and Indian Cart Corps respectively were better employed. Cumbersome divisional logistic units were left in Egypt. At Helles, initial attacks inland increased the space available. Personnel from 29 Division Train were reorganized into a


History Contribution

Photo 1. An approximate comparison photograph showing how West Beach, Suvla Bay, was once a hive of activity in late 1915 compared a 2016 image. The photo shows working parties, tramways, horsed and wheeled transport, stores tents and part of the artificial port. The dugout from which the Suvla MLOs worked (likely the site of the photo of four MLOs above) was to the right of the foremost lorry.

Supply Section which employed mules of the ZMC, carts, some of their own wagons and infantry battalion first-line transport.8 Within the beachheads, in the absence of formal divisional logistic structures, the MLO and their supporting units filled these gaps. From the initial landing, to the evacuation, every soldier, mule, crate, letter or casualty that crossed a Gallipoli beach came within the purview of a Military Landing Officer (MLO). Randolph Baker, an MLO at Suvla, described the prominence of his work: ‘… It is very interesting in some ways, with plenty of hard work, & and lots of authority, to be exercised with caution.’9 Major Sir Randolph Baker, According to another source 4th Baronet, DSO and Bar, TD, DL was an MLO at Suvla the MLO was responsible for: Bay from August 1915

‘… receiving, and safeguarding, all stores, supplies, ammunition etc … He details the necessary fatigue parties, working parties and arranges for guards. He is also responsible for … local water resources … and for arranging with the Medical Authorities for the embarkation of the sick and wounded.’10 MLOs were not unique to Helles, ANZAC and Suvla. Their role varied between theatres from hard work and frivolous play in well-established French ports to long frenetic hours in Salonika’s congested docks.11 The Gallipoli MLOs were a different breed of logistic enabler controlling ‘all-arms’ groupings and operating in austere conditions. At Gallipoli a PMLO (normally a colonel) controlled each beach area (Helles, ANZAC etc) and was: ‘… the Base Commandant, and his jurisdiction commences at the high-water mark. He is appointed by General Head-Quarters, and takes his orders direct from them.’12 The PMLO had various MLOs (majors/captains) under command running different beaches. Assistant MLOs

Map 3. This shows the Cape Helles Sector including W Beach (Lancashire Landing) and V Beach. After the disastrous landing at V Beach on 25 April 1915, Captain Stoney helped the infantry fight their way ashore and into the village of Sedd-el-Bahir before returning to run V Beach as the MLO. This later map is annotated to show the Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) plan for 52nd (Lowland) Division in early June 1915. Note the artificial harbour facilities developed at Lancashire Landing and V Beach.

(subalterns) were allocated subsectors. Though MLOs/AMLOs comprised the PMLO’s ‘staff’ their job was practical; they did not provide staff ‘horsepower’ for the PMLO.13 Though key logistic enablers most MLOs/AMLOs were not professional logisticians. Most were an eclectic and eccentric collection of supernumerary infantry or yeomanry officers who were trawled before the landings.14 Even Colonel William Western, an experienced PMLO at Helles, later Suvla, was a former infantry officer.15 MLOs had varying tasks and managed transitory assets including labour, transport and construction. The nature of conditions, and therefore MLO experiences, varied considerably between different beach sectors. The scale of the campaign meant the beach MLOs were far from the only logisticians sustaining the campaign. The Greek Islands near Gallipoli (Imbros and Lemnos) were packed with camps, stores, hospitals and headquarters.16 Gallipoli offers two opposing scenarios in which the VEGp might deploy. The first is a large benign logistic base area (the Greek islands). The second scenario involves opening an expeditionary campaign in arduous, austere and hostile conditions (the Gallipoli beaches). This similarity between the beach MLOs and modern logistic enablers could be considered superficial and the similarity is imperfect.17 However, the Gallipoli beaches do show a potential deployment of elements of the VEGp in an extreme scenario. THE REVIEW 2017-2018 61


History Contribution

Captain (later Acting Lieutenant Colonel) George Stoney, 1KOSB, who as an MLO helped the infantry fight their way ashore at V Beach on 25-26 April 1915

‘One could hear the bullets …’ As fighting soldiers first landed on the Gallipoli beaches there were logistic officers following closely behind; sometimes too closely. Captain George Stoney, MLO for ‘V’ Beach, approached this sector on 25 April just behind the first wave: ‘… the firing was so hot that the beach master, whom I was with, decided there was no object in our going ashore and we came on board the steamer …[SS River Clyde]. I nipped up the ladder pretty quickly as we were under the fire of a maxim [machine gun] from the shore. One could hear the bullets hitting the ships side all round me.’18 Stoney subsequently got involved in the beachhead fighting along with other staff officers.19 Whilst the VEGp should not deploy into an overtly hostile environment the convenient presence of a benign airport and sea port cannot be guaranteed. The VEGp advance party might well operate in an initial security vacuum. Likewise, the main body may operate in a theatre with ambiguous security. Stoney mentions his immediate activities at ‘V’ Beach once the area was safer: ‘The first thing that had to be done was to get water and Am[munition] up the hill. The men had had no water since the day before and they wanted it badly. While this was going on they [the Turks] started shelling us … Since this happened our duties as Military Landing Officers have been pretty strenuous. We land people of almost every nationality.’20 Stoney could not describe a more immature, emerging

An artist’s impression of the landing at V Beach from the River Clyde. Captain Stoney sought safety in the ship during the attack


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Frederick Lawson, 4th Baron Burnham, a Buckinghamshire Yeomanry officer seconded for MLO duties. He was a newspaperman and later deputy to the manager of The Daily Telegraph. Later Major General Lord Burnham CB DSO MC TD DL

theatre. Though not a member of the Army Service Corps, Stoney was definitely a ‘fighting logistician’.21 By August 1915, the beachhead at ANZAC was relatively stable but was far from safe and comfortable. According to Frederick Lawson, an MLO there: ‘No words of mine can convey the extreme unpleasantness of this spot. … I am … in my dug-out on the beach some 800 yards from our furthest advanced trench … At no time in the day or night are we free from shell fire and there is no place on the beach which is safe. … in this work we lose 30 men every day …. every single member of the whole army corps, from the General down to one of the military policemen on the beach, is under fire … night or day.’22

ANZAC Cove as experienced by Lawson whilst an MLO there

Gallipoli MLOs had complicated and dangerous jobs. Baker recorded; ‘Poor Harold Browne [an MLO] … was landing some officers and men … when a shell burst above his head and killed him almost at once … he died in 10 minutes’.23 Baker himself was wounded and evacuated in October. Commander Edward Cater, the Beach Master at ANZAC Cove, was killed by shellfire on 7 August 1915; a critical time.24 The MC, Postal & Courier (PCS) or Port Operator tradesmen of today do not anticipate conducting their duties under enemy artillery fire and expect benign environments. The only reason that any logistic endeavours could occur on the Gallipoli beaches was because they were protected by the infantry holding trenches around the beachheads. Though the VEGp is present to enable and support the force inserted into theatre the logistic ‘tail’ may need to wag the dog. Teeth arms, likely elements of the Vanguard Light


History Contribution

A landscape painting of the beaches and shelter areas at ANZAC Cove prior to August 1915 when it was still compressed into a small area. This shows the difficult nature of the terrain for the storage and transport of supplies and the constrained space available

It was not until the connecting up of the ANZAC and Suvla Beachheads in August 1915 that there was more space into which logistic infrastructure could expand at ANZAC. This photograph shows the extended beach area, jetties, stores, tented camps and hospitals

A pier at ANZAC Cove damaged in the gales

Forces Brigade (VLFB), may need to be subordinated to the VEGp, or operate within its battlespace, as force protection. Without such support the scenarios in which the VEGp could be employed would be significantly limited only to benign environments. The 3 (UK) Division of the future will be a powerful combat force but without an orderly insertion into theatre and robust sustainment during its vulnerable early days its full potential may not be realised. The idea of ‘hybrid warfare’, attributed to Valery Gerasimov, may, or may not, be the style of conflict for our future potential enemies. But our vulnerable logistic footprint will face threats from across the spectrum of conflict to frustrate our efforts; be they conventional, unconventional or even non-military.

It is possible that the VEGp might operate within range of enemy rocket artillery or undergo air attack; troops of the VEGp might need to dig shell scrapes or construct shelters. Nor must the threat of CBRN attack be ignored. Likewise, state-sponsored terrorist attacks or activities of unattributed paramilitaries might be employed to delay logistic preparations or provoke negative responses. Even in a friendly country, problems such as pilfering, kidnap, demonstrations, strikes or corruption may still degrade logistic activity. These issues could also be sponsored, exacerbated or exploited by our enemies. The VEGp cannot expect to operate in a benign environment devoid of Clausewitzian friction and must train accordingly and maintain a soldier-first ethos. Just because there are no conventional enemy soldiers within a kilometre of them does not mean that VEGp logisticians will not require the endurance, alertness and courageous restraint of their Gallipoli forebears.

The HQ of the Suvla Base Area shows the very Spartan conditions in which the PMLO worked. This is the equivalent of an RHQ or Bde HQ for the VEGp

MLOs, water and the racing the Turks The MLOs directly affected the Campaign in the provision of water during in the initial Suvla Bay landings in August 1915. This requires additional examination. For Gallipoli the ability of the Royal Navy and Army to embark divisions, move them by sea and deposit them on the Turkish mainland provided great campaign opportunities. The Suvla operation was intended to break the Dardanelles deadlock by outflanking the Turks at ANZAC to capture high ground at Suvla and ANZAC and force a Turkish withdrawal. The British at Suvla needed to capture features like Tekke Tepe before Turkish reinforcements could march down the Gallipoli Peninsular and occupy them. In this race the British THE REVIEW 2017-2018 63

History Contribution


held a distinct advantage. Sufficient materiel needed landing to sustain this movement inland and thence sufficient stockpiles achieved to enable those gains to be secured. In August 1915 Lieutenant-General Stopford, commanding IX Corps at Suvla, gave inadequate priority to his administrative staff. When faced with limited space on his command vessel he left his staff of logisticians behind.25 Though provision had been made for water supplies there was insufficient emphasis on its importance and assumptions were made about wells being captured. It became clear, early on, that lighters carrying water had not arrived or had beached offshore. Colonel Western, as PMLO for Suvla, alerted Stopford, to the logistic situation whereby these failures meant there was almost no drinking water available.26 Tim Travers blamed this failure partly on the: ‘… astonishing number of people in charge of different aspects of the Suvla water plan’. Travers included Western as PMLO and Baker as an MLO; the last link in the chain before the fighting troops.27 Other logistic officers were ashore but nothing was done immediately and some key officers responsible for water earlier in the ‘chain’ were critically absent. There was an absence of ‘first-line’ logistics; battalion water carts, if landed, might have alleviated some problems. Western and his MLOs were also kept busy ensuring other necessary stores and troops were landed and it took time to hunt down the missing lighters.28

Soldiers landing on C Beach at Suvla Bay during the afternoon of 7 August 1915. Note the unloading of stores whilst the beach is still under fire. Meanwhile, arrangements for provision of water were sadly lacking

Without the ship carrying the troughs and tanks for water storage, and these being installed ashore by the RE, only ad hoc water solutions could be provided. However, the situation had strategic consequences. Water shortages, combined with poor leadership, meant that battalions did not push inland and confusion reigned; the Turks later occupied the heights first winning by just thirty minutes. Suvla stagnated like ANZAC and Helles. This was a clear example of poor logistic staff planning symptomatic of the rushed preparations and an ‘it’ll be alright on the night’ attitude. Problems could have been ironed out through a wargame or ROC drill involving the relevant parties and ‘actions-on’ might have been planned for. The whole episode highlights the importance of VEGp 64

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Captain Harold Vernon Browne of the Dorsetshire Yeomanry, aged 30, was killed by a shell whilst working as an MLO at Suvla under Randolph Baker

staff training, mission rehearsals and how small, unrecorded, assumptions can impact on operational success. MLOs did not operate in a frictionless environment; nor will the VEGp and it must train, both individually and collectively, in an appropriate manner. Gallipoli gives an idea of the logistic failures of inadequate force-generation, planning and training; the VEGp must be as prepared as possible for its role. Everyone involved must be suitably qualified and experienced personnel (SQEP). The MLOs, as logistic enablers, were not optimally effective during the April and August landings; Baker was nominated as an MLO days before Suvla. Readiness is a vital aspect of the modern British Army and the VEGp must train in deploying at appropriate readiness. It is, however, difficult to train as we fight. Overseas exercises to demonstrate the readiness and responsiveness of the VEGp require considerable planning. For the test deployment of the 29 Regiment RLC VEGp (Task Force CENTURIAN [sic]) on ExSS15 planning commenced six months beforehand. However, running accurate VEGp deployment training is difficult and expensive. Often aspects that cannot be accomplished can only be war-gamed. However, it is only by actually experiencing such training, and highlighting and overcoming the difficulties, that true training value can be achieved. The Gallipoli case study of MLOs is littered with issues that could have been resolved by better preparation and training. Multi-National – from Hebrew to Hindustani Stoney also experienced the difficulties of coalition warfare in having to land soldiers and material of various nationalities including the French Army. The difficulties this presented can only be imagined. Gallipoli was a very multicultural theatre with fighting troops from France, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India and Nepal with further nationalities represented in the rear areas. A multitude of languages would have been spoken on the beaches; from Hebrew to Hindustani. The problems were significant at Gallipoli but the situation was far less complex than it might be now. Conforming with NATO inter-operability regulations reduces friction but interoperability and flexibility cannot be ignored. Having foreign military participants and visitors on an exercise gives an international ‘feel’ to training and satisfies superficial desires for inter-operability. However, the only way to experience the frictions and difficulties in a similar vein to Stoney would be to transit a whole foreign battlegroup through the VEGp from advance party to rear party or completely replace VEGp components with similar overseas contingents.


History Contribution

Below the high-water mark The activity of the MLOs required close joint-service cooperation and goodwill. One senior officer described the interface between the RN Beach Masters (BMs) and Army MLOs: ‘… the Principle Beach Master (PBM), is appointed by the Admiral, and is responsible to him that all men and materiel are landed, and conveyed to the highwater mark and there handed over to the Principle Military Landing Officer [PMLO]. The PBM … selects the sites for the various Piers and landing stages but the actual construction is generally carried out by working parties provide by the PMLO.’29 Likewise, at Helles air cooperation: ‘… was almost nonexistent’.30 In the modern era, in addition to thinking Tri-Service, there are now other TLBs to cooperate with, adding complexity to ‘jointery’. For the VEGp to function it must work closely with RN and RAF enablers and should embed liaison officers with them to build relationships.

After the Victoria Crosses were won – the scene at ‘W’ Beach (Lancashire Landing) as a logistics beach during the months after the initial landings

A large stockpile of materiel near the Helles beaches

and MHE the modern labour requirement is lower but not absent. The alternative is contracted labour, either imported or through locally employed civilians (LECs), which raises security and cost implications. The Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) was already having problems with locally sourced contract labour loading ships in Egypt where: ‘The quality of the labour provided was very bad…’ (an understatement!); let alone at Gallipoli.32 Poorly sourced labour could reflect very badly on the Army; one soldier saw on Lemnos: ‘Working on the roads … were hundreds of men and boys of what nationality I did not know … dirty, lousy, unshaven, scratching themselves … dressed in the most comical fashion … lots of these creatures died in their sleep at night…’33 These conditions bordered exploitation. Contract labour is a potential problem depending on theatre maturity and enemy threat; i.e. hazardous environments like ANZAC Cove or under CBRN conditions. This is not bemoaning the disbandment of the Pioneers as their roles have been acquired by other units/arms.34

‘…“Resting” behind the lines…’ There was a voracious logistic appetite for labour at Gallipoli and in the absence of a dedicated organisation for this activity available infantrymen were required to work. A SNCO of the RN Anson Battalion, along with his platoon, arrived at the recently secured ‘W’ Beach (Lancashire Landing) to assist the MLO:

Force transition Initial logistic activity was frenetic according to a BM at Suvla: ‘Our chief job was the rushing ashore, and stowing of, ammunition and doing what we could to get the wounded off in the various boats that were available…‘.35 At Suvla, a month later, there was a more mature and routine environment according to Baker:36

‘… Now we started to do what I call “Hard Work”, for several months, under shell fire all the time, also many casualties from bullets, although we were termed to be “Resting” behind the lines. We started off by unloading lighters, and hauling guns up the sandy slopes, for the latter job we were soon making roads. …’.31

‘… constant landing of stores and supplies and reinforcements most nights … I start out about 6[am], and go on till 7.30 at night, constantly on my legs, and working brain all I can. I manage to get time for 3 meals at irregular intervals. At present I still have to run the sending of water to 3 divisions … and have now two clerks working at general work, and at labour problems…‘37

This NCO would rather have been engaged in active operations than providing labour. However, the command states of any infantry attached to the VEGp would likely prevent them being tasked for labour. VEGp security/force protection and artisan tasks would still come from the RE and Infantry; likely to their chagrin. With palletised loads

The Gallipoli beachheads give unclear examples of the potential transition between the initial VEGp (e.g. OF-4 led) and its follow-on forces (e.g. OF-6 VEGp or VSB). MLO experiences at ANZAC suggested that little transition occurred there until August due to the geographic THE REVIEW 2017-2018 65

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constraints of the beachhead perimeter. There, MLOs remained the prominent organisation.38 At Suvla there was a more steady transition over a long period whereby the MLO domain reached a sufficient critical mass and was subsumed into the Suvla Base area (albeit still under the OF-5 PMLO). Just like 104LogX might subsume the lead VEGp RHQ. This ‘enabling’ base possessed everything from a light railway to a carpentry shop and mirrored the all-arms nature of the VEGp. It could be likened to a 1915 Camp Bastion. However, at no beachhead was there sufficient space for full divisional or corps-level logistic frameworks to roll out properly to mirror the role of the VSB. Atrocious communications Gallipoli was a campaign plagued by poor communications; both across the Aegean to the Greek islands and from the Gallipoli beaches to fleet. The latter was initially via visual signalling and wireless with seaborne cables installed later. Seaborne cables also later connected Gallipoli to the islands. A robust strategic communications network was not established until a week after landing. One logistic unit commander stated: ‘… the signalling arrangements for the MEF [Mediterranean Expeditionary Force] were atrocious throughout the landing operations…’39 Communication was largely provided by Territorial Army RE Signals Companies; some were newly formed and lacked experience.40 There was also little opportunity to work closely with RN signals staff prior to the 25 April landings.41 There was no interoperability with the French contingent so an RE cable section was attached to them. Were the VEGp to be split over any distance so communications would be more complicated? Modern high-frequency (HF) voice comms could be employed over long distances, between the APOD/SPOD and force assembly areas, but lack bandwidth for data. The Comms Troop of the lead VEGp regiment might require reinforcement with additional personnel and vehicles to allow data comms of sufficient bandwidth to be established.42 Alternatively, a further Royal Signals detachment might bridge this intra-theatre gap but they are in short supply. Force recovery - ‘… the only impeccable part of the whole Gallipoli campaign’.43 Gallipoli and the MLOs highlight the importance of, and difficulty of, theatre closure. Often the recovery of a force is not initially considered. At Gallipoli the problem of extracting the force was acute. The operational and logistic challenges of embarking a force in contact with the enemy carried considerable risks. On the night of the Helles evacuation James Hutchison was stationed near the River Clyde with a telephone to oversee the final embarking: ‘… As the hours and the men went by, I could feel a tense excitement … a succession of parties arrived, were checked and passed on to the immobile and ghostly River Clyde … the last three parties arrived and were sent on.’44 Hutchison met up with the remaining MLO staff in the mess room on the Clyde and made a toast with a glass of 66

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champagne before departing. As they boarded a destroyer the ammunition dump at ‘V’ Beach disappeared in a thunderous explosion.45 Just over 100 days after 25 April 1915, a new MLO contingent was force generated for the Suvla landings. This allowed for operational flexibility in opening the Suvla front. These MLOs comprised some experienced officers from ANZAC or Helles but most were inexperienced. With regard to the VEGp there is limited redundancy in terms of key niche enablers. For example, the VEGp requires an SO2-led Force MC Cell (FMCC) which can only come from a 29 Regiment task squadron. Discounting fixed squadrons, there are only three potential FMCCs available.46 There are also strategic limitations regarding these VEGp capabilities; the VEGp is at R2 and this means that there is no capability to simultaneously deploy, at readiness, to more than one operational theatre. The MLO role was an officers’ activity and therefore carried a high level of rank inflation; SNCOs were not considered SQEP enough to devolve responsibility to. Hence Baker was, ‘… working my brain all I can…’, unsupported by amply SQEP tradesmen and unable to delegate. There is still the desire to inflate rank and competencies today. Where PC or MC tradesmen are needed for a task the requirement should be expressed rather than a rank. The gold-plated SNCO solution will give the greatest capability but they are in short supply. This does not empower JNCOs to develop and replace them. Like Baker, this would likely lead to burn out amongst the few personalities constantly demanded. Within 90 days a duplicate VEGp should be generated, trained or validated but this carries significant risk. Therefore, the VEGp, like 3 Division, is a one-shot weapon.47 Furthermore, the efficient recovery and redeployment of the VEGp is extremely important to maintain this capability. ‘Just in time’ vs ‘just in case’ That stores were left behind for destruction at Gallipoli suggested the size of stockpiles and an inability to backload them. According to Kane, logisticians: ‘… must strike a balance between starvation and constipation…’. The latter stages of Gallipoli would be a poor example of economy of effort.48 ‘Just in time’ logistics is now popular but this was unsuitable for Gallipoli where the Army was preparing itself to withstand the winter on the Peninsular before orders to evacuate arrived. ‘Just in time’ can mean ‘just too late’. At Gallipoli supply lines were not responsive, leaving no option but stockpile excessive stores. One officer recalled the impact of the extreme weather that lashed the peninsular in late November 1915: ‘This gale played havoc with my beaches. One pier was entirely destroyed and another nearly so. Almost all my small craft were sunk.’49 Poor weather may have been anticipated and any reductions in stores arriving could only be absorbed by having prepositioned stockpiles, whilst a stone pier was built. Though many thousands of soldiers suffered from frostbite and exposure in late 1915, relatively few starved or suffered deficiencies of combat supplies.


The VEGp will have to rely on the ‘coupling bridge’ to get materiel into theatre; air freight is expensive and supply by sea would be intermittent. Stockpiles of materiel limit freedom of movement and are expensive, but, as Kane states, allow greater resilience and operational opportunities. But, without pre-positioned key spares, mission essential equipment (e.g. a Rough Terrain Container Handler (RTCH)) may be immobilised at critical junctures awaiting spare parts which may not readily arrive. The VEGp must be agile but also have sufficient materiel stockpiled to allow for supplychain problems, climatic issues or interdiction for a multitude of possible reasons. Conclusion In conclusion, the informal and ad-hoc logistic enabling groups on the Gallipoli beaches, run by the MLOs, consisted of similar ‘all-arms’ FEs to those employed in the VEGp for establishing a modern theatre. Though a century has passed, there are plenty of similarities between the two; historic issues encountered are likely to be those facing the VEGp. Gallipoli offers two polar views of how the VEGp might be employed. On one hand the Greek Islands contained a large, mature, logistic base area, which was unthreatened. On the other, the men working under the MLOs on the Gallipoli beaches were delivering similar functions in austere and hazardous conditions in lieu of traditional divisional logistics structures. Both scenarios are extremes but neither could occur now without some aspect of direct or indirect enemy intervention. The VEGp must be prepared for such eventualities. The need for robust niche logistic specialists to operate in austere and hazardous conditions is a lesson that resonates. It is unknown how modern CSS soldiers might fare in Stoney’s or Baker’s shoes. The tasks and stresses placed on the MLOs highlight the need for adequately manned and balanced VEGp staffs and a driving down of tradesman rank inflation to more evenly share the burden for tasks. The VEGp must be capable of agility, flexibility and redundancy to meet the operational situation, the maturity and extent of the theatre, and the myriad of different enabling units commanded. The need to anticipate, wargame and counter enemy interaction is a key lesson. Logistic FEs make soft targets both for insurgents and conventional forces. Every piece of materiel that crossed the Gallipoli beaches run by overworked MLOs was either expended without bringing victory, back-loaded pre-evacuation or was ‘denied’ to the Turks. The worst aspects of British logistic efforts at Gallipoli are what the VEGp strives to avoid. The better aspects reflect what we hope to accomplish; delivering logistic effect in an all-arms, joint, coalition environment, in austere, hazardous and uncertain conditions. The 1915 logistic enablers had much to be proud of achieving during what became a doomed campaign in spite of their efforts. Much of the poor performance by logisticians on the Gallipoli beaches can be blamed on unpreparedness, inexperience and over-optimism. When money for training

History Contribution

is tight, cost-effective activities must be sought. Whilst there are limitations regarding historic study without visiting the ground on a battlefield study it is still viable as a training activity. The MLOs at Gallipoli offer just one vignette by which to look at modern logistic problems and solutions. There are many possible historic examples from the last century; for example, the amount of archive documents available for the Beach Groups employed on D-Day and afterwards is an untapped resource of learning which can exploited almost free of charge.50 This cost-effective activity could be likened to the conceptual equivalent of the German Army training for war in the 1930s with paper tanks mounted on cars. Bibliography Unpublished Sources 29 Divisional Train War Diary, The National Archives (TNA), WO95/4309. 232 Depot Unit of Supply, ASC, WD, TNA, WO95/4358. 104 Beach Group War Diary, TNA, WO171/817. Papers of Randolph Baker, Imperial War Museum, Documents3723. Papers of Lord Burnham, IWM, Documents 2743, 1 Aug 15. Papers of Major General G Egerton, TNA, CAB45/249. Papers of AS Holmes, TNA, CAB45/255. Account by Sergeant WH Meatyard, TNA CAB45/158, Letter by JH Patterson 30 January 1931, TNA CAB45/244. Papers of Major General JH Poett, TNA, CAB45/244. Account by Lieutenant R Seed RN, TNA, CAB45/222. Papers of George Stoney, IWM, Documents 7301. Signals – Gallipoli, by HCB Wemyss, TNA, CAB45/230. Unknown (illegible signature), Letter dated 7 December 1931, TNA, CAB45/241. Published Sources Aspinall-Oglander, CF, History of the Great War, Military Operations, Gallipoli, Vol 1 (London: Heinemann, 1929). Boulding, Kenneth, Conflict and Defence: A General Theory (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962). Hargrave, John, The Suvla Bay Landing (London: MacDonald&Co, 1964). Hart, Peter, Gallipoli (London: Profile, 2011). Hutchison, Sir James Bt, That Drug Danger (Montrose: Standard Press, 1977). Kane, Thomas, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance (London: Frank Cass, 2001). Kirke, WM, The Kirke Report, British Army Review, Special Edition April 2001 (Upavon: General Staff Training Publication, 2001). Malthus, Cecil, ANZAC a Retrospect (Auckland: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1965 Moorhead, Alan, Gallipoli (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1956). Newman, Steve, Gallipoli Then and Now (London: After the Battle, 2000). Proud, EB, History of the British Army Postal Service Vol II 1903 to 1927 (Dereham: Proud-Bailey, 1948). Robertson, John, ANZAC and Empire (London: Leo Cooper, 2010). Travers, Tim, Gallipoli 1915 (Stroud: Tempus, 2001). Unknown, Some Notes on the Evacuation of Suvla and ANZAC, The Naval Review (London: The Naval Society, 1916). pp. 320-323. Unknown, “ANZAC”; Impressions of the Landing and 14 Weeks’ Work on the Beach, The Naval Review (London: The Naval Society, 1916). pp. 298-319. Unknown, Vanguard - Active Edge, The Army Readiness Order, 2015/2016 Edition (Andover: Army Directorate of Operations and Contingencies, 2015). Wade, AG, Counterspy (London: Stanley Paul, 1938). Wohlstetter, Albert, ‘Illusions of Distance’, Foreign Affairs, Vol 46, No 2, January 1968.

Footnotes 1

29 (Regular) Division, the Royal Naval Division (RN personnel seconded as infantry and RM), 1 Australian Division and the mixed Australian and New Zealand Division. The last two formed the Australian and New Zealand

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Army Corps (ANZAC). The following infantry divisions also served at Gallipoli: 10th (Irish), 11th (Northern), 13th (Western), 42nd (East Lancashire), 52nd (Lowland), 53rd (Welsh), 54th (East Anglian), 2nd Mounted Division and 2nd Australian Division. Also 29 (Indian) Brigade. 2 Ex CENTURION CANAKKALE was a joint 29 Regiment RLC and 162 Regiment RLC Battlefield Study to Gallipoli, 14-18 March 2016. Ex CC incorporated archive research and a study of published literature regarding the work of the MLOs combined with an understanding of the Gallipoli terrain and climate gained by walking the ground. 3 Thomas Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 9. 4 Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defence: A General Theory (New York: Harper, 1962). 5 Albert Wohlstetter, ‘Illusions of Distance’, Foreign Affairs, Vol46, No2, January 1968, 244. Boulding, Conflict and Defence. 6 During Op GRITROCK, Sierra Leone, 104LogX ran the operation from the beginning. 7 Each infantry division was horse powered. It contained a column of horsedrawn limbers for artillery and small arms ammunition (the ‘Divisional Ammunition Column’ (DAC)) which was run by the Royal Field Artillery (RFA). It also had a column of horse-drawn wagons supplying the materiel needs of the division; the ‘Divisional Train’ which was comprised four Army Service Corps (ASC) Horse Transport Companies. 8 29 Divisional Train War Diary, The National Archives (TNA), WO95/4309. 9 Papers of Randolph Baker, Imperial War Museum, Documents3723. 10 Papers of Major General JH Poett, TNA, CAB45/244. 11 AG Wade, Counterspy (London: Stanley Paul, 1938), pp. 179-185 and pp. 196-200. Major Wade was an MLO at Boulogne and Salonika. 12 Poett, TNA, CAB45/244. 13 Each PMLO controlled a couple of enlisted clerks to assist with administration. 14 One MLO, Thomas Scott-Ellis; Baron Howard de Walden was a Scottish nobleman with a penchant for collecting medieval weapons. He later commanded a Welsh battalion in France and issued traditional Welsh machetes for his men. 15 Major General Sir William Western KCMG CB, Mentioned in Despatches (MiD) six times and wounded. 16 Some cynics joked another island called ‘Chaos’ existed. 17 The MLO role could be likened to managing a large and complex logistic RV (Log RV) or being an oversized Port Task Group (PTG) operating without a port. Though the command relationships between the MLOs and their supporting FEs is hard to determine the control of an ‘all-arms’ grouping and the wider activities accomplished within the MLO’s remit go further than them being a logistic node. 18 Stoney was seconded from 1st Battalion the King’s Own Scottish Borderers (1KOSB). Papers of George Stoney, Imperial War Museum, Documents 7301. The SS River Clyde was packed with troops and deliberately grounded off the shore to provide a giant landing craft for the infantry battalions landing; it turned out to be a death trap. 19 Other staff officer participants included Lieutenant Colonel Charles Doughty-Wylie and Captain Garth Walford, both were killed and awarded posthumous Victoria Crosses. Walford is buried in ‘V’ Beach Cemetery. Doughty-Wylie was buried where he fell. The platoon of the ‘Anson’ Battalion RND was unable to assist in landing supplies with Stoney but Sub-Lieutenant Arthur Tisdall worked to rescue wounded men under fire. He too was awarded the VC but was killed in action on 6 May 1915 and is commemorated on the Helles Memorial.

