SANCTIONS AND BLOCKADE A Crime against Humanity Aimed at Venezuela

SANCTIONS AND BLOCKADE A Crime against Humanity Aimed at Venezuela

VENEZUELA IN THE SIGHTS OF THE EMPIRE The following report contains arguments and facts which demonstrate the deepening of the policy of hostility and aggression by the United States of America towards the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. This policy is expressed with particular intensity through the adoption of legislation in 2015 that authorizes the imposition of unilateral coercive measures (sanctions) against the Venezuelan economy. These unilateral measures, which violate international law and the human rights of the Venezuelan people, are aimed at disrupting the economic and political stability of Venezuela’s democracy as part of a plan that seeks to overthrow the constitutional Government of President Nicolås Maduro and take control of our economic resources. This is part of the strategy of recolonization of Latin America and the Caribbean through the reimposition of the Monroe Doctrine throughout the continent. The United States sanctions against a small country like Venezuela constitute an inhuman blockade against our people, a gross violation of our sovereignty and an international crime against humanity.

“Regime Change” Since the Bolivarian Revolution came into power through the presidential election of Hugo Chávez in 1998, Venezuela has been in the sights of U.S. interests in the continent and occupies a privileged position as a priority objective in its strategy of global hegemony.

As of 2000, the U.S. has established a policy of “regime change” towards Venezuela that makes it impossible for the U.S. Empire to coexist with Venezuelan popular democracy. It considers this model - with its nationalist policies of sovereignty, independence and social justice - to be a threat to its system of domination and control of the region in the 21st century.

This strategy led the administration of George W. Bush to finance and support the failed coup d’état against President Hugo Chávez in April 2002. As of 2015, the policy of “regime change” was accelerated when President Obama issued a decree that considers Venezuela “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”

With Executive Order 13692 of March 2015, which has since been renewed by both Barack Obama and Donald Trump, the U.S. regime legalized what had been until then an unofficial policy that was carried out through covert financial, political, media, paramilitary and diplomatic operations, as has been demonstrated by information from Wikileaks and hundreds of declassified U.S. Government documents.

The Donald Trump administration, influenced by powerful lobbies from the state of Florida and global interests such as those of oil company Exxon Mobil, has escalated this policy of hostility, openly declaring its intention to remove the legitimate Government of Venezuela from power, using any means possible.

In August 2017, Donald Trump himself declared he was keeping open “all of the options” against Venezuela, including a possible military operation.

Since then, high level officials of the Trump administration, such as Mike Pence, Mike Pompeo, Rex Tillerson, James Mattis, Nikki Haley and John Bolton, have reiterated that the U.S. objective is to “remove from power” the president of Venezuela. More recently, Senator Marco Rubio, one of the most influential politicians in Washington, claimed that the time had come to act militarily against Venezuela. These reckless declarations constitute a grave threat to hemispheric peace as they place Venezuela a small country in the continent - as a U.S. military objective.

Seen as a whole, and considering its multiple, growing and aggressive

Unilateral coercive measures by State or group of States 2014-2018.

forms, U.S. policy towards Venezuela in the past two decades can definitively be considered a warmongering policy.

The United States has defined Venezuela as a “hemispheric enemy” and has carried out an undeclared war against our country. A war whose objective is the destruction of Venezuela’s democratic model, the annihilation of popular movements and the leadership of the Bolivarian Revolution, and the reappropriating and taking control of Venezuela’s immense riches.

From sanctions to blockade In this context, the U.S. has opted, since 2017, to punish Venezuela through the application of unilateral coercive measures, particularly in the economic and financial fields, along the same lines as those it has applied against countries such as Cuba, Russia, Iran, Syria, Sudan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

These unilateral, coercive, unjust and illegal measures that violate international law have been presented by the Trump administration as being timely actions that target individuals: officials from the Venezuelan Government as well as people or businesses identified as political and economic partners of the Venezuelan Government. The Trump administration argues that these measures do not create negative impacts upon the Venezuelan people, and on the other hand, are designed to improve the country’s situation and accelerate its “return to democracy.” The measures include: • A prohibition on entering U.S. territory.

• The freezing and seizing of financial assets, bank accounts in the U.S. financial system and goods in the United States such persons may possess.

• A prohibition on having commercial or financial relations with U.S. entities.

• The sanctions, officially imposed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Treasury Department, are authorized by executive orders of the U.S. administration.

