Strategic Vision, Issue 60

STRATEGIC VISION for Taiwan Security Volume 13, Issue 60

w

September, 2024

w

ISSN 2227-3646

Major Powers & Clashing Worldviews US-China Meet at 21st Shangri La Dialogue Hon-min Yau

Nuclear Brinksmanship in North Korea Lai Ping Huang

Taipei administration eyes CPTPP bid Li Ming-Cheng

Taipei, New Delhi Ties Raviprasad Narayanan

Cross-Strait Relations Tobias Burgers

STRATEGIC VISION for Taiwan Security Volume 13, Issue 60

w

September, 2024

Contents Nuclear brinksmanship by North Korean regime..........................4 Lai Ping Huang Taipei, New Delhi share responsibility to deepen ties....................8 Raviprasad Narayanan Global narratives compete at Shangri La Dialogue...................... 13 Hon-min Yau New administration in Taipei eyes CPTPP bid............................ 18 Li Ming-Cheng Cross-strait stability becoming global issue.................................24 Tobias Burgers

Submissions: Essays submitted for publication are not to exceed 2,000 words in length, and should conform to the following basic format for each 1200-1600 word essay: 1. Synopsis, 100-200 words; 2. Background description, 100-200 words; 3. Analysis, 800-1,000 words; 4. Policy Recommendations, 200-300 words. Book reviews should not exceed 1,200 words in length. Notes should be formatted as endnotes and should be kept to a minimum. Authors are encouraged to submit essays and reviews as attachments to emails; Microsoft Word documents are preferred. For questions of style and usage, writers should consult the Chicago Manual of Style. Authors of unsolicited manuscripts are encouraged to consult with the executive editor at xiongmu@gmail.com before formal submission via email. The views expressed in the articles are the personal views of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of their affiliate institutions or of Strategic Vision. Once accepted for publication, manuscripts become the intellectual property of Strategic Vision. Manuscripts are subject to copyediting, both mechanical and substantive, as required and according to editorial guidelines. No major alterations may be made by an author once the type has been set. Arrangements for reprints should be made with the editor. The editors are responsible for the selection and acceptance of articles; responsibility for opinions expressed and accuracy of facts in articles published rests solely with individual authors. The editors are not responsible for unsolicited manuscripts; unaccepted manuscripts will be returned if accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed return envelope.

Strategic Vision remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover photograph of ships and submarines from the Republic of Singapore Navy and US Navy taking part in exercise Cooperation Afloat Readiness is courtesy of Joe Bishop.

Editor Fu-Kuo Liu Executive Editor Aaron Jensen Editor-at-Large Dean Karalekas Editorial Board Chung-young Chang, Fo-kuan U Richard Hu, NCCU Ming Lee, NCCU Raviprasad Narayanan, JNU Hon-Min Yau, NDU Ruei-lin Yu, NDU Osama Kubbar, QAFSSC Rashed Hamad Al-Nuaimi, QAFSSC Chang-Ching Tu, NDU STRATEGIC VISION For Taiwan Security (ISSN 2227-3646) Volume 13, Number 60, September, 2024, published under the auspices of the Center for Security Studies and National Defense University.

All editorial correspondence should be mailed to the editor at STRATEGIC VISION, Taiwan Center for Security Studies. No. 64, Wanshou Road, Taipei City 11666, Taiwan, ROC. Photographs used in this publication are used courtesy of the photographers, or through a creative commons license. All are attributed appropriately.

Any inquiries please contact the Associate Editor directly via email at: xiongmu@gmail.com.

Or by telephone at: +886 (02) 8237-7228 Online issues and archives can be viewed at our website: https://taiwancss.org/ strategic-vision/ © Copyright 2024 by the Taiwan Center for Security Studies.

Articles in this periodical do not necessarily represent the views of either the TCSS, NDU, or the editors.

From The Editor

W

elcome to this latest issue of Strategic Vision, in which we explore the rapidly shifting landscape of Indo-Pacific security and its impact on the region. In an era where security threats are increasingly sophisticated and pervasive, understanding the evolving tactics and strategies of our mutual adversaries is crucial. This edition brings together thought leaders and industry experts to offer comprehensive analyses on the latest developments, from issues surrounding nuclear threats and international cooperation to information security and the internationalization of the Taiwan Strait crisis.

Our contributors provide the essential knowledge needed to stay ahead in this constantly changing domain.

We begin with an article by Lai Ping Huang who looks at the development of North Korea’s nuclear program in the wake of Pyongyang’s reaction to recent joint US-South Korea military exercises, calling them a prelude to nuclear war. Next, longtime Strategic Vision contributor Dr. Raviprasad Narayanan looks at the relationship between Taipei and New Delhi, who share a “graded responsibility” to deepen bilateral relations for the betterment of security in the region.

This is followed by an article by Dr. Hon-min Yau, a professor of Strategic Studies at the ROC National Defense University, who offers his analysis of the events that transpired at the recent 21st Shangri La Dialogue, especially with respect to how the global superpowers compete in terms of setting the global narrative.

Next, Li Ming-Cheng offers an examination of the recently inaugurated administration of ROC President Lai Ching-te and whether the new team in charge will be able to navigate the difficult challenges facing Taiwan’s accession to the CPTPP. Finally, Dr. Tobias Burgers of the Fulbright University Vietnam gives us part two of his examination of the internationalization of China-Taiwan relations, with a particular emphasis on the role played by Taiwan’s recent presidential elections.

We hope the insights and analyses provided in this issue of Strategic Vision have enhanced your understanding of the rapidly evolving world of international relations and its profound implications for Indo-Pacific security. Stay vigilant, stay informed, and join us in our next edition as we continue to explore the critical challenges and innovations shaping the future of security in the digital age.

Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu Editor Strategic Vision

4 b

photo: Nancy Gomez Artillerymen fire the M77A2 Howitzer during a combined arms live-fire exercise at the Mugun-ri Training Center in Paju, Gyeonggi-do, Korea.

Strategic Vision vol. 13, no. 60 (September, 2024)

Shielding Freedom Taking stock of renewed nuclear brinksmanship by North Korean regime Lai Ping Huang

T

he Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) released a statement recently in which it claimed that recent military exercises by South Korea and its allies constituted little more than rehearsals for an armed conflict. The bilateral military exercises, dubbed Ulchi Freedom Shield, are held every year to give American and South Korean armed forces a chance to practice joint operations and improve their defense readiness against the growing nuclear threat from North Korea. According to a report in a North Korean state-run news outlet, Pyongyang views the exercise, which includes a simulated nuclear confrontation on the peninsula, as a clear provocation

and a prelude to nuclear war.

