Religiosity and Party Identification in Catholics and Protestants in the United States

Abstract Catholics and Protestants have become increasingly Republican since the peak of the New Deal Coalition in 1936, but differences exist between each group’s party identification and the manner of each group’s realignment towards the Republican Party. Scholars have claimed a number of reasons for these differences. Among these reasons are ideological differences, differences in socioeconomic statuses, and regional differences. While there are elements of truth to each of these explanations, they all have critical flaws. This paper will apply the concept of religiosity in an effort to better explain these differences. The effect of religiosity will be determined by testing the change in party identification among self-identified Catholics and Protestants who will be sorted into four groups based upon their relative levels of religiosity.

These Catholics and Protestants have self-identified on a seven-point scale of party identification over a period of thirty-two years. While it was hypothesized that those with a higher level of religiosity would be less likely to change party identification, this was not the case. The findings of this paper showed that Catholics and Protestants with higher levels of religiosity were more likely to change party identification than respondents with lower levels of religiosity.

Additionally, Catholics were more likely to change party identification than Protestants on average. All changes in party identification saw respondents self-identifying as Republicans more frequently than ever before, resulting in net losses of self-identified Democrats and true Independents. The findings of this test allow one to conclude that those with higher levels of religiosity are more likely to change party identification than those with a lower level of religiosity. Additionally, the findings show that religiosity affects Catholics and Protestants differently. Although no evaluation of party platforms was done, the findings suggest that the Republican Party is becoming the party of the religious, especially those who are devout in their beliefs.

Intro Throughout the history of the United States of America, there has been a great deal of work done to further our understanding of party identification. Following every election, the results are dissected in every way possible, and results are often analyzed on a group-by-group basis demographically. Some of the most commonly analyzed demographic groups are religious denominations. These vote results are often reflective of longstanding party identifications held by members of various religious groups, such as Catholics and Protestants. Interestingly, the party identifications of seemingly-similar religious denominations differ, which raises many questions. In particular, the majority of Catholics identify as Democrats, while the majority of members of most Protestant groups identify as Republicans.1 While religious denomination is important, it is possible that religiosity could have a more profound effect on religious groups in politics. This prompts the following question: What is the effect of religiosity on the changing of party identifications of Catholics and the majority of Protestant groups? For the purpose of simplicity, only white Catholics and Protestants will be compared in answering this question, as historically black Protestant groups are so strongly Democratic that they are statistical outliers among Protestants as a whole.2 This question is necessary to ask because a greater understanding of what separates Catholics and Protestants in terms of party identification would allow for a greater understanding of the political parties as coalitions. Each of the major political parties consists of broad coalitions, and answering this question may explain why Catholics or Protestants find themselves in one coalition instead of the other. Furthermore, answering this question would allow political

1

Michael Lipka, "U.S. Religious Groups and Their Political Leanings," Pew Research Center, February 23, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/23/u-s-religious-groups-and-their-political-leanings/.

2 Lipka, “U.S. Religious Groups and Their Political Leanings.”

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scientists to better understand the effects of religious denominations on party identification, and why simply being religious does not determine one’s party identification – there may be an aspect of Catholicism or Protestantism that directs the respective religious denominations towards one party or the other. Also, the answer to this question may bring a greater understanding of the effects of religiosity on religion and party identification. If there is a difference in religiosity between Catholics and Protestants, it may help explain a difference in party identification.

The intersection of religion and politics has been studied by many political scientists and has yielded significant findings. There has been much said and written regarding the differences among religious denominations, particularly among Catholics and Protestants. However, there has been less said and written regarding the causes of these differences. The difference has been apparent for decades, if not centuries, but the reason behind the difference is much less clear. By answering the question regarding the effects of religiosity on the differences in party identification between Catholics and the majority of Protestant groups, a better understanding of the effects of religion on politics and party identification may be possible. For example, if religiosity is found to play a role in the differences between Catholics and Protestants, one may be able to apply religiosity to Sunni and Shia Muslims or even Mainline and Evangelical Protestants.

There are a number of plausible theories regarding what causes the difference in party identification between Catholics and most Protestants. For example, one could argue that Catholics are more religious than Protestants – and vice-versa – and are therefore more likely to identify with a given political party. Additionally, one could argue differences in their respective religious beliefs, as they are indeed different denominations, albeit both are Christian 2

denominations. However, others would argue that there is no religious reason for the difference in party identification between the two groups. Instead, these scholars would argue that the difference is due to something completely different – the socioeconomic statuses in which members of these religious groups have found themselves throughout the history of the United States. Differences in the relative wealth and social conditions of Catholics and Protestants have always been a reason behind their differences in party identification, although recent decades suggest this may be changing slightly. Still others would argue that the difference in party identification between Catholics and Protestants is due to a regional divide, which put Northeastern Catholics against Southern Protestants.

This paper will set out to explain the otherwise unknown or lesser-known causes of the difference in party identification between Catholics and most Protestant groups. First, a broad literature review will be included to elaborate on what is known regarding the party identification of Catholic and Protestant groups, which will provide a basis of knowledge on which hypotheses can be tested. After the literature review, the hypothesis being tested will be introduced, as will the hypothesis’ concepts, variables, and operationalization. This hypothesis is that lower levels of religiosity lead individuals to be more likely to change their party identification. Conversely, individuals with a higher level of religiosity are hypothesized to be less likely to change their party identification. A connection between high religiosity and a high attachment to one’s party is assumed because of the frequency of individuals to strongly identify with their respective social groups. Following the introduction of the hypothesis, a series of data, methods, and operationalization will be expounded upon to adequately test and ultimately determine the accuracy of the hypotheses. This will be followed by a section detailing the findings in which the value of the hypothesis will be detailed more precisely. Lastly, a brief section of discussion will

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make conclusions regarding party identification among Catholics and Protestants and consider the findings’ effects on political science more generally.

