12 b STRATEGIC VISION
many disputed islands in the region’s littoral—and contributing to regional polarization and the risk of an arms race. The nuclear test has pushed South Korea and Japan ever closer into the US security orbit. Internationally, the fallout of the test will be felt as far as the Middle East, with indications that the regime has been assisting Iran with its own nuclear weapons program, under the auspices of a scientific and technological cooperation agreement signed in September opening the door to technology transfers. Indeed, the Washington Times reported that Iranian scientists may have been present at Punggye-ri this month to witness the test.
According to North Korea’s official news agency, “the test was conducted in a safe and perfect way on a high level, with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb, unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power.” Initial estimates from the South Korean defence ministry put the explosive yield at the equivalent of six to seven kilotons, according to analysis of seismic data. This is significantly higher than the two previous tests and, coupled with the assertion of miniaturization, could indicate a shift from the use of plutonium, such as in 2006 and 2009, to highly enriched uranium. If so, it implies a technological leap forward to a new and self-sustaining nuclear weapons program in Pyongyang. The regime unveiled uranium enrichment activity at its Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center— and experts suggest uranium may also be in produc-
equipment and techniques for enriching uranium are much easier to hide—as well as to transfer—than those for plutonium, owing to the use of centrifuge cascades rather than the need for an entire reactor. American officials believe that North Korea has only enough plutonium for between six and 10 bombs. The ability to enrich weapons-grade uranium, however, would give the Kim regime a substantially larger potential nuclear arsenal, to say nothing of the possibility of selling the equipment and technology to rogue states and non-state actors. In order to confirm these suspicions, both the United States and Japan have employed “sniffer” planes—aircraft equipped with specialized gear to collect radioactive gases in the atmosphere for forensic examination. Thus far, no Xenon isotopes were detected, as they were after the 2006 detonation. However, such traces are difficult to detect, and the absence of results so far are far from conclusive. Whatever the short-term implications of this latest nuclear test, one thing remains clear: Pyongyang has every intention of conducting further such controlled explosions and of continuing work on delivery systems, including further rocket launches—perhaps within months. The Kim regime informed Beijing as much after the third test. “It’s all ready,” an anonymous source with knowledge of the communication told the Reuters news agency. “A fourth and fifth nuclear test and a rocket launch could be conducted soon, possibly this year.” According to David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security, North Korea is probably already capable of mounting a plutonium-
tion at other secret facilities in the hermit kingdom— in 2010 during a visit by foreign scientists. If the program has achieved efficiency of the weaponization stage, it would have dire implications for the international non-proliferation regime and global security. Uranium is perhaps the easiest and best fissile material with which to construct a dirty bomb, and the
based warhead on its Nodong short-range missile, which can reach targets up to 800 miles distant. The tests referred to by the Pyongyang official will likely be used to demonstrate the North’s growing capabilities not only in miniaturization and weaponizing fissile material, but in developing delivery systems capable of hitting targets farther afield. n
Technological leap