This messaging reflects the high state of current tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the degree to which the promising diplomatic developments seen under the administration of former US President Donald Trump have soured.

The Trump era On June 12, 2018, Trump met with North Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong Un in Singapore where the two leaders signed a joint statement, emphasizing that the United States and DPRK would work together to establish a lasting and stable peace mechanism on

Lai Ping Huang is a student in the Graduate Institute of International Security at National Defense University, ROC. He can be reached for comment at pinghuanglai618@gmail.com

Nuclear North Korea b 5

the Korean Peninsula, and commit to working towards a denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. On February 28 of the following year, however, Trump abruptly walked out of negotiations in his second meeting with Kim, this time in Hanoi, Vietnam, where the two were discussing the dismantling of the DPRK’s nuclear facilities, as well as Kim’s demand that the United Nations lift economic sanctions. Despite this power move, the military threat from North Korea was generally much abated during the Trump administration.

Pyongyang sent athletes to march alongside their South Korea counterparts in the opening ceremonies of the Olympic Games in 2000, 2004, and 2006.

This was during the 1998-2007 Sunshine Policy era.

They took this symbolic cooperation a step further in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics on February 25, 2018, when the two sides fielded a unified women’s ice hockey team.

This thawing of relations extended past the realm of sports, moreover. On April 21 that same year, Kim Jong Un announced a halt to nuclear and missile tests and the closure of the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri.

On April 27, Kim Jong Un attended a summit meeting with his counterpart from the South, Moon Jae-in, in a village near the demilitarized zone, after which the two leaders issued the Panmunjom Declaration, to promote peace, prosperity, and reunification on the Korean Peninsula.

It was beginning to appear as though the DPRK had embarked on a diplomatic journey of peace internationally. The reason behind DPRK’s policy change was hotly debated, with most analysts concluding that it was driven by the DPRK economy having been significantly affected by the pressure of US and international sanctions. In particular, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced a complete ban on the export of goods to the DPRK on January 5, 2018, which was a major blow to the already fragile DPRK economy and affected the stability of the Kim regime.

This thawing of relation was short-lived, however.

Since mid-2019, North Korea has carried out several ballistic missile launches, most notably the test launch of the Pukguksong-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile in October of that year in the longest-range solid-fuel missile test North Korea had conducted to

photo: Eric Kestner Korean and US soldiers participate in a mass casualty exercise at Ulchi Freedom Shield 24 at Camp Humphreys, Korea, on August 22, 2024.

6 b STRATEGIC VISION

date, sending shock waves around the Indo-Pacific region and the international community.

Based on the above analysis, even if the status of the DPRK as a nuclear-armed state has not been recognized by the United States and other international powers, it is no longer possible to deny that Pyongyang can attack its perceived enemies with nuclear weapons. The effectiveness of the DPRK’s nuclear deterrence has been effectively exerted, and the military strategic goal of nuclear deterrence has been achieved. For the DPRK, the country’s economic development will be a priority goal of national construction plans. As a result, the nature of the problem with DPRK’s nuclear weapons has shifted from the early objective of military security to the purpose of obtaining national economic development.

History This early objective finds its roots in the Korean War (1950–1953). After the Armistice Agreement put an end to the hot war, Pyongyang was facing the threat of a US deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea.

Seeing this, as well as the benefits accrued to Beijing as a result of China’s nuclear weapons program, the DPRK embarked on its own nuclear weapons research in 1965, and even agreed to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 in exchange for assistance from the Soviet Union. Indeed, representatives from Pyongyang signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1992, only to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in early 2003.

The DPRK conducted its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006, and the United Nations Security Council Safety Committee responded by unanimously adopting Resolution 1718, which banned the entry and exit of a wide range of goods into and out of the DPRK, and imposed an assets freeze and travel ban on personnel associated with its nuclear weapons program. The DPRK conducted its first ballistic missile launch on April 5, 2009, followed by its withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks on April 13, and conducted two nuclear weapons tests on May 25, for a total of six nuclear weapons tests from 2009 to 2017. Pyongyang announced on April 20, 2018, that

photo: James Johnson During Ulchi Freedom Shield 24 at Kunsan Air Base, the 8th Fighter Wing and the ROK Air Forces conducted several large-scale, live-fire training events.

Nuclear North Korea b 7

photo: Brittany Russell A US Air Force Fighter Squadron pilot prepares to take flight during Ulchi Freedom Shield 24 at a cooperating base location in Korea.

its verification of the actual combat use of nuclear weapons had been completed.

In the eyes of the Kim regime, it is as important to understand the development of ballistic missiles as it is to develop nuclear weapons, because how to project nuclear weapons into the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region is an expression of nuclear deterrence capabilities. In addition to the development of land-based and mobile ballistic missiles, the DPRK began in 2016 to carry out self-developed submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The essence of the problem surrounding the DPRK nuclear crisis is the regime’s desire to develop a nuclear identity to ensure the country’s absolute security.

From the standpoint of Northeast Asian security, the DPRK’s acquisition of nuclear weapons affects the issue of the global prohibition of nuclear weapons proliferation and power competition in Northeast Asia.

Conclusion This article analyzes the issue of the DPRK’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons status and how it impacts the issue of global nuclear proliferation and the re-

lationship between China and the West in Northeast Asia. In terms of the nature of the problem, it has shifted from the purpose of military security in the early days to the purpose of supporting the country’s economic development. In terms of the subjective and objective interests of various countries, the DPRK nuclear issue is a key factor for the United States in maintaining its influence in Northeast Asia through such programs as exercise Ulchi Freedom Shield, among others.

