Topic Overviews

Warsaw 2016 Power Shifts Academic Forum

TABLE OF CONTENTS EU Guide 3-7 CLIM - Committee on Climate Change 8-9 ENVI - Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety 10 IMCO - Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection 11 ITRE I - Committee on Industry, Research and Technology I 12-13 ITRE II - Committee on Industry, Research and Technology II 14 JURI - Committee on Legal Affairs 15-16 LIBE - Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 17 TRAN - Committee on Transport and Tourism 18

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THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE EU This section will provide an insight into the aims, processes and rules of governance of the European Union. The following videos introduce key aspects of EU procedural mechanisms and provide fundamental information in many of the current topics on the EU agenda. The European Union in brief At the core of the EU are the Member States — the 28 countries that belong to the Union — and their citizens. The unique feature of the EU is that, although these are all sovereign, independent countries, they have pooled some of their ‘sovereignty’ in order to gain strength and the benefits of size. Pooling sovereignty means, in practice, that the Member States delegate some of their decision-making powers to the shared institutions they have created, so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at European level. The EU thus sits between the fully federal system found in the United States and the loose, intergovernmental cooperation system seen in the United Nations.

The European Council Setting the strategy

ROLE: Defines political direction and priorities MEMBERS: Heads of State or government from each Member State, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission

The European Council brings together the EU’s top political leaders, i.e. Prime Ministers and Presidents along with its President and the President of the Commission. They meet at least four times a year to give the EU as a whole general political direction and priorities. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy also takes part in the meetings. What the European Council does As a summit meeting of the Heads of State or Government of all the EU countries, the European Council represents the highest level of political cooperation between the Member States. At their meetings, the leaders decide by consensus on the overall direction and priorities of the Union, and provide the necessary impetus for its development. The European Council does not adopt legislation. At the end of each meeting it issues ‘conclusions’, which reflect the main messages resulting from the discussions and take stock of the decisions taken, also as regards their follow-up. The conclusions identify major issues to be dealt with by the Council, i.e. the meetings of ministers. They may also invite the European Commission to come forward with proposals addressing a particular challenge or opportunity facing the Union. European Council meetings as a rule take place at least twice every six months. Additional (extraordinary or informal) meetings may be called to address urgent issues in need of decisions at the highest level, for example in economic affairs or foreign policy. Warsaw 2016 - Power Shifts Academic Forum - 3

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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How the European Council takes its decisions The European Council takes most of its decisions by consensus. In a number of cases, however, qualified majority applies, such as the election of its President, and the appointment of the Commission and of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Then the European Council decides by vote, only the Heads of State or Government may cast a vote.

The European Parliament The voice of the people

ROLE: Directly elected legislative arm of the EU MEMBERS: 751 Members of the European Parliament The Parliament has three main roles. The Parliament has three main roles. 1. It shares with the Council the power to legislate — to pass laws. The fact that it is a directly elected body helps guarantee the democratic legitimacy of European law. 2. It exercises democratic supervision over all EU institutions, and in particular the Commission. It has the power to approve or reject the nomination of the President of the Commission and Commissioners, and the right to censure the Commission as a whole. 3. It shares authority with the Council over the EU budget and can therefore influence EU spending. At the end of the budget procedure, it adopts or rejects the budget in its entirety.

The European Commission

Promoting the common interest

ROLE: Executive arm of the EU that proposes laws, polices agreements and promotes the Union

MEMBERS: College of Commissioners, one from each Member State The Commission is the politically independent institution that represents and upholds the interests of the EU as a whole. In many areas it is the driving force within the EU’s institutional system: it proposes legislation, policies and programmes of action and is responsible for implementing the decisions of the European Parliament and the Council. It also represents the Union to the outside world with the exception of the common foreign and security policy. What is the Commission? The term ‘Commission’ is used in two senses. Firstly, it refers to the ‘Members of the Commission’ — i.e. the team of men and women appointed by the Member States and Parliament to run the institution and take its decisions. Secondly, the term ‘Commission’ refers to the institution itself and to its staff. Informally, the Members of the Commission are known as ‘Commissioners’. They have all held political positions and many have been government ministers, but as members of the Commission they are committed to acting in the interests of the Union as a whole and not taking instructions from national governments. The Commission has several Vice-Presidents, one of whom is also the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and thus has a foot in both the Council and the Commission camps. The Commission remains politically answerable to Parliament, which has the power to dismiss it by adopting a motion of censure. The Commission attends all the sessions of Parliament, where it must clarify and justify its policies. It also replies regularly to written and oral questions posed by Members of Parliament. What the Commission does The European Commission has four main roles: 1. to propose legislation to Parliament and the Council; 2. to manage and implement EU policies and the budget; 3. to enforce European law (jointly with the Court of Justice); 4. to represent the Union around the world.

