The Minority Groups of the Middle East

Minority Groups of the Middle East

Tyler Bauer

Y339 Middle Eastern Politics Professor Lutz 2 January 2018

Minority groups exist in almost every region of the world, and the Middle East is no exception. For a variety of reasons, the Middle East sees a particularly interesting set of cases involving minorities. Many of these cases have been causes of historical and modern-day conflicts, making these cases all the more important.

While most Middle Eastern countries have some sort of a minority group within its borders, not all minority groups are treated equally in their respective countries. For example, Palestinians in Israel are treated significantly differently from Palestinians in Jordan. Similarly, the Kurdish population of the Middle East receives different treatment in Turkey than it does in Iraq. The list of minority groups in the Middle East is seemingly endless, but a handful of minority groups stick out in particular.

Understandably, much of the focus when evaluating minority groups lies in the ethnic, cultural, and religious differences which separate them from the majority of the population in the country in which they reside. However, one of the most important differences among the majority and the minority groups in a country lies within the rights afforded to each group.

Ultimately, the rights afforded to groups – whether these groups exist independently on ethnic, cultural, religious, or any other grounds – affect their power and their ability to act in their respective political systems.

Unfortunately, not all countries effectively protect the rights of minority groups, thus undermining minority groups’ power and political efficacy. This is made even more difficult by the existence of non-democratic and less-than-democratic countries within the Middle East. By their very nature, democracies require that the country’s minority groups have established rights that are not dependent on holding political power at any point in time. Instead, these rights

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should be as well-established as the rights of the majority in the country, whomever that may be.1 Among the countries studied – Israel, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey – and the ethnic minority groups studied – Palestinians and Kurds – it is evident that oppression is only made possible through a given country’s institutional stability, whereas institutional instability seems to benefit minority populations in the aforementioned cases. Therefore, it can be concluded that a lack of government – or, at the very least, a weaker government – may very well be the solution to solving the issue of repression among the various minority groups in the Middle East.

The Palestinians – those who are native inhabitants of the area known as Palestine – have been at odds with Israel since the country’s founding. Israeli-Palestinian relations have been strained since Israel’s independence due to Israel’s existence as a Zionist state. The emphasis placed on Judaism disadvantaged Palestinians, many of whom are Muslims, while the remainder are largely Christians or Druze.2 Another inherent cause for this division is ethnicity. While Palestinians adhere to a variety of religions, there is no internal ethnic divide – all Palestinians are of Arab descent. Many Israelis, however, are of European descent. The sudden influx of European Jews, as well as Jews from other areas of the world, created a natural cleavage between the Palestinian and Israeli populations in 1948 and the years following. While the ethnically-Jewish population was relatively small in Israel’s early days, it now makes up roughly three quarters of Israel’s population.3

1 “Majority Rule/Minority Rights: Essential Principles,” Democracy Web, http://democracyweb.org/majority-ruleprinciples.

2 Mark Gasiorowski and Sean L. Yom, eds., The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2017), 152.

3 Gasiorowski and Yom, Government and Politics, 152.

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These cleavages, as well as the sympathy shown by Israel’s neighboring countries towards the Palestinians, created an unstable situation both domestically and internationally.

Domestically, Israel has long been at odds with Palestinians within its borders. For over four decades, Israel has occupied what had historically been Palestinian territory. The West Bank – including East Jerusalem – and the Gaza Strip have been under Israeli control for most of Israel’s history as a country. Among the tragedies that have taken place within Israeli occupied territories are ill-treatment and torture of detainees, excessive use of force, the detention of conscientious objectors, and forced evictions and home demolitions. Under Israeli occupation, Palestinians have faced a great deal of human rights abuses. While some Israelis do suffer as a result of the occupation, the majority of the victims are Palestinian.4 The Israeli forces in occupied territories have committed human rights abuses in a variety of ways. Amnesty International had the following to say regarding human rights abuses by Israeli forces: Human rights violations by Israeli forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) have included, but are not limited to, home demolitions and the forced eviction of Palestinian families; punitive arrests, unfair trials, ill-treatment and torture of detainees and the use of excessive or lethal force to subdue nonviolent demonstrations as well as the use of restrictive legal means. In contravention of international law, Israel continues to build parts of the wall/fence in the OPT, expand settlements and use draconian restrictions on the movement of Palestinians with some 600 roadblocks and checkpoints.

4 “Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories,” Amnesty International, https://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territories/.