In terms of forecasting future development trends, the issue of DPRK’s nuclear weapons will not be resolved in the short term. The operational function of the international security mechanism of the SixParty Talks is only to prevent the outbreak of sudden military conflicts and to manage the crisis. In terms of strategic objectives and actions, maintaining the issue of DPRK’s nuclear weapons is beneficial to both China and the United States. Subsequent changes to the situation may affect the results of various variables, and then affect the final prediction results. These are all things that need to be analyzed and revised repeatedly to grasp the actual aspects of the event. n

8 b

Strategic Vision vol. 13, no. 60 (September, 2024)

Natural Allies

Taipei and New Delhi share ‘graded responsibility’ to deepen bilateral relations Raviprasad Narayanan

photo: TWAS

F

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh presents the 2009 TWAS Prize in Agricultural Sciences to Yang Huey-Lang of National Taiwan University.

ellow democracies India and Taiwan are coming to appreciate each other as economic powers, and their respective leaders have begun toning down the informal bilateral political rhetoric that many feel could inflame Beijing. Since unofficial relations were established in 1995, both New Delhi and Taipei have operated representative offices in their respective capitals. The Taipei Economic and Cultural Center (TECC) has a branch in Chennai too, whereas India operates the India Taipei Association (ITA) in Taiwan’s capital. A branch of the ITA in Kaohsiung or Tainan would be most welcome as the two nations’ trade volume increases. Indeed, the

Taiwanese election of 2024 was widely covered in India by established media, including newspapers and TV channels.

As the result of the election, Republic of China (ROC) President Lai Ching-te assumed office on May 20, 2024, and formed an unprecedented third consecutive government by a ruler from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), after two terms by his predecessor, former President Tsai Ing-wen, for whom Lai served as vice president. Lai’s own running mate, and now serving as vice president, is the former ROC representative—meaning de facto ambassador—to the United States, Hsiao Bi-khim. Hsiao, whose mother

Dr. Raviprasad Narayanan is an associate professor at the Centre for East Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. He can be reached for comment at raviprasad.narayanan@gmail.com

India -Taiwan Ties b 9

is American and who was educated in the United States, is well versed in the nuances of conducting foreign policy, and her selection for the role of vice president is no doubt a subtle message to China that the United States is central to Taiwan’s international interactions with the Indo-Pacific region.

As a successful democracy, Taiwan shares certain qualities with the government and culture of India.

Typifying a highly literate society where issues are discussed threadbare, voters are well-informed before deciding their favorite candidate. Taiwan’s vibrant, if somewhat polarized, media landscape ensures that competing candidates and their agendas receive coverage through traditional channels, as well as through digital means, with the internet and new phone apps becoming the trend. The immense soft-power draw of this democratic process is worrying to the leaders in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as the latter is a one-party state totally controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The threat posed by the CCP and its military wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), pose many chal-

lenges to President Lai. This is especially true due, perhaps ironically, to one of the other characteristics of a democracy: the need to attract votes in order to govern. The DPP did not win a majority in the Legislative Yuan, meaning that Lai may have to enlist the aid of his erstwhile electoral opponent, Ko Wenje, whose Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) could be the swing votes needed to get bills passed. As the thirdplace political party with more than one-fourth of the popular vote, it seems likely that the TPP is going to play a very important role going forward, and could become a major player. Equally likely, given their parties’ stance on China ties, the TPP could team up with the main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), to thwart Lai’s policy initiatives. The KMT was Beijing’s preferred winner in the recent elections as it favors closer cross-strait relations, stronger China trade, and has adopted a narrative of US skepticism of late.

For India, Taiwan is a central pillar of economic success in Northeast Asia. With a GDP of US$1.7 trillion in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) and

photo: Justin Morelli Indian soldiers train in cordon and search operations during Khaan Quest 2024, in Altanbulag, Mongolia on July 28, 2024.

10 b STRATEGIC VISION

a population of 23.5 million, Taiwan has a per capita income exceeding US$32,000, making it Northeast Asia’s second richest economy after Japan. The international system has been cabalistic in keeping Taiwan out of the G20, a club of trillion-dollar GDP economic countries. The G20 ignores PPP calculations, which puts Taiwan GDP slightly below US$800 billion. The tremendous economic success of Taiwan is largely owing to innovative research in computer electronics, making the island a hub for micro technologies, especially microchips and other semiconductor manufacturing.

Respected names in tech Smartphone manufacturers like Apple source their microchips and nano-chips from companies like MediaTek and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (TSMC), both respected names for the cutting-edge quality of their products. More than 70 percent of Taiwan’s GDP comes from international trade, and almost 90 percent of global advanced electronic chips are from Taiwan, with a digi-system of

compact firms contributing to larger corporations with a global presence.

The CCP covets the digital technologies created and fabricated in Taiwan—a success story that Beijing wants to replicate. Despite the economic power of China and its bellicose statements, Taiwan has stuck to the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which was signed with Beijing during the presidency of the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou. Not surprisingly, China has a large trade deficit with Taiwan, as bilateral trade in 2023 was around US$224 billion, with Taiwan exports around US$190 billion in 2022.

Trade with China is intertwined, as Taiwanese private investments in the mainland are estimated to be more than US$100 billion, and a few million working in factories owned by Taiwan companies.

There have been calls in Taiwan to reduce this economic overreliance on China, and to shift to places like India, Vietnam, and the Middle East. Taiwan’s multi-billion dollar investments in the software sector to manufacture digital chips in India are one instance of this shift being realized. The CCP leader, Xi Jinping, recently visited Vietnam, with whom

photo: Li Jilin A logo of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (TSMC) is seen at its headquarters in Hsinchu, Taiwan.

India -Taiwan Ties b 11

photo: World Bank Vietnamese workers process fish at a factory in Vietnam. Increasingly, multinational companies are offshoring to countries other than China.

China fought a war in 1979, and this has economic undercurrents, too. These arise from Xi’s worries that Taiwanese firms’ investments in Fujian province will be shifted to Vietnam. After all, from 1999-2002, Xi himself served as the governor of this province, located right across the strait from Taiwan.

Though it has not been a member of the United Nations since 1971, Taiwan has scrupulously adhered to conventions like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the World Health Organization (WHO), and done so voluntarily. Not being a member of the World Health Assembly (WHA), owing to obstacles put in place by China, Taiwan should be acknowledged as a follower of the rules adherent to international norms, and should at least be granted observer status in the WHA, which Beijing allowed between 2009 and 2016, when the KMT had the ROC presidency. Once the DPP regained power in 2016, China began once again obstructing Taiwan’s participation in the health body.