Literature Review Overall, there is relatively little known regarding precisely what causes the differences in party identification between Catholics and the majority of Protestant groups. This is somewhat surprising given the importance of party identification in American politics, as it can serve as a fairly accurate predictor of future election outcomes. Party identification can also serve as a reading on the health of political parties – a high number of identifiers indicates a popular party, while a low number of identifiers indicates an unpopular party. In spite of the importance of party identification, there has been little definitive comparative studies of party identification between Catholics and Protestants. The research and findings included in this paper will show that the difference in party identification between Catholics and most Protestant groups is largely due to the socioeconomic status of the identifiers of these groups.

To understand the effect of religion on party identification, party identification must first be analyzed and understood. Party identification is a measure of the political party with which an individual identifies, and this can be used to “characterize the individual’s affective orientation” towards a political party. Although party identification is clearly important, not much is known about what exactly it means.3 Party identification does not act as a determinant of one’s vote, but it does provide a good indication of how one views the world and how one views his or her group membership – or lack thereof.4 Additionally, party identification can also be used to

3

Sabrina J Mayer, "Ideological Congruency, Social Group Linkage or the Best-Evaluated Party of all? Why Partisans Identify with a Political Party," Quality and Quantity (04, 2018): 1-2.

4 Mayer, "Ideological Congruency,” 3.

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evaluate how parties attract certain individuals and groups in an effort to build coalitions large and diverse enough to win elections.

What is already known regarding differences in party identification among religious groups is the simple fact that differences exist among said groups. There is not much known regarding the causes of the differences between Catholics and Protestants when it comes to party identification. In fact, these differences in party identification are relatively new. As recently as 1936, Catholics and Southern white Protestants were among the most supportive of the religious groups that voted for Franklin D. Roosevelt as part of the New Deal Coalition.5 By 1972, this had changed, as Catholics were now more likely to vote Democrat than Southern or Northern white Protestants.6 In the years since 1972, the gap between Catholics and Protestants has widened to varying degrees, resulting in the difference between the probability of a Catholic identifying as a Democrat and a Protestant identifying as a Democrat being four times larger in 2004 than it was in the 1970s.7 Political science literature is divided on many things, but one claim that is agreed upon is that the United States is more religious than other advanced industrial democracies, as the United States has been strongly religious since its founding.8 Although religion plays such a large role in the lives of many Americans, it rarely causes great divisions among the public. For example, there is no religious consensus – or secular consensus – on abortion, but religious denominations are rarely, if ever, at each other’s throats over this issue.9 Part of this is surely due to the US’s

5

Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, "Partisanship, Party Coalitions, and Group Support, 19522004," Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 2 (June 2006): 172.

6 Everett Carll Ladd and Charles D. Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978) 158.

7 Stanley and Niemi, “Partisanship, Party Coalitions, and Group Support, 1952-2004,” 177-8.

8 Everett Ladd, "Secular and Religious America," Society 24, no. 3 (1987): 64.

9 Everett Ladd, "Secular and Religious America," 68.

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status as a pluralist country with many different groups, making coexistence and tolerance a necessary part of everyday life. Overall, it is clear that religion is an important aspect of American life to this day.

John Ladd’s “Politics and Religion in America: The Enigma of Pluralism” largely agrees with the aforementioned piece. Ladd asserts that religion has always played a large role in American politics, citing Alexis de Tocqueville’s claim that “religion was America’s first political institution.”10 Tocqueville made this claim because religion, like politics, often has a hierarchical structure and governance. Furthermore, religion functions as a social institution, as a set of ecclesiastical organizations, and as a body of doctrines.11 Ladd also examines parallels between religion and political ideology, showing that religion has inherent value systems and these value systems can be used to ignore, suspend, or even break rules, much in the same way that political ideology or party identification can act as a perceptual screen through which one views the world. Additionally, some religions allow for mistreatment or intolerance of “outsiders,” much like different political ideologies and parties are often intolerant towards dissidents and opponents.12 To this point in time, the majority of literature relevant to this topic addresses the interconnectedness of party identification and religious denomination. The basis for this literature, at least for recent years, can be supported by public opinion organizations such as Pew Research Center, which found that the difference in party identification between Democrats and Republicans in the Catholic Church is greater than all but three white Protestant denominations.

10

John Ladd, "Politics and Religion in America: The Enigma of Pluralism," American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy 30 (1988): 268.

11 John Ladd, “Politics and Religion in America,” 268.

12 John Ladd, “Politics and Religion in America,” 271-3.

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Although some Protestant denominations show a higher percentage of respondents indicating they identify as Democrats, these parties also feature a higher percentage of Republican identifiers and a lower percentage of Independent identifiers, meaning these denominations are not quite as Democratic as they may appear.13 Other recent, relevant public opinion data has shown that Americans may actually be becoming less religious than they once were. As a percentage of the US population, the number of people who claim “they believe in God, pray daily and regularly go to church or other religious services” have declined modestly in recent years. Despite the recent decline, the US is still much more religious than other advanced industrial countries, meaning religion is still an important influence on topics such as politics. However, many of those who no longer claim this simply do not belong to any organized religion, which is significant in that these respondents are more agnostic than atheistic. Perhaps the most important finding is that those who still identify with the aforementioned statement – about three quarters of the US population – may be becoming more devout in their beliefs. This is important because it suggests a possible polarization between the religious and non-religious, and also leads to many questions regarding the effect of religiosity – one’s commitment to their religion – on politics and party identification.14 Another recent study focused on Catholics and the 2016 presidential election. While it is never a good idea to look to a single election for party identification, as vote choice and party identification are two entirely different things, elections provide an informative snapshot of the political landscape at a point in time. In this study, conducted by National Catholic Reporter, the

Lipka, “U.S. Religious Groups and their Political Leanings.”

Benjamin Wormald, "U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious," Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project, November 03, 2015, http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/u-s-public-becoming-less-religious/.

13 14

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vast majority of respondents – eighty-six percent – claimed that religion played little or no role in their presidential vote. Additionally, both Trump and Clinton supporters held similar religious beliefs, such as belief in Jesus’ resurrection. The difference between the two groups of voters appears to have been their feelings on the importance of religion in America – those who believed religion was becoming less important voted for Trump, while those who did not believe religion was becoming less important voted for Clinton.15 The recent entry of a new pope, Pope Francis, has also been evaluated for its effects on the Catholic population in the US. Public Religion Research Institute conducted a study in 2015 that evaluated American Catholics soon after the beginning of Pope Francis’s papacy. This study found that older Catholics are mostly white, while younger Catholics are more diverse. On political issues, most Catholics generally agree with the Pope, and most Catholics are also supportive of one of the Pope’s biggest issues, fighting economic inequality. Economic inequality and social justice are perhaps the most important issues to Catholics, with issues like abortion and same-sex marriage taking a backseat. However, there is a correlation between religiosity and focus on abortion and same-sex marriage, as the more religious Catholics preferred to focus on these issues instead of economic inequality and social justice.16 While recent public opinion data offers a good amount of information regarding the intersection of Catholicism and politics, these data do less to explain differences among religious denominations. Therefore, more literature is needed. In addition to public opinion data, much of the literature comes in the form of journal articles or books. One such journal that discusses the

William D’Antonio, "US Catholics Weigh in on 2016 Election in New Survey," National Catholic Reporter, November 01, 2017, https://www.ncronline.org/news/politics/us-catholics-weigh-2016-election-new-survey.

16 Daniel Cox, PhD, and Robert P. Jones, PhD, "The Francis Effect? U.S. Catholic Attitudes on Pope Francis, the Catholic Church, and American Politics," PRRI, August 25, 2015, https://www.prri.org/research/survey-the-franciseffect-u-s-catholic-attitudes-on-pope-francis-the-catholic-church-and-american-politics/.

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intersection of religion and politics and the intersection’s effect on public opinion is “The Influence of Religious-Political Sophistication on U.S. Public Opinion.” Religious-Political Sophistication (RPS) is best described as one’s knowledge of their church’s teaching on a given political issue, such as abortion or social spending. It has been established that religion – and RPS – affects one’s political attitudes, including party identification, by making religious people more aware of relevant issues and their church’s stances on said issues.17 Even those who are relatively uninformed can take cues from religious leaders, much in the same way people do in politics.18 RPS is acquired in a similar manner to party identification. Both are learned from interacting with members of one’s own group and members of other groups, creating group identities.19 Much like a devout partisan is more likely to hold the views of his or her respective party, religious identifiers are more likely to share the views of their respective church or religious denomination. As one’s RPS increases, religious knowledge begins to affect ones opinions more than political knowledge. Interestingly, religious knowledge tends to affect one’s views differently in that religious views are inherently viewed as moral and correct, whereas other religious views are inherently viewed as immoral and incorrect. Political views, on the other hand, are understood to be open to questions and debate.20 While the general effects of religion on politics have been analyzed, political science literature has also done a great deal of analysis on the intersection of specific religious denominations and politics. In Religion and Politics in the United States, the authors agree that

17

Eric R Schmidt, "The Influence of Religious-Political Sophistication on U.S. Public Opinion," Political Behavior 40 (2018): 22.

18 Schmidt, “The Influence of Religious-Political Sophistication,” 23.

19 Schmidt, “The Influence of Religious-Political Sophistication,” 25.

20 Schmidt, “The Influence of Religious-Political Sophistication,” 38-41.

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the US is quite religious by many measures. The three main religious groups are as follows: Catholics make up twenty-five percent of US families, Evangelical Protestants make up twenty percent of US families, and Mainline Protestants make up nineteen percent of US families.21 These three groups are the religious denominations being analyzed in this paper.

As for the political identifications of the aforementioned religious groups, Wald and Calhoun-Brown offer some insights that are largely in agreement with political science literature.

According to Wald and Calhoun-Brown, Protestants – with the exception of historically black Protestant denominations – strongly self-identify as Republicans and conservatives. Conversely, Catholics by and large self-identify as Democrats. However, it is worth noting that many Catholics simultaneously self-identify as conservatives, which implies an inconsistency between Catholics’ beliefs and their party identification.22 In addition to literature discussing Catholics and Protestants more broadly, many scholars have also analyzed religious denominations as parts of party coalitions. Party coalitions are the broad collection of diverse individuals and groups that make up a party’s supporters. Catholics came to political prominence in the 1928 and 1932 presidential elections. In the 1928 election, Democrat Al Smith became the first Catholic to be chosen as a major party’s presidential nominee.23 Then, in 1932, Catholics were a major part of the New Deal Coalition which elected Franklin D. Roosevelt and supported him and the Democratic Party for quite some time.24

21

Kenneth D. Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown, Religion and Politics in the United States, 5th ed, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007) 12, 29.

22 Wald and Calhoun-Brown, Religion and Politics in the United States, 35.

23 David R. Mayhew, Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004) 8.

24 Mayhew, Electoral Realignments, 162.

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Stanley and Niemi seem to pick up where Mayhew left off when discussing the New Deal Coalition. Catholics were originally members of the Democratic Party and the New Deal Coalition, but have drifted towards the Republican Party over the years.25 Stanley and Niemi also point out that Protestants are also becoming more Republican, but Catholics are still more likely to be Democrats than Republicans. Overall, regular church-goers are becoming more Republican.26 Another important note made by Stanley and Niemi is that religiosity is becoming more important than religious denomination when analyzing religion in political science.27 In “Religion and Political Realignment,” A. James Reichly adds significant information regarding the party identification of Catholics. Reichly notes that, historically speaking, Catholics have always been predominantly Democratic for a variety of reasons. For example, Catholics commonly lived in urban areas, were often poorer manual workers, and were a substantial immigrant population upon their arrival to the US. Additionally, the Democratic Party was the first major party to have a Catholic presidential nominee and a Catholic president in Al Smith and John F. Kennedy, respectively.28 These factors all combine to increase the likelihood of Catholics identifying as Democrats.

As for Protestants, Reichly provides more important information regarding their party identification over time. Interestingly, for much of the twentieth century Protestants seemed to be split based upon where they lived, rather than their ideologies or religious differences. In the South, Protestants were largely Democrats. In the Northwest, Midwest, and West, Protestants

25

Stanley and Niemi, “Partisanship, Party Coalitions, and Group Support,” 172, 177.

Stanley and Niemi, “Partisanship, Party Coalitions, and Group Support,” 178-9.

Stanley and Niemi, “Partisanship, Party Coalitions, and Group Support,” 172-3.

28 A. James Reichley, "Religion and Political Realignment." The Brookings Review 3, no. 1 (Fall 1984): 31.

26 27

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were often Republicans, although they were by no means a monolith. After 1980, many Protestants – especially Evangelicals in the South – began to become Republicans.29 In Transformations of the American Party System, Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and Charles D. Hadley go into further detail discussing the history of party identification for Catholics and Protestants. Ladd and Hadley do a significant amount of comparative analysis of Catholics and Protestants throughout this book, resulting in a number of informative findings. For example, they found that non-Southern Catholics have a greater probability of being Democrats than nonSouthern Protestants, and the gap in this area has increased in recent years.30 Furthermore, Southern white Protestants have become more Republican at a faster rate than average for the South, allowing Catholics to be more Democratic than all Protestants, regardless of sect or region – on average – by 1976.31 In The Catholic Voter in American Politics, William Prendergast details the history of Catholic voters in American politics. In the beginning of his work, Prendergast focuses primarily on Catholic voters historically, finding that they were largely Democratic from their earliest electoral participation. Although Catholics had distanced from the Democratic Party in 1920 and 1924, they returned in near-unanimity with their support of Catholic Democrat Al Smith in 1928.

Gallup estimated well after the election that eighty-five to ninety percent of voting Catholics voted for Smith and the Democrats in 1928.32 The Catholic voters, who were mainly urban,

Reichley, “Religion and Political Realignment,” 30.

Ladd and Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System, 51, 71.

31 Ladd and Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System, 160-1, 296.

32 William B. Prendergast, The Catholic Voter in American Politics: The Passing of the Democratic Monolith, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1999) 96-7.

29 30

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voted in line with other urbanites and immigrant populations, and went on to unwaveringly support the Democratic Party for decades.33 Although Prendergast places a great deal of emphasis on the Democratic attachment shown by Catholics throughout American political history, he also makes note of the slow shift towards the Republican Party during the twentieth century. At the high point of Democratic support among Catholics, the Republican Party drew between ten and fifteen percent of the Catholic vote in presidential elections. This steadily grew with each presidential election following, with a few exceptions. Among these exceptions are elections in which a third party drew a sizeable amount of the vote, such as 1968 and 1992. Another set of exceptions came in 1960 and 1964, when John F. Kennedy’s presence as a Catholic Democrat drew many voters back to the Democratic Party for the time being. Although Kennedy was assassinated before the 1964 election, many Catholics were unwilling to end their support of the party so quickly.34 A similar trend can be found in votes cast by Catholics for the House of Representatives. It took longer for Catholics to vote Republican down ballot, which means that Republicans have had less support in elections for the House of Representatives than in elections for the presidency.

Nevertheless, the trend is there, as Catholics are beginning to support Republicans at all levels of government at a greater rate than before.35 In Divided America, Earl Black and Merle Black analyze the regional divisions that have existed throughout the history of American politics. Of course, the biggest of these divisions is the division between conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats within the five regions of the US. The Republicans control the South and the Mountains and Plains, while the Democrats

33

Prendergast, The Catholic Voter in American Politics, 108-13.

