THE ROYAL LOGISTIC CORPS FOUNDATION
distances that needed to be projected were once again significant. The nearest coast to Bamako was more than 800km. From Bamako forward to Gao, the French needed to project lines of supply up to 1,000km and the projection north east of Gao to the mountainous regions was a total distance of 1,300km. The vast distance to be covered required logistic effort to be based on necessity to supply only vital components and consumables, to prevent logistic formations from being over reached and over tasked. The next friction to consider is demand. The French logistic chain faced the high demands of a mechanised infantry on a high intensity footing. To overcome this, the French streamlined its fighting force by using simpler, wheeled vehicles to minimise the need for complex spares. This increased the mean time to failure allowing for more track miles. The fighting force and vehicles adopted a foraging approach to the operation, they drained fuel stations dry as they moved through the country, taking food and water from the land. This streamlined demand allowed for only critical supplies, such as ammunition and vehicles spares, to be brought forward. Duration is the final friction to consider. French success in Mali depended on the duration of the operation being kept as low as possible to enable the demand, distance and destination frictions to be minimised. A short campaign allowed for logistical success where frictions were met with minimal logistical effort and only a smaller number of vital supplies were required to be brought forward or flown in at great cost. Essentially the operation had high risk, as the high demand was able to be maintained over a short duration but not throughout a long campaign. The frictions discussed above were overcome using the tactical principles of logistics FACES, which led to the operation being a success. There are three aspects to foresight that are key to consider. The first is France’s colonial and historical links to Mali. The second is France’s pre-positioned troops in Chad, which allowed for French troops to enter Mali quickly given their relatively close proximity to the country. It also enabled a staging area with consumable supplies and with a preestablished logistical supply route. Finally, the Guepard alert system allowed France to quickly mass a logistical chain and fighting elements to start the onward projection of force and log facilities to project supply. Looking at the logistic principle of agility, France achieved this by employing several methods. Foraging enabled the fighting elements to fuel, eat and drink without needing an extensive log chain, as food and fuel didn’t need projecting in great mass. Increased lift capacity from Allied aircraft allowed the inload of vital spares and ammunition to be pushed forward quickly without a ground-based log chain. The readiness of the French military enabled quick deployment of vehicles and troops, projection of force and logistic nodes. The principle of co-operation was key to France’s success in Mali, using home nation support and allied help. The ability
OPERATIONS AND TRAINING
to keep a large force mobile through Mali, with minimal logistical tail, was only achievable through support from the Malian people and government; the access to their fuel pumps, food, water and other consumables, meant the French did not carry these with them as they moved forward. The reliance on knowledge and infrastructure from the home nation was also key. The allied support was mainly achieved with massed allied air, the need for vital supplies was weighed up against food and water and only the absolute minimum was taken forward with the fighting force, the remainder was air dropped in by the allied air fleet available to them. Operation SERVAL also embodied efficiency through the use of allied support and the reliance on home nation support. Working in conjunction with the home nation minimised the areas of responsibility following the operation. The maintenance of momentum kept efficacy to a maximum, while France’s forward movement at speed prevented the enemy from putting up a sustained fight in a defensive position. This efficiency reduced the logistic strain and allowed for further projection of the force. The offensive achieved simplicity through establishing a simple logistic chain. Only ammunition and mission critical kit was moved forward with the fighting force, the remainder of supplies were gained from the land or from host nation support. They embodied fight light and resourced the operation through allied air support and host nation infrastructure. Looking at the logistic effort in Mali, there are several factors identified which contributed to achieving a successful
THE REVIEW 2018-2019
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