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Stoney, IWM, 7301. Stoney had no time to write home until 10 May 1915 which demonstrates how busy his MLO role was. He later returned to his battalion and was killed on 15 October 1915 when his dugout was hit by a shell. Though only 38 he was in acting command of 1KOSB. He was buried at Pink Farm Cemetery. Stoney, IWM, 7301. 22 Frederick Lawson, 4th Baron Burnham, a Buckinghamshire Yeomanry officer seconded for MLO duties. He was a newspaperman and deputy to the manager of The Daily Telegraph. Later Major General Lord Burnham CB DSO MC TD DL. Papers of Lord Burnham, IWM, Documents 2743. 23 Captain Harold Vernon Browne, Dorset Yeomanry, aged 30, was buried in Hill 10 Cemetery. Baker, IWM, 3723. 24 Cater was buried in Beach Cemetery, ANZAC Cove. 25 Stopford had ‘… suggested that the Administrative Staff should remain at Imbros till [sic] the landing had been affected and the forward movement commenced.’ The IX Corps Administrative Staff actually travelled to Gallipoli on a supply ship. Poett, TNA, CAB45/244. 26 John Hargrave, The Suvla Bay Landing (London: MacDonald&Co, 1964), p. 131. Colonel Western, as PMLO Suvla Bay, was assigned on the orders of the Army Commander (Sir Ian Hamilton) not IX Corps (Stopford) which was landed there. 27 Tim Travers, Gallipoli 1915 (Stroud: Tempus, 2001), p. 207. 28 Taking their duties literally meant that their responsibility theoretically did not begin until the ships hoses stretched beyond the high-water line; until then it was a ‘Navy’ problem. 29 Poett, TNA, CAB45/244. 30 WM Kirke, The Kirke Report, British Army Review, April 2001 (Upavon: GS Training Publication, 2001), p. 87. 31 Papers of WH Meatyard, TNA CAB45/158. 32 232 Depot Unit of Supply, ASC, WD, TNA, WO95/4358. 33 George Ashurst, My Bit (Marlborough: Crowood Press, 1987), pp. 66-7. 34 Though at some opportunity cost 35 Account by Lieutenant Seed, TNA, CAB45/222. 36 Major, later Lieutenant Colonel, Sir Randolph Littlehales Baker, 4th Baronet, DSO TD DL, of the Dorsetshire Yeomanry and an MP for North Dorset. He later returned to his regiment and commanded it in Palestine. He was awarded the DSO and Bar and became a lieutenant general. 37 Baker, IWM, 3723. 38 Burnham, IWM, 2743. 39 Letter by J H Patterson 30 January 1931, TNA CAB45/244. Patterson’s command, the ZMC, remained afloat for two unecessary days though needed ashore. 40 Signals – Gallipoli, by HCB Wemyss, TNA, CAB45/230. 41 Wemyss, TNA, CAB45/230. 42 Each rebroadcast or relay site would also need to be suitably secured. 43 Sir James Hutchison Bt, That Drug Danger (Montrose: Standard Press, 1977), p.28. 44 Hutchison, Danger, pp.27-28. 45 Hutchison, Danger, p.28. 46 The JAMC and Germany Firm Base commitments. 47 Unknown, Vanguard - Active Edge, The Army Readiness Order, 2015/2016 Edition (Andover: ADOC, 2015). 48 Kane, Military Logistics, 4. 49 Letter from Unknown (illegible signature) to the Official Historian, dated 7 December 1931, TNA, CAB45/241. 50 104 Beach Group War Diary, TNA, WO171/817. 21


History Contribution

To what extent was the outcome of the Lebanon war of 2006 a consequence of Israeli military failures, rather than Hezbollah’s military effectiveness? On the morning of 12 Jul 2006, Hezbollah, a Shi’ite militia group based in Lebanon, conducted a cross-border attack on an Israel Defence Force (IDF) patrol that resulted in the deaths of eight Israeli soldiers, whilst also leaving two wounded and a further two captured. By Maj M Tyers

When viewed together, they will prove that the immediate outcome of the Second Lebanon War was only partially a consequence of Israeli military failures. It was also partially because of Hezbollah's military effectiveness and partially because of the constraints imposed on the IDF by Israel’s politicians. Whilst widely accepted that Israel lost the war, the passage of time has shown that by re-establishing the effectiveness of their deterrence strategy, Israel gained a significant strategic.

Launched with the limited aim of seizing soldiers that could be used for a prisoner exchange, the event triggered a 34 day conflict that is estimated to have left over 8,000 people dead or wounded.1,2 At its conclusion, Israel had been tactically and operationally defeated by the labour intensive irregular forces of Hezbollah, and the cloak of invincibility that shrouded the heavily capitalised IDF, pierced.3 The outcome shocked Israel and reverberated around the Middle East, demonstrating the flaw in the age-old adage ‘that conventional military superiority prevails in war’.4 The Lebanon War of 2006 (also known as the Second Lebanon War) is a classic asymmetric conflict in that ‘a semimilitary organization of a few thousand men resisted...the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority.’5 In his seminal article, Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars, Andrew Mack proposed that success or failure in asymmetric conflicts was a result of each actors relative interest levels, which could be deduced from the relative power gap; the greater the power gap, the lower the strong actors interest.6,7 Ivan Arreguín-Toft followed this in 2001 by studying the outcome of historical asymmetric conflicts and the strategies employed by the warring parties. He concluded that when both actors adopted the same type of strategy the strong actor prevails in line with their relative power. Conversely, when opposing strategies are employed, the weak actor is favoured as the relevancy of the power gap is reduced.8 After looking in more detail at the theories that explain why strong actors lose asymmetric conflicts, this essay will highlight the background to the conflict, before assessing the asymmetry in Israel and Hezbollah's strategies and goals, and their respective resource power and conflict interest levels.

Asymmetric conflict According to the United States Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, asymmetric warfare is ‘the application of dissimilar strategies, tactics, capabilities and approaches used to circumvent or negate an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weaknesses’.9 Until Mack published his work on Small Wars, these differences were rarely seen as critical contributors to a conflicts outcome, despite clearly characterising it. In addition to those asymmetries that the US officially recognises in its definition, Mack highlighted work done to distinguish between both an asymmetry in goals and ‘the asymmetry in power and the willingness to suffer costs’, an idea first articulated by Steven Rosen in 1972. This latter point is one considered crucial to understanding how weak actors prevail. Mack notes that the wealth, economic and technological differences between the actors prevents the weak actor from defeating the strong actor militarily; victory can only be gained through the ‘destruction of the [strong actors] political capability to wage war.’ The military power asymmetry that results from these factors directly influences the level of interest that the strong actor has in the conflict. The greater the relative power gap, the stronger the perception that the war will be ‘easier’ to win, and thus the more 'limited' the strong actor interprets it to be.10 This makes them more politically vulnerable because of the reduced willingness to incur economic or political costs11 in the pursuit of victory. Toft subsequently developed his 'Strategic Interaction Thesis' to explain the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts by building upon Mack's work. Based on the premise that a strong actor attacks while the weak actor defends, four possible war winning strategies were identified. The attacker could use either 'Direct Attack' or 'Barbarism', whilst THE REVIEW 2017-2018 69

History Contribution


the defenders could use 'Direct Defence' or a 'Guerrilla Warfare Strategy’. The ‘Direct Attack’ and ‘Direct Defence’ approaches could both be classed as conventional warfare strategies, with practitioners’ exponents seeking to use their own military strength to damage or destroy their opponent’s armed forces to such an extent that it is rendered unable to operate in the conflict. Barbarism conversely aims to destroy an adversary’s will and capacity to fight rather than its capability through “the systematic violation of the laws of war in pursuit of a military or political objective”. This can be achieved by the targeting of a civilian population and includes the use of strategic bombing.12 Finally, the Guerrilla Warfare Strategy (GWS) shares the aims of Barbarism but not the approach as it uses ’armed forces trained to avoid direct conflict’ whilst inflicting costs on the opponent. Having studied 200 years of data surrounding asymmetric conflicts, Toft proposed that when both sides adopt the same aims and victory conditions through the use of complimentary strategies (i.e. Direct Attack and Direct Defence) there is little the weak actor can do to close the military power gap. Strong actors should therefore win in proportion to their relative power advantage. Conversely, the employment of opposing strategies favours weak actors as they can draw out the conflict duration and target the strong actor’s political vulnerability highlighted by Mack. These relationships can be seen clearly in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Expected effects of strategic Interaction on Conflict Outcomes (expected winners in boxes)13

Lebanon, Hezbollah and the development of Israel’s political vulnerability Having looked at some of the theories that seek to explain the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts it is worth briefly looking at the background to the Second Lebanon War to aid in understanding the approaches adopted and some of the decisions made by Hezbollah and Israel during the conflict. In 1982, during the Lebanese Civil War, and following repeated attacks into Northern Israel by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the IDF launched a ground invasion of Lebanon that became known as the First Lebanon War. Refusing to withdraw after succeeding militarily, the Israeli’s quickly became seen as an occupying force. Around the same time, an Iranian financed Shi'ite organisation named Hezbollah emerged with the stated aim of removing the Israeli presence from Lebanese territory, and by 1985, the strong support they had received across 70

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the full spectrum of the population had enabled them to apply sufficient pressure upon the IDF to force them to withdraw from Beirut into Southern Lebanon. Spurred on by their early success, the next 15 years saw Hezbollah inflict a steady stream of casualties on the IDF and, by 2000 in a bid to counter an obvious source of political vulnerability, the Israeli government had become casualty averse. Unwilling to pay the cost of sustained occupation any longer, the IDF left Lebanon in May 2000. Within 4 months however, Israel found itself involved in a CounterInsurgency (COIN) campaign as a result of a Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.14 This new threat forced the IDF to focus on counter-insurgency training at the expense of conventional warfighting. Not content with forcing the IDF withdrawal, Hezbollah continued to be involved in acts of aggression along Israel's Northern Border post 2000.15 The Israeli reactions to these attacks were somewhat limited in scope, something that has long been suspected to be a consequence of the unwillingness of Israeli politicians to ‘acknowledge that they were wrong to withdraw from southern Lebanon in the first place’.16 The Second Lebanon War: Goals and strategies When Israel finally responded to activity along its northern border it did so unexpectedly, with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declaring Hezbollah's attack as an "act of war by the government in Beirut", perpetrated in an attempt to ‘undermine regional stability.’17 Despite this statement being made on the on the first day of the war, it took until the conflict was six-days old for the official announcement of Israel’s latest limited war aims: ‘retrieve the two Israeli soldiers captured by Hezbollah, end the threat of rocket attacks on northern Israel, remove Hezbollah from southern Lebanon, and pressure the Lebanese government to deploy its army into the southern portion of the country’.18 A fifth unannounced objective was disclosed towards the end of the conflict: re-establish the credibility of Israel's deterrence strategy.19 The deterrence strategy is a source of constant dilemma to Israel and exposes the dichotomy in its political vulnerability; the application of disproportionate force produces immediate physical safety but risks condemnation and the loss of international support, the use of proportionate force provides the opportunity for the opponent to believe their violence has worked.20 These risks triggering domestic dissatisfaction in a populous that has become accustomed to regional military supremacy. All this must be balanced against the states willingness to sustain casualties. In the Second Lebanon War, Israel's goals and lack of a regular military opponent to target combined with its political vulnerability to dictate the strategy that would be employed during the conflict. With the ‘cost’ of conventional military operations deemed too high the 'Direct Attack' strategy was ruled out. This forced the IDF to dismiss long established plans for an offensive into Lebanon to be enacted through a co-ordinated, large scale ground and air offensive. Instead, driven by the Chief


of the IDF General Staff, Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, a strategy aligned to 'Barbarism' was adopted – that of a substantial air campaign and naval blockade.21 Whilst some IDF officers and senior politicians had doubts over this, the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister, both of whom had ‘limited backgrounds in military affairs’, supported it.22 Crucially for them, the refusal to commit ground troops and instead rely heavily on air power was deemed the most effective way of protecting their ‘political will’. The statistics reinforce the assertion that the IDF employed the Barbarism strategy; more combat sorties were flown and artillery shells fired in the five weeks of the conflict than in the entirety of the Yom Kippur War when Israel fought two regular armies. In total, the IDF dropped 19,400 bombs and fired 2,200 missiles and 170,000 artillery shells into Lebanon; in comparison, Hezbollah launched 4,000 short range Katyusha rockets.23 This is despite Halutz declaring the war won following the destruction of Hezbollah’s long range rockets after just two nights of Israeli Air Force (IAF) raids, and the exhaustion of the target list compiled by the Israeli intelligence services by day four. The realisation that air power alone could not halt the Katyusha rockets threat came early in the conflict and Battalion and Brigade sized ‘limited’ raids were soon authorised into the first 10km of Southern Lebanon with the aim of making Hezbollah believe it was losing through the achievement of symbolic victories. The most surprising aspect of them was the attempt to measure success through the number of Hezbollah fighters killed; an approach employed by the US during the Vietnam War and widely discredited.24 Despite little progress being made towards their stated conflict aims, Israel only changed its strategy to the more conventional ‘Direct Attack’ during the final week of the war, with a UN brokered ceasefire on the horizon and the outcome effectively decided.25 Hezbollah conversely had few goals at the start of the Second Lebanon War. Following the IDF withdrawal in 2000 it had been fighting for its very existence within the state. The group gained legitimacy from its opposition to Israel’s occupation of Lebanon, and when this ended, there were calls from factions within Lebanon for its disarmament inline with UNSC Resolution 1559. The kidnapping operation that triggered the conflict was confirmed after the war to have been nothing more than an attempt by Hezbollah to prove to the population that they were still needed, in this instance by securing the release of Lebanese nationals held prisoner within Israel.26 Once the Second Lebanon War commenced and Israel’s aims were announced Hezbollah suddenly found itself fighting a Total War. Israel’s escalation was not anticipated but nor was it unexpected, and Hezbollah quickly enacted the strategy they had been preparing since 2000, that of a ‘Direct Defence’. Like all weak actors in asymmetric warfare, Hezbollah knew that to win the war it did not need to defeat the IDF but rather Israel’s political will. The best weapons to do this were its rockets, as repeated attacks would undermine positive messages from Israel’s leadership on the

History Contribution

wars progress. As the vast majority of its rockets were short range and limited to only 20km they needed to be fired en masse from close to the Israeli border to have an effect.27 To protect the rocket systems, Hezbollah adopted a conventional defensive posture, building over six years an incredibly complex system of hardened underground tunnels and bunkers throughout much of Southern Lebanon. This network included decoy positions, command and control bunkers and weapon-arsenals, reinforced with minefields and anti-tank units. To ensure the security of the network, each Hezbollah unit was given access to only three bunkers – one primary and two reserves – with instructions to fight only in specific areas.28 As proposed by Toft and highlighted in figure 1, the limited ground raids adopted by the IDF in support of the air campaign only served to optimise Hezbollah's chance of success, reinforcing the theory that when strong and weak actors adopt conflicting strategies the weak actor is likely to emerge victorious. Free from political constraints it is possible (although highly unlikely given Halutz views on air power) that the IDF would not have chosen to use the ‘Barbarism’ strategy at the start of the conflict; unfortunately for them, the political vulnerability that forced this was anticipated and countered incredibly effectively by Hezbollah. With the war effectively over when the IDF changed to ‘Direct Attack’, Hezbollah were not forced to change their own strategy. Barbarism was clearly the correct strategy for reestablishing the deterrence strategy; there have been just 16 attacks from Southern Lebanon into Israel since the end of the conflict, none of which have been claimed by Hezbollah.29 Power and interest Having looked at the opposing strategies and goals, it is appropriate to examine the asymmetry in power that drives interest levels and thus exposes political vulnerability. At the outbreak of hostilities Israel’s defence budget was $7.69 Billion, 33% higher than the combined total of the four Arab states that surrounded it.30 This provided Israel with a significant military power advantage over all its neighbours and a relatively low interest level, making them particularly politically vulnerable, especially to casualties. To protect this weakness, the preceding years had seen a greater investment in air power and ‘high-tech wizardry’ at the expense of ground forces.31 This was to the detriment of conventional technical competence and the IDF's ability to execute either manoeuvre or combined arms warfare, but considered an acceptable trade-off that would aid in the successful execution of COIN campaigns. After the war and following an ambush that damaged or destroyed 11 tanks, one armoured battalion commander commented on the reality of the trade: “To be in top form, a tank reservist needs a five-day refresher exercise each year.32 Most hardly got that on the course of three years, others in the space of five years.”33 This issue was also identified during the post conflict investigations by Major General Yair, who noted that the lack of a war for 24 years meant no-one at the divisional level downwards had any THE REVIEW 2017-2018 71

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war-fighting experience. The casualty adverse mind-set used in COIN operations was therefore taken into a conventional war,34 hindering operations and exposing the IDF and the Israeli government to the very risk they had sought to shield. The IDF's inability to maximise its power advantage was also a result of the new doctrine that was adopted in the months preceding the conflict. Centred on Effect Based Operations it replaced the historically successful and trusted structure of ‘Mission Commander’s Intent, Forces and Tasks’ with ‘bigger picture’ detail such as Political Directive and Strategic Purpose, using terminology drawn from ‘postmodern French Philosophy’ that the doctrines author claimed meant it was ‘not intended for ordinary mortals.’35 It is unsurprising then, that instead of enhancing understanding, the terminology used in the orders only confused Field Commanders.36 At the opposite end of the power spectrum, Hezbollah's had very few means of generating wealth or developing technology. As an irregular, non-state actor assessed to be made up of a core of just 3,000 regular fighters their relative military power was very low, and they relied heavily on external support to develop capabilities.37 With similar political ideologies, Iran emerged as the primary source of support. In addition to providing the majority of weapons and basic training through the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, members of Iran’s al-Quds force developed a training network to enable the use of advanced weaponry and positioned themselves as operational advisors.38 Syria also played a key role, as a facilitation route for Iranian weapons and by providing a large quantity of medium-range rockets, the extent of which came as a major surprise to Israeli intelligence during the war.39 Despite its small size, Hezbollah's status as a non-state actor was advantageous in the conflict, as its interest levels in fighting the war could not realistically be reduced by the Lebanese population or diminished by the IDF ‘Barbarism’ strategy. When the conflict began, the IDF had expected to encounter a force employing the same GWS that it had last faced in 2000. Unfortunately for them, Hezbollah had evolved over the six years into something new, a force that was ‘not a regular army but was not a guerrilla in the traditional sense either. It was something in between.’40 It had also developed a plan to counter an Israeli attack based on an understanding of Israel's political vulnerability and therefore operational constraints. To defeat the heavy investment in airpower, Hezbollah's defensive system was built up to 50m underground, ‘weapon signature and target-appearance time’ were reduced and the cells that made up the ground forces were made more autonomous to minimise potential disruption to command and control networks.41 To attack the Israeli's political vulnerability it aimed to inflict casualties on the IDF whenever it could, but it primarily sought to maintain a constant stream of rocket attacks into Israel to directly target the interest of the Israeli population. On average over 100 rockets a day, the majority of which were short-range variants, landed in Israel during the conflict and more than 72

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200 were launched on the final day to undermine Israeli attempts to claim victory.42 Although the relative power gap between Hezbollah and the IDF was theoretically significant, the reality was somewhat different. Whilst still undoubtedly weighted in the IDF's favour, the underfunding of ground forces and changes in doctrine, combined with Hezbollah's ability to maximise the effectiveness of its own power meant the power gap was significantly reduced. The interest levels of the two did not reflect this new reality placing the IDF at a significant disadvantage. Conclusion Mack and Toft’s theories for why big nations lose asymmetric conflicts were both evident during the Second Lebanon War. Despite the vast amount of money invested in the military by the Israeli government to ensure they had the military power advantage, a number of factors aligned to undermine the IDF’s effectiveness. Years spent waging COIN campaigns turned the focus away from conventional war fighting and reduced the IDF's preparedness for the conflict, and the change to doctrine undermined the confidence of its officers. Hezbollah however had spent the preceding six years anticipating the conflict and become a highly trained and effective force. Whilst the military power gap between the two sides was significant, the gap between their relative military effectiveness was small, exposing Israel's interest level and therefore its political vulnerability more than was anticipated. If Toft's work is to be believed, the single most important factor in the outcome of the Second Lebanon War was the strategies used, and this certainly was a key factor in why Israel lost the tactical and operational war. Imposed upon the IDF in an attempt to protect that political vulnerability, the IDF's ‘Barbarism’ strategy was in theory the correct method to counter the anticipated Hezbollah GWS. Hezbollah's evolution however enabled them to employ a ‘Direct Defence’ strategy that denied the IDF the opportunity to bring their relative power advantage to bear, handing another advantage to Hezbollah. It is therefore clear that the outcome of the Second Lebanon War in 2006 was as much a consequence of Hezbollah's military effectiveness and the strategic failures imposed upon the IDF by the government as it was a consequence of Israeli military failures. Bibliography Books Byman, Daniel. A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Cordesman, A.H. Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War. Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2007. Farquhar, Scott C (Lt Col). Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead. [Pamphlet] Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, 2009. http:// (accessed June 17, 2016). Glenn, Russell W.. All Glory Is Fleeting: Insights from the Second Lebanon War. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012. pubs/monographs/MG708-1.html.

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Makovsky, David and White Jeffrey. Lessons and Implications of the IsraelHizbullah War: A Preliminary Assessment. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006. Matthews, M. We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War. The Long War Series Occasional Paper 26, Kansas: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute Press, 2011. Saad-Gharayed, Amal. Hezbollah’s Outlook in the Current Conflict: Motives, Strategy and Objectives. Carnegie Policy Outlook, 2006 http:// Journals Arreguín-Toft, I. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1, Summer 2001, pp. 93-128. Carron, Ryan T (Lt Cdr). Hezbollah: Operational Art in Fourth Generation Warfare. [Pamphlet] Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006. http:// (accessed June 17, 2016). Caverley, Jonathan D. The Myth of Military Myopia. International Security, Vol 34, No. 3, pp. 119-157, Winter 2009/10. Gabrielsen, Iver. Military Strategy and the Conduct of the 2006 Israel– Hezbollah War. Comparative Strategy. Vol. 32. No. 5, November-December 2013, pp. 435-442, 2013. DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2013.840206 Henriksen, Dag. Deterrence by Default? Israel's Military Strategy in the 2006 War Against Hizballah. The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, February 2012, pp. 95-120, 2012. Kober,Avi. The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?. The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 31, No.1, pp340, February 2008. Lambeth, Benjamin S. Israel's War in Gaza: A Paradigm of Effective Military Learning and Adaptation. International Security, Vol. 37, No. 2, Fall 2012, pp. 81-118, 2012. Lambeth, Benjamin S. Learning From Lebanon: Airpower and Strategy in Israel's 2006 War Against Hezbollah. Naval War College Review, Vol 65, No 3, Summer 2012, p83-104, 2012. Mack, Andrew. Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict. World Politics, Vol. 27, No.2, January 1975, pp. 175-200. Murphy, Brian J (Lt Cdr). No Heroic Battles: Lessons of the Second Lebanon War. [Pamphlet] Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command & General Staff College, 2010. (accessed June 17, 2016). Nakhleh, Hany T (Lt Col). The 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon: Analysis and Strategic Implications. [Pamphlet] Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2007. http://library/resources/EResources\e-docs\nakhleh_ 2006israellebanon.pdf (accessed June 17, 2016) Zisser, Eyal. Iranian involvement in Lebanon. Military and Strategic Affairs, Vol. 3, No.1, pp3-16, 2011. Defence Research Papers Kotoun, A (Lt Cdr). The 2nd Lebanon War 2006: Causes for the Israeli Failure and Lessons to Be Learned for Western Armed Forces. Acsc 12. [Book] Watchfield: JSCSC, 2009. http://library/resources/EResources\DRP\ ACSC12\kotounaltcol.pdf (accessed June 17, 2016). Moalic, J G (Sqn Ldr). Israel-Hezbollah 2006. Use of Conventional Force in Contemporary World. Acsc 14. [Book] Watchfield: JSCSC, 2011. http://library/resources/EResources\DRP\ACSC14\MoalicJGSqnLdr.pdf (accessed June 17, 2016). Articles Ben-David, Alon. “Lebanon War Report Reproaches Israeli Leaders,” Janes Defence Weekly, May 04 (2007). Display/1157888 (accessed June 22, 2016). Janes. “Hizbullah’s new manifesto goes back to basics,” Janes Intelligence Weekly, January 08 (2010). (accessed June 22, 2016). Leaders. “Nasrallah wins the War,” The Economist, August 17, (2006). (accessed June 22, 2016). Schenker, David. “Hezbollah’s Limited Options After Israeli Strike,” The Washington Institute, January 23 (2015) policy-analysis/view/hezbollahs-limited-options-after-israeli-strike (accessed June 22, 2016).

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Tigner, Brooks. Israel Reviews ‘Lessons Learned’ From Regional Conflicts” Janes Defence Weekly, November 07 (2007). Janes/Display/1155644 (accessed June 22, 2016). Newspapers Crooke, A and Perry, M. "How Hezbollah defeated Israel Part 1: Winning the Intelligence War," Asia Times Online, 12 October, 2006, Harel, Amos. “Analysis: IDF Plans to Use Disproportionate Force in Next War” Haaretz, October 05 (2008). (accessed June 22, 2016). Chris McGreal, “Capture of soldiers was 'act of war' says Israel,” The Guardian, 13 July, 2006, jul/13/israelandthepalestinians.lebanon1 Websites Jewish Virtual Library . "Vital Statistics: Total Casualties, Arab-Israeli Conflict," accessed 14 October, 2016, History/casualtiestotal.html. United States Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, accessed 13 Oct, 2016, Council on Foreign Relations . "Winograd Commission Final Report," accessed 10 Oct 2016,

Footnotes 1

Iver Gabrielsen,’Military Strategy and the Conduct of the 2006 IsraelHezbollah War’, Comparative Strategy 32 (2013): 436. 2 "Vital Statistics: Total Casualties, Arab-Israeli Conflict," Jewish Virtual Library, accessed 14 October, 2016, jsource/History/casualtiestotal.html. 3 In The Myth of Military Myopia Jonathan Caverly commented that military power is developed and exercised through two factors: Capital (i.e. tanks and planes) and labour (i.e. soldiers and sailors); each can be replaced by the other. 4 Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics 27 (1975): 177. 5 "Winograd Commission Final Report," Council on Foreign Relations, accessed 10 Oct 2016, 6 Actor refers to the state or military forces involved in the conflict. Using the definition articulated in How the Weak Win Wars a strong actor is one whose material power (the product of a given state’s population and armed forces) exceeds that of its adversary by at least ten to one. 7 Mack. 8 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," International Security, 26 (2001). 9 United States Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, accessed 13 Oct, 2016, 10 An entity involved in a Limited War does not expend all of its resources fighting that war, those involved in a Total War do. 11 'Political costs' equates to pressure applied to the strong actor’s governance as a result of questions over the morality of the military means employed and the value of military casualties. 12 Toft, 102. 13 Toft, 108. 14 A. Crooke, "How Hezbollah defeated Israel Part 1: Winning the Intelligence War," Asia Times Online, 12 Oct, 2006, Middle_East/HJ12Ak01.html 15 In 5 years there were a total of 21 attacks against Israel that wounded six civilians and killed nine. A heavier toll was paid by the IDF with 29 wounded and 14 killed in the attacks. 16 Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 HezbollahIsraeli War (Kansas: Combined Arms Centre Combat Studies Institute Press, 2011), 22. 17 Chris McGreal, “Capture of soldiers was 'act of war' says Israel,” The

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Guardian, 13 July, 2006, jul/13/israelandthepalestinians.lebanon1 18 Gabrielsen,435. 19 Anthony Cordesman, Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, (Washington DC: The CSIS Press, 2007), 6. 20 Daniel Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 362. 21 The first Air Force officer appointed to the position and a man utterly convinced of the effectiveness and decisiveness of technologically advanced air power. 22 Matthews, 36. 23 Avi Kober, "The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?," The Journal of Strategic Studies 31 (2008), 24. 24 Gabrielsen, 436. 25 Cordesman,5. 26 Amal Saad-Gharayed, “Hezbollah’s Outlook in the Current Conflict: Motives, Strategy and Objectives,” Carnegie Policy Outlook (2006) p. 1-2.