Prendergast, The Catholic Voter in American Politics, 220.

35 Prendergast, The Catholic Voter in American Politics, 221.

34

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control the Northeast and the Pacific Coast. The fifth region, the Midwest, is the swing region that these two parties fight over in each election.36 Of course, Black and Black point out that the regions’ party identifications have not always been as they are today. The Republican advantage in the Mountains and Plains was not always as strong as it is today, and the South was previously a Democratic stronghold. However, the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 proved to be a big help in furthering the Republican cause in each of those regions.37 The Democrats, on the other hand, have held onto the Northeast and the Pacific Coast thanks to the widespread support in these areas for New Deal and Great Society policies.38 Lastly, the Midwest remains a battleground for both parties as it is a sort of political puzzle. The Midwest has rural aspects like farmlands, but also has urban aspects like Chicago and Detroit. Due to this, as well as the Midwest’s geographic location between Republican and Democratic strongholds, the Midwest continues to be a vital, hard-fought region during every election.39 Earl Black and Merle Black also wrote The Rise of Southern Republicans. In this book, Black and Black give a history of the transformation in party identification that occurred in the South. Black and Black begin by analyzing the blue wall that was the South, then show that the first cracks in the Democratic stronghold began in states on the South’s periphery, such as Texas and Tennessee.40 Despite Republican gains in the periphery, it was extremely difficult to break into the Deep South.41 This changed in 1980 with the election of Ronald Reagan, as the South

36

Earl Black and Merle Black, Divided America: The Ferocious Power Struggle in American Politics, (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2008) 1.

37 Black and Black, Divided America, 61.

38 Black and Black, Divided America, 93.

39 Black and Black, Divided America, 123-7.

40 Earl Black and Merle Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002) 88-93.

41 Black and Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans, 114-5.

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was now voting for Republican presidents. Then, in the 1990s, this transition spread to congress as well.42 Although it took time to become firmly established, the South is now quite Republican on both the presidential and congressional level.43 This realignment is particularly important because it allows for competitive politics on the national level once again. The Great Depression and the New Deal Coalition rendered the Republicans relatively weak in many areas of the country, but their ability to overtake the South means that Republicans and Democrats are on relatively equal footing on a national level, making for much more interesting and contested elections.44 The competitiveness of elections makes party identification far more important, as parties must form coalitions broad enough to lead to electoral success.

Controversies in Voting Behavior – edited by Richard G. Niemi, Herbert F. Weisberg, and David C. Kimball – analyzes voting trends throughout the history of American politics, focusing on certain aspects and factors which have a noticeable impact on vote outcomes and the political process. One chapter which is particularly relevant to the party identification of Catholics and Protestants is the chapter on racial and moral issues as they relate to the South and the “Southern Strategy.” This chapter explains that, although race was no longer explicitly brought up by most Republican candidates, it was brought up implicitly by talking about issues such as forced bussing, states’ rights, or fiscal conservatism. None of these issues were explicitly racial, but the way they were discussed in the South was implicitly racial.45

42

Black and Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans, 203-5.

Black and Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans, 329.

44 Black and Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans, 369-73.

45 D. Sunshine Hillygus and Todd G. Shields, Controversies in Voting Behavior, Edited by Richard G. Niemi, Herbert F. Weisberg, and David C. Kimball, 5th ed (Washington (D.C.): CQ Press, 2011) 393-4.

43

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Racial and moral issues have had varying levels of importance in the South. For the most part, racial issues have lost the importance they once held as attitudes on civil rights have evolved over time. Moral issues, on the other hand, have gained prominence in place of racial issues. Moral issues are now more likely than racial issues to be topics of campaign coverage in the South and are also more likely to have an influence on one’s vote. However, it is worth noting that moral issues are not the sole determinant of one’s vote.46 Much of the literature has focused on issue differences as the division between Catholics and Protestants when it comes to party identification. For example, literature like Hillygus and Shields’ chapter in Controversies in Voting Behavior showed the importance of racial and moral issues in the South and these issues’ effects on defection from the Democratic Party.47 Others, like Black and Black, may argue that differences in party identification between Catholics and Protestants are largely due to regional differences.48 Another theory, which is supported by Prendergast, suggests that differences in average socioeconomic statuses between Catholics and Protestants explains differences in party identification between the two religious groups.

Catholics were relatively poor and uneducated upon their immigration to the US. This partially held true throughout the post-World War II era, when Protestants ranked above Catholics in terms of income, occupation, and education. Since then, Catholics have reduced the gap in the aforementioned measures between them and Protestants, which may explain their convergence in recent years.49 While these are all logical theories, they do not address why both Catholics and

46

Hillygus and Shields, Controversies in Voting Behavior, 396-7.

Hillygus and Shields, Controversies in Voting Behavior, 396-7.

48 Black and Black, Divided America, 1.

49 Prendergast, The Catholic Voter in American Politics, 9.

47

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Protestants have dealigned from the Democratic Party since 1936 or so, but only Protestants have strongly realigned to the Republican Party.