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Amnesty International is also concerned about discriminatory policies affecting access to water for Palestinians.5 Israel continues to effectively control the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the Gaza Strip, Israel controls “all but one of the crossings into Gaza,” as well as the airspace, territorial waters, methods of telecommunication, and the popular registry. The popular registry is particularly important because it determines who is allowed to enter and leave Gaza. Control of the popular registry has allowed Israeli forces to reject or delay permit applications to leave Gaza. Some applications to leave Gaza were for purely medical reasons, and many Palestinians have died as a result of these rejections and delays.6 In addition to regulating the number of people who can leave Gaza, Israeli forces also regulate who – and what – can enter Gaza. Most of the inhabitants of Gaza – largely ethnic Palestinians – are reliant on international aid to survive.7 Israel has effectively blockaded Gaza, preventing most aid from entering the region. Under international humanitarian law, Israel is the occupying power in Gaza, and is therefore responsible for the wellbeing of its inhabitants.

Clearly, the Israeli forces are abusing the rights of Palestinians in Gaza, as well as in the West Bank, where similar abuses are common.8 The oppression of Palestinians in the OPT manifests itself in a variety of ways. Ever since the time of Israel’s creation, there has been a desire to create Jewish settlements within Israeli and the territories it occupies. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu echoed this policy in June of 2017, vowing to strengthen Israel’s “settlement enterprise” when he said, “Everyone has a right to live in his home and no one may uproot him.” While this seems 5 “Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories.”

6 “Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories.”

7 “Middle East: Gaza Strip,” CIA, https://www.cia.gov/Library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_gz.html.

8 “Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories.”

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harmless and agreeable, it is contrary to the long-standing practices of Israeli forces. In the fifty year history of Israeli military occupation of Palestinian territories, tens of thousands of Palestinian properties have been destroyed, displacing numerous communities. Israel’s “settlement project,” which clearly defies international law, has taken at least one hundred thousand hectares of Palestinian land for Israeli use, whether it be for construction, agriculture, or any other use. Additionally, Israel has unlawfully stripped Palestinian lands of their resources – such as fertile land, water, and minerals – and appropriated these resources for Israeli settlements. Those Palestinians fortunate enough to still have access to and use of these resources are hampered by heavy restrictions. Predictably, the Palestinian economy has suffered as a result of Israeli occupation, seeing a steady decline. Israel, on the other hand, has benefited economically from these practices.

As a result of the oppression of Palestinians, many wonder whether Israel can truly be labeled a democracy. While no democracy is perfect, Israel’s history of discrimination against Palestinians does a great deal to support the belief that Israel is not a democratic country. The systematic oppression of Palestinians in Israel has been compared to South Africa’s Apartheid by some – including Nelson Mandela9 – as each country is similar in the sense that one group of citizens enjoys more rights than another.10 The comparison of Israeli-Palestinian relations to South Africa’s apartheid is not too farfetched. To this day, more than fifty laws discriminate – either directly or indirectly – against Palestinian citizens of Israel, who make up roughly twenty percent of Israel’s population.11 Many

9 “Discrimination Against Palestinian Citizens of Israel,” Institute for Middle East Understanding, https://imeu.org/article/discrimination-against-palestinian-citizens-of-israel.

10 Yousef Munayyer, “Not All Israeli Citizens are Equal,” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/opinion/not-allisraeli-citizens-are-equal.html.

11 “Discrimination Against Palestinian Citizens of Israel.”

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of these laws violate Palestinians’ basic human rights, such as the right to act politically. The Law of Political Parties, Amendment No. 12, does the following to restrict Palestinian political participation: Regulates the procedures for the establishment of political parties in Israel. Article 5(1) sets forth various [ideological] limitations on the registration rights of political parties similar to Section 7(A) (1) of The Basic Law: The Knesset, including the prohibition on registration of parties which, by their platforms, “deny the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state”. The amendment to Article 5 adds the provision that a political party that wishes to run for the Knesset elections will not be registered if its goals or actions, directly or indirectly, “support armed struggle of an enemy state or of a terror organization, against the State of Israel.”12 Clearly, the aforementioned law restricts Palestinians’ ability to take part in the political process, as it outlaws any party that opposes Israel. The Palestinian citizens of Israel are those Palestinians who remained within Israel following the Nakba, or “catastrophe,” when roughly 750,000 Palestinians were expelled from their lands to make room for the Jewish-majority country of Israel.13 As a result of the Nakba, many Palestinians view Israel’s existence as illegitimate, and therefore oppose Israel. However, those Palestinian citizens of Israel who oppose Israel cannot take part in the political process due to the previously-cited discriminatory law.