India needs to play a more active role regarding Taiwan’s participation at the WHA. The United States, while increasing its arms sales to Taiwan, conveniently ignores Taipei’s desire to be a member of the WHA,

despite the exceptional health care system and facilities on the island. As a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO)—albeit under the unflattering designation Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei)—the economy of Taiwan has acquiesced to trading with China, the United States, the European Union, Japan and other countries as a recognition of its difference and separateness from China. As president, Lai will have to straddle the line with caution and not make the island a theater for big powers to squabble over.

As a democracy, Taiwan shares certain values with the freedom-loving nations of the world. This is where India might come into the picture.

In terms of commercial relations, trade between India and Taiwan, both members of the WTO, is in need of being more diversified and trading arrangements made simpler, mostly from the Indian side.

Starting from bilateral trade of less than US$1 billion in the late 1990s, the bilateral commercial statistics for 2023 had reached only US$8.2 billion. As president, Lai would be advised to continue Taiwan’s New Southbound policy as implemented by his predecessor, not only for economic but also diplomatic rea-

12 b STRATEGIC VISION

photo: Danielle Rayon US and Indian servicemembers land on Kakinada Beach in assault amphibious vehicles during Exercise Tiger TRIUMPH, in India on March 29, 2024.

sons. India is a key partner in this effort as it follows its own “Act East” policy. This meeting of two broadly synergistic policies by both countries can only lead to positive benefits. Taipei’s establishment of a new TECC office in Mumbai was warmly embraced by the corporate sector, as this city is home to Asia’s oldest established stock exchange (since 1875), with a market capitalization exceeding US$4.5 trillion this year. As one of the world’s largest stock exchanges, it offers Taiwan companies with another place to float shares and debentures with very appealing returns, as evidenced by incoming investments into the world’s fifth-largest economy in GDP terms.

Education, health and advanced scientific research

at the G20 (in both GDP and PPP terms), India requires multi-faceted skills partnerships, where Taiwan is at the forefront. In broad terms, the two countries display a potential that is not yet being realized.

Since 2010, India has not employed the term “one China” in its official government documents that mention China. This has been appreciated by Taiwan, and trade investments are an indicator of how economic diplomacy is a determinant of bilateral ties.

An important aspect for both countries is to collaborate on science and technology. Taiwan’s proven scientific advances and India’s success in high-altitude technologies opens a spectrum of potential for closer cooperation with support from official levels. It is hoped that the two countries can begin to discuss a bilateral free trade agreement.

are three fields in which Taiwan will find quick reciprocity from India. Advanced technical and scientific skills for students from India with the required managerial capabilities for India’s growing small and medium enterprises focusing on computer peripherals and nano technologies will be welcomed. As a growing economy, and a voice

India and Taiwan need to move closer together.

They must create a realm where the prescient words of Chinese diplomat and philosopher Hu Shih might resonate in contemporary times: where a “graded responsibility” in which a nation’s contribution is based on its ability, strength, and geopolitical position. This applies equally to both Taiwan and India. n

Fields of reciprocity

b 13

Strategic Vision vol. 13, no. 60 (September, 2024)

Track II Showdown Competition of global narratives on display at 21st Shangri La Dialogue Hon-min Yau

G

reat powers, in addition to their material capabilities, often leverage strategic narratives to imbue international events with political significance and thereby sustain their global influence. This is particularly evident in the current geopolitical landscape, often referred to as the “new cold war,” in which both great powers, namely the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), are engaging in high-intensity competition without resorting to direct hot conflict, with each looking for non-confrontational means to expand

their political influence. If strategic competition is about the clash of political wills, by creating timely strategic narratives in international space, a great power may be able to transform the international discursive environment not only to protect its political interests but also to manage the expectations of both domestic and international audiences.

Organized by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) under the auspices of the Singapore government, the 21st Shangri La Dialogue was convened May 31 to June 2, 2024, in Singapore. It gath-

photo: Chad McNeeley US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin mreets Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the 21st Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, June 2, 2024.

Dr. Hon-min Yau is a professor of Strategic Studies at the ROC National Defense University. He can be reached at cf22517855@gmail.com

14 b STRATEGIC VISION

ered high-profile participants including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Philippines President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr., US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, PRC Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun, and many other government ministers and officials to discuss the pressing issue of global security. While the issues of the RussiaUkraine War and the Israel-Hamas conflict certainly occupied the stage, the concern of Taiwan security also became a central issue of conversation. Hence, this article intends to look into the narratives of each party in this event and understand the likely implications for the international community and Taiwan.

Dealing with global challenges In retrospect, the first Shangri La Dialogue was held in 2002 after the 911 terrorist attack with the objective of promoting dialogue to deal with global challenges.

Although the organizer, IISS, is a track II think tank, the event has always been elevated to track 1.5—or even track I—status with the support of the Singapore government, with the aim of promoting dialogue among defense officials in a non-governmental setting. Washington has participated in this event since

its inception, but Beijing has long been skeptical of such a Western-led activity, and later organized its own competing version of a security dialogue venue, the Beijing Xiangshan Forum, in 2006. By 2007, China eventually decided to participate in the Shangri La Dialogue, but its participation was often led by a lower-level military delegation.

It was not until 2011 that a PRC defense minister, Liang Guanglie, first participated in this dialogue to exemplify China’s proactive and confident participation in international affairs, as proclaimed by China’s domestic media. The activities of the Shangri La Dialogue were briefly disrupted by COVID-19 in 2020 and 2021, but once the conferences resumed in 2022 and 2023, Beijing dispatched its defense ministers, General Wei Fenghe and General Li Shangfu, respectively, to participate in the dialogues. In 2024, China finally has its first defense minister from the PLA Navy, Admiral Dong Jun, unlike most of his predecessors who originally served in either the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or the PLA Rocket Force.

Although the PLA is commanded by the Central Military Commission, China’s Ministry of National Defense serves more of a military diplomatic function, without having any actual operational command

photo: US DOD In 2019, China revealed the DF-17 hypersonic missile, with a hypersonic glider as its warhead and faster than Mach 5 with an unpredictable trajectory.

21st Shangri La Dialogue b 15

of the military. Hence, this subtle distinction has shifted the focus of this investigation from a traditional military one to a discursive perspective focusing on the employment of narratives.