Cordesman, 106. Matthews, 17- 20. 29 The majority were linked to Palestinian groups or Al-Qaeda affiliates. 30 Cordesman, 158. 31 Matthews, 27. 32 ibid 54. 33 ibid 27. 34 Kober, 14-15. 35 Matthews, 25. 36 Ibid, 26. 37 Cordesman, 17. 38 Eyal Zisser, "Iranian involvement in Lebanon," Military and Strategic Affairs 3 (2011): 8-10. 39 Cordesman, 10. 40 Matthews, 21-22. 41 Gabrielsen, 438 42 D. Makovsky and J. White, Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hizbollah War: A Preliminary Assessment (Washington D.C, 2006). 28


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Based on a critical analysis of relevant leadership theories and models, evaluate Indira Gandhi’s effectiveness as a leader and, as a result of that analysis, identify lessons that have utility for the Army When first selected for the position of Prime Minister of India in 1966 following the unexpected death of the incumbent Lal Shastri, Indira Gandhi was considered nothing more than a political party figurehead and a mere mouth piece for the real wielders of power within the country.1 That belief however had been obliterated by the time of her assassination in October 1984, replaced by the image of a truly global leader that commanded respect from those that encountered her.2 By Maj M Tyers Domestically she is still considered one of India’s greatest prime ministers, responsible for turning the country into both a nuclear state and the principle sovereign power in South Asia.3 This would suggest that she was a highly effective leader, but for every success, there was an equally savage failure that overshadows her legacy, perhaps none more so than the events that led to her being shot dead by two of her bodyguards. There are a number of leadership theories that could be used to determine how effective a leader Indira Gandhi really was. The skills model, first proposed by Katz in 1955, would have been effective, as it could assess the relationship between her knowledge and capabilities, and her overall performance. Alternatively, situational leadership, developed by Hersey and Blanchard, would be an excellent tool to help understand some of her successes and failures. Both were dismissed in favour of two theories that have greater relevance for the Army: The Trait Approach and Gender and Leadership. Despite not promoting the trait approach in any of its endorsed leadership literature, the observation of certain traits still plays a key role in army leadership course selection processes; including helping identify candidates to

attend the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and potentially become commissioned officers. Gender is likewise ignored in army leadership texts, despite it taking until 2015 for a female officer to be promoted to the rank of Major General, or for a female Brigadier to command a Brigade, two significant milestones that reflected the growing trend of women occupying middle and senior leadership positions in the army.4,5 After briefly looking at who Indira Gandhi was, this essay will outline the theory behind the trait approach and its strengths and weaknesses before evaluating her effectiveness. This approach will be replicated for the gender and leadership theory before concluding with the identification of lessons that have utility for the Army. Who was Indira Gandhi? Born on 19 November 1917, Indira Nehru was the only child of Jawaharlal Nehru, a close friend of Mahatma Gandhi and the man that in 1947 would become the first Prime Minister of a newly independent India. Shortly after her birth, her parents joined Gandhi’s ‘Quit India’ movement positioning her at the forefront of Indian politics from an early age. The role played by her family in the independence movement resulted in both her mother and father spending a considerable amount of her early childhood incarcerated. Finding herself alone at home for lengthy periods she became increasingly withdrawn and self-reliant. Having such close involvement in Gandhi’s movement however appears to have provided her with an understanding of the power of populist policies. She married Feroze Gandhi in 1942, taking his name and having two children before separating when he became jealous of her later political success. Indira subsequently took on the role of hostess and personnel assistant to her father when he became prime minister, positions that saw her accompany him on overseas engagements, stand in for him at meetings and eventually control access to him.6 In the 37 years between Indian independence and her death in 1984, she was either Prime Minister or employed within his office for all but five years. Despite initially being reluctant to move into the public eye, she quickly developed a taste for power, spending THE REVIEW 2017-2018 75

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considerable time trying to secure it. She gradually changed political rules that she felt worked against her, and ruthlessly removed the influence of those who did not support her. Splitting her own political party twice, she surrounded herself with those considered loyal, as she increasingly tried to centralise power through personal appointments to positions of note. When politically threatened, her policies moved to the left to gain public support, although a failure to implement them only succeeded in increasing public anger, eventually driving it to a level that caused the suspension of democracy and the implementation of a two year state-ofemergency. With a talent for foreign affairs, she skilfully remained non-aligned throughout the Cold War and secured the countries eastern border by defeating the Pakistan military in 1971 during what became known as the Bangladesh crisis. Ultimately her legacy as a leader is mixed; her actions have made the country secure from external threats however internally she created conditions for it to try and tear itself apart. The Trait Approach For as long as there have been effective leaders there have been people attempting to determine what attributes the individual possesses that makes them different from others.7 As a consequence, a considerable amount of research and study has been conducted to try and quantify and list these characteristics, an approach that has gradually evolved into the leadership theory known as The Trait Approach. This essay uses the 2004 study by Zaccaro, Kemp and Bader that sought to synthesise the theories previous research to understand Indira Gandhi’s effectiveness as a leader. The study also defines leadership traits as: ‘relatively stable and coherent integrations of personnel characteristics that foster a consistent pattern of leadership performance across a variety of group and organisational situations.’ The outcome of Zaccaro’s study was the identification of two types of attributes, and the belief that leaders have 11 traits.8 These traits can in-turn be grouped into six categories (see Figure 1). A traits categorisation as a distal attribute (a foundational trait that defines a leader’s ‘core’ effectiveness) or a proximal

attribute (a developed trait) will dictate how much a situational factor will moderate the leader’s effectiveness as they employ their leadership processes. By articulating that a leader’s effectiveness is influenced by the situation leaders find themselves in, the theory overcomes one of the traditional trait theory criticisms. Zaccaro’s version of The Trait Theory has a major strength beyond some of the ‘generic’ advantages regularly stated.10 It understands that possession of specific traits alone is no guarantee of effectiveness; instead it is dependent upon how one or more traits integrate with another (i.e. a high level of cognitive ability combined with low motivation would reduce a leader’s effectiveness). It also accepts that some important attributes can be ‘grown’ and developed through experience and education. Opponents of The Trait Approach point to its failure to provide a single list of traits that define effective leadership. This criticism includes studies done before the theory evolved in the 1980s to explain the interaction between situations and traits. This evolution devalues the findings of pre-1980s studies as they were produced in a different context, one that failed to comprehend the importance of the situation when attempting to describe a leader, likely forcing researchers to identify traits that could explain situational factors.11 The primary failing of the Zaccaro theory is the belief that only proximal attributes can be influenced by the situation, a suggestion that appears to ignore the decrease in cognitive ability brought about by fatigue, or how a situation can alter a person’s motives and values.12 Both have the potential to reduce a leader’s effectiveness. A possible amendment to the model could be made by simply extending the ‘Leader’s Operating Environment’ bar over ‘Distal Attributes’ and identifying the extent to which each of the six different components is susceptible to situational factors, categorising them as low, medium or high accordingly. Unlike the expected leadership emergence pathway shown in the model, Indira Gandhi took advantage of political patronage to rise to positions of leadership, so her effectiveness can only be assessed from when she became a professional politician. Having dropped out of university after

Figure 1. A Model of Leader Attributes and Leader Performance9


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failing her first year she would appear to lack the academic intellect traditionally associated with effective leaders, and yet the manner in which she wove together India’s military, political and diplomatic efforts to respond to the Bangladesh crisis despite significant domestic pressure (due to perceived inaction) demonstrated high cognitive prowess. A detailed personality study conducted by Steinberg in her book Women in Power identified another list of traits and concluded that conscientiousness, openness and lowagreeableness were among Indira’s most prominent, present in levels expected for an effective leader. Her introversion was a significant constraint though, and should have limited her leadership effectiveness. There is some evidence of this in her early political career, most notably in the way she became president of her political party, a position she reluctantly accepted because of the risk of public humiliation if she refused. Gradually the prominence of her introversion decreased, to be replaced by a level of self-confidence that became her hallmark and was considered one of the primary reasons for Gandhi’s international success.13 Her motivations throughout her life were also very clear; everything she did – in her mind at least – was for the betterment and benefit of India. She played on the image of herself as the mother of India seeking to protect her children, the population. However, what began as a noble motivation was gradually warped, and as Indira and India became increasingly intertwined in her mind, ‘threats to herself [were perceived] as threats to India itself’ resulting in an increasingly authoritarian rule.14 If viewed through the lens of a lower or middle class Indian, Indira’s social appraisal skills were excellent.15 In 1969, her decision to nationalise fourteen leading commercial banks, less than 24 hours before parliament was due to meet to discuss the issue, was done to outmanoeuvre her enemies and secure popular support by underscoring that she alone understood the people and was capable of acting in their interests. She also had an enormous amount of understanding, knowledge and political expertise as a result of the support she had from her father. When communal rioting erupted in several parts of Punjab early in her reign ‘she quickly ensured the restoration of law and order by the security forces before successfully negotiating with the Naga rebels to reduce tension and shatter their unity’.16 She also tore up the restrictive agreement she had signed with the US government when agreed food and financial aid failed to turn up on time, instead seeking limited assistance elsewhere, including the Soviet Union. Determined not to be dependent on another state again, she subsequently skilfully played the cold war enemies off against each other whilst never violating India’s non-aligned status. In hindsight, there is little doubt that Gandhi was an effective leader at times, but flaws in her distal attributes and specifically her personality impeded her ability to be continuously effective. Gender based leadership After looking at who Indira Gandhi was and examining her leadership through the trait approach I will now explore the

History Contribution

impact of gender on her leadership. Research into this area only really began in the 1970’s, becoming famous in 1986 when a Wall Street Journal article described an invisible barrier that prevented women from rising into elite leadership positions despite academic qualifications or professional experience. Since then, other concepts have developed including the ‘glass cliff’ theory that predicts women are more likely to be promoted than men ‘in firms that are struggling, in crisis or at risk to fail’ because ‘decision-makers [may be motivated] to promote nontraditional leaders to signal that the firm is heading in a bold new direction.’17,18 In 2007, Eagly and Carli came up with a labyrinth metaphor to describe the challenges encountered by women aspiring to elite leadership positions, as the belief of just a single barrier holding women back towards the end of a successful career failed to account for complexity and variety of challenges that can appear along the way.19 Crucially this model accepts that the labyrinth can be successfully navigated by women and for this reason, the ‘Labyrinth of Leadership’ is the model that will be used to measure Indira Gandhi’s effectiveness as a leader. There are three broad groups of challenges: • Human Capital. The belief that women are less committed to education, training or work experiences and have a greater level of work-home conflict than men (i.e. women take on the majority of child rearing responsibilities).20 • Prejudice. Driven by gender stereotypes such as men are confident, assertive and decisive, unlike women who are sensitive, nurturing and have concern for others.21 • Gender Differences. The general belief that women and men are different, and that the lack of an equal split between men and women in leadership positions is as a results of a less effective leadership styles employed by women. Interestingly, reports have shown that when women try to lead in a ‘masculine’ manner then they are devalued as a leader. The study of the relationship between gender and leadership has a number of strengths. By understanding the issues surrounding the advancement of women and the reasons for such unrepresentative numbers in senior leadership positions, organisations can identify ways to diminish the power of ingrained biases which should ultimately maximise the ‘pool-of-talent’ from which they can draw, helping to mitigate the dangers of ‘groupthink’. It will also help to develop a form of ‘best practice’ leadership, likely to be a more gender neutral style that works effectively for both sexes. The glass ceiling so often referred to is frequently a source of debate. Opponents often dismiss the metaphor because of the presence of some women in senior leadership positions, advocates highlight that this is not what is meant. They propose the metaphor does not state that women cannot reach senior leadership positions, but rather that on average, women are disproportionally disadvantaged to reach such positions. Additionally, much of the research has also only been conducted in the West, meaning the impact of culture, an undoubtedly significant factor when considering gender and leadership effectiveness, has not been examined. THE REVIEW 2017-2018 77

History Contribution


Finally, in a true labyrinth, individuals can reverse to overcome obstacles. Certain challenges women face such as childbirth are impossible to undo if the result is a career deadend, suggesting that model needs some refinement to rank the risk to advancement caused by each pitfall. How effective was Indira Gandhi based on this gender and leadership theory? The inadvertent investment early in her life in Human Capital was the primary reason she became Prime Minister and then successfully remained in power. Almost past the enormous pitfall that is child-rearing by the time she became independently involved in politics in 1956 – her two children were 12 and 10, her nationalist education and close association with the independence campaign gave her more prominence and credibility in a country with low education levels than any educational background could. She was additionally advantaged by her exposure to highlevel politics through her father, and quickly used her experience to secure an official mandate in the 1967 general election. She did face difficulties though, concerning ‘gender differences’ and ‘prejudice’, including from her own husband. Her families’ political pedigree combined with the public support she received in India’s most populous state brought her to the attention of key people in her party. Her subsequent reserved performances in parliament during the months before Shastri’s death reinforced the belief amongst her parties’ kingmakers that whilst her appeal would strengthen the parties grip on power, she was no different to the small numbers of women already in Indian politics; pliable, incapable of providing strong leadership and full of deference to them. Her continued poor performance at the beginning of her prime-ministership saw her ridiculed by opponents for being nothing more than a “dumb doll”. She soon became distrusting and disdainful of others and falling back into her childhood self-reliance, concluded that she alone would be responsible for her survival in a maledominated political system. Moving her political outlook to the left she approached that ’67 election with a campaign based on convincing the populous ‘that she cared for them more than any other leader’.22 Her overwhelming success compared to other members of her party filled her with self-belief and enabled her to severe ties with those that had raised her to power, ensuring she could no longer be manipulated. Unfortunately this created powerful enemies, and she subsequently adopted a domestic leadership strategy that increasingly focused on her own political survival. This caused policy ‘zigzags’ and, distrustful of leaders she did not control, a centralisation of power that ruptured the unity of Indian society which had formed following the bloody split with Pakistan. She successfully played on the three challenges by manipulating situations to turn situations to her advantage, the best example of which is from the Bangladesh crisis. Underestimating Gandhi, the Pakistani President dismissively stated: “If that woman thinks she is going to cow me down, I refuse to take it”, which may in part explain why the Pakistani military launched attacks on Indian soil that provided Gandhi with the excuse for 78

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launching her military campaign.23 Ultimately, Gandhi overcame the three main gender pitfalls and showed that on the international stage she was a highly talented leader. Domestically however her self-reliance and distrust cancelled out the successful navigation of the labyrinth reducing her effectiveness significantly. Lessons for the Army After looking at who Indira Gandhi was and then reviewing her effectiveness against two leadership theories, it is appropriate to briefly look at leadership in the army. The army considers effective leaders to be those that operate in line with the transformational and transactional theories and adhere to the principles of the Leadership Framework (see Figure 2).24 This framework is a pathway that explains the characteristics of leaders, what makes them effective and what they do with once in a position of authority.

Figure 2: The Leadership Framework25

Having reviewed Indira Gandhi’s leadership it is clear the army can learn a number of lessons from the trait approach that could improve the effectiveness of its leaders. Conversely, Indira is not a good case study for the identification of lessons concerning gender and leadership, although the theory itself has utility. Lesson 1. Personality is as crucial to effective leadership as cognitive ability. Gandhi’s leadership style evolved as a way to survive in power and her self-reliance and distrust of others runs counter to the Army’s principles of decentralised command and subordinate trust. It was in fact Gandhi’s personality that dictated her effectiveness. Lesson 2. Cognitive ability is not solely measured in educational awards and the army must reject attempts to make them a pre-requisite for rank. The Army has been contemplating making possession of a Masters qualification a pre-requisite for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel for several years. Gandhi showed that the absence of an academic aptitude does not preclude someone from having high cognitive ability, nor (when reviewing her outward facing leadership activities) from them being an effective leader. Lesson 3. A greater degree of time must be spent enhancing understanding and developing problem solving skills in the Army to offset inexperience. One of the reasons Gandhi was so effective at overcoming problems such as the THE REVIEW 2017-2018 78


Madras language riots was because she had accrued a lifetimes worth of relevant experience and the knowledge of how to solve political problems. Army leaders expected to deal effectively in similar situations must be given sufficient opportunities to develop in order to compensate for their lack of key experience and knowledge. Theoretical study, exposure to the experience of others and practical training are the most obvious ways to provide this understanding and yet it is these areas that are often ‘squeezed’ first when the pace of work intensifies. Lesson 4. A list of traits should be developed and incorporated into the Leadership Framework to either identify what leaders are or, what they are not. By identifying traits that effective leaders don’t have, rather than searching for the ‘positive’ traits they do, the talent pool from which leaders can be drawn would be expanded and the dangers of group-think reduced. Lesson 5. Human Capital is the most significant pitfall to female leadership. Prejudices and gender differences can be offset with success, but a perceived shortfall in Human Capital can prevent the opportunity to lead from being provided. Gandhi was given power primarily because of her Human Capital, namely her historic political exposure and well-publicised commitment to the independence campaign. The age of her children also meant child rearing was reduced as an issue. Lesson 6. Research must be done into the leadership styles of male and female leaders in the army to identify a truly neutral yet effective leadership model to overcome ‘gender difference’ based biases that limit women’s career progression. Despite promoting the transformational and transactional models, effective leadership in the army at the tactical level is often perceived to be as a result of masculine traits. Replicating this can have a negative impact on a women’s leadership effectiveness and hinder career progression. Conclusion Indira Gandhi was a complex and flawed character driven by a personal belief that she alone was capable of acting in the best interests of India. Both effective and ineffective she simultaneously secured India externally whilst destroying it domestically. The shortfalls in Gandhi’s traits make this dichotomy unsurprising. There are a number of the lessons that have utility for the army from examining her leadership using a trait model, not least that the model itself still requires some refinement. Conversely, although the number of lessons with utility for the army when considering Gandhi’s effectiveness as a leader against the Gender and leadership model is quite low, there is certainly value in studying the theory and the army’s own leadership doctrine to try and improve the representation of women in senior leadership positions. Bibliography Books Bajpai, K.P. and Pant, H.V. Critical Issues in Indian Politics: India’s National Security. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013.

History Contribution

Bass, B.M. Bass and Stogdill’s handbook of leadership: a survey of theory and research. New York: Free Press, 1990. Bose, S and Jalal, A. Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999. Eagly, A.H., & Carli, L. L. Through the labyrinth: The truth about how women become leaders. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2007 Frank, K. Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi, Great Britain: HarperCollins Publishers, 2001 Genovese, M.A, Steckenrider, J.S. Women as Political Leaders: Studies in Gender and Governing. East Sussex: Routledge, 2013. Marlay, R. Neher, C. Patriots & Tyrants: Ten Asian Leaders. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1999. Masani, Z. Indira Gandhi: A Biography. New York: Ty Crowell Co, 1976 Malhotra, I. Indira Gandhi: A personal and political Biography. London: Coronet Books, 1991 Northouse, P.G. Leadership: Theory and Practice. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2016. Steinberg, B. Women in power: the personalities and leadership styles of Indira Gandhi, Golda Meir, and Margaret Thatcher. Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2008 Zaccaro, S.J., Kemp, C., Bader, P. “Leader traits and attributes.” In The Nature of Leadership, edited by J. Antonakis, A.T. Cianciolo, and R.J. Sternberg, 101-124. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2004. Journals Eagly, A.H. Johannesen-Schmidt, M.C. “Transformational, Transactional, and Laissez-Faire Leadership Styles: A Meta-Analysis Comparing Women and Men.” Psychology Bulletin 129, no. 4, (2003):569 – 591 Glass, C. and Cook, A. “Leading at the top: Understanding women’s challenges above the glass ceiling” The Leadership Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2016):51-63 Heilman, M.E. “Description and prescription: How gender stereotypes prevent women’s ascent up the organisational ladder” Journal of Social Issues 57, (2001):657-674 Indira Gandhi’s bequest. Economic and Political Weekly 19, no. 44 (1984): 1849-1850 Joseph, D.L, Dhanani, L.Y, Shen, W, McHugh, B.C, McCord, M.A. “Is a happy leader a good leader? A meta-analytic investigation of leader trait affect and leadership” The Leadership Quarterly 26, no. 4 (2015):558-577 Nichols, A.L, Cottrell, C.A. “What do people desire in their leaders? The role of leadership on trait desirability” The Leadership Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2015):711-729 Ryan, M.K., & Haslam, S.A. ”The glass cliff: Exploring the dynamics surrounding the appointment of women to precarious leadership positions” Academy of Management Review 32, no. 2 (2007): 549-572. Salmoni, B.A, Hart, J, McPherson, R, Winn, A.K. Growing Strategic Leaders for Future Conflict” Parameters 40, no. 1 (2010): 72-88 Defence Research Paper Reddy, Vishnu. Lt Cdr “India’s Foreign Policy – Way Ahead in the Evolving World Order.” Defence Research Paper, JSCSC, 2015. Official publications United Kingdom. British Army. Developing Leaders: A British Army Guide. London: Ministry of Defence. United Kingdom. British Army. The Army Leadership Code: An Introductory Guide. London: Ministry of Defence, 2015. Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. Centre for Defence Leadership and Management. On Leading in Defence: A Guide for Leaders in Defence. London: Ministry of Defence. United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. UK Armed Forces Annual Personnel Report. April 2014. uploads/attachment_data/file/312539/uk_af_annual_personnel_report_2 014.pdf (accessed July 29, 2016). United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. UK Armed Forces Annual Personnel Report. April 2011. uploads/attachment_data/file/280426/1-april-2011.pdf(accessed July 29, 2016).

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History Contribution


United States of America. Federal Glass Ceiling Commission. A Solid Investment: Making Full Use of the Nation’s Human Capital. November 2015. (accessed July 30, 2016) Articles Baruch, H. “Moving Up the Ladder: The Evolution of Female Leaders” National Clearinghouse for Leadership Programs, (2011) (accessed July 30, 2016) British Army. “Army appoint first female Major General” Army, July 06 (2015) (accessed July 29, 2016) Hindle, T. “The Glass Ceilling” The Economist, May 5 (2009) http://www. (accessed July 30, 2016) Kidwai, M.S. “Indira Gandhi – An Outstanding International Leader” Mainstream Weekly, Vol XLV, No 45, October 31 (2007) http://www. (accessed July 30, 2016) Newspapers Pillalmarri, A. “India’s 3 Greatest Prime Ministers of All Time” The National Interest. April 27 (2015) Williams, Zoe. “The glass ceiling: a metaphor that needs to be smashed” The Guardian. July 27, (2016) (accessed July 30, 2016)

Footnotes 1

Steinberg, 2008, p. 26 Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore for 31 years stated that she was “tougher, more determined and ruthless than Margaret Thatcher” whilst Henry Kissinger stated in his memoirs, that “she outclassed and outmaneuvered both him and Richard Nixon”. 3 Steinberg, 2008, p. 19 4 In August 2014, Brigadier Sharon Nesmith was appointed Commander of 1st (United Kingdom) Signal Brigade and in September 2015, Brigadier Susan Ridge was promoted to the rank of Major General. (MOD, 2015) 5 Between 1 April 2011 and 1 April 2014, the total percentage of officers 2


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that were female in the army rose from 11.3% to 11.8%. This trend was replicated at every rank from Brigadier to 2nd Lieutenant. (MOD, 2014) 6 Masani, 1976, p. 124 - 125 7 Bass, 1990 8 Cognitive Abilities, Motivation, social intelligence, self-monitoring, emotional intelligence, Leader Problem-Solving Skills, Expertise, and Tacit Knowledge and The ‘Big 5 factors’ identified by L.R Goldberg in 1990: Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, Openness and low Agreeableness, 9 Zaccaro, Kemp and Bader, 2004, p. 122 10 It is an intuitively appealing process that takes advantage of the popular belief that leaders are different and it is supported by credible and prolonged research. 11 Northouse has listed the traits identified in six major studies (three pre1980s, three 1986 onwards). In those conducted after situational factors were incorporated into the trait approach there is a much greater degree of similarity than in those produced before-hand. 12 It has been argued that Royal Marines Sgt Alexander Blackman shot dead a wounded insurgent whilst on operations in 2011 because his personal values were significantly affected by substantial situational factors over the length of the deployment. 13 Indira Gandhi’s bequest. (1984) 14 Steinberg, 2008, p. 40 15 A leader’s understanding of the feelings and behaviours of others in a social environment and the ability to select the most suitable response. 16 Masani, 1976, p. 152 - 154 17 Ryan & Haslam, 2007 18 Glass & Cook, 2016, p. 52 19 Eagly & Carli, 2007 20 The concept of human capital [states that] the quality of employees can be improved by investing in their education, experience and abilities. 21 Heilman, 2001. 22 Malhotra, 1989, pp 103. 23 Malhotra, 1989, pp 137, 190 (p 169 of women as pol. Leaders). 24 Transformational leaders create visions that followers is invested in, transactional leaders motivate through reward and punishment. 25 Army Leadership Doctrine, 2016, p.9

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Nicholas Johnson Kuehne + Nagel Warehouse Shift Manager (Nights) at Amazon Lance Corporal I had been thinking of leaving the military for some [PTL HUK 0 ZH^ HU HY[PJSL PU [OL 7H[OÄUKLY YLZL[[SLTLU[ magazine on an ex-Royal Logistic Corps driver called John Fletcher who works for Kuehne + Nagel. Then I saw Kuehne + Nagel’s Military Talent a Pool ad on the Career Transition r Partnership P (CTP) website. I applied and was contacted by the military project manager nagerr, Phil Doyle. He conducted a telephone interview, told me about the types of vacancies available, gave me some information on the company and advised on how interviews are conducted. On my return from my last exercise, I was invited for an interview for a shift manager role for Kuehne + Nagel’s Amazon contract. The interview was conducted by the hiring manager; one of my future bosses and the Human Resources representative who had invited me for the interview. It was quite relaxed. I was asked competency based questions which I answered using the ST TAR A method. They seemed impressed and I was VɈLYLK [OL YVSL H ^LLR SH[LY


I started with Kuehne + Nagel on the 14th August 2016. ;OL ÄYZ[ ^LLRZ ^LYL PUK\J[PVU [YHPUPUN ^OPJO NH]L me a chance to adjust. I am now 10 weeks in and I am settling into the e job. Volumes o have quickly ramped up and we are now operating at quite a fast pace. There is a lot of learning on your feet and, as a team, we are NL[[PUN TVYL HUK TVYL JVUÄKLU[ HZ ^L I\PSK \W MVY M\SÄSSPUN *OYPZ[THZ VYKLYZ I have told a lot of friends about Kuehne + Nagel, describing the overall recruitment process and the type of company it is. It is very professional and the training and support has been second to none. It is challenging, but with that comes lots of opportunities. I couldn’t have wished for a better start to my civilian careerr. I do hope to stay with Kuehne + Nagel for as long as possible and I can’t recommend the company enough.



Military Contribution


Continuous professional development and the Army Reservist of the 21st Century Army Reserves are missing out on financial opportunities and above all free personal development training which would benefit their civilian employment, their future earnings potential and their career in the Armed Forces. Awareness of funding schemes available to Reservists, whilst well established, is not universal or understood and this article summarises the schemes available. By Maj A Aitkin The Army Reserve needs to recruit to its full manning of 30,000 trained soldiers, with up to an additional 8,000 soldiers in training, to provide an integrated and trained whole Army by April 2019. Army Reservist Commanders at all levels must attract, recruit and retain Reservists and by investing and promoting the value and benefits of Continuous Professional Development (CPD), it can contribute to the Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) and Army 2020 Refine (A2020R) assumptions. Army Reserves are entitled to receive CPD linked to rank progression, educational and personal development. The opportunity for self-development meeting the needs of both military and civilian careers is easily accessible and can be funded under the Standard Learning Credits (SLC) and Enhanced Learning Credits (ELC) schemes.1 This article looks at how to use these CPD funded options to retain and develop Reservists. Civilians considering Army Reservist careers can now attend a range of Military Preparation Courses (MPC) funded by the Government. This article, by way of example, looks at the success achieved within 162 Regiment RLC with YH Training Services Ltd in Hartlepool and Coulby Newham, as a recruiting methodology to the Reserves as a key ‘Attract and Develop’ tool. Standard Learning Credits Standard Learning Credits (SLC) were introduced to the Army Reserve in April 2014 as part of FR20.2 Serving Army Reservists can claim 80% of course fees up to a maximum 82 THE REVIEW 2017-2018 82

value of £175 per financial year. The scheme is designed to allow multiple small claims throughout a Reservist’s career. The funded study must lead to a nationally recognised qualification or an accreditation from a National Governing Body (NGB), and have development value which benefits the Army Reserve. The scheme works on a refund mechanism and applies from 1 April to 31 March annually. The eligibility of courses can take the format of residential, group or individual study, distance and on-line learning, and can be either part-time or full-time. The most popular funded courses for Army Reservists has been NGB accreditation in the arena of instructional coaching qualifications including: 5 Activity Instructors 5 Mountain Biking 5 Water Sports 5 Climbing & Mountain Leader 5 Paddle Sports 5 Walking and Navigation The Army Reserve is committed to ensuring that all Reservists can develop their Literacy and Numeracy skills linked to qualifications and life-long-learning. This ensures that Reservists are ready for career progression and are operationally effective. It is a requirement that all Reservists must: have obtained a minimum National Level 1 (L1) standard which is the equivalent of GCSE - grade D, E, F or; hold the relevant GCSE no later than 01 April 2018 for promotion to Cpl; and National Level 2 (L2) which is the equivalent of GCSE - grade A, B or C for Sgt by 01 April 2020 as the table outlines below:

Specifically, for 162 Regiment, Reservists for Postal and Courier must hold a National Level 1 (L1) and for Movement Control a National Level 2 (L2) by 01 April 2018 regardless of rank or seniority. The use of SLC has benefitted Army Reservists in 162 Regiment in attaining these requirements by referring Reservists to attend either local colleges or with the resident


training provider on-site in Hartlepool and Coulby Newham (YH Training Services Ltd). Reservists have undergone a Functional Assessment to baseline their competencies and areas for development, and training has been tailored to meet the individual’s needs and ability to study within the work-life balance. The instruction has taken place on non-drill nights and weekdays with the training provider, who through ex-military tutors and serving Reservists deliver the courses. Since January 2017; 16 members of 162 Regimen have enrolled and are undergoing training within the training provider onsite in Coulby Newham. Success to date has resulted in the award of three L2 Maths and three L1 Maths. The Army Reserve commitment to life-long-learning and above all accreditation for the Command, Leadership and Management Programme (CLM) is underpinned by CPD. This programme is designed to develop a soldier’s skills and knowledge as they progress through the ranks. The skills and qualifications that soldiers gain via this programme are accredited and recognised by civilian employers. The use of SLC aligned to the CLM Programme will result in accreditations and nationally recognised qualifications with the likes of: 5 Chartered Management Institute (CMI) 5 Chartered Institute of Leadership and Management (CILM) 5 City and Guilds of London Institute 5 BTEC/Edexcel 5 Chartered Institute of Administrative Management (CIAM) 5 Chartered Institute of Professional Development (CIPD) 5 Chartered Institute of Industrial Management (CIIM) 5 Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply (CIPS) 5 Chartered Institute of Logistics and Supply (CLM) Military Proficiency Course The success of recruiting within 162 Regiment has benefited from the ability to refer Candidates to a Military Proficiency Course (MPC) delivered by YH Training Services Ltd, where minimum Literacy and Numeracy qualifications fall below the standard required to serve as an Army Reservist.3 The Company performs an assessment of an individual’s reading, writing, speaking, listening and mathematical skills as part of the evaluation and to understand the student’s functional skills. Through Government funding, students are enrolled and attend the programme in the Army Reserve Centre (ARC) during the week. The core aims of the MPC are not just academic but also allow learners to: 5 Prepare and follow the application process of their chosen force, developing their employability, interview and presentation skills for both civilian and military careers 5 Develop fitness levels to enable leaners to complete physical assessments, selection criteria and develop a healthy lifestyle 5 Understand and be aware of Equality, Diversity and Inclusion through course content and through activities to assist learners in gaining an awareness of values and democracy, extremism and radicalisation, religious belief and faith awareness, online safety and cyberbullying 5 To guide, support and encourage learners by building self-

Military Contribution

confidence and self-esteem through various activities and course content 5 Promoting independence and discipline 5 ICT skills including Microsoft packages and applications Candidates are actively encouraged to attend Drill Nights as well to ensure their interest in the Army Reserve is maintained. Sports and physical development also play an integral part of the MPC as well as leadership and team spirit.

A typical physical training activity undertaken in 282 Squadron location in Coulby Newham under a former PTI

The success of the MPC cannot be underestimated as courses are regularly oversubscribed and since inception in 162 Regiment in 2016, three students have enrolled in the Army Reserve, two have joined the Regular Army and three have enrolled at the Army Foundation College at Harrogate. There are currently 12 students referred by 883 Postal and Courier Squadron and 282 Movement Control Squadron who are all potential Army Reservists of the future. Enhanced Learning Credits Army Reservists can access Enhanced Credits (ELC) which provides funding, by means of an upfront payment, for higher level courses including study at Further Education and Higher Education Institutions, such as Universities.4 Higher level courses include: 5 Level 3 (AS levels and A levels are both level 3) 5 Level 4 (Higher National Certificate (HNC) or equivalent) 5 Level 5 (Higher National Diploma (HND) or equivalent) 5 Level 6 (Degree with or without Honour’s) 5 Level 7 (Master’s Degree Level or Post Graduate Diploma) Enhanced Learning Credits Administration Service (ELCAS) provide the administrative support for the Ministry of Defence ELC Scheme. They function as the single source point of contact for Education Staff, ELC Members services and as the portal for the supplier and course options available to Army Reservists. They are also responsible for the approval of both ELC Application and Claims. THE REVIEW 2017-2018 83

Military Contribution


There are over 6,000 ELC funding eligible courses available from over 700 accredited institutions, training providers and organisations which are all accessible via the ELCAS website. The national reach of training providers and courses available either full-time, part-time, distance learning and online can be best demonstrated by a search undertook on the ELCAS website. Taking 282 Squadron’s location in Coulby Newham (TS28 0TQ) and applying a 15-mile radius the following was captured:

eligible you must have served not less than six years’ service to qualify for the Lower Tier. For Army Reservists who have completed four years qualifying service prior to 1 April 2017 additional information is available via JSP 822 on qualifying and accessing the Upper Tier awards. Conclusion In conclusion, Army Reservists are not taking full advantage of funding available via SLC and ELC schemes. Consequently, the uptake against the commitment of the Army to fund and promote CPD is being missed. A key Attract and retain resource is available to commanders who seek to meet the recruiting demands of the Army Reserve. The introduction of CLM recognises that a more highly skilled and capable Army Reservist is required, furthermore the mapping of military training to civilian qualifications enhances the employability and earning potential in civilian employment. Footnotes 1

The scheme works by providing a single payment in each year of study towards a nationally recognised qualification at Level 3 (A level). ELC awards are made at three tiers with the Lower Tier award being £1,000 per year up to a maximum of £3,000. The Second Tier is an award of a single payment of £3,000 towards a course. The Upper Tier provides a maximum of three awards of £2,000 per year. As an Army Reservist, you must register onto the scheme via the ELCAS website and enrol after enlisting. Before being

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There are two main learning credit schemes available throughout your Army Reserve Career and details can be found in JSP 898. The two schemes are Standard Learning Credits (SLC) scheme (see section 3.5.1 on page 125) and Enhanced Learning Credits (ELC) scheme (see section 3.5.2 on page 133). 2 For SLC you must complete an application form (MOD Form 1950) before starting a course. This form must be signed by your line manager and education staff. 3 YH Training Services Ltd is an independent training provider who specialises in Education, Traineeships, Apprenticeships and Employment. Their aim is to ensure that any learning is as relevant and enjoyable as possible and are proud of their reputation as being a leading training provider with over 30 years’ experience in the Yorkshire and Humberside region. YH Training Services Ltd are funded by the Education and Skills Funding Agency and have contracts to provide Apprenticeships and other qualifications. YH offers a range of services and has contracts to deliver Employability, 16 – 19 Study Programmes (Career Link), Traineeships and the Prince’s Trust Team Programme. YH Training Services Ltd is proud to have been awarded the Silver Award of the Employer Recognition Scheme and are a signatory to the Armed forces covenant. 4 There are several stages to the ELC process. Full information is set out in Joint Service Publications (JSP) 822.


