STRATEGIC VISION for
Taiwan Security
Examining the Regional Implications of the New US Administration
Finland Joins NATO
Chung-Yu Liu
CCP Pressure on Taiwan
David Scott
Golden Triangle BRI
Anderson Weng
Indonesia’s China Policy
Dean Karalekas
STRATEGIC VISION for Taiwan Security
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Editor
Fu-Kuo Liu
Executive Editor
Aaron Jensen
Editor-at-Large
Dean Karalekas
Editorial Board
Chung-young Chang, Fo-kuan U
Richard Hu, NCCU
Ming Lee, NCCU
Raviprasad Narayanan, JNU
Hon-Min Yau, NDU
Ruei-lin Yu, NDU
Osama Kubbar, QAFSSC
Rashed Hamad Al-Nuaimi, QAFSSC
Chang-Ching Tu, NDU
STRATEGIC VISION For Taiwan Security (ISSN 2227-3646) Volume 14, Number 62, April, 2025, published under the auspices of the Center for Security Studies and National Defense University.
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From The Editor
The editors and staff of Strategic Vision would like to wish our readers the best as we move into the summer months, and as the security situation in the region, and the world, continues to become ever more complex. The shift in America’s stance under the second Trump administration, in particular, has introduced a raft of unprecedented factors impacting not only the security relationships among states, but economic ones as well, even as the wars in Ukraine and Israel continue unabated.
We open this issue with a series of op-eds penned by members of the Strategic Vision editorial board on the topic of Trump 2.0 and the impact this may have on Taiwan’s security. Next, Chung-Yu Liu of the Graduate Institute of International Security, ROC National Defense University, analyzes Finland’s accession to NATO through the lens of Neorealism.
This is followed by an examination of China’s escalatory naval maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait, and how trends reveal a dangerous escalation, penned by Dr. David Scott of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC). Anderson Weng, also a student at the Graduate Institute of International Security at the ROC National Defense University, offers his perspective on how China’s Belt and Road Initiative is contributing to development in the Golden Triangle economic zone and the Mekong River basin. Finally, Strategic Vision’s Editor-at-Large Dean Karalekas looks at the new administration in Jakarta and how Indonesia’s China policy may be affected by its new president, Prabowo Subianto.
We hope you find this issue insightful and that our coverage sheds light on today’s complex geopolitical landscape. We remain committed to delivering the highest-quality analysis and reporting on the key security challenges facing the Taiwan Strait and the broader AsiaPacific region. n
Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu Editor
Strategic Vision
Strategic Vision vol. 14, no. 62 (April, 2025)
Uncertain Times
Taiwan seeks to navigate uncertain international order in era of Trump 2.0 Editorial Staff
In his second term as President of the United States, Donald Trump has made dramatic changes to American foreign and domestic policy. These changes in American foreign policy and international relations have caused a significant degree of uncertainty for many of America’s allies. Members of Strategic Vision’s editorial board offer their views of Taiwan’s situation in the current international environment. First, Dr. Liu Fu-Kuo discusses the problems which Trump’s tariffs create for the international community. Next, Jiuchou Richard Hu examines the major challenges to Taiwan’s overall security. Hon-min Yau looks at how Trump’s actions have caused problems for America’s international credibility. Chang-Ching Tu then provides some insight into how Taiwan can successfully navigate current instabilities. Ruei-lin Yu argues that while Trump maintains a position of ambiguity towards Taiwan, the US congress seeks to strengthen Taiwan’s deterrence. Finally, Dean Karalekas argues that Taiwan’s security remains vital for America’s interests.
Fu-kuo Liu
Since winning the election in November 2024, President Trump has continually shocked the world with his uncouth political assertions, e.g. taking over Greenland, the Panama Canal, and Gaza, as if global order is simply defined by American politics. While Trump is not concerned with existing international practices, his efforts only serve the policy of “America first.” Today, it has become extremely ironic to hear discussions about maintaining rules-based inter-
national order by mainstream Western media. It is greatly confusing to regional allies and friends. Trump executes his extreme diplomatic pressure for “reciprocal tariffs” on all trading partners in order to make new deals. Although it may bring about a possible path for the “Make America Great Again” ambition, it is alerting allies to the emerging risks of America’s true political intentions. As such, there are two significant impacts on the shifting strategic landscape in Asia. First, Trump’s trade agenda may
“Faced with US-China strategic competition, regional countries havemanagedtobalancetheirpol-
iciesbyseekingmiddlegroundand rejectingtheideaoftakingsides.”
not be appreciated by all allies and friends. The seeds of distrust are growing in the region. Second, faced with US-China strategic competition, regional countries have managed to balance their policies by seeking middle ground and rejecting the idea of taking sides. However, Trump is forcing many to comply with new pressures and distancing them further from the United States. As a result, regional countries are pushed to accept Trump’s pressures, but they are quietly tilting toward China. Blaming others for taking advantage of US markets, the Trump administration projects itself as an unpredictable, uncertain, imperious, and unreliable partner.
Undoubtedly, many countries will search for ways to hedge against high US tariffs by accelerating economic cooperation with other tariff victims. Trump’s
stormy disruption of global supply chains could badly hurt Asian suppliers and incur a negative impact on the industrial stability of supply chains. In addition to reciprocal tariffs, hard appreciation of Asian currencies against the US Dollar, initiated by the Trump administration, could differentiate traditional trading partners in Asia from the US. While Trump is considering a strategic push, the desperate move will cost the credibility of American leadership in the region. Even though the US is following the list of tariff negotiations to put trade relations right back on track later, what Trump’s gesture shows to the region is his reckless intention.
Juichou Richard Hu
Trump’s forceful return to the White House, backed by America’s national power and economic leverage, coupled with his unique way of deal-making has sent shockwaves through both the US political establishment and the international community. At the same time, it is destabilizing the post-World War II rulesbased global order and the institutions of internation-
al trade and finance. The “Trump phenomenon” remains a subject of intense debate, as observers around the world continue to grapple with its far-reaching implications and determine appropriate responses. Yet, even within the first hundred days of his presidency, the erratic and disruptive conduct of this real estate mogul-turned-president has already unleashed an array of profound and unprecedented impacts. Against a backdrop of shifting geopolitical and geoeconomic dynamics, Taiwan now finds itself navigating a perilous and increasingly complex security environment. Three escalating risks stand out with particular clarity: the growing military threat from mainland China; the strategic use of Taiwan by the United States to constrain China, alongside pressure to increase Taiwan’s defense spending to 5-10 percent of GDP; and the economic vulnerabilities arising from Taiwan’s overdependence on cross-strait trade, particularly in light of US tariff and chip war measures. The convergence of these three factors is not only amplifying Taiwan’s strategic dilemma—it is propelling its security situation into uncharted and potentially dangerous territory.
Photo: Paige Bodine
US President Donald J. Trump delivers remarks during a press briefing at Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Michigan, April 29, 2025.
