Strategic Vision, Issue 61

STRATEGIC VISION for Taiwan Security Volume 13, Issue 61

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December, 2024

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ISSN 2227-3646

North Korean Troops Fighting in Ukraine Soldiers Facing Putin’s Meat-grinder Tactics Dean Karalekas

Assessing Motives of China’s BRI Anderson Weng

Taiwan’s Support of Israel Mor Sobol

Wider Impacts of Taiwan Quarantine Chen Shuai-hsien

Domestic Politics in the Philippines Aaron Jed Rabena

STRATEGIC VISION for Taiwan Security Volume 13, Issue 61

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December, 2024

Contents North Korean soldiers face meatgrinder in Ukraine.....................4 Dean Karalekas Assessing BRI motives in the Middle East and Africa................. 12 Anderson Weng Taiwan’s backing of Israel after Hamas attack.............................. 18 Mor Sobol The wider impacts of a quarantine of Taiwan...............................24 Chen Shuai-hsien Philippine politics and SCS conflict management.......................30 Aaron Jed Rabena

Submissions: Essays submitted for publication are not to exceed 2,000 words in length, and should conform to the following basic format for each 1200-1600 word essay: 1. Synopsis, 100-200 words; 2. Background description, 100-200 words; 3. Analysis, 800-1,000 words; 4. Policy Recommendations, 200-300 words. Book reviews should not exceed 1,200 words in length. Notes should be formatted as endnotes and should be kept to a minimum. Authors are encouraged to submit essays and reviews as attachments to emails; Microsoft Word documents are preferred. For questions of style and usage, writers should consult the Chicago Manual of Style. Authors of unsolicited manuscripts are encouraged to consult with the executive editor at xiongmu@gmail.com before formal submission via email. The views expressed in the articles are the personal views of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of their affiliate institutions or of Strategic Vision. Once accepted for publication, manuscripts become the intellectual property of Strategic Vision. Manuscripts are subject to copyediting, both mechanical and substantive, as required and according to editorial guidelines. No major alterations may be made by an author once the type has been set. Arrangements for reprints should be made with the editor. The editors are responsible for the selection and acceptance of articles; responsibility for opinions expressed and accuracy of facts in articles published rests solely with individual authors. The editors are not responsible for unsolicited manuscripts; unaccepted manuscripts will be returned if accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed return envelope.

Strategic Vision remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover photograph of the monument to revered Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) in the town of Borodianka shot and defaced by Russian troops is courtesy of Dean Karalekas.

Editor Fu-Kuo Liu

From The Editor

Executive Editor Aaron Jensen

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Editor-at-Large Dean Karalekas Editorial Board Chung-young Chang, Fo-kuan U Richard Hu, NCCU Ming Lee, NCCU Raviprasad Narayanan, JNU Hon-Min Yau, NDU Ruei-lin Yu, NDU Osama Kubbar, QAFSSC Rashed Hamad Al-Nuaimi, QAFSSC Chang-Ching Tu, NDU STRATEGIC VISION For Taiwan Security (ISSN 2227-3646) Volume 13, Number 61, December, 2024, published under the auspices of the Center for Security Studies and National Defense University.

All editorial correspondence should be mailed to the editor at STRATEGIC VISION, Taiwan Center for Security Studies. No. 64, Wanshou Road, Taipei City 11666, Taiwan, ROC. Photographs used in this publication are used courtesy of the photographers, or through a creative commons license. All are attributed appropriately.

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Or by telephone at: +886 (02) 8237-7228 Online issues and archives can be viewed at our website: https://taiwancss.org/ strategic-vision/ © Copyright 2024 by the Taiwan Center for Security Studies.

Articles in this periodical do not necessarily represent the views of either the TCSS, NDU, or the editors.

he security situation in the Indo-Pacific region, and indeed the world, continues to be marked by increasing tensions. Russia’s war in Ukraine continues unabated, even as the Israel-Hamas war grows to encompass other Iranian proxies, and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria promises only further global instability as we move into the new year. This is surely to be exacerbated as we embark upon a second Trump administration in Washington. In this issue, we examine a number of topics of direct relevance to observers of the region’s security situation.

We open this issue with an article by Strategic Vision’s own Editor-at-Large Dean Karalekas on the implications of North Korea’s deployment of troops to fight for Russia in the Ukraine theater. Dr. Karalekas has recently returned from Ukraine, and he provides his perspective on what this development portends for the war, and for the Indo-Pacific region as well.

Next, Anderson Weng, a Major in the ROC Air force, looks at China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and how despite the glowing press over its successful infrastructure projects in the region, as well as in the Middle East and Africa, it begs a deeper examination as to Beijing global ambitions not just economically, but politically and in terms of influence projection.

Dr. Mor Sobol, who teaches terrorism studies at Taiwan’s Tamkang University, looks at the close relationship between the ROC and Israel, and how Taiwan has consistently provided backing and support for Israel since the brutal October 7 attack

by Hamas.

This is followed by an article by Chen Shuai-hsien, a master’s degree student at the Graduate Institute of International Security at Taiwan’s National Defense University, who examines the potential fallout of a Chinese quarantine of the island of Taiwan, and how the effects would be far reaching not just in terms of geographically, but for the global economy as well.

Finally, we present an article by Dr. Aaron Jed Rabena of the Asian Center at the University of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Council for Foreign Relations, who offer his analysis of the complex state of Philippine domestic politics and how this may affect conflict management efforts with China in the South China Sea. We hope you enjoy this issue, and that our coverage helps to make sense of current geopolitical realities. We look forward to bringing you the finest analysis and reporting on the issues of importance to security in the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific region.

Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu Editor Strategic Vision

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photo: Kremlin.ru Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks with DPRK leader Kim Jong Un on a visit to the Vostochny Cosmodrome on September 13, 2023.

Strategic Vision vol. 13, no. 61 (December, 2024)

Cannon Fodder

North Korea deploys soldiers in aid of Russia’s meat grinder in Ukraine Dean Karalekas

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hen Russia enlisted the aid of North Korean soldiers in its ongoing war against Ukraine, Moscow, intentionally or not, further internationalized the conflict and opened the door to unanticipated global response options. According to information provided by the South Korean National Intelligence Service, more than a thousand soldiers entered Russian territory via Vladivostok on October 8 and began training at Russian military facilities. Satellite imagery reveals that facilities in Ussuriysk, Primorsky Krai and Khabarovsk, Khabarovsk Krai, are host to large numbers of North Korean troops. While early reports hint that the fighters from the Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea (DPRK) were being mismanaged, being used as little more than cannon fodder, this development brings the conflict to the Indo-Pacific region, and will have long lasting consequences for the region.

Speaking to the Economist, Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine’s defense intelligence directorate, said that among the estimated 12,000 troops sent to Russia (some estimates are as high as 15,000), there are 500 commissioned officers and three generals. The deployment is led by the DPRK’s mysterious three-star Colonel General Kim Yong Bok. General Kim is deputy chief of staff of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and has served as head

Dean Karalekas is an Editor-at-Large for Strategic Vision and the author of Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan: Identity and Transformation.

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of its special forces since 2015. The last time he apKursk Oblast—an area held by Ukrainian forces peared in official media was October 6, days after his since August. Ukraine’s Defence Minister Rustem departure for Russia with his North Korean troops.

Umerov confirmed these reports and characterized This deployment in aid of the Russian the fighting as small contacts, not fulloffensive represents the first time North scale engagement.

Korean soldiers have seen such a large Relations between Russia and the overseas deployment, and is the KPA’s DPRK have found renewed strength largest combat engagement since the since the beginning of the war. Russian Korean War of 1950 to 1953. According President Vladimir Putin met personto US secretary of state Antony Blinken, ally with the DPRK’s General Secretary Russian instructors have been providKim Jong Un at the 2024 North Korea– ing the troops with training in artillery, Russia summit in Pyongyang where the drone warfare, infantry operations, and two leaders signed a mutual defense Col. Gen. Kim Yong Bok trench clearing techniques. If his mispact. Over the past year, Kim has supsion in Russia proves to be a success, General Kim— ported the offensive in materiel terms, selling Russia already one of the most important military figures an estimated 8 million artillery shells and several in the DPRK—could see further promotions in his short-range ballistic missiles. Nevertheless, the defuture. ployment of active military personnel to the war zone Moscow wasted little time in putting its guest solwas more likely made for financial reasons. diers to work: their first alleged engagement with According to a report in the New York Post, Putin Ukrainian troops was reported on November 5, is spending US$2,000 a month per DPRK soldier—a when Ukrainian fighters engaged in a skirmish with salary that goes straight into the coffers of the DPRK a small group of North Korean soldiers in Russia’s government, which is dealing with starvation and

photo: Dean Karalekas A building scarred by shrapnel and bullet holes serves as a canvas for an artist’s depiction of a young Ukrainian soldier who died fighting at the scene.

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food shortages. Undernourishment is reportedly afflicting an estimated 12 million people in the Hermit Kingdom, and the deployment could earn the Kim regime up to US$25 million per month.

For Moscow, the cost is well worth it. The prosecution of the war so far has been deadly. It has been reported that Russia has lost a sizeable portion of its

“Some Russian generals are already considering their North Korean allies a ‘burden.’” male military-age population, with the Pentagon estimating casualties—both wounded as well as those killed in action (KIA)—at over 600,000 since the invasion began in 2022: Russia’s highest conflict-related casualty count since World War II, and far exceeding initial estimates. While the numbers might suggest that this war of attrition would seem to favor the Russians over the long term given that country’s larger population base, Western estimates of Ukrainian casualties for that same period amount to between 60,000 and 80,000. During a recent trip to Ukraine,

a local informant reported to the author that the Ukrainian military was killing 10 Russian soldiers for every single Ukrainian KIA. This high body count has prompted the Russia-Ukraine battlefield to earn the nickname “the meat grinder.”

If these ratios are accurate, the importation of troops from overseas may be a sign of desperation on the part of Russian war planners. There have already been numbers of volunteer fighters singing up to support the Russian offensive, including those from Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Latvia, as well as mercenaries from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. As early as September, 2023, sources indicated that Russia had been enticing Cubans to enlist, offering US$2,000 to anyone from the beleaguered island nation willing to carry a rifle and swell the Russian troop rosters. Thus far, however, none of these overseas recruitment efforts has been as successful as the North Korean deployment.

The four brigades of North Korean servicemen entering the Russian battlespace are said to be members of the XI Corps of the KPA, a special forces unit also known as the “Storm Corps.” Although they

photo: Dean Karalekas A flag of Taiwan, and those of other countries, can be seen among the sea of flags at Kyiv’s Maidan Square. A flag is planted for every fallen soldier.

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are designated as a special forces unit, and they are considered the cream of the crop of North Korea’s fighting men, in terms of proficiency and capabilities they are not in the same league as Western special forces units such as US Navy Seals. Most are young—in their teens and early twenties—and have most likely never travelled outside of North Korea, or had the opportunity to learn a foreign language. It has been reported that Kim Jong Un has been isolating the families of the soldiers, to use them as leverage to prevent defections, as well as to ensure that bad news such as high casualty reports does not filter back home and become fodder for gossip in the soldier’s family villages.

Storm Corps The Storm Corps’ history goes back to North Korea’s Special 8th Corps special forces unit. It has its roots in the same unit photo: Dean Karalekas that raided the South Korean Blue House in The Arch of Triumph in Pyongyang memorializes Korean soldiers who fought the Japanese.

1968, when a 31-man team of commandos infiltrated the demilitarized zone (DMZ) on a misKorean fighters in with the existing Russian comsion to assassinate then-South Korean President Park mand structure, rather than fighting under Russian Chung Hee at his official residence in Seoul. The team command but in their own self-contained units, with was intercepted by police, and all but two were killed. which they have trained and drilled, and no doubt It is estimated that the Storm Corps consists of beoperate more efficiently as a unit rather than as inditween 40,000 and 80,000 fighters, divided into 10 brividual fighters in a strange platoon with unfamiliar gades, including an airborne unit named “Thunder,” operating procedures. This would seem to be una light infantry regiment dubbed “Lightning,” and a necessary, as they were deployed with their chain of commando unit called “Bolt.” They are said to be the command intact, including the aforementioned 500 best fed of all North Korean soldiers. Despite their officers and three generals. This ill-advised decision pedigree, reports suggest that the Russian generals has reportedly had disastrous results. commanding the visiting units are not leveraging the In one incident, it was reported that the embedabilities of these crack troops. ded North Korean soldiers were abandoned on the For one thing, the Russian commanding officers battlefield by their Russian unit, not realizing who are apparently trying to integrate individual North they were. Ukrainian intelligence has intercepted

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photo: Dean Karalekas A fragment pile of Russian rockets collected by sapper soldiers after Ukraine regained control of this deoccupied region.

transmissions suggesting that the Russian officers are having difficulty integrating the North Koreans—they have questioned their level of training, and are not sure how best to use them in combat.

On 18 December, Kruglyenke in the Ukrainianoccupied Kursk Region was the site of a decisive loss for the KPA soldiers. In a grim reminder of the human cost of the war, one video of the aftermath of a previous assault in the same region show more than two dozen North Korean corpses lined up in a field, awaiting transport. Compounding these problems, Ukrainian soldiers on the ground have reported witnessing a disturbing practice on the part of the North Koreans, which is not to provide any first-aid treatment or attempts to evacuate their wounded comrades, in many cases abandoning the wounded alongside the KIA.

Insufficient training The Russian airborne and marine brigades were assigned the task of providing the NK troops with instruction in modern warfare, but gave them only rudimentary training, as many of their experienced

instructors have been depleted by the high casualty count. Moreover, KPA units are reportedly complaining about not being issued sufficient ammunition for hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers. Being

“The rapprochement between North Korea and Russia will reduce Pyongyang’s reliance on Beijing.” forced to conduct infantry-only assaults into open terrain under icy winter conditions rendered the untrained and under-equipped KPA fighters easy prey for Ukrainian artillery fire aided by drone tagging. Reporting by The Telegraph indicated that some Russian generals are already considering their North Korean allies a “burden.”

Compounding these problems is the Russian insistence that the North Korean soldiers, rather than wearing their own uniforms, be outfitted with Russian kit. They are issued Russian weapons, with which they may be unfamiliar, and are carrying counterfeit documentation identifying them as Siberian, rather than Korean. Korean culture is an extremely proud one, and this latter attempt at subterfuge on

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the part of Russian commanders has no doubt been insulting, and contributed to low morale among the North Korean troops, as well as animosity with their Russian hosts.

Moreover, there is the issue of the language barrier. North Korean soldiers peppered in with Russian units is a recipe for miscommunication, inefficiency, and ultimately, heavy casualties. These challenges are unlikely to be overcome soon given the speed with which the North Koreans entered the battlespace, without the benefit of rigorous training in combined ops maneuvers with their Russian hosts. Already it has been reported in the Ukrainian press that a captured Russian soldier, based near the village of Glushkovo, claimed that North Korean troops had exchanged gunfire with his Russian unit—again, not realizing who they were and mistaking them for Ukrainians. In addition to adding this unneeded layer of chaos, the North Koreans, according to the debriefed Russian POW, represent a potential diplomatic scandal should they experience high casualties, suggesting they are perhaps being treated with kid gloves. This only adds to the potential for animosity

between the Russian hosts and their North Korean guests, and represents a battlefield weakness that the Ukrainians would do well to exploit.

Some Ukrainian servicemen serving in frontline positions in Kursk have been issued three-page printed booklets with transliterations of a few basic Korean phrases, it was reported in The Guardian. These include “Hands up,” “drop your weapon and come to us slowly,” and “Throw off your body armor and helmet,” among others. The booklet, a good start, is not enough. The Ukrainian military and government must do more to exploit the chaos and disorder that the Russians have brought upon themselves by mismanaging their methods of deployment of these North Korean troops.

Lessons learned Despite the chaotic conditions on the ground as a result of the integration of North Korean troops, there is no doubt that this live-fire experience will only be beneficial to the DPRK military, from a long-term perspective. The nature of

photo: Dean Karalekas A statue at the entrance of a performing-arts school near Kyiv is pockmarked with signs of shrapnel.