• In every case, these sanctions have been extended to the relatives of the people sanctioned.

As of 2017, the individual sanctions have been extended to include general aspects of the Venezuelan Government’s management and impede the normal operation of the Venezuelan economy, such as: • A prohibition on U.S. persons and financial sector entities from carrying out operations with the sovereign debt bonds of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, or with any financial instrument issued by the Government of Venezuela, like PDVSA bonds.

• A prohibition on U.S. persons and entities of the financial sector from carrying out operations or transactions with the “Petro” cryptocurrency, or any cryptocurrency or monetary instrument issued or backed by the Government of Venezuela.

The extension of these sanctions toward the economic field and the international financial and commercial activities of Venezuela, represent an escalation of the U.S. policy of hostility. This escalation fits in perfectly with the military concept that holds that one of the first tasks in a war is to “cut the enemy’s supplies.”

Thus the United States attempts to block and suffocate the Venezuelan economy and spur destabilization or an internal conflict of such

Since 2014, fourteen legal acts have been issued: laws, decrees, executive orders that sanction Venezuela.

magnitude that it will require an “international response” in terms of “humanitarian collective action.” In other words: an intervention in Venezuela.

General effects of the sanctions Based on the prerogatives established in the Obama Decree, the United States’ sanctions against Venezuela generate serious disruptions to the national life, specifically in the economic sphere. This phenomenon, which has been called economic aggression or the economic war, has the following effects: • Impeding commercial trade, depriving the country of access to food, medicine and essential goods.

• Blocking of accounts, financial operations and transactions that impede or disrupt international payments for the Republic’s legitimate commitments, or the payment of claims that international suppliers or nations have with Venezuela.

• Freezing or retaining legitimate resources belonging to Venezuela in banks and financial entities.

• Delays in the carrying out of buying and selling operations, which not only affects Venezuelan businesses and the Government, but foreign trading partners as well.

The unilateral coercive measures demonstrate U.S. involvement in Venezuelan politics, aggravating the paralysis that has marked relations between the two States for several years. The Trump administration has led a genuine escalation of tensions in the bilateral relationship. It should be noted that, having not even reached the halfway point of his presidential term, the Trump administration has already carried out four rounds of sanctions against Venezuela.

The overall aim of these sanctions is to harm the Venezuelan economy, promoting a collapse of international trade, blocking and hindering Venezuela’s financial operations, impeding the country from obtaining access to sources of financing, and sabotaging the purchase of food, medicine and essential goods. All of this is done to spur an internal economic crisis that can be used as an excuse for destabilizing actions in the political arena.

Politically, these sanctions are applied during a time in which Washington has begun to recognize the failure of Venezuela’s opposition. With the sanctions against Venezuela, the U.S. has accepted the inability of its internal allies to produce “regime change” and has assumed the de facto political leadership of the Venezuelan opposition.

The failure of the violent strategy of 2017, when there was an attempt to spark a “Color Revolution” in Venezuela, is addressed in 2018 with a strategic plan to suffocate the Venezuelan economy, push the population to mass migration or to internal civil conflict, and create the conditions for the so-called “humanitarian intervention.”

The unilateral coercive measures seek to impede and block any initiative at dialogue between the Government and opposition, and therefore close any road to constitutional and peaceful solutions to the situation in Venezuela. The sabotage by the United States of the dialogue in the Dominican Republic in 2017 and 2018, which would have enabled the country to begin its path toward the normalization of politics, proves that the only policy acceptable to the U.S. administration is the removal of the President Nicolás Maduro Moros’ Government through unconstitutional and violent means.

The United States is not looking to “restore democracy” in Venezuela as it so demagogically claims. The plan of an “economic war” attempts to force a situation of chaos and violence to make the country ungovernable and delegitimize constitutional, democratic and electoral paths, provoking a “surrender of Chavismo.” This is what the U.S. calls a “transition” for a “return to democracy.”

The escalation of aggression The U.S. strategy consists of presenting as “sanctions on individuals” what is actually a massive, comprehensive and global strategy of economic and financial blockades and economic sabotage. These measures are complemented by a global plan to isolate the Venezuelan Government political and diplomatically, along with a renewed media campaign of criminalization and symbolic destruction that includes the

manipulation and exploitation of the migration issue.

In light of the terrible effects the sanctions have on the Venezuelan people, it is perverse to affirm that the U.S. regime is worried about the well-being of Venezuelans.

