Strategic Vision, Issue 58

STRATEGIC VISION

for Taiwan Security

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle for Defense

Bayraktar TB-2s proposed for Taiwan

Ahmet Yigitalp Tulga

PRC’s Himalayan Doctrine Follows SCS Model

Kumari Mansi

Internationalizing Cross-Strait Stability

Tobias Burgers

Hybrid Threats Demand Whole-of-Society Defense

Serafettin Yilmaz

China Ramps Up Espionage Efforts in Taiwan

Aaron Jensen

STRATEGIC

Kumari Mansi Serafettin Yilmaz

Aaron Jensen

Ahmet Yiğitalp Tulga

Tobias Burgers

Submissions: Essays submitted for publication are not to exceed 2,000 words in length, and should conform to the following basic format for each 1200-1600 word essay: 1. Synopsis, 100-200 words; 2. Background description, 100-200 words; 3. Analysis, 800-1,000 words; 4. Policy Recommendations, 200-300 words. Book reviews should not exceed 1,200 words in length. Notes should be formatted as endnotes and should be kept to a minimum. Authors are encouraged to submit essays and reviews as attachments to emails; Microsoft Word documents are preferred. For questions of style and usage, writers should consult the Chicago Manual of Style. Authors of unsolicited manuscripts are encouraged to consult with the executive editor at xiongmu@gmail.com before formal submission via email. The views expressed in the articles are the personal views of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of their affiliate institutions or of Strategic Vision. Once accepted for publication, manuscripts become the intellectual property of Strategic Vision. Manuscripts are subject to copyediting, both mechanical and substantive, as required and according to editorial guidelines. No major alterations may be made by an author once the type has been set. Arrangements for reprints should be made with the editor. The editors are responsible for the selection and acceptance of articles; responsibility for opinions expressed and accuracy of facts in articles published rests solely with individual authors. The editors are not responsible for unsolicited manuscripts; unaccepted manuscripts will be returned if accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed return envelope. Strategic Vision remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Enhanced photograph of an MQ-9 Reaper drone in flight over the Nevada Test and Training Range is courtesy of William Rio Rosado.

Editor

Fu-Kuo Liu

Executive Editor

Aaron Jensen

Editor-at-Large

Dean Karalekas

Editorial Board

Chung-young Chang, Fo-kuan U

Richard Hu, NCCU

Ming Lee, NCCU

Raviprasad Narayanan, JNU

Hon-Min Yau, NDU

Ruei-lin Yu, NDU

Osama Kubbar, QAFSSC

Rashed Hamad Al-Nuaimi, QAFSSC

Chang-Ching Tu, NDU

STRATEGIC VISION For Taiwan Security (ISSN 2227-3646) Volume 12, Number 58, December, 2023, published under the auspices of the Center for Security Studies and National Defense University.

All editorial correspondence should be mailed to the editor at STRATEGIC VISION, Taiwan Center for Security Studies. No. 64, Wanshou Road, Taipei City 11666, Taiwan, ROC.

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© Copyright 2023 by the Taiwan Center for Security Studies.

Articles in this periodical do not necessarily represent the views of either the TCSS, NDU, or the editors

From The Editor

As 2023 draws to a close and we look forward to a new year, the editors and staff of Strategic Vision would like to wish our readers well. The security situation in the Indo-Pacific region, and indeed the world, continues to experience tensions. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine continues to unfold, even as the Israel-Hamas war increases in intensity, with little hope the Israeli hostages will soon be released. In this issue, we examine a number of topics of direct relevance to observers of the region’s security situation.

We open this issue with an examination of Beijing’s tactics against India in the Himalayan region, and how they are following the template that the PRC employed so successfully in the South China Sea, written by Dr. Kumari Mansi, who is currently in Taiwan researching India-Taiwan relations on an ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs fellowship. Next, Dr. Serafettin Yilmaz, an associate researcher at the Taiwan Center for Security Studies, examines the nature of hybrid threats and how an effective defense can be mounted by adopting a whole-of-society approach.

Strategic Vision’s own Aaron Jensen provides an analysis of the increasing growth of China’s espionage activities and networks in Taiwan, and the consequences this has not only for ROC security, but for morale in Taiwan. This is followed by an article by Dr. Ahmet Yiğitalp Tulga of Ankara University, who makes a case for Taiwan’s adoption of the Turkish-built Bayraktar TB-2 drones to aid in the ROC’s asymmetric defense.

Finally, we present an analysis of China’s grey zone warfare by regular contributor Dr. Tobias Burgers, a professor at Fulbright University Vietnam. According to Burgers’s analysis, Taipei’s efforts to internationalize the issue of cross-strait peace have succeeded in narrowing the range of options open to Beijing as it seeks to annex the island nation.

We hope you enjoy this issue, and that our coverage helps to make sense of current geopolitical realities. We look forward to bringing you the finest analysis and reporting on the issues of importance to security in the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific region.

Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu Editor

Strategic Vision

Strategic Vision vol. 12, no. 58 (December, 2023)

From Sea to Mountain

Beijing’s tactics in Himalayas take page from PRC’s South China Sea playbook Kumari Mansi

In a deteriorating geopolitical climate marked by two ongoing wars—Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas—with the potential for a third—an invasion of Taiwan by China—India finds itself in a tight spot in the Himalayas. Despite 20 rounds of Corps Commander-level talks, the disengagement at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China remains incomplete, and it seems highly unlikely that the border will be demilitarized to restore the pre-April 2020 status quo ante. What makes matters worse is the diplomatic stalemate between these two nuclear neighbors, which has the potential to plunge the region into armed conflict.

The 3,488 km of unfenced Sino-Indian border has become the most dangerous continental flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific region since the 2020 incident in the Galwan Valley.

Likewise, the South China Sea (SCS) is already considered a dangerous maritime flashpoint, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the primary antagonist seeking to claim almost the entire body of water, enclosing it within its nine-dash-line (now a ten-dash line). Beijing continues to increase its military presence in the sea: The incidents of harassment by the PRC’s maritime militia have ratcheted up in recent years as Beijing’s new self-confidence is leading

Dr. Kumari Mansi is an assistant professor at Amity University Haryana, India and is currently researching India-Taiwan relations on an ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs fellowship.

The border between India and China has been the site of numerous clashes between the two nuclear giants in recent years, echoing tensions in the SCS.

photo: Jeevan Singla

to more prominent assertiveness. This confidence is derived from the realization that asymmetric power distribution in the region is broadly in China’s favor, and hence Beijing can flex its military muscle, intimidate and infringe upon its neighbors, and simply defy international law with seeming impunity.