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Moreover, the rapprochement between North Korea and Russia will reduce Pyongyang’s reliance on Beijing. Since the end of the Cold War, China has been the DPRK’s most important ally and primarily security guarantor. More than 90 percent of North Korea’s total imports and exports are Chinese, and China is the starving nation’s largphoto: Dean Karalekas est source of food aid and crude oil.

The highway sign entering Donetsk Oblast is festooned with messages by soldiers heading to the front.

Despite this highly dependent rewarfare has changed considerably since the last lationship, there is great mistrust between the two time Pyongyang has put its military personnel in communist nations. During the Sino-Soviet Split, harm’s way, and Storm Corps members who survive North Korea’s Great Leader Kim Il Sung was adept the meat grinder will bring home valuable knowlat extracting military and economic assistance from edge about modern methods of warfare against both countries by playing them against one another, a Western-trained and -supplied adversary—rethereby preventing overdependence on either one. fined offensive doctrine, command and control A stronger Moscow-Pyongyang relationship is likely experience, and proficiency with drones and electo increase instability on the Korean Peninsula—and tronic warfare systems—that could be applied to the Indo-Pacific region in general—by emboldenfuture conflicts, most likely against South Korea ing a more independent Kim regime. It will cut into and America.

China’s influence over its neighbor, and exacerbate

photo: Dean Karalekas A Ukrainian technician repairs components at an on-site drone repair shop at the military headquarters just kilometers from the front lines.

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photo: Dean Karalekas Ukrainian soldiers lay their fallen comrade to rest at a church service in Odessa in July 2024.

Beijing’s current frustration with Pyongyang. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is acutely aware that it needs the DPRK to serve as a buffer zone, protecting it from US allies.

Pressure on Beijing Moreover, the CCP will no doubt be concerned that by deploying troops to the European war theater, NATO will only increase the already uncomfortable level of attention it pays to Asia, and nervous IndoPacific nations may be pushed further into the US orbit, fearing conflagration in their home region.

Finally, it also increases the pressure on the CCP to become more actively involved in the Ukraine War, perhaps eventually to include the deployment of People’s Liberation Army assets to the theater. This would be a disaster for Beijing’s efforts to expand its geopolitical influence.

Moreover, the closer Russia-DPRK relationship may eventually see military assistance go the other way, with Russian aid to Pyongyang in a future conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Certainly the recent RussiaNorth Korea mutual defense agreement may open

the door to this possibility, and sending unknown numbers of his own troops into the meat grinder of the Russia-Ukraine war might seem a small price to pay for Kim Jong Un to secure such an invaluable future asset. It is worth remembering that Kim and his regime have very little consideration of the value of human life—even for their own people. This is a characteristic they share with the leadership in both Russia and the PRC: North Korea’s allies in the geopolitical effort to remake the US-led liberal international order whose values of freedom, democracy, and human rights are derided as alien values, or Western decadence.

The deployment of North Korean troops to the Ukraine conflict has expanded the war beyond the border of Europe, to embroil the entire Indo-Pacific region. According to American writer and political commentator Gordon Chang, It is not inconceivable that Ukraine could strike North Korea in retaliation.

The world has just become a smaller place. Leaders in Asia and Europe alike are now forced to re-evaluate the security situations they face, entailing new calculations of security threats, new re-evaluations of alliances, and new considerations for the future. n

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Strategic Vision vol. 13, no. 61 (December, 2024)

Strategic Dimensions Belt and Road in the Middle East and Africa hint at broader PRC objectives Anderson Weng

photo: PRC.gov KCIC400AF, a Chinese-built electric high-speed train, waits at Halim Station in Makasar, East Jakarta, part of the Jakarta-Bandung High-speed Railway.

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he Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway (HSR) marked its first anniversary of operations recently, with operators boasting of peak occupancy rates of 99.6 percent and a record of carrying 5.79 million passengers in that first year. This flagship project is billed not only as a quantum leap forward in Indonesia’s transportation infrastructure, but as a shining example of what China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) can accomplish. Behind these promising statistics and diplomatic celebrations, however, lies a more complex narrative about the ambitious global strategy behind China’s BRI.

The Belt and Road Initiative, unveiled by President Xi Jinping in 2013, represents the most extensive infrastructure investment effort in modern history, spanning continents and promising to reshape global connectivity. While Beijing frames the BRI as a win-win cooperation model, and points to the Jakarta-Bandung HSR as an example of its success, the international community remains unsure about China’s true intentions behind the initiative. This railway project, which has dramatically reduced travel time between Indonesia’s capital and its textile hub, serves as a microcosm of the larger questions surrounding China’s growing global influence

Anderson Weng is a Major in the ROC Air force, and is currently a student at Graduate Institute of International Security at the ROC National Defense University. He can be reached at anderson351121@gmail.com

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through infrastructure diplomacy.

This raises a crucial question: Beyond the official rhetoric of mutual development and shared prosperity, what are China’s actual strategic objectives in pursuing such massive international infrastructure projects? The answer lies not just in examining individual success stories like the Jakarta-Bandung HSR, but in understanding the broader implications of China’s systematic approach to expanding its economic and political footprint across the globe.

Engaging the Middle East The China-Arab Cooperation Summit in Beijing held on May 30, 2024, represents a strategic milestone in China’s Middle Eastern diplomacy, particularly against the backdrop of regional tensions and the Gaza conflict. The high-profile attendance of UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Tunisian President Kais Saied underscores the growing significance of ChinaArab relations. This summit, following the success-

ful Sixth China-Arab States Expo held in Yinchuan, Ningxia, in September 2023, demonstrates Beijing’s systematic approach to strengthening its presence in the Middle East.

President Xi Jinping’s opening address strategically invoked the historical Silk Road connections, emphasizing centuries-old ties between China and the Arab world. However, beyond the historical narrative, the summit served a dual purpose: positioning the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a reliable partner in addressing regional challenges, particularly the Palestinian issue, while simultaneously advancing Beijing’s economic interests through the BRI framework. This diplomatic balancing act reveals China’s sophisticated approach to expanding its influence in a region that has traditionally been dominated by Western powers.

The timing of this summit, amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza, is particularly significant. By aligning with Arab positions on regional issues, China is effectively leveraging current geopolitical dynamics to strengthen its diplomatic and economic foothold in

photo: PRC.gov Visitors learn about a clean energy project at the sixth China-Arab States Expo in Yinchuan, northwest China’s Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Sept. 21, 2023.

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the Middle East. This approach not only helps secure China’s energy interests but also positions Beijing as an alternative diplomatic partner to Western nations in regional affairs, demonstrating how the BRI has been revealed to be more than a purely economic initiative, but is part of a larger, comprehensive platform for advancing China’s strategic interests.

African engagement The 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing marks a pivotal moment in the evolution of the BRI, highlighting China’s deepening engagement with the African continent. In his keynote speech at the FOCAC, President Xi announced his intention to elevate Sino-African relations to a “new era all-weather China-Africa community with a shared future,” signaling Beijing’s strategic prioritiza-

image: PRC.gov

tion of Africa in its global ambitions. This diplomatic upgrade is backed by substantial financial commitments, including a US$137 million military aid package and an impressive US$49 billion in development funding over the next three years.

Xi’s contention that “without China-Africa modernization, there can be no global modernization” is particularly telling, considering that China and Africa together represent one-third of the world’s population. This statement, coupled with the launch of the Ten Major Partnership Actions, reveals Xi’s vision of positioning the PRC as the leading partner in Africa’s modernization journey. The scale of financial commitment—approximately US$50 billion—dwarfs similar initiatives by Western nations and international institutions, effectively making China the continent’s primary development partner.

The comprehensive nature of the Ten Major Partnership Actions demonstrates how the BRI has evolved beyond traditional infrastructure projects. This new approach encompasses a broader spectrum of cooperation, from industrial development to technological innovation, suggesting that Xi intends to integrate China deeply into Africa’s economic and social fabric. Bolstering this economic relationship are Beijing’s efforts to influence the development of political systems in Africa, as exemplified in the curricula on offer at the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School in Tanzania. Built and paid for by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the school provides ideological education to cadres from liberation-oriented political parties from throughout Africa, teaching them how to subjugate the government to the ruling party in their home countries, essentially serving as a school for authoritarianism. Through these actions, Beijing is not merely building infrastructure but creating a comprehensive framework for

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photo: PRC.gov Xi Jinping leads African heads of state and the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.

long-term economic and political partnership with countries that share China’s political system.

Strategic implications China’s Belt and Road Initiative, while publicly presented as an economic development program, reveals multiple layers of strategic objectives that extend far beyond infrastructure development. Through careful analysis of its implementation patterns, particularly in regions like Africa and the Middle East, several key strategic implications emerge.

First, the BRI serves as a powerful tool for economic statecraft. By investing massive amounts of capital—exemplified by the nearly US$50 billion commitment to Africa—China is not merely building infrastructure but creating economic dependencies.

These financial commitments give Beijing significant leverage over recipient countries’ political decisions while simultaneously addressing China’s domestic economic challenges, such as industrial overcapacity and the need for new markets. The Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway’s success demonstrates how infrastructure projects can create long-term economic

ties and technological dependencies on Chinese expertise and standards.

Second, the initiative represents a sophisticated approach to geopolitical expansion. By establishing what Chinese officials call an “all-weather ChinaAfrica community with a shared future” and deepening ties with Arab states, Xi is effectively building a new international coalition. This network of partnerships serves as a counterbalance to Western influence and provides the PRC with reliable allies in international forums. The strategic value of these relationships is particularly evident in UN voting patterns on international disputes where China seeks diplomatic support.

Third, the BRI embodies Xi’s vision for a new global order. His statement that “without China-Africa modernization, there can be no global modernization” reveals Beijing’s ambition to lead an alternative development model that is distinct from the Westernled international system. Through projects such as the BRI and the Nyerere Leadership School, China is not just building roads and railways; it’s constructing a new framework for international cooperation that challenges the existing world order, with Beijing

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photo: PRC.gov Employees work in a welding workshop of an automaker in Qingzhou, east China’s Shandong Province.

positioned at its center.

Moreover, the initiative’s focus on critical infrastructure and strategic locations—from ports in the Indian Ocean to railways in Southeast Asia—suggests a long-term strategy to secure vital trade routes, and potentially to project military influence. While China emphasizes the commercial nature of these projects, their dual-use potential cannot be ignored, particularly in the context of growing global strategic competition.

These strategic dimensions of the BRI indicate that Xi’s true goal extends beyond economic development to fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. Through this initiative, Beijing is systematically building the foundation for a new international order where it plays a central role in global governance, economic development, and security arrangements.

The BRI represents a transformative manifestation of China’s grand strategy to reshape the global order.

It evinces historical resonance through its connection to the ancient Silk Road and contemporary aspirations for China’s national renaissance. The BRI must be viewed beyond the conventional framework of an infrastructure development program: it is a sophisti-

cated instrument of Chinese statecraft that operates at multiple levels, including the economic, diplomatic, institutional, and strategic.

The initiative’s comprehensive scope and strategic depth indicate that China has multiple, interrelated objectives. Firstly, from an economic standpoint, the BRI represents a significant mechanism for addressing China’s domestic economic challenges, particularly in response to decelerating GDP growth and the necessity for a sustainable development trajectory. The PRC government’s objective is to create new markets, construct trade corridors, and facilitate international economic integration in order to secure long-term growth momentum and expand its economic influence on a global scale.

Secondly, from an institutional perspective, the BRI illustrates China’s increasing sophistication in leveraging both governmental and non-governmental mechanisms to advance its interests. Through the strategic deployment of Chinese enterprises, NGOs, and international organizations, the CPP is actively shaping new institutional frameworks and norms that parallel and potentially challenge existing international arrangements. This institutional entre-

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preneurship reflects Xi’s determination to assume a leadership role in establishing rules and regulations that align with his strategic vision.

Thirdly, the initiative represents China’s broader aspirations for the establishment of “new international relations” and the realization of the “Chinese Dream.”

Although China publicly advocates for mutual benefit and opposes protectionism and hegemony, it is simultaneously leveraging its expanding economic power and comprehensive national strength to create dependencies that enhance its global influence.

This approach demonstrates a sophisticated grasp of how economic statecraft can be utilized to reshape international power dynamics without resorting to traditional forms of coercion.

Moreover, the BRI’s implementation across both land and maritime domains indicates China’s emergence as a novel type of regional power, one that combines continental and maritime capabilities in pursuit of comprehensive influence. This dual-domain approach allows China to maximize its strategic flexibility while creating multiple pathways for

expanding its influence beyond its traditional spheres of influence in Eurasia.

By fostering interdependencies through infrastructure development, economic cooperation, and institutional engagement, China is creating a network of partnerships that serves both its immediate interests and long-term strategic objectives. This networkbuilding approach illustrates Beijing’s recognition that sustainable influence necessitates both material capabilities and institutional frameworks that legitimize and perpetuate its preferred international order.

In essence, the Belt and Road Initiative fully embodies Xi’s vision of China’s role in the world. This vision is characterized by a combination of economic strength, institutional influence, and strategic capabilities, which are utilized to achieve a national renaissance and to construct a new international order that is more to China’s liking. As this initiative continues to develop and expand, its impact on global governance, economic relations, and strategic balance will become increasingly significant. Consequently, it is worthy of continued attention and in-depth exploration. n

photo: PRC.gov China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) includes Gwadar Port, supported by a nearby dockyard, impacting trade routes and maritime security.

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Strategic Vision vol. 13, no. 61 (December, 2024)

A True Friend

Taiwan’s backing of Israel in the aftermath of the October 7 attack by Hamas Mor Sobol

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n October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a devastating terror attack. More than 1,200 were killed, mostly civilians, around 250 people were taken hostage, and thousands were injured in the darkest day in Israel’s history and the most brutal attack on Jews since the Holocaust. This attack was the opening shot for Israel’s ongoing multi-front war against Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, alongside an interstate confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Following the October 7 attack, many world leaders, including those from Germany, Great Britain,

France, Canada, Japan, and India, expressed their support for Israel. However, the United States distinguished itself as Israel’s closest ally and key political and security guarantor.

American backing extended beyond statements, as President Joe Biden made history by visiting Israel during wartime, conveying a powerful message of solidarity and commitment. Biden also cautioned potential hostile actors against exploiting Israel’s vulnerability. This warning was underscored by the deployment of two US aircraft carrier strike groups to the eastern Mediterranean, signaling a strong deterrent posture. These actions and statements represent one

photo: ROC Government Then-President Tsai Ing-wen presents Chair of the Knesset Taiwan friendship group Boaz Toporovsky with a gift.

Dr. Mor Sobol is an associate professor at Tamkang University where he teaches a course on terrorism studies. He can be reached for comment at 155876@o365.tku.edu.tw

Taiwan’s Support of Israel b 19

of the most significant demonstrations of support in the history of US-Israel relations.

While many countries showed strong support for Israel in its darkest hour, as the conflict continued and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) began operations in the Gaza Strip and on other fronts, that support started to wane—even among Israel's closest allies, including the US, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. However, one country, not traditionally seen as a close ally of Israel, consistently stood out with unwavering political backing and action from day one: Taiwan.

As scholars and analysts continue to examine the role and response of key international players and stakeholders in the Middle East—such as the US, China, Russia, the European Union (and its member states), and the Muslim/Arab world—relatively little attention has been given to Taiwan’s response to the October 7 attack and the ongoing conflict. Against this backdrop, the primary aim of this paper is to explore Taiwan’s response and investigate the rationale behind Taipei’s steadfast support for Israel.

Arab/Muslim countries at the UN, as well as reliance on Arab oil, led it to adopt a more anti-Israel stance, supporting UN resolutions against Israel, restricting visas and trade, and avoiding diplomatic contact.

Despite this, Taiwan pursued security cooperation with Israel, resulting in clandestine nuclear collaboration in the 1960s and arms sales in the 1970s and 1980s.