In contrast to President Biden’s repeated and explicit statements that the United States would deploy military force to defend Taiwan in the event of a crisis, Donald Trump’s intentions remain significantly more opaque. His iconoclastic policies have deepened social divisions and generated growing dysfunction within the United States, while his tariff wars have disrupted global trade and undermined stability across the Indo-Pacific region. Confronted by sustained American economic and technological containment, anti-American sentiment in China has surged to unprecedented levels.
More critically, China’s military capabilities have recently undergone combat testing during the PakistanIndia border conflict in May 2025, bolstering Beijing’s confidence in the feasibility of a rapid and decisive campaign to annex Taiwan. The belief that a swift military operation could be completed within an acceptable timeframe—minimizing global response and disruption—has noticeably increased the probability that Beijing may resort to force.
Simultaneously, President Lai Ching-te of Republic of China on Taiwan has adopted a dual course that may further aggravate the situation: an excessive reliance on the United States that constrains Taiwan’s national security policy options, and a strategy of intensifying political polarization to secure reelection and extend both his and the DPP’s political lives. This combination may further provoke Beijing to resolve the long-standing Taiwan issue through military means. Given these interrelated developments and emerging trends, Taiwan now stands at its most perilous strategic juncture since 1949.
Hon-min Yau
Since January 20, 2025, Trump has returned to the White House triumphantly as he has received unchallenged votes, and his Republican party has obtained a majority in both the US House and Senate. The
election result indicated that the traditionally Rust Belt blue-collar workers supported him, and Silicon Valley and traditional right-wing conservatives offered their unquestionable support to him. As a result, Trump has been moving very fast regarding his policies toward different areas. For security issues, he has been pressing Ukraine to accept a peace deal with Russia, which was brokered by his team, and he has also been very supportive of Israeli operations against Hamas. Economically, he imposed high tariffs on his enemies and the US’s traditional allies, raising concerns about being considered an untrustworthy partner. Politically, he implemented a Small Government
“Trump’s
fast-track policies and transactionalhandlingofdiplomacy havecreatedhugeuncertaintyinthe world and the Indo-Pacific.”
policy and conducted a huge redundancy along with restructuring the governmental agencies, including removing the Department of Education, USAID, and stopping what he deemed unnecessary spending on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) endeavors. Trump’s fast-track policies and transactional handling of diplomacy have created huge uncertainty in the world and the Indo-Pacific. While the US administration was arguing that his policy was a strategic retreat from Europe and focused more on the Indo-Pacific, the indiscriminate attacks both on friends and allies dent the credibility of his actions. International relations are often based on long-term relations, not on short-term gain. Nevertheless, we should not forget that Trump’s election indicates the collective American anxiety about the US’ declining position in global politics. People should remember that Trump rejuvenated the QUAD and initiated the trade war during his first term. Hence, the trade spat may eventually develop into a part of the larger US
security statecraft towards China. It could naturally be expected that greater security turbulence will unfold in the Indo-Pacific in the coming years.
Chang-Ching Tu
The global geo-economic landscape is profoundly restructuring due to the Trump administration’s “reciprocal tariff” policy launched in April 2025. This measure has escalated the US-China trade war into its 2.0 phase and compelled nations to reassess their economic strategies toward the United States. Despite the Geneva Joint Statement on Economic and Trade Talks signed on May 12, which temporarily reduced US tariffs on Chinese goods from 145 percent to 30 percent and Chinese tariffs on US exports from 125 percent to 10 percent, the 90-day “ceasefire” merely postpones unresolved structural conflicts. Within this context, Taiwan, as a critical node in global supply chains, faces strategic pressure and opportunities analyzable through three dimensions: fragmentation
of the global trade order, deepening US-China technological decoupling, and compounding security risks in the Taiwan Strait.
The essence of Trump’s tariff war lies in reshaping a US-dominant trade system through rule-breaking tactics. His controversial “reciprocal tariff formula” (calculating rates based on trade deficit ratios) has effectively forced countries back to bilateral negotiations. Taiwan’s 32 percent tariff rate stems from its US$73.9 billion trade surplus with the US in 2024 and American allegations of “unfair trade practices,” including industrial subsidies and market access restrictions. Notably, US think tank scholars suggest Taiwan could negotiate a reduction to 10 percent, contingent on concessions such as lifting restrictions on US pork/beef imports and revising subsidy policies—a move likely to exacerbate domestic political divisions. The ruling party must balance economic interests with public health concerns, while opposition factions may weaponize “pro-American detriment” narratives to weaken the government’s
Photo: Elijah Strickland
An F-16 from the 54th Fighter Group takes off at sunset from Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico.
bargaining position.
The Trump tariff war epitomizes the reconstruction of “Globalization 2.0” rules, placing Taiwan at the intersection of economic dependency and security fragility. Short-term priorities include negotiating tariff reductions and industrial exemptions while mitigating domestic backlash. Long-term survival hinges on enhancing technological autonomy and supply chain resilience. Stability in the Taiwan Strait necessitates preventing the total securitization of economic issues, and regional cooperation mechanisms must evolve to address the escalating volatility of great-power rivalry.
Ruei-Lin
Yu
On May 15, 2025, the US House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party held a pivotal hearing titled “Deterrence Amid Rising Tensions: Preventing CCP Aggression on Taiwan,” at
the Cannon House Office Building in Washington, D.C. Key witnesses included General Charles Flynn (ret.), former Commander of US Army Pacific; Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery; and Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell.
The hearing reaffirmed that UN Resolution 2758 does not authorize the PRC to represent Taiwan in the United Nations, challenging Beijing’s long-standing disinformation. Witnesses emphasized the need for international awareness and solidarity with Taiwan.
General Flynn argued that the PLA Army would be the main force in any invasion of Taiwan, making its ability to land, maneuver, and control decisive. To deter such a scenario, he urged the US and allies to enhance forward deployments, stockpiles, and logistics, particularly by developing resilient, land-based forces across the first island chain. This suggests that future US-Taiwan military cooperation may shift toward strengthening ground capabilities.
The hearing also explored the possibility of a Chinese blockade rather than an outright invasion.
Photo: Kaylianna Genier
Sailors stand watch in the pilot house aboard the Arleigh-burke class guided-missile destroyer USS Kidd (DDG 100) while transiting the Taiwan Strait.
Witnesses advised Taiwan to bolster reserves of food, energy, and critical materials. Based on these two different scenarios of a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, it is evident that the United States does not yet have a definitive assessment of how the PRC might act. Instead, it is taking a comprehensive approach to evaluating Taiwan’s current security situation.
Furthermore, the hearing stressed the importance of US cooperation with allies—especially Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and India—through joint training, intelligence sharing, and integrated operations to strengthen regional deterrence.
This clear congressional stance stands in contrast to President Trump’s continued strategic ambiguity in his second term. While Trump remains tough on China, he avoids explicit military commitments to Taiwan, preferring economic leverage and negotiation flexibility. This contrast reflects a broader US strategy: the president maintains ambiguity to preserve options, while Congress delivers clear messages to bolster deterrence.