This article argues that the playbook employed by China isn’t limited to the maritime aspects of the SCS but is also evident in the continental realm, particularly along the LAC with India in the Himalayas. A closer look at the developments of recent years highlights a clear parallel between the maritime and continental domains of the Indo-Pacific region vis-à-vis Chinese belligerence.

The main element of the PRC’s playbook includes, first and foremost, the land reclamation which it has accomplished by artificial island-building through the dredging of the present structures in the SCS. According to a RAND-produced research primer published in 2022, China has constructed artificial features amounting to 3,200 acres in the SCS.

Second, these disputed islands have been heavily militarized. As noted by the US Department of

Defense in 2015, China has built airstrips capable of accommodating large transport aircraft, along with significant military installations with advanced antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) equipment on several of these features.

Third, China’s use of gray-zone operations to confront its regional rivals over competing claims in the strategically important and resource-rich waterway of the SCS has ramped up, in particular in the use of the maritime militia and other examples of the civilian-government nexus. As an operational and strategic concept, such operations help Beijing to create uncertainty, ambiguity, and plausible deniability of state involvement in such operations. Furthermore, it keeps the contest below the threshold of military engagement, while at the same time keeping the confrontation at a level high enough to irritate and harass its opponents.

Finally, Beijing has been in breach of international law since it chose to defy the international court ruling, by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which awarded in favor of the Philippines in 2016. The court dismissed PRC claims of sover-

A combined-arms regiment under the PLA Xinjiang Military Command operate an anti-aircraft artillery system to attack mock targets during a live-fire test.

photo: Zhou Kaiwei

eignty over the SCS, especially as those claims were predicated on historical arguments, rather than international law. In particular, the court found that the nine-dash line (to which Beijing has recently added another dash) was without legal foundation. The PRC still uses this imaginary line to delineate what it considers the furthest extent of its territory, using lawfare (or legal warfare) to press its claims.

Leveraging the courts

Lawfare is the process of leveraging existing legal regimes to constrain enemies, confuse legal precedent, and maximize claims, according to Doug Livermore.

Writing in the Georgetown Security Studies Review, Livermore points out how lawfare (along with public opinion warfare and psychological warfare) is a key component of the theory and practice of China’s “three warfares” doctrine being applied in the SCS. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) places significant importance on legitimization of its claims and has expended a substantial effort in researching and articulating the historical basis to its SCS claims. In fact China explicitly uses legal warfare in its re-

sponse to contested situations where it is increasingly using grey zone operations as a strategy to reinforce its claims. The PRC has formalized and adopted this lawfare doctrine when it revised the “Political Work Guidelines of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)” in 2003 and has applied it to the extent no other country has.

The typical Chinese strategies and approaches in the SCS—land reclamation, militarization, confrontation using gray-zone tactics, and lawfare—also resonate in the Himalayas. In terms of territorial claims and land reclamation, the thousands of kilometers of shared border between India and China—the aforementioned LAC—is generally divided into three sections. The western section involves Ladakh on the Indian side and Tibet and Xinjiang on the Chinese side. The middle section includes Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh on the Indian side and Tibet on the Chinese side. Finally, the eastern part comprises Arunachal Pradesh on the Indian side, which China claims and refers to as “South Tibet,” alongside Tibet on the Chinese side. The western and eastern sections are the most contested areas along the LAC, having witnessed border clashes and a heightened military pres-

photo: Zhou Kaiwei

Artillerymen with the PLA Xinjiang Military Command operate an anti-aircraft artillery system to attack mock targets during a live-fire test.

ence since 2020. According to media reports, Beijing has constructed 628 villages in 112 Tibetan border towns—part of the CCP’s euphemistically named “Plan for the Construction of Well-off Villages in the Border Areas of the Tibet Autonomous Region.”

According to India’s Foreign Ministry, one of these villages lies 4.5 km inside Indian territory, in the eastern section of the LAC. The CCP has relocated nearly 250,000 Tibetans to these villages since 2017, the policy serving as a tactic to reinforce and legitimize China’s territorial assertions. The PLA strategy in the Himalayas is akin to that deployed in the SCS, using a combination of hybrid and salami-slicing tactics. One report revealed that, as of January, India had lost access to 26 of its 65 patrolling points between Chumar and the Karakoram Pass, effectively conceding territory to China. Beijing is creating facts on the ground by building villages and resettling people along the LAC and at the same time using its salami-slicing approach to gradually and incrementally change ground realities in its favor for strategic gains.

The villages so constructed by Beijing are well equipped with dual-use infrastructure like roads, housing, schools, police stations and even 5G connec-

tivity. Furthermore, PLA military build-up near the LAC has doubled since 2017 to include air bases, heliports, and air-defense sites. In the western section, China is constructing a major highway, the G695, due to be completed by 2035. This highway will connect Tibet and Xinjiang and will pass within 15 kms of the LAC, where forces from both sides are deployed.

The construction is set to span the entirety of the contested Aksai Chin region, extending from Pangong Tso Lake to the Galwan Valley where the CCP has been planning for a substantial and protracted military deployment. Furthermore, the PRC government announced plans to build a second bridge on Pangong Tso lake, around 20 km from the LAC. The aim is to connect both sides of the lake, which would significantly reduce the deployment time for PLA troops and armored vehicles to mobilize to the area in the event of a conflict.

These constructions not only provide a means by which China is creating facts on the ground to advance its territorial control but they also reflect the Chinese policy of civilian-military fusion. Like the fishing boats pressed into service as a maritime militia in the SCS, Tibetan herdsmen are deployed as

Indian army soldiers and this US counterparts share information about vehicles and weapons systems at Exercise Yudh Abhyas at the Babina Indian army base.

photo: Rodney Jackson

plainclothes security operatives to work alongside PLA and CCP agents in border patrol teams. This group is responsible for conducting monthly patrols and reporting back to PLA and CCP units with intelligence about local conditions and routes.

In terms of lawfare, China has issued several lists since 2017 renaming the localities in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. This past April, Beijing published a list renaming eleven places in Arunachal, with the regime’s mouthpiece the Global Times declaring it “a legitimate move and China’s sovereign right.” This followed the publication of China’s “standard map 2023” which continues to show the entire Arunachal Pradesh and the Aksai Chin within its territory. The CCP’s Land Borders Law, passed in 2021, is yet another example of lawfare, where the vague language used can be deployed to strengthen and legitimize the disputed claims. This law provides a domestic legal pretext to advance the PRC’s contested claims along the LAC, and it provides significant discretion for the use of force to respond to border crossings. It also prohibits border construction without permission, which may include both sides of the

LAC (mainly those claimed by the PRC). It further adds to the potential for hostilities between India and China, as India ramps up its border infrastructure building to counter China.

Rules-based order

While India is not a SCS littoral state, it is deeply committed to upholding the rules-based order and ensuring freedom of navigation in the SCS, which constitutes a complex geopolitical space. At approximately 3.6 million square kilometers in size, it is larger than the area of India and carries almost a third of the world’s shipping. About 55 percent of India’s trade with other Indo-Pacific countries passes through the SCS, which is a critical junction for navigation between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean via the Malacca Strait. About 80 percent of China’s crude oil imports are shipped through this route. The sea lines of communication in the SCS are vital for China’s energy security, just as they are for India’s interests in this region.

At the same time, the SCS is an extension of India’s

A helicopter attached to an army aviation brigade under the PLA Xizang Military Command flies in a mountainous area during reconnaissance training.

photo: Hu Qiwu

terrestrial disputes with China, as both countries are vying for influence in the same region. While China tries to react to India’s growing influence in the IndoPacific by keeping it busy along the LAC, India tries to deny China any leverage by working closely with all the major players in the region and further abroad, including the United States, Japan, Australia, South Korea, France, and the member states of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The SCS forms part of India’s extended neighborhood under its Act East Policy, and recent posturing from New Delhi signals a subtle change in its traditional neutral stance vis-à-vis the SCS, toward perhaps a more proactive role in the SCS within the broader framework of its Indo-Pacific strategy. The revised stance on the international court of arbitration, for example, comes as India increases its security engagement with countries in Southeast Asia, mainly the Philippines and Vietnam.

This can also be viewed in the wake of the increased tensions between India and China at the Himalayan border. In December 2021, troops from the two sides

clashed along the border in Arunachal Pradesh, in Tawang district. Twenty rounds of India-China Corps Commander Level Meeting have been conducted so far, but the two sides have not been able to restore the pre-2020 status quo—a demand from the Indian side which China vehemently ignores. It’s a stalemate, both diplomatically and militarily, as India maintains that bilateral relations cannot be normalized until the situation at the border returns to normal.

Chinese aggression in the SCS and the Himalayas in recent years must be viewed as a by-product of an enhanced sense of comprehensive national power in Beijing, which is fueling its self-perception to consolidate its status as a global power and reshape the existing rules-based international order according to the CCP’s whims and fancies. India is only too aware of this power differential, and hence its goal is to counter the Chinese playbook in its neighborhood by recalibrating its foreign policy and enabling New Delhi to work closely with major players in the Indo-Pacific region. Benign containment, rather than overt confrontation, is the way forward. n

An Indian Army Soldier assigned to the 31st Armored Division fires a Javelin missile as part of Exercise Yudh Abhyas with US forces.

photo: Rodney Jackson

Strategic Vision vol. 12, no. 58 (December, 2023)

Social Duty

Whole-of-society approach to defense advocated against hybrid threats

Serafettin Yilmaz

In the ever-evolving national security landscape, the question of complexity is a particularly important issue. The concept refers to the intricate nature of threats. Multiple factors contribute to this. First, threats today are multidimensional and interconnected, involving military, economic, political, social, technological and environmental aspects. Second, advancements in communications, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and other areas create vulnerabilities that state and non-state actors may be able to manipulate. Finally, in the globalized international system, local threats such as economic

distress or terrorism can have spillover effects with global ramifications.

The outcome of this complexity is that national security can no longer be approached conventionally. Traditionally, threats are divided into two broad categories (traditional and non-traditional) where the agents responsible for addressing them are fixed. However, owing to their increasing complexity, the line between the two realms has become less distinct, including military, political, economic, information, cyber, and social domains.

The European Center of Excellence for Countering

Serafettin Yilmaz

Tech Sgt. Kyle Hanslovan is a cyber-warfare specialist serving with the 175th Cyberspace Operations Group of the Maryland Air National Guard.

photo: J.M. Eddins Jr.

Hybrid Threats defines a hybrid threat as “an action conducted by state or non-state actors, whose goal is to undermine or harm a target by influencing its decision-making at the local, regional, state or institutional level.” The actors engaging in hybrid action “blur the usual borders of international politics and operate in the interfaces between external and internal, legal and illegal, and peace and war.” The application of conventional and unconventional methods creates ambiguities, “complicating attribution and response.”

War and peace

Similarly, NATO analysts view hybrid threats as particularly challenging, first, because they obscure “the line between war and peace.” Second, they make attribution and response difficult, resulting in further complications in crafting clear policies and strategies. In sum, a hybrid threat blurs the boundaries between the actions by state and non-state actors, includes all potential domains, helps the perpetrators weaponize information and other cognitive tools, provides them with the opportunity to deny responsibility, and

allows conventionally weaker states and non-state actors to employ asymmetrical tactics offensively. Hybrid actions pose a specific challenge to democratic countries because they are built on open and transparent institutions which recognize access to information as a basic right. Conversely, in authoritarian states, limited openness and broad state control over freedoms in a political environment where leadership does not change through elections act as natural barriers to external influence. Also, democratic governments are bound by laws and norms whereas undemocratic states may sidestep or breach those rules more liberally. Therefore, especially when weakened, internally divided and destabilized, democracies may experience an innate disadvantage in knowledge, cognitive, and social aspects of hybrid warfare.

As such, democratic regimes are required to be more proactive and innovative to develop effective means to reinforce their capabilities to detect, deter, counter, and respond to hybrid threats. This is especially true in recent years when authoritarian states are more sophisticated and increasingly organized to execute a military-society fusion strategy

ROC service members pose in front of an ATV. The hybrid challenges of modern warfare demand modern defensive solutions.

photo: ROC MND

and engage in political, cognitive and legal warfare (e.g., China’s Three Warfares Strategy and Russia’s Gerasimov Doctrine).

The changing threat landscape lays bare the need for innovations in the way nations organize themselves by reassessing their security structures, strategies and instruments. The whole-of-society (WoS) approach represents a paradigm shift in how national security is perceived conceptually and operationally. In essence, the approach recognizes that contemporary international security requires, beyond the government institutions such as the military, intelligence community and treasury, all the societal stakeholders (citizens, civil society, the private sector, NGOs, etc.) to claim responsibility for and participate in the defense of the nation.

This is due to the fact that hybrid threats create warlike conditions without the presence of kinetic warfare. Their innate complexity calls for the engagement of all elements of a society. To defend against such threats, all stages of threat (Presence of threat, breach of defense and post-defense) have to be considered. As the threat evolves, so should the policy

objectives and the related set of actions. Conventionally, government-centric security doctrines advocate that state agencies, especially military and intelligence-related branches, prepare against security risks with limited participation by the larger society. The whole-of-government approach expands the scope of participation to all government agencies and introduces a number of measures to optimize the capabilities of the entire political apparatus. For example, it prescribes coordination and policy cohesion, integrated national defense planning, and effective public communication.