For the 21st Shangri La Dialogue, the participants focused on Indo-Pacific security in general but talked particularly about the Russia-Ukraine War, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait Crisis. On the topic of Indo-Pacific security, the US defense minister pronounced that Washington’s commitment to its allies in the region is ironclad, and the US is working to reform the traditional hub-and-spokes security system into “a set of overlapping and complementary initiatives and institutions, propelled by a shared vi-

“This is unfortunate that such a big, independent, powerful country as China is an instrument in the hands of Putin.” He argued that Russia was leveraging China’s political influence to sabotage the upcoming Summit on Peace in Ukraine, which was organized

by Switzerland in mid-June in the hopes of creating new momentum for peace in Eastern Europe. Despite evidence to the contrary, Beijing has consistently held to its official line, that “we stand firmly on the side of peace and dialogue” and “never provided weapons to either party of the conflict.”

The Chinese delegation argued that, in the South China Sea, “a certain country, emboldened by outside powers, has broken bilateral agreements,” and

sion and a shared sense of mutual obligation.” The Chinese defense minister opined that these US efforts were destabilizing to the region, arguing that “small circles targeting other countries cannot make our region safer and can only cause more attention.”

In terms of the Russia-Ukraine war, Zelenskyy called China to task for its support of Russia, saying

deployment of “a mid-range missile system” in this country endangers the overall interests of the region and violates the ASEAN Charter. Responding to this thinly veiled rebuke, the Philippines president stated that the “effort to resolve maritime differences in … the South China Sea must be anchored on international law,” and while “the South China Sea is the

16 b STRATEGIC VISION

passageway for half of the world’s trade,” he argued strongly that the South China Sea is a global issue.

Although not much of any substance was discussed on the issue of the Israel-Hamas War, the Chinese participants stated that the ongoing conflict in the Middle East has created a humanitarian catastrophe, and “International fairness and justice is severely undermined by double standards” of the West. While Zelenskyy was asked about the Western hypocrisy regarding the conflict, he emphasized the danger of conflating two phases of this conflict, making it clear that “Israel has the right to defend itself,” but when, unfortunately, there is a humanitarian crisis, Ukraine is also ready to help Gaza compassionately, respect international law, and recognize both the rights of Israel and of Palestine. As discursive competitions by the great powers are ongoing in the international space, the above observations illustrate that there are two distinct interpretations of the world: that of China, and that of the West.

It is worth mentioning that cross-strait security became the central issue of the event. Although no defense officials from Taiwan were invited, some civilian scholars from Taiwanese think tanks were present, though they were barred from asking questions.

Unlike the US defense minister, who only stated that the US “supported the status quo across the Taiwan Strait,” the PRC minister devoted a large portion of his speech to criticizing the government of the Republic of China (ROC), even when the questions were about the security context of Europe and the Middle East.

Dong Jun stated that “some external interfering

well-prepared to defeat Taiwan and “It will be as easy as catching a turtle in a jar, nothing to sweat about.”

Trying to fight the PLA, Dong Jun colorfully illustrated, would be as futile as “the praying mantis that tries to block a cart with its arm.” The Chinese minister appeared confident about the PLA’s military capacity, and clearly despises Taiwan’s defense. This suggests that while China has presented no genuine intention for peace and dialogue, the cross-strait situation will remain uncertain in the coming years.

If one key element of effective communication is about knowing the perspectives of one’s audience, Dong Jun’s tough stance could be interpreted by the Western audience as evidence that the threats to security in the Taiwan Strait are more likely to derive from the conscious actions of China, and the military security challenge that the PLA poses in the region, and less from the unintended results of regional actors’ security dilemma.

forces keep hollowing out the One China principle with a salami-slicing strategy,” further arguing that “Taiwan is pursuing separation in an incremental way” and “this prospect [of peaceful reunification] is increasingly being eroded by separatists for Taiwan independence and foreign forces.” He threatened to resolve the issue by force, commenting that the PLA is

to agree to engage in genuine dialogue with the current administration in Taipei, and that the Taiwan Strait can still be seen within the context of a great power game. In addition, even though the Chinese defense minister has no actual power or control over the PLA, Dong Jun should not be considered a mere ceremonial figure in China’s military diplomacy, but

Double-duty message On the other hand, Dong Jun’s message was no doubt received positively by the Chinese domestic audience, which exists within its own social-media universe.

As such, Dong Jun’s message may have been crafted to serve double-duty; as a discursive deterrent to the West, yet reaffirming and rallying domestic political support for his government at home. In addition, there was a slim market for Dong Jun’s threatening message in Taiwan, suggesting that it was not mere dialogue but a strategic narrative with manipulative intent. This suggests that PRC leaders are unlikely

21st Shangri La Dialogue b 17

photo: Chad McNeeley Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin meets with Gen. Wei Fenghe, China’s defense minister, at a defense ministers’ meeting in Siem Reap, Cambodia, in 2022.

rather as more of an official spokesman for China’s national security posture.

The events that transpired at the 21st Shangri La Dialogue indicate that, amid the current fragile global order, the Chinese Communist Party is seriously invested in establishing its own strategic narrative, even to the point of actively participating in an international event organized by the West, of which Beijing harbors deep suspicions. Likewise, small and medium-sized countries, like the Philippines and Ukraine, continue to endeavor to call global attention to their issues in major international media outlets.

However, the danger of inconsistency in messaging could also backfire in a yet-interconnected global media environment. One incident was when the PLA commandant of the International College of Defence Studies, Major General Xu Hui, argued that Ukraine

of the noble justification for defending oneself from aggressors. This also suggests that if one’s messaging is not genuine, and based on principle, there will always be cases of contradictions, and the risk of damaging one’s credibility.

At the 21st Shangri La Dialogue, the US defense secretary urged that “dialogue is not a reward; it’s a necessity,” and the US and Chinese defense chiefs did have an opportunity for a private meeting in Singapore. Still, the event was not a forum for forging consensus and enhancing dialogue, and unfortunately it became a space for strategic narratives with the rhetoric of threat and language of intimidation. The 21st Shangri La Dialogue also served as a barometer to indicate the status of Indo-Pacific security, and it is expected that the region will continue to face more instability.

should stop fighting to the last man, as this merely serves American interests. His speech caused great disagreements even among Chinese audiences, as it goes against Mao Tse-tung’s criticism of the logic of “To fight is to perish, not to fight is to survive” in his 1939 article titled “Oppose Capitulationist Activity,” which the great helmsman argued strongly in favor

This development means that while Taiwan’s military is relatively small compared to China’s, there is no security dilemma over the Taiwan Strait; only a security challenge for Taiwan. It will be crucial for Taipei to continuously improve the nation’s defense capacity, for this is the only wany for Taiwan to discourage Xi Jinping from making a fatal miscalculation. n

18 b

Strategic Vision vol. 13, no. 60 (September, 2024)

Trans-Pacific Goals New administration brings impetus to Taiwan’s bid for CPTPP membership Li Ming-Cheng

R

epublic of China (ROC) President Lai Ching-te noted in his May 20, 2024, inauguration speech that Taiwan had officially submitted an application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and would “continue to actively engage in regional economic integration.” To accomplish this goal, the new administration will have to put emphasis on aiding Taiwanese enterprises in broadening their global reach and markets.

Lai aims to actively seek bilateral investment agreements with democratic nations across the globe and

enhance trade relations. This is in direct alignment with the goals of Lai’s predecessor, former President Tsai Ing-wen, as outlined in her New Southbound Policy.

The fundamental economic pathway for Taiwan to find acceptance into the CPTPP by its member countries is for Taipei to build upon its record as a responsible member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as to showcase its current efforts via the New Southbound Policy. This article discusses how Taipei might draw insights from its involvement in the WTO to mitigate the obstacles and complexi-

photo: ROC Presidential Office Taiwan’s new President Lai Ching-te delivers his inaugural speech in Taipei, Taiwan on May 20, 2024.

Li Ming-Cheng holds an MA from ROC National Defense University and serves as a radio engineer in the Air Force in Taiwan. She can be reached for comment at a0980050183@gmail.com

Taiwan and the CPTPP b 19

graphic: Congressional Research Service

ties associated with joining the CPTPP. Moreover, it will analyze the many time periods linked to the objectives of the New Southbound Policy in order to achieve for Taiwan a multifaceted presence in the international community. Ultimately, this leads to a final determination and recommendation about the endeavor of joining the CPTPP.

The WTO is the exclusive global international agency tasked with overseeing and enforcing trade regulations. Established in 1995, this organization currently has a membership of 164 countries, together repre-

ing the knowledge and skills of developing nations in matters related to international trade.

The ROC government prioritizes issues concerning the development of the multilateral trade system established by the WTO. Since becoming a member economy of the WTO, Taiwan has actively engaged in the Doha rounds of international negotiations.

Through the application of WTO regulations, Taipei has successfully eradicated obstacles to trade while simultaneously enhancing trade and economic ties with other WTO member countries. As one of the top 20 global trading economies, Taiwan is required to reassess its trade policies every five years in accordance with the revised regulations of the WTO. In addi-

senting over 98 percent of global trade. Taiwan acceded to the WTO in 2002. The primary functions of the WTO involve engaging in negotiations to decrease or remove barriers to trade, establishing rules for international trade, examining the trade policies of member countries to ensure transparency in regional and bilateral trade agreements, and enhanc-

tion, Taiwan has actively engaged in the Trade Policy Review (TPR) meetings of other member countries.

Through participation in these TPR meetings, Taiwan has gained a comprehensive understanding of the trade policy orientations of those other members, thereby facilitating the expansion of the global business prospects for various Taiwanese industries.

The WTO

20 b STRATEGIC VISION

photo: ROC Presidential Office Former President Tsai Ing-wen meets with Robert Nault, Chair of Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Countries like the United States, Japan, Australia, and India have implemented Indo-Pacific policies geared toward countering China’s growing influence.

Beijing has enhanced its technologies, infrastructure, and economic sectors to strengthen its sovereignty.

The New Southbound Policy, initiated by Tsai in 2016, aims to enhance relations with Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania through economic collaboration and regional advancement. Taiwan has implemented measures like visa facilitation and investment incentives to support the policy. However, Taiwan must expand its significance to protect regional security through the Indo-Pacific strategy. This strategy focuses on maintaining peace, stability, and prosperity in the region through cooperation and partnerships.

Future presidents should extend the strategy to other areas, such as law enforcement cooperation and information exchange, and involve more countries with shared interests throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

The objectives in New Southbound Policy can be categorized into two phases: general and long-term goals, as well as short- and mid-term goals. Taiwan’s overall goals include a focus on the long term, as

well as forging robust economic, trade, scientific, technological, and cultural ties with South Asia, New Zealand, Australia, and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

“Examining Taiwan’s record as a twodecade-long member of the WTO reveals its commitment to developing a comprehensive trade policy in order to collaborate with fellow members.”

The policy is designed to promote the exchange of resources, skills, and market growth to cultivate an economic community, as well as to implement efficient negotiation protocols and address associated matters in order to cultivate trust and a communal atmosphere. Regarding the short- and mid-term aims, the concept proposes a combination of national resolve, governmental incentives, and commercial opportunities to promote economic and trade relations, investment, tourism, culture, and talent. The recommendation includes the implementation of a New Southbound strategy, the promotion of skill

Taiwan and the CPTPP b 21

development, and the strengthening of international and bilateral negotiation for economic cooperation.

By its very nature, all this effort lays a solid foundation for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in a trade bloc such as the CPTPP—one that encompasses countries in both Asia and the Americas. Japan has taken over leadership of the grouping, which was first led by the United States before the latter dropped out under the Trump administration.

The CPTPP The CPTPP consists of 12 nations that collectively contribute to 15 percent of the global gross domestic product (GDP). The CPTPP can be viewed as an extensive free trade agreement that comprises various aspects such as trade in goods, rules of origin, trade remedy measures, health sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical trade barriers, service trade, intellectual property rights, government procure-

ment, and competition policy. In 2021, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) submitted an application to join the group before Taiwan, with a difference of less than a week. However, both applications are currently pending and have not been processed. The PRC has expressed its opposition to Taiwan’s application. The provisions of the CPTPP require countries to eliminate or reduce tariffs, make robust commitments to opening services and investment markets, and adhere to regulations concerning competition, intellectual property rights, and protections for foreign companies.

These requirements would pose a significant challenge for Beijing. Undoubtedly, given the PRC’s official stance on the difficulties of entering the CPTPP, Beijing will actively explore all potential avenues to prevent Taiwan from joining. China’s substantial market size and abundant resources exert a sizeable impact on the members of CPTPP, in some cases creating an economic dependency, and hence a point of

photo: Prachatai On March 8, 2018, the CPTPP was signed in Santiago, Chile. The free trade agreement now involves a dozen countries in the Pacific region.

22 b STRATEGIC VISION

leverage that Beijing has proven it is all too willing to exploit to achieve its political and strategic goals.

China can therefore be expected to employ any and all economic and political means as a strategic approach to exert influence over those members to, among other things, thwart Taiwan’s participation in any international groupings such as the CPTPP.

Apprehensions regarding China The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has affirmed its commitment to supporting applicants that are willing to meet the rigorous requirements for membership in the CPTPP in 2021, recognizing China’s political influence on the economy.

Japan and the United Kingdom, in addition to New Zealand, have expressed apprehensions regarding China’s true commitment to international standards.

Japan is concerned about China’s progress in technology and its efforts to secure its economy, while the UK is worried about Beijing’s lack of adherence to

important matters. Lee Hsien Loong, former prime minister of Singapore, has expressed the view that China’s involvement in the bloc could be advantageous, provided it adheres to the established criteria.

Examining Taiwan’s record as a two-decade-long member of the WTO reveals its commitment to developing a comprehensive trade policy in order to collaborate with fellow members. Meanwhile, Taiwan periodically reviews its trade policy every five years to align with present conditions, in compliance with the regulations of the WTO. Taipei demonstrates its willingness to conform to the standards of the CPTPP by undertaking a systematic review of its trade policies. To clarify, Taiwan places a high importance on its advanced domestic economy and market economy as a viable and competitive option. The ROC government has already undertaken a thorough assessment and made amendments to 11 laws in accordance with the official language of the CPTPP, thus ensuring compliance with international market norms.

Like its membership in the WTO, Taipei’s New

photo: Chris Linnett Taiwan has been a member in good standing of the WTO since joining the international trade body in 2002.

Taiwan and the CPTPP b 23

photo: ROC Presidential Office ROC Vice President Chen Chien-jen meets with Maan Amin of the Indonesian Council of Islamic Religious Scholars to discuss the New Southbound Policy.

Southbound Policy is an outward- and forwardlooking effort to better integrate Taiwan into the global economy, and hence evidence of its readiness to become a contributing member of the CPTPP. The objective of the New Southbound Policy is to foster stronger relationships with Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania through economic cooperation and regional progress. This aligns with the bilateral or multilateral aims of meeting the criteria of the CPTPP. Through the implementation of various initiatives of the New Southbound Policy, Taiwan can enhance its diplomatic relations with member countries, thereby improving its reputation and increasing the likelihood of being accepted as a member of the CPTPP.

Taiwan and Canada. In addition, Taiwan has made diligent efforts to participate in informal negotiations with the 11 members of the CPTPP, as stipulated in Article 2.2 of the current CPTPP Accession Process, which outlines the steps that applicant nations must undertake in order to attain membership. To date, Taiwan has actively participated in direct discussions with influential figures in CPTPP member countries that are more receptive to Taiwan’s admission, such as Japan and Canada. Given that Australia and New Zealand are also partners of the New Southbound Policy, Taipei must exert additional efforts in order to secure agreements from these countries for its entry into the CPTPP. Taiwan is also interested in engaging in a transparent dialogue on economic collaboration with the UK in order to support Taiwan’s

Canadian chairmanship

membership.

In essence, Taiwan must remain persistent in its efforts to secure membership in the CPTPP, despite the challenges posed by China’s opposition and the need to meet the stringent standards set by CPTPP regulations, in order to obtain the assent of existing members. n

Canada is currently undertaking the role of chair of the CPTPP Commission during 2024. The current stance has sparked positive dialogues regarding the possibility of Taiwan’s inclusion in the grouping, given the robust economic and trade ties between

24 b

Strategic Vision vol. 13, no. 60 (September, 2024)

A Global Issue

China-Taiwan relations internationalize in the wake of Taiwan’s 2024 elections Tobias Burgers

I

n the first part of this analysis, published in volume 12, number 58, we examined how Taiwan, under the then Tsai Ing-wen government, successfully managed to transition the crossstrait conflict from a conflict between two nations into a geopolitical, technological, and economic conflict, with strategic importance for the entire Asian region, and even beyond. It was this internationalization of the Taiwan issue, more so than the outcome of the 2024 elections, that shaped the strategic envi-

ronment for China in the cross-strait conflict. As a result of this internationalization, any actions taken by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will likely receive a far greater response than just a Taiwanese one. Herein lies the effectiveness of this internationalization effort by Taiwan: Rather than having a dimensional dynamic between the two nations, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) now faces a multidimensional environment in its engagements with Taiwan, in which its actions will be subject to addi-

photo: Braden Trudeau Servicemen aboard HMCS Montreal (FFH-336) conduct hoist drills with a CH-148 Cyclone. The Montreal transited the Taiwan Strait in August 2024.

Dr. Tobias Burgers is an assistant professor at the Social Studies faculty, Fulbright University Vietnam and a fellow at the Cyber Civilization Research Center, Keio University.

Cross-Strait Relations b 25

tional scrutiny by an array of actors, including the United States, Japan, South Korea, and possibly the Philippines and the European Union.

Indeed, escalatory actions such as an attempt by the PLA to invade the main island of Taiwan would be subject to an international political backlash, economic sanctions, or even military intervention. This leaves China with a narrow set of strategic options vis-à-vis the cross-strait conflict: It is evident the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) economic and political efforts—its charm offensive, if you will—have failed to achieve their aims, leaving a military means as the sole alternative. However, as described above, military options carry significant consequences and risks. Therefore, the million-dollar questions might not be about how China will react to the new administration of Lai Ching-te, but rather how it will respond to this newly limited strategic environment.

Given this strategic environment, the expectation is that China will continue to employ grey zone tactics, albeit in an escalatory pattern, while maintaining the escalation dominance. Under current international conditions—the election of Donald Trump could be a significant game changer, for example—the application of this strategic framework would yield China the greatest benefit, and therefore it is likely to be continued, despite the new DPP government.

The purpose of this strategic approach is two-fold.

First, to gradually limit Taiwan’s ability to operate economically, politically, and militarily, and to effec-

forts will take place across the economic domain, as well as the political and military domain, with the overall sum of illustrating to Taiwanese society that the pain of remaining independent would be significantly higher than the pain of being integrated into the people’s republic.

There are already noticeable examples of such approaches when considering the arguments made by the legislative caucus convener of the Kuomintang (KMT), Fu Kun-chi, to the effect that a conflict with China would effectively limit Taiwan’s economic prosperity. China has long made similar efforts to conduct geo-economic grey zone tactics by using economic incentives, but increasingly, a mixture of political, juridical, and economic actions are being implemented, such as the abrogation of that tacit median line in the Taiwan Strait, to the changing of flight paths and heavily increasing military patrols around Taiwan and its outlying islands, such as Kinmen.

There have also been a number of PRC espionage balloons spotted floating across the main island; renewed efforts to poach the Republic of China’s (ROC) few remaining international allies; stringent objections against parliamentary visits by foreign dignitaries; sanctions against Taiwanese products; the list goes on. China is using a broad array of means to further shrink Taiwan’s civil and international space and limit Taipei’s ability to function as a de facto state.

In this effort, Beijing is walking a tightrope with this strategic approach: it must increase the pressure across multiple domains while ensuring that the threshold of actual violent conflict, such as wounded soldiers or fatalities, is not crossed. The benefit

tively restrict and reduce the existing limbo in which Taiwan currently conducts its functions of statehood.

The aim here would be to convince Taiwanese society that the costs of maintaining the country’s de facto independence are higher and possibly intolerable, vis-à-vis any costs the Taiwanese would have to pay should the island become part of China. Such ef-

of such dynamics is that it allows China to avoid a military escalation while simultaneously challenging the ROC government to contest Chinese efforts to increase its control, thereby, in essence, challenging the ROC government to defend its political control over islands like Kinmen and Matsu.

Here, we can observe how China skillfully seeks

Dual purpose

26 b STRATEGIC VISION

photo: Alexandria Esteban A sonar technician stands watch on the bridge of the guided-missile destroyer USS Rafael Peralta (DDG 115) during a transit through the Taiwan Strait.

to maintain the escalation dominance that enforces the dynamics of challenging Taiwan. The purpose of this escalation dominance is two-fold and highlights the internationalization of the cross-strait conflict.

Namely, by maintaining escalation dominance and effectively dictating how and by what means Taiwan’s economic, military, and political space is increasingly pressured, China ensures that its secondary audience—the nations that, over the course of the last five years, have become engaged in the crossstrait conflict—observe China increasing its pressure, while keeping that pressure below the threshold that would justify an armed response. It is worth keeping in mind that China aims to ensure that, in this internationalized conflict, international public opinion in support of Taiwan remains in check.

A full-scale invasion would undoubtedly evoke a strong response from Taiwan’s allies. However, attempts to limit the sea and airspace of Taiwan and slowly change its political statehood across its outlying islands are thin slices of the salami, and therefore less likely to provoke much of a response. Here, we

observe how China is mindful of its second audience in its conflict with Taiwan: Grey zone strategies will continue, as they are designed to ensure that any increases in pressure against Taiwan remain below the threshold that would trigger a possible response from any foreign actors.

Hesitant and cautious This avoidance of further internationalization might be feasible for China. On the one hand, international actors are increasing their perceived stakes in the cross-strait conflict, as outlined in part one of this series. Still, these same actors are hesitant and cautious about their engagement with China over the cross-strait issue, particularly when it comes to the aforementioned outlying islands.

The situation surrounding these islands and their unique characteristics are generally not well known to the broader public outside of Taiwan, and it remains to be seen whether any foreign actors would be willing to risk an escalatory cycle to defend

Cross-Strait Relations b 27

the ROC’s sovereignty over these outlying islands, some located less than two miles from China.

It is through this approach that the PRC is creating a second narrative, which is equally one in which doubt is the central variable. Whereas the first narrative aims to create doubt in Taiwan society about the ability of the ROC state to safeguard its de facto statehood, the second focus is on building a narrative in which any foreign actors, and in particular their domestic societies, have doubts about how worthwhile it would be to aid Taiwan by intervening militarily in any potential conflict. Due to the limited visibility of the outlying islands, their proximity to China, and the high levels of pro-China sentiment among the populations of these islands, in the absence of violence and casualties, few nations would be willing to risk a conflict with the PLA over them.

Grey zone campaign The sum of these approaches is that leaders in Beijing understand the strategic environment that they are currently facing. Military invasions are unlikely to result in positive gains, as evidenced by Russian efforts in Ukraine. Observing this quagmire, Beijing appears to have doubled down on an increasingly aggressive grey zone campaign; one most easily practiced around the outlying islands. Whether this is intended merely to harass leaders in Taiwan and sow fear and doubt among the Taiwanese people, or whether the CCP intends to wrench political control of these small islands away from Taipei, only Beijing knows. Through more minor actions—such as unilaterally changing the civilian M503 flight path and introducing two new routes, W122 and W123, dangerously close to Taiwan’s Flight Information Region; increasing overflights over the outlying islands; and an increase in so-called law enforcement patrols in the wake of a February incident in which two Chinese nationals died after their incursion into Taiwanese

waters near Kinmen led to a conflict with the ROC Coast Guard—China is seeking to impose its jurisdiction over these waters, and by default also these islands.

Effectively, China seeks to create new norms of what is acceptable in the Taiwan Strait, with each step aiming to move existing norms into new types of norms and behavior that favor China, and then finally daring other actors—be it Taiwan or another foreign actor—to challenge these new norms. This is not solely a matter of geographical and legal control (over these islands and their surrounding waters), but it is equally a component of the CCP’s cognitive operations that seek to develop a belief within Taiwanese society that the ROC state is not able to protect its citizens, thereby creating a further narrative that could contribute to the perception of a declining legitimacy for statehood.

Effectively, if the outlying islands were to slip into China’s orbit, this would corner the ROC, and force the Lai government to either protect its current de facto statehood across these outlying islands, or focus solely on the protection of the main island.

In either case, it is hard to see how Taiwan could gain from this situation. Armed conflict is not in Taipei’s interests, but equally damaging would be the loss of these islands, and the attendant perception that the ROC cannot defend its territory. Thus, while the internationalization of the cross-strait conflict has contributed to the overall standing of Taiwan over the last half decade, it now faces an adversary that is equally aware of the dynamics across the Taiwan Strait, and that has developed a response to Taiwan’s internationalization efforts.

What is now necessary is for Taiwan to develop a further approach to counter China’s ongoing efforts: one that builds further on the internationalization strategy, but that equally understands that the greatest threats—at least in the short term— might be extremely localized. n

Visit our website:

https://taiwancss.org/strategic-vision/