Military Contribution

Why setting a good example is essential to leadership A leader will always set an example, whether they want to or not, whether it is good or bad. If the leader consistently sets a good example, on occasion it may go unnoticed as it is nothing more than expected. A bad example, however, is contagious. By 2Lt N Halliday It is a fact that people are led by their eyes more than their ears; what they see means more to them than what they hear. “Do as I say and not as I do” are words that should never pass the lips of a true leader. Simply put, if your words do not reflect your actions then you can expect those following you to follow your example, not what you have said. “He that gives good advice builds with one hand. He that gives good counsel and example builds with both. But he that gives good admonition and bad example builds with one hand and pulls down with the other”.1 Wise men throughout the ages have agreed upon this with little evidence to suggest otherwise. There is a story involving a team of fisherman who were aboard a Hull Fishing Trawler. A bully who had recently been demoted from the rank of skipper to mate was in charge of the deckhands when the ship came into trouble. During an icy storm somewhere in the Atlantic Ocean he told one of the deckhands to climb a mast to adjust a light. To the request the deckhand replied: “Not bloody likely,” his reasoning being that the mast was swaying wildly in the harsh wind. “You do it, Bill,” continued the angry mate to another deckhand. “Not me,” Bill replied, with no sense of compulsion to do as his leader desired. Noticing that tension was building upon the deck a figure came down from the bridge. “What’s up?” asked the skipper. After the situation was explained to him, he turned and asked the mate “Why don’t you go up yourself?” Stunned in silence, the mate just stared back without reply. “Right, I’ll do it myself,” continued the skipper as he began to remove his jacket in preparation for the ascent. As soon as the crew had realised the skipper was serious they all jumped forward to volunteer; better they do it themselves than lose their navigator.2 During the undertaking of tasks at work, it is important that those who lead are seen to be doing so from the front. It is no coincidence that a definition of leading is literally being first in a group of people. A good example of this could

be ‘The lantern carrier should go ahead’, what use would the lantern be at the back? To personify the lantern carrier, it is in the first instance the troop commander; they should be in front of their subordinates inspiring them to follow.3 In contrast would be the lantern carrier, from behind, shouting at the front person to go on ahead. Another good physical representation of this age-old theory is the use of a wet noodle upon a plate by General George Smith Patton Jr.4 During a briefing to his senior commanders he announced that his Army was like a “wet spaghetti noodle”. He then placed a wet noodle upon a plate and passed it around the room challenging the officers to push it from one side of the plate to the other. Of course, they failed and could not see the General’s point after the noodle just crumpled and remained more or less where it started. Gen Patton then took it and proceeded to pinch the noodle between his thumb and forefinger and drag it efficiently across the plate in one easy movement. He then announced that if you want to lead you must get to the front. When we remove the physical and literal components of any example discussed so far, we can still see that it is the leader who gives others direction influenced by their own behaviour. Ensuring the speed and direction (the aim) of the team is coherent with that of its leader requires the leader’s acceptance of the risk of being out in front. This may not be the physical act of completing an arduous activity first; it may also refer to the decision to be forwardthinking and unafraid to stand-up and say what is required, when it would be easier to follow those who have gone before. Developing upon this analogy further suggests that if they are too far ahead of those they lead, they risk becoming detached. They may lose contact completely and therefore must know how to remain measured, and ensure they are always a part of the team. Falling too far behind will also be detrimental to the team and more specifically their position as leader. This is captured best in the quote from a politician during the French Revolution of 1848 taken as he was attempting to force his way to the front of a mob for which he was responsible. He said: “Let me pass, I have to follow them, I am their leader [...].”5 It is understandable that at different levels of leadership then different levels of physically doing the job oneself is required. Someone leading at very low level would be expected to do the job themselves, for example a section 2IC in the way they expect it to be done. Other leadership functions such as planning, deciding, controlling and coordinating may take precedence over participating in the THE REVIEW 2017-2018 85

Military Contribution


work itself, but it is important that opportunity is taken to get involved when most pertinent and practicable. During service throughout the armed forces this analysis is accurate. For example, a troop commander leads his Troop from the front and a squadron leader in the RAF leads his Squadron from the sky in his own fighter. There is a point where this analogy requires the prioritisation of the other functions for example General Sir Nick Carter does not lead an attack in person. This does not mean that he has stopped leading by example. In 1978, a young Lt Carter led his platoon from the Royal Green Jackets on operations in Northern Ireland during the troubles. This fact alone is important in winning the respect of all that serve within the Army today. It is enough that he has led from the front in the past to satisfy the saying: “Do not ask others to do that which you would not do yourself.” Someone who is unwilling to do what they ask of others cannot be an effective commander. Some senior leaders throughout history have performed what may be referred to as symbolic example. Even when the task they performed is small in terms of achieving the goal, it may carry disproportionate weight in inspiring confidence in the leader when completed by such a senior figure. The scene depicted in the famous 19th century painting (Figure 1) of Napoleon on sentry duty whilst the soldier whose duty it was lay asleep emphasises this theory perfectly.6 After defeating the Austrians at Arcole in 1796, Napoleon Bonaparte, dressed as an officer, decided to walk around his troops to get an insight into their lives. Upon finding a sentry asleep he armed himself with the man’s rifle and provided security for his men for two hours until the sentry awoke. Although the sentry ought not to have neglected his duty, Napoleon decided the completion of the task himself was more important than punishing the soldier whom had suffered the rigours of the battlefield more comprehensively than he. When the men discovered what Napoleon had done, they realised the importance of sentry duty and imitated his behaviour, ensuring such duties were performed as Napoleon himself would have done. Having acted in this way, Napoleon’s credibility amongst his mean soared. The influence the simplest of acts carried throughout the entire army inspired Napoleons men to fight and do things they otherwise wouldn’t have done. Napoleon isn’t the only famous commander remembered for leading by example, specifically on task. Julius Caesar Commander-in-Chief of the Roman Empire, involved himself with the low-level military exercises his men completed. After spending the previous evening sharing bread, meat and cheap wine with ten soldiers around their basic mess table, Caesar decided to show his men how he expected them to train. He led by example and news travelled fast; it is said the whole Roman Army knew of the event within weeks. It is extremely important to set an example when wishing to maintain or change the standards of a team or group that an individual leads. The standard or change they wish to implement must be one they are willing to undertake themselves. Without this conviction, any expectation in the 86 THE REVIEW 2017-2018 86

Figure 1 Napoleon guards his troops6

implementation of their vision is likely to prove futile. Punctuality and standards of dress are the most obvious routine examples of how standards may be set and instilled top down; poor standards accompanying lazy or lack-lustre leadership. Being turned-out to the highest standard empowers the leader to demand that their team follow such a good example. Perhaps more importantly, such high standard setting affords leaders the moral high ground when applying discipline to those who chose to ignore the required standard. As Shakespeare wrote: ‘It is certain that either wise bearing or ignorant carriage is caught, as men take diseases; therefore, let men take heed of their company.’7 The last thing a leader wants to be known as is a hypocrite. Hypocrisy is poisonous to both team cohesion and a leader’s ability to influence others to realise their vision. A leader whose actions reinforce his words is an effective one who can stand in confidence as he issues a command. When those actions require self-sacrifice, such confidence can prove reassuring to those charged with carrying out legitimate orders at their own peril. Sharing in hardship or adversity in line with one’s subordinates provides the leader with moral authority. A strong example of this is Nelson Mandela, who shared all of the hardship, danger, suffering and treatment of his people, including arduous, protracted incarceration. The punishment he endured helped to raise his profile and ensure his message was believed. He inspired others with great success and implemented change on a global scale through persistently sticking to his word and remaining dedicated enough to maintain the standard he expected of his followers. An officer in the army is responsible for inspiring their subordinates to accept and live by the values and standards of the Army. This requires the officer to be true to what they preach and embrace the Values and Standards wholly. This may be demanding on an officer’s self-discipline and moral courage, but it is just and necessary. If they are seen to be allowing standards to slip, or their own personal standard is not at the required level, their soldiers will notice. It is this


that creates a sense of unfairness, detracts from unit cohesion and diminishes the respect the soldiers have for the standards and the officer who is attempting, or not, to impose them. Leading by example is the first step to fostering the values and standards within a team, but it does not stop here. In order to discipline and train soldiers, an officer must first live in the way he expects other to. For example, if an officer turned up late to conduct disciplinary procedures, on a soldier for turning up late, it would immediately create a sense of unfairness and paint the picture of an unjust system. Soldiers who feel there is ‘one rule for one and another for others’ are more likely to spread dissent detracting from the operational effectiveness of a unit. An officer needs to be considered authentic in order to perform his duty effectively and to optimise the ability of his unit and those in their charge. ‘Walking the walk’ as well as ‘talking the talk’ are essential to becoming considered as an authentic leader. Demonstrating the behaviour associated with the Army’s six core values is a fundamental requirement of an officer. This behaviour must be upheld regardless of the surrounding environment. An officer who cannot demonstrate they can

Military Contribution

lead by example at home and in barracks is unlikely ever to be capable of doing so in an operational context. Soldiers will look to an officer in whom they can trust for inspiration in difficult circumstances. If this relationship is not built during training and routine it will be hard to generate in the heat of battle. People will instinctively look for guidance when a situation seems bad: Guidance and direction is sought and accepted more faithfully from someone in whom subordinates have trust. It can be the difference between success and failure; life and death. For this reason, a good leader is never not a leader; and should embrace the requirement to lead by example wholeheartedly in everything they do.

Footnotes 1

Francis Bacon 1561-1626. John Adair: Effective Leadership, Macmillan, 2009, pg 174. 3 Japanese proverb. 4 Carlo D'Este Patton: A Genius for War HarperCollins, 1996, pg 395 5 Alexandre Auguste Ledru-Rollin 1807-1874. 6 Painting by French School: Napoleon on sentry duty after the Battle of Pont d''Arcole, 15th-17th November 1796, 19thc 7 Shakespeare: Henry IV Part 2: Act 5, Scene 1, Page 3. 2

Rheinmetall Defence Supporting Material Distribution today and in the future.


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Military Contribution

Professional Development – Achieving long term career goals in the Army Progressing on your military career will be a rollercoaster but staying focused, levelheaded and determined to stick to a path you have planned is key. By LCpl L Smith Making the decision to join the British Army at the age of 17 for some may be daunting, making them question whether this is the career they want to pursue. For me this was quite different in fact, from a young age this was the career I was determined to follow. To this day I remember standing at the front door of the Army Careers Office, not yet acknowledged by the world as an adult, but ready to join the family of the British Army. I chose the trade of a Driver Communications Specialist, within The Royal Logistic Corps (RLC). My decision to choose this as my trade wasn’t as hard as you would expect, considering there are some 200 roles within the Army, each coming with its own challenges and rewards. In fact, what stood out to me was the technicality of the job, qualifications I can gain that are transferable to civilian life and also interacting with new people from around the world. As a private soldier, I soon learned that the best way to progress was to recognise quality from others and learn from them. There are so many people I watched and took note of, especially within my trade and this made me think that one day I’d like to be where they are. As my confidence grew I quickly started to try and map out my life, and decided that I’d like to be in an instructional role, to help others and ultimately make them into the best they can be. Understandably I knew that this wasn’t going to be an ambition that I would achieve just like that. This was going to take a long time and I would need to get over a few hurdles! Ultimately, I want to reach the role of a Master Driver, or Head of Trade Communications Specialist. Overcoming obstacles Acceptance that future dreams and aspirations are going to take a lot of hard work and commitment is the first obstacle that will be encountered. There are a number of factors affecting the rate at which service personnel can advance

through the career structure and these are based upon the need for personnel in the next rank up and for them to be qualified, suitably experienced and recommended for promotion. The rate that Service personnel can progress through the career structure is determined by the nature of the structure itself and varies by cap badge.1 I have found that annual appraisals are very important, as ultimately this is the only thing that stands in the way of whether you are promoted or not. By talking to others about factors that help with your reports, recognising that being good at your job is not all that counts but, being able to work outside of your comfort zone and abiding by the values and standards of the British Army is key. Once a recommendation for promotion has been given and you are selected for promotion, you can then complete your Command, Leadership and Management courses and progress in your future aspirations and other planned courses. Understandably temptation that it might be better/easier being in Civvy Street is something everyone thinks about; however this really is down to the individual and what exactly they want in their life. For me, staying in the Army has never been one thing to question, because of the plans I have for myself and what I want to achieve. I have set myself goals and I know what courses I want to do and when I want to do them. Knowing what courses you need and when you need to do them will keep you on track to where you want to be at the end state or in line with your ambition, so research is very important. Keeping the momentum to stay focused is also something that can be very difficult but remembering that there is no rush and also they are called long-term goals for a reason is something to keep in mind. Planning a timeline Promotions are essential when planning long term career goals, as there are some courses for example that can’t be undertaken if you do not fit the eligibility requirements, plus obtain the correct rank. As a Private solider I undertook a DIT course (Defence Instructional Techniques), as this was the first exposure to a teaching environment, needless to say teaching did not come naturally so a lot of hard work and determination had to be applied. From there I knew that to progress with my THE REVIEW 2017-2018 89


Military Contribution

Soldier average time to promote across the British Army

Time Scale



On completion of Phase 1 Training, all new soldiers start as Privates, although the title may be Trooper, Gunner, Signaller, Sapper, Guardsman, Rifleman or even Kingsman depending on Corps/Regiment.

Minimum of 3 years at this rank.

Lance Corporal

Promotion to Lance Corporal may follow after Phase 2 Training or after about 3 years as a private. Lance Corporals are required to supervise a small team of up to four soldiers called a section. They also have opportunities to specialise and undertake specialist military training.

Minimum of at least 3 years’ service to reach Lance Corporal.


After 6-8 years and depending on ability to lead, promotion to Corporal typically follows. In this rank additional trade and instructor qualifications can be gained. Corporals are given command of more soldiers and equipment such as tanks and guns.

Minimum of at least 6 years’ service to reach Corporal.


Sergeant is a senior role of responsibility, promotion to which typically takes place after 12 years depending on ability. Sergeants typically are second in command of a troop or platoon of up to 35 soldiers, with the important responsibility for advising and assisting junior officers.

Minimum of at least 12 years’ service to reach Sergeant.

Staff/Colour Sergeant

After a few years as a Sergeant promotion to either Staff or Colour Sergeant may follow. This is a senior role combining man and resource management and even command of a troop or platoon.

Minimum of at least 16 years’ service to reach Staff Sergeant/ Colour Sergeant.

Warrant Officer Class 2

This is a senior management role focusing on the training, welfare and discipline of a company, squadron or battery of up to 120 soldiers. WO2s act as senior adviser to the Major in command of the sub-unit and may also be selected for a commission as an Officer.

Minimum of at least 19 years’ service to reach Warrant Officer Class 2.

Warrant Officer Class 1

This is a senior management role focusing on the training, welfare and discipline of a company, squadron or battery of up to 120 soldiers. WO s act as senior adviser to the Major in command of the sub-unit and may also be selected for a commission as an Officer.

Minimum of at least 22 years’ service to reach Warrant Officer Class 1.

Average time to promote from Corporal to Sergeant is longer than other promotions.

Table showing the promotion structure.2

ambition I had to promote and then I could complete the instructional courses I had planned for myself. These included All Arms Skill at Arms course and All Arms Basic Drill Instructor course. I decided to become an instructor in these areas as I found them very enjoyable and also gave me the chance to hone the skills I’ve learnt with teaching and perfect them. 90 THE REVIEW 2017-2018 90

There are parts in my plan that I had no control over; for example the need to continue with my day to day job and unit responsibilities, where priority and patience was important. Summary Flowchart showing courses that I have completed in green and courses I have planned in white.



Military Contribution

( 2012, aged 18)

Defence instructional techniques

Promotion to Lance Corporal

(2015, aged 22)

Trade Qualifications- including B1 Advanced Signaller

All Arms Skill At Arms Course

Flowchart showing courses that I have completed in green and courses I have planned in white. All Arms Basic Drill Instructors Course

Range Managment qualification

Promotion to Corporal (estimate - 2019, aged 24)

Junior Potential Instructors Cadre

Promotion to Sergeant

(estimate - 2022, aged 27)

command leadership and managment course

Posting to a Army Training Regiment

Promotion to Sergeant/ Staff Sergeant (estimate - 2028, aged 33

Promotion to Warrant Officer Class 2 ( estimate - 2031, aged 36) End state - Warrant Officer Class 1- head of trade

As seen above this is not a full representation of all courses and objectives that need to be undertaken, however this does show a guideline of how long this will take to achieve a long term career goal. I have managed to complete my courses that I was determined to do and I would say that I have been successful - I’m on track to becoming an instructor, whether that being within a training wing at unit level, Phase 1 establishment or at Phase 2 training. My next steps are to continue with my day to day job within my current unit to prove that I am ready for the next rank, whilst carrying on with the courses that I want to achieve. I am positive that I have the ability to achieve my dreams and with the determination and staying focused this will help make my dreams a reality.

If I had the opportunity to start again I believe that because I’m on track with my long term career goal and I really enjoy doing what I do, then in my personal view I would not do anything differently. Keeping the momentum will always remain the biggest challenge ahead and I’m looking forward to my future years and ticking off the obstacles as they pass.

“Success is not final, failure is not fatal; it is the courage to continue that counts.” Winston Churchill References 1

Career Management Handbook ( Chap 01, Para 08 )


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Industry Contribution


The Case for 3D Printing in Defence Additive Manufacturing, better known as 3D Printing, has often been described as the next industrial revolution1. It is a collection of design and manufacturing technologies that focus on the production of a digital design by use of existing Computer Aided Design software. By Maj AA Cox The design is then manufactured on a ‘printer’ that adds base material in layers to build the product. This group of technologies is in its infancy, but developing rapidly and is already having beneficial effects in manufacturing and logistics. As costs decrease and the technology becomes more widely available, it will have an increasingly significant effect. The potential benefits of using Additive Manufacturing in the logistic chain across Defence are clear: it will serve to modernise the support chain, making it more simple, resilient, agile, innovative and cost-effective. However, the changes in the supply chain that it will demand will require significant levels of investment, executive support, training and culture change. This paper intends to discuss the potential and relative merits for the adoption of Additive Manufacturing within Defence and make the case as to why this technology is worthy of more serious attention. It will first explain the technology as it currently stands and its future potential. It will then explain why and how Additive Manufacturing will deliver benefit across Defence. It will conclude with the argument that Additive Manufacturing is already being implemented in beneficial ways by the logistics industry and other national defence organisations. Therefore, the UK Ministry of Defence needs to act quickly to develop the technology, investment and organisational culture required to maximise the benefits of this technology. Additive Manufacturing has its origins in the 1980s although it has only developed as a serious manufacturing technology over the last decade.2 However in recent years, the technology has made significant advances, as the Economist reported: ‘crossing from hype and experimentation into one of rapid maturation.’3 It is a union of two technologies: a computer with 3D design software, and a printer that prints 3D products out of base material. 3D printers are a family of associated technologies that all work on similar principles: namely taking a digital design for a product and building it out of base material by use of various 92

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methods.4 These methods range from the relatively simple, such as Fused Deposition Modelling, which builds products from layers of heated plastic from a printer head fed with plastic wire, to the technologically advanced methods, such as Electron Beam Freeform Fabrication, which fuses successive layers of metal powder into a predetermined shape with an electron beam.5 Different methods of printing are required to print different base materials, and currently, printers exist that can print resins, plastics laminated paper and metals. The most common base materials for 3D printers include liquid resin, plastic or metal filament and metal powder, but more materials can be 3D printed, such as foodstuffs.6 Some of these materials, especially the metal powders, are quite advanced and expensive to produce in themselves. However, as demand from industry increases, the price is expected to decrease.

Table of current Additive Manufacturing technologies and their base materials

The general trend is that Additive Manufacturing is on the rise in the manufacturing sector, especially in the medical, research and development and defence industries. The technology is also becoming more diverse, accessible, costeffective and practical. This technology is developing at a considerable pace and as advances in printing and base materials happen, the potential of the technology increases. The current technology is comparatively slow to make products, but 3D printers are developing to be faster and more consistent in their outputs.7 There are already experimental 3D printers that can print multiple materials, and printers that can print organic matter, such as some foodstuffs. Developments are also being made with base material; not only in the potential to print a greater range of materials, but also in the potential to use recycled material.8 There are even experiments being conducted in the 3D


printing of live biological material; a potential game-changer in medicine.9 The implications of this technology are manifold: Additive Manufacturing essentially ‘turns data into things, and things into data’, and puts considerable low-level manufacturing potential closer, if not physically in the hands of the enduser.10 Items that can be 3D printed do not need to be made on a production line and then shipped to where they are required; they can be made wherever there is a suitable 3D printer. This makes them a very cost-effective method of supplying small quantities of specific components quickly and on-demand instead of having to store them. It also means that anyone with the right software and permissions can design, prototype and build their own products, or customise existing products without the long lead-times of conventional manufacturing. The different method of manufacture often means that products need to be redesigned to be 3D printed, but it also means that products can often be made lighter and with less waste.11 Additive Manufacturing is still very much in its infancy and is far from a manufacturing panacea. Currently, the techniques used can only manufacture products slowly and in small quantities, so they cannot match the economies of scale that conventional manufacturing techniques can achieve. There are also still limited in the materials that can be used, and there are issues to be overcome in quality controlling 3D printed products. Perhaps the largest technical problem with 3D printed products is that there are still questions as to the quality and durability of certain products manufactured in this way, especially those that have to withstand high stresses, but the quality of printed products is on the increase. More broadly there are also legal issues to address, especially over obtaining permissions to digitally reverse-engineer and copy existing designs, and the question of who carries the legal liabilities if a 3D printed

Commercial 3D Printers come in many types, shapes and sizes

Industry Contribution

part fails.12 Perhaps the greatest challenge identified by industry research is the required culture change in organisations to incorporate 3D printing into their planning, processes and strategies, as the technologies and the potential they represent are still not widely understood.13 3D Printing is already having a significant impact on the logistical factors of the industries where they are used, with one study stating that it would have ‘devastating outcomes’ for the logistics sector.14 In their study on the impact of 3D printing, the logistic company UPS acknowledged that 3D printing had significant disruptive potential to the supply chain.15 There is a myriad of logistic benefits: The ability to manufacture lighter components closer to the end-user would reduce the lead-time, cost and indeed requirement of shipping and distribution, and would allow more remote locations to be better supplied.16 The increased agility that these factors allow means that there is far less pressure to asset-track large amounts of products. Many items would be substituted for their equivalent volume of base material; which is easier to move, may be able to be sourced locally, and has less impact if lost. The ability of the supply chain to react to a dynamic change in requirement is also greatly increased: Changes in end-user requirements, be that in scale, numbers, locations or timescales can be easily responded to without clogging up the supply chain with items that are no longer needed or going to the wrong place.17 The capability of storing the designs of certain products; effectively a ‘digital inventory’, and printing them only when required would also reduce the need to store many products; thus reducing physical inventory size and costs.18 One study assessed that 3D printing could reduce supply chain costs by 50-90%, depending on the product being supplied.19 A 3D printed product is usually made to order, so is also almost certain to be used rather than be stored. In their study of 3D printing, Deliotte showed that the ratio of 3D printed parts produced to parts used (what they call the ‘buy-to-fly ratio’) was 1:1.20 The relatively small scale of 3D printing infrastructure next to conventional manufacturing, and the ability to manufacture many components from a single facility without adjustment means that decentralised, outsourced, or even mobile manufacturing facilities become realistic possibilities for obtaining products.21 There are other less obvious benefits: A 3D printed product does not need to move over a national border if there is a suitable printer in-country, and so will incur fewer administrative issues over import and export, such as excise duties.22 It is also possible to make rapid customisations or modifications to 3D printed products to respond to demands from the end-user.23 This feature also means that 3D printers can make products that are considered obsolete and are no longer manufactured by conventional means, thus reducing costs in keeping older equipment running.24 Future acquisitions built with 3D printing in mind will not only have a shorter and cheaper development, but will also have reduced through-life costs. Overall, the concept of Additive Manufacturing epitomises the principle of ‘Just in Time’ logistics; manufacturing items closer to the end-user and THE REVIEW 2017-2018 93

Industry Contribution


One of the future possibilities: A 3D printer that prints live tissue

only when required. What is clear is that this technology has the potential to reduce the cost and complexity of the supply chain considerably. What is also clear is that this capability demands a significant change in the way that supply chains are managed and organised. This will demand a new way of thinking about logistics. This technology is already making significant inroads into industry and logistics, and it is already seen as a credible manufacturing option for certain requirements. The potential for 3D printers to manufacture bespoke items to exact specifications is already being used extensively in the medical sector. An increasing amount of items such as hearing aids, medical and dental implants and prosthetics are being manufactured in this way.25 Both UPS and DHL already have what is referred to as ‘end of runway’ services; small 3D Printing facilities owned by the logistics provider that exploit the cost benefits of manufacturing items closer to the end-user or distribution hub.26 The remote location manufacturing potential of 3D printing is already being exploited by NGOs such as ‘Field Ready’ for their potential to manufacture complex items on-demand in remote locations; especially in the field of disaster relief. It is also being used to make products on the International Space Station, and it is hard to imagine an end-user with a more remote location, or a more difficult and complex logistic challenge than that.27 The technology is also creeping into the military sphere, and the US Army have already deployed a 3D printing facility on operations and seen positive results. The Rapid Equipping Force, a unit that is dedicated to the rapid provision of equipment that solves specific operational issues, deployed 3D printer equipped ‘FabLabs’ to Afghanistan in 2010 and achieved many procurement successes. For example, an identified weakness in the tyre valve stems for their MRAP protected mobility vehicles was given an operationally proven interim solution in two weeks in the form of a 3D printed valve stem cover. The component was conceived, invented, developed, tested and manufactured entirely intheatre.28 Likewise, the US Navy is already deploying pilot 3D printer facilities on-board its operational warships: Trials were conducted on the USS Essex (a Wasp Class Amphibious 94

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Assault Ship), and following this, the USS Harry S Truman (a Nimitz Class aircraft carrier) conducted a full operational voyage to the Middle East in 2015-2016 with two 3D printers on board.29 In addition to printing numerous examples of simple plastic items cheaply and on-demand, the US Navy identified real cost benefits in terms of obsolescence management and problem solving: the development and manufacture of a single item; a plastic clip that prevented routine damage to crew radios is reckoned to have saved $40,000 in replacement parts during the USS Harry S Truman’s voyage. The 3D printers reportedly only cost $2,000 each.30 These examples prove the viability of the technology for active use in the military logistics sector, and showcase some of the benefits and possibilities that even the basic technology can offer. Although there are still challenges, especially with the mobility of the printers and using them on a moving platform, these initial deployments show the future potential and cost-effectiveness of 3D printing in the battlespace.