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The Council of Ministers

The voice of the Member States

ROLE: Deciding on policies and adopting legislation MEMBERS: One minister from each Member State

In the Council, ministers of EU Member States meet to discuss EU matters, take decisions and pass laws. The ministers who attend these meetings have the authority to commit their government to the actions agreed in the Council meetings. What the Council does The Council is an essential EU decision-maker. Its work is carried out in Council meetings that are attended by one minister from each of the EU’s national governments. The purpose of these gatherings is to: discuss, agree, amend and, finally, adopt legislation; coordinate the Member States’ policies; or define the EU’s foreign policy. Which ministers attend which Council meeting depends on the subjects on the agenda — this is known as the ‘configuration’ of the Council. If, for example, the Council is to discuss environmental issues, the meeting will be attended by the environment minister from each EU Member State and is known as the ‘Environment Council’; likewise, for the ‘Economic and Financial Affairs Council’ or the ‘Competitiveness Council’, and so on.

Union law, with the primary law ranking above the secondary. Therefore, secondary law can only be effective as long as it is consistent with the primary law. The differentiation between primary and secondary law is especially important in the process of law-making: While secondary law is enacted by the EU institutions, the enactment or amendment of primary law is solely within competence of the Member States. Primary sources of EU law include all founding treaties of the European Union, all later EU treaties (i.e. Treaty of Maastricht and the latest Treaty of Lisbon), as well as all accession treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The EU has the following secondary legal options to legislate: Regulations, Directives, Decisions, Recommendations and Opinions: Regulations have to be strictly adhered to in all Member States and leave no room for adjustments during the implementation process. Directives provide a framework and give a certain policy direction, leaving the states with more flexibility and room for adjustments. Decisions always address certain recipients and are only valid for those specific countries/people/ institutions. Recommendations and Opinions are not formally valid. The European legislative procedure lasts a bit longer than on a national level. The EC has the exclusive Right to Initiative, the Council and the EP decide if the proposal becomes a legal act after having discussed relevant details. General policy guidelines and statements, especially from the EP, are formulated in Resolutions. They can entail instructions for future procedures as well as regulations, which are formally valid in the Member States. Legal acts passed by the EP and the Council only enter into force after the respective national governments have introduced and implemented it within their national laws.

The Presidency of the Council rotates between the Member States every six months. It is not the same as the President of the European Council. The responsibility of the government holding the Presidency is to organise and chair the different Council meetings. By way of exception, the Foreign Affairs Council is chaired by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who carries out foreign policy on behalf of the Council. In the interest of continuity of Council business, the six-monthly Presidencies work together closely in groups of three. These three-Presidency teams Mixed competences by policy area (‘trios’) draw up a joint programme of Council work What decisions are taken? over an 18-month period. The treaties list the policy areas in which the EU can take decisions. In some policy areas, the EU has exLaw-making in the European Union clusive competence, which means that decisions Does the EU pass laws? Not exactly! The sources of are taken at EU level by the Member States meeting EU law can be divided into two groups: the primain the Council and the European Parliament. ry source of Union law and secondary source of 6 - Warsaw 2016 - Power Shifts Academic Forum

These policy areas cover customs, competition rules, monetary policy for the Euro Area and the conservation of fish and trade. In other policy areas, there is shared competence between the Union and the Member States. This means that if legislation is passed at EU level, then these laws have priority. However, if no legislation is adopted at EU level, then the individual Member States may legislate at national level. Shared competence applies in many policy areas, such as the internal market, agriculture, the environment, consumer protection and transport.

In all other policy areas, the decisions remain with the Member States. Thus, if a policy area is not cited in a treaty, the Commission cannot propose a law in that area. However, in some fields, such as the space sector, education, culture and tourism, the Union can support Member States’ efforts. And in others, such as overseas aid and scientific research, the EU can carry out parallel activities, such as humanitarian aid programmes.