Upon holding hundreds of millions of dollars of Venezuela’s money hostage in foreign banks, prohibiting transactions with Venezuela’s sovereign debt bonds and unleashing financial persecution against the Republic’s accounts in the global financial system, particularly with regards to the entry of food and medicine into the country, the United States has demonstrated its contempt for the Venezuelan people The cynical strategy of economic aggression against Venezuela also has an essential element of promoting and encouraging the migration of an important number of Venezuelan citizens to neighboring countries. This condition is fundamental for placing the narrative of “humanitarian crisis” in the international community, which would therefore “require” an international “humanitarian” intervention in Venezuela.

In this context, President Trump uses the Organization of American States (OAS) to continue attacking Venezuela and pressures Latin American countries when he demands they support aggression against a sibling nation. While he insists on walls, persecutes migrants and separates families on the border, President Trump demands the absolute subordination of the continent’s governments for the policy of blockade and sanctions. This is the explicit resurrection of the “big stick” policy.

The measures imposed by President Trump and his international allies against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela are causing harm and suffering to the people of Venezuela while they are presented as actions to save Venezuela from the hardships caused by an alleged “dictatorship” or “failed state.”

This is a cynical attitude that is impossible to deny, and it is a new attack on the principles that govern the coexistence of States. This is a crime against the Venezuelan people; a crime against humanity.

The internationalization of the aggression against Venezuela The policy of sanctions against Venezuela has been internationalized from Washington through a fierce lobbying campaign and pressure against many countries and Governments.

The United States has managed to get the European Union, the European Parliament and a group of conspiratory governments in the selfproclaimed Lima Group to form an international coalition to establish and promote sanctions, diplomatic isolation and political actions to destabilize Venezuela’s democracy.

Countries such as Canada have joined in on the unilateral coercive measures that seek to break the national economy, which has imitated the Obama and Trump executive orders and established its own legislation to criminalize and punish Venezuela.

Additionally, under pressure from the European Parliament, the European Union has adopted unilateral sanctions, just as specific decisions have been made by some Latin American countries that have given in to Trump’s pressure to “punish” Venezuela and depose its legitimate Government.

Sanctions and Migratory Flows The economic effects of sanctions, coupled with sabotage to the Venezuelan economy from Colombia, the United States and other countries, has induced, over the last three years, an increase in the migratory flow of Venezuelan citizens to foreign countries. Although Venezuela is below the international average in terms of emigration and essentially continues to be a receptor country of migrants and refugees, mainly from Colombia, the increase in the number of Venezuelan citizens who cross borders is a new phenomenon.

In their campaign of aggression against Venezuela, the U.S., the so-called Lima Group and international corporate media - with the support of some officials from the United Nations system - have framed international

opinion to manipulate the migratory situation and attempt to turn it into a “humanitarian problem” for the entire region.

Thus, the United States seeks to pressure countries in the region to act concertedly to criminalize the Venezuelan Government and justify an international action for “humanitarian” reasons.

At the same time, the manipulation of migration statistics and the creation of a narrative in the media of an alleged “humanitarian tragedy” are used by some Governments to request international aid, which represents a shameless attempt to benefit from international resources while engaging in propaganda against Venezuela.

In addition to these phenomena are the actions of criminal organizations that traffic in persons, which capture people and move them across borders with the aim of exposing the “Venezuelan problem”, a phenomenon that is joined by xenophobic campaigns against Venezuelan migration. All of these problems are directly associated with the grave effects the sanctions have on the economy and the Venezuelan people; sanctions that are the direct responsibility of the U.S. government.

CHRONOLOGY UNILATERAL COERCIVE MEASURES TO IMPOSE A COMMERCIAL ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AND FINANCIAL PERSECUTION AGAINST PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA • December 2014. The U.S. Congress approves Law 113-278, the “Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014.”

This legal instrument dictates the course of action for the policies of the United States Government against Venezuela and establishes the roadmap for other States to adopt unilateral coercive measures under its influence.

• March 8, 2015. The United States issues Executive Order 13692 (the Obama Decree), which is supported by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act and the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, (Public Law 113-278). The Obama Decree declares Venezuela “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States” and allows it to frame and legally substantiate all of the actions undertaken since then by the U.S. against Venezuela.

• March 3, 2016. The U.S. administration renews Executive Order 13692 (the Obama Decree) for one year.