Alternative Hypotheses There are a number of alternative hypotheses that are used to explain the difference in party identification between Catholics and Protestants, but a few rise above the rest. The first of these alternative hypotheses is the hypothesis that claims ideological differences in Catholicism and Protestantism lead each religious group to be more likely to identify with a given party – for Catholics, this is the Democratic Party, while Protestants are more likely to identify with the Republican Party. This is not a result of religious differences between the two groups. Instead, it is a result of widely-held issue stances that are dependent on one’s religious affiliation. There is nothing inherent in Catholicism or Protestantism that causes members of these groups to have certain views on issues – instead, these views are learned through socialization based solely upon the religious group one finds oneself in.

The strength of this alternative hypothesis lies in the fact that religious-ideological conflicts do exist in modern American politics, usually occurring on topics such as abortion, homosexuality, pornography, and even educational issues such as aid to parochial schools.50 These topics, among others, do expose ideological differences between Catholics and Protestants on average. For example, Catholics are moderately liberal on economic and foreign policy

50

John Ladd, “Politics and Religion in America,” 267.

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issues, 51 putting them left of Protestants in general.52 On social issues, Catholics are generally more open to things like gay rights,53 gender equality,54 and government services in general.55 One of the main weaknesses of this hypothesis is the fact that theological conflicts, while present, are not taken all that seriously in American politics.56 One issue where theology appears to matter greatly is abortion. However, Catholics are relatively split on abortion, rather than voting as a monolith.57 Furthermore, abortion does not seem to be too important to Catholics, as only about ten percent of Catholics say their political actions are directly affected by abortion.58 Furthermore, Catholics are between Mainline Protestants and Evangelical Protestants on abortion – Mainline Protestants are most supportive of abortion, Catholics are less supportive of abortion, and Evangelical Protestants are the least supportive of these three groups on abortion.59 Lastly, the difference between Catholics and Protestants on supporting gender equality is quite slim.60 Therefore, while this alternative hypothesis has valid points, it is by no means perfect, as none of the groups are unified ideologically.

The second alternative hypothesis is that differences in socio-economic statuses have caused the differences in party identifications between Catholics and Protestants. This hypothesis is predicated on the belief that Catholics are, on average, less educated and less wealthy.

Protestants, on the other hand, are better educated and wealthier. This difference in socioeconomic status is the factor which causes a difference in party identification between

Reichley, “Religion and Political Realignment,” 32.

Wald and Calhoun-Brown, Religion and Politics in the United States, 185.

53 Wald and Calhoun-Brown, Religion and Politics in the United States, 194.

54 Wald and Calhoun-Brown, Religion and Politics in the United States, 191.

55 Wald and Calhoun-Brown, Religion and Politics in the United States, 186.

56 John Ladd, “Politics and Religion in America,” 267.

57 Reichley, “Religion and Political Realignment,” 31.

58 Reichley, “Religion and Political Realignment,” 32.

59 Wald and Calhoun-Brown, Religion and Politics in the United States, 191.

60 Wald and Calhoun-Brown, Religion and Politics in the United States, 191.

51 52

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Catholics and Protestants. Seeing as it is hypothesized that there is a positive correlation between socioeconomic status and an identification with the Republican Party, it is to be expected that both Catholics and Protestants should have seen increases in socioeconomic status in the years in which they have become more Republican. Furthermore, seeing as Protestants are still – on average – more Republican than Catholics, Protestants should still have a higher average socioeconomic status than Catholics.

There is no doubt that differences in socioeconomic statuses of Catholics and Protestants do exist and have existed for quite some time. For example, Catholics have historically been urbanites, immigrants, and laborers. These three traits attracted Catholics to the Democratic Party and the New Deal Coalition, so there is certainly a correlation between Catholics’ relatively low socioeconomic status and their attachment to the Democratic Party.61 This correlation between socioeconomic status applies to Protestants as well, as those with lower socioeconomic statuses in either religious denomination have both been shown to be more Democratic than their wealthier counterparts.62 This has been proven to apply to both party identification and voting patterns.63 The alternative hypothesis of differences in socioeconomic statuses is not without its faults. Over the years, Catholics have become more affluent, which has resulted in Catholics identifying as more conservative than ever before. This shift in self-identified ideology also coincides with the Roe v. Wade decision, insisting that socioeconomic status may not be as strong of a predictor as it once was.64 Additionally, Catholics are more educated on average than

Stanley and Niemi, “Partisanship, Party Coalitions, and Group Support, 1952-2004,” 172.

Ladd and Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System, 123.

63 Ladd and Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System, 69.

64 Reichley, “Religion and Political Realignment,” 32.

61 62

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Evangelical Protestants, meaning Evangelical Protestants should be more Democratic than Catholics if the socioeconomic argue is supported; however, this is clearly not the case.65 The third and final alternative hypothesis is that regionalism causes the difference in party identification between Catholics and Protestants. For this hypothesis, one has to look no further than the usual breakdown of presidential elections – the Republicans control the South and the Mountains and Plains, while the Democrats control the Northeast and the Pacific Coast.66 There is simply no denying that there appears to be a correlation between certain regions and party identification and voting patterns.

This alternative hypothesis is particularly strong. For example, the South became increasingly Republican while the Northeast has becoming increasingly Democratic between 1932 and 1972.67 In that same time period, there were increases in self-identifications of both Republicans and Independents, supporting this claim.68 Furthermore, white Northeastern Catholics are more likely to be Democratic than white Northeastern Protestants, who are more likely to be Democratic than white Southern Protestants.69 Therefore, it can be determined that there is a correlation between certain regions and the party identification of individuals and groups within those regions.