Unfortunately, discrimination toward the Palestinian citizens of Israel has not gotten any better in recent years. The Knesset – Israel’s parliament – continues to pass discriminatory laws,

12 “Law of Political Parties – Amendment No. 12,” Adalah, https://www.adalah.org/en/law/view/512.

13 “Discrimination Against Palestinian Citizens of Israel.”

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drawing the attention of international human rights organizations.14 Increasing numbers of nonPalestinian Israelis are beginning to deny the citizenship of Palestinian Israelis, believing Arabs cannot be “real” Israelis. Additionally, over half of Israelis polled would support limiting press freedoms to protect Israel’s image, as well as restricting the right to oppose the government’s “defense policy.” Half of all Israeli Jewish students do not want to be educated alongside Arabs, and an equal number of Israeli Jewish students believe Arab Israelis should not have equal rights.

Many municipal chief rabbis have taken it upon themselves to segregate the Israeli population in a variety of ways, such as forbidding Jews from renting property to Arabs15 or encouraging Jews not to associate with Arabs.16 Overall, Israel does a poor job – at best – of protecting the rights of Palestinians. At worst, Israel actively works to discriminate against and oppress Palestinians, both within Israel and within the OPT. Whether the discrimination and oppression is as bad as some make it out to be is up for debate. What cannot be debated, however, is that Palestinians have long been subject to discrimination and oppression not faced by their Jewish counterparts. As a result, the credibility of Israel’s democratic system suffers. Despite the actions of various organizations, basic human rights – such as freedom of movement, freedom of expression, and freedom to act politically – are being infringed, and will likely continue to be infringed for the foreseeable future.17

14 “Israel: New Laws Marginalize Palestinian Arab Citizens,” Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/30/israel-new-laws-marginalize-palestinian-arab-citizens.

15 Chaim Levinson, “Top Rabbis Move to Forbid Renting Homes to Arabs, Say ‘Racism Originated in the Torah,” Haaretz, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/top-rabbis-move-to-forbid-renting-homes-to-arabs-say-racismoriginated-in-the-torah-1.329327.

16 “Discrimination Against Palestinian Citizens of Israel.”

17 “Anti-Democratic Initiatives,” The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, https://www.acri.org.il/en/category/democracy-and-civil-liberties/anti-democratic-legislation/.

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The Kurds are another ethnic group present throughout the Middle East. Although they amount to somewhere between twenty-five to thirty-five million, making them the fourth-largest ethnic group in the Middle East, they are a minority group in every country they inhabit. The Kurds are a people who are indigenous to the Middle East, located primarily in the Mesopotamian plains and highlands. Most Kurds can be found in what are now southeastern Turkey, northeastern Syria, northern Iraq, northwestern Iran and southwestern Armenia. Despite being separated by borders, the Kurds are a relatively unified ethnic group. Particularly, the Kurds are united through culture, race, and language, although there is no common dialect among all Kurds. Some religious differences do exist among Kurds, but the majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims.18 Kurdish separatism or Kurdish nationalism has existed in the Middle East for nearly a century. Almost immediately after the founding of the countries in which Kurds live, movements to create an independent Kurdish state – generally called “Kurdistan” – began. Hope for an independent Kurdish state reached its peak in the years following World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire. However, after the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, hope was lost as the boundaries of what became Turkey did not allow for an independent Kurdish state.19 Nevertheless, Kurds in multiple countries have supported independence movements throughout the years since the Treaty of Lausanne. Despite the continued support, the prospect of multiple countries ceding territory to make way for Kurdistan seems unlikely at best, and some fear that a true independence movement would be detrimental to Kurds.20

18 “Who are the Kurds?” BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29702440.

19 “Who are the Kurds?”

20 Hamid Dabashi, “On the Kurdish Question,” Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/kurdishquestion-171030073038610.html.