BLOCKING THE ACCESS TO MEDICINES July 2017: The Citibank bank (USA) refuses to receive Venezuelan funds for the import of 300 thousand doses of insulin, destined to cover the demand of thousand registered patients

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERFERENCE Public Law 113-278 establishes the option to apply unilateral and coercive measures for the economic, financial and commercial blockade of Venezuela, and also expressly seeks to “work” with Member States of the Organization of American States and the European Union to this end.

• April 2016. Venezuelan government institutions begin to receive notifications from foreign financial entities about restrictions applied to Venezuelan accounts for payments in U.S. dollars.

• May 2016. Commerzbank (Germany) closes the accounts held by various Venezuelan institutions and public banks, including PDVSA. • July 2016. U.S. based Citibank unilaterally ceases servicing the foreign currency correspondent accounts of Venezuelan institutions in the U.S., including the account belonging to the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV).

• July 2016. The country’s EMBI+ risk rating

by JP Morgan bank, places Venezuela as the riskiest country in the world (2,640 points), well above countries experiencing wars, such as Ukraine. JP Morgan ignores that the Venezuelan State paid off 6 billion dollars in foreign debt in 2016 and uses the risk variable as a political tool without economic justification.

• August 2016. The closing of correspondent accounts reduce Venezuela’s ability to carry out operations in U.S. currency and forces the Republic to migrate its operations of transferences and money management to other currencies (Euros, RMB, GBP and others), imposing high transaction and operating costs on the country.

• August 2016. Novo Banco (Portugal) informs the country that it is impossible to perform operations in U.S. dollars with Venezuelan institutions and banks due to pressure applied by the correspondent banks of this institution.

• September 2016. The Government of Venezuela offers to exchange 7.1

billion dollars in PDVSA bonds to relieve the amortization schedule and partially refinance its obligations. The three major U.S. risk rating agencies frighten investors with a default declaration if they agree to Venezuela’s proposal.

• November 2016. JP Morgan bank issues a false default alert about an alleged lack of payment of PDVSA debt worth 404 million dollars in order to generate fear in the financial world.

• November 2016. U.S. oil company ConocoPhillips sues PDVSA in a court in Delaware, USA, for its bond exchange operation. The purpose of this legal recourse consisted in frightening participants and thereby derailing the operation.

• December 2016. Crane Currency, a supplier of bills for the Treasury Department and hired by the Venezuelan Government to print part of its monetary base, delays shipment of new bills for the new monetary base to foment anxiety and chaos in the population.

• February 2, 2017. Senator Marco Rubio presents a distorted media report - fake news - from CNN International on the U.S. Senate floor, which claims that Venezuela provides passports to terrorists and drug traffickers. He accuses the Vice President of Venezuela of leading an alleged terrorism and drug trafficking network.

• February 13, 2017. The U.S. Treasury Deparment, through its Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), includes the executive Vice President of Venezuela, Tareck El Aissami, on its list of people sanctioned for “drug trafficking.” The OFAC document offers no evidence regarding the accusation nor does it open a court inquiry.

• May 19, 2017. The U.S. government announces a set of sanctions, through the Treasury Department, against eight justices of Venezuela’s Supreme Court (TSJ).

• July 2017. Delaware Trust, the payment agent for PDVSA bonds, informs that is correspondent bank in the U.S. (PNC Bank) refuses to receive funds from the Venezuelan oil company.

• July 28, 2017. Donald Trump imposes sanctions on three high level officials from the Venezuelan government in an attempt to stop the National Constituent Assembly elections.

BLOCKING THE HEALTH SECTOR October 2017: Venezuela approves resources for vaccine and medicines through the Revolving and Strategic Fund of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO).

The U.S. blockade prevents Venezuela from doing deposits in the UBS Swiss bank, thus provoking a delay of four months in the acquisition of vaccines, altering vaccination schedules in the country.

• July 31, 2017. The U.S. Treasury Department, through its Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), applies sanctions against a group of Venezuelan officials, including the President of the Republic, Nicolás Maduro Moros, a day after the elections for the National Constituent Assembly. They accuse the president of establishing a dictatorship by holding an election for a National Constituent Assembly, which is legally and formally established instrument in the Constitution.

• August 2017. Credit Suisse (Switzerland) prohibits its clients from carrying out financial operations with Venezuela.

• August 21, 2017. The Bank of China (BOC - Panama) informs that due to instructions from the U.S. Treasury Department and pressure from the Panamanian government, it can no longer perform any operations in foreign currency for Venezuela.