MIXED COMPETENCES BY POLICY AREAS SHARED PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE IF EU HAS POLICY

NON EXCLUSIVE

Customs union

Internal market

Research and Development

Most Human health policies

Eurozone monetary policy

Certain social policy

Outer space policy

Industry

Development cooperation

Culture

Conservation of marine resources Common commercial policy

Cohesion policy Agriculture and fisheries Environment Consumer protection Transport Energy

“The Fundamentals of the EU” gathered and prepared by Fahad Saher (NL), layouted by Endre Haugland (NO) and Annemari Sepp (EE).

Humanitarian aid

Tourism Industry Education and training Civil protection and disaster prevention Administrative cooperation Coordination of economic, employment and social policies

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CLIM Saving the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: With the Market Stability Reserve expected to become effective only around 2025, is Sweden’s recent decision to purchase and scrap emissions allowances an example to follow? What avenues can be pursued to make ETS work better sooner? Chairperson: Nia Chigogidze (GE) The European Union’s emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) was launched in 2005 to promote the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient way. It works by restricting the volume of greenhouse gases that can be emitted by energy-intensive industry, power producers and airlines. The cap for emission allowances is set by the EU, and companies either receive or buy individual allowances. The cap is reduced over time so that the amount of emissions gradually decreases. However, a surplus of emission allowances has been building up in EU ETS since 2009. A significant reason for this is the economic crisis of 2008, which caused companies to decrease production, which resulted in there being more emissions on the market than where required. Another key cause of the surplus is policy overlap. As a means of reaching its 20-20-20 headline targets, EU member states launched support mechanisms to stimulate renewable energy deployment. The rise in wind and solar energy and the economic crisis therefore resulted in an overall decrease of emissions. The surplus of emissions causes the price of carbon (that is to say EU ETS allowances) to decrease. When carbon prices are sufficiently high compagnies get an incentive to invest in energy efficient technologies, as it saves them money in the long run. However, when the price is low firms find, companies find it easier to simply just buy additional allowances. The European Union plans to address this issue through short-term and long term-solutions. As a shortterm measure the Commission postponed the auctioning of 900 million allowances until 2019-2020, in an action known as “back-loading”. As a long-term measure, changes will be introduced to reform the ETS by establishing a market stability reserve (MRS) which should start operating in 2019. This new mechanism creates a system that will automatically take a portion of ETS allowances off the market and place it in a reserve if the surplus exceeds a certain threshold. In the opposite scenario, allowances could be returned to the market. As a means of supporting and straightening the EU ETS Sweden recently launched a program, whereby the Swedish government will annually purchase and cancel over 300,000 Euro worth of emissions in the period from 2018-2040. With this initiative Sweden hopes to tackle the present surplus allowances and low carbon prices under the ETS. Unfortunately, cancelling out about 7 million allowances (0.4% of the current surplus of almost 2 billion) will have no major effect or reducing oversupply in a noticeable way. As such some people have been coming out criticizing the plan as a waste of public money could have otherwise

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been invested in climate friendly solutions. The EU ETS was designed as the main instrument for achieving EU’s greenhouse gas emission reduction targets within its 2030 climate and energy framework. This is why the effective functioning of the ETS is so important and why in July the European Commission presented a legislative proposal to revise the EU ETS from 2020 onwards. The main question now lies in how should EU, and the countries participating in ETS, approach improving this failing system. Should other countries follow Sweden’s example and contribute to decreasing the allowance surplus through buy outs? Is there a need for a more fundamental reform of the entire ETS structure? Or, taking into account the vast criticism EU ETS has been receiving, is there any need for an existence of a EU ETS system at all?