“Sporadic conflicts between Taipei and Jerusalem typically revolved around Israel’s ties with China or Taiwan’s political outreach, rather than the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.”

While Taiwan's response to the October 7 attack and the ongoing conflict may have surprised some, those familiar with Taiwan-Israel relations would find this support less unexpected. In fact, the roots of Taiwan's backing for the Jewish state can be traced back over a century to 1920, when Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China (ROC), expressed his support for the Zionist movement. Moreover, the

In the early 1990s, Taiwan shifted its stance towards Israel, moving toward formalized ties. In December 1990, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs met with an Israeli diplomat to discuss potential diplomatic relations. However, in 1992, Israel formally established ties with the PRC, complicating the situation.

Eventually, Israel (like many others) decided to pursue a non-political path to accommodate China, resulting in the opening of Representative Offices in 1993. Over the following years, Taiwan-Israel relations grew significantly, with multiple agreements signed in fields such as trade, agriculture, technology, and science.

Evidently, sporadic conflicts between Taipei and Jerusalem typically revolved around Israel’s ties with China or Taiwan's political outreach, rather than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For example, Taiwan faced criticism in 2006 when Foreign Minister James

ROC backed Israel's United Nations (UN) membership in 1949.

However, Taiwan’s support for Israel diminished after Israel recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1950, as Taiwan enforced a policy against relations with any state recognizing Beijing.

Additionally, Taiwan’s dependence on support from

Huang met with Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah.

To avoid future tensions, Taiwan later (in 2010) rejected Iran’s proposal to open an office in Taipei, showing sensitivity to US and Israeli concerns.

Taiwan has also demonstrated its support for Israel following terror attacks, condemning incidents like the 2022 Jerusalem bombing and the 2023 synagogue

A Brief History of Taiwanese Support for Israel

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photo: ROC Government Members of the Taipei City Council visit Israel.

attack. Notably, there is no indication that Taiwan has publicly criticized Israel’s policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

emotional support to those affected by the conflict.

By year’s end, Taiwan’s sustained commitment was evident through ongoing volunteering, animal welfare donations, and contributions to resilience cen-

Taiwan-Israel since October 7

ters, reflecting a strong, multi-layered solidarity with Israel during its time of need. Taiwan’s humanitarian outreach extended to Gaza as well, with a donation of $500,000 earmarked for civilian support, balancing its pro-Israel stance with an acknowledgment of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. This dual approach has allowed Taiwan to stand firmly with Israel against terrorism while maintaining a nuanced humanitarian policy.

In contrast, China responded to the October 7 events by emphasizing a commitment to the twostate solution, civilian safety, and regional stability but

In the aftermath of the October 7 attacks, Taiwan showed clear and swift support for Israel. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately issued a statement condemning Hamas’ violence and expressing solidarity with Israel. President Tsai Ing-wen also conveyed condolences to the victims and their families, underscoring Taiwan's empathy and firm stance against terrorism. Symbolic gestures followed, with Taipei 101 lighting up in Israel’s blue and white colors to display unity. Taiwan’s Representative to Israel, Abby Lee, played an active role, in organizing donations, visiting hospitals, and showing visible support for affected Israeli communities.

In the following months, Taiwan expanded its support efforts, including a $70,000 donation through Pitchon-Lev for IDF soldiers and families, visits to Magen David Adom, and various activities to offer

notably refrained from directly condemning Hamas.

While Chinese social media platforms saw a dramatic rise in antisemitic content, and some Chinese companies temporarily removed Israel from maps, China took no concrete actions to counter these developments. In addition, Chinese-made weaponry reportedly found in Gaza has further raised con-

Taiwan’s Support of Israel b 21

cerns about China’s tacit support for the Palestinian cause, highlighting how China balances its support for Palestine with its rivalry with the US and its strategic positioning in the Middle East. While China’s response aligns with its broader goal of appearing neutral, these actions serve its aim to counterbalance American influence and strengthen ties with Middle Eastern partners, underscoring the contrast between Taiwan’s straightforward support for Israel and China’s cynical use of the war to frame the situation through the lens of great power rivalry.

Rationale behind Taiwan’s support While Taiwan’s government’s support for Israel after the October 7 attack has been clear, domestic opinion and civil society within Taiwan reveal a more complex picture.

Shortly after the attack, a survey found that a larger share of the Taiwanese public sympathized with Israel (35%) than with Palestine (15%), but as the conflict progressed, supporters of both sides held public demonstrations, with pro-Palestinian groups organizing more frequent, larger events that attracted media attention.

Some in Taiwan believe the country should support the Palestinian cause and even reduce commercial ties with Israel, arguing that Taiwan, as a society pursuing self-determination, should empathize with Palestinians and support their struggle for recognition. Proponents of this view also feel that Taiwan’s support for the Palestinian cause would align it with universal values like human rights, echoing Taiwan’s desire to be recognized as a responsible member of the global community.

Despite these sentiments, Taiwan’s government

photo: ROC Government Members of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office demonstrates the spirit of ‘Taiwan can help’ through volunteering at a persimmon plantation.

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has stronger reasons to support Israel, rooted in the well-established and mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. Bilateral ties between Taiwan and Israel encompass trade, technological, scientific, and cultural cooperation, spanning sectors like agriculture, education, air transport, and R&D. In 2022 alone, trade between the two reached over $3 billion, positioning Israel as a crucial trade partner for Taiwan in the Middle East. While Taiwan and Israel have cultivated a strong partnership, Taiwan has no formal diplomatic relations with the Palestinian Authority or any kind of ties and (non-political) agreements for that matter.

Moreover, Taiwan’s support for Israel also reflects a principled alignment with democratic values and a clear distancing from China’s more ambiguous stance on the Israel-Palestine conflict. China has traditionally supported the Palestinian cause and has often avoided directly condemning Hamas or specifically acknowledging the impact of its attacks. Taiwan, by contrast, underscores its commitment to democratic principles and condemns terrorism directly, positioning itself in solidarity with Israel as a fellow democracy under threat. This stance enables Taiwan to

highlight the values it shares with the US and other Western allies, aligning itself with a broader, democracy-oriented bloc. Given Taiwan’s limited formal recognition, standing with Israel and like-minded allies strengthens its image as a country that upholds human rights and condemns extremism, distinguishing it sharply from China and emphasizing Taiwan’s position as a responsible global actor.

Taiwan’s diplomatic positioning also serves its strategic interests by bolstering ties with key allies.

Taiwan’s support for Israel not only reaffirms its solidarity with the US-led democratic alliance but also facilitates the expansion of informal partnerships in areas like defense technology and innovation, which are crucial to Taiwan’s security. Additionally, by aligning itself with Israel, Taiwan benefits from reinforcing its stance within the US’s geopolitical framework, which places emphasis on democracies working together against authoritarian threats from powers like China, Russia, and Iran.

This strategic alignment thus supports Taiwan’s security and legitimacy on the international stage. At the same time, Taiwan’s decision to provide humanitarian aid to Gaza demonstrates its nuanced ap-

photo: ROC Government Taiwan’s Representative Abby Lee visited the headquarter of hostage and missing families to express support and solidarity with the families.

Taiwan’s Support of Israel b 23

photo: ROC Government Representatives from Taiwan and Israel sign an agreement to expand bilateral cooperation in education, student exchanges, and sports.

proach—acknowledging humanitarian needs in the region without compromising its support for Israel.

Conclusion Taiwan's supportive stance toward Israel following the October 7 attack has reinforced their deepening partnership, positioning Taiwan as one of Israel's most consistent allies during a period of significant international pressure. While the US remains Israel’s primary ally, Taiwan has stepped forward as a steady partner, extending its support amidst widespread global condemnation of Israeli military actions in Gaza and Lebanon.

This evolving relationship is rooted in shared values, similar geopolitical pressures, and mutual reliance on US security assurances. Taiwan has shown particular interest in Israel’s expertise in security and civil defense, reflecting both countries’ shared challenges of navigating hostile regional threats while maintaining democratic principles. Taiwan’s approach also aligns with American efforts to minimize Israeli engagement with China, reinforcing its role in the strategic triangle between Washington, Jerusalem, and Beijing.