• August 22, 2017. Allied banks in Russia report the impossibility of making transactions for Venezuelan banks due to the restrictions imposed by correspondent banks in the United States and some in Europe on operations made carried out from Venezuela.

• August 23, 2017. A correspondent bank of BDC Shandong, citing administrative reasons, paralyzes a transaction for 200 million dollars

to Venezuela despite the fact that the funds were drawn by China.

• August 24, 2017. Donald Trump issues Executive Order 13808, titled “Imposing Additional Sanctions With Respect to the Situation in Venezuela.” This order prohibits certain transactions involving the Venezuelan Government, including Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) and any other entity that is the property of or is controlled by the Venezuelan Government.

• August 2017. Through pressure by the U.S. Treasury Department, Euroclear, the financial services company in charge of an important proportion of Venezuela’s sovereign bonds, freezes bond trade operations, citing a need for “review.” To date, Euroclear has over 1.2 billion U.S. dollars retained without the possibility of their being moved, which has seriously impacted the financial resources of the Republic.

BLOCKING THE ACCESS TO MEDICINES November 2017: Venezuela pays for the acquisition of anti-malarial treatment (primaquine and chloroquine), requested to the BSN Medical laboratory in Colombia. Colombia hampers the delivering of such medicines without justification.

BLOCKING THE HEALTH SECTOR November 2017: The transnational Pharmaceutical companies Baster, Abbot and Pfizer refused to issue exportation certificates to cancer drugs, making it impossible for Venezuela to buy them.

• September 2017. As a result of the US administration sanctions, Citgo Petroleum, a PDVSA subsidiary, begins having troubles in acquiring crude oil for its refineries and in maintaining stable operations. Since 2015, Citgo had repatriated a total of 2.5 billion dollars to Venezuela, which at present it cannot do due to the financial blockade.

THE TRUMP SANCTIONS Executive Order 13808 signed by Donald Trump establishes restrictions on the operations of Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA: • It prohibits U.S investors from purchasing new securities of the Government of Venezuela and the purchase of debts with a maturity greater than 30 or 90 days • It prohibits acquiring new debt from PDVSA with a maturity greater than 90 days.

• It prohibits selling assets to the Government of Venezuela or acquiring assets issued by the Government.

• It prohibits performing transactions on a set of public debt bonds issued by the Government of Venezuela prior to the effective date of the Executive Order.

• It prohibits the payment of dividends to the Government of Venezuela by entities in the United States, like Citgo Petroleum.

The White House declared that these new prohibitions were “carefully calibrated to deny the Maduro dictatorship a critical source of financing.” Executive Order 13808 represents a significant shift in the administration’s approach towards Venezuela. Before Executive Order 13808, Venezuela-related sanctions were limited to government officials being placed on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list.

As of Executive Order 13835, the measures have been expanded to include public enterprises and their commercial and financial operations with private financial and non-financial businesses around the world, with the aim of directly harming the Venezuelan economy

• September 2017. The U.S. Treasury Department, through its Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), issues a “red flag” alert that imposes a system of surveillance and control on Venezuela’s financial transactions to impede the payment of food and medicine.

• September 2017. 300 thousand doses of insulin paid for by the Venezuelan State did not arrive in the country because U.S. based Citibank boycotted the purchase of this important medicine. According to Venezuela’s Health Ministry, 450 thousand patients were affected by this disruption in the supply of insulin.

• September 2017. The shipment of 18 million CLAP boxes (a system of direct distribution of subsidized essential goods to communities) is interrupted by obstacles imposed by the U.S. financial system.

• September 5, 2017. Canada and the United States announce an alliance to “adopt economic measures against Venezuela and against those who actively contribute to the current situation in Venezuela.”

• September 8, 2017. The U.S. Treasury Department sanctions eight elected members of the National Constituent Assembly.

• September 22, 2017. The Canadian government announces unilateral sanctions against 40 Venezuelan officials. The sanctions against Venezuela are enacted via the 1992 Special Economic Measures Act that enables the implementation of this decision taken by the partnership between Canada and the United States.

• September 25, 2017. Venezuela is included in the list of countries in the U.S. travel ban. The prohibition only applies to Venezuelan government officials.

• September 28, 2017. The U.S. approves a bill that orders the State Department to work with private non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to send “humanitarian aid” to Venezuela.