While supporters of this hypothesis may make compelling points, there are faults in this alternative hypothesis. First, the gap in Democratic presidential support between Northeastern Catholics and Northeastern Protestants is not necessarily evident of a difference in party

65

Wald and Calhoun-Brown, Religion and Politics in the United States, 115.

Black and Black, Divided America, 1.

67 Ladd and Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System, 137.

68 Ladd and Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System, 145.

69 Ladd and Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System, 158.

66

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identification.70 Seeing as the Democratic candidate lost the 1972 presidential election, it is not unreasonable to posit that some Democrats did not support their party’s presidential candidate despite sharing a party identification. In fact, according to the American National Election Studies (ANES) database, fifty-one percent of respondents in 1972 self-identified as Democrats if leaners are included.71 This total exceeds the presidential support of both white Catholics and Protestants, regardless of region. Ultimately, all white groups are shifting away from the Democratic Party, meaning region does not necessarily correlate with one’s party identification.72 Hypothesis The hypothesis being tested is that high religiosity makes an individual unlikely to change his or her party identification. As one’s religiosity increases, it is assumed that so does his or her attachment to the party with which they identify with. This is assumed because a high level of religiosity suggests a strong attachment to the religious group one identifies with.

Logically, it seems as though one who is strongly attached to their respective religious group would also be attached to their political group. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that Protestant groups, particularly Evangelical Protestant groups, have a lower amount of religiosity than Catholics as a result of the Protestants’ self-identifications as Republicans. A weaker religiosity means a weaker attachment to one’s group, making it more likely that one would change his or her party identification. Therefore, Protestants’ lower religiosity makes them more likely to change political parties. This has nothing to do with ideology, socioeconomic status, or regions –

70

Ladd and Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System, 158.

The American National Election Studies (www.electionstudies.org). THE ANES GUIDE TO PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer and distributor].

72 Ladd and Hadley, Transformations of the American Party System, 158.

71

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instead, this is about the attachment one feels to his or her identity and social group, whether it be religious or political.

Data, Methods, Operationalization This hypothesis deals with concepts like religious denomination, party identification, and religiosity. Religious denomination is best operationalized by recording one’s self-identification with a religious group. Party identification, similarly, is best operationalized by recording one’s self-identification with a given political party or as an independent. Lastly, religiosity is best operationalized by measuring how often one attends religious services, prays, or does any other religious act.

Religious denomination, party identification, and religiosity will be the three variables used in testing this hypothesis. Religiosity will function as the independent variable, party identification will function as the dependent variable, and religious denomination will function as a control variable. This is in agreement with the hypothesis, which asserts a correlation between religiosity and party identification. Religious denomination is a control variable because controlling for religious denomination will allow for comparisons between Catholics and Protestants of similar levels of religiosity.

To determine the relationship between these variables, public opinion data from ANES will be used.73 It will be necessary to analyze the party identification of members of religious denominations. Groups of religious identifiers will be separated based upon the identifiers’ respective religiosity. The gradation of religiosity is as follows: those who attend religious services once per week, those who attend religious services once or twice per month, those who

73

The American National Election Studies.

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attend religious services no more than a few times per year, and those who do not attend religious services. These respondents will then be evaluated to determine the effect of their religiosity on their party identification. Religious denomination will be controlled for and used to sort respondents into their respective groups.

For the purposes of this test, independents who lean towards either major party will be counted as partisan respondents. This is due to the ambiguity of what constitutes a weak partisan and a leaning partisan, as it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the value of either response.

Additionally, since the hypothesis presumes a correlation between high religiosity and strong partisan attachment, it follows logically that weak partisans and leaning independents would be most likely to change party identification.

Findings The testing resulted in interesting findings among each religiosity group and religious denomination. Overall, there was an increase in the percentage of Catholics and Protestants who self-identified as Republicans. While this is significant, the results are far more telling when analyzed on a group-by-group basis.

Group One, the group of the most religious respondents whose attend religious services weekly, saw sizeable increases in those who identified as Republicans. More specifically, Catholic Republicans in this group increased by twenty-eight percent over the time period, adding former Democrats and Independents. Protestants changed their party identification, too, as the Republicans gained twenty percentage points, mainly bringing in former Democrats. This group saw the biggest change in party identification among Protestants. <<FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE>>

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Group Two – whose members attend religious services once or twice per month – also saw a general shift towards the Republican Party. However, this group changed party identification in a slightly different manner. Among Catholics, Republican identifiers increased by forty-four percent. Almost all of those new Republicans shifted from the Democratic Party.

This shift of Catholics to the Republican Party was the largest shift among Catholics in any of the religiosity groups. Protestants, on the other hand, saw a much weaker shift towards the Republican Party, with nine percent of respondents becoming Republicans, almost all of whom are former independents. <<FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE>> Group Three – respondents who attend religious services no more than a few times per year – was fairly similar to Group Two, with one exception. In this group, both the Catholics and Protestants saw a nine percent increase in Republican identifiers. This is a substantial decrease in the shift of Catholics, but is consistent with the shift of Protestants from Group Two. Additionally, new Catholic Republicans came entirely from the Democratic Party, with some former Democrats becoming Independents. As for Protestants, almost all of the Republican Party’s gains came from former Independents. <<FIGURE THREE ABOUT HERE>> Group Four – respondents who never attend religious services – saw results that were somewhat like both Group Two and Group Three. Catholics in Group Four became more Republican than those in Group Three, seeing a twenty-one percentage point increase in Republican identifiers over the time period, two-thirds of whom are former Democrats.