3D Printing in the field: A US Army Rapid Equipping Force ‘FabLab’ in Afghanistan

It is easy to consider the logistic benefits of mobile 3D printing facilities both in the Defence Support Network and across the battlespace. They will shorten and simplify the supply chain whilst catering to an increasingly complex array of logistic and technical needs as the technology matures. They will serve to manage the logistic risks associated with remote locations and expeditionary operations by making units more self-sufficient. These versatile machines would also be of benefit where the military has to support the diverse needs of a civilian population, such as in military aid to civil powers or civil-military cooperation tasks. The future possibilities of the technology promise even greater things. Today it is printing valve covers and radio clips in austere environments, but the printing of more sophisticated machine parts is being done only in more controlled conditions. As the sophistication and reliability of 3D printers increase, the printing of high-stress machine parts and even weapon systems in the battlespace could soon be in scope. It does not end there. Soon customised clothing and other ‘on the soldier’ equipment could be printed that thanks


On-board 3D Printing: A Fused Deposition Modelling Printer on board the USS Harry S Truman.

to the manufacturing technique is lighter, seamless, and tailor-made for the individual and their mission. Rations could be printed, incorporating precise nutritional requirements for the soldier and their environment.31 Currently the printers use specialised base material, but in the future they are more likely to be able to use recycled material. Therefore, it is conceivable that a military 3D printer could be developed that uses locally sourced base material, recycled materials and war scrap to build militarily useful items. War could potentially nourish war in a way that has not been seen since the days when armies pillaged for their supplies; only in a way which would be beneficial, not destructive. The potential benefits that an Additive Manufacturing enabled logistic chain could bring to a military force cannot be understated, and the benefits are only set to get greater as the technology develops. The UK is highly active in the development of Additive Manufacturing and the Government is taking an interest: a government study published in February 2016 identified the UK as a world-leader in the development of this field, with growth in investment and research, and limited, but growing commercial exploitation. It also identified the need for a UK national strategy, as well as the requirement to develop user networks, and initiatives to promote skills growth.32 It is also clear that Additive Manufacturing is on Defence’s radar: the technology is mentioned in The Future Operating Environment 2035, and Global Strategic Trends, Out to 2045, where it is predicted that the technology will localise even advanced manufacturing, thus shortening supply chains, reducing stock holdings and making logistics cheaper.33 Also, in the last year, DES has collaborated with various industry specialists to produce AMDex; a technology demonstrator for a mobile 3D printing facility.34 However, it is clear that more needs to be done if Defence is going to exploit the potential of this technology fully. It is clear from civil industry studies that the disruptive potential of Additive Manufacturing is considerable; not only to the way in which supply chains operate, but also how they are organised and how those within them think. What can we learn from others? The US military experience, which was one of almost ‘bottom-up’ experimentation and acquisition, shows that Defence would

Industry Contribution

benefit from a joined-up policy from the outset to prevent a stove-piped and disjointed adoption of the technology.35 Civil industry studies generally agree on the need to understand the potential benefits early and make gradual organisational changes to suit. Many show the important role of executive leadership due to the wide-ranging implications of the technology. Another key requirement that frequently comes out of these studies is the need for training and education: Not only do printer operators, logisticians and supply chain managers need to understand this technology, but so do those being supplied, so that they can understand the potential and tailor their requests accordingly.36 So what does Defence need to do to prepare for the Additive Manufacturing revolution? Firstly, it requires adaptation from the top-down. An Additive Manufacturing ‘Champion’ must be appointed from within our senior executive, an individual who is able to understand and advocate this technology at the senior levels of Defence. A policy and strategy must then also emerge that will not only deal with the technology as it currently stands, but also to exploit future opportunities as they progress. A part of this strategy must be to conduct a ‘root and branch’ study of Defence’s supply chain with a view to incorporating Additive Manufacturing. The scope of such a study across the Defence Lines of Development would be huge, but would be critical to understanding the potential risks, opportunities, gains and savings that can be made across development, acquisition and logistics. Particular attention must be given to how we organise the supply chain and the roles of not only the military, but our industry and civilian contractor partners within it. We must also pay attention to the training and career development of our logisticians, who will need to understand the technology and its possibilities. In conclusion, this article has introduced and discussed Additive Manufacturing as a technology; looking at its nature, its future and its potential. It has also shown the disruptive effects that this technology is already having on the manufacturing and logistics sectors and how this is set to develop in the future. It then discussed how the technology has been applied in the military environment and the future possibilities. It ended with where Defence currently stands with Additive Manufacturing and what should initially be done to make for a smoother adoption. It makes the argument that it is critical that Defence starts to embrace Additive Manufacturing and the opportunities that it represents. It argues for the appointment of an Additive Manufacturing ‘Champion’ within our executive leadership and the development of policy and strategy that spans Defence. It also shows the need for a wide-ranging study to discover what changes need to be made to how we make acquisitions, store and distribute our supplies, and the role of Defence personnel and contractors therein. What is clear is that this technology is set to turn the logistics industry upside-down, and its effects are already being felt. What is also clear is that this technology is upon us now: 3D printing is now commonplace in certain medical spheres and is increasing its presence in the Aerospace and THE REVIEW 2017-2018 95

Industry Contribution


Defence industries. Our alliance partners, such as the United States, are already using 3D printers and reaping the benefits; as are some of the civilian logistics companies that we may be partnered with in a future conflict. How Defence responds to it in the coming years will be critical to fully exploiting the technology as it develops. It will not be long before an industry partner will stop asking for a delivery address for an order, but for the IP address to the closest 3D printer to the end-user. Defence needs to be ready for when that happens. Bibliography 3D Printing Industry, The Free Beginners Guide to 3D Printing, http:// Accessed: 15 March 2017 AT Kerney, 3D Printing: A Manufacturing Revolution, https:// cturing+Revolution.pdf/bf8f5c00-69c4-4909-858a-423e3b94bba3 Accessed: 15 March 2017 UPS and CTA, 3D Printing: The Next Revolution in Industrial Manufacturing, Accessed: 15 March 2017 BSR, BSR Issue Brief: 3D Printing – Sustainability Options and Challenges, Accessed: 15 March 2017 S Mohr, O Khan, 3D Printing and Supply Chains of the Future, Accessed: 15 March 2017 DHL Trend Research, 3D Printing and the Future of Supply Chains, hts/dhl_trendreport_3dprinting.pdf Accessed: 15 March 2017 V Bhasin, MR Bodla, Impact of 3D Printing on Global Supply Chains by 2020, Accessed: 15 March 2017 Sculpeto, The State of 3D Printing, Accessed: 15 March 2017 S Tomar, IDSA Comment, 3D Printing and Defence: A Silent Revolution, 3 Jan 2014, Accessed: 15 March 2017 PWC Issue 7, 3D Printing: A Potential Game Changer for Aerospace and Defence, assets/pwc-gaining-altitude-issue-7-3d-printing.pdf Accessed: 15 March 2017 Deloitte, 3D Opportunity in Aerospace and Defence: Additive Manufacturing Takes Flight, articles/additive-manufacturing-3d-opportunity-in-aerospace/DUP_7063D-Opportunity-Aerospace-Defense_MASTER2.pdf Accessed: 15 March 2017 US Government Accountability Office, US Government Accountability Office 16-56 - Defence Additive Manufacturing, 680/673099.pdf Accessed: 15 March 2017 The Economist, A Printed Smile, 28 Apr 2016, http:// news/science-and-technology/21697802-3d-printing-coming-agemanufacturing-technique-printed-smile Accessed: 15 March 2017 The Economist, Having No Truck With It, 5 Nov 2016, http:// Accessed: 15 March 2017 RAND Europe, Additive Manufacturing and Obsolescence Management in the Defence Context, perspectives/PE100/PE171/RAND_PE171.pdf Accessed: 15 March 2017 Innovate UK, Mapping UK Research and Innovation in Additive Manufacturing, Feb 16, system/uploads/attachment_data/file/505246/CO307_Mapping_UK_Acce ssible.pdf Accessed: 15 March 2017 IHS Janes International Defence Review, Make and Mend: The Revolutionary


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Promise of 3D Printing, 223/43223/the_revolutionary_promise_of_3D_printing.pdf Accessed: 15 March 2017 DES, DESider Issue 104, February 2017, uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/598568/201702desider_104_Feb2017-V_Purple2.pdf Accessed: 15 March 2017 DCDC, Global Strategic Trends, Out to 2045, government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/348164/2014 0821_DCDC_GST_5_Web_Secured.pdf Accessed: 15 March 2017 DCDC, Strategic Trends Programme, Future Operating Environment 2035, ta/file/484861/20151203-DCDC_FOE_35.pdf Accessed: 15 March 2017 UK Government, National Security Strategy, government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478936/5230 9_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_PRINT_only.pdf Accessed: 15 March 2017

Footnotes Example: UPS and CTA, 3D Printing: The Next Revolution in Industrial Manufacturing, p1 2 3D Printing Industry, The Free Beginners Guide to 3D Printing, pp11-18 3 The Economist, A Printed Smile, 28 Apr 2016 4 3D Printing Industry, The Free Beginners Guide to 3D Printing, pp21-22 5 There are many more forms of 3D Printer. A good precis of the technology can be found at The Free Beginners Guide to 3D Printing, pp25-47 6 3D Printing Industry, The Free Beginners Guide to 3D Printing, pp41-47 7 UPS and CTA, 3D Printing: The Next Revolution in Industrial Manufacturing, p10 8 BSR Issue Brief: 3D Printing – Sustainability Options and Challenges, p6 9 3D Printing Industry, The Free Beginners Guide to 3D Printing, pp41-47 10 AT Kerney, 3D Printing: A Manufacturing Revolution, p1 11 3D Printing Industry, The Free Beginners Guide to 3D Printing, p49 12 DHL Trend Research, 3D Printing and the Future of Supply Chains, p8 13 S Mohr, O Khan, 3D Printing and Supply Chains of the Future, pp154-157 14 S Mohr, O Khan, 3D Printing and Supply Chains of the Future, p154 15 UPS and CTA, 3D Printing: The Next Revolution in Industrial Manufacturing, p2 16 S Mohr, O Khan, 3D Printing and Supply Chains of the Future, pp151-152 17 S Mohr, O Khan, 3D Printing and Supply Chains of the Future, p153 18 UPS and CTA, 3D Printing: The Next Revolution in Industrial Manufacturing, p7 19 V Bhasin, MR Bodla, Impact of 3D Printers on Global Supply Chains by 2020, p1 20 Deliotte, 3D Opportunity in Aerospace and Defence – Additive Manufacturing Takes Flight, p4 21 S Mohr, O Khan, 3D Printing and Supply Chains of the Future, p157 22 UPS and CTA, 3D Printing: The Next Revolution in Industrial Manufacturing, p7 23 S Mohr, O Khan, 3D Printing and Supply Chains of the Future, p162 24 RAND Europe, Additive Manufacturing and Obsolescence Management in the Defence Context, pp1-2 25 DHL Trend Research, 3D Printing and the Future of Supply Chains, pp10-12 26 BSR Issue Brief: 3D Printing – Sustainability Options and Challenges, p20 27 BSR Issue Brief: 3D Printing – Sustainability Options and Challenges, p2 28 US Government Accountability Office, US Government Accountability Office 16-56 - Defence Additive Manufacturing, pp17-18 29 The Economist, Having No Truck With It, 5 Nov 2016, p24 30 The Economist, Having No Truck With It, 5 Nov 2016, p24 31 IHS Janes International Defence Review, Make and Mend: The Revolutionary Promise of 3D Printing, pp4-5 32 Innovate UK, Mapping UK Research and Innovation in Additive Manufacturing, Feb 16, pp30-32 33 DCDC, Global Strategic Trends, Out to 2045, p51, p68. DCDC, Strategic Trends Programme, Future Operating Environment 2035, pp14-18 34 DES, DESider Issue 104, February 2017, p25 35 US Government Accountability Office, US Government Accountability Office 16-56 - Defence Additive Manufacturing, pp25-31 36 S Mohr, O Khan, 3D printing and Supply Chains of the Future, pp166-167 1


Military Contribution

Nelson Mandela and the ‘Invictus’ Theory of Leadership Having been born and raised in South Africa, I see Nelson Mandela as an icon of reconciliation, forgiveness and one of the most inspiring figures of our age. The former President of the United States, Barack Obama described him as, “The legend who changed history and a man who sacrificed so much for change.” By Maj B Ekman

In this article, I will detail a brief history of Mandela and then, in relation to this extraordinary man, critically analyse his leadership three relevant leadership theories and models namely; The Great Man Theory of Leadership, The Trait Leadership Theory and the Transformational Leadership Theory. I will be identifying a number of key lessons that the British Military can learn from this profoundly inspiring man and will also put forward a leadership theory that I have developed and have named The ‘Invictus’ Theory of Leadership. In closing, I will explain the key lesson I have learnt, that we should talk to terrorists and why I believe that the UK Government should open a dialog with the Islamic State. Mandela's birth name was Ghlolly-ghlas ghla which translates into ‘tugging at the branches of the tree’, an expression which in English means ‘troublemaker.’ When he started school, his first teacher, not happy about having a child named troublemaker in her class, gave him the name "Nelson." In white ruled South Africa and under Apartheid, the black majority were denied even the most basic rights. But as the adopted son of an African chief, Mandela had access to the best education available and he went on to study for a

Bachelor’s degree. At university, Mandela joined the African National Congress which was a political party fighting for equal rights. Originally the African National Congress, known as the ANC, had believed solely in a non-violent struggle but, after the police gunned down 69 unarmed protestors. The ANC started an armed wing called Umkhonto weSizwe which means ‘Spear of the Nation’ and which was led by the young Mandela. Their Zulu chant was: “Amangla … Awetu...,” which translates into “power to the people.”

In 1963, Mandela joined ten others on trial for sabotage in what became known as The Rivonia Trial. While facing the death penalty, his famous three hour ‘Speech from the Dock’ became immortalised. In the speech, Mandela described why the ANC had decided to adopt sabotage as part of their activism against the South African government. THE REVIEW 2017-2018 97

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Mandela argued that all non-violent means had been tried and that they had only resulted in mounting restrictions and reduced freedoms. He stated that: "the government which uses force to support its rule teaches the oppressed to use force to oppose it," and that the decision to adopt the use of violent means was in his words: "not because we desire such a course, solely because the government left us no other choice.” He was sentenced to life imprisonment and was sent to the infamous Robben Island Prison where he began his almost three decades of incarceration.

During his long confinement, he came to cherish William Ernest Henley's poem, Invictus. He often recited it to fellow inmates and an extract from it goes as follows:

Out of the night that covers me, Black as the pit from pole to pole, I thank whatever gods may be For my unconquerable soul. It matters not how strait the gate, How charged with punishments the scroll, I am the master of my fate, I am the captain of my soul. During his imprisonment, he never gave up the struggle for equality and he became an icon of the fight against injustice and Racism. After agreeing to talks with the Nationalist Government, Mandela was released from prison in 1990.


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In 1993, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and a year later he was elected President in the country’s first free and fair elections. After only one term he handed over power to Tabu Mbeki his gift to Africa an example of a leader who relinquishes power. He then continued his life as a statesman and a national treasure. Nelson Mandela passed away on the 5 December 2013 at the age of 95. In the words of the Dahli Lama: “The best tribute we can pay to him is to do whatever we can to contribute to working for peace and reconciliation, as he did.” This is a sentiment that I will touch on in my closing statement but now I would like to investigate what made Mandela such an effective leader, by analysing a number of leadership theories. The saying, ‘Great leaders are born, not made,’ succinctly sums up the basic tenant of The Great Man Theory of Leadership. This theory suggests that the capacity for leadership is inborn and therefore you are either a born leader or you are not. The Great Man Theory of Leadership became popular during the 19th-century. The mythology behind some of the world's most famous leaders such as Julius Caesar, Alexander the Great, King Leonidus of Sparta and great religious leaders such as Moses, Jesus and the Prophet Mohammad who helped contribute to the notion that great leaders are born and not made. These were examples of great men who emerged at the precise moment they were needed, to take control of a situation and lead a group of people into safety or success. Thomas Carlyle had a major influence on this theory of leadership in 1840, stated that: “The history of the world is but the biography of great men." According to Carlyle, effective leaders are those gifted with divine inspiration and the right characteristics. Bernard M Bass a distinguished professor on Organisational Behaviour and Leadership called The Great Man Theory: the well-spring from which much of the leadership literature derives. However, the theory was disputed in as early as 1860 by an English philosopher named Herbert Spencer. He affirmed that great leaders were simply the product of their times, and their actions the results of social conditions. Other criticisms of the theory highlight that it holds typically masculine traits and discounts the emergence of great women. Despite these criticisms I have an unexpected attraction to The Great Man Theory and despite the theory being


widely discredited and falling out of vogue, I see many of the Great Man characteristics in Mandela who seemed to possess an aura that set him apart from other people. I will now break down a few of the characteristics of this theory to show how it is still relevant today. According to the theory, the leader is gifted with unique qualities that capture the imagination of the masses. After meeting the young Mandela for the first time, Walter Sisulu, the then Deputy General of the ANC commented: “We wanted to be a mass movement, and then a mass leader walked in.” Mandela, being the son of a Xhosa chief was born with power and authority. The Great Man Theory of leadership states that some people, usually aristocracy, are born with the necessary attributes that set them apart from others and that these traits are responsible for their assuming positions of power and authority. This caused some early researchers to propose that breeding had something to do with leadership. However it is often thought that the bulk of the great leaders came from the aristocracy simply because the lower and middle class were rarely given opportunities to lead. The second theory that I would like to critically analyse in relation to Mandela is that of The Trait Theory of Leadership. This approach focuses on the personal attributes (or traits) of leaders, such as physical and personality characteristics, competencies, and values. It views leadership solely from the perspective of the individual leader. Implicit in this approach is the assumption that traits produce patterns of behaviour that are consistent across all situations. Early trait researchers often developed lists of characteristics that they believed were related to successful leadership. Today, many popular books on leadership continue the tradition of providing lists of traits that are thought to be central to effective leadership. In 1989, John W. Gardner published a study of a large number of leaders and concluded that there are some attributes that appear to make a leader successful in any situation. These traits included the following: Charisma, Physical vitality, Stamina, Integrity, Vision, Courage I will now unpick a number of these assumptions in relation to Nelson Mandela. 5 Charisma. Mandela was tall, attractive, immaculately dressed, he had studied law and had competed as an amateur boxer, but most importantly, he carried himself with the regal air of a chiefs son. Mandela also had the ability to stir a crowd, and people listened intently to him when he spoke. During the 1963 Rivonia Trial, where he was facing the death penalty, he delivered a three hour address to the court expressing his determination to continue his quest to end apartheid. 5 Integrity. Integrity in a leader increases the commitment of his or her followers. Nelson Mandela was known as a balanced, disciplined, honest and respected man who was

Military Contribution

successfully able to carry out free and fair elections in South Africa. He could have pressed to be president of South Africa for life. But, unlike many other African Leaders, such as Robert Mugabe, Nelson Mandela stood down after only one term in office as he had always promised that he would do. 5 Vision. Mandela was able to envision the future in the way many other individuals could not. He was able to see the bigger picture throughout his 27 years of imprisonment where he continued his quest for equality. So although Mandela fits very well in The Trait leadership Theory it would be amiss if I did not cover some of the criticisms of this theory. One of the concerns about such lists is that like in The Great Man Theory. The attributes typically associated with successful leaders are often perceived as “male” traits. It is also important to note that the research also discovered that most of the traits correspondingly appeared in many of the followers, and some research even found that individuals who possessed these traits were less likely to become leaders. So few of the traits clearly differentiated between effective and ineffective leaders, their effectiveness in selecting individuals for leadership positions was severely limited.

The final leadership theory that I will be critically analysing is Transformational Leadership. This leadership theory suggests that individuals stimulate and inspire their followers to achieve extraordinary outcomes. Transformational Leaders are able to foster an atmosphere of loyalty and respect by being motivational, inspiring and stimulating to those they are leading. I believe this model to be the one that most symbolises Mandela as an icon who revolutionised South Africa. Although the challenges of leading in the military are very different to the issues Mandela faced, his ability to lead by asserting his authority, authenticity, commitment, and messaging is something every officer can learn from. Having grown up in South Africa and having researched this great leader extensively, I will now identify a number of transformational leadership examples seen throughout his life. 5 The Idealised influencer aspect of Transformational Leadership theory involves how actions are related to the leaders’ values, beliefs and missions. Nelson Mandela was able to make those who followed him realise that their THE REVIEW 2017-2018 99

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sacrifices and decisions would one day lead South Africa to ‘freedom’. He possessed all the characteristics of a Transformational Leader, persuading, inspiring and leading South Africa to become a fairer and freer society. Mandela’s transformational leadership style is as precious as it is rare, and his legacy provides ample inspiration for military leaders today. He encouraged harmony in a country ripped apart by hatred, practiced forgiveness toward his persecutors, and focused on the future, not the past. The key to realising his vision was his forgiveness of his former enemies – he even invited his former prison guards to attend his Presidential Inauguration. His leadership legacy will not be forgotten and should inspire us all.

Despite all of these models that detail important attributes of Mandela’s leadership, I have worked on a new leadership model called The Invictus Theory of Leadership. In this fledgling theory, I intend to draw on many of the characteristics from the leadership models I have already explained. I will incorporate the ideas into the cornerstone of my new model which is that the leader has survived a great suffering, trial or misfortune and has, like in the poem ‘Invictus’, emerged unbowed, unbroken, unsubdued and unconquered. The key aspects of this leadership model will focus on the leader making enormous sacrifices for his beliefs. The leader who emerges from the ordeal, often still bearing the scars, physically and emotionally, but who is then adored by his followers as a combination of martyr a hero and a saint. The Invictus leader is a man or a woman who has not only survived a great tribulation, but who also has the following traits: 5 Physical vitality 5 Tenacity 5 The Capacity to motivate people with words and actions 5 Instils their followers with a sense of possibility 5 Gives their followers Courage 5 Combined with all of these factors, he or she, must also have charisma, vision and integrity 100

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Other famous leaders that I believe fit into the Invictus Leadership Model are:

Lieutenant-General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart, VC, KBE, CB, CMG, DSO. The famous British Army Officer who served in the Boer War, First World War, and Second World War; He was shot in the face, head, stomach, ankle, leg, hip, and ear. Despite these injuries he was awarded a Victoria Cross for his dauntless courage and inspiring gallantry. Another famous Invictus Leader is Lord Nelson who carried several severely disabling injuries. Many people know of his arm that he lost in Tenerife but he had also lost much of an eye in Corsica, been injured in the belly at Cape St Vincent and had been badly injured in the head, in a battle in Egypt. The Inivictus Theory not only applies to leaders who were injured but also to leaders who have suffered extreme tribulations, such as: Jomo Kenyatta who was arrested for engaging in a rebellion against Kenya's British rulers. Kenyatta who, after serving five years in prison with hard labour, became prime minister of Kenya, where he supported reconciliation and consistently asked white settlers to stay.

Lessons that we can learn from Mandela The first lesson is for leaders to show courage that inspires their subordinates to see beyond their current circumstances. When an engine failed on a plane journey Nelson Mandela famously sat calmly and read his newspaper. Afterwards he said: “I learned that courage was not the absence of fear, but the triumph over it.” The second lesson is that as a leader you need to know your enemy. Whilst imprisoned on Robben Island, Nelson Mandela studied the habits and culture of the White Afrikaner and said, this was in order to understand ‘the enemy’. Years later, during an argument with his daughter, who vehemently disliked the Afrikaners, he famously told her not to criticise without understanding.


The third lesson and one that the British Military is already looking into is the importance of knowing the languages of the people in whose country we are likely to be operating in. In his book, the long walk to freedom, Mandela said: “If you talk to a man in a language he understands, that goes to his head. If you talk to him in his language, that goes to his heart.” Even though Mandela could speak both Xhosa and English fluently, he took the time to learn the White Afrikaner language called Afrikaans. The reason for which he is quoted as saying: “Without language one cannot talk to people and understand them: one cannot share their hopes and aspirations, grasp their history or savour their songs.”’ The fourth lesson is for us to always maintain the moral high ground by treating our enemies and prisoners correctly under the rules of law. Mac Maharaj, a fellow prisoner recalled Mandela’s retort when he was mistreated by the head of the Robin Island Prison. He said to the head: "I want to say one thing to you. You are a general on the one side and I am a commander on the other side. When we have fought it out and reduced our country to ashes, it will still be necessary for one to accept the surrender from the other, whoever wins and whoever loses. But how we behave at that moment of surrender, will be dictated, by how we have treated each other now." The penultimate lesson that I learned from Mandela is that we must not hate and resent our enemies. Seeing the atrocities carried out by the Islamic State, I, like many of my officer cohort, have begun to build up an intense hatred for the extremist organisation and it is when you hate your enemy that you begin to dehumanise them. Nelson Mandela had so many reasons to hate; he had been locked up for almost three decades. During which time his mother and his son both died. But he said: “As I walked

Military Contribution

out the door, toward the gate that would lead to my freedom, I knew if I didn't leave my bitterness and hatred behind, I'd still be in prison.” When I think about the resentment I have towards the Islamic State I began to understand the Mandela quote: “Resentment is like drinking poison and then hoping it will kill your enemies.” He went on to say that “No one is born hating another person. People must learn to hate, and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught to love, for love comes more naturally to the human heart than its opposite.” It is for this reason that I would like to put forward the most important lesson I have learned from researching Mandela. That we should talk to terrorists and that I believe the British government should open a dialog with the Islamic State. I have not always been convinced of the need to talk to terrorists. I have spent more than 18 months on operations in the Middle East and on my last tour I was blown up an IED which put me in a wheelchair for 6 months. It was only during my research for this CLM presentation that I realised that when it comes to terrorism, governments seem to suffer from a collective amnesia. All of our historical experience tells us that there can be no purely military solution to a terrorist problem, and yet every time we confront a new terrorist group, we begin by insisting we will never talk to them and that we must destroy them. As Dick Cheney famously put it: “we don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it.” In fact, history suggests we don’t usually defeat terrorists and we nearly always end up talking to them. Certainly that has been the case throughout most of the history of the British Empire. Men-a-kem Bagins terrorist group was responsible for blowing up the King David Hotel. The British authorities called him a terrorist and tried to hunt him down. But when

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he became Prime Minister of Israel and made peace with Egypt, we acclaimed him as a hero. Jomo Kenyatta was a managing member of the Mau Maus. He was captured and jailed for 5 years but we later negotiated with him and he went on to become the prime minister of Kenya. Or closer to home, look at Northern Island and see how Gerry Adams of Shin Fein became an MP and Ian Paisley was admitted to the House of Lords. Most poignantly look to the example of Nelson Mandela, he was convicted of terrorism and incarcerated for 27 years. After his release he won the Nobel Prize for Peace and became a symbol of the struggle for justice, equality, and peace around the globe. We need to escape from the idea that the only solution to the terrorist problem is a military one. Looking back at the last decade of military operations in the Middle East even Donald H. Rumsfeld has admitted: “It is impossible to know with any precision whether the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have created more terrorists than they've killed.” One of the problems identified with regards to my idea about talking to Islamic State, is how would we contact them, and who do we send to talk. The solution to this problem is not as hard to find as you would think. There are some fantastic NGOs who specialise in diplomacy and negotiations. One of which is called ‘Intermedi-Ate’ which is run by a personal hero of mine named Jonathan Powell. He was one of the British gGovernment’s chief negotiators with Northern Island and his organisation has helped brochure negotiations with terrorist organisations such as the PLO and Hamas.

In closing, I am certain that air raids in Northern Iraq are not the answer and that Islamic State will not be bombed into submission. I believe that the only solution to this conflict will be found around the negotiating table and not from the video feeds provided by drones. I believe this so strongly that I personally volunteered to go with Intermedi-Ate to negotiate with Islamic State and, to quote Nelson Mandela’s famous speech from the Dock: “This is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.”

References Owen, Jo. The Leadership Skills Handbook: 50 Essential Skills you need to be a Leader. Kogan Page Limited, Third edition 2014. Northouse, Peter G. Leadership: Theory and Practice. Sage, 2010. Bass, Bernard M. and Ronald E. Riggio. Transformational leadership. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006. du Preez, Max. The Rough Guide to Nelson Mandela: His life, his impact, his legacy. Penguin Books Ltd, 2011. DeLuca, Anthony R. Gandhi, Mao, Mandela, and Gorbachev: Studies in personality, power and politics. Praeger Publishers USA, 2000. Meer, Fatima. Higher than Hope: The Authorised Biography of Nelson Mandela. Hamish Hamilton London, 1988 First, Ruth. No Easy Walk to Freedom: Articles, Speeches and Trial Addresses of Nelson Mandela. Heinemann, 1973. Stengel, Richard. Nelson Mandela: Portrait of an Extraordinary Man. Virgin Books, 2010 Mandela, Nelson R. Conversations with Myself. Macmillan, 2010. Mandela, Nelson R. Long Walk to Freedom. Little, Brown and Company, 1994.

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Military Contribution

The value of sport and AT to retention in the Corps How valuable are sports and adventurous training (AT) to the Corps with regard to morale, personal fitness and retention of serving personnel of all ranks? Can this benefit ongoing recruitment? This article looks at the positive contribution that sport and AT make, and will identify how participation helps develop an individual to achieve the core values and standards that form the backbone of the British Army. By Lt S Greaves We have success stories of those serving within the Army who have made significant achievements through sports and AT and also an account of a serving soldier being put through his paces at an AT centre. In the interest of presenting a balanced debate, the contrary view will also be presented, as there are some that believe that conducting sport and AT within the Corps and wider Armed Forces may have a negative impact. As part of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) of 2010, the Government set out guidelines for the Army’s regular force to be reduced from 102,000 to 82,000, with an increase in the reserve force from 20,000 to 30,000. The cuts, however, have subsequently resulted in the regular force numbers now standing at below 80,000. A historically low civilian unemployment rate, a lack of operations and reported low morale after years of cutbacks has all harmed recruitment. It is critical that this current trend regarding manning and retention within the Corps, and the British Army as a whole, is addressed. The Army 2020 initiative is to ‘set out the nation’s Defence requirements to meet the security challenges of an increasingly uncertain future beyond the current operation in Afghanistan. For the Army, this requires a generational change in its vision, structure, composition and capability to ensure that it can meet the challenges of 2020 and beyond.’1 ‘Despite millions of pounds having been spent on recruiting campaigns, the rate of recruitment is currently only 90 per cent of what is needed’ one officer told The Telegraph. Charles Heyman, editor of Armed Forces of the United Kingdom and a former Infantry Officer, said ‘it’s significant because it is part of a trend and the Army is going to find it difficult to catch up quickly.2 There’s no doubt that

not having Afghanistan does have an impact on recruiting. There’s a lot of opportunities in civilian life and there’s not really any fresh thinking about how to get people to serve in the Army.’3 Another factor affecting recruitment has recently been expressed by General Carter; “Millennials are too selfinterested to be easily recruited into the military and are mainly concerned with “what’s in it for them”, according to the Head of the British Army. At a speech to announce a new collaboration between big business and the military, General Carter laid out some of the problems with recruiting for the reserves. After a failed £3 million campaign to get more people to sign up to the part-time military, the Army has now re-launched a campaign celebrating camaraderie in the forces. Speaking at the event, General Carter said: “We are now dealing with a different generation, Generation Y, born after 1985, and they have a slightly different expectation of life, which tends to be slightly self-interested. They are much more adaptable to the information age than my generation; they want to know what’s in it for them. They are looking for instant self-gratification. They are much more adaptable and what we wish to do is to empower every level to seize opportunities that further our cause. Whatever their ideal,” said General Carter, “the Army is determined to see Generation Y serve its nation.”4 In these times of austerity, where the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is faced with cuts year on year, some might argue that it is perhaps not the best use of public money to send soldiers off ‘gallivanting’ on activities that may, at first sight, be perceived as being of no necessity. All arms of the MoD are facing budget cuts, yet money is being spent to send servicemen and women on AT, sometimes abroad at even extra cost.

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Military Contribution


A minority view argues that participation is not a crucial requirement for service personnel and that someone who has never been on AT can still be a very fine and perfectly capable soldier. Although the majority of AT packages are relatively short, 2-3 weeks duration, some soldiers might discover they are particularly good at a certain sport and might find themselves away from their parent unit more often, participating in that sport for the majority of the year. This would result in the soldier being known as a ‘tracksuit soldier’ and can lead to an unintended outcome. That is, the service person gets promoted solely on the basis of being a good athlete rather than being good at their trade. Conversely, after a long time away on the AT circuit, soldiers may find that they are behind their peer group and this may result in a service person being overlooked when it comes to promotion because they have not been practising their trade. It is an undisputed fact that a career in the Armed Forces comes with a level of risk to life and limb that is greater than that of most civilian careers. So why, some may ask, is it justifiable to expose service personnel to the further risk of a sports-related injury? Not everyone in the Army gets the opportunity to partake in AT because of the fact that there are jobs to be done and fewer people than ever to do them. Would it not be better for them to carry out their actual jobs rather than sending them off on AT? So that someone else does not end up covering for them; thus, resulting in their dissatisfaction which could result in them leaving the Army, thereby fuelling the whole under-manning problem?