• October 11, 2017. Oil refiner PBF Energy, the fifth highest U.S. importer of Venezuelan crude, suspends direct purchases from PDVSA.

• October 18, 2017. Canada approves Bill S-226, known as the “Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act.” This law authorizes Canada to impose restrictions on the transaction of goods and to freeze the assets of foreign officials accused of violating human rights and corruption, among other crimes.

• October 20, 2017. U.S. oil company NuStar Energy forbids PDVSA from using its storage terminal in the Caribbean.

• October 2017. Deutsche Bank informs Citic Bank of the People’s Republic of China that it will close its correspondent accounts for having processed PDVSA payments. This is a clear demonstration of the pressure faced by international banks that have operations with Venezuela.

• November 3, 2017. Canada reports that “by virtue of the new Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act”, it has applied sanctions against a group of foreign citizens from Russia, Sudan and Venezuela (19 officials).

BLOCKING THE ACCESS TO MEDICINES

Year 2018: The payment of 9 million USD through and international account from Venezuela, destined to the acquisition of dialysis supplies for the treatment of 15 thousand patients of hemodyalisis was blocked. Such treatment is ensured by Venezuela free of charge.

• November 11, 2017. The United States sanctions a group of Venezuelan officials for “undermining democracy, censoring the press and administering corrupt government programs for the supply of food.” Despite this “humanitarian” rhetoric, these measures seek to prevent officials with high-level responsibilities, including those who administer food programs, from signing commercial agreements or international conventions to strengthen Venezuela’s food policy.

• November 13, 2017. The European Union forbids the sale of weapons

and security equipment to Venezuela, and applies travel restrictions to and freezes the assets of a group of officials, holding them responsible for alleged human rights violations.

• November 15, 2017. Deutsche Bank, the primary correspondent of the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV), definitively closes the correspondent accounts of this institution, endangering the Republic’s flow of operations.

• November 2017. A total of 23 financial operations originating from Venezuela, aimed at purchasing food, basic supplies and medicine for 39 million dollars, were blocked returned by international banks.

• November 2017. Risk rating agency Standard and Poor’s declares Venezuela to be in a “selective default” after technically manipulating a payment process that had not been registered on time.

• November 2017. Wilmington Trust, a U.S. based bond manager, accuses state electric company Corpoelec of not paying interest on debt to the order of 27 million dollars, just as the country is experiencing a total blockade of means of payment in the U.S. financial system.

• December 8, 2017. The United States approves a law for providing humanitarian aid in Venezuela.

• December 22, 2017. Due to the U.S. sanctions, Venezuelan payments are blocked for refueling services for the transport of fuel, which causes a shortage of fuel in various Venezuelan states.

• December 2017. 19 of Venezuela’s bank accounts abroad were arbitrarily closed by U.S. banks, preventing payments to creditors.

• December 2017. In the months of November and December, Venezuela Transportation Ministry had 471 thousand tires retained abroad due to the financial sanctions, where payment was made but the shipments were not delivered.

• January 5, 2018. The U.S. Treasury Department, through the Office of

Foreign Asset Control, sanctions a group of Venezuelan officials under generic “corruption” accusations.

• January 22, 2018. The European Union sanctions seven high level Venezuelan officials, including the president of the National Electoral Council (CNE), and prevents them from entering EU territory, accusing them of “undermining democracy.”

• January 2018. The U.S. Department of State, on addressing the effectiveness of unilateral coercive measures, affirms: “the pressure campaign against Venezuela is working. The financial sanctions we have placed on the Venezuelan Government has forced it to begin becoming in default, both on sovereign and PDVSA, its oil company’s, debt. And what we are seeing ... is a total economic collapse in Venezuela. So our policy is working, our strategy is working and we’re going to keep it.”

• January 2018. Then CIA Director Mike Pompeo said in an American Enterprise Institute event that the set of financial sanctions against Venezuela had been coordinated directly between the CIA and President Trump.

• January 2018. A total of 11 bonds of Venezuelan and PDVSA debt, worth 1.24 billion dollars, could not be paid to creditors due to the obstacles imposed by the sanctions.

• February 1, 2018. Then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson begins a tour of Latin America and the Caribbean with the goal of pressuring Venezuela and fencing the country in.

• February 4, 2018. Then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said: “one of the aspects of considering sanctioning oil is what effect will it have on the Venezuelan people, and is it a step that might bring this to an end, to a more rapid end and a more rapid close? Because not doing anything to bring this to an end is also asking the Venezuelan people to suffer for a much longer time.”