The current climate may accelerate Israeli interest in expanding ties with Taiwan, especially as both

countries face political isolation. Although formal diplomatic recognition from Israel remains unlikely, Taiwan’s emphasis on civil defense and technological collaboration represents a pragmatic path forward that may avoid direct Chinese retaliation. By focusing on these less controversial areas, Taiwan hopes to draw on Israel’s extensive experience in resilience-building and defense innovation, while Israel may see enhanced collaboration with Taiwan as a way to deepen its alignment with other democratic partners in Asia.

Despite these positive developments, the trajectory of Taiwan-Israel relations remains uncertain, given the potential for changes in China’s position on Israel.

China's recent signals of a more balanced approach toward Israel’s security concerns may prompt Israel to recalibrate its approach to Taiwan to avoid unnecessary tension with Beijing. This shift could shorten the current window of opportunity for Taiwan, making it imperative to secure meaningful advances in its relationship with Israel while the geopolitical climate remains favorable. Taiwan's strategic challenge, therefore, lies in capitalizing on this moment to achieve substantial partnership gains while navigating the delicate balance of not provoking China or compromising Israel’s broader foreign policy flexibility. n

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Strategic Vision vol. 13, no. 61 (December, 2024)

Condition: Quarantine Chinese quarantine of Taiwan seen having wider regional, global impacts Chen Shuai-hsien

A

quarantine of Taiwan by China would have profound implications for the global economy, international security, and geopolitical stability. Such a quarantine is increasingly being seen as more likely than an outright invasion by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as Beijing inches closer to action on its threat to annex the island, as such a move would constitute a non-kinetic way to exert pressure on Taiwan by controlling access to the island’s ports and airspace, allowing China to assert de facto sovereignty without provoking a full-scale conflict.

A quarantine differs from an outright blockade mostly in who carries it out, and what legal implica-

tions it holds. In a blockade, all shipments to the targeted nation are turned away, or at least intercepted and inspected. This is performed by the perpetrator country’s military assets: the navy at sea and air force to maintain air supremacy, and constitutes a clear casus belli, not only according to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, but Article 54 of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions as well. In contrast, a quarantine would have to be carried out by a nonmilitary force, such as the China Coast Guard, and would fall short of a justification for war, while accomplishing the same effect of frightening, demoralizing, and starving out the Taiwanese population and

photo: US Navy The Arleigh-Burke class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) conducts underway operations in the South China Sea.

Chen Shuai-hsien is a student in the Graduate Institute of International Security at National Defense University, ROC. He can be reached for comment at formosan413@gmail.com

Taiwan Quarantine b 25

softening them up for occupation.

The repercussions would extend far beyond the Taiwan Strait, disrupting essential global systems and prompting a range of international reactions. A quarantine of Taiwan would greatly hinder global trade, given its strategic position along one of the world’s busiest shipping routes. According to the US Naval Institute, more than 40 percent of the global container fleet traverses the Taiwan Strait, and any interruptions to maritime transport would delay essential goods and elevate shipping costs on a global scale. Notably, disruptions to Taiwan’s semiconductor exports—critical to industries ranging from electronics to automobiles—could trigger significant supply chain shocks, resulting in product shortages and increased inflation.

An energy crisis could develop in East Asia as a consequence of a major disruption of this shipping, especially in countries such as Japan and South Korea which, like Taiwan, rely significantly on oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments that currently ply these waters. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the increased threat of such a quarantine will begin to heighten competition for alternative energy sources, leading to rising global fuel prices and exacerbating inflation in nations that import energy. Taiwan’s heavy dependence on imported energy could also lead to severe power shortages, threatening industrial operations and public services alike.

From a security perspective, even a quarantine

runs the risk of triggering an immediate military response—although it is impossible to know for certain, given Washington’s policy of strategic ambiguity.

Regional players, such as Japan and Australia, would likely bolster their defenses, while member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) would face pressure to balance their tradition of neutrality with the need for regional stability.

Lastly, the economic and political fallout from a

would escalate military tensions. The United States, Japan, and other stakeholders may deploy naval forces to counter China’s actions, thereby increasing the likelihood of military confrontation. The US IndoPacific strategy is centered on preserving freedom of navigation, meaning that any disruption to Taiwan’s access to the sea lines of communication (SLOC)

quarantine would affect international markets and diplomatic alliances. The G7 countries might impose sanctions on China, but such measures could trigger a global economic slowdown given China’s role as a manufacturing hub. Simultaneously, multinational corporations would likely accelerate their efforts toward supply chain diversification and de-risking

graphic: ROC MoD

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from China, further reshaping global trade patterns.

Clearly, a quarantine of the Republic of China (ROC) would lead to significant economic disruption, increase energy insecurity, and escalate military tensions. This scenario would compel the international community to manage a complex crisis with no straightforward solutions. It would require a careful balance between diplomatic initiatives and military preparedness to mitigate the fallout and prevent escalation.

ics, automotive manufacturing, and defense systems.

These consequences would further stress global supply chains, compounding the bottlenecks already exacerbated by the response to the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing geopolitical tensions.

Moreover, a quarantine would worsen global energy insecurity, especially in East Asia, where countries rely heavily on energy imports, particularly LNG, a significant portion of which passes through the Taiwan Strait. Any disruption to this supply chain

photo: Andre Richard The USS Chung-Hoon, in a Taiwan Strait transit alongside the HMCS Montreal, observes the Chinese navy’s Luyang III executing unsafe maneuvers.

From a global perspective, a quarantine of Taiwan by the China Coast Guard would have significant ramifications, touching upon economics, security, energy markets, and geopolitics. Economic disruptions and supply chain breakdowns are among the most anticipated consequences in the spheres of economics and trade. Taiwan serves as a crucial center for semiconductor manufacturing, with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (TSMC) accounting for over 50 percent of the world’s advanced microchips. A quarantine would have a detrimental effect on semiconductor exports, resulting in substantial shortages across key industries, including consumer electron-

could intensify competition for LNG and other fuel sources, leading to higher energy prices worldwide.

If Taiwan’s imports are severely curtailed, the island could experience power shortages, paralyzing industrial output.

All of which would lead to heightened military tensions and security risks. Just as a blockade by the PLA would significantly increase military tensions in the region, a quarantine could likewise lead to the same outcome, albeit more slowly, as the aforementioned effects will take longer to make themselves felt. The United States, Japan, and Australia—all dedicated to upholding freedom of navigation in the Indo-

Taiwan Quarantine b 27

Pacific—would be pressured to respond with naval deployments and joint military exercises, escalating the situation into a risky environment where miscommunication or an accidental clash of opposing forces could lead to armed conflict.

The US Indo-Pacific Command would almost certainly conduct freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs) to challenge China’s quarantine, which would further escalate tensions. China may employ non-conventional tactics, such as cyberattacks on Taiwan’s infrastructure and communication systems, complicating the ROC’s ability to respond. In addition to the maritime militias and the Chinese Coast Guard, PLA assets may be deployed to contribute to the harassment should leaders in Beijing feel that its quarantine is taking too long to induce Taipei’s surrender.

The political and diplomatic fallout of a quarantine would be considerable, creating major divisions within the international community. The United States and its allies are likely to contemplate the imposition of economic sanctions on China, although the implementation of such measures would pose challenges due to current economic interdependencies.

Sanctions aimed at China’s financial and manufacturing sectors could lead to far-reaching consequences for global markets, reflecting the instability seen during the sanctions on Russia. Multinational corporations are poised to accelerate the diversification of their supply chains by embarking on “friendshoring” and “homeshoring” efforts—shifting production from China and Taiwan to less volatile locations such as Vietnam, India, and the United States. While this restructuring of complex supply chains will take time, it is a necessary step to strengthen industries and reduce vulnerabilities.

A prolonged quarantine of Taiwan may also lead to serious humanitarian challenges, including shortages of food, fuel, and medicine. This could incite public unrest and potentially result in attempted refugee

flows to neighboring countries such as Japan and the Philippines. The international community would undoubtedly feel pressured to offer humanitarian aid, but such efforts could be hampered by China’s quarantine measures.