Unique strengths

The WoS approach assigns responsibility to all societal actors. While recognizing the government’s overarching responsibility, it views individuals as resources and decision-makers so that each social segment can contribute their unique strengths. The primary aim of the WoS model is to develop societywide resilience against non-military threats such as cyber-attacks, disinformation and propaganda, co-

ROC Navy divers conduct diving operations in aid of maintenance on a ship’s propulsion system.

photo: ROC MND

ercion and manipulation of domestic political processes, economic pressure (sanctions, trade restrictions, financial manipulations), psyops, subversion and sabotage attempts.

Essential for the successful implementation of WoS policy is, first and foremost, to build cohesion and create synergy between the public and civil sectors by establishing efficient government-citizen communication and ensuring a transparent and regular flow of information to create mutual trust and understanding. This calls for a comprehensive upgrade of existing security doctrines, systems, and platforms, the reorganization of governmental institutions, and the adaptation of regulatory frameworks. Second, resilience-building efforts need to involve the whole of society, including business sectors and civil communities. Included in resilience efforts are physical infrastructure (energy, telecommunication, healthcare, transportation, etc.) reinforcement, economic diversification, crisis management and response planning, and social cohesion. Finally, an effective WoS

strategy requires establishing viable international collaboration through diplomacy at all levels, sharing professional intelligence, and coordinating efforts for a common response.

Among democratic states, the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has been one of the primary targets for hybrid warfare by foreign actors. Among the threats it faces are military aggression and intimidation, cyber warfare (espionage, intelligence gathering and disruption operations against government entities, businesses and civilian infrastructure, and disinformation, psychological warfare, and propaganda), economic coercion, political influence, proxy warfare, and diplomatic isolation.

Taiwan has been on the receiving end of cognitive warfare operations. According to CBS News, “Taiwan has ranked as the biggest target for foreign disinformation in the world for nearly the last decade.” It also notes that “approximately 20 million cyberattacks target the island each day. China… is the source of the overwhelming majority of them.” In 2019, the

Ukrainian fighters from the Odin Unit includes foreign volunteers, seen here carrying the bodies of soldiers and civilians under the Irpin Bridge.

photo: manhhai

V-Dem Annual Democracy Report stated that Latvia and Taiwan were the primary targets “for the spread of false information by foreign governments.”

Over the years, other than creating false accounts and operating content farms on social media, China has resorted to other tactics such as impersonating genuine websites to spread fake news, using AI to generate deepfake videos of ROC government officials, promoting pro-Beijing content on applications popular among the Taiwanese youth, and hacking attempts and disinformation on other social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, YouTube, and LINE) to hurt morale and create social divisions.

Gray Zone tactics

As early as 2002, in the National Defense Report (NDR), Taipei recognized Beijing’s hybrid warfare tactics and stressed the need for “all-out defense,” where “national defense… is concerned, supported and participated by all the people.” In a similar vein, the first Quadrilateral Defense Review (QDR, 2009) listed developing asymmetrical warfare capabilities as one of the national defense objectives. The asymmetric threats Taiwan faces and the innovative/asymmetric capabilities it plans to build have been a repeated theme in almost all defense papers. In the 2021 QDR, the vision for asymmetric defense is clearly stated: “Asymmetric capabilities that are small, numerous, smart, stealthy, mobile, and hard to be detected and countered shall be built up.”

The 2006 NDR is one of the earliest documents pointing out PRC’s asymmetric and nonlinear combat methods. The 2008 NDR observed the PRC’s

Taiwan has been increasingly subject to Gray Zone tactics as well. For example, China has been regularly challenging Taiwan’s ADIZ and the maritime median line in the Taiwan Strait. Through these actions, the PRC hopes to generate confusion, impair societal readiness, and cause a sense of fatalism among the public. The WoS approach, therefore, offers a viable blueprint for Taiwan against hybrid threats.

333rd Training Squadron cyber warfare officers engage in a training exercise inside Stennis Hall at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi.

photo: Seth Haddix

“asymmetrical warfare philosophy” where it “actively constructs combat capabilities in areas such as information, electronics, networks, and space.” The 2021 QDR outlines Beijing’s strategy, including cognitive and information warfare and other Gray Zone operations. The 2023 NDR is notable since it mentions for the first time that the PRC employs hybrid warfare measures that include “asymmetrical tactics in political, diplomatic, legal, psychological, propaganda, informational, and even criminal domains with multi-channel, highly informatized, flexible, and highly concealed features.”

A former chief of the general staff of the ROC Armed Forces, retired Admiral Lee Hsi-min, conceptualized a vision of all-out homeland defense that better reflects the WoS approach. He states that Taiwan’s current all-out defense posture “organize[s] and equip[s] the reserve force like the regular army...” He suggests that this model be transformed “into a homeland defense force to comprise volunteers, conscripts, policemen, fire fighters, and coast guards.” Lee contends that “our young people would be willing to defend their own country as long as govern-

ment provides a pragmatic and viable all-out defense mechanism.”

Over the past few years, Taipei has explicitly recognized the existence of hybrid threats and, eventually, the importance of moving from a whole-ofgovernment to a whole-of-society doctrine. However, whether these policy visions and plans have been put into full implementation is debated.

It should be added, in conclusion, that WoS cannot be thought of in isolation from the larger international context. A whole-of-international-society approach needs to accompany the WoS doctrine. This is especially true for countries that face existential threats from formidable state actors. The adaptation of a well-formulated WoS approach can be convincing proof for Taiwan’s partners, mainly the United States, that it takes the threats to its national security seriously. Such a policy would add further value to Taiwan as a thriving democracy which commands a near monopoly on advanced logic chips and is situated at the critical geopolitical juncture where great power rivalry between the United States and China has been taking place. n

The ROC government recognizes the importance of moving from a whole-of-government to a whole-of-society doctrine.

photo: ROC MND

Strategic Vision vol. 12, no. 58 (December, 2023)

Spy Games

Communist China’s espionage activities, networks in Taiwan kick into high gear

In recent years, the defense of Taiwan has taken on a much greater sense of urgency and importance. International commentators, as well as officials with the Republic of China (ROC) government and military, have raised warnings regarding the increasing ability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to undertake an invasion or blockade of Taiwan.

In response, the ROC government and military have taken steps to upgrade the island’s defenses. In addition, a grassroots movement made up of loosely affiliated citizens’ groups have emerged to undertake training in combat first aid, weapons handling, and other forms of preparation. While these initiatives are important, there are other serious security concerns

which demand attention. In particular, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) espionage offensive against the ROC government and military presents a serious threat to Taiwan’s security and defense. It has harmed Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, and it could also seriously undermine its deepening security relationship with its key ally, the United States.

PRC espionage has penetrated Taiwan’s military and government to an alarming degree. In 2017, Taiwan’s national security authorities estimated that there were roughly 5,000 individuals in Taiwan collecting state secrets on behalf of Beijing. From 2013 to 2019 the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB) registered 44 espionage cases. In 2023 there were at least 16 people accused of espionage.