For Taiwan, this dual-track US approach presents both risks and opportunities. To ensure its security, Taiwan must not only enhance self-defense but also engage both branches of the US government to build a stable and credible deterrence framework against Beijing’s growing pressure.
Dean Karalekas
Taiwan’s security position has deteriorated since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces, which prompted speculation and long-buried fears that a similar attempt by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to annex Taiwan, by force if necessary, was now a practical reality, given the precedent set by Moscow. Exacerbating such resurgent fears was the return to power of US President Donald Trump, who loudly proclaimed that his governing philosophy would be one based on an “America First” stance.
The lack of any conciliatory gestures or outright statements of support for Taiwan’s defense, of the sort seen during previous administrations, has left many in Taiwan bereft of any hope that the country’s sole security guarantor might possibly, under this unconventional administration, leave Taipei to fend for itself. This might be true, though it depends largely on how exactly Trump conceptualizes America First.
If America First means a turn towards isolationism, and a Washington that retreats from the world stage, then such fears may well be founded. There is ample evidence to the contrary, however. The muchmaligned global tariff war that 47 launched suggests that, far from seeking to retreat from global geopolitics, Trump is attempting to reassert control over that ruled-based international order, often described as “US-led.”
Moreover, if an internationally-engaged America is to truly espouse an America First stance, then Washington policymakers cannot but recognize Taiwan as a lynchpin in that effort insofar as the security of the Indo Pacific is concerned. More to the point: if Trump loses Taiwan, then America’s own legitimacy cannot but suffer irreparably. This true in the region: it is just as true globally.
By all indications, it seems that Trump is motivated by his legacy; by leaving his mark on the world map. But it would mean nothing in the annals of history to ostensibly gain Greenland, for example, if he is also remembered as the president who allowed an authoritarian state to extend its sphere of influence out to the Second Island Chain, seize control of Taiwan’s bleeding-edge semiconductor industry, and consign 23.5 million freedomloving Taiwanese to rule under the communist thumb. No; properly understood, “America First” is entirely contingent upon Taiwan remaining a free country. It is hoped that Trump and his team remain acutely aware of this fact, and that they govern accordingly. n
Vision vol. 14, no. 62 (April, 2025)
NATO Expansion
Finland’s accession to NATO considered through perspective of Neorealism Chung-Yu Liu
On April 4, 2023, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg welcomed
Finnish President Sauli Niinistö to NATO Headquarters for a flag-raising ceremony to celebrate the country’s accession as the security alliance’s 31st member state. Yet this historical moment didn’t come easily. A year prior, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine sent shockwaves through the international community and triggered a significant change in the European security landscape.
Following the event, on May 18, 2022, both the Finnish and Swedish ambassadors to NATO simultaneously handed in their joint application for
NATO membership. The Finnish government believed that, through NATO membership, it would be part of NATO’s collective defense bubble and exert a stronger deterrence inherently built on the premises of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Hence, from a security perspective, this article aims to examine Finland’s accession to NATO through the lens of Neorealism, highlighting the appropriateness of the move while identifying the challenges of the selected theory.
To fully understand Finland’s journey to NATO accession, one must start with the historical context. Immediately after WWII, Finland’s top priority was
Chung-Yu Liu is a Masters student at the Graduate Institute of International Security, ROC National Defense University. He can be reached for comment at jonasliu0804@gmail.com
Finnish and American delegates pose for a photo during the Finland flag unfurling in the NATO corridor at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., April 4, 2023.
photo: John Wright
to pursue benign relations with the Soviet Union to secure its independence and sovereignty. Finland signed the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet Union in 1948, which acknowledged Finland’s aspirations for neutrality and set the course for the bilateral relationship throughout the Cold War. Thus, Finnish leaders embraced the foreign policy that came to be known as “Finlandization,” wherein they maintained friendly relations with the Soviet Union while simultaneously securing their country’s sovereignty. The primary consideration of joining any international organizations was not to upset the Kremlin by violating its national interests, e.g. refraining from accepting aid through the Marshall Plan; maintaining a clear distance from NATO; and not pursuing membership in the European Economic Community.
The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet regime quickly altered the geostrategic environment in which Finland found itself. The annulment of the Friendship Treaty in 1992 granted Finland autonomy
in its foreign policy, and the subsequent admission to the European Union (EU) in 1995 marked the end of neutrality and the commencement of military non-alignment. Finland maintained an “option” policy toward NATO membership that enabled it to maintain a close partnership status with NATO while reserving its right to seek full membership should circumstances change. Subsequently, at the Wales NATO summit in 2014, Finland joined the Enhanced Opportunities Partners program to further deepen security cooperation and strengthen interoperability with NATO to maximize its own benefit.
The Russian aggression against Ukraine challenged Finland’s sense of security and expedited the country’s efforts to seek external support. After reassessing the security environment and considering the overwhelming public support, Finland acknowledged the principal benefits of joining NATO and marked the end of its military non-alignment policy.
There are five major theoretical assumptions that are central to Neorealism. The first assumption is
A Finnish Maxim M/09-21 machine gun crew man a machine gun nest 100 m from the Russians, about 5 km north of Lemetti during the Winter War.
that states are unitary actors that would rationally pursue their national interests within the anarchic international system. The second is that anarchy in the international system indicates that there is no central authority that sits above the states to govern their interactions or monitor their actions. The third assumption delineates that all states possess some level of offensive military capability, and the fourth assumes that by no means can states be certain about the true intentions of other states. The fifth and final assumption is that, given all of the above, states are capable of formulating a comprehensive strategy to pursue power and security, and maximize their prospects for ultimate survival.
Balance-of-power logic
Balance of power refers to the distribution of power among states, and a balance-of-power logic may lead to distinctive measures including balancing, bandwagoning, and buck-passing. For Finland, joining an alliance as a means of cooperation was crucial given its limited options for survival, and the move can be seen as a strategic balancing act against poten-
tial Russian threats, echoing realist notions of states seeking powerful allies to counterbalance stronger adversaries. Finland is a small power without sufficient resources to defend itself, and its NATO membership may provide the security guarantees that the country needs based on Article 5, raise the threshold for the adversary to launch an invasion, and provide military aid when required.
All too often, analysts and policymakers in one state may not be able to ascertain the true intentions of their counterparts in another state. One major factor supporting Finnish NATO membership was Russia’s possible intention of military aggression against Finland, and this perception was drawn from the precedents of the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the RussoUkrainian conflict in 2022. Likewise, Finland shares the same security interests and threat perceptions with NATO, especially after October 2014, when Russia’s repeated incursions into Baltic and Nordic airspace ushered in a “New Normal” marked by a persistent and heightened pattern of Russian military provocations and airspace violations in the region. For a country that shares a 1,340-kilometer long land
border with Russia, the estimate of adversarial intentions and threat perception becomes an essential consideration of security policy.