Effective responses The international community is examining ways to respond effectively to energy disruptions in the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific region through a strategic blend of diplomatic initiatives, market interventions, and military actions. These measures will aim to stabilize the region and mitigate the broader impacts on global energy markets and trade flows.

In terms of emergency energy assistance and market stabilization, the United States, Qatar, and Australia— major energy exporters—could potentially step in with emergency LNG shipments to the region to stabilize markets, as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all rely heavily on LNG and oil imports that pass through the Taiwan Strait. Disruptions would trigger global competition for alternative energy sources, leading to price surges.

Countries are likely to draw on their strategic petroleum reserves (SPR), similar to the coordinated efforts seen during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

However, reserves are limited, and infrastructure bottlenecks could hinder rapid deployment. While emergency shipments and SPR activation could temporarily stabilize prices, they may not fully offset supply gaps, leading to higher energy and transportation costs across industries globally.

The G7 nations would likely coordinate diplomatic pressure on China to lift the quarantine, aiming to minimize disruptions to energy and trade flows.

However, responses could also include sanctions targeting Chinese firms or industries, particularly in the energy, finance, and technology sectors.

If effective, sanctions could potentially moderate

28 b STRATEGIC VISION

Chinese behavior, but they would significantly impact the global economy due to China’s extensive trade connections. A sanctions regime similar to that imposed on Russia could result in increased inflation and disruptions in supply chains, particularly if Beijing responds by halting key exports, as it has demonstrated a propensity to do.

As a last resort, FONOPs and military measures might be employed in an attempt to maintain access to critical shipping lanes. The US Navy and allied forces would likely deploy to the Taiwan Strait to conduct FONOPs to signal deterrence and demonstrate an international commitment to keeping maritime trade routes open.

While these operations may prevent an escalation from a quarantine to a complete blockade, they also carry the risk of military conflagration. Any confrontation between Chinese and US or allied forces would destabilize the situation, further complicating efforts to restore energy and trade flows. Such a crisis would likely prompt Japan, South Korea, Australia, and ASEAN nations to strengthen regional energy cooperation and defensive alliances. Japan and Australia,

in particular, view the stability of the Taiwan Strait as vital to their national security, leading them to invest in infrastructure for diversified energy sources, such as renewable energy and nuclear power. Although ASEAN countries may prefer to maintain neutrality, disruptions in trade and energy could push them to align more closely with US-led initiatives aimed at stabilizing the region, while still striving to avoid direct confrontations with China. Additionally, companies are likely to seek long-term contracts for energy supplies from more stable regions to safeguard against potential future crises.

Taking sides A quarantine would strain US-China relations and force governments to take a clearer position on Taiwan.

The G7 nations, along with US allies like Japan and Australia, would surely issue joint statements condemning the quarantine, advocating for freedom of navigation, and calling for a diplomatic resolution.

However, ASEAN countries may struggle to maintain their neutrality, balancing trade ties with China with

photo: Timothy Lenzo US Marines drill an amphibious landing in support of Exercise Steel Knight at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton. c

Taiwan Quarantine b 29

photo: US Navy A US Navy visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) team from USS Preble approaches an international oil tanker while conducting interaction patrols (IPATS).

their interest in regional security and stability.

Beijing is widely expected to justify its quarantine as a law enforcement operation in an effort to complicate international responses and deter an outright intervention. Some countries might adopt cautious compliance to avoid economic retaliation, similar to how airlines complied with China’s 2013 Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) regulations in the East China Sea. The diplomatic fallout could deepen geopolitical rifts, leading to polarizing international alliances, with countries aligning with the United States or China. This could hinder cooperation on other global issues such as climate change and trade reform.

The security environment would become highly volatile, with the risk of military escalation between the United States and China: two nuclear powers.

The United States and allies would likely conduct FONOPs to challenge the quarantine, while Chinese maritime militias and coast guard forces would complicate navigation and increase the risk of clashes.

The presence of multiple military forces operating in close proximity increases the risk of accidental conflict, which could escalate rapidly given the lack of reliable communication channels between the US

and Chinese leadership and military forces. Such a scenario underscores the need for diplomatic mechanisms to manage tensions and prevent escalation.

A Chinese quarantine of Taiwan would present significant diplomatic challenges, economic disruptions, and increased security risks, and the very prospect of such an eventuality is a clear call for policymakers in Taipei, as well as Washington and the capitals of stakeholder countries, to waste no time in making advance preparations. Indeed, Beijing has already begin sanction-proofing its economy by stockpiling food, energy, and commodities: it makes sense for the nations of the region to take similar measures, just in case the international community is forced to navigate such a complex crisis. Although effective diplomatic coordination will be vital to prevent escalation, managing economic upheavals and military tensions may prove difficult. Hence, it is advisable to emphasize the necessity of diversifying supply chains and reinforcing regional defense cooperation now, to address vulnerabilities and ensure stability in the Indo-Pacific region into the future. Achieving long-term resilience will require both energy diversification and the enhancement of security frameworks. n

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Strategic Vision vol. 13, no. 61 (December, 2024)

Palace Intrigue

Philippine politics and conflict management with China in the South China Sea Aaron Jed Rabena

N

ot long after the formation of a grand political alliance between the Duterte and Marcos clans for the 2022 Philippine national elections, the united front has collapsed and a war of words has become the new normal between the warring camps, with each side accumulating political ammunition to use against the other—locally and internationally. The foundations of the Duterte family’s alignment with the Marcoses go back to August 2016, when then-Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte ordered the transfer of the remains of the current president’s father, former president Ferdinand Marcos

Sr., to the Heroes’ Cemetery—an act no Philippine president had ever dared to perform, given the longstanding debate over whether the late president was a hero or a dictator. Yet, Duterte did not mind risking his political capital to finally put the divisive issue to rest, and the Marcos family was extremely grateful.

One could argue that it was the “Duterte magic” that helped Marcos Jr. win the presidency in 2022 because when he ran for vice president in 2016—prior to his alliance with the Dutertes—he lost to Leni Robredo.

Noticeably, when Marcos Jr. ran for president in 2022, he won on a ticket with Rodrigo’s daughter, Sara

photo: Philippines Govt President Rodrigo Duterte sits next to Xi Jinping at the opening ceremony of the FIBA Basketball World Cup 2019 in Beijing on August 30, 2019.

Dr. Aaron Jed Rabena is a Professorial Lecturer at the Asian Center at the University of the Philippines and a visiting scholar at the Taiwan Center for Security Studies at National Chengchi University.

Managing Conflict b 31

photo: Melanye Martinez Philippine Marines secure a beach landing after inserting from an UH-60 Blackhawk during exercise Balikatan 22 at Claveria, Philippines, March 31, 2022.

Duterte, as his vice-president. By bandwagoning with the Dutertes, Marcos Jr. benefited from the legitimacy of a sitting president who is said to have been the most popular outgoing Filipino president. Since there is no such thing as a free lunch, the likely quid pro quo for the Dutertes would be for Sara to be the next in line for the presidency in 2028. However, fissures started to emerge early on, as Marcos Jr. did not give in to Sara’s desire to head the Defense department, instead appointing her as Education Secretary. Sara’s sense of entitlement likely stems from the fact that the Marcos family is indebted to her family for what they did to Marcos Sr. In July 2022, a new variable was introduced into the Philippine political landscape when Marcos Jr.’s cousin, Martin Romualdez, was elected as House Speaker, though he is said to have ambitions for even higher office.

Consequently, Duterte ally and former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was removed from her position as Senior Deputy House Speaker for an alleged attempt to stage a coup against the House Speaker.

Congress afterward launched an investigation into the allocation of confidential funds to Sara as Vice

President and Education Secretary. Besides taking a different approach on the war on drugs, the Marcos Jr. Administration has started to dangle possible cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in relation to former president Duterte’s drug war excesses which could lead to the former president’s arrest. Duterte retaliated by calling the House “corrupt” and President Marcos Jr. a “drug addict.” The Marcos Jr. government also tried to dismantle the media platform of the Dutertes, SMNI, by arresting its leader on criminal charges. In addition to this, Sara is being threatened with impeachment.