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Iraq, home to roughly five and a half million Kurds, has seen a great deal of the unrest and uprisings involving Kurds in the Middle East.21 The oppression of Kurds in Iraq dates back to Iraq’s founding, as Kurds failed to achieve the political representation and power they deserved as an ethnic group. The oppression became particularly noticeable during the reign of Saddam Hussein, who regularly targeted Iraqi Kurds. Perhaps the most notable example of the Iraqi government directly targeting Iraqi Kurds came in 1988. Throughout Iraqi Kurdistan, Hussein’s forces destroyed over two thousand villages and killed between fifty thousand and one hundred and eighty thousand civilians. According to Hussein, these attacks were in response to what Hussein believed was Iraqi Kurds’ support of Iran in the Iran-Iraq War. It is alleged that many of these deaths came as a result of Hussein’s regime using chemical weapons.22 For this, Hussein and many of his subordinates faced a long list of charges, the biggest of which was genocide.23 Hussein began to target Iraqi Kurds more often after the end of the Gulf War in 1991, as the Kurds – with some encouragement from the United States – assisted the United States-led coalition which fought Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces. In response to Hussein’s attempts at vengeance, the United States enacted no-fly zones over northern Iraq to protect Kurds in Iraq.24 Hussein felt that the no-fly zone was unnecessary, as he claimed to only target the “insurgents” among the Kurds, rather than Kurds in general. Hussein went on to claim that Kurds enjoyed rights under his regime and that he never discriminated against Kurds.25 21 “The Time of the Kurds,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/interactives/time-kurds#!/?cid=socat-the_time_of_the_kurds-infoguide.

22 Edward Wong, “Saddam Charged with Genocide of Kurds,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/05/world/05iht-saddam.html.

23 “Saddam Charged with Genocide of Kurds.”

24 Daniel Byman, “What the No-Fly Zone in Iraq Reveals about the Challenges in Libya,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-the-no-fly-zone-in-iraq-should-have-taught-us-about-thechallenges-in-libya/2011/03/23/AFk2t9VB_story.html.

25 “Saddam Defends Killing of Kurds,” The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/sep/11/iraq1.

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After the actions taken by Saddam Hussein’s regime, many more Kurds began to see the need for Kurdish separatism. This, along with the support of superpowers like the United States, empowered Iraqi Kurds to an extent. With this empowerment came a renewed idea of what is Iraqi Kurdistan, or the distinctly Kurdish portion of Iraq. The Kurds have long inhabited their own portion of Iraq, and have always been seen as being different from “real” Iraqis. These distinctions were finally codified in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, which recognized an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. This autonomous region is controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This was the first legitimate step towards increased political representation for Kurds in quite some time. Also, this marked the first time in recent history that Kurds have been able to establish their own government. Although still within the federal system of Iraq, making Iraqi Kurdistan not fully independent, the autonomy granted under Iraq’s 2005 Constitution was a completely unprecedented step towards Kurdish political power.26 The progress made by Kurds in 2005 was, for the most part, lost nearly a decade later.

The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) posed a threat to Iraqi unity. Due to the national concern regarding ISIL, Kurdish issues fell by the wayside to make way for national defense issues. The possible fragmentation of Iraq led many Kurds to consider a renewed push for independence. This sentiment was echoed by Iraqi Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani, who announced his government planned on holding an independence referendum in 2014. This announcement caused mix feelings throughout Iraq and the world. Some were optimistic regarding what could come of an independence referendum, while others feared such a vote may be too destabilizing. A change in Iraqi leadership resulted in improved Iraqi-Kurdish relations, mitigating the support for a referendum. However, the support for an independence referendum 26 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile,” BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28147263.

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could only be delayed a few years, as an independence referendum was eventually held in 2017.27 On September 25, 2017, Iraqi Kurds took to the polls to vote in the long-awaited independence referendum. Over three million Kurds and non-Kurds showed up to vote in the Kurdistan Region, and ninety-two percent of the votes cast were in favor of independence for Iraqi Kurdistan. The independence referendum – and the result of the independence referendum – worried the Iraqi government, as the possibility of losing such a large portion of Iraq’s territory is understandably worrisome. The independence referendum result also worried surrounding countries with Kurdish populations, as many feared that the uprising in Iraq could trigger uprisings and independence movements in other countries with sizeable Kurdish populations.

Some members of the international community who opposed the independence referendum believed it would have a destabilizing effect on the region, which could have the effect of strengthening ISIL.28 Unfortunately for the Kurds, their collective vote in the referendum was met with another round of repression. In an attempt to “preserve citizens’ security” and “impose Iraq’s rule in all districts of the region,” the Iraqi central government deployed troops to Kurdish-controlled areas of Iraq.29 In the process of imposing Iraq’s rule in Iraqi Kurdistan, the Iraqi military took territory which had been held by the Kurds – who took the territory during the fight against ISIL – since 2014. Given the nature in which this territory was gained by the Kurds, they were not willing to forfeit the territory. The disagreement that ensued regarding whether the Kurds or the Iraqi

27 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile.”

28 “Iraqi Kurds Decisively Back Independence in Referendum,” BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east41419633.

29 “Iraqi Kurds Decisively Back Independence in Referendum.”

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government were the just owners of the territory led to a number of clashes, leaving many dead and many more injured.30 As it stands, neither side seems to be willing to resort to a civil war, especially given the status of the civil war in neighboring Syria. Following these skirmishes, the KRG called for an immediate ceasefire in order to avoid dragging all of Iraq into a civil war. The Iraqi central government, now holding the territory in question, certainly would prefer to avoid further hostilities. Now that hostilities have largely died down, Baghdad has voiced its support for an annulment of the Kurds’ independence referendum.31 Rather than annul the referendum, the Kurds prefer to “freeze” the referendum results. That is, the Kurds want to “start an open dialogue … on the basis of the constitution.” So far, Baghdad has not engaged in the dialogue the Kurds continue to seek.

Ultimately, the status of the Kurds in Iraq is seemingly stuck in a sort of political limbo.

This century has brought a great deal of advances, such as the autonomy granted by the 2005 Iraqi Constitution. On the other hand, the status of autonomy was all but lost due to the threat of ISIL. Another surge in Kurdish power occurred after ISIL was effectively driven out of Iraqi Kurdistan, which allowed the recent referendum to take place. Then, the result of the referendum was met by a crackdown by the Iraqi government. Put simply, the Kurds in Iraq have seen a surge and decline in their power, and the Iraqi government has respected Kurds’ rights at varying levels over the past few decades. The long-term ramifications of recent events remain unclear, but the Iraqi government has provided more protections for Kurds than most other countries in the Middle East.

30 “Iraqi Kurds Offer to ‘Freeze’ Independence Referendum Result,” BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-41744376.

31 “Iraqi Kurds Offer to ‘Freeze Independence Referendum Result.”

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The recent events in Iraq have also drawn Iran – which opposed the referendum – into Kurdish politics in Iraq. Following the independence referendum, Hashd al-Shaabi – a paramilitary force controlled by Iranian-backed Shia Arab militias – demanded an annulment of the results. In Tuz Khurmatu, Iraq, members of Hashd al-Shaabi destroyed hundreds of properties in predominantly Kurdish areas. Additionally, a total of eleven citizens were killed in indiscriminate attacks, although it is unclear exactly which party was responsible for the deaths.

Regardless of who was responsible, recent events have caused a mass exodus from the area, as tens of thousands of residents have fled Tuz Khurmatu in recent months. Fewer than ten days after Hashd al-Shaabi destroyed the Kurdish properties in Tuz Khurmatu, nearly thirty-five thousand people had left the area.32 Iranian-Kurdish relations go much further back in history than just the past few months.

Within Iran, two cleavages are inherent – ethnicity and religion. Ethnically, sixty-one percent of Iranians are Persian. Kurds, on the other hand, only make up ten percent of the Iranian population, making them the third largest ethnic group in the country. As for religion, Iran is a predominantly Shia Muslim country.33 Kurds, despite their many differences, are largely Sunni Muslims.34 These cleavages, which are not uncommon in other countries, help set the foundation on which further discrimination is built.

Following the Iranian revolution in the late 1970s, many factions appeared on the Iranian political scene. After the “Islamic Republic” of Iran was officially formed, there were many disagreements regarding minority rights. Specifically, Iranian Kurds began to rebel, as they were neither respected due to their ethnicity – Kurdish – nor their religion – Sunni Muslim. In 32 “Iraqi Kurds Offer to ‘Freeze’ Independence Referendum Result.”

33 Gasiorowski and Yom, Government and Politics, 288-9.

34 “Who are the Kurds?”

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response to the Kurdish rebellion, radical Islamists created the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a paramilitary organization. Radical Islamists also pushed for – and succeeded in creating – a radical constitution that had few, if any, protections for religious or ethnic minorities. The framework of the constitution made it much easier for the Kurds to be left out of the political process and have few protections afforded to them.35 Even in Iran’s more moderate times, the Kurds were still without the rights and protections that one would hope for. However, given that a moderate theocracy is a theocracy nonetheless. Although Iranian Kurds have endured their fair share of hardships, the oppression experienced by Iranian Kurds is less well-known and receives less international attention. There are multiple potential reasons for the lack of recognition this issue receives. One reason for the lack of light shone on this issue is the relative internal disunity of Iranian Kurds. Another reason – which likely has a larger effect – is Iran’s political repression and limits on media coverage.36 While all of the major countries in which Kurds are oppressed have a means of limiting media coverage of the oppression, what sets Iran apart is that it is a relatively strong, stable country. In countries like Iraq or Syria, which are less unified than Iran, it is harder for the central government to prevent media coverage of a sensitive topic. Iran, on the other hand, has a strong central government that has no problem controlling the country’s media outlets, making it easier to ignore the issues faced by Iranian Kurds.