Finland fully understands the concept of self-help and the need to build its own defense capability. Thus, Helsinki continues its efforts in the investment of comprehensive defense capability, maintaining a general conscription service with a strong will (81 percent of public support), and facilitating the role of security provider for NATO. Moreover, Finland is also required to meet the benchmark of 2 percent GDP on defense spending based on the Defense Investment Pledge for member states, and this could also be interpreted as part of the dedication to enhancing its military might. All of these showcase states’ behavior in a self-help environment where they never cease to build national strength for survival.
The key for collective security to function is trust, and Finland’s leaders have placed their trust in the country’s allies to assist when needed, based on the shared norms and values of NATO membership. Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin gave a presentation of the report on Finland’s accession to NATO at the Parliament’s plenary session on May 16, 2022,
in which she said that “supported by NATO security guarantees, the deterrent effect of Finland’s defence would be considerably stronger than it is at present. We would thus strengthen the security of NATO as a whole.” As a formal member of NATO, Finland is now placed under NATO’s security umbrella for collective defense and enjoys the privilege of security guarantees enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which specifies that an armed attack against a single party is considered as an attack against the entire alliance.
Some aspects of Finland’s case cannot be fully explained by the Neorealist perspective, such as the country’s historical ties with Sweden, the drastic change in public opinion, and the recognition of Finnish identity. They all play a significant role in shaping the Finnish move to join NATO.
Political scientists such as Tuomas Forsberg and Anna Wieslander have argued that Finland’s neighbor and closest ally, Sweden, played a significant role in influencing Helsinki’s decision to seek NATO membership, and in fact, the joint application submitted on May 18, 2022, makes for compelling evidence of this assertion. From a historical standpoint, Finland
Finland Joins NATO
A Finnish soldier takes part in a training exercise designed to defend against a potential Russian aggression.
photo: Pori Brigade
and Sweden share similar beliefs and liberal values; they joined the EU and have concurrently participated in the NATO partnership program. Logically, it seems clear that when they face a common security threat together, one would be left more exposed and threatened if they did not choose to address that threat in concert.
rity environment. The strong basis of public opinion served as a driver for the Finnish government to change its foreign policy and make the decision to seek NATO membership.
Most Finns supported the idea of neutrality and military non-alignment during the Cold War, believing that it was in the best interests of Finland to stay out
According to a survey conducted by the Advisory Board for Defence Information during the period from April 7 to May 3, 2022, 68 percent of Finnish respondents supported NATO membership. This is a monumental increase over the previous year when public support for NATO membership stood at a mere 24 percent, making it evident that Finnish society was keenly attuned to the deteriorating secu-
of the great powers’ competition. Finland managed to deftly navigate a middle ground between Eastern and Western identities. According to conventional constructivism, identity is socially constructed through the social interaction of actors within a society, and it is not permanent: it changes over time. EU membership in 1995 had already brought an initial change to the Finnish identity—that Finland was leaning toward the
A warship with the Finnish Navy test fires the Swedish-made RBS-15 SF anti-ship missile system.
photo: Finnish Navy
West, and the position of neutrality was better replaced by one of military non-alignment. Moreover, given the perceived threat from Russia combined with influence from pro-NATO advocates and media, 91 percent of the population began to view Russia as having a negative impact on Finland’s security, and public opinion in terms of support for NATO membership skyrocketed. These results indicate that the Finnish people have undergone an identity change, and thus constructivism may offer an alternative tool to conduct an in-depth analysis of the country’s move to join NATO.
Real-world events
As Robert Cox famously put it, “theory is always for someone and for some purpose.” Theories offer different perspectives from which to examine real-world events. In this case, although Neorealism is not without limitations in accounting for several areas such as public opinion and identity change, it still serves as a useful tool to explain the cause behind the process of Finland’s seeking NATO membership. Finland’s case provides critical insights into how a small state can respond to austere security chal-
lenges. In the post-Cold War era, Russia never gave up its ambitious goal to increase its sphere of influence over the Baltic Sea and the Nordic region. Faced with such an assertive adversary, Finland navigated its path prudently based on the security assessment, and successfully gained a security guarantee from NATO to ensure its ultimate survival. This has important implications for the security landscape in the Indo-Pacific, where the same pattern is seen—a pattern of small states, under implicit or actual threat, desirous of aligning with stronger security partners. We may, for example, see more Asia-Pacific countries hedge against China’s assertiveness through more and stronger strategic partnerships. Finland’s case, moreover, demonstrates how shifting public opinion and perceived threats can push governments into alignment with military alliances. Following this pattern, it would be reasonable to expect the increasing intensity and pace of Chinese coercion against Taiwan and neighboring states to push regional governments into deepening ties with Western security frameworks. After all, a small state actor will choose the best course of action based on the threats and challenges presented by the great powers. n
Finnish soldiers on maneuvers.
photo: Pori Brigade
Vision vol. 14, no. 62 (April, 2025)
Growing CCP Pressure
Beijing’s naval maneuvering in the Taiwan Strait represents escalation
David Scott
Naval deployments into and through the Taiwan Strait were a prominent feature during the second half of 2024. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted three significant naval and air exercises in May, October and December in and around the Taiwan Strait, which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) considers its own waters. Even as China carried out these exercises, outside powers were increasingly passing through the Taiwan Strait from May to October for explicit freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) purposes, but also showing some implicit support for Taiwan’s beleaguered administration. The backdrop for the PRC deploy-
ments and outside FONOP transits was the victory of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which maintained its political power in the elections held in January 2024 for the president of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, with Lai Ching-te duly inaugurated on May 20.
The PLA exercises represented an escalation to double and triple in terms of frequency and numbers, compared to 2022 and 2023.
Joint Sword-2024A took place May 23-24, three days after Lai’s inaugural address. Sixty-two planes and 27 vessels were dispatched to five exercise areas around Taiwan. The destroyer Kunming took up station off
Dr. David Scott is a member and writer for the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), specializing in Indo-Pacific geopolitics. He can be reached for comment at davidscott366@outlook.com
This photo of a PRC serviceman observing a Taiwan warship caused controversy for appearing altered when it was released by the PRC government.
photo: PRC Government
Kaohsiung south-west of Taiwan. This zone did not feature in the previous Joint Sword exercises held in 2022 and 2023. Located just west of the Penghu Islands, this was meant to demonstrate the PLA’s ability to cut off access to the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese Coast Guard was also dispatched to the northern and southern ends of the Taiwan Strait, suggesting a reinforcing role in future naval operations against Taiwan. The Global Times was explicit concerning the purpose of the exercises, running an article on May 23 under the headline “PLA holds joint drills surrounding Taiwan island to punish secessionist forces.”
Joint Sword-2024B took place on October 14, three days after President Lai’s address to commemorate the ROC’s National Day. This time, 153 aircraft (111 crossing the median line), and 26 vessels (14 naval ships and 12 coastguard ships) were dispatched to six areas around Taiwan. This included the four PLA units that make up the Liaoning Carrier Strike Group to the southwest of Taiwan. In their October 14 profile titled “Liaoning aircraft carrier participates in PLA’s joint drills surrounding Taiwan”—again, published in the regime’s mouthpiece, The Global Times—Liu Xin and Guo Yuandan were explicit that “from its strategic position, the Liaoning carrier controls a key chokepoint, forming a solid maritime barrier and establishing external blockade and internal pressure, effectively exerting pressure on the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionists.”
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson was unconcerned, blandly stating on October 22 that “Taiwan is Chinese territory. It is perfectly normal for Chinese aircraft carriers to sail in its own territory and territorial waters.” The Chinese Coast Guard was used
more extensively. A heart-shaped circumference of the island was posted by them on October 14 with the image and caption “[Our] patrols take the shape of loving you”. Beijing’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Wu Qian was clear on October 14 that “Joint Sword-2024B is not a repeat of 2024A, but an increased pressure attack on ‘Taiwan independence.’” Equally explicitly, Wang Wenjuan’s piece in The Global Times on October 14 was titled “‘Joint Sword-2024B’ drill indicates two swords hanging over ‘Taiwan independence,’” the two swords being “military punishment” and judicial punishment.
A third set of PLA drills were carried out December 9-13, in effect a Joint Sword-2024C. Taiwan’s Emergency Response Center was immediately opened. These followed President Lai’s high-profile Pacific tour in ear-
ly December, which included the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, and Palau (all of which recognize the ROC), as well as the American territories of Hawaii and Guam. This drill represented a further escalation as the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command was joined by the Southern Theater Command. On December 13, the PRC Defense Minister Wu Qian, quoting from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, said that “just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions,” in a report in The Global Times.
Ongoing military presence
The naval deployment was wider, running across and up and down the First Island Chain, from Japan, past Taiwan, to the Philippines, with speculation being that this was a deliberate attempt by Beijing to normalize an ongoing military presence. Hence Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense warned on December 13 that “the threat posed by PLA to Taiwan and the region has escalated from coercion [of Taiwan] to directly affecting the First Island Chain.”
The US Navy’s presence in the Taiwan Strait con-
tinued to be frequent throughout 2024, generally declared to be “routine,” and reflecting an almost monthly pattern of freedom of navigation and aerial overflight transits, as has been established over the past few years. What was new in 2024 was the wider appearance of other navies, namely those of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, and New Zealand.
The tone was set by HNLMS Tromp in late May, the first appearance by the Dutch navy in the Taiwan Strait in modern times. China’s response was denunciation by the Foreign Ministry, but also close monitoring by the guided-missile frigate Nantong, stationed on the eastern side of the median line; there to make the point that Beijing considers the whole Taiwan Strait to be “Chinese waters.”
Two German vessels, the FGS Baden-Württemberg and the support ship Frankfurt transited through the Taiwan Strait on September 13, the first German appearance in twenty years. The German Defense Minister Boris Pistorious was sanguine that day, stating that “international waters are international waters. It is the shortest and, given the weather conditions, also
The Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning took part in the “Joint Sword” military exercises around Taiwan.
photo: creative commons
the safest route. So we are going through.” The German ships were shadowed by PLA Navy (PLAN) vessels. On September 13, the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson condemned Germany’s decision, stating that the “Taiwan question is not about freedom of navigation but about China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” They furthermore stated their opposition to “any act of provocation under the pretext of freedom of navigation that harms China’s sovereignty and security.”
In the wake of Joint Sword 2024-B, there was a joint transit by US and Canadian vessels, the USS Higgins and HMCS Vancouver, on October 20. The next day, the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Taiwan “welcomes and affirms the United States and Canada once again taking concrete action to emphasize the Taiwan Strait’s status in law as an international waterway and their firm stance on safeguarding freedom of navigation and regional stability.” Predictably, the PRC condemned the transit, with the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command saying “The actions of the United
States and Canada caused trouble and are disruptive to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”
A different permutation was the joint transit by New Zealand’s HMNZS Aotearoa (a first-time New Zealand appearance) and Australia’s HMAS Sydney on September 25, a first-time joint appearance, their mission stated as being to assert the right to freedom of navigation. Their joint transit had an implicit third partner, the simultaneous transit on September 25 by Japan’s JS Sazanami. Though their simultaneous appearance in the Taiwan Strait was not acknowledged as a trilateral appearance, the three ships then exercised together in the South China Sea—a further affront to Beijing. Finally France’s FS Prairial passed through the Taiwan Strait on October 29. The passage was lowkey but permission from Beijing was deliberately not sought. In the Chinese state media, The Global Times headline on 30 October read “‘Cheering for Western warships’ Taiwan Strait transits reflects separatists’ trepidation.”
A sailor aboard the US Navy’s destroyer USS Higgins (DDG 76) observes the Royal Canadian Navy’s HMCS Vancouver (FFH 331) in the South China Sea.
photo: Donavan Patubo
Such transits of the Taiwan Strait by outside parties can be seen as maintaining the sea lines of communication and transit rights through freedom of navigation operations, reflecting the practical maxim; use it or lose it.
With regard to the Taiwan Strait, the most relevant parts of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are Articles 34-45 “Straits used for International Navigation.” Nowhere does UNCLOS say that ships need permission or escorting of coastal states in question. This is bad news for the PRC position. Article 38.1 states quite simply: “All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded.” Again; bad news for Beijing’s position.
However, Article 39.1.b is complicated. Transiting ships and aircraft “shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of states bordering the strait, or in any other manner.” The PRC could argue that naval transits, if they gave de facto support for Taiwan’s continuing existence as a separate political entity, particularly under the pro-independence leadership of the DPP administration, was threatening the
territorial integrity of the PRC. The counterargument is that the refrain of transit would threaten the political independence of another state bordering the Strait, namely Taiwan; and that China’s deployment of its own aircraft carriers in and through the Taiwan Strait very directly threatens the independence of another state bordering the Strait, Taiwan.
A picket line
There is an unstated practical side to these freedomof-navigation appearances. The more that other navies deploy in the Taiwan Strait, the less monopoly the PRC has on presence, and the more Beijing’s monopolistic claim that the entire Taiwan Strait is “Chinese waters” remains unrealized. To some extent, naval transits can be seen as a form of picket line, getting in the way of unimpeded operations by Beijing across the Taiwan Strait.
Such freedom of navigation operations are designed to give some support to Taiwan’s continued existence as a separate entity from the PRC. This is implicit, to be inferred, but is discernible. The greater range of coun-
The Royal New Zealand Navy auxiliary oiler replenishment ship HMNZS Aotearoa (A 11) conducts a replenishment-at-sea with USS Boxer (LHD 4).
photo: Tyler Miles
tries now periodically deploying through the Taiwan Strait (Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, UK, US) are countries that have become more critical of the PRC and have edged towards some greater compensatory support for Taiwan. Deployment by the UK Carrier Strike Group later in the year would be a welcome sign of support for Taipei.