Protestants in Group Four, staying consistent with Protestants in Groups Two and Three, saw a modest increase of seven percentage points in the total of Republican identifiers, most of whom are former independents. <<FIGURE FOUR ABOUT HERE>>

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Ultimately, the general findings and the findings within the specific groups of religiosity fail to disprove the null hypothesis. As the figures show, the most religious respondents appear to have been most likely to change party identifications. This is evidenced by the fact that both Catholics and Protestants saw the biggest change in party identification in Group One and Group Two. Additionally, it appears as though religiosity affects the party identifications of Catholics and Protestants differently. On average, Catholics became more Republican than Protestants over this time period. While it is worth noting that Catholics began as more strongly Democratic than Protestants, meaning they were able to shift further right than Protestants could, the difference in party identification changes are noteworthy.

Discussion Overall, this test provided valuable insight regarding the effect of religiosity on the party identifications of Catholics and Protestants over time. Although the hypothesis was disproven, the tests did reveal that varying levels of religiosity do appear to affect party identification. It was hypothesized that higher religiosity would result in less of a change in party identification, but the results showed that higher religiosity actually resulted in greater changes in party identification.

Although the results of this test are quite specific – they are focused on two specific religious groups over a thirty-two year period – they can be generalized and applied to the larger religious community. It can be generalized that, among all religions, those who have a higher level of religiosity are more likely to change party identification. Additionally, seeing as Catholics and Protestants were affected differently by religiosity, it can be assumed that other

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religious groups would be affected by religiosity in their own unique ways. Lastly, seeing as those respondents with the highest level of religiosity became more Republican than respondents with a lower level of religiosity, it appears as though the Republican Party must be more accepting of those who are especially religious than the Democratic Party is. This test included no study of party platforms, so there is no specific evidence to prove such a claim, but there does appear to be a correlation between high religiosity and the likelihood of self-identifying as a Republican.

Despite the efforts of many scholars, the explanation for differences in party identification between Catholics and Protestants, as well as the reason for differences in their dealignment and realignment, is not yet fully formed. Rather than being able to be explained by a single variable, this difference is instead a result of many variables, such as religion, ideology, socioeconomic status, and regionalism, to name those referenced in this paper. Future study is still necessary to fully answer the research question at hand, and the findings of this paper should be helpful in advancing the understanding of the effect of religiosity on party identification among Catholics and Protestants.

While this paper does take a relatively narrow focus, it is still significant for the field of political science more generally. The results of the test in this paper can be applied to religious groups more generally, or at least used as a hypothesis until proven or disproven by further testing. Additionally, these results may also be applicable to social institutions similar to religious groups, such as community organizations, athletic clubs, and more. If another social institution takes the place of the church in this test, it may be found that those who attend social institutions more frequently – whether this institution be a church or something else – are becoming more Republican. Lastly, a better understanding of the connections individuals feel 26

with their groups will provide a better explanation of how the American voters views themselves and others.

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Figures Figure 174

Party ID Among Catholics & Protestants Who Attend Religious Services Weekly

1970

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

Catholic Dem

Catholic Rep

Catholic Ind

Protestant Dem

Protestant Rep

Protestant Ind

1998

2002

Figure 275

Party ID Among Catholics & Protestants Who Attend Church Once or Twice Per Month

1970

74 75

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

Catholic Dem

Catholic Rep

Catholic Ind

Protest Dem

Protest Rep

Protest Ind

The American National Election Studies.

The American National Election Studies.

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1998

2002

Figure 376

Party ID Among Catholics & Protestants Who Attend Church a Few Times Per Year

1970

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

Catholic Dems

Catholic Reps

Catholic Inds

Protestant Dems

Protestant Reps

Protestant Inds

1998

2002

Figure 477

Party ID Among Catholics & Protestants Never Attend Religious Services

1970

76 77

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

Catholic Dems

Catholic Reps

Catholic Inds

Protestant Dems

Protestant Reps

Protestant Inds

The American National Election Studies.

The American National Election Studies.

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1998

2002

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D'Antonio, William. "US Catholics Weigh in on 2016 Election in New Survey." National Catholic Reporter. November 01, 2017. https://www.ncronline.org/news/politics/uscatholics-weigh-2016-election-new-survey.

Hillygus, D. Sunshine, and Todd G. Shields. Controversies in Voting Behavior. Edited by Richard G. Niemi, Herbert F. Weisberg, and David C. Kimball. 5th ed. Washington (D.C.): CQ Press, 2011.

Ladd, Everett. "Secular and Religious America." Society 24, no. 3 (1987): 63-68.

Ladd, Everett Carll, and Charles D. Hadley. Transformations of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s. 2nd ed. New York: Norton, 1978.

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Prendergast, William B. The Catholic Voter in American Politics: The Passing of the Democratic Monolith. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1999.

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Schmidt, Eric R. "The Influence of Religious-Political Sophistication on U.S. Public Opinion." Political Behavior 40 (2018): 21-53.

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Wald, Kenneth D., and Allison Calhoun-Brown. Religion and Politics in the United States. 5th ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007.

Wormald, Benjamin. "U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious." Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project. November 03, 2015. http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/u-spublic-becoming-less-religious/.

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