Although the issues faced by Iranian Kurds are underrepresented in the media, the stories that do come out paint a particularly violent picture of oppression. One such example of violent repression came in 2011. In 2011, the Iranian government carried out a large-scale military campaign against the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), a Kurdish guerilla group.

35 Gasiorowski and Yom, Government and Politics, 278-280.

36 “The Time of the Kurds.”

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Opinions of PJAK vary according to one’s point of view. As the old adage goes, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” In the eyes of Iran, PJAK is a terrorist organization.

In the eyes of many Kurds, PJAK is an organization fighting for freedom from an oppressive government. Nevertheless, Iran carried out a military operation against PJAK in 2011 which resulted in hundreds of deaths. Reportedly, some of those who were killed in the fighting were Kurdish civilians.37 The conflict between Iran and PJAK was not limited to 2011. To this day, it carries on, as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps continues to fight PJAK in northwestern Iran.38 While the conflict between Iran and PJAK takes place in a moral gray area, there is greater consensus on the actions taken by the Iranian government towards Kurdish activists. On multiple occasions, the United Nations has expressed its concern regarding the treatment of religious and ethnic minorities in Iran. On a regular basis, Iranian Sunni Kurds are mistreated in a variety of ways, whether it be through indefinite detention, lack of due process, unlawful executions, or any number of other offenses. In recent years, Iran has executed an astonishing number of religious and ethnic minorities, many of whom were Kurds. At one point, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's promised to "extend protection to all religious groups and to amend legislation that discriminates against minority groups." However, to this point, no such progress has been made.39 Iran, being the world’s second-largest executioner, has routinely ignored or defied pressure from the international community to indefinitely suspend executions, if not end the

37 “The Time of the Kurds.”

38 “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Kill Five Kurdish PJAK Militants,” Rudaw, http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iran/13062016.

39 “Tehran Hangs 6 Sunni Kurds, Day after UN Concern over Iran Executions,” Rudaw, http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iran/05032015.

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practice of execution permanently. While the international community generally opposes the use of executions, Iran’s use of capital punishment is made worse by the way it targets minority groups and regularly executes minorities in cases where their guilt is, at best, questionable. On numerous occasions, Iran has executed Kurdish detainees who were almost surely unconnected to the crime at hand. For example, in 2015, six Sunni Kurds were executed. Four were executed for their role in the assassination of a member of parliament from the Kurdistan province, while the other two were executed for alleged connections to extremist Sunni Salafi groups. These six executions came a day after the United Nations expressed its concern regarding Iran’s practice of executing minorities. Making matters worse, the four detainees who were executed for the assassination of a member of parliament were detained a full ten months before the assassination in question occurred. In another case, Iran defied the pleas of various international groups when it executed a man who had been detained since he was a teenager.40 As made evident by its actions, Iran offers no protections for minority groups such as the Kurds. According to a United Nations report, “Individuals seeking greater recognition for their cultural and linguistic rights risk facing harsh penalties, including capital punishment.” As a result of these penalties, religious minorities, women, journalists, and activists are regularly oppressed by the Iranian government.41 Although this issue does not receive much media coverage, Iran clearly has a practice of discriminating against the Kurds, along with essentially every other minority group in the country. Given the recent unrest in the country, it is possible that the Iranian government will be forced to make some concessions to pacify minority groups.

However, Kurds have been promised similar reforms – which obviously never materialized – in

40 “Tehran Hangs 6 Sunni Kurds, Day After UN Concern Over Iran Executions.”

41 “Tehran Hangs 6 Sunni Kurds, Day After UN Concern Over Iran Executions.”

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the past, so it is unclear whether another set of promises would be enough to rectify the situation in Iran.