In the meantime, the military context continues to be the extent to which the PRC is increasing the tempo and invasion-readiness of its forces for cross-strait operations. Their three operations in the second half of 2024 makes this a growing concern for Taiwan and its security partners; further exacerbated recently by the Strait Thunder 2025A exercise which Beijing carried out April 1-2. The strategic fear for Taipei is that such normalized ongoing military deployments could be switched into invasion mode much more easily. In the wake of the latest drills, on December 26, Taiwan’s Presidential Office for the first time conducted a tabletop exercise involving state and civil society agencies simulating a Chinese invasion. Taiwan’s announce-
ment in August of an US$8.8 billion investment in submarines—with seven (eight including the prototype) to come over the next decade through its Indigenous Defense Submarine Program—is a long-term effort rather than immediate help.
In conclusion, the key military issue for 2025 will continue to revolve around what military support the United States is prepared to render to Taiwan, including providing supplies to the island, as well as the deployment of its own naval forces. This is all the more central but potentially uncertain with the return to the presidency of Donald Trump. His appointments, including Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and former National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, are all hawks on China. Firm US geopolitical support is needed for Taiwan, and the Trump administration needs to resist the geoeconomic protectionist calls for curbing Taiwan’s advanced semiconductor business in favor of supporting Taiwan’s continued autonomy, as a democratic ally in the face of mounting Chinese pressure. n
A gunner’s mate monitors a surface vessel from the pilot house of the USS Rafael Peralta (DDG 115) during a freedom of navigation exercise in the SCS.
photo: Colby Mothershead
Strategic Vision vol. 14, no. 62 (April, 2025)
Golden Opportunity
BRI development in Golden Triangle economic zone and Mekong River basin Anderson Weng
Long a region known primarily for its remote tribes, as well as its infamy as a source of much of the world’s illicit drug trade, the Golden Triangle and Mekong River Basin have recently been targeted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a destination for development funding, particularly through Beijing’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). According to the Chinese government, this effort is aimed at promoting regional integration and cross-border cooperation with Southeast Asia, and to that end China’s is building coordinated infrastructural, economic, and security development in the area. The following article presents China’s strategic perspective on this potential geopolitical hotspot, with an eye to understanding how policymakers in Beijing conceptualize this effort, as well as how they are building a narrative around it.
The Golden Triangle is located at the intersection of Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand, covering an area of approximately 350,000 square kilometers. With the Mekong River as a major waterway, it primarily encompasses Myanmar’s Shan State, Laos’ Bokeo Province, and Thailand’s Chiang Rai Province. Prior to the 1950s, this area was mainly inhabited by ethnic minorities, including the Shan and Karen peoples. Due to its remote geographical location, relatively weak central government control, and complex terrain and climatic conditions, the region gradually developed into a significant opium cultivation area in the 1960s. By the 1980s, with the Thai government actively promoting crop substitution programs and the international community strengthening its anti-narcotics activities, the Golden Triangle region had begun its
Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone New City 2021
photo: SaiLp
transformation. During this period, tourism and commercial activities started to develop, bringing new economic opportunities to the region. After 2000, with substantial increases in Chinese investment, regional infrastructure saw significant improvements, and countries successively established special economic zones, promoting legal trade development and strengthening regional economic cooperation.
There is a long history of negative, or at least problematic, aspects of China’s involvement in the Golden Triangle region—a region once synonymous with the drug trade. Examples include increased crime, scam groups, narcotics, and environmental concerns. These issues continue, and will likely remain of great concern. With deepening regional economic integration and cross-border cooperation, however, it is undergoing a transformation. The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone leverages the unique geographical advantages at the nexus of Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos to promote economic transformation and industrial upgrading. With China’s assistance, the Laotian government has invested over US$1.5 billion in developing a comprehensive infrastructure network within the 100-square-kilometer zone, including power supply, water systems, sewage treatment, and modern communication facilities, laying a solid foundation for industrial development.
Regional cooperation
The development of the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone demonstrates a new pattern of regional cooperation for Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. China has strengthened interconnectivity with the Golden Triangle region through major infrastructure projects such as the China-Laos Railway and the Lancang-Mekong Economic Corridor. The improvement of infrastructure in the area has not only shortened the distance between China and Southeast Asian countries but also injected new momentum into the
zone’s development. In particular, the opening of the China-Laos Railway has significantly reduced travel time from Vientiane, Laos, to Kunming in China’s Yunnan Province, providing a convenient corridor for funneling Chinese capital, technology, and tourists into the zone.
Chinese enterprises are actively participating in the development and construction of the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, investing in hotels, entertainment, and commercial sectors, driving the development of local service industries. Meanwhile, the zone has become an important node under the ChinaASEAN Free Trade Area framework, promoting crossborder trade and investment facilitation through the establishment of bonded zones and cross-border economic cooperation zones. Chinese investment has not only created numerous employment opportunities but also promoted the optimization and upgrading of local industrial structures.
Asia’s seventh-longest river, the Mekong, originates in the Tibetan Plateau and flows through six countries: China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. With a total length of approximately 4,909 kilometers, it plays a vital role in Southeast Asian regional development. This river does not only serve as an important transportation route: it is a lifeline for the residents living along its banks. The Mekong River has unique geographical characteristics; in its upper reaches within China, where it is known as the Lancang River, it features abundant water flow, significant elevation drops, and rich hydroelectric resources. As it enters the middle and lower reaches, the river channel gradually widens, forming vast alluvial plains.
In terms of economic value, the Mekong River brings enormous benefits to riparian countries. Firstly, it is a crucial fishery resource zone, with annual production accounting for approximately 25 percent of global inland fishery production. Secondly, the alluvial plains along both banks are important agricultural areas,
particularly suitable for rice cultivation. Additionally, the Mekong River provides abundant hydroelectric resources, with multiple large hydropower stations constructed to provide important energy security for regional development. To promote regional cooperation, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam signed the Mekong Agreement in 1995, establishing
the Mekong River Commission, marking a new stage in regional cooperation.
The strategic implications of the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone and the Mekong River Basin are manifested in multiple aspects, including geopolitics, economic development, and regional security. From a geopolitical perspective, the Golden Triangle is a critical region, where China borders Southeast Asian countries. For China, this area serves as a potential gateway to Southeast Asia’s resources and could be useful for developing new land-sea transportation routes. For Southeast Asian countries, this region serves as a crucial bridge connecting them to the Chinese market, particularly under the context of growing regional economic integration.
In terms of economic strategy, the Golden Triangle possesses unique advantages. First, it is an important area for crossborder economic cooperation, where countries have successively established special economic zones to promote industrial upgrading and trade facilitation. Second, the rich natural resources and labor force advantages provide a solid foundation for regional industrial development. Furthermore, as an important logistics hub, the Golden Triangle plays a crucial role in promoting regional economic integration. This economic significance has been further
graphic: International Rivers
enhanced by the development of modern infrastructure and digital connectivity.