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ENVI With the Effort Sharing Regulation proposal tabled, how can it be improved to ensure living up to the EU’s 2030 climate deal? Chairperson: Juho Nikko (FI) At the Paris Climate Conference in December 2015, the United Nations made history by creating the first ever legally binding agreement for keeping global warming at less than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. As part of the agreement, the EU committed itself to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 40% before 2030, compared to 1990 levels. The Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR) proposed by the European Commission in July 2016 would be an important part of the EU’s efforts towards reaching its 2030 emission targets. It is aimed at reducing emissions in areas not already covered by the EU emission trading system (ETS), including transport, buildings, agriculture, small industry and waste. In 2013, these sectors accounted for as much as 55% of GHG emissions in the EU. The proposed regulation sets national targets for reducing GHG emissions, meaning that each Member State has their own target. To ensure fairness and cost-effectiveness, the main criterion for setting the targets is the Member State’s GDP: for example, the reduction target for Germany is 39%, whereas for Poland it is 7%. Even though the Commission’s proposal strives to treat Member States fairly, the personal targets have sparked mixed feelings in EU countries. Directly following the proposal’s announcement, the Finnish Minister of Environment, Kimmo Tiilikainen, described the 39% reduction as “a tough goal”, given that the country had expected a target of 37-38%. Sweden, on the other hand, was dealt the toughest possible target (40%), but responded by saying that the country is actually aiming for even greater reductions. Polish press found Poland’s requirements “drastic”, as the EU’s previous policy had allowed Poland to increase their emissions to foster economic growth. In an October interview, the Polish Minister of Environment Jan Szyszko criticised the EU’s focus on reducing emissions, emphasising that the Paris Agreement also named forestry as a way of effectively reducing the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere. On a different front, several non-governmental organisations (NGO) have expressed their disappointment with the proposal. The European Environmental Bureau criticised the possibility for agriculture-heavy states such as Denmark and Ireland to offset emissions from unsustainable farming by planting trees. WWF described these flexibility measures as loopholes, allowing Member States to cheat their way out of real climate action. The next meeting of the EU’s Ministers of Environment is scheduled for 17 October. With the Effort Sharing Regulation already marching through the common legislative procedure, how can it be improved to ensure that it is not rejected by Member States and that it will live up to the EU’s goals for 2030?

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IMCO Making energy flow in Europe: How can the EU transition to a fully interconnected electricity market whilst facilitating further integration of renewables and ensuring energy affordability? Chairperson: Zura Giorgobiani (GE) The EU’s Energy Market has faced some changes in recent years but despite the progress made European energy system is still underperforming on different levels. Ineffective market design leads to the insufficient investments and weak competition and while the future of the energy market lies on different renewable source, redesigning the EU’s Energy Market is becoming more relevant every day. The share of electricity produced by renewables is expected to grow from 25% to 50% in 2030 and the European Commission has already agreed that its energy market needs to be redesigned, however there still is not a common ground on which should be the most effective plan for the future of the energy market in the EU. The EU aims to create reliable and affordable energy supply for its’ citizens and become a world leader in renewable energy. The market design affects the ways energy is generated, traded and consumed in the EU. Through common energy market rules energy can be produced in one EU country and consumed in another. This system creates a competition on the market and gives consumers choice when it comes to choosing their energy supplier. However, if the EU wants to meet its’ 2030 climate and energy targets, which includes at least 40% cut in greenhouse gas emissions, at least 27% share for renewable energy, and at least 27% improvement in energy efficiency, the energy market needs to take steps towards electricity market. On the other hand, even though EU is one of the biggest producers of primary energy it still imports 53% of the energy it consumes, which costs more than a billion per day. Also, the total primary energy production in EU has reduced drastically after Brexit since the United Kingdom was third biggest producer of primary energy after France and Germany. The latest EU Energy Market legislation, known as third energy package, covers five main areas, including strengthening the independence of the regulators, establishing the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and cross-border cooperation. However, the third energy package doesn’t cover every aspect of the electricity market which gives Member States a freedom to legislate this field by themselves. Since the energy is a shared competence of the EU, it leads us to having different legislations in different countries. Having so many different legislations by Member States and knowing the few energy produced inside the EU, how can the EU work to standardise its energy market and not rely on imported energy? How should therefore the future of the EU Energy Market look like?