Similar to their reception in neighboring countries, the attitude towards Syrian Kurds has historically varied between being tolerated and being actively oppressed by the Syrian government. When being oppressed, Syrian Kurds face the same issues as Kurds in Iraq, Iran, or Turkey, such as a lack of political rights and having limited legal protections.42 In fact, the fate of Syrian Kurds is worse than Iraqi Kurds in some ways, as Syrian Kurds do not enjoy the same level of autonomy granted to their Iraqi counterparts, meaning they are subject to more direct rule from the Syrian central government.43 The only time Syrian Kurds receive anything near favorable treatment from the Syrian government is when it directly benefits the Syrian government. Essentially, the Kurdish population gets used as a means to an end. For example, the Syrian government has used its Kurdish population as a way of waging a proxy war against Turkey. Syria is waging this proxy war in opposition to Turkish actions that made Syria more susceptible to droughts.44 More recently, the Syrian government has made a point of not fully opposing the Kurdish population during the Syrian civil war. While the Kurdish-led faction is seen as the only viable political alternative to the entrenched Assad regime45, there is no doubt that the Assad regime has benefitted from the Kurds’ victories against ISIL throughout Syria.46 Therefore, it seems as though Syrian-Kurdish relations are, at best, a marriage of convenience the larger issue of ISIL is resolved.

42 Till F. Paasche, “Syrian and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict and Cooperation,” Middle East Policy Council, http://www.mepc.org/syrian-and-iraqi-kurds-conflict-and-cooperation.

43 “Syria to Consider Granting Kurds Greater Autonomy,” Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/syria-granting-kurds-greater-autonomy-170926121821968.html.

44 “Syrian and Iraqi Kurds.”

45 “Syrian and Iraqi Kurds.”

46 “Syria to Consider Granting Kurds Greater Autonomy.”

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Before the start of the Syrian civil war, Syrian Kurds were more regularly targeted by the Syrian government. Specifically, Syrian authorities would attack peaceful Kurdish gatherings on a regular basis without provocation. These gatherings, often organized to “call for Kurdish minority rights or celebrating Kurdish culture,” were interrupted or attacked in an attempt to oppress the Kurdish community within Syria. Because of this practice, the Syrian government has drawn disapproval from various members of the international community, which claims the following: Syria has obligations under several international treaties to uphold freedom of expression and association, and the associated right to freedom of assembly. In addition, international law requires Syria to protect the identity of minorities and to guarantee them the right to participate actively in public and cultural life, including practicing their language and celebrating their culture in private and public.47 In addition to the practice of abusing the right to freedom of assembly, Syrian authorities regularly torture their Kurdish detainees. This torture was made possible by trying detainees in military courts, allowing the detainees to be viewed in the legal system as enemy combatants, rather than as political activists or petty criminals. For many, the mistreatment does not end with being released from detention. Some methods of interrogation and harassment continue beyond one’s time in detention. Syrian security forces regularly call former detainees in for further question and also bar former detainees from traveling outside of the country. One Kurdish political activist described the torture he faced while detained by the Syrian government as follows:

47 “Syria: End Persecution of Kurds,” Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/11/26/syria-endpersecution-kurds.

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If the investigator was not convinced by what I said, the guards would take me to the "torture square," where they would make me stand on my feet for long days with my hands tied behind my back and my eyes covered with a black cloth. I was made to stand for 11 days with only brief periods of rest for 10 minutes to eat. If I would fall due to lack of sleep...they would throw cold water on me and beat me with cables. I developed many illnesses because of this torture. Tests I had done after my release showed that I had inflamed joints as well as infections in the stomach, kidneys, and chest.48 In recent years, the usual oppression faced by Syrian Kurds has existed in an entirely different set of circumstances. As a result of the Syrian civil war, the Syrian government cannot focus much, if any, of its attention on the Kurds, thus lessening the oppression Kurds may otherwise face. The relative weakness of the Assad regime essentially created a power vacuum in the Kurdish-majority areas of Syria, and the Kurds took advantage of this power vacuum. While Syrian Kurds were no doubt aided by the relative weakness of the Syrian government, they were also aided by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a political party based in Turkey.49 With the help of the PKK, Syrian Kurds were able to take power and create some of the most stable governments in Syria in Kurdish-majority areas.50 At this point in time, it is nearly impossible to predict what the future holds for Syrian Kurds. With so many unsolved variables – the civil war, the rise of ISIL, and the involvement of world superpowers involved in Syria, to name a few – the future is unclear. To make matters more uncertain, Kurdish local elections in northern Syria took place late in 2017. The Syrian central government was opposed to these elections, as they encouraged greater autonomy among 48 “Syria: End Persecution of Kurds.”

49 “Turkey and the PKK: Saving the Peace Process,” International Crisis Group, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europecentral-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/turkey-and-pkk-saving-peace-process.

50 “Syrian and Iraqi Kurds.”

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Syrian Kurds. These elections were part two of a three-part process, with part three occurring in January of 2018. In January, Syrian Kurds will hold “an election for an assembly that would act as a parliament for a federal system of government, as part of a decentralized Syria.”