In terms of regional security, the strategic significance of the Golden Triangle is even more prominent. Historically, this area was a hive of illegal activities, posing challenges to regional security. However, in recent years, through the establishment of multilateral cooperation mechanisms, countries have made significant progress in combating transnational crime and border management. The establishment of a Mekong River joint patrol law enforcement mechanism in particular has provided a new model for maintaining regional security, demonstrating the effectiveness of collaborative approaches to addressing common challenges.
From the perspective of regional governance, the Golden Triangle demonstrates the importance of cross-border cooperation. Issues such as water resource management, environmental protection, and infrastructure construction all require coordination and cooperation among relevant countries. This multilateral cooperation not only promotes regional development but also provides a practical platform for building a regional community with a shared future. The success of these cooperative efforts has implications far beyond the immediate region, offering valuable lessons for similar cross-border development initiatives worldwide.
As the Golden Triangle region continues to evolve under the influence of major initiatives like the BRI, its strategic potential for shaping the future of Asian regional cooperation and development becomes increasingly evident. Moreover, as China’s BRI continues to develop deep into the Golden Triangle, combined with the unique geographical advantages of the Mekong River Basin, cooperation between China and Southeast Asian nations is showing new opportunities and challenges. The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, serving as a crucial hub connecting China to Southeast Asia, with the potential to serve as
a new model of regional cooperation and also to provide an important platform for promoting regional economic integration. Coordinated development of land and water transportation networks has injected new momentum into the zone, particularly after the opening of the China-Laos Railway.
Looking ahead, with the strengthening of regional infrastructure interconnectivity, the zone is expected to develop into a significant node for ChineseSoutheast Asian economic and trade cooperation. Moreover, in emerging fields such as green development and the digital economy, the zone can play a demonstrative role: against the backdrop of deepening regional integration, the development experience of the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone provides a valuable model for cooperation in other regions. Through deepening multilateral cooperation and strengthening policy coordination, the promotion of a closer regional community with a shared future is advancing. This process not only relates to regional economic stability but also extends to China’s strategic intentions and influence over regional security. This development trajectory holds significant implications for regional economic integration, cross-border cooperation mechanisms, infrastructure development, and strategic security arrangements.
Western countries and the world’s community of democratic nations would do well to closely observe developments in this once-secluded region, as the ongoing development process not only affects regional economic prosperity but it also shapes the future development pattern of the Asian region—a pattern that Beijing is actively influencing to suit its own interests. Therefore, it is important to understand the PRC’s motivations behind its narrative on the development dynamics of the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone and the Mekong River Basin, and to follow new trends in regional cooperation. This region has the potential to exert a significant influence on the future direction of China-Southeast Asian relations. n
Strategic Vision vol. 14, no. 62 (April, 2025)
New Bearing
Jakarta re-examines China policy under administration of President Prabowo Dean Karalekas
Although it has been several months since Prabowo Subianto was sworn in as Indonesia’s eighth president in a ceremony that took place on October 20, 2024, there is still much speculation on what policy direction his administration will set, especially as regards the all-important financial and trade relationship with the PRC.
Events in the North Natuna Sea have long been a sticking point standing in the way of ameliorating relations between Jakarta and Beijing. For one thing, while Beijing ‘s claims to the area are predicated on its sweeping assertions of ownership over everything contained within it’s expansive “nine-
dash line”—a segmented line drawn on a 1947 map that delineate almost the entirety of the South China Sea (SCS)—Jakarta’s claims over the North Natuna Sea are more in line with international law, namely the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which stipulates that coastal states shall enjoy an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extending up to 200 nautical miles from their baselines. The North Natuna Sea falls squarely within this EEZ boundary, as measured from the Natuna Islands, which lends credence to the Indonesian claim, predicated as it is on international law. The so-called Cabbage Strategy is one of the techniques
Dean Karalekas is Editor-at-Large for Strategic Vision and the author of Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan: Identity and Transformation.
An Indonesian Armed Forces paratrooper smiles after landing during the 2019 Garuda Shield opening ceremony Aug. 19, 2019, at Dodiklatpur, Indonesia.
US Army Photo
used by China in its gray zone operations against its neighbors, in which (as per the similar “salami slicing” tactics) each move conducted by the PRC remains just slightly below the threshold of constituting a casus belli, yet it produces incremental movement towards Beijing’s strategic objective and, over time, allows China to claim victory over the territory in question without firing a shot.
Cabbage Strategy
The Cabbage Strategy, in particular, is a territorial strategy employed by the PRC to assume control over disputed islands by encircling them with multiple layers of assets, like the layered leaves of a cabbage. The inner layer, and the first to arrive, are often the fishing vessels—really, the Maritime Militia—to establish an ostensible civilian presence that demands protection from the next layer; the China Coast Guard, symbolically claiming area as Chinese territory, The outer layer, there to provide firepower in the event the target country’s
forces should choose to defend their islands, is the Chinese Navy.
Not only does this strategy block the target country’s vessels from entering the area to resupply their forces, it creates a de facto Chinese presence that is difficult or impossible to expel without escalating into a full kinetic conflict. To the foreign media, it appears as though China is only protecting its civilian fishing fleet in the face of other countries’ navies and coast guards, whereas it is a preplanned maneuver to reinforce PRC control, as well as to provide cover for other, questionably legal activities. For example, China used the Cabbage Strategy during 2015 not just to seize control of Spratly outposts like Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi reefs, but to keep outsiders at bay while its forces conducted dredging operations, island building, and construction of military infrastructure such as airstrips, radar stations, and missile launcher emplacements on its confiscated and built-up artificial islands in the South China Sea. By the end of 2015, China had effectively established full control over these Spratly outposts.
photo: Leah Ganoni
US Soldiers get on line on Platoon Live Fire lanes on August 26, 2019, at Puslatpur Marine Base, Indonesia.
“The regional balance of power is shifting,withthegrowthofChina’s influenceandthecontinueddecline of America.’”
China has used the strategy successfully in the past to take territory away from smaller nations. Examples include the PRC annexation of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012, and parts of the aforementioned Spratly Islands from Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia during the 2010s. Moreover, while China officially concedes that the Natuna islands and the seas around them belong to Indonesia, it nonetheless began employing these same tactics in the North Natuna Sea in 2016-2017, with Chinese fishing fleets and Coast Guard support vessels making incursions into Indonesia’s EEZ. In March 2016, the situation came to a head when the Chinese fishing vessel Kway Fey was found operating illegally in Indonesian waters off the Natuna Islands. Members of a special task force vessel operated by the Indonesian
Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries detained the captain and crew and began towing the ship into port when a Chinese Coast Guard ship intervened by intentionally ramming the Kway Fey to free it from the tow cable, while leaving its crew in the hands of Indonesia, to be haggled over later by diplomats. Prior to this occurrence, similar incidents in the past had largely been de-emphasized by the Indonesian government, or swept under the rug. This one, however, appears to have precipitated a rethinking in Jakarta about the best way to deal with China’s assaults on Indonesian sovereign economic zone.