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ITRE I In light of on-going struggle to develop a coherent grid strategy across borders, how can the EU build up upon previous results in order to ensure the architecture standards are coherent with the developments in decentralised energy? Chairperson: Marta Sznajder (PL) The European Union originates from the Coal and Steel Union, which established in 1952 was the beginning of the peaceful cooperation between France and Germany. Despite its huge value, until today energy remains as a shared competence between the EU and its Member States. The issue Europe is right now trying to deal with is the decentralisation of energy. Majority of countries still strongly rely on centralised energy and conventional power generators. The worst example of this phenomenon can be Poland, with only one, the biggest power station in the European Union, in Bełhatów which supplies 55% of energy in the whole country. Such combination of both of these factors may pose serious threats to country’s stability and safety, as conventional power generators can never function on their own, they always require an external impulse of power in order to start working. In case of a breakdown, accident or an outbreak of a war and hypothetical bombings of the power station, it would quickly lead to a total blackout within the whole country, as there would be no other place from where the energy could be provided. The best solution for this is obviously the decentralisation of energy, however, as the process of the decentralisation of energy is extremely expensive, especially that according to the 2020/2030 EU regulations the production of energy at the conventional energy power stations is crazily expensive, due to high punishments connected to production of the CO2, most of the Members States with the centralised systems are hardly struggling to move forward. Therefore different solutions must be found. One possible solution is to rely more on the renewable energy, as most importantly it is sustainable, and although it’s less efficient that traditional energy, the alternative one may serve as a useful tool for cooperation. For instance in case of an accident in a conventional power generator, a water power generator located nearby may easily deliver the necessary impulse of energy to bring it back to life. Although the case is not as simple either in this situation, as the costs of infrastructure needed to produce renewable energy are often terrifying and knowing their inefficiency countries often resign from building them at all (f.e. it takes 20 years for a water power generator to start paying off; this is also the estimated time when it requires serious reconstructions). Last but not least possibility in the aforementioned case of a conventional power generator accident is to borrow the needed impulse of energy from another country. With this countries can support each other through transmitting the energy. All of the countries of the European Union, and even on top of that, most of the European countries are connected via grids, they are all, however, blocked at the country’s borders. Energy in Europe today is synchronised and ready for it. What stops them then from transmitting energy when needed, selling it their neighbours or just sharing when they produced too much?

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There are three main areas of European policies that prevent form a full unification: the market integration, which could fear that domestic, energy producers are not competitive enough to perform at the European level; the renewable transition, which poses the threat that production will be shifted to those countries that have access to more sources of renewable energy, offer better incentives for expanding capacity or can exploit them cost-efficiently, the Member States will simply be forced to face a “make or buy decision�; and, last but not least the supply diversification, which bearing in mind especially the latests issues concerning the Ukraine crisis of 2014, where after the crisis the EU decided to shift away from the external energy providers and build its inner security. What is also more, on a more political note, there is a certain level of trust needed to achieve to fully build a greater pan European grid. Economic instruments and a regulatory framework are deemed necessary to ease the geopolitical concerns of the EU. Lastly, co-ownership and/or shared control over grids assets and their operation, either between groups or on the EU level is also a necessity. What is also worth noticing, is the diagram on which the dependence between the usage of energy and amount of it being produced is presented. Whilst the first keeps growing, due to the consistent development of industry, the latter is being kept at the same level. Naturally these lines will soon cross which would potentially cause a massive blackout and serious issues with the lack of energy, that are even not fully possible to predict yet. Such danger let the scientists to develop the concept of the smart grids. It would allow the power industry to observe and control parts of the system at higher resolution in time space. It would also allow the consumers to obtain cheaper, greener, less intrusive, more reliable and higher quality power from the grid. The system of smart grids already works perfectly in the USA, where a consumer connected to it receives a text message on their smartphone announcing the prizes of energy would be cheaper within hours X-Y on that day. Centralised or not? Conventional or alternative? Traditional or smart? Divided or united? These are the questions the European Union and its Member States should answer in order to decide which path to take to develop a strong, sustainable and efficient energy market.

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ITRE II Securing gas supply for good: Given the insufficient resilience of most EU Member States to gas shortages, what stance should the EU agree upon to ensure both a solidary and diversified supply of gas? Chairperson: Matthias Klonner (AT) Being one of main energy sources in the European Union, gas is a highly discussed and important topic, especially when it comes to its supply in the future. As of today, over 69% of the EU gas imports are comprised by only two nations: Russia and Norway, making the whole Union vulnerable to possible, as experienced during the Ukraine crisis. Furthermore, the expected decline of domestic gas production of the world’s biggest gas importer will lead to a further increase in gas imports. In addition to that, gas plays a vital role in a secure energy supply when it comes to sustainable resources, being the first fall back energy source in case of shortfalls. As energy is a highly sensitive issue in general, the differences between various Member States and the European Union itself are significant, with the Member States primarily focusing on their own energy security and the Commission trying to tackle the problem on an EU-wide level. Contributing to that, there are big differences in the use of gas and the infrastructure of gas storage facilities between the different Member States, making it hard to find common ground. However, the possible consequences of major gas suppliers would affect the entire Union, which is why the Commission proposed an new regulation for gas security this February. The main objective of the regulation is to introduce a solidarity clause, however, the clause and the whole proposal are still under discussion. Another goal of the European Union is to increase the usage of liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a new source of gas supply in order to achieve a greater diversification of suppliers. On the other hand,some experts argue that a working and well regulated internal gas market, together with a full usage of the already existing storage facilities would be sufficient to tackle any fallouts. Should the European Union strive for more cooperation between the Member States or are national differences too fundamental for a union-wide approach? Is the costly diversification of resources with LNG necessary to secure supply, or is an improved use of the existing infrastructure sufficient?

