The two previous points, which make reference to the armed forces, are very relevant to the situations in Tunisia and Egypt; and less so to Libya and probably Syria, where the transitions must first start by rebuilding an army that has been destroyed in a civil war. The fourth topic, which is manifest in only in some transitions, concerns the economy and relates to privatisation. In Latin America, the right-wing military dictatorships drove a collection of economic and privatisation reforms, which created a close relationship with the business sectors, as has also happened in Tunisia and Egypt. These divestitures of public enterprises were almost always undertaken with a lack of transparency and many of them constituted acts of corruption; thus, the pressure to reverse them is not surprising. However, this decision, although fair in principle, can trigger a conflict with an economically powerful social class with strong ties binding it to international economies in the capitalist world. This can also exacerbate fears of insecurity and instability in the rules of the game, which, in a vicious cycle, can undermine the economy by discouraging investment or provoking capital flight. Under the weight of these fears, the Latin American experiences preferred not to innovate in these matters arguing, additionally, that it was a way of avoiding a military and business alliances being unified against them, which would create a very adverse correlation of powerful enemies.
AN ACCELERATOR AND A BRAKE Transitions are continuous processes; they are not definitive acts that take place over a short space of time. They have epic moments that catalyse the most intense civil feelings of their people, as we have seen in so many places; in Portugal, where the people placed carnations into the barrels of the rifles that soldiers carried; in the streets of Prague, Warsaw, or Montevideo; or in Tahrir Square. But they also have bitter moments when even the most hopeful lose heart upon seeing their leaders, under the threat of back-sliding, having to accept negotiations and compromises that please no one but are presented as being essential. Along this long road, the leaders of the transition must be capable of inspiring and exciting people, taking to the streets in mass demonstrations to show that backtracking is not acceptable, driving them to the institutions and the polls. But, at the same time, leaders must convince the populace that sometimes they will have to wait and adjust demands to reflect to what is realistic. A transition that only talks about moderating its objectives and styles will surely sow its own failure; but, likewise, it is probable that one that radicalises intemperately, will first split and then, weakened, be quashed. The leaders must know that sometimes it is braver to call for limits than to lead ostensibly heroic actions that have the effect of tens of thousands of ordinary men and women seeking order and security at the expense of liberty. In the climate supporters of left- or right-wing dictatorships will show a Machiavellian reliance on disorder as a means to undermine the transition. As their leaders cultivate ‘unrest for unrest’s sake’, citizens become exasperated with politicians, which may ultimately lead them to turn to opponents of the current leaders who endorse ‘order for order’s sake’. Leaders, therefore, in driving the transitions, must know how to use an accelerator and a brake. Knowing when to apply one or the other is not a technique but rather an art, just like politics.
POLITICAL PARTIES in DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS DIPD page 25