One of the PRC’s primary, and most successful,

Aaron Jensen is the executive editor of Strategic Vision. He can be reached for comment at xiongmu@gmail.com

Aaron Jensen

PRC espionage against the ROC government and military could seriously undermine Taiwan’s deepening security relationship with the United States.

methods of espionage against Taiwan is to recruit retired ROC military officers to set up spy rings in Taiwan. After retiring, many military officers go to China to establish businesses, or spend time there on vacation. This provides PRC intelligence agencies with fertile opportunity to spot and assess potential spies.

In October of 2023, retired air force colonel Liu Sheng-shu was sentenced to 20 years in prison for establishing a spy ring in Taiwan. Liu had moved to China to do business after retiring from the military in 2013, and was recruited to infiltrate the ROC military using his connections. After returning to Taiwan, he recruited six active-duty military officers for China. He also provided intelligence on Taiwan’s military aircraft and warships. Among those included in Liu’s spy ring were an active-duty lieutenant colonel and three majors. Liu was well-rewarded for his treason, and received an estimated NT$16.7 million in remuneration.

In 2014, retired Vice Admiral Ko Cheng-sheng, who had been deputy commander of the ROC naval

fleet, was found guilty of conducting espionage on behalf of the PRC. Ko passed classified information to Chinese authorities and attempted to recruit officers under his command to erect a spy ring. Prior to his retirement in 2003, Ko had visited China on trips arranged by his CCP handler. Despite his high rank and the grave seriousness of his crimes, Ko was only sentenced to a mere 14 months in prison. A source in Taiwan’s navy said Ko would have caused serious damage to national security if he had given all he knew to China, especially the nation’s military mobilization and operational tactics, known as the Gu An Combat Plan for the defense of Taiwan and Penghu in the event of war.

In 2016, retired Army Major General Hsu Naichuan, a former candidate for Kinmen County magistrate, was sentenced to two years and 10 months for spying. Hsu had been recruited to spy for the PRC by Zhen Xiaojiang, a retired PLA officer. Zhen had been traveling to Taiwan as a tourist and had recruited several retired, as well as some active duty, ROC military officers to spy for China.

photo: ROC Presidential Office

ROC President Tsai Ing-wen and President-elect Lai Ching-te appear at a flag raising ceremony on the grounds of the ROC Presidential Office.

Lo Hsien-che, a major general in the ROC Army, was convicted of espionage in 2011. He had been recruited by PRC agents during an assignment to Thailand between 2002 and 2005. Lo had served as the director of the army’s information and communications bureau and admitted to providing confidential military information to the PRC on at least five occasions. He received NT$5 million (US$173,749) in payments for providing secrets to China and received a life-sentence in prison.

The PRC’s espionage successes against Taiwan are not limited to the military. Taiwan’s most prestigious intelligence agency, the National Security Bureau (NSB) has also fallen victim espionage. In 2000, Colonel Liu Kuan-chun, the director of the NSB’s Cashiers’ Section fled to China, presumably with secret documents. Liu allegedly embezzled about NT$190 million (US$6.81 million) of bureau funds that had been allocated to secret government projects. Shortly following a media scandal over the existence of the funds, Liu fled to the PRC using a fake

passport. Given Colonel Liu’s high position and experience, he would have very extensive and detailed knowledge of Taiwan’s intelligence and military secrets. The undoubted compromise of this information would have seriously harmed Taiwan’s intelligence collection operations.

Military hardware

The PRC has recently stepped up its efforts to compromise Taiwan’s military and is now trying to steal Taiwan’s military hardware. In August of 2023, an ROC Army lieutenant colonel, surnamed Hsieh, was arrested for collaborating with the PRC to steal a CH-47 Chinook helicopter. Hsieh was offered US$15 million to fly the helicopter to a PLA Navy aircraft carrier, which would have been operating in the Taiwan Strait. He was recruited by Chen Yu-hsin, a retired military officer. As part of the deal, Hsieh’s family would have been given special visas to travel to Thailand.

The aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan steams in the Philippine Sea.

photo: Markus Castenada

This development marks a serious escalation by the CCP in its efforts to undermine and attack Taiwan’s military. Taiwan defense experts note that if Hsieh had been successful in defecting, it would have adversely affected morale in the military, and undermined Taiwan’s combat capabilities. Moreover, this incident almost certainly raises concern among defense officials in Washington who are seeking to strengthen military exchanges between Taiwan and the United States. This latter eventuality is likely one of Beijing’s primary motivations for convincing Hsieh to steal the helicopter.

Detrimental impacts

While military defections between the PRC and the ROC were common for air force pilots during the Cold War, this activity ceased after relations between the two sides improved during the 1990s. It must be assumed that the PRC will make more attempts to lure ROC military pilots to defect to the PRC with

sensitive military hardware.

PRC espionage activities against ROC military and security organizations have a range of detrimental impacts. First, the compromise of classified military information seriously undermines and detracts from the military’s mission to defend the island. PRC spying has aggressively targeted such assets as the Po sheng, or Broad Victory, C-4ISR system purchased from Lockheed Martin, as well as Taiwan’s US-supplied Patriot missile system. If the CCP gains enough information on these and other defense systems, then they could identify weaknesses and potentially develop countermeasures to decrease their defensive effectiveness.

Second, PRC espionage increases the potential threat to Taiwan’s civilian leadership. A major fear is that the PLA could effect a decapitation strike against Taiwan’s top leaders at the outset of a conflict. Naturally, information related to the president and other top leaders is extremely sensitive. Unfortunately, China has also compromised Taiwan’s

A US Army soldier conducts security from a firing position during a join multinational exercise.

photo: Elizabeth MacPherson

presidential guard unit. In 2018, Wang Wen-yen, who had been working in a security guard unit at the Presidential Office, began to spy for China. He was recruited by his uncle, Sun Han-Fang. Sun was a retired ROC military officer, and had also worked on presidential security details during the time of Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui. Wang provided the PRC with details about President Tsai Ing-wen’s daily schedule, as well as personal information about other members of the presidential security detail. Surprisingly, Wang was only given a prison sentence of a year and four months, while his uncle received two years and two months.

Third, PRC espionage likely undermines and erodes morale in the military. Morale has long been an issue in the ROC military, and frequent cases of espionage are likely making it worse. According to Grant Newsham, a retired US Marine Corps colonel, “The repeated cases of the most senior level of Taiwan armed forces officers being convicted of espionage has got to have a psychological effect on the officer corps and in the ranks. And, once you can create

doubt in the honesty of one’s leaders, the rot sets in and deepens.”