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The case for the positive side, however, is formidable and represents the majority view, particularly when looking at the ‘bigger picture’. The Army provides subsidised AT courses and sports to keep personnel engaged both physically and psychologically. Operations and other deployments are few and far between, to promote camaraderie, to maintain morale and ultimately, to retain our soldiers. In James D. Campbell’s, The Army Isn’t All Work, the author looks into the physical culture within the Officer Corps of the British Army between 1860 and 1920. Despite the passage of time, his findings are still relevant to the Army today: ‘Aside from the social aspect of sport and games for Officers, these men carried with them into the Army their fundamental belief in the value of sports and games for building character…Games and field sports [were believed to give] Young Officers the essential traits to lead British soldiers- moral and physical courage, physical fitness and mental agility, loyalty and team spirit.’5 Why is sport and adventurous training invaluable to the British Army? What effect does it have on our soldiers and is it a valuable tool for retention? Numerous academic studies have concluded that sport and AT can provide a platform for personal excellence. One such study records that participating in sport can improve the quality of life of individuals and communities, promote social inclusion, improve health, counter anti-social behaviour, raise individual self-esteem and confidence, and widen horizons. In a military context, this can only help to reinforce the core values and standards. It alleviates the associations of perceived monotony within day-to-day barrack life, thus increasing morale and supporting retention. Sport and AT also have a positive effect for recruitment on those outside of the Armed Forces looking in, particularly in the current era of celebrity sport stars. Sport can be seen as being a bridge between civilian and military life and, through demonstrating and promoting sporting excellence. This can only act as a magnet to attract the attention of the next generation of potential recruits. Army life appears more attractive due to the availability of a wide range of facilities and equipment, providing a choice of sporting outlets, along with the time to engage in the chosen field. Such availability may well be beyond anything an individual could hope to enjoy in a civilian role and may well inspire them to consider a military career instead. There is a widespread consensus, through countless studies, about the general links between physical activity and health. These studies have demonstrated that personal benefits extend to: 5 Physical and Mental Health and Well-being 5 Motivation 5 Endurance 5 Rehabilitation 5 Discipline/Leadership 5 Teamwork/Inclusion6 Furthermore, those that excel are given the opportunity to represent their sport at the highest level. Many great athletes that have represented their country have honed


their skills through the funding and support of the Army and their respective Corps and Regiments. For instance, Maj Heather Stanning (RA) has represented Great Britain in rowing and received dispensation from the Army to compete in the 2012 and 2016 Olympic Games. Through the Army’s commitment to providing its personnel with these opportunities, it is a widely held view that retention is more likely to occur. Major Stanning has now retired from rowing in order to pursue a long career with the Royal Artillery. In addition, the Army is also committed to supporting those veterans that are no longer serving due to the fact that they made a huge sacrifice for their country, through wounds, injury or sickness. By way of the Invictus Games, an international paralympic-style multi-sport event, we are able to celebrate the success of those who have been given a new lease of life and identify potential GB paralympians of the future. Pte Reece Devaney from 6 Regt is currently detached from his unit and is working at the Adventurous Training Foundation Wing, Inverness (ATFW(I)). When asked what he has achieved since arriving at ATFW(I) and how he believes AT and sport affects him as a soldier he said the following: “Since my arrival in Inverness I have completed the following courses: Introduction to Winter Mountaineering, Mountain Bike Foundation, Mountain Bike Trained. By taking part in the AT course at ATFW(I), I believe that my self-confidence and my confidence in a team ethos has improved tremendously. It has taught me to have a more open mind-set about what the Army can offer outside of barrack life. The course has taught me how to cope in various situations that ultimately could help in the operational context and has allowed me to thoroughly investigate the Core Values in a pressurised situation. In addition, this course has helped me develop my navigation skills, as in my opinion the MATT 5 process once a year is sometimes wanting.” WO2 Simon Cherret, a member of Pte Devaney’s current chain of command believes that: “AT creates an esprit de corps, a feeling of pride and mutual loyalty shared by the members of the group. AT helps soldiers explore the core values in a controlled environment. It allows them to be tested through the three zones of comfort, stretch and panic and it can expose peoples weaknesses and highlight their strengths, as an in unit soldier sat in a warm, happy and comfortable environment may be found to be wanting when being introduced to stretch and panic. Soldiers who may not be natural barrack leaders, who struggle to find their place in unit lines, may be the soldier who excels in the AT environment and is then able to shine above his peers and seniors.” Cpl William Brogan of 6 Regt talks about his history with sport and how, combined with AT, he has had a career full of successes that has ultimately led him to continue serving within the Army. “I joined the Army in 1999 after completing a course in Sports Science and Public Service at a local college. I joined 8 Transport Regiment RLC in 2000 and in November that year I went skiing and competed at Corps, Divisional and Army Championships. In total I skied for 6

Military Contribution

years, winning gold medals at Divisional, Corps and Army level. In 2009, I started playing rugby union and by 2010 I made the RLC Corps team and continued playing for a further 3 years. Throughout my time in the Army I have continued to train and compete to a high level in karate, and in 2015 I made the Army Karate Team. I have attended many AT camps were I have done various activities from Hill walking in Snowdonia to diving in Cyprus. Doing AT and sports within the Army has opened up various doors for me, including pushing my martial arts ability to a higher level allowing me to compete at the European Championships (earlier this year) and ultimately, the World Championships in 2018. Being able to do these sorts of activities has shown me that the “work hard, play hard” ethos within the Army is very much alive and with the current tempo and climate these activities play a crucial role in raising morale.” Sgt Steven Jackson of 6 Regt has a varied and successful sporting career to date. Having learnt to ski on an AT package, he was quickly selected for his Regimental Ski Team and after a just few months was selected to compete at the RLC Ski Championships and his success saw him selected for the Corps team. Sgt Jackson has served in the Army for 16 years and has enjoyed 11 ski seasons in some idyllic locations in Europe. Sgt Jackson has also represented the Corps in Athletics and Hockey and has found himself travelling to the USA and Portugal to take part in a number of training camps. When asked how he believes sport and AT within the Corps affect morale and retention, he said the following: “I’ve been very fortunate to represent my Corps in a number of sporting disciplines. Speaking purely from a skiers perspective, sport is, in some ways, a rankless activity. There is an opportunity for all members of the ski team to bond closely regardless of rank and allows for better cohesion which ultimately breeds success; this is something I have been witness to. Sport and AT packages are a privilege for those serving. It has a massive, positive impact on morale and retention. From a personal viewpoint, I believe that I would have left the Army many years ago if I had not had the chance to experience all of opportunities that I have had to date. Having worked in warehousing and supply chain THE REVIEW 2017-2018 105

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management myself for over five years with a civilian company, I decided to join the Army as an Officer, having first gained vital life experience as a manager within my field of preference, logistics. One of the main reasons I joined the Army was to practice my profession in a more pressurised, varied and challenging environment in order to reach my full potential. Additionally, as a keen sportsman, it didn’t escape my notice that by joining the Army I would potentially have the opportunity to travel the world, participating in sports and adventurous training. Despite only having been in the Army for just under 2 years, I have already visited new countries and participated in a number of AT packages that have meant I can challenge myself and push beyond my original limits and comfort zone, to try things I would not have had opportunity to experience. In addition, I have also gained a qualification as a mountain bike instructor.” Sport and AT not only challenge and push individuals; but they act as a way of ‘recharging the batteries’ and provide a new perspective. This article has looked at both the positive and negative effects and perceptions that sport and AT have on personnel, both internally and external to the Army. Whilst sport and AT do come at a price to the public purse, the output and training received is second to none. The whole point of sport, and AT in particular, is to expose those participating to an element of risk, to challenge in order to develop their confidence and explore the core values and standards that we all stand by as serving officers and soldiers. In a period of time in which there are no major Operational deployments, we need this challenge to push both ourselves and those under our command in order to realise our full potential. Sport and AT therefore help to develop the individual and promote a positive attitude of commitment to the Army, a choice that is welcomed with open arms, particularly during this period of change. In conclusion, sport and AT are absolutely vital tools to both retain personnel and to attract the ongoing target intake of new recruits. Retention of existing personnel remains a more cost effective option than the continued recruitment and training of replacements.


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Bibliography Professor Fred Coalter, ‘The Social Benefits of Sport: An Overview to Inform the Community Planning Process’, Sport Scotland, January 2005. The Telegraph. British Army already below smaller 82,000 target. 29 July 2015. British-Army-already-below-smaller-82000-target.html Crown copyright, The Pen and Sword Club, ‘Transforming The British Army: Modernising to face an unpredictable future’, July 2012 http:// The Telegraph. Army shrinks below 80,000 as recruitment struggles. 2 September 2016. RT. Millennial ‘self-interest’ is damaging military recruitment – British Army chief. 11 Jan 2017. James D. Campbell, ‘The Army Isn’t All Work: Physical Culture and the Evolution of the British Army, 1860 - 1920’, Ashgate Publishing 2012 and Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2016 Oxfordshire and New York. PA20&dq=value+of+sport+and+at+in+the+army&source=bl&ots=bqnT UNBVA_&sig=DEpmo0FABTKwd4UymbNBv3NEkSU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0 ahUKEwiv6dq6hvXTAhUHvRoKHXndCLwQ6AEIXzAI#v=onepage&q=valu e%20of%20sport%20and%20at%20in%20the%20army&f=false

Footnotes 1

Crown copyright, The Pen and Sword Club, ‘Transforming The British Army: Modernising to face an unpredictable future’, July 2012 http:// 2 The Telegraph. British Army already below smaller 82,000 target. 29 July 2015. British-Army-already-below-smaller-82000-target.html 3 The Telegraph. Army shrinks below 80,000 as recruitment struggles. 2 September 2016. 4 General Sir Nick Carter speaking at a conference hosted by business giants BT in London in which he launched a collaboration between big businesses and the military. January 11 2017. 5 James D. Campbell, ‘The Army Isn’t All Work: Physical Culture and the Evolution of the British Army, 1860 - 1920’, Ashgate Publishing 2012 and Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2016 Oxfordshire and New York. PA20&dq=value+of+sport+and+at+in+the+army&source=bl&ots=bqnT UNBVA_&sig=DEpmo0FABTKwd4UymbNBv3NEkSU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0a hUKEwiv6dq6hvXTAhUHvRoKHXndCLwQ6AEIXzAI#v=onepage&q=value %20of%20sport%20and%20at%20in%20the%20army&f=false 6 Professor Fred Coalter, ‘The Social Benefits of Sport: An Overview to Inform the Community Planning Process’, Sport Scotland, January 2005.


Military Contribution

The British Army in Nepal – Surviving a fuel crisis and delivering logistics in the land of uncertainty The British Army has had an interest in Nepal for over 200 years and has had a large contingent deployed on a permanent basis since the 1950's. Whilst its footprint has reduced over the years, the continuing role the Brigade of Gurkhas has played ensures that it is still necessary to maintain a significant presence within this interesting country. By Capt A Griffiths Whilst most young people in the cities and affluent rural villages can be found with a smart phone, the country firmly retains its status as a developing country and it is currently considered one of the worst countries in the world in terms of investment potential. This has meant that infrastructure remains poor, which coupled with rife corruption (131 out of 176 countries according to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index 2016), endemic political and social instability and a general laissez faire attitude from government institutions, makes delivering logistics in Nepal fraught with difficulties.

Grass roots logistics in Sagarmatha National Park

British Gurkhas Nepal (BGN) is the organisation that is responsible for delivering the British Army's requirements in country. It has 4 enduring Missions: • Recruitment: In recent times around 250 - 270 recruits have been selected to join the British Army every year. Being selected to join the British Army is life changing not only for the Nepali potential soldier but his entire family.

The low rate of employment and poor wage in Nepal ensures that every year BGN must carefully select the best recruits from several thousand applicants. With the current lull in recruiting in the UK and the increased number of squadrons within the Gurkha regiments of the Corps, this recruitment is likely to remain a key function for many years to come. Recruitment activity presents the busiest period of the year and is the main effort for the organisation.

The Attestation Parade at the end of the recruiting cycle

• Support to the Serving Soldier: BGN provides support to British soldiers, which includes but, is not limited to movement and welfare assistance for compassionate cases, support to language courses, duty treks and supporting organised unit AT activities. • Support to Ex-Servicemen: BGN is responsible for delivering pension payments to retired service personnel who served the army before the terms and conditions of their service included a pension. Pension payments are carried out in association with the Gurkha Welfare Scheme (GWS). BGN are also indirectly involved in ex - Gurkha community and welfare support through mutual support agreements with GWS and Kadoorie Agricultural Aid Association (KAAA). BGN also provides a resettlement office for eligible Gurkha soldiers and their families who wish to resettle into the UK. • Maintain Disaster Relief Preparedness. The devastating earthquakes of 2015 put BGN's effectiveness of this task to the test. The constant threat of the inevitable and even stronger earthquakes makes disaster preparedness a perennial real time task. BGN is situated in 3 main camps across Nepal, in addition it has a pension payment office outside of the camps. The support to GWS also finds elements of the organisation carrying out work at any of the 21 GWS Area Welfare Centres (AWCs). THE REVIEW 2017-2018 107

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The 3 camps are as follows: British Gurkhas Kathmandu (BGK). Originally founded as British Gurkhas Transit Camp, BGK is now the site of BGN Headquarters and is the key logistic node for distribution of stores to the rest of the organisation. BGK has a Movement Control Centre (MCC) which manages the booking of all international and domestic movement of personnel as well as management and tracking of all surface freight. MCC has a Movements Detachment (MovDet) situated next to Tribuvan International Airport (TIA). MovDet manages all aspects of airfreight and handling of passengers (pax) into and out of the country. BGK has a fleet of 28 vehicles which are a mixture of Land Rovers, vans, mini buses a coach and a HGV for movement of pax and stores within country. There is also modest selection of Manual Handling Equipment (MHE). Central to the logistic support of BGK is the quartermasters department which manages day to day logistic matters of BGK and BGD (below) as well as overseeing the day to day matters of BGP (also below). In headquarters a staff officer is responsible for the previously 3 posts of Staff Officer for Logistic Support, Staff Officer for Movements and Transport and the Mechanical Transport Officer. British Gurkhas Pokhara (BGP). Situated 200 km west of Kathmandu along the Prithvi highway, BGP is now the largest camp in terms of real estate within BGN and conducts the initial filter (Regional Selection West) for the western regions of Nepal in the recruitment process. BGP then conducts the final selection process (central selection) where the best 250 potential recruits from each of the East and West Nepal are assessed and the first 250-270 are selected. BGP has a smaller MT fleet of 11 vehicles and a 1 man MovDet to facilitate internal air movements. There is a quartermasters department who as well as maintaining the day to day camp logistics also delivers the logistic aspects of recruitment. This will involves managing the ramping up of food and accommodation from a few dozen personnel to hundreds of potential recruits, recruiting officers, recruiting assistants, VIPs and other visitors to arranging the local purchase of the right number of dokos (Nepali carrying basket) for the famous Doko Race and everything in between. Also co-located at BGN is HQ GWS.

The Doku Race is the final and most iconic part of Gurkha selection


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British Gurkhas Dharan (BGD). This huge camp in the south-east of the country was once the flagship of BGN and was a garrison for hundreds of soldiers. The majority of this camp has been handed back to the Nepali government and is now the largest training hospital in Nepal. The entire BGN footprint in Dharan now consists of the old MT compound and the military cemetery at the back of the site. BGD has a fleet of 3 Land Rovers and a single movement staff. The main role of the camp is to deliver Regional Selection East to facilitate pension payments to the western AWCs and supporting duty treks in the region.

The supply chain By nature of the fact that the BGN is dislocated from the UK supply chain by 4500 km it has to balance its supply chain with a combination of locally procured stores and stores sent directly from the UK via surface or air. In most cases, stores sent from the UK will be demanded through the military system and sent to the 4th line depot at Bicester. It is then the responsibility of DHL Global who are contracted to make the arrangements for the onward transport and delivery to Kathmandu. In the event of stores travelling as surface freight, items will accumulate at Bicester until there is a container's worth of stores. When a container is ready for dispatch it will be collected and sent to Southampton for shipping to Kolcatta via the Suez Canal. As part of the Dharan Agreement, BGN are granted an import licence with a duty exemption for ÂŁ1.47 million worth of stores. The Dharan Agreement, amongst other things, refers to coffee and alcohol quantities for garrisoned troops as based in Dharan when the British Army presence was significantly larger and hasn't been adjusted for inflation since it was dreamed up, it is an aspiration of BGN to revise the agreement but revising anything in Nepal that requires liaison with official agencies is, of course, not a straightforward matter and the blanket licence square peg is generally fit to serve BGNs purpose for the time being. An interesting example of the differing priority of revising existing agreements was late 2015. 36 Engineer Regt had 70 Gurkha Fd Sqn deployed in Nepal as part of Op MARMAT with the permission of the Nepal government, however they only had permission to remain until the end of the year. The Nepal government had provisionally agreed to extend the length of the stay, but were far too busy with a constitutional crisis to make the formal arrangements and simply had the attitude that they would not ask the foreign troops to leave so there was no issue. However as the days counted down to the end of the month Regional Command (BGN's higher formation) were acutely aware that they would soon be in a position where they had British troops on foreign soil with no mandate to be there. A tentative date was set for the Engineering Support Group's (ESG) withdrawal from the operation. Thanks to the dogged efforts of the Defence Section an agreement was struck with days to spare which permitted the ESG to remain in country until the end of 2016 and go on and achieve the huge reconstruction successes that they did.


Whilst the container makes its way to Asia the Bill of Lading and other documents will be sent by air to the movements cell at BGK who will then start making arrangements for its import into Nepal and associated duty exemption. Receiving an import licence for BGN requires engagement with the Ministry of Foreign affairs via the Defence Section. The time an import licence takes to acquire depends on a combination of the urgency, the motivation of the MoFA officials and the number of unexpected public holidays that the civil servants would be observing. No matter the timeliness of the documents being submitted, there will always be a level of anxiety every time essential spares or supplies were inbound as images of kit languishing in a bonded warehouse or sat on the Indian border spring to mind. Once the import licence is received paperwork is dispatched to Kollatta and Bigunj (Nepal-India border) for customs clearance. Assuming there is no backlog of containers at Kolcatta, which can last for days or months, the value of the goods will then be deducted from the import licence and the container will be dispatched north to the Nepal border. At Birgunj the container will again be customs cleared and then be moved onwards to Kathmandu upon reaching camp will be receipted and broken down. Stores destined for BGP and BGD with then be moved onwards using BGN transport as the unit's locally employed civilians brave some of the most dangerous roads in the world. Urgent stores or items which have security implications will be sent as air freight, the typical route being from LHR via the middle east to TIA, the delivery to Kathmandu is the responsibility of DHL . MovDet will manage the receipt and onward movement once it arrives in country in association with Nepal Airlines Corporation (NAC) and customs officials. In all cases the incoming stores are taken to the bonded warehouse for customs inspection (and the value deducted from the years remaining blanket licence) before release with the exception of diplomatic mail, which is met by the unit Postal and Courier Operative. In the aftermath of the 2015 earthquakes large quantities of stores were sent from the UK to provide humanitarian relief. This picture shows the hastily packed aircraft pallet is too heavy for the MHE available at TIA. In this instance the NAC provided the RAF ballast in the form of people to counterbalance the rear of the fork lift truck in order to unload the aircraft and free space for further humanitarian flights. It is worth noting that, due to the short window of import duty exemption on humanitarian stores, tons of humanitarian aid still lies in a warehouse at the airport as the Nepal government refused to allow their entry without payment of duty. This is mirrored by millions of pounds of international aid which sit in a bank account as the squabbling government cannot decide how best to focus its reconstruction.

The 2015-16 fuel crisis In September 2015, the Government of Nepal unveiled the first constitution in Nepali history. One of the key pillars of

Military Contribution

the constitution was that Nepal would consist of 6 provinces. A number of castes in the southern 'Terai' particularly the Madhesi, the Tharu and to a lesser extent the Limbu's were not happy with this arrangement and have aspirations for a greater autonomy in the region. The United Democratic Madhesi Front (UMDF) had demanded that the Madhesi areas would have their own seventh province in order to have greater self-governance. The government were not willing to bow to this demand as this would play into the hands of the overbearing big brother, India, who have strong bonds with the Medhesi communities and also have an interest in the region due to the rich water resources within. The UMDF frustrated with a lack of compromise from the government, acted to take advantage of Nepal's dependence on the main supply routes of the southern Nepal - India border and, with the support of the Indian government, launched a full blockade or 'Bandh' (Nepali for closed) of Nepal's southern border.

Fuel tankers unable to enter Nepal at the India - Nepal crossing point at Birgunj

The outcome of the blockade was to choke not only the capital, but the whole of the country from the supply of any imported commodities. 61% of Nepal's imports are from the southern Indian border and the supermarket shelves rapidly started becoming empty. The main aim of this country wide siege was to deny essential fuel to the nation and the effect became immediately obvious as the pattern of life within Nepal began to change dramatically. BGN would suffer as much as any other organisation in the country and with its heavy consumption of its primary fuel of diesel and LPG it very quickly realised that there was a real risk that if swift action would not be taken the unit would be unable to achieve its missions. In particular, Op MARMAT 2 was about to arrive with a full squadron of engineers and their machinery and the annual recruitment period was about to commence. THE REVIEW 2017-2018 109

Military Contribution


The timing of the fuel blockades could not be worse as the winter was closing in and the use of scheduled power cuts across the major cities to manage the power supply (load shedding) was at an all-time high. Over previous winters BGKs consumption of diesel had reached 2000L a day whilst BGP had consumed 600L a day. Initial suggestions to fly packed fuel into the international airport using Military Air Transport (Mil AT) were dismissed due to the high profile nature and that it would be seen as a signal that the Nepal government could not manage the crisis and subsequently damage UK-Nepal relations. In addition to the scarcity of diesel, the supply of LPG bottles, the primary cooking fuel in Nepal, also became extremely hard to acquire. Queues began forming as the roads began emptying. Profiteering and pump fixing was rife amongst suppliers and the black market was quickly established as businesses and individuals alike struggled to carry out their daily business.

Beg, borrow, steal As the severity of the situation was slowly dawning on the foreign missions and NGOs around the country, BGN was already well on its way to addressing the shortfalls in the supply chain. Reducing Consumption - One of the first measures introduced was the prudent initiation of austerity measures across the organisation. This involved the recalibration of work hours to match the load shedding schedule, ie the times when the camp was provided power by the National

Queuing for fuel

Protesters burning fuel in the Terai


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Energy Association (NEA). By doing this the load to the camp generators would be minimised and the consumption accordingly. The reduced camp consumption was mirrored by a restricted number of hours that power would be guaranteed at the 'hirings' or rented married quarters for the BGN service personnel and their families. Between 1800hrs and 2100hrs in the event that NEA were not supplying power, whether the load shedding was scheduled or not, the hiring generators would be fired up to provide light and energy for cooking. Outside of these hours once the NEA supply was off, the houses would be plunged into darkness. Families would sit in their front rooms wearing locally purchased puffer jackets with head torches on and discuss the political developments of the day and speculate how long the crisis would last. Whilst those with fireplaces suddenly found the number of visitors had miraculously increased, the cost of firewood rose significantly and the risk of landslides increased in certain areas as the woods shoring up the topsoil on many hills were heavily harvested. The ESG supporting Op MARMAT did not escape the austerity and had to carefully manage their fuel reserves to ensure the troops could operate their plant machinery and complete their tasks. The troops were located in the hill regions of Gorkha and Jiri both of which dropped endured low temperatures every night throughout their deployment. The RLC chefs rationed their precious LPG reserves and put their skills to the test as they employed improvised cooking techniques to ensure that the troops would to receive hot food as their bodies were thawed out and their morale would be topped up. To further conservation of fuel the use of mechanical transport (MT) was minimised across the organisation, with all non-essential details would be cancelled. The use of expensive contracted road moves was employed, whilst logistic companies would add heavy surcharges to cover the inflated price. The British Ambassador had decreed to HMG organisations that, as one of the British government’s aims in Nepal was to facilitate the reduction of corruption, HMG organisations would not be permitted to purchase the black market fuel that was becoming available. Whilst BGN never purchased black market fuel to ensure its continued survival, nobody in the organisation would ever question too deeply about the contractors fuel chain. Throughout most of Nepal there is no mains water available; potable water is processed in water purification plants and distributed by tankers to large bulk storage tanks. A second order effect of the scarcity of fuel was the inability of contractors to deliver water. Whilst both the Kathmandu and Pokhara camps have boreholes for production of potable water, the water in Kathmandu contains a high level of Ammonia and takes significantly longer to purify. The normal consumption of water at BGK outstrips the production and it is therefore necessary to supplement production with locally purchased supplies. With the shortfall of water deliveries is then became essential that water was added to list of controlled commodities. Water rationing involved a host of measures from the obvious cessation of washing down


vehicles, to the 'if its yellow, let it mellow' rule of thumb. Amongst the most arduous of the measures was the requirement for 'ship showers', which meant that for those on camp it was the norm that hot water had not made its way from the boiler to the user by the time they had finished with the shower, which was coupled with the lack of central heating to conserve diesel. It would be a cold winter. Maximising supply - Despite a hollow pledge which could not be kept by the Nepal government to provide 3000L a week to each of the official overseas agencies, it soon became necessary that any organisation within the capital and beyond who wished to remain operational would have to compete for the scraps. As much as BGN liked to think of themselves as a good customer of Nepal Oil Corporation (NOC), so did the UN, the many embassies and foreign missions, the non-government organisations (NGOs) and the large firms throughout the capital. Key members of BGN HQ and MT staff would arrange weekly meetings with the head of the NOC depot in Thankot where they would explain the long relationship the organisation has had with Nepal and the importance of their work. BGN however were by no means innovative in their approach; at every visit staff would play diplomatic plate bingo as the blue plates littered the NOC car park. It is worth noting that whilst the British organisations would not pay bribes, they were in direct competition with many who would. BGN's close rapport with senior NOC figures did, however carry weight and BGN maintained an infrequent, but vital trickle of fuel coming in from the depot. On a day when supply was good, BGNs timing when speaking to the depot hierarchy was correct and the stars were correctly aligned then a single chamber (3000L) of diesel would be pledged. A Petrol, Oil and Lubricants (POL) staff member would then spend all day at the depot reminding NOC of their promise, half of the time he would return empty handed as the fuel was diverted to an even more urgent (or better paying customer). But when the going was good he would give the signal and the MT staff would wait long into the evening for the telltale rumble of a fuel truck on the horizon. The POL staff would always ride in the cabin of the NOC tanker to ensure that there were no unscheduled stops as the tanker went from one NGO fuel lottery winner to the next, emptying each of its chambers. Upon receipt of the fuel the POL Manager would calculate the difference from what the tank meters would display and they should display. A combination of dipping tanks, flow meters and the in tank gauges would be used to determine whether any deficiency was the result of the distorted tanks and hence incorrectly calibrated gauges from the 2015 earthquakes or being short changed by the nationalised fuel company and single source of legitimate fuel in the country; recourse in the latter instance was obviously limited and ill advised. Similar meetings would occur between BGN and LPG suppliers, when LPG bullets managed to slip through the blockade a 24hr warning would be sent to favoured clients. However due to the scarcity of diesel, suppliers would not deliver and customers would have to collect from the depot

Military Contribution

(2 hr drive from Kathmandu). When BGN got the nod, they would warn off a contractor who would be escorted to collect from the LPG bottling plant and bring the rationed 50% full bottles back to BGK, the caps would be removed to give the impression the bottles were empty. The use of contractors would reduce BGN's diesel consumption and remain as close to ADR compliance as possible (despite being outside of the EU, it is MOD policy to comply with ADR wherever it is operating). As the crisis dragged on the contractors refused to collect the bottles due to the risk of being hijacked, such was the desperation for LPG on the streets. BGN would be forced to collect the bottles in the back of a transit van as unknown 'dickers' would watch the vehicles drive in and out of the bottling plant. A combination of escort vehicles, blue plates and slick operation ensured that no BGN collection ever ran into trouble. The US embassy that first managed to beat the blockade and sneak a convoy of 4 x 20,000L Indian tankers across the border. The Nepal government had conceded that the NOC monopoly was stifling its options and had granted a number of commercial licences for companies to import fuel into Nepal. The convoy came through on the evening of a Terai festival when many of the picketers would be celebrating with their families. BGN's American cousins kindly offered BGN 1 of their tanker's payloads. Due to the tight movement window, receipt of this tanker meant a carefully co-ordinated plan with BGN staff meeting the tanker at the US embassy escorting it across the city where the POL team would meet it at BGK and begin the slow gravity dump of its load. Concurrently the tanker drivers and co-driver would be fed and watered. Upon completion the tanker and escorts would then race across the deserted streets back to the US embassy in time to see their final tanker finish its drop and send the convoy on its way back across the troubled border. A second convoy was repeated a month or so later, if the scraps that NOC had provided offered some comfort, the 20,000L that the Indian tankers brought felt like the monsoon hitting the African plains after the drought and BGN saw it's Days of Supply (DOS) and survivability move a few weeks to the good. At this stage BGN were able to employ an out of work NOC tanker owner who shifted 12,000L of the precious oil over to Pokhara to quench BGPs worsening thirst for UN 1202. The third convoy was the turn of the British. The coordination was headed up by the British Embassy who employed the UK's soft power to liaise with or obtain authority from the a long list including the Nepal Government, the Indian High Commission, Nepal and Indian customs, the many Indian Police District Officers from the fuel depot to the Nepal border, and the Nepal Police to provide an escort for the convoy from the Nepal border to its destination in Kathmandu and return journey. The spoils of the convoy were shared between the British Embassy and its partner organisations (DFID, The British Council, etc) and BGN. The US Embassy were offered a share but politely declined as their tanks were full from previous convoys. The success of the latest convoy came as the fuel crisis was failing and it now looked like BGN and its THE REVIEW 2017-2018 111

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partners would survive the ordeal. On the 5 of February 2016 a poor turnout at the picket lines on the crossing point at Birgunj allowed local businessmen from both sides of the border to seize the initiative and tear down the barricades, the resultant flow of trucks, stricken for months, was an irresistible force that the agitators were unable to stem the flow.

The aftermath of the fuel crisis Ultimately the blockades failed because of the greed of those participating in them; the availability of black market fuel steadily increased as the Bandh went on, there were incidents of smugglers being set on fire for undermining the blockade but ultimately they probably failed to bribe the right people. The people of the Terai were the ones who suffered the most as their businesses were closed, their livelihoods lost and the region stagnated for 6 months. The prospect of future country wide blockades remains a real threat although this is tempered with the recent memory of the pain the Madhesi people felt at the hands of the party cadres and their blockade and a reluctance to self-inflict such hardship with little guarantee of success. Rumours of such blockades surface frequently to instigate artificial shortages and facilitate profiteering for fuel providers. The commercial licences awarded to fuel companies were quickly revoked as the government restored the NOC monopoly and its financial control over the single strand industry. The head of the NOC depot was removed from post and placed on corruption charges although he was never convicted after some behind the scene wranglings. The LPG supply chain took the longest to recover as hotels and restaurants, prioritised due to the taxes they generate from tourism, swallowed up the gas entering the country for many months. It would be many months before the common man could exchange an empty LPG bottle without waiting weeks with it in a queue. BGN felt the legacy pain in the form of demurrage charges incurred as the 30 containers, which had been piled up in Calcutta with thousands of others, were one by one released, destined for the Nepal border. Salt was added as the 3 containers filled with operational ration packs originally for Op MARMAT had all expired by the time of arrival so they could not be used to bolster the earthquake contingency supplies. The legacy costs for the organisation ran into hundreds of thousands. Despite the constraints, BGN managed to achieve its missions and tasks. The recruitment period was highly successful with 270 recruits selected to join the British Army. Op MARMAT 2 was a great success; across four communities – Jiri, Netrakali, Jaubari and Pachok – the Gurkhas built six school buildings with 25 classrooms in total, two community centres, an accommodation block for GWS staff and four houses for retired Gurkhas. With the ever present threat of manmade or natural crisis BGN is constantly seeking to improve its resilience. A large scale rollout of solar panels across all of the buildings in Kathmandu is underway this will greatly reduce consumption of diesel, this is coupled with a huge reduction in load 112

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The queue for LPG bottles. At the height of the crisis it could take several months to exchange a bottle and the cost was inflated by 300%

shedding thanks to better resource management from NEA and particularly Managing Director Kul Man Ghising, who is rapidly becoming a national hero for the effect he is having on people's lives. BGN is also in the process of replacing standard MOD rations for commercial long life rations. This will not only reduce the cost of replacing the rations but will remove any risk that a crisis affecting the supply chain will span over the time when rations are due replacement. New surface tanks are due to replace the venerable subsurface tanks at Kathmandu and whilst bulky will have the same capacity and much greater earthquake resilience. Perhaps more than most places the British Army operates, Nepal is a testament to the principles of logistics as The RLC teaches them. The acronym FACES can be directly applied to BGN's reaction to the Nepal fuel crisis of 2015-16 and explains how the organisation managed to survive the crisis and concurrently complete its mission. 5 Foresight - to predict future crisis' and provision accordingly 5 Agility - to adapt to a constantly changing environment and react to situations in a timely manner 5 Co-operation - with partner agencies, suppliers, authorities and allies 5 Efficiency - minimising consumption and running as lean as possible 5 Simplicity - carrying out essential tasks and minimising all activity that was not mission critical Nepal will continue to remain a challenging and unstable environment. However, as long as BGN continues to apply good logistic processes the organisation can manage the difficulties faced and ensure that it continues to achieve its mission on an enduring basis.


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The Corps at 25 – Where to next? As a relatively new Staff Officer in the Capability Development area of Army Headquarters, I am struck by the wide variety of changes, planned, programmed or envisaged, which will have an impact on the Corps and the wider logistic community. By Lt Col A Griffiths In the military, change is not new. It is a characteristic of what we do. Moreover, our ability to adapt to changing circumstances has been key to our success. Much of the work which looks to the future is often compartmentalised and conducted against racy timelines. Sometimes, this leads to ‘unknown unknowns’ that might need to be addressed while change is in flight amongst a community that understandably has feelings of exclusion or uncertainty. With this in mind it can sometimes help to look at the whole of the journey, so the aim of this essay is to outline where The RLC has come from, where we are now and to signpost the future. I do this so that we can reflect on, appreciate and be justifiably proud of our Corps history. Also to highlight that we ought to have the confidence to seize the opportunities coming our way, and embrace the significant changes that will or are likely to impact upon the delivery of logistics in the foreseeable future. We do not have to like the changes that will be imposed upon us, but we should seek to exploit every opportunity to make change a success. Finally, this essay aims to highlight why there is good reason to be excited at many of the opportunities ahead.

A potted Corps history The way many of us view the Corps will depend on when we joined it. To put it kindly, the more mature minority amongst us will have joined one of the forming Corps. The 1990 – 1991 Logistic Support Review was a fundamental review of those areas of support contained within the 4* Quarter Master General area.1 The premise of the Logistic Support Review was that support to the Army could be delivered more efficiently by way of a two Corps structure focused on the delivery of Service Support and Equipment Support. The Service Support area comprised transport, movements, supply, catering, port, maritime, postal, courier and pioneer capabilities and ultimately brought together The Royal Corps of Transport (RCT), Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC), Army Catering Corps (ACC), Royal Pioneer Corps and the Postal and Courier Services of the Royal Engineers into the Royal Logistic Corps (RLC). The Corps has changed much 114

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over the last 25 years. Subsequent reviews have deleted and changed trades, formations and units resulting in widescale restructuring and re-alignment. The background to the Options for Change and the associated Logistic Support Review was a strategic collapse of the Soviet Union and the potential to reap a peace dividend from a World assumed to be more stable and secure.2 Those of my generation observed an Army of the 1980s, predominantly forward deployed in West Germany, with a UK-led Corps of 3 Armoured Divisions and a UK-based Infantry Division, operating from well-founded infrastructure prepared to fight a set-piece defensive battle against the Warsaw Pact in Northern Germany. Equally, for some 27 years, Operation BANNER, in Northern Ireland developed our ability to operate protected mobility supporting infantry and grow capabilities such as our Explosive Ordnance Disposal into a world leading brand. However, the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein in 1990 put the changes of the Logistic Support Review on hold as we fought a divisional battle in Iraq and Kuwait under Operation GRANBY. All elements of 1(UK) Armoured Division acquitted themselves. However it required the mass of troops, materiel and equipment from three Germany-based divisions to field a two armoured brigade division operating in an austere environment against a poorly trained and equipped enemy. This was a great way for our forming Corps to ‘go out with a bang’. However there were many lessons to be exploited, notably including our sub-optimal accounting, control and husbandry of stock and the advantages of Service Support being delivered by a single organisation, which was all of one company. From an unexpected curtain call for a 1st British Corps that was armour heavy at the turn of the decade, the 1990s saw a different Defence requirement placed upon the newly formed RLC; Peace Support Operations, first in the former Yugoslavia then Kosovo toward the end of the decade. We should not lose sight of the fact that all these operations saw an increased use of Contractors on Deployed Operations (CONDO) providing services previously provided by logistic and engineer military personnel. On 9/11 the World changed and for the following 12 years, the RLC was heavily committed to significant and hard fought operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; starting with a division scale intervention in Iraq and enduring above brigade scale as stabilisation campaigns in both Theatres of operations; a huge accomplishment. In parallel, the Corps also delivered and sustained considerable operational effect in the joint space and in support of UK resilience. To name but a few examples: Operation ELLAMY (2011 military intervention in Libya), Operation CATALINA (UK recovery from Afghanistan), the Boxing Day Tsunami, North American hurricanes, the


Haiti disaster, Op GRITROCK (British, Irish and Canadian participation in the fight against the Ebola virus epidemic in West Africa), Op TOSCA (Cyprus), fire strikes, fuel strike, support to SF and Homeland Resilience. Operation TELIC in Iraq and Operation HERRICK in Afghanistan provided the Corps with several key positive experiences and outcomes. The scale, complexity and tempo of Operation TELIC 1 provided very useful lessons on how we should develop future requirements to support divisional level warfighting; first the need for properly generated and collectively trained Divisional and Theatre support groups. We should not have to ‘task-organise’ CSS units from across our Army to support warfighting at scale. Second, the need for all-arms integration. Operationally focused, commanders at all levels developed a sophisticated planning process in a truly all-arms environment. As both campaigns matured, the resourcing of those plans included capabilities in support of logistic effect such as task lines of AH, ISTAR and coalition air power. Amongst the many key deductions was that we should train our people to incorporate these capabilities and to interoperate across a ‘whole force’ of allies, all-arms, contractors and agencies. This remains a relevant lesson, however, it is worth considering that a return to intervention at division scale renders it unlikely for CSS to have the level of all-arms support available in enduring stabilisation campaigns; we will most likely need to deliver sustainment as efficiently as possible, and largely from within our own units. The Army also sequentially grew a series of vehicle and equipment capabilities which matched a sophisticated and prevalent IED threat and determined enemy. Going forward, there is a need to ensure that we have sufficiently protected vehicles, matched to the environment and threat. Future conflict will require agility, reach and resilience in all aspects of support. Third, the training and deployments met the expectation of what our people joined for. As we look to the future, we must seek out relevant operational roles for our personnel. Of significance, the concurrent largely niche operations of the present require small teams in support, while intervention at scale requires collectively trained and effective CSS units within our support and enabling brigades. This contrast in outputs is a challenge. Future bespoke logistic training opportunities need to be sought out and exploited and we should seek to align training events with those we will ultimately support through deploying on their exercises. We must train to be scalable. Fourth, the use of contractors. While Contractor Support to Operations (CSO) is not a new concept for logisticians, the numbers and breadth developed considerably throughout our campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.3 As we return to contingent capability we must be careful to learn safe – not false – lessons in our Whole Force Approach (WFA) to capability. For some years now, we have been wrestling with a perception held by many senior Defence and Army leaders that military logisticians could be widely substituted for contractors. However, the operating environment in Iraq and Afghanistan is not a safe

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Figure 1 – A Combat Logistic Patrol Afghanistan

comparable to the use of CSO on intervention operations against a peer or near-peer. Using contractors to reduce military head-count and keep force-structure costs down would seem an attractive proposition, but needs to be applied with great care and appropriate levels of assurance. This will be explored later. Not necessarily linked to our operational experience but a more general observation, there is a requirement to examine the balance between specialist and generalist capabilities within the Corps and the associated rank. Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP) and Knowledge, Skills and Experience (KSE) are increasingly being used to identify individuals for appointments throughout the rank structure and within joint and multinational postings. Investment in some specialisations and the mechanisms for career progression needs to be considered carefully if we are to compete successfully within the Army and externally across Defence for high profile logistic (and other) appointments. Similarly, trade and career structures shaped more like rugby balls than pyramids are difficult to sustain and manage. Ultimately, our people are a key asset. The Corps should be justifiably proud of them and vice versa. The RLC is a diverse organisation which reflects a globalised society. At unit level, some 30% of our personnel were non-EEA and 12.36%4 of our people are female. Clearly this diversity is central to our effectiveness. Our diverse backgrounds are helpful on every level; both in the home base and when deployed. To summarise our journey, since the formation of the Corps, logistic support stove-pipes are much better aligned and collaborative – thus more efficient and effective. We have grown a generation of operationally savvy individuals who are competent on operations, utilising an array of KSE, tools and processes. The Corps has a cohort of leaders who have been proven on operations. There needs to be sufficient challenging opportunities for them and those who follow and are hungry to put their training to use and prove their quality. Ultimately, The RLC has achieved and learned a huge amount in its first quarter century and, going forward, there are some great opportunities for us to improve even further. So the past has been powerful and successful – where are we now and what about the future? THE REVIEW 2017-2018 115

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The current environment The current geo-political landscape is probably the most complex and uncertain in a generation. The reinvigoration of democracy or populism, as witnessed by the election of President Trump in America and a decision by the UK to leave the EU through the BREXIT process has significantly challenged the status quo. At the borders of Europe, a revanchist Russia is flexing its military and non-military might. On the Korean Peninsula, we are seeing a level of tension that could lead to a significant conflict. Meanwhile, with the promise of the Arab Spring now faded, the proxy conflicts within the Middle East continue to demonstrate an appalling appetite for death, destruction and brutal repression of the people. Capping the challenges and threats we face are the enduring global financial situation and risk-averse Western democracies. Starting in 2008, an age of austerity still prevails and any military measures to address these challenges and threats will have to be prioritised against other departments’ requirements. The financial settlement for the Army is likely to come under increasing pressure and efficiencies will be ruthlessly pursued. This means that our leadership must be capable of articulating the Army’s value. They will need to consider carefully where limited financial resource is prioritised and spent. For the RLC, our unique capabilities, professionalism, effectiveness and efficiency must be recognised at every level of leadership. Amongst these challenges, it is important we consider and embrace opportunities in the present. In office, the new American President recognises the value of NATO and the need for all Members to pay their way. A raft of niche and small operations and contributions to the NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) and Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (Land) (VJTF(L)) point to an important expression of UK global influence in the post BREXIT era. Moreover, there is an increased appetite for Joint training overseas; perfect for logisticians.

Joint Force 2025 and Army 2020 Refine Set against an uncertain future, in order to answer the question of ‘where to next?’ for the Corps, we need to understand the higher level direction. The Ministry of Defence articulated the future Defence capability outputs in Future Force 2020 (FF20) and subsequently in Joint Force 2025 (JF25). By 2025, the Joint Force will deliver across the Defence spectrum: • A maritime task group centered on a Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carrier equipped with F35 Lightning combat aircraft • A land division with three brigades including a new Strike Force • An air group of combat, transport and surveillance aircraft • A Special Forces task group In November 2015, CGS initiated work in the Army HQ to refine the Army 2020 force structure, in response to the SDSR15 and the JF25 proposition. Known as Army 2020 Refine (A2020R), the work was compartmentalised, so for many months, little was known about the change proposals 116

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therein. Whereas the Army 2020 structure was designed principally to deliver five rotations of medium scale stabilisation operations, the new headmark under A2020R is the Army’s ability to field a division that can warfight at scale. Under A2020R, the Army’s Core Outputs are: • The ability to field a modernised division capable of warfighting at scale – the Army’s core strategic output, conferring the broadest range of political choice • The provision of other contingent tasks at high readiness, including much of the foundation of joint capability and two new STRIKE brigades • The provision of forces to deter, shape and understand and promote UK prosperity through Defence Engagement and resilience • The maintenance of a framework for reconstitution and regeneration • The Army will reconfigure to deliver a modernised division capable of warfighting. The 3rd (United Kingdom) Division (3(UK) Div) will deploy as a ‘triangular’ division, force packaged from two STRIKE Bdes and two AI Bdes. The 1st (United Kingdom) Division (1(UK) Div) will focus on Defence Engagement with specialist forces capable of delivering increased Train, Advise, Assist, Mentor activity as part of conflict prevention and capacity building.

Army 2020 Refine – The proposition Overall, the proposition for The RLC under A2020R has seen a realignment of units towards providing logistic support to a warfighting 3 (UK) Div enabled by properly configured theatre support. At the front end, the major change is the creation of CSS Regiments in support of the two new Strike Brigades, combining 2nd Line logistic and equipment support sub-units. The AI Bdes will continue to be supported through CSLRs. In the divisional space, the key changes will be the reestablishment of a properly resourced Divisional Support Group (DSG) within 101 Log Bde and the integration of the Reserves fully into the three Force Logistic Regiments (FLR) aligned to the two Divisional Support Areas (DSAs) and Div Troops. In the Joint Support Area (JSA), a theatre Enabling Brigade will be generated using 104 Log Sp Bde including 9 Regt RLC as a Theatre Logistic Regiment (TLR). A key feature of this template, versus previous experience, is the increased time assumed for receiving the division into a new

Figure 2 – A2020 versus A2020R


theatre. The hard fact is we resource to Defence Planning Assumptions and anything more challenging would be at ‘best effort’. The changes for the RLC from A2020 to A2020R are summarised at Figure 2.

The Army Support Sub-Strategy (2017 – 2030) With A2020R due to be implemented over the next 10 years, we need to examine how we adapt to the challenges it will bring. As we look forward, we need to consider how we deliver logistic efficiency, agility and innovation with a key emphasis on reducing logistic need. This is increasingly set against a backdrop of restricted and competed resources. The key challenges we face are: • The current support systems lack analysis or pre-emption. They are industrial age and are largely analogue with a lack of automated analytics. • The lack of effective Log IX results in a ‘just in case’ culture with an unintelligent ‘push-system’ that both over and under provision. • ES, although lean at times, lacks data capture and we show signs of wavering between under and over maintaining. Our legacy platforms are neither energy efficient or intelligent. They are repaired on a reactive basis and serviced based on time rather than empowered decisions. • Our deployed footprint is particularly power hungry and relies on traditional energy sources. From its experience of campaigning, the Army has an expectation of goldplated provision. It needs to rediscover an expeditionary ethos. There is little incentive for commanders to reduce or conserve logistic need and they have little or no cost awareness. • The Whole Force Approach is a reality but it is largely untested. We need to move beyond the equipment DLOD, specifically focussing on an integrated approach to manpower planning with our strategic partners. • Our global Logistic Intelligence network is infrastructure focused and not based on potential in-theatre logistic capabilities, whether CSO/CONDO, HN or Allies. Despite operating alongside allies for many years, our logistic interoperability is minimal. If we do nothing to drive change into the support area, we will fail to sustain an ambitious strike or divisional operation effectively or efficiently, specifically in terms of reach and agility. We need to reduce logistic need, optimise the logistic footprint, maintain assured support across the spectrum of operations through highly capable, interoperable, logistic organisation across the entire Defence Support Network (DSN), enabled by vastly improved Logistic Intelligence and Log IX. In achieving this vision, the Army Support Sub-Strategy seeks to deliver 4 goals: • Enhancing Readiness. We aim to optimise equipment and stocks for JF25 sized for war fighting, at high readiness, and able to deploy a scalable force, such that commanders have confidence in Equipment and Sustainability for both FE@R and FE@S. This could involve

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the development and exploitation of Controlled Humidity Environment (CHE) hangars in the UK and abroad; working with Defence Logistics to exploit Logistic Intelligence in order to unlock theatres and develop appropriate Logistic contingencies; and develop FE@S planning so that choices, risks and opportunities enable the optimisation of contingent stocks, held in the right location at the correct readiness. • Reducing Logistic Need. A critical aspect of enabling agility, reach and freedom of action is to reduce logistic need. This is a whole Army opportunity and is as much about reducing all-arms demand including consumer behaviour, as it is optimising logistic support via preemption and proactivity. Figure 3 below illustrates that ‘All Arms Demand’ is balanced against ‘Optimised Support’ arrangements which includes our end to end force structures, equipment and stock levels. If you can reduce one side of the fulcrum, you can reduce the other. The fulcrum, which represents Logistic responsiveness, is the key enabler to achieve balance between demand and a reduced support architecture. Developing and delivering appropriate Logistic IX, Logistic Intelligence, suitably empowered people with the requisite KSE and a support chain that can generate greater velocity, the fulcrum can move left, delivering a balance of current or increased demand against a reduced support arrangement.

Figure 3 – The Support Fulcrum

• Improved efficiency and reduced costs (both for routine activity and operations). The experience from Industry and other nations’ militaries suggest resource savings of up to 25% are achievable (in terms of whole life costs, costs of ownership and energy consumption). Given the current Army Support cost is c£1.45Bn annually and the current usable Army inventory is £1.3Bn, we aim to reduce the annual Support cost by 20% by 2025.5,6,7 • People. We will operate a highly productive Whole Force: • By 2020 confirmation of the A2020R proposition assumed 30% savings in military liability in the CSS force structure for Strike Bdes (a hypothesis based upon predicted benefits of Reducing Logistic Need). • Given that the ability to reduce logistic need within the AI Bdes and Div Tps is bounded by legacy equipment and a warfighting demand, the likely military liability savings based on existing evidence within these areas will be up to 10% by 2025. THE REVIEW 2017-2018 117

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• By 2025, we aim for an end to end CSS workforce that integrates a Whole Force as well as highly productive and competent people throughout the chain. In particular, we must maximise the talent of our people, develop their KSE prior to the point of need and reward them for success.

Reducing Logistic Need The area of Reducing Logistic Need is the key area for development as we conclude on where next for the Corps. The four key areas currently under development in Army HQ are:

Figure 4 – Reducing Logistic need Programme and Spotlight

• Sustainment Planning Applications to improve the accuracy and forecasting of logistics. We have initiated the development of two software applications to the point of demonstration; Reports and Returns Data Delivery (R2D2) and Joint Enterprise Data Interoperability (JEDI). The purpose of R2D2 is to standardise all the CSS R2 data input by units and brigades, and bring that information together into a single version of the truth. JEDI is a ‘translator’ being developed in concert with the US military. In the first instance, we expect JEDI to translate CSS information from US, NATO and UK systems that are incompatible with each other to produce a Recognised Logistic Picture. R2D2, along with JAMES, MJDI, SEESUPs and the rest, will feed into JEDI. The next step will be the creation of a Logistic Forecast. The many significant benefits – logistic interoperability, increased precision, assurance and confidence in logistics – to name but four, will reduce the requirement for stock, while enabling increased agility and reach. Both applications will be demonstrated in the next year, are to be LOSA compliant, compatible with Morpheus, expandable and complementary with JFC’s Defence Support Network Transformation Programme. • Ground Logistic Autonomous Movement (GLAM). We aim to fit our trucks with the capability to operate semiautonomously together with the US. Envisage a logistic convoy with both US and UK trucks that are largely selfdriving, with our people on hand to drive through towns, protect the convoy and make decisions; such a convoy requires fewer people. This extends the reach of our fleet 118

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with the same number of people because we do not need to double crew vehicles as we do at present. This is how we intend to meet the requirements of an extended line of communication without increasing our workforce. We have two trucks in the US being fitted for semi-autonomy and will demonstrate the capability in the next 12 months. • Autonomous Last Mile Resupply System (ALMRS). Imagine if you will, drones and unmanned vehicles such as quads delivering re-supply packages and replacement parts direct to the point of need; be it fighting troops or technicians. This will enable support to greater points of presence by way of further optimised echelons and increased logistic precision and velocity. The US are in the process of operationalizing these capabilities. • Additive Manufacture. The aim is for as many components as possible to be manufactured using 3D printers in the ‘A’ Echelons for expedient repair. We have secured FMC innovation funding to determine the extent and pace of this initiative. The US are ahead here too; which we intend will usefully provide evidence we can employ to help us move forward. The potential benefits – though yet to be defined – could be great; considerably fewer materiel items to store and move, much less stress on the supply chain, combat formations less ‘tethered’ to the supply chain and far greater logistic velocity to name a few. This capability is clearly a candidate for a WFA. The sooner we can include the ability to 3D print parts in requirements documents, the greater the likely benefits by 2025.

Conclusion In sum, this essay has given you a feel of where we have come from, the current situation and the key developmental themes. As to the future, the CSS Conceptual Headmark8 gives the simplest view: • CSS Force 2025: A highly productive, efficient, professional, agile, integrated, scalable and resilient Whole Support Force, led by strong Logistic C2 nodes and a highly developed logistic intelligence and information framework. It will deliver optimised, assured, high velocity, precision, effect through the use of the global support network (including POE), and a clear understanding of operating environments (4Ds), to a responsive, scalable and modular army with a reduced logistic need, as far forward as operationally advantageous. It will be a reference Support Force. • CSS Force 2035: A highly automated Support Force, delivering optimised, modular, scalable, high velocity, precision effects packages, exploiting the Global Support Network and the most appropriate and up to date technologies in an agile and assured manner, throughout all domains and environments. Intelligence-led, it will be prepared for operations of any scale, across the globe, and contribute to global security through persistent and temporary, focussed, overseas engagement. At the leading edge of multi-modal, multi-nodal and directed, precision logistics, it will be a reference Support Force for other militaries and commerce.


These may sound like nirvana; our task in Army HQ is to develop and deliver these – not as visions – but as future realities. Where we succeed in part or full, one thing is for sure. The RLC – with a past and present to be rightly proud of, has a very exciting future.

Footnotes 1

Wait for the Waggon: The Story of the Royal Corps of Transport and its Predecessors by D J Sutton.

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Defence (Options for Change) Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Commons 25 July 1990. 3 A UK force cap of 9000 military personnel in the latter stages of Op HERRICK compared to a deployed contractor force iro 9000. 4 RLC Manning Dashboard dated Jan 17 – 9243 (Male) 1303 (Female). 5 DP17 directs FLCs to cut fuel usage by 10% by 25/26. 6 ACDS (Log Ops) Defence Support Network (Transformation) Programme calculations which include personnel and TLB(P) costs. 7 Hd Log(A) Inventory Control Tower analysis of Army inventory dated 11 Jan 17. 8 CSS Conceptual Headmark. 1 Mar 2015. Niteworks.

R RMS MS g girls irls think think d differently ifferently O ur teaching teaching develops develops pupils’ pupils’ independence, Our independence, resilience resilience aand nd cr eativity. creativity. elf-belief iin nw ho tthey hey aare re O ur pupils pupils possess possess tremendous tremendous sself-belief Our who aass aan n iindividual. ndividual. ith ex ceptional p astoral ca re. W re a vvery ery ccaring aring sschool chool w Wee aare with exceptional pastoral care. O ur vvalues-based alues-based eeducation ducation ccreates reates a n urturing, healthy healthy Our nurturing, llearning earning culture. culture. Ex cellent ex amination results: results: Excellent examination ((48% 48% A* -A aatt A llevel evel aand nd 5 at GCSE GCSE in in 2 017). 2% A *- A at A*-A 52% A*2017). Ov er 1 00 eextra-curricular xtra-curricular aactivities ctivities eeach ach tterm erm aand nd oover ver 1 00 Over 100 100 ttrips rips ev ery yyear. ear. every W nd eeach ach girl’s girl’s talents, talents, inspire inspire h er aand nd g ive h er tthe he Wee fifind her give her ccourage ourage ttoo cchallenge hallenge h erself. herself.

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Military Contribution

Lessons from Coca Cola’s 2012 London Olympics The 2012 London Olympics project may arguably be a perfect example of what could be achieved as a legacy for logistics for the many organisations that were involved. This paper will use the Gibbs (1988) reflective style to explore Coca Cola Enterprise’s distribution of drinks during the 2012 Olympics. By Sgt C Musicha The paper will observe how Coca Cola’s strategy may have helped crystallise a legacy of logistics initiatives that may be utilised in future endeavours. The paper examines whether, in the author’s opinion, several logistics aspects of Coca Cola’s drinks distribution project could hold as a lasting legacy well after the 2012 Olympics. These logistics aspects include: • Coca Cola’s demonstration of an agile supply chain • The use of collaboration across the supply chain network • Concern for corporate social responsibility • Access to information • Achievement of logistics technological advancements. The paper will, where possible, seek to apply the lessons learned to the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) contemporary supply chain operations. Firstly, having experienced London driving on several occasions on delivery journeys with the Armed Forces, congestion almost always proves unbearable to say the least. London may be one of the busiest cities in the world (Jenkins, 2014), and therefore the delivery of drinks during the Olympics, for Coca Cola, could not have been any more difficult. The increasing levels of traffic during the 2012 Olympics further compounded the pressures on the firm’s delivery systems. Therefore, Coca Cola’s logistics team needed to do something to circumnavigate the hot-spot areas of the London Olympics (FTA, 2012). The company's decision to shift its non-London routes to other depots, as well as the re-alignment of its deliveries to night times to overcome the delivery challenge, may have been a correct response. This appears to have freed up capacity, thereby ensuring that delivery was maintained in a pressurised environment (FTA, 2012).

Agility For this adjustment to be achieved, Coca Cola may have had to use a degree of agility in its logistics systems. Gligor (2013) describes agility as the organisation’s capacity to

quickly adjust its structures and processes in response to changes in the environment. Oneway agility can be adequately achieved is by being responsive to a changing environment through flexibility and the ability to re-align supply chain operations in a dynamic manner (Harrison and Van Hoek, 2011). Coca Cola appears to have used its extra capacity in its distribution system to achieve this fit (FTA, 2012). This also appears to be in agreement with Waters’ (2011) assertion that agility may be achieved when an organisation is flexible enough in its physical structure so as to be able to move operations between different locations when risk in one area increases. However, this might be problematic to consider as a logistics legacy from the Olympics since Coca Cola appears to have used spare capacity in its economic prowess. This may not be the case for other organisations like the MOD that increasingly rely on austere and somewhat inflexible budgets.

Collaboration Much of the literature on the logistics legacy of the Olympic project seems to point to a wider collaboration between the organisations that were involved. One viewpoint is that for supply chains to deliver products efficiently and reliably in such an environment as the Olympics, organisations have to collaborate widely and plan meticulously Supplychain247 (2013). Birdsall (2014) seems to concur with this, suggesting that collaboration between industry and government agencies in route planning, as well as revising delivery modes to night time, may have been the greatest legacy of the Olympic Games in logistics terms (FTA, 2012). The Coca Cola logistics team seem to have relied on such integration and collaboration with other stakeholders during the Olympics project to keep London moving during this challenging period. Christopher (2011) suggests that one of the key ingredients of supply chain excellence is a high level of collaboration across the supply chain network. Sadler (2007) THE REVIEW 2017-2018 121

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expands this notion by suggesting that greater integration and collaboration provides an opportunity for organisations to work together through shared information to provide and deliver goods and services to customers. Ultimately the Coca Cola logistics team had to rely on its collaboration to persuade more than 100 of its customers to move to night time deliveries as well as convincing the Noise Abatement Society and other enforcement agencies to consider a flexible approach to certain rules with regards to deliveries (NAS, 2012). It therefore appears that much success hinged on more and more organisations coming together in an agreeable fashion, or in other words, collaboration. Greater collaboration may therefore be upheld as a way forward for all logistics organisations, including the MOD rather than purely a legacy from the 2012 Olympics. For the MOD, increasing collaboration is demonstrated in the ever-closer relationships with industry to achieve Endto-End delivery of materiel and services, including support through-life (UKCEB, 2017). This knack of collaborative logistics requires continual development, especially in the contemporary military environment with a tendency towards increasing complexity of operations. Emphasis needs to be applied, not only greater collaboration upstream of the supply chain, but also downstream and among the tri-service functionalities.

Corporate social responsibility The third aspect to consider from the 2012 Olympics project is the willingness of organisations to incorporate corporate social responsibility in their planning for the games. Regular travels on London roads tend to be punctuated by the slow movement of traffic due to congestion that seems to be caused by what can only be described as the unattractive array of delivery trucks. The trucks can be a nuisance in terms of noise, sight and other senses at best of times. McKinnon et al (2012, 31) suggest that ‘logistics is responsible for a variety of externalities, including air pollution, noise, accidents, vibration, land-take and visual intrusion.’ In winning the bid for 2012 Olympics, London made a pledge to host the greenest games ever (Kintrea et al, 2012). For most organisations, such enduring concerns for environmental issues and the resultant desire to tackle them can add pressure and cost to the normal delivery systems. Coca Cola seems to have underpinned its logistics strategy with corporate and social responsibility through a number of objectives, such as promoting health and wellness, reducing and compensating for carbon emissions, waste management, and making a real difference to society (Coca Cola, 2012). At times, such endeavours can be dismissed as a ploy to enhance public relations for the organisation more than they are to actually improve the environment (Gilmore, 2008). Coca Cola, however, appears to have been in keeping with the entire 2012 Olympics project which was dubbed as a Zero Waste Games (WRAP, 2012). Under this theme, the London Organising Committee for the Olympics and Paralympics (LOCOG) was committed to ensuring that at 122

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least 70% (by weight), of all operational waste was re-used, recycled or composted. This may be upheld as a logistics legacy as all organisations under the 2012 Olympics project were bound by the requirement to show this concern for corporate social responsibility. As environmental concerns increasingly affect vehicle manufacture in the UK, it could be argued to be only a matter of time that the MOD is looked at to decrease its negative vehicle footprint, not only in the UK but across all worldwide operations. Although the financial costs to this may somewhat be substantial, the corporate social responsibility element of it cannot be overlooked. While the MOD has recognised legacy for continually re-using equipment in terms of recycling, there appears to be grounds for significant improvement. This would require a much revised and refined reverse supply chain, for example, in the packaging of equipment and parts thereof that the military uses as well as at the tactical level by increasing recycling bins in all military bases. To achieve a vastly increased rate of recycling would, however, require a holistic and consistent approach across the three services and indeed across all aspects of the MOD as it depends on a monumental step change in the everyday activities and habits. If this were to be achieved, such corporate social responsibility would not only rival the likes of Coca Cola but also other government departments, so creating a legacy of its own.

Information distribution The fourth aspect of the Olympics project legacy explores the subject of data and information sharing and distribution. My own experience working for a delivery company around the London area showed that on a normal day it was very important to have ready access to data and information on roads and traffic conditions if one is to make successful daily deliveries. Similarly, good information flow up and down the logistics chain as well as across organisational functions would have been paramount for the Olympics project to be successful. After all, sharing of information is a core part of supply chain management (Waters 2011). It is suggested that the Transport for London 2012 website was the most well-known source of information among businesses and freight operators (Transport for London, 2013). Other information was on a borough-by-borough basis on the London 2012 website (TfL Bulleting, 2012), as well as


many other sporadic sources. The Coca Cola logistics team seems to have taken full advantage of the available sources of information to plan its routing and deliveries (FTA, 2012). Although such information was available for businesses to use, it appears as though it came through a number of different sources (FTA, 2012). It could be argued that deliveries and logistics firms would have benefited more if timely information was publicised through a single point of contact in the same manner that was developed by the Health Protection Agency London WHO Collaboration Centre (McCloskey and Endericks, 2013). This could have enabled logistics information such as delivery restrictions, road network conditions, local area traffic management and parking plans to be harmonised, through a single source, for ease of access for many firms. Such a proposition may be in agreement with Wang (2014) who asserts that a single source of information in a complex supply chain undertaking results in better communication between companies throughout the chain. Ultimately, it has been demonstrated that effective information and communication programme played an important role in managing the increased demand on the transport infrastructure during the Olympic Games (International Olympics Committee, 2015). This also resonates with the MOD in the way that supply information and good communication are such an integral part of any supply chain. The use of Single Point of Contact (SPOC) and Defence Intranet go a long way in enabling such communication within Defence. Management of Joint Deployed Inventory (MJDI) has also enhanced the capturing of demand for materiel downstream and transmitting upstream to the suppliers. Such endeavours need to be consolidated, upheld as good practice and improved as necessary.