• February 12, 2018. The U.S. Treasury Department, through the Office of Foreign Asset Control, expands the financial sanctions against Venezuela and Venezuelan businesses established in Executive Order 13808 of August 2017. The expansion prevents the renegotiation or restructuring of Venezuelan and PDVSA debt that was issued prior to August 25, 2017. These measures seek to impede the process of debt renegotiation being carried out by Venezuela with its international creditors.

• March 2, 2018. The Trump administration renews Executive Orders 13692 and 13808 for another year. Executive Order 13808 imposes six new coercive measures that threaten the financial stability of Venezuela upon prohibiting the restructuring of debt and preventing the repatriation of CITGO profits. Subsequently, the FinCEN, an agency that enforces financial crimes in the U.S., issues a notice to alert financial institutions that Venezuelan public transactions can be linked to corruption. This decision ends up affecting suppliers of essential goods such as food and medicine, and also led to the retention in the international financial system of over 1.65 billion of Venezuela’s dollars.

• March 19, 2018. The Trump administration issues Executive Order 13827, which prohibits U.S. persons and institutions from carrying out financial transactions with the “Petro”, Venezuela’s cryptocurrency, despite the fact that it is still in its pre-sale stage and is not formally dealt in cryptocurrency markets. This decision is unprecedented in the short history of cryptocurrency markets.

• March 20, 2018. U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, during the G20 in Buenos Aires, told the audience he “assures that we [the U.S.] continue evaluating the situation in that country [Venezuela] and we are considering applying more sanctions.”

• March 27, 2018. The Government of Panama publishes a list of sanctioned Venezuelans (including President Nicolás Maduro) and Venezuelan firms considered “high risk.” Venezuela responds suspending economic relations with Panama and sanctioning president, high-level officials and Panamanian companies.

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• April 14, 2018. The Foreign Minister of Peru, during the Summit of the Americas and on behalf of the Lima Group, announces they have decided to create a working group to study political and economic measures against Venezuela. At the same Summit, the U.S. and Colombia agree to accelerate mechanisms to prosecute financial transactions from Venezuela and hinder the supply of basic goods required by the country.

• April 19, 2018. U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin meets with representatives from various countries in Latin America and to ask for “concrete actions [that] are necessary to restrict the ability of corrupt Venezuelan officials and their support networks.” He claims that President Maduro had no “legitimacy” to ask for loans for the country.

• April 19, 2018. The United States Government issues a statement asking for the resignation of the President of the Republic, Nicolás Maduro.

• May 10, 2015. Canadian energy firm SNC-Lavalin introduces a lawsuit against PDVSA in a court in New York, U.S.A., alleging non-payment of debts. This is the first official lawsuit for a default against Venezuela.

• May 2018. Claiming an arbitration award for 2.04 billion dollars from the International Chamber of Commerce, U.S. oil company ConocoPhillips announces it will embargo PDVSA’s international assets.

• May 2018. Canadian mining company Rusoro files a lawsuit seeking Citgo and PDVSA assets as payment for an arbitration award of 1.2 billion dollars.

• May 2018. The Colombian government blocks the shipment of 400 thousand kilograms of food to Venezuela that is part of the CLAP food subsidy program.

• May 21, 2018. In response for the presidential election for the 2019-2025 term, in which 9 million venezuelans voted, Donald Trump issues Executive Order 13835 which expands economic sanctions against Venezuela. Through the decree, Trump prohibits the buying of

debts and accounts payable of Venezuelan Government companies.

• May 23, 2018. The U.S. sanctions 20 companies in Venezuela for alleged “links to drug trafficking.”

• June 1, 2018. The United States demands that Venezuela be suspended from the OAS. • June 24, 2018. The European Union approves sanctions against eleven high-ranking government posts of the Venezuelan State, including the executive vice president of the Republic and the vice president for the economy in retaliation for the May 20 presidential suffocating venezuela election.

Executive Order 13835 signed by Donald Trump in May 2018 extends the scope of Barack Obama’s Executive Order 13692 of March 2015. This new decree prohibits any U.S. person, institution or company for acquiring Venezuelan debt or assets and properties in the United States that belong to the Venezuelan Government, including investments belonging to Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA).