Finally, PRC espionage threatens to harm the deeping military and security relationship between Taiwan and the United States. In response to the rapid increase in PLA development, Washington has sought to provide more military training to Taiwan’s troops, increase weapons sales, and deepen intelligence sharing. However, PRC espionage could potentially compromise technology, military tactics, and intelligence-related information that the United States shares with Taiwan. Espionage might be reduced if military members are given more respect from society. Many people in Taiwan do not hold the military in high regard, and consider military service to be a bad career choice. Taiwan’s leaders must continue to try and increase respect for military members and military service. While this is a huge task, one initiative that the ROC government could consider is to establish a mechanism to foster familiarization and dialogue between civilian and academic leaders and their military counterparts. Thomas Shattuck, the Global Order pro-

A US Air Force C-17 takes off from Tinian International Airport, Northern Mariana Islands.

photo: Hailey Staker

gram manager at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House, has argued that Taiwan should establish a version of the United States’ Joint Civilian Orientation Conference (JCOC).

The JCOC is an annual program convened by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) that takes civilian leaders to military bases and installations across the United States. The program is meant to inform leading business, professional, and religious representatives about the mission of the DOD and about the strength and readiness of the US Armed Forces, and to encourage conference participants to impart this information to their communities to stimulate support and interest in DOD activities. Taiwan could benefit from a similar program if it brought academic, business and religious leaders into closer contact with the military.

Finally, given that the PRC has reignited efforts to lure ROC military personnel to defect with military equipment and military secrets, it could be worthwhile for Taiwan fight fire with fire, and target PLA

personnel for defection. The PLA is a highly corrupt organization where graft is commonplace and bribes play an important role in promotions. Providing hefty monetary rewards would be a tempting proposition for some PLA officers, and it has worked in the past. Any defection by a PLA officer to Taiwan would not only provide invaluable military intelligence, but it would be a great propaganda and morale victory for Taiwan.

PRC espionage against Taiwan has been plaguing the ROC military and government for decades, and there does not appear to be any simple solution to this problem. For a long time, Taiwan’s judicial system did not properly punish those who spied for the CCP. This is seen in Vice Admiral Ko’s sentence of just 14 months in prison, as well as other convicted spies who received a slap on the wrist. While Taipei has recently taken steps to punish traitors more severely, which is sorely needed as a means to deter further would-be spies, time is needed to judge its true impact. n

Soldiers with the ROC military take advantage of a recent snowfall at high elevations to conduct cold-weather combat training.

photo: ROC MND

Strategic Vision vol. 12, no. 58 (December, 2023)

Droning On

Turkish-made Bayraktar TB-2s proposed for Taiwan’s asymmetric defense

Ahmet Yiğitalp Tulga

Two significant developments, both occurring in 2022, have sparked a surge in worldwide interest in the potential flashpoint that is the Taiwan Strait. The first was the war initiated by Russia against Ukraine in February 2022, which served as a stark reminder that we still live in an era when sovereign states face the risk of brutal military invasion by the standing army of another sovereign state. The second was the August 2022 visit to Taiwan by then-Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi—or rather, the missile launches with which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) chose to express its fit of pique in response to

the visit—which illustrated that China is no more immune than Russia to the temptation to employ force of arms to achieve its expansionist goals.

The harsh reality of Taiwan’s vulnerability can no longer be ignored, and in response, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of China (ROC) has announced an increase in the defense budget to foster the development and support of weapons systems capable of countering the formidable threat posed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Consequently, investments aimed at enhancing both traditional and asymmetrical capabilities play a significant role in the advancement of weapons systems within the

Dr. Ahmet Yiğitalp Tulga is a Doctor of Political Science at Ankara University. He can be reached for comment at ahmettulga@hotmail.com

The UAV 9717, on display at CKS Memorial Hall, can perform surveillance, reconnaissance, artillery spotting and battle damage assessment sorties.

photo: Shuan Shi-sheng

ROC army. Key among these weapons systems are unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, which have demonstrated their effectiveness and combat lethality in the Ukraine war and other conflicts.

Indigenous drones

For these reasons, Taiwan has initiated the production of indigenous drones designed for military applications. Additionally, it is actively working towards developing anti-drone systems to counter China’s own advancing drone technologies. By expanding its arsenal of drones, Taiwan can bolster various capabilities, including target detection, early warning, tactical reconnaissance, mobile radar, and the ability to execute rapid, unexpected, and surprise attacks, while reducing the loss of life among servicemen. In pursuit of this objective, Taiwan’s leaders have commenced the domestic development of UAVs. At the recent Taipei Aerospace and Defense Technology Exhibition (TADTE) held in mid-September 2023, more than three dozen drone manufacturers exhibited their wares, including AeroVironment and Northrop Grumman. The presence of so many UAV

producers is testament to the increased interest in Taiwan of acquiring such weapons systems. In addition to purchases, however, Taipei has sown the seeds of a domestic drone industry. Also present at the TADTE was the Asia UAV AI Innovation Application R&D Center, formed by the ROC government in August 2022 in the southern county of Chiayi. The center serves as a cluster for the island’s domestic drone producers, with more than 40 entities from industry, government, and academia represented.

Jackal purchase

In the week following the TADTE, Defense News reported that Taiwan-based GEOSAT Aerospace and Technology had signed a deal with Flyby Technology of the UK for 160 Turkish-made Jackal drones, including provisions for technology transfer and production. The Jackal is a multirole vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) drone capable of delivering short-range air-to-surface missiles to enemy targets. Designed by Turkish engineers, the Jackal can carry a payload of over 33 pounds as high as 13,000 feet at a top speed of 99 miles per hour, for an operating range

TB-2 for Taiwan b 23

Attendees take photographs at the Taipei Aerospace Defense Technology Exhibition (TADTE), held in September 2023.

photo: ROC MND

of about 80 miles. According to the Defense News report, this remotely operated platform will give ROC defenders the capacity to conduct airstrikes, provide air support, target tanks and helicopters, and deny the enemy the use of runways and roads.

“TheUkrainianarmy’sproficient utilization of drones in partially obstructingtheRussianadvance underscores the significance of drones in asymmetric warfare strategies.”

This deal demonstrates the potential for further drone cooperation between Taiwan and Turkey. One such model that is worthy of a closer look is the Turkish-made Bayraktar Tactic Block 2, (TB-2), which has distinguished itself in successful attacks against Russian forces during the initial phases of the war in Ukraine.

The general characteristics of TB-2 drones highlight why they are considered one of the most significant alternatives to domestically developed models. TB2s can remain airborne for about 27 hours, reaching

altitudes of up to 25,000 feet. Furthermore, the TB-2s possess features such as a 186-mile communication range, fully automatic flight control and navigation with route tracking, four laser-guided smart munitions, a fuel capacity of almost 80 gallons, and realtime image transmission and archiving capabilities, all of which position them ahead of other alternatives. Another notable feature of the TB-2 is its ability to fly below 1,000 feet, enabling it to evade fighter jets and radar. With a striking resemblance to the Americanmade MQ-1b, the TB-2s are also proficient at hitting targets in regions with limited air-defense capabilities and attacking distant targets.