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JURI What role should the EU take in controlling and supervising private and intergovernmental agreements in the energy sector? Chairperson: Ugnė Alškaitė (LT) Energy interdependence is increasing in the EU. Every year, more and more Member States seek new energy supplies outside of the EU. Such negotiations with energy suppliers frequently require political and legal support, for example to provide certainty to investors constructing energy infrastructure. This political support is given in the form of intergovernmental agreements (IGAs). These agreements are often the basis for more detailed commercial contracts. In 2015 the Commission carried out an evaluation of the efficiency of the 2012 IGA Decision. It concluded that while the current system is useful for receiving information on existing IGAs and for identifying where they do not comply with EU law, it is not sufficient enough to tackle any such cases. As it stands, the current law requires Member States to notify the Commission of their energy agreements with non-EU countries only after they have been concluded. However, it has proven very difficult to renegotiate any terms of the agreements after they have been signed by the parties. The Commission’s analysis of all notified IGAs showed that around one-third of the agreements related to energy infrastructure or energy supply contained provisions were not compliant with EU law. To date no such agreement has been successfully renegotiated. In the first week of October, the Energy Committee of the European Parliament approved of a new draft law requiring Member States to notify the European Commission when they negotiate energy supply deals with third parties. This means the effort to monitor IGAs is increasing. The aim of this is to ensure that a deal “complies with Union law and respects Energy Union objectives”, say MEPs. IGAa signed by individual Member States with third parties or countries can have a negative impact on the security of supply in neighbouring countries or on the functioning of the EU Energy Market. The Energy Union strategy, endorsed by Member States in 2015, sees safeguarding the integrity of EU Energy Market as key to securing energy supplies for EU citizens and promoting greater solidarity and a fairer economic union. However, following the Union’s rules may not always be in the commercial interests of non-EU energy suppliers, and therefore Member States may come under pressure to include sign deals which may hamper the functioning of the EU Energy Market. Some examples that are particularly troublesome include preventing the ownership unbundling of energy transport infrastructure and energy generation companies; limiting the access of other companies to the infrastructure; not allowing competitive tariff setting and preventing the purchaser of gas or oil from reselling the commodity to other Member States. Many also question the power that the EU should have when intervening in a private agreement. Some companies and countries believe that in an individual deal the EU shouldn’t have a say and companies

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shouldn’t be obliged to notify of the deal. Others believe the EU should act to ensure it’s laws are being met, but not having an active role in the negotiations, as some also suggest. The question is: Should the EU supervise at all the negotiations of IGAs and private agreements? What power does the EU have to tell one of it’s Member States, or even a private company, what they can or not do in matters of energy, which is not their exclusive competence? Even, should Member States be obliged to inform the Commission about their intent to enter into negotiations with a non-EU country on a new IGA or to amend an existing one?