Interestingly enough, many experts believe the Syrian government has no plans to stop this process, despite their opposition to the ambitions of Kurdish groups.51 The final country with a sizeable Kurdish population is Turkey. In Turkey, Kurds account for approximately eighteen percent of Turkey’s population.52 Just as in the three aforementioned countries in which Kurds constitute an important minority, the primary cleavage in Turkey is ethnicity. Turks are unique ethnically, in that they are not quite European nor Middle Eastern, yet find themselves in what is the connecting country between Europe and the Middle East. Kurds, although being Middle Eastern, have no true home country, causing many Turks to believe Kurds do not belong in Turkey.

The Kurds have been mistreated throughout all of Turkey’s history as a country. In the 1920s and 1930s, during the country’s infancy, the leaders of Turkey were trying to quickly establish Turkey as a country. To do this, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk – Turkey’s founder and first president – sought to rewrite society to make it more patriotic and instill Turkish pride. To do so, Ataturk kept many Kurdish areas he deemed “essential for modern Turkey.”53 Naturally, the mistreatment of Kurds by Ataturk angered Turkey’s Kurdish population.

This resentment caused uprisings among Turkish Kurds. In response to these uprisings, many Kurds were resettled to less desirable parts of Turkey to make way for Turks. While the physical oppression was damaging, the cultural repression may have been even worse – Kurdish names 51 Farrah Najjar, “Can Syria’s Kurds Avoid their Iraqi Brethren’s Fate?” Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/syria-kurds-avoid-iraqi-brethren-fate-171102194030498.html.

52 Gasiorowski and Yom, Government and Politics, 213.

53 Gasiorowski and Yom, Government and Politics, 205.

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and costumes were banned, the use of the Kurdish language was restricted, and the existence of a Kurdish ethnic identity was denied. Rather than being called Kurds, Kurds were given the derogatory distinction of being "Mountain Turks.”54 Perhaps the single largest difference between Turkey and the aforementioned countries is the organization of Kurds within Turkey. Turkish Kurds have a much more organized, unified front than Kurds elsewhere. In 1978, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, was founded with the goal of creating an independent Kurdish state within Turkey. In 1984, the PKK’s tactics turned violent, beginning a conflict that has resulted in over forty thousand deaths and hundreds of thousands of people displaced. In 1990, the PKK slightly changed its goal, declaring support for greater cultural and political autonomy instead of true independence.55 Recent years have seen a fluctuation in the amount of violence caused by the PKK’s struggle. In 2013, a ceasefire between the PKK and Turkey was agreed upon.56 Unfortunately, this ceasefire was fairly short lived. In 2014, many began to doubt the longevity of the ceasefire agreement after complications caused by the rise ISIL, increasing hostilities between the two sides, and urban unrest.57 Soon after, in July of 2015, the ceasefire agreement officially failed “after a suicide bombing blamed on IS killed 33 young activists in the mainly Kurdish town of Suruc, near the Syrian border. The PKK accused the authorities of complicity and attacked Turkish soldiers and police. The Turkish government subsequently launched what it called a ‘synchronized war on terror’ against the PKK and IS.” Since July of 2015, several thousand

54 “Who are the Kurds?”

55 “Who are the Kurds?”

56 “Who are the Kurds?”

57 “Turkey and the PKK.”

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Turkish citizens, including hundreds of civilians, have been killed or wounded in the ensuing violence.58 Future Turkish-Kurdish relations will likely continue to be violent for some time. The already prevalent issues will likely be exacerbated by the ongoing pushes for independence or autonomy in Iraq and Syria. If either of these movements were to see any real success, Turkish Kurds would likely try to follow suit with progress of their own. Even if those movements were to fail, Turkish Kurds will likely continue to push for increased autonomy, although it is unclear whether the Turkish government would – or could – grant such autonomy.

Overall, a number of factors influence whether a given minority group is afforded equal rights within a country. A number of factors, such as religious, ethnic, or cultural differences, largely cannot be controlled by a government. However, where government can play a role, the aforementioned cases demonstrate that a strong, organized set of institutions often does more harm than good in protecting minorities. While there are certainly some protections afforded by governments, the minority groups in the less stable and less strong countries – the Kurds in Syria and Iraq, for instance – are either closer to equality or have a greater ability to become equal to the country’s predominant groups. Therefore, it can be asserted that weaker governments may do a better job of protecting minority groups, even if this effect is accidental.

58 “Who are the Kurds?”

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