Crucially, concurrent with these dramatic domestic episodes, geopolitical tensions were rising between the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the South China Sea (SCS). For instance, there was a rocket debris incident in November 2022 in which the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) forcibly seized space debris from one of its rocket launches from the Philippine Navy. A month after Marcos Jr.’s state visit to China in February 2023, a CCG vessel pointed a military-grade laser at a Philippine vessel on a Rotation

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photo: Brennick Stevens US and Philippine artillerymen prepare for a littoral live fire event at the Naval Education, Training and Doctrine Command, Philippines, April 26, 2023.

and Resupply (RORE) mission to Second Thomas Shoal—a maritime feature where the Philippines has a grounded commissioned naval vessel, the BRP Sierra Madre. By April 2023, the Philippines and US governments had announced an expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites from five to nine. In September of that same year, Rodrigo Duterte met with PRC President Xi Jinping in Beijing for confidence-building talks, although collisions at sea ensued in the following months. March 2024 became a critical moment for the Philippines because the CCG unleashed its strongest watercannon assault on a Philippine resupply boat, injuring four Philippine Navy sailors.

Disagreeing with the Marcos Jr. government’s approach of allegedly escalating tensions with China, the Duterte camp, through former presidential spokesperson Harry Roque, publicized that a “gentleman’s agreement” with China on Second Thomas Shoal had been reached during Duterte’s watch, which was affirmed by the Chinese Embassy. Duterte himself also began accusing Marcos Jr. of being “pro-US.” For Marcos Jr.,

Duterte’s commitment to China was a secret agreement, while Sara faced criticism from oppositionists for not being as vocal as other high-ranking officials in condemning China’s SCS actions. Unsurprisingly, the House initiated an investigation into the so-called gentleman’s agreement. China also became stricter to the point of seizing air-dropped supplies for soldiers stationed on Second Thomas Shoal.

Pattern of scrutiny In Philippine politics, there is a recurring pattern: when a president is succeeded by an opposition figure, the controversial actions of the previous administration often come under scrutiny. This was seen when then-President Benigno Aquino III disparaged Arroyo’s dealings with China (i.e., NBN-ZTE broadband project and NorthRail project). This pattern is now evident in how Marcos Jr. addresses issues related to the Dutertes. Against this backdrop, the worst and most dangerous encounter between the Philippines and China took place on June 17,

Managing Conflict b 33

2024, when a melee resulted in a Filipino sailor losChina was widely perceived to be disadvantageous to ing his thumb after his vessel was rammed by the the Philippines because of his submissive rhetoric on CCG, drawing widespread international condemChina. This made it easier for people to allege that his nation. A month after the incident, agreement with China was in violation China and the Philippines, through the of the Constitution. But under Marcos, 9th Bilateral Consultation Mechanism the political posture is assertive and (BCM), agreed on a “provisional agreeprincipled. These disparate approaches ment” which was welcomed even by impress upon the public whether the Washington. In fact, contrary to what government is negotiating from a posicritics say, China and the Philippines tion of strength or weakness. have continued to engage beyond the Second, with the gentleman’s agreeBCM, with President Marcos meetment, the compromise was done in ing President Xi on the sidelines of the private and informally. Under this Vice Admiral Alberto Carlos 2023 APEC Summit, and in early 2024, agreement, China will permit the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Secretary Philippines to conduct RORE missions provided Enrique Manalo and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang that prior notification is given, only essential supYi holding direct phone discussions. plies (e.g., food, water, medicines) are transported, While both the “gentleman” and “provisional” and operations should be limited to one Coast Guard agreements share the objectives of de-escalating tenvessel and one civilian vessel. To ensure the consions with Beijing while resisting China’s hard-power tinuation of this arrangement post-Duterte, China pressure, differences can be found in terms of politireportedly spoke directly to Vice Admiral Alberto cal environment, modality, and diplomatic semantics.

Carlos, the Commander of the Western Command First, during Duterte’s tenure, the political deal with (WESCOM), which is the unit of the Armed Forces

photo: Corwin Colbert The Philippine Navy’s BRP Andres Bonifacio arrives at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam for a port visit.

34 b STRATEGIC VISION

of the Philippines responsible for the South China Sea. China bypassing the DFA underscores Beijing’s preference for a backdoor approach. Significantly, Admiral Carlos had served as WESCOM chief during Duterte’s administration, making him a familiar figure to the Chinese in these dealings. This is similar to when China, through its defense attaché in Manila, was willing to work with an appointed backchannel negotiator, then-Senator Antonio Trillanes, during the Aquino III Administration, to defuse the ongoing standoff at Scarborough Shoal in 2012.

Shady agreements According to China, the Philippines upended the status quo in February 2023 when Manila reversed Duterte’s China-friendly policies by bringing in construction materials to shore up the dilapidated BRP Sierra Madre. China maintains that they recorded a conversation with Admiral Carlos indicating that higher-ups in the Philippine defense and security

establishment were aware of the arrangement. In fact, this issue gave rise to two other gentleman’s agreements. China claims that a gentleman’s agreement was also reached in Scarborough Shoal with Duterte where China allowed small-scale fishing around the Shoal but restricted access by Philippine military and coast guard assets to the 12-nautical mile territorial waters. China also contends that in the 1990s, the Philippines said that it would tow away the beached LST-542-class tank landing ship.

But for the Philippines, as far as gentleman’s agreements are concerned, it was China that reneged on the agreement for mutual withdrawal of vessels in Scarborough Shoal in 2012.

In contrast to the gentleman’s agreement, the provisional agreement was done transparently and formally by the DFA, with the same issuing a statement that Manila had reached a consensus with Beijing that will not prejudice “respective national positions.”

Third, since there was no joint statement on the provisional agreement, both parties came up with their

photo: Steven Hitchcock Philippine soldiers prepare far an assault on a platoon live fire exercise with their US counterparts during joint training at Fort Magsaysay, Philippines.

Managing Conflict b 35

photo: Tristan Moore Philippine Army Staff Sgt. Delvaris Berto, a rescue diver, takes a break at sunset aboard a cargo ship at Basco Port, Batanes, Philippines, on May 4, 2024.

individual statements. China insists that, like the gentleman’s agreement, it will allow RORE missions provided there is prior notice and “on-site verification,” but the PRC will resolutely oppose the delivery of “large-scale” construction materials meant for building “fixed facilities” or a “permanent outpost.”

The Philippines rejects “prior coordination,” as it connotes consent, and instead says that there will only be an “exchange of information.” Regardless of nomenclature, and despite the absence of an explicit statement allowing the Philippines to make repairs to the BRP Sierra Madre, Philippine RORE missions have been successful since this time, and are no longer being harassed.

Furthermore, China only prohibits “large scale” repairs, and the Philippines will likely not compromise maintaining the ship as the inability to repair it will eventually lead to its collapse and the loss of the Philippine’s claim to the shoal. Overall, this provides a contextual clue that what is said in public may differ from what happens behind closed doors.

Despite this, some quarters demand a publication of the details of the agreement.

The current Duterte-Marcos rift is a domestic strug-

gle for power. Both parties’ political strategies and tools employed foreign policy issues to strike at the other, but incumbent Marcos Jr. has the advantage of political power—commanding not just the bully pulpit but the machinery of the state. Due to the two families’ diverging value systems and opposing stances toward China and the United States, it appears that the great powers have their proxies in the Philippines. Additionally, because of Marcos Jr.’s disagreements with the Dutertes over policy, he has indirectly allied himself with the liberal opposition which, to some extent, props up his political capital.

Marcos Jr. has also demonstrated that striking a deal with China is possible without being defeatist or fatalistic. While a provisional agreement was reached regarding Second Thomas Shoal, workable arrangements in other maritime hotspots such as Sabina Shoal and Scarborough Shoal are also needed for broader regional stability. Philippine leaders worry that we might see a repetition of the precedents set in Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal, where China had carried out land reclamation, established unilateral control, and denied the Philippines fishing rights access. n

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