Price tag

Another important feature that distinguishes TB-2s from other alternatives is their affordability. The price of TB-2s is less than one-tenth of the average price of Protector unmanned aerial vehicles produced in the United States. With their array of features and costeffectiveness, TB-2s represent a successful combination of low price and high efficiency. Many experts describe TB-2s as UAVs that can be assembled using

An enemy drone shot down by a Turkish laser in Libya. The Libyan conflict was a proving ground for Turkish drone warfare.

photo: Ernest Rockwell

off-the-shelf components; they are economically viable, and require little maintenance. Despite these features and competitive pricing, however, the most significant aspect that renders TB-2s as one of the foremost alternatives for Taiwan is their superiority in various aspects compared to comparable classes of PLA drones like the GJ-2, or Wing Loong II, which is basically a reverse-engineered version of the American MQ-1 Predator. It has been reported that TB-2s possess more accurate strike capabilities, the ability to engage targets from higher altitudes, and superior flight performance during takeoff and landing in comparison to their Chinese counterparts. Given the overall efficiency advantage of TB-2s over their PRC equivalents, Ethiopia—previously reliant on Chinese drones—opted to purchase Turkish TB-2s instead.

Another crucial factor that positions TB-2s as a viable alternative for Taiwan is the comprehensive after-sales services offered by Baykar TECH, the manufacturer of the TB-2. The company extends its after-sales support to the purchasing countries and also provides valuable know-how on various aspects to nations acquiring TB-2s.

Another potential advantage that TB-2s offer Taiwan is their proven effectiveness in various engagements, which distinguishes them from drones produced by numerous other nations. Moreover, TB2s have demonstrated their efficiency in conflicts and wars across diverse geographical regions, including Ethiopia, Morocco, Libya, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan. While TB-2s were initially extensively employed in counter-terrorism operations during their early production phase, they are now employed in numerous operational domains.

Syrian campaign

In 2016, Turkish forces extensively utilized TB2s during combat operations in Northern Syria, namely the Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, and Peace Spring. The Turkish army’s effective deployment of TB-2s in these operations played a crucial role in its notable achievements in the region. Additionally, TB-2s demonstrated remarkable performance in Libya, where they prevented General Khalifa Haftar’s forces from capturing Tripoli, resulting in their retreat within a week, largely attrib-

TB-2 for Taiwan b 25

A Bayraktar TB2, loaded with the MAM-L lightweight Smart Micro Munition, sits on the tarmac.

photo: Bayhaluk

uted to the assistance provided by TB-2s. However, the conflict that brought the most attention to TB-2s was the second Nagorno-Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020. TB-2s played a crucial role in Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia and were considered one of the key factors in the outcome. Moreover, the war that made TB-2s a significant consideration for Taiwan was the conflict that commenced in 2022 between Russia and Ukraine. TB-2s have conducted successful attacks against Russian forces since the early stages of the Ukrainian war, and their remarkable contribution to the resistance of the Ukrainian army against Russia’s intense assaults should be acknowledged. Additionally, given Taiwan’s status as an island nation and the potential threat of a seaborne invasion by China, the effectiveness of TB-2s in naval operations during the Ukrainian conflict is noteworthy. The TB-2s deployed by the Ukrainian navy swiftly neutralized the Russian naval presence, which is an aspect that needs to be taken into account. Consequently, TB-2s hold the potential to yield significant advantages for

Taiwan in a conflict with China, especially considering Taiwan’s adoption of an asymmetric warfare strategy similar to Ukraine’s.

The war between Ukraine and Russia has provided ample evidence of the effectiveness of asymmetric warfare strategies employed by militarily weaker actors against stronger adversaries. Furthermore, the Ukrainian army’s proficient utilization of drones in partially obstructing the Russian advance underscores the significance of drones in asymmetric warfare strategies.

The pivotal role which drones have played in the war has prompted the ROC military to incorporate drones more extensively into their defense plans. Taiwan aims to enhance its asymmetric warfare capabilities by leveraging drones, and TB-2s are noteworthy due to their advantageous combination of affordability and performance. The significant contributions made by the Bayraktar TB-2 drones in Ukraine’s defense, despite facing intense Russian attacks, could potentially serve as a crucial component in Taiwan’s own asymmetric warfare strategies. n

The fixed-wing/vertical take-off and landing Sky Saker FX80 UAV is manufactured by China North Industries Corporation (Norinco).

photo: Sino Defence Forum

Strategic Vision vol. 12, no. 58 (December, 2023)

Raising Awareness

Beijing’s options narrow as cross-strait stability becomes international issue Tobias Burgers

Much has been written about the results of Taiwanese elections. From news media to more in-depth reporting by think tanks and academia, Taiwan’s elections have become more than a matter of national importance. While we should view the elections as, first and foremost, a Taiwanese exercise in hard-earned democratic rights, given the nature of cross-strait relations, such elections and the sensitivity the People’s Republic of China (PRC) holds for the Taiwan issue, these national elections have indeed international implications. In her assessment of the 2024 election season, Simona Grano of the Center for China Analysis notes

how they carry “enormous geopolitical implications.” Further observing the academic, media, and policy debates about Taiwanese elections, much less interest has been paid to the issues of importance to the Taiwanese electorate, such as affordable housing and wage stagnation. Instead, the focus is on how the outcome of the national elections will influence crossstrait relations.

Indeed, the million-dollar question seems to be, how will China react to the outcome of the Taiwanese elections? Many pundits have been trying to read the tea leaves on how China might react and what this will mean for cross-strait relations, regional stability,

Dr. Tobias Burgers is an assistant professor at the Social Studies faculty, Fulbright University Vietnam and a CCRC fellow at the Cyber Civilization Research Center, Keio University.

Taiwan’s arms purchases from the United States has long focused on big-ticket items such as tanks.

photo: ROC MND

Sino-American relations, and even for the stability of the international system. This debate focuses on the possibility that China could decide to undertake military action against Taiwan. Indeed, in a recent piece for Foreign Policy magazine, political scientists Michael Beckley and Hal Brands argue that if China decides to go to war with Taiwan, it is among the “single most important questions in international affairs today.”

An important variable

Given this proposed importance by several pundits to the cross-strait relationship, we could perceive the elections—and their outcome—as a variable of the highest importance in assessing the state of relations and, thus, the possibility of a conflict.