The goal is to further limit the Venezuelan Government’s ability to obtain liquidity, affecting the accounts receivable of the Venezuelan Government, as well as of state oil company PDVSA and the Central Bank of Venezuela. Despite this, the Trump sanctions do not directly attack Venezuelan oil transactions, as the U.S, has not impeded sales of Venezuelan crude to the country.

•June 26, 2018. The U.S. Supreme Court backs Donald Trump’s travel ban, which includes Venezuela.

•August 8, 2018. The U.S. authorizes Crystallex to seize assets from Citgo, thereby satisfying its claim regarding the nationalization of its gold operations in the country in 2008.

•August 30, 2018. The Government of Brazil admits that due to the economic blockade imposed by the US against Venezuela, it has not been able to comply with the payment of 40 million dollars to Venezuela’s National Electric Corporation for providing energy to the border state of Roraima. The Foreign Minister of Brazil, Aloysio Nunes, declares the that the debt “has not been paid due to the economic and financial blockade imposed by the United States and European Union against Venezuela.”

Main Features of the Financial Blockade in Venezuela Feature

Description

Country risk

Deterioration of the credit rating risk of Venezuela. This increases the cost and makes difficult to access to international debt and financial services. Continuing campaign from the rating agencies of risk against Venezuela, without any justification and despite the fulfillment of the international commitment on the part of the Republic.

Laws / Lists

Laws and lists created by the U.S. government and multilateral institutions justifying the international financial blockage. In 2010 we have been added into the Grey list of the Caribbean Financial Actions Task Force (CFATF), from which we could exit in 2013 after a very important effort demonstrated through regulations. During 2017, a group of Venezuelan public officials have been added to the OFAC list, including the President and the Executive Vice-president of the Republic as a kind of sanction.

The unilateral cancellation of contracts of correspondent banking. Limitation and Blockage/ interruption of the international banks operations. Last months, Venezuela has Closing of been subject of the closing of correspondent banking accounts such as Citibank, Bank accounts Comerzbank, Deutsche Bank AG, and other.

Multilateral

Implementation of impediments of legal and administrative nature within international organisms and institutions, with the aim of delay and preclude the payment of the membership and not allow the access to the credits. It means the smear of the Republic within the international organisms. Imposition of bureaucratic impediments and/or smear campaigns from multilateral institutions and organisms as the BID, the World Bank, the IMF, the CAF, and other.

Assets Blockade

Blocking of financial assets and capital of branches and associated companies to Venezuela. We have been subject of assets blockade to our state companies as PDVSA and other banks and national institutions.

Financial intermediation Limitation or denial of financial transactions and intermediation operations from or to Venezuela by international banks, in a different currency from USD. services Policies of fulfillment

Hampering and delays in the operations; abuse and rigor when requesting documentation and information related to traceability of the operations without the warranty that they will be executed.

Imposition of fines

Imposition of millionaire fines to banks that provides services of correspondent and intermediation banking. These fines breed uncertainty, thus limiting the relations and opening of accounts.

Operations Cost Increase

An increase in the compliance costs above the operation costs has occurred in correspondent banks. This affects the commissions set forth in the correspondent contracts with our institutions, which as a result, have to bear such cost increase.

Examples of suspensions of the payments and commercial operations paralysis, as a result of the U.S. unilateral sanctions that prejudice the Venezuelan people

Vessel of Kabuco food supplier company: Within the framework of sanctions, the bank account belonging to an important company of soy food (key raw material for preparing balanced animal food) has been closed by the Swiss bank Hyposwiss Private Bank. The arbitrary closure of the supplier’s account was based on the fact that the payment of 15.9 millions of Euros for more than 90,000 tons of soybean -transported by vessel- came from Venezuela.

Blockade of transactions: Several transactions from European banks were returned between 15th and 28th December 2017. Such transactions amounted more than 29.7 millions USD to different suppliers and aimed to pay the food distributed through the CLAP program (Government food supplying program).

Delay of payment proceedings: The U.S. bank JP Morgan has increasingly delayed the acceptance of funds for an amount of 28.1 millions USD aimed to pay the transport -vessels- of the food for the food supply of Venezuelan people.

Colombia’s blockade to transit of food: From December 24th to 26th, 2017, international food suppliers held 1,700 tons of pork leg in the Colombian border in order to be entered into Venezuela for their distribution among the Venezuelan people. Even today, Colombian authorities hamper the transit of these pork legs through an intentional delaying scheme, which includes a double and triple check to the same cargo.