To demonstrate national fortitude and further assert sovereignty over the area, in 2016 Jakarta adopted a strict maritime enforcement policy by which Indonesian forces began blowing up and sinking Chinese and other foreign fishing boats caught poaching in their waters. Jakarta also began deploying warships to the Natuna Islands in greater numbers and started loudly and proudly conducting military exercises in the area. The following year, in 2017, Indonesia officially renamed the northern part of its EEZ as the
Tentara Nasional Indonesia Soldiers demonstrate techniques in Indonesian martial arts during the 2019 Garuda Shield opening ceremony.
US Army Photo
North Natuna Sea, to distinguish the area from the rest of the South China Sea and to reinforce Indonesian sovereignty against Chinese claims. In the eyes of Jakarta, the ruling by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) rejecting China’s history-based claims gave it the right under international law to take a harder defensive position, and to strengthen its naval presence in the area, notwithstanding the fact that Beijing rejected the PCA ruling while Manila, which launched the legal challenge, had all but abandoned its PCA victory under Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s pivot to a pro-China policy.
Enter President Prabowo. In his state visit to China in November 2024, delegates from the two nations issued a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on support for joint maritime development in areas of overlapping claims. According to the agreement, an Inter-Governmental Joint Steering Committee would be set up to promote cooperation in the contested maritime areas of the North Natuna Sea in such areas as fisheries, conservation of fish stocks, and possibly other maritime resources. Not unexpectedly, the joint statement raised concerns back home, with Indonesian hardliners worried that it was tantamount to giving away Indonesian sovereignty. Even the acknowledgement that there are “overlapping claims” made Indonesia the first ASEAN member nation to implicitly legitimize the nine-dash line. Moreover, it represented a contradiction of longstanding policy that portended a disastrous impact on Indonesia’s sovereignty over the Natuna Islands and the country’s EEZ waters by implicitly legitimizing China’s SCS claims, it has been argued. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs backtracked, quickly issuing a clarification that paid lip service
to international law, UNCLOS, and Jakarta’s official refutation of the nine-dash line.
Does this suggest a shift in Indonesia’s foreign relations closer into China’s orbit? There are factors supporting that analysis. For one, the same state visit that led to the joint statement also netted Indonesia a US$10 billion Chinese investment pledge, speaking to the strong and growing economic partnership between Jakarta and Beijing. Indeed, China continues to be Indonesia’s largest investor and trading partner, particularly under the BRI’s contributions to developing Indonesia’s infrastructure. Moreover, this comes at a time when the regional balance of power is shifting, with the growth of China’s influence and the continued decline of America. It is perhaps not
The Black Daggers parachute team perform during the 2019 Garuda Shield exercise.
photo: Ezra Camarena
surprising that Prabowo would view closer cooperation with the PRC as a means of staving off confrontation with the aspiring superpower. Malaysia and the Philippines have likewise opened the door to talk of joint resource development with China, suggesting that Prabowo’s move is not an isolated incident but a regional trend.
Civil-military relations
Standing in the way of closer military-to-military ties between Beijing and Jakarta under Prabowo could, ironically, be another of the new president’s policies: that of ushering in a new era of civil-military relations in Indonesia, with a larger role for the military in administrative affairs. The move has prompted some commentators to caution against the potential for democratic backsliding of the sort seen during Suharto’s “New Order” regime, when the military was allowed to assume control over various aspects of national governance and suppress dissent according to the doctrine of dwifungsi, or “dual function.” In this context, “dual” refers to the military’s twofold role: not only serving a defensive function but also
engaging in policymaking and supporting Suharto’s authoritarian rule.
Prabowo laid the legal foundations for this move with revisions to the country’s military law—revisions that were passed by the country’s parliament on March 20, 2025 —that will allow Army officers to occupy government posts previously designated for civilians. This has already been the practice since Prabowo took office in October 2024, with active military officers filling formerly civilian posts in the Transportation and Agriculture Ministries, as well as serving as the new president’s Cabinet secretary.
This shift in civil-military relations is an important factor to consider in the analysis of Indonesian foreign policy going forward under Prabowo. There have been several studies to indicate that governments that are strongly influenced by military institutions tend to engage upon more aggressive, interventionist, and risk-prone foreign policies. Military officers are trained to view international disputes through a strategic and security-focused lens, as opposed to seeing them as a matter of diplomacy or economics. Researchers such as Peter Feaver and Michael Desch have studied how strong military influence within
A US Soldier drinks the blood of a cobra during the field craft subject matter expert training on August 27, 2019, at Dodiklatpur Army Base, Indonesia.
photo: Lawrence Broadnax
a government may lead to a preference for armed force over diplomacy, and how military preferences in administration and policy can prevail even in the absence of an all-out coup.
In “Leaders, Advisers, and the Political Origins of Elite Support for War,” Elizabeth Saunders examines the dynamics of leader–adviser interactions, and how elite cues from within a leader’s circle of advisors can influence policy direction, particularly in decisions regarding the use of force. Personal military experience, Saunders finds, can shape attitudes on defense matters. Interestingly, in their exploration of this dynamic, Michael C. Horowitz and Allan C. Stam find that the leaders most likely to initiate militarized conflict are those with prior military experience, yet without any actual combat experience.
Kopassus head
On this last point, it is worth noting that this finding does not necessarily apply to Prabowo, who was head of the Army Special Forces (Kopassus), and as a young man was deployed to East Timor in 1976 following Indonesia’s invasion of that country. At 26, he was the youngest commander of the Nanggala
commando unit and led the mission that resulted in the death of the first Prime Minister of East Timor, Nicolau dos Reis Lobato, on December 31, 1978. Indeed, Prabowo’s military record has been the subject of controversy and even led to allegations of human rights abuses severe enough to have had him banned from visiting the United States.
Moving forward, based on the analysis contained herein, it appears likely that Prabowo will continue to pay lip service to the relationship with China even as he builds upon security alliances and strengthens Indonesia’s defense ties with Western partners. In a region that is likely to see only increased polarization in the coming years, bolstering defense ties with the West on the one hand while continuing to make the Chinese happy with deeper economic ties seem to be the more likely route forward. Mitigating the effectiveness of this push is an increased policymaking role for the Indonesian military—a military that has a deep mistrust of the Chinese Communist Party and a pervasive anti-communist legacy that goes to the core of the Indonesian military’s institutional identity. Time will tell which of these two factors has the greater effect on Indonesia-China ties under the Prabowo administration. n
A soldier from the 16th Combat Aviation Brigade, looks out of a Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk during exercise Garuda Shield 19 in East Java, Indonesia.
photo: Lawrence Broadnax
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