On first reading, an electoral victory of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) would seem to be an unfavorable outcome in the eyes of China. This outcome would read as a clear rejection of China’s unification narrative and equally a failure of sustained efforts by Beijing—through election interference, mis- and disinformation efforts, and political pressure campaigns—to create favorable conditions for a more amenable election outcome. In light of these failures, it merits an assessment of how China could seek a more assertive approach that might include military means, as its political efforts have failed, with three consecutive DPP electoral victories and an evergrowing part of the Taiwanese electorate that firmly rejects unification. The rejection of these Chinese efforts, in combination with the rapid military modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as

Map showing the flight path of the Chinese spy balloon and incursions by PLAAF aircraft in early December, 2023. graphic: ROC MND

well as frequent references to the importance of unification by Xi Jinping, warrants the idea, as several pundits have noted, that the elections could lead to a realignment of China’s view of cross-strait relations towards a more escalatory military approach. However, the outcome of the elections, unfavorable for China, is less relevant as an indicator of how crossstrait relations will develop over the next four years. In this, the effect of the elections as a variable influencing cross-strait relations is significantly more limited. Instead, China’s strategic options concerning Taiwan are significantly limited because of the changing dynamics of the security environment in the Taiwan Strait. Increasingly, it is these dynamics that define the state of cross-strait relations, and will likely continue to do so in the future. While the military balance has undisputedly shifted across the Taiwan Strait in favor of China, with the PLA having clear dominance in the military realm, political dynamics have transformed the conflict and altered the security dynamics in the strait: Throughout the last decade, the world has changed its perspective on cross-strait relations, seeing them now as being more significant than just relations between two nations. Whereas two decades ago, crossstrait relations were considered of lesser importance in the Asia-Pacific geopolitical realm, these days, Taiwan is recognized as a crucial pivot point of the region.

Limiting China’s options

The rising geopolitical importance of Taiwan is such that it reshapes the conflict across the strait, effectively limiting China’s strategic options. Beckley and Brands argue that “countries don’t choose war or peace in a vacuum; they also take cues from the larger state of the world.” Moreover, the larger state of the world these days, at least from a regional perspective, is not very favorable to China, let alone to the notion that China could seek military action against Taiwan. The changing international dynamics therefore has

an impact on cross-strait relations. Observing the main actors in the region, it is evident that they have used various measures to signal their objection to a possible military conflict over Taiwan. Among these, the United States has been most evident in its support of Taiwan and in signaling its strong desire to prevent conflict. US President Joe Biden went so far as to state

“Taiwan has transformed its political posture from a smaller island nation in conflict with China to an outsized issue in prime seating on the global stage.”

in 2022 that the United States government would militarily support Taiwan in case of a PRC invasion. Beyond this firm diplomatic language, Washington has increased its military support through material and training missions, effectively signaling to China that the United States is willing to go to great lengths to support Taiwan. While other nations are not as evident in their support, an observable shift has occurred here.

Japan, long considered a passive force, has for decades embarked on a defense expansion program, with defense budgets rising by over 50 percent. While not all of this is directed at a possible cross-strait conflict, the potential for such plays an important role in Japan’s defense planning. Furthermore, Japan’s political establishment has warmed up to Taiwan and has realized that any contingency over Taiwan, in the words of then Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, “would inevitably drag in Japan.” The sum of military investments and increasing political support for Taiwan signals to China a new, more muscular Japanese foreign and security policy approach that now considers peace across the Taiwan Strait to be among its core security interests.

Things are likewise shifting in manila. Under former President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines sailed a

staunchly pro-China course. The new government under Duterte’s successor, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, has made a 180-degree turn. While its direct support for Taiwan remains limited, it has signaled its political position through indirect measures: By opening up bases to US armed forces—including three located across from Taiwan, facing the strategic Bashi Channel—the Filipino government has effectively aligned itself with the United States, and made itself a strategic partner in the Taiwan security environment.

Finally, South Korea—long absent from the debate on cross-strait relations—indicated its changing position when President Yoon Suk Yeol this year lamented “attempts to change the status quo by force, and we together with the international community absolutely oppose such a change.” Yoon added that “the Taiwan issue is not simply an issue between China and Taiwan but, like the issue of North Korea, it is a global issue.” Though doubt remains about the extent of direct support that can be expected from South Korea, as mentioned earlier, the statement is a deci-

sive change in South Korean policy towards crossstrait relations.

Beyond these regional actors, the European Union has also indicated a growing support for Taiwan. According to Philippe Le Corre, a senior fellow on Foreign Policy at the Center for China Analysis, this support constitutes a “rebirth of Europe-Taiwan relations.” Le Corre recently penned an article in which he reveals that a new awareness has risen in the EU— on a supranational level but equally among crucial member states such as Germany—that Taiwan’s survival is essential for geopolitical stability, economic security, and democratic survival.

Raising the stakes

In this, we should observe how the current government of Tsai Ing-wen, through its geopolitical policies, effectively raised the prospect for Taiwan’s survival and the stability of cross-strait relations to issues of regional and possibly global geopolitical importance. Beyond the security angle, the govern-

A recent report indicates that China has an advanced capability for deploying and dispersing aerosolized biological weapons.

photo: PLA

ment leveraged its democratic position and the global threats against democracy as a further tool to raise its international profile. Indeed, a recent study by Timothy Rich and Carolyn Brueggemann illustrated how South Korean respondents saw the survival of Taiwan’s democracy, and US support for this, as a critical indicator of their own survival. As such sentiments of Taiwan’s democracy and its need for survival are gaining more traction, it effectively adds another successful layer to the efforts to internationalize cross-strait stability. Finally, leveraging Taiwan’s economic and technological power, most visibly manifested through its leading position in the semiconductor industry, the island nation has added a third layer to international awareness efforts.

This illustrates how much Taiwan has transformed its political posture from a smaller island nation in conflict with China to an outsized issue in prime seating on the global stage. Taiwan has managed to parlay the question of its survival into a matter of strategic

importance for the Asian region, and possibly even as an indicator of global geopolitical affairs, as well as a measurement of the US-China rivalry, and which side is surging forward in this rivalry. By raising the specter of cross-strait relations to one of global geopolitical, political, and economic importance, Taipei has been able to effectively limit China’s strategic options, as any aggressive military move, including something as escalatory and drastic as war, would lead to an international political backlash, economic sanctions, or even military intervention by countries supporting Taiwan. In essence, the more that stability across the Taiwan Strait becomes an issue of international concern, the narrower China’s strategic options become. Observing this development, it is evident that the international environment is shaping China’s strategic options. This leaves open the question of China’s current options in this security environment, as it is evident that Beijing’s earlier political and economic approaches toward Taiwan have failed. n

The ROC military is preparing to defend the island against an attack by a larger, better funded, and more well-equipped People’s Liberation Army.

photo: ROC MND

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