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LIBE Security and privacy in the era of smart grids: How can the EU improve the cyber resilience of infrastructure in order to protect the privacy of its citizens? Chairperson: Dimitris Krokos (GR) Smart grids and smart meters are just some of the innovations that are transforming the energy sector and an electricity distribution system that was conceived more than 100 years ago. At the same time concerns are raised regarding the protection of consumers’ privacy -in accordance with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights- and the safety of these grids in the information area. Firstly, the use of not only dual, but multi-tariffs, utilising the data provided by smart meters is thought to help in curbing peak demand and distributing electricity demand more evenly throughout the day. Concerns have been raised, most notably by the European Bureau of Consumers’ Unions (BEUC), regarding the effects of such pricing schemes on low income consumers, as well as the fact that mass data collected at frequent intervals cannot be adequately anonymised. Interconnected with multi-tariff pricing is also the issue of more efficient power generation by matching supply with demand in real time through the use of data collected by smart meters and ensuring grid efficiency and stability. Critics are worried about the vast amount of data collected and stored for this application; who will store the data, for how long, how will they be used- are only some of the questions emerging. They also fear that the even with the reformed data protection rules across the EU, their privacy might still be at risk. Some go as far as saying that the accrued data will be of even more value to power suppliers than the actual commodity, raising fears about the transformation of the nature of the energy industry. The issue of network and grid security is also troubling a great deal of consumers and agencies. With occasions of cyber attacks on smart grids hubs and substations, not concerns are raising about the vulnerability of a more digitised and remotely controlled energy infrastructure to attacks. Notably, in December 2015, a cyber attack on Ukraine’s energy grid by deactivating 30 substations, deprived more than 200.000 people of electricity and was only resolved through physical intervention. On the other hand, such substations and hubs increase the reliability of the energy grid, preventing extensive blackouts and containing their effects, whose costs are far from negligible, as the 2003 Northeastern blackout in the US suggests with an estimated cost of $6bn and at least 11 deaths. The infrastructure needed to counter a general blackout costs an estimated £150m, in the UK alone. Moreover, the remote access feature embedded in some smart devices allows remote shutdown and scheduling from the part of the consumer, but also the energy supplier. Although this feature allows for better load balancing, especially during peak hours, it also raises fears of susceptibility to cyber-attacks even within the consumer’s residence.

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TRAN Transitioning mobility: what incentives and regulations should be promoted to ensure that low-emission mobility becomes real? Chairperson: Laura Korn (NL) Due to the growing threat of global warming policy makers are now forced to rethink our current way of living. An important aspect to this is mobility, the way citizens travel from point A to point B. Currently the rate of emission in the EU caused by vehicles is still high. In 2013 the transportation sector was the highest contributor to NOx emissions. Furthermore, in urban areas the transport sector is responsible for up to 60% of NO2 emissions. Road transport is the second highest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions. To reduce these numbers the EU released “A European Strategy for low-emission mobility”. The strategy focuses on low-emission and zero-emission vehicles, the efficiency of the transport sector and on actions on a regional level. However, aviation and shipping emissions are largely a global issue Legislations in both fields is relatively new, so there is no guarantee that the EU will succeed in reducing emissions in either of the sectors. Moreover, Sugarcane.org released a stament about the strategy saying that the European Commission missed an opportunity when they didn’t include suger-cane ethanol. Sugar-cane ethanol can reduce up to 90% on average of the greenhouse gasses compared to gasoline. Unfortunately this type of ethanol does require a certain climate to produce, warm and rainy, making it unfit to grow throughout the entire Union. Another point of critique regarding the Strategy and other EU legislation on cars is that the regulations are mainly to solely focussed on new cars, not on all of the cars that are already produced, sold and used. This results in a slower transition to low-emission and zero-emission mobility. On the other hand, discarding all of the older models would not be sustainable either. As the European Commission stated in “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions” about the strategy, customer awareness regarding the benefits of low-emission cars (in particular electric and fuel cell vehicles) is still to low. Eventually, customers are the ones buying the vehicles, it is crucial that both regular citizens and companies are aware of the benefits of low-emission vehicles and the consequences of vehicles that aren’t considered either low- or zero-emissions. The EC already took the first step towards solving this problem and introduced “Car labelling”.

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CONTACT US! Should you have any questions regarding the preparations to the Forum or the Forum itself, please do not hesitate asking and approaching one of the following addresses: DELEGATES SUPPORT Anna Rumetshofer a.rumetshofer@eyppoland.com PARTICIPANTS SUPPORT Olga Glinicka o.glinicka@eyppolad.com +48 697 188 573

The delegates support general mail: delegates.powershifts@eyppoland.com HEAD ORGANISER Andrzej Daniluk Vice-President of the Board Europejski Parlament Młodzieży EYP Poland a.daniluk@eyppoland.com +48 793 765 315 FOLLOW THE EVENT ON FACEBOOK: https://www.facebook.com/PowershiftsEYP/ VISIT OUR WEBPAGE: http://powershifts.eyppoland.com Europejski Parlament Młodzieży EYP Poland ul. Nowogrodzka 31 00-511 Warszawa www.eyppoland.com facebook.com/eyppoland info@eyppoland.com Instagram: EYPPoland Snapchat: EYPPoland

Warsaw 2016 - Power Shifts Academic Forum - 19

Topic Overviews Warsaw 2016

Power Shifts Academic Forum

20 - Warsaw 2016 - Power Shifts Academic Forum