22 b STRATEGIC VISION
the former head of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the de facto US embassy. Speaking in a personal capacity, William Stanton cited the success and frequency of spying cases as serving to “undermine US confidence in security cooperation with Taiwan.” Last but not least, PRC spies have been uncovered from a wide spectrum of military backgrounds. From generals and retired officers to low-ranking personnel from the air force, navy, and army: the PRC has been successful in recruiting spies from all levels of Taiwan’s defense community. The broad scope of this problem raises difficult questions about the identity and loyalty of Taiwan’s military members. According to the NSB, a wide range of espionage cases exhibiting a diversity of techniques were uncovered between 1993 and 2013, including three which occurred in the United States and the United Kingdom. For those cases uncovered in Taiwan, one important aspect of turning an agent was found to be the use of personalized networks of influence, or guanxi, which is a defining feature of traditional Chinese social i nte r a c t i on , and one which still serves an
the importance of guanxi and has utilized it effectively in its espionage campaign against Taiwan. Peter Mattis, a US expert in the study of Chinese espionage and editor of the Jamestown Foundation’s
important purpose in contemporary society in both Taiwan and China. By building trust and friendship, individuals can strengthen their social networks to the point where guanxi connections can sometimes become more important than official channels. The PRC recognizes
Taiwan. In 2008, Taiwan’s government decide to lift the ban on tourist from China and allowed them to visit in small, organized tour groups. After 2011, Chinese were allowed to visit Taiwan freely, apart from controlled tour groups like the one that the tourist Ma walked
“Raising awareness and increasing general understanding of espionage activity is the first step toward bolstering defenses against hostile espionage activity.” China Brief, has described PRC espionage cases in Taiwan as the “control type” rather than the “mosaic” or examples of the “thousand grains of sand” approach. In contrast to the use of a controlled agent, the thousand grains of sand approach to espionage seeks to use a large number of individuals, each of whom collects just a small bit of information. These small pieces of the puzzle are assembled together to form a larger, and clearer, picture of the target. Unfortunately, this kind of approach is also being used in