Technology advancement Finally, the proliferation of new in-vehicle and on-road technologies can be appreciated by anyone who drives in this day and age. These could range from the built-in satellite navigation systems in vehicles to automatic road signage on the motorways. It could be argued that events like the Olympics provide a somewhat perfect opportunity for host countries to try out such new technologies. The International Olympic Committee (2015) claims that the Olympic Games technology projects give the host city a unique opportunity to build lasting legacy in new and

Military Contribution

improved technology. In supply chains, it has been argued that technology facilitates the integration of processes across firms and provides decision support tools that enable system-wide optimisation (Mentzer, 2004). This may be the case for the logistics firms that were involved. London saw a proliferation of road by road and junction by junction planning using new technology to give customers robust delivery timings (Manufacturing and Logistics IT, 2012). For Coca Cola’s supply chain, one of the new technological advances was encompassed in its quest to deliver sustainable games. Coca Cola seems to have successfully trialled its new engine technology in delivery trucks powered by biogas in order to cut carbon emissions as opposed to the conventional diesel-fuelled alternative (Green Futures, 2012). Coca Cola claims that these vehicles have been integrated into its distribution systems as a lasting legacy from the Olympic Games (Coca Cola, 2012). However, some of the new technologies trialled during the 2012 Olympics can feel a long way out of reach for other firms. The biogas engine technologies, for example, may be perceived as too costly for other organisations whose priorities might be economical rather than environmental friendly considerations (Eidenskog, 2015). This might be due to factors such as difficulties in establishing re-fuelling stations and arguably, but more importantly, in these austere times, escalating costs attributable to new technologies. Therefore, such specific technological exploits may not necessarily hold as a lasting legacy from the 2012 Olympics. In its Defence Technology Strategy (2006) the MOD acknowledges that innovation in military equipment contributes to achieving a battle-winning edge by giving technological advantage over opponents. It is imperative that the MOD, even in austere times, continue chipping away at the lessons learned from the games by exploiting what the civil sector has produced. The MOD should also continue to aggressively encourage technological innovation from within its supply base and to increase the number, as well as variety, of suppliers eager to offer innovative solutions to achieve greater pull-through and exploitation of innovation to the front line.

Conclusion The 2012 London Olympics project may have provided the host city and many organisations an opportunity to explore many new and different approaches to tackling logistics challenges. This paper suggests the main logistics takeaway THE REVIEW 2017-2018 123

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and recommendations from the Olympics are as follows: • The strategy to use non-London depots as alternative hubs seems to have worked well for the Coca Cola logistics team. But as it has also been noted, this might be due to spare capacity that the firm already possessed due to its sizeable economic advantage. In smaller firms and the MOD, it might be recommended that they should seek more collaboration to establish such capacities. Collaboration seems to be the key that largely contributed to the successes of the logistics in the Olympics project. It could be argued that if improved collaboration were achievable in a pressurised Olympics environment, then it could also be achieved in a normal business setting. • Corporate social responsibility should not only be considered as a public relations tool for organisations. Rather, if an organisation is involved in a socially responsible undertaking in collaboration with other organisations in a supply chain, it can achieve not only real results but also enhance its corporate image. • Lastly, good information availability allows organisations to make timely and effective plans. However, harmonisation of such information and the ease of access to logistics information would have gone a long way in enabling all organisations to plan earlier for the Olympics games. Therefore, it is recommended that a single harmonised source of information be made available in similar projects in future to allow organisations to plan early.

Reference list: Birdsall, M. (2014) ITE London study tour 2014 part two: Learning from the highways agency transformation and smart motorways. ITE Journal (Institute of Transportation Engineers), 84 (12) 26-30. Christopher, M. (2011) Logistics & Supply Chain Management. 4th Edition. Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall. Coca Cola (2012) Coca Cola London 2012: Our sustainability legacy. [Online] Available from hidden/PDFs/london-2012-legacy-brochure.pdf [Accessed 01 September 2016 Crowther, D. and Capaldi, N. (eds.) (2008) Corporate social responsibility. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Eidenskog, M. (2015) Caring for corporate sustainability. PhD. Linköping University. FTA (2012) Logistics legacy. [online] Kent: FTA. Available from tics_legacy_x_olympics_low.pdf [Accessed 5 September 2016]. Gibbs, G. (1998) Learning by doing. Manila. Philippines: FEU publications. Gilmore, D. (2008) How real is green supply chain? [Online] SupplyChainDigest. Available from FirstThoughts/08-08-07.php [Accessed 23 August 2016] Gligor, D. M. (2013) The concept of supply chain agility: Conceptualization, antecedents, and the impact on firm performance. PhD. University of Tennesse.


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Harrison, A. and Van Hoek, R (2011) Logistics management and strategy. 4th edition. Essex: Pearson Education Ltd. Hirst, M. (2012) London 2012 Olympic route network Q&A. [Online] London: BBC. Available from [Accessed 06 September 2016]. IOC (2015) Olympic games framework. Switzerland: IOC. Available from _Games_Framework_English_Interactive.pdf [Accessed 28 August 2016]. Jenkins, T. (2014) London. Leicester. Troubador Publishing Ltd. Kintrea, K., Law, D., Agent, N. and Orgam, L. (2012) Learning legacy. London: ODA. Available from documents/pdfs/programme-organisation-and-project-management/204programme-assurance-ppm.pdf [Accessed 29 August 2016]. McCloskey, B. and Endericks, T. (2013) Learning from London 2012. London: Health Protection Agency. McKinnon, A.,Browne, M. and Whiteing, A. (eds.) (2012) Green logistics. London: Kogan Page Ltd. Menzter, J. T. (2004) Fundamental of supply chain management. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. MOD (2006) Defence Technology Strategy for the 21 Century [Online] London: MOD. Available from defence/harnessing_innov_presents/delivering%20the%20defence%20te chnology%20strategy.pdf [Accessed 29 May 2017]. NAS (2012) Out-of-hours delivery to be encouraged during London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic games. [Online] London: NAS. Available from [Accessed 23 August 2016]. Sadler, I. (2007) Logistics and supply chain integration. 1st edition. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. Slavin, T. (2012) A medal for innovation in the road race: Beyond the finish. Forum for the future. Available from greenfutures/articles/medal-innovation-road-race [Accessed 6 September 2016]. Supplychain247 (2013) Logistics collaboration: an Olympic effort. [Online] New Jersey, USA: Supplychain247. Available from http:// [Accessed 28 August 2016]. Taylor, D. G. (ed.) (2008) Logistics engineering handbook. Florida, USA: CRC Press. Transport for London (2013) Olympic legacy monitoring: Adaptation to deliveries by businesses and freight operators during the games. London: TfL. Available from [Accessed 28 August 2016]. UKCEB (2017) Team Defence Information Brief. [Online] London: UKCEB. Available from cabc8451e19c4be6325 [Accessed 28 May 2017]. Wang, J. (ed.) (2014) Management, science, logistics, and operations research. Pennsylvania, USA: IGI Global. Waters, D. (2011) Supply chain risk management. 2nd edition. London: Kogan Page Ltd. Webster, E. (1999) The economics of intangible investment. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. WRAP (2012) London 2012 legacy transfer report re-use in events. [Online] London: WRAP. Available from WRAP%20London%202012%20Legacy%20Transfer%20Report%20%20 -%20Re-use%20in%20Events.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2016].


Military Contribution

How important is Morocco as a stable and secure partner in North Africa? The Anglo-Moroccan relationship is often credited with being the second oldest diplomatic relationship in UK history. First diplomatic relations were established in the thirteenth century, with the first ambassadors being exchanged in the seventeenth century. By Lt R Smith Today, it can be argued that the importance of the Anglo-Moroccan relationship is growing, with Morocco widely accepted as one of the most stable countries in North Africa in a region currently struggling to adapt to its Arab Spring awakening.1 For its part, Morocco widely avoided the consequences of the Arab Spring that dramatically changed and destabilised many countries in North Africa with Egypt, Libya and Tunisia all undergoing their own independent and unique struggles. It is a relatively peaceful state and hasn’t been in an armed conflict with another nation since its conflict with Algeria in 1963 and although political tensions between the two countries still exist its own focus is very much on maintaining its reputation as a stable nation state. The aim of this essay is to give a brief introduction to Morocco so one can understand the country itself before studying its role as a stable partner to North Africa. The focus will be predominately on security and how a strong Anglo-Moroccan relationship is of importance to the UK and wider region. In order to better understand how Morocco has remained relatively stable and secure and how this is of importance to the UK, it is first important to have a basic understanding of the country itself. Morocco is classified as a ‘Hybrid Regime’ according to the Democracy Index 2016. Here Morocco is ranked above other MENA (Middle East and North Africa) States including Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, all of which are all classed as ‘Authoritarian’, and ranked below Israel, Tunisia and Lebanon – classed as ‘Struggling Democracies’.2 Morocco operates as a constitutional Monarchy under King Mohammad VI with a fully elected parliament, including 20% representation of female MPs and has enacted modern reforms since the Arab Spring, including equal rights for women. However, recent political developments have undermined the progress of reforms

made in 2011 with the new coalition government taking six months to form and being accused of being heavily influenced by the Palace. It is important to note that despite having an elected parliament the King remains arbiter with significant powers. Despite this, Morocco’s government is at little risk of instability and the King is widely popular and respected. Unfortunately, the country does struggle with press freedom, with Reporters Without Boarders ranking it 133 out of 180 countries in its World Press Freedom Index - citing political and economic pressure on independent media outlets from reporting highly sensitive subjects.3 Its economy is increasing by becoming liberalised and its infrastructure is improving – Morocco is due to join the small list of countries that have high-speed rail and its road infrastructure is modern. It has a rich history and culture and is a popular destination for British tourists, with approximately 600,000 visiting a year.4 In outlining future export possibilities, the ONS listed Morocco 4th position, after Liechtenstein, Chile

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and China as the fastest growing market for UK goods and services between 2005 and 2014.5 Militarily, Morocco is a member of the Counter-Daesh coalition and Moroccan F-16s have engaged ISIL targets in Syria and Iraq. Morocco is also active in the UN, providing a total of 1,5896 peacekeepers to United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), where it recently lost a soldier to enemy action, and The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).7 Despite its struggles with trying to adopt a more democratic process and its issues with liberal freedoms, it still remains one of the most liberal countries in the Arab world and holds significant importance as a stable and secure state. The UK has a strong interest in Africa and security will be a key issue for many African Countries over the next 30 years. Terrorism, including attacks by Islamist extremist groups, is likely to continue to pose a threat in Africa. Out to 2045, extremists could establish a stronghold in Africa, the most at risk areas being the Horn of Africa, the Sahel (a land mass stretching from Mauritania in the west to Sudan in the east-approximately 4266 miles by road) and North Africa.8 In addition to this, there is no evidence that international conflict between African states will disappear but may even increase as populations increase, coupled with the effects of climate change and scarcity in resources that could lead to conflict.9 However, this is deemed unlikely in the present regional context. There are much more pressing areas of concern than intra-state conflict; the threat of Transnational Violent Extremist Organisations (VEOs) such as the Islamic State (IS) and other armed factions continue to destabilise the region. In addition to this, the migration crisis is both a symptom and a cause of further regional instability in North Africa and there are external state actors, such as Russia, who are seeking to profit from instability by increasing their influence in the region. In addition to these numerous threats is a more unique principal important factor which is of concern to the UK - the close proximity of Morocco to the Straits of Gibraltar (STROG). The importance of a stable and Morocco is further reinforced when you consider Tunisia as a struggling democracy, Egypt struggling with a militant insurgency, Libya as a fractured country riddled with armed groups and Algeria as a political state whom stability is centred on a single aging president who has ruled for twenty years. In a post-ArabSpring North Africa, we are at an uncertain time for regional security. Indeed, according to the Global Terrorism Index, Morocco was ranked lowest in 2016 at 95 (number 1 being the highest threat of terrorist attack), compared with Algeria at 42, Tunisia at 25, Libya at 10 and Egypt at 9.10 The table below highlights the trends over the last five years, with Morocco showing consistent movement towards a low score. This further highlights how secure Morocco is compared to its North African neighbours in relation to the threat posed by terrorism. 126

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Table 1: Global Terrorism Index

Note: Morocco has seen a steady improvement compared to its neighbours, giving it the lowest GTI score in the region.11 It is unfair however to present Morocco as a country without its own security issues, indeed, the threat to Morocco itself is not extant; like the UK it has large numbers of nationals fighting for Islamic State, with estimations being in the region of 1000-1500 fighters and there is legitimate concern that these fighters may return to Morocco to carry out attacks.12 Although attacks have been rare they have happened in the past. In April 2011, 17 people were killed and 25 injured in a large explosion caused by a bomb in Marrakech and it is a regular occurrence that IS recruiters are arrested and detained in the country. High levels of youth unemployment has compounded the problem and led to rises in extremism and with tourism a key contributor to the Moroccan economy, contributing 12% of GDP, the country is keen to avoid a Tunisian style attack. This has led to a large and visible security presence in most major towns and cities. Morocco has sought to combat the spread of militant Islamism by becoming actively engaged in the prevention of the spread of extremist teachings. In the Moroccan capital, Rabat, King Mohammed VI has built a new centre for the training of imams in his country's peaceful interpretation of the faith, indeed; imams from a number of countries are sent here to train in the moderate preaching of Islam.13 The King has also been vocal of his criticism of extremism, stating in a speech delivered to the nation in August 2016, “Those who engage in terrorism, in the name of Islam, are not Muslims… They have strayed from the right path, and their fate is to dwell forever in hell.”14 This resounding rejection of Islamic extremism reflects the countries position as a secular society and its role as a religious moderate in the Islamic world and a key soft power partner in the fight against Islamic extremism. Having studied the threats the country and the wider region faces, it is important to look at how the UK contributes to the relationship and how important that relationship is to the UK. One of the strongest tools at our disposal is Defence Engagement (DE) and the UK DE programme in Morocco is our strongest in Africa. Former Defence Secretary, Sir Michael Fallon stated: “Defence engagement projects influence, promotes our prosperity and helps to protect our people. It enables the UK to respond to threats and crises


when they emerge, and strengthens our position as the world’s leading soft power. In short, it is vital to UK interests.”15 In regards to DE, Morocco is our strongest partner in Africa and where we have the largest amount of activity. The ways in which this manifests itself are numerous, for example, STTTs (Short Term Training Teams) in counterterrorism and policing, joint UK-Moroccan Military exercises, Staff Officer Exchanges and Maritime Security. With so many British tourists visiting Morocco and the rising threat of VEOs and trans-national actors, the importance of a strong and stable Morocco is mutually beneficial to both countries. In addition to this, Defence engagement breeds greater trust between states and leads to increased intelligence sharing. One prominent example of the benefits of strong bilateral relations is the November 15 attack in Paris - Morocco provided the intelligence that enabled French police to apprehend the main planner of the attack. In addition to this, with the cross border threat that VEOs present, it is in our interest that Morocco has a strong and capable military. Here the UK has again been active, with joint UK-Moroccan military exercises taking place each year with the focus on developing border security and CT capabilities. We only have to look at Libya to see that the lack of a strong military allows extremist factions to en-trench themselves within the state, giving them safe havens to plan and operate from. Defence Engagement serves not only to build capability but to also develop further military and diplomatic ties that are mutually beneficial to both parties, and while we lag behind the French in military activity in Africa through sheer numbers we are taking positive steps to increase our regional influence through more precise Defence Engagement. Further to this, it is important to note the French presence is focused predominately around Op BARKHANE, an ongoing anti-insurgent operation in the Sahel rather than in a Defence Engagement capacity. Morocco’s geographical location is also of keen interest to the UK with Morocco just a few nautical miles from Gibraltar. Instability in Morocco therefore would have strategic implication on the security in the STROG with huge ramifications not just for the UK but globally. After the English Channel, the Strait is the world’s busiest shipping

Military Contribution

lane: around 110,000 vessels travelling between South-East Asia, China and the Middle East and the Atlantic coastline of Europe, Africa, and the United States, passed through it 2014, while around half of the world’s trade, a third of its oil and gas, and 80 percent of the goods and gas consumed by the EU, all move through this 100-kilometer maritime corridor.16 An unstable Morocco would lead to a decrease in security for shipping as well as increased drug and people smuggling used to fuel VEOs. There is also precedence in threats to shipping in the STROG, in June 2002; the Moroccan government arrested a group of al Qaeda operatives suspected of plotting raids on British and U.S. tankers passing through the Strait of Gibraltar.17 We only have to study the attack on the USS Cole by al-Qaeda in Yemen’s Aden Harbour to see the consequences of poor maritime security where 17 sailors were killed in an attack by an explosive laden boat. The narrow strip of land that separates Morocco from Spain is 8.7 miles long at its shortest point and this has proved tempting for migrants seeking to enter Europe through Spain, the majority of which wish to travel to the UK to seek asylum. Morocco has therefore been a fundamental partner in policing the STROG and preventing illegal migration into Spain. It is safe to predict that an unstable Morocco would increase the threat of it becoming a major crossing point for illegal migration into Europe, fuelled by illegal people smuggling gangs – often who have to share their profits with Terrorist Organisations. As Dr Christina Lang highlights in the Global Terrorism Index: ‘According to the EU, nine out of ten irregular migrants from North Africa or Turkey use criminal facilitators. A recent Europol report claimed that migrant smugglers facilitating travel from Algiers, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Jordan and Turkey were making between three and six billion dollars for their efforts in 2015. There is evidence that smugglers have to share their profits with terrorist groups. If smugglers paid terrorists a third of the profits, a conservative estimate, terrorist groups could have earned as much as 100 million in 2015 alone from smuggling in Libya according to a study of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism.’18

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Military Contribution


This only serves to highlight the geopolitical importance of Morocco to the UK and wider Europe as we struggle with illegal migration, people smuggling and the detrimental effect this has on counter-terrorism efforts. Overall, we have seen evidence of Morocco as a progressive state in North Africa and tangible evidence of the path it wishes to take as a contributor to greater regional and global security. It has rejected extremism and has taken soft and hard steps to combat it in whatever form it takes, whether that is combating Islamic extremism as part of the counter-Daesh coalition or countering Christian extremism as UN Peacekeepers in the Central African Republic. As a UK partner it plays an active role in policing the STROG preventing it from becoming a hot-spot of people-smuggling like its regional neighbour Libya. It has taken an active role in increasing its military and police counter-terrorism capabilities through partnerships with other nations, including the UK and therefore has prevented infiltration by extremist groups who operate with impunity in other parts of North Africa. Importantly, it has remained stable in the face of the Arab Spring and has taken steps to narrow the socio-economic divides that gave rise to it. With the circumstances in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt we cannot afford another struggling state in the Region. What we need is a strong and stable partner in North Africa and given the evidence, Morocco is our only viable option.

Bibliography Fallon, Michael Sir. UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy. Ministry of Defence, 2017 Korin, Anne and Luft, Gal. Terrorism Goes to Sea. Council on Foreign Affairs, 2004 Liang, Dr Christina Schori. Mapping the New Global Criminal-Terrorist Networks. Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016 Institute for Economics and Peace. Global Terrorism Index. 2014, 2015, 2016 Rodriguez, Jesus. Safeguarding The Strait of Gibraltar. El Pais, 2015 Reporters Without Borders. Strategic Trends Programme. Regional Survey – Africa out to 2045. Ministry of Defence, 2016 The Economist Intelligence Unit. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office. organisations/foreign-commonwealth-office


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The Morocco-British Society. The Office for National Statistics. The United Nations.

Footnotes 1 07 May 17 2 07 May 17 3 07 May 17 4 02 May 17 5 Top 20 fastest growing markets for UK exports of goods and services – ONS 6 Other North African State’s UN Troop contributions are as follows: Algeria: 5, Libya: 0, Tunisia: 233, Egypt 2,904 7 15 May 17 8 MOD, Strategic Trends Programme, ‘Regional Survey – Africa out to 2045.’ Executive Summary p. XV 9 MOD, Strategic Trends Programme, ‘Regional Survey – Africa out to 2045.’ Conflict. p. 109 10 Institute for Economics & Peace; Global Terrorism Index p.94 15 May 17 11 Figures extracted from the Global Terrorism Index; Issues: 2014, 2015, 2016. 15 May 17 12 08 May 17 13 In 2015, France signed a deal with Morocco to educate future Imams on moderate Islamic teachings, the aim was to combat the ultraconservative fundamentalist strands being taught by countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. 14 08 May 17 15 Sir Michael Fallon, ‘UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy,’ Introduction a/file/596968/06032017_Def_Engag_Strat_2017DaSCREEN.pdf 11 May 17 16 08 May 17 17 08 May 17 18 Dr Christina Schori Liang; ‘Mapping the New Global Criminal-Terrorist Networks’, Institute for Economics & Peace; Global Terrorism Index p.85 15 May 17


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Military Contribution


Military outsourcing: Opportunities and threats Outsourcing is the process by which a business output or deliverable, which was previously produced ‘in house’ by employees of that company or organisation, is taken on by an external company for a fee. This external company may well specialise in outsourcing, and have a particular expertise in that given area, e.g. catering, administration, cleaning or supply chain. The decision to outsource may have been taken for a variety of different reasons, which will be explored later. By Capt M Wright A more formal definition of outsourcing is as: The act of (contractually) transferring some of an organization's recurring internal activities and decision rights to outside providers (Greaver II, 1999). The outsourcing of public sector work to the private sector by governments is a topic of significant importance, particularly to the armed forces. The reputational and even strategic impact when military outsource providers ‘get it wrong’ can be enormous, witness the furore over the killing of civilians in Nisour Square, Baghdad in 2007 by the US Private Military Company (PMC) Blackwater (Chapman 2010). This essay will investigate historic military outsourcing trends. It will then identify some generic motivators for outsourcing, and ask how these apply specifically to the military, including practical examples. It will then discuss opportunities and threats presented when outsourcing military capability.

Historic military outsourcing trends There are arguments in the literature which suggest that military outsourcing is well-established in history, but also that it represents a departure from the 20th century norm. Those who argue that it is a well-established trend point to examples such as the Admiralty practice of issuing Letters of Marque to civilian ships during the Napoleonic era, allowing them to conduct armed attacks against enemies of the crown, with compensation taking the form of the proceeds of the sale of captured ships (Suman, 2007). Others, such as Uttley, argue that while there are historical 130

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instances of civilians providing military functions, the overriding trend during the 20th century is towards militaries aiming for ‘self-sufficiency’, i.e. being able to deploy at reach and conduct warfare independent of any support from outside their own organisation (2004). Regardless of whether you believe it to be an entirely new trend, or a re-emergence of older policies, there is significant evidence in the academic literature which deals with both logistics and defence studies which indicate that modern military forces are increasingly leaning on outsourcing in order to continue functioning. (Erbel & Kinsey, 2015). Krahmann (2014) argues that the Thatcher Government were early-adopters of the mantra that the private sector is inherently more efficient than the public, with a clear policy that all Government departments were to find savings by outsourcing support services. The key philosophy behind this was the use of market testing to establish where money could be saved; and the vast Defence Estate, equipment holdings and personnel support requirement were ripe for outsourcing. In the three decades since, various aspects of defence support, including the majority of hard & soft facilities management, 4th line vehicle maintenance and many other support services are now provided by civilian companies under defence contracts. Taylor encapsulates how this has come into effect by discussing the move of the Defence Logistics Organisation (now Defence Equipment and Support) from being primarily a provider of support services, to being a ‘decider’ of services (2004). By this, he means that the organisation which was once focused on providing the output itself is now mainly focused on awarding the contracts to civilian industry to provide the services which were once provided by civil servants or armed forces personnel. This political trend has been combined in recent years with a more ‘expeditionary’ style of warfare requiring flexibility and the ability to project forces at reach (often achieved with assistance from contractors), in contrast to the cold war, where huge stocks of ammunition and equipment were prepositioned near the Inner German Border in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion (Moore and Antill 2000).

Why outsource? Kremic et al (2006), argue that the main drivers behind outsourcing, in a generic sense, can be summarised as Cost, Strategy and Politics. 1. Cost. This driver is the most obvious. This driver assumes that there are business outputs which can be


delivered for less cost by an external provider than by an internal one. For instance, a company may seek to outsource catering because bearing the cost of infrastructure maintenance, staff training and sourcing food might be exorbitant in comparison to shifting that cost to a large soft facilities management provider, who can deliver the same output with a fraction of the overhead cost; essentially seeking to create profit by employing economies of scale. This is a pertinent example for Defence. 2. Strategy. Strategy-driven outsourcing tends to arise from a desire to focus on core competencies (Suman 2007). In essence, this means that a company or organisation prioritises work on the main output at the expense of support functions, as these support functions are outsourced to other companies. This allows the leadership elements of the companies to put a clear emphasis on driving the strategic advancement of the company’s main output or main revenue stream, with the support functions entrusted to other companies who may have greater expertise. In the case of defence, it can be argued that combat is the ‘core competence’ of an armed force (Huntington 1957). 3. Politics. This tends to be a public-sector driver, simply because public sector organisations have to follow policy changes as Governments come and go with new political stances on various issues. As mentioned, the Thatcher administration championed neo-liberal economic theory, which holds that the public sector is inherently less efficient than the private sector and therefore outsourcing is a way of increasing productivity in public services by accessing market forces (Monbiot 2016). Despite Kremic et al (2006) arguing fairly strongly that drivers 1 & 2 are far more prevalent in the private sector, it is arguable that all 3 drivers exist within the military. Cost saving is often a factor in outsourcing military functions, and this ties in to the strategy of focusing available resources on the core competencies, i.e. delivering combat effect. Political drivers follow naturally as the armed forces ultimately answer to the Government, in the UK via the Civil Service and Secretary of State for Defence. The author would argue that in the case of the armed forces, most cases of outsourcing are driven by a combination of all three aspects; initiated by politics (i.e. those who set public policy for the Armed Forces & public expenditure), moulded by strategy (framing the requirement and balancing the focus on key military outputs) and underpinned by cost (as military equipment becomes increasingly expensive, but military budgets are under pressure, there have to be cost-saving measures). The increasingly complex equipment in use by modern militaries provides another key reason for increased outsourcing. The example chosen here is that of the British support helicopter (SH) fleet. Whereas early SH were (relatively) simple platforms, modern SHs will have complex communications equipment, targeting systems, air defence systems and so on which in addition to other elements such

Military Contribution

as the drive train, weapons mountings etc. comprise a ‘system of systems’. The complexity involved often means that the expertise required to repair & maintain these individual systems, beyond very basic user repairs, has to be provided by their manufacturer in what NATO armies would term ‘4th line support’. In the UK case, this through life support to the SH fleet is provided by the manufacturer Boeing under a long contract (Boeing 2016). The US Department of Defence has come in recent decades to favour this form of outsourcing as the preferred method of equipment support, termed ‘Performance Based Logistics’, whereby manufacturers are held to account by the performance levels of the equipment they have sold; platform availability falling below agreed acceptable levels means financial penalties to the company (Glas et al, 2011).

Opportunities and threats It is quite clear that outsourcing is a necessary part of any modern Armed Forces. This may be dealing with the maintenance and upkeep of the complex platforms, which requires the technical expertise which can no longer be provided ‘in house’ or it could be supporting a vast defence estate with hard & soft facilities management. Another opportunity provided by military outsourcing is outlined by both Moore and Anthill (2000) and Suman (2007). They use the term ‘teeth to tail ratio’. What is meant by this term is the combat arms capacity versus the support chain which is required to get those combat arms into the position whereby they can deliver effect. If the ‘teeth to tail’ ratio can be increased, i.e. more combat arms with less support, then for the same resource more actual effect can be achieved. For example, why have a soldier performing 4th line repair when the repairs are so complex they can only be conducted in a safe environment in the firm base. Arguably the engineer only requires military training if they are to conduct their repairs in a hostile environment. However, there are risks. Datta and Roy (2013) posit that the cost driver for outsourcing discussed earlier is potentially dangerous; effectively a failure in the outsourcing provider can have strategic implications rather than purely financial. For example, an armed force reliant on one company to deliver 4th line repairs on a key piece of equipment, say targeting systems in Attack Helicopters, would lose a key capability if this company became insolvent and shut down. Were these helicopters being used in a combat operation it is not inconceivable that there might be casualties suffered as a direct result of a civilian company failing. In addition to the risk to life, there can be a significant reputational risk. The large-scale corruption uncovered at Supreme foods, a major US contractor, during recent conflicts, was hugely damaging to the reputation of both the US Armed forces and the US Government (Pearson and Church, 2014). That being said, arguably a well-run and well-managed outsourcing contract can provide significant value, if the contract manager has the subject matter expertise and ability to build strong relationships with the outsourcing provider (Greaver II, 1999). THE REVIEW 2017-2018 131

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Regardless of whether you believe the case for outsourcing has been made convincingly, it seems clear that British Government policy is strongly in favour of moving output from the state to the private sector. The author would argue that outsourcing should continue to be used by militaries and the British Armed Forces, and even increased, with three caveats: 1. Uttley argues that the extent to which outsourcing can be employed in the support chain is down to the risk appetite held by the chain of command (2004). There therefore must be careful consideration of the risk profile for each individual deployment which involves aspects of a contracted support chain, and a command decision must be taken at the highest level to accept the risk. 2. There must be efficient and effective management of the outsourcing provider, they must be held to the contract but also a robust but friendly relationship must be established by contract managers in order to ensure smooth delivery of output. 3. There must be a clear understanding of what our core outputs are, and these must never be compromised by outsourcing. A clear understanding of the benefits and risks of outsourcing by commanders at every level is vital. Only with careful risk management will Armed Forces be able to utilise outsourcing to increase their output while maintaining the necessary capability to conduct the full spectrum of warfare at reach.

Boeing. 2016. “The Handbook: Essentialy Capability for the UK.” London: Boeing. Chapman, Katherin J. 2010. “The Untouchables: Private Military Contractors' Criminal Accountability under the UCMJ.” Vanderbilt Law Review 63 (4): 1047-1080. Datta, Partha Priya, and Rajkumar Roy. 2013. “Incentive issues in performance-based outsourcing contracts in the UK.” Production Planning & Control (Production Planning and Control) 24 (4-5): 359-374. Ebel, Mark, and Christopher Kinsey. 2015. “Think Again - Supplying War: Reappraising Military Logistics and Its centrality to Strategy and War.” Journal of Strategic Studies 1-29. Glas, Andreas, Erik Hofmann, and Micheal Essig. 2013. “Performance-based logistics: A portfolio for contracting military supply .” International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management 43 (2): 97-115. Greaver II, Maurice F. 1999. Strategic Outsourcing: A structured Approach to Outsourcing Decisions and Initiatives. Washington DC: AMACOM Div American Mgmt Assn. Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. The Soldier and the State. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard UP. Krahmann, Elke. 2010. State, Citizens and the Privatization of Security. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kremic, T, Icmell, O & O.Rom, W. 2006. “Outsourcing decision support: a survey of benefits, risks and decision factors.” Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 11 (6): 467-482. Monbiot, G. 2016. Neoliberalism – the ideology at the root of all our problems. 15 April. Accessed April 20, 2017. books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problem-george-monbiot. Moore, David M, and Peter D Antill. 2000. “British army logistics and contractors on the battlefield.” The RUSI Journal 145 (5): 46-52. Pearson, Sophia, and Steven Church. 2014. Supreme Pays U.S. $389 Million for Afghanistan Food Fraud. Accessed April 12, 2016. http:// Suman, Mrinal. 2007. “Outsourcing of Defence Logistics in the Indian Armed Forces.” Strategic Analysis 31 (4): 603-624. Taylor, Trevor. 2004. “Contractors on deployed operations and equipment support.” Defence Studies 4 (2): 184-198. Uttley, Mathew R H. 2004. “Private Contractors on deployed operations: the United Kingdom Experience.” Defence Studies 4 (2): 145-165.


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