9781850659730

THE BORDERS OF ISLAM

The Borders of Islam Exploring Huntington’s Faultlines, from Al-Andalus to the Virtual Ummah

Edited by

Stig Jarle Hansen, Atle Mesøy, Tuncay Kardas

HURST & COMPANY, LONDON

First published in the United Kingdom by C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 41 Great Russell Street, London, WC1B 3PL © Stig Jarle Hansen, Atle Mesøy, Tuncay Kardas and the Contributors, 2009 All rights reserved.

Printed in India The right of Stig Jarle Hansen, Atle Mesøy and Tuncay Kardas and the Contributors to be identified as the authors of this publication is asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988.

A Cataloguing-in-Publication data record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBNs 978–1–85065–972–3 hardback 978–1–85065–973–0 paperback www.hurstpub.co.uk

Contents Preface and Acknowledgements Stig Jarle Hansen, Atle Mesøy, Tuncay Kardas

vii

Introduction: Huntington and “Islam’s bloody borders” Stig Jarle Hansen, Atle Mesøy, Tuncay Kardas

1

Region I: Asia and the Middle East: Borders at the Centre of Islam?

Stig Jarle Hansen

15

Chapter 1: Israel/Palestine—Multiple Agendas and Division Lines Andrew Rigby and Jørgen Johansen

23

Chapter 2: Lebanon—Between “Clash” and Coexistence Hicham Bou Nassif Chapter 3: Afghanistan—“Friction” between Civilizations Antonio Giustozzi

35 51

Chapter 4: Pakistan—Have the Chickens Come Home to Roost?

Kavita Khory Chapter 5: Indonesia—The Radicalization of Islam Kirsten Schulze

65 83

Chapter 6: Philippines—“Civilizational” or Colonial Border?

Ben Reid

99

Stig Jarle Hansen

111

Chapter 7: Nigeria—Islamist Activism and Religious Conflicts Sakah Mahmud

115

Chapter 8: Somalia—Grievance, Religion, Clan, and Profit Stig Jarle Hansen

127

Region II: Africa, the Crescent of Islam

v

contents Chapter 9: Ethiopia—On the Borders of Christianity

Terje Østebø

139

Chapter 10: Sudan—Trying to Understand its “Multiple Marginality” Gérard Prunier Region III: The “Old” European Border Stig Jarle Hansen

155 169

Chapter 11: Chechnya—How War Makes Jihad

James Hughes

173

Chapter 12: Turkey—Secularism, Islam and the EU Tuncay Kardas

191

Chapter 13: Bosnia—Religion and Identity

Svein Mønnesland

211

Chapter 14: Spain—The Al Andalus Legacy

Elena Arigita

223

Atle Mesøy

235

Chapter 15: Britain—Rejecting Western Modernity?

Dominique Thomas

239

Chapter 16: France—The Clash of Civilizations?

Farhad Khosrokhavar

249

Chapter 17: Scandinavia—Alienation or Integration?

Atle Mesøy and Stig Jarle Hansen

261

Chapter 18: The United States of America—American Muslim Exceptionalism Allen D. Hertzke

271

Stephen Ulph

289

Stig Jarle Hansen and Atle Mesøy

309

Region IV: The New Borders

Chapter 19: A Virtual Border Conflict Conclusion Glossary Endnotes Contributors Index

vi

317 321 377 381

Preface and Acknowledgements This volume seeks to offer the reader a systematic, critical, in-depth investigation of some of the most important states that are situated on what Samuel P. Huntington defined as “Islam’s bloody borders”. There is a great need to go beyond the media headlines in order to understand the political, cultural, ideological, and religious factors that influence political dynamics on the so-called borders of Islam. The Borders of Islam explores how religion influences conflicts, insurgency and politics in the twenty countries that have been chosen for in-depth studies.

The book is the product of a large collective effort by all the contributors, as well as commentators from all around the world. We would like to convey our deepest thanks to all the researchers who have given their valuable input and comments, as well as the Norwegian Research Council that supported the copy-editing process. We would also like to thank the many interviewees who discussed with our contributors the themes addressed. Last but not least, we would like to thank our publisher, Michael Dwyer—you have been incredibly patient.

Stig Jarle Hansen Atle Mesøy Tuncay Kardas

Oslo, October 2008

vii

INTRODUCTION

Huntington and “Islam’s bloody borders” Stig Jarle Hansen, Atle Mesøy, Tuncay Kardas

What is the clash?

In recent years the expression/theory “clash of civilizations” has been used frequently in the media, often referring to conflicts involving Islam.1 The examples of incidents interpreted as signs of a clash of civilizations are many.

Theo van Gogh, the Dutch film maker, was for example killed by a radical violent Islamist because he produced a movie with a critical perspective on gender equality and Islam.2 The killer, Moroccan-born Mohammed Bouyeri, declared the murder to be part of a holy war, a war of religions.3 The expression “clash of civilizations” was first used to describe the relationship between a supposedly western civilization and Islamic civilization in Bernard Lewis’ 1990 article “The Roots of Muslim Rage”.4 However, it became most associated with Samuel P. Huntington who employed the term in an article published in 1993 in Foreign Affairs.5 According to Huntington, future conflicts will increasingly be ignited by cultural and religious issues.6 Huntington followed this in 1996 with the book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. He described Islam as being the most conflict-prone civilization. Moreover, Huntington claimed that the borders of Islamic civilization and the rest of the world, “Islam’s bloody borders”, were filled with war and conflict that supposedly proved his point.7 1

the borders of islam While there have been several quantitative research projects examining his thesis, systematic in-depth case studies of the various border zones of the civilizations have been lacking. This book systematically examines the border zones of Islamic civilization by investigating whether events and local dynamics in these border zones contribute to a global confrontation between Islamic and surrounding civilizations.8 Studying cases from a wide range of countries such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Bangladesh, Chechnya, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Spain, and Turkey, the book goes beyond solely examining the dynamics of confrontation in the areas physically bordering Islamic civilization, by also studying the new border areas created by patterns of emigration. Islamic enclaves in traditional Christian or secular societies such as the United Kingdom, France, Scandinavia and the United States are explored. Lastly, it studies the new global border, the Internet, as Huntington focused on increased communication contributing to a civilizational discourse, by making civilizational communication easier as geographical distance becomes a less important barrier to communication.

The thesis Huntington’s thesis is, in short, that future conflicts will increasingly be between what he calls “civilizations”.9 Civilizations are according to him “defined both by objective elements, such as language, history, religion, institutions and by the subjective self-identification of people”. Although religion is only one out of many defining criteria of a Huntingtonian civilization, and although the borders of what he defines as civilizational entities and the world religions at times are different, he names three civilizations according to world religions, the Orthodox, Hindu and Islamic civilizations.10 In 1993 and 1996, when he wrote his major articles, Huntington claimed that religion and religious identity are becoming more prominent as political factors.11 Huntington suggested that the importance of religious cleavages will rise because of the increased contacts and interaction between the different parts of the world.12 Through the information technology revolution, religious and political groups have increased their ability to disseminate information and communicate across borders. For Huntington, this communication in turn weakens local identities and traditions; in consequence, broader identities, such as religious identities, will become strengthened.13 Old values and beliefs are constantly being challenged by new impulses, what were previously believed to be sacred 2

introduction values are desecrated, and relativism is spreading. To Huntington this may be one of the reasons why people are searching for religious answers with the comfort and foundational beliefs these environments can promise.14 Samuel Huntington, supported by notable scholars commenting upon Islam in particular, such as Gilles Kepel, claims that religion gives a sense of belonging in the modern world, filled with people moving between classes, countries, and even families.15 Huntington’s “clash” is thus not only a result of differences between ancient civilizations and religions; it is equally a result of the factors that dominate the modern world, and of modernity itself. Some of the most important ideologies and belief systems, that act as alternatives to religion, are also in decline. Capitalism has its problems, and many fail to believe in the solution offered by the free market. Nationalism, the worship of the state and the nation, was undermined not least by critical scholarship attacking the perception of some kind of primordial foundation of the state, and even the justification of the state itself.16 Communism was discredited because of the fall of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the collapse of the Soviet empire led to the rise of the local ally of the United States in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia. It crucially removed the many obstacles, such as Soviet support for Baathist/Marxist regimes in the Middle East, and a possible ideological counterbalance that hindered Saudi Arabia from spreading radical texts and missionaries around the world. Additionally, the collapse of the Soviet Union was used by extremists to demonstrate that a superpower could be destroyed by militant Islamic networks, focusing on the role the war in Afghanistan had supposedly played in this collapse.17 Secular Pan-Arabism/Baathism had been severely discredited by the failure of Nasser’s Egyptian regime to fight wars with Israel efficiently, after the huge losses in the 1967 war, which sparked a revival of religiously-based militant movements.18 Last, the weakening of the state might accelerate developments leading to a clash of civilizations, as loyalty towards the state weakens, and the state becomes less able to govern its citizens, there is ideological space for civilisational loyalties.

Huntington points to the borders of one specific civilization, defined by religion, namely the Islamic, as particularly problematic. Building on Ted Gurr’s quantitative studies of ethnopolitical conflicts, he draws the conclusion that Muslims in the early 1990’s were engaged in more inter-group violence than non-Muslims.19 Although Huntington argues that Islam was spread with the sword and that it glorifies militaristic virtues,20 he does not claim that these values of Islam created most of the conflicts in the past, but rather that the values, in combination with the effects of modernity and of 3

the borders of islam demographics, will spark conflict in the future. He also emphasises that the vast demographic growth of Muslims21 and the fact that many Muslims are young and unemployed as having the potential to spark conflicts. The combination of the above factors will, according to Huntington, create conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims. Huntington employed the expression “Islam’s bloody borders” to illustrate the effect.22 To Huntington there are three types of civilizational conflicts: those between states that are dominant in each civilization (core states), international fault line conflicts, (those between two states on the fault line of a civilizational border), and finally, domestic fault line conflicts, taking place within a single state. This book will analyse the second and third versions of supposedly civilizational conflicts on the borders of Islam; it seeks to explore the political and conflict dynamics of what Huntington defines as “Islam’s bloody borders”, to examine the role of religion, and of Islam in particular.

Several newer, quantitative (statistical) studies have seemingly underlined the increased centrality of Islam in conflict. Monica Duffy Toft demonstrates how rebel groups who identified with Islam were far more involved in religious civil wars, and that religious wars were longer and more intense.23 Andrej Tusicisny claims that: “the Islamic civilization remains the most conflictprone”.24 Tanya Ellingsen suggests that the importance of religion has grown after the Cold War, and that increased religiosity makes intra-state conflict more probable. Ellingsen underlines that the economic conditions and the regime type of the country in question are key elements.25 Fox maintains that after 2002, following the Iranian Revolution, religion has been an element in the majority of all domestic conflicts that meet the definition of state failure.26 He also shows however, that Muslims are statistically more likely to fight with other Muslims than with members of other religions, thus that religion and civilization are not always overlapping. Furthermore he illustrates the crudeness of the term “civilization”, which is used to join together several religious sub-groups, for civilizational entities that Huntington emphasized were strongly influenced by religion (the Islamic); and entities in which religion played a minor part (the African).

Cleavages and flexibility Religious differences within Islam have been the theme of another group of Huntington’s critics. Halliday, Beedham, Yamazaki, Walt, Gurr, Sen, Kader, 4

introduction Heilbrunner, Rocecrance, and Tipson, all argue that civilizations, including the Islamic, are divided by internal cleavages.27 They are supported by statistical analyses conducted by Fox and Sandler.28 Islam is divided, as are all world religions. The conflict between the respective belligerents in a leadership struggle within Islam that resulted in two different interpretations of Islam, Sunni and Shia, has continued up to this day, and has played a major role in later wars. It was a factor in driving Iran into becoming a de facto ally of the US when the latter intervened in Afghanistan in 2001. The American-led Northern Alliance received support as well as military advisors from Iran, partly because of the Afghan Taliban regime’s persecution of Shias.29 Moreover, the Sunni/Shia divide has fuelled civil wars in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. The Sunnis too are divided: different legal schools, based on the works of Muhammed al-Shafi, Malik ibn Annas, Abu Hanfa and Ahmad ibn Hanbal, were established in the seventh and eighth centuries. Sufism, another, often quietist, strand of Islam, also developed.30 The divisions between the various Sunni law schools, Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanafi and Hanbali are on their own not major: traditionally all of the law schools accept the legitimacy of their rivals. Sufism was also in general accepted as a part of Islam. This was to change within the Hanafi school of thought when Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) reformed the works of Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s book, Kitab al-Tawhid (“Book of Monotheism”), condemned the worship of ancestors, explicitly targeting the Sufi practice of invoking a Sufi saint in prayer. He also condemned Shiism and several of the customs within other law schools, creating deep fissures within Islam.

However, it is again necessary to underline the importance of modernity and modernization in Huntington’s thesis. He sees the clash of civilizations as a product of a process in which local identities are weakened, in a world that is experiencing a renewed focus on religion partly because of this weakening.

A paradox of the previously described resurgence in religion is that it is actually a process of weakening religion as well as its strengthening. Old institutions are weakened, the law schools are increasingly confused with each other, and the rich philosophical tradition of Islam is fading. Somalia could serve as an example: Salafists and war put pressure on the traditional Islamic traditions of that country. The growth of new and poorly educated but nevertheless religiously active strata contributed to a weakening of the traditional Somali religious institutions, and a growth of a new generation of self-appointed religious leaders with little formal religious education.31 This is not only a Somali phenomenon, for those Oliver Roy refers to as “new intellectuals” have 5

the borders of islam emerged globally. Intellectuals not trained in the religious orthodoxy, who nevertheless claim to be religious leaders, seem to fill an ideological vacuum in the whole Islamic world.32 Several of these new scholars are seemingly, at times, able to span old cleavages within the religion, often also gathering supporters for extremist organizations. The case of Abu Hamza al-Misri, a former bouncer at strip clubs in Soho, London, who ended up as an extremist Sheik and a leader of the militant extremists in the Finsbury Park Mosque in London before he was imprisoned, is perhaps one of the most notable examples.

Weakened religious structures and the lack of traditional anchorage might paradoxically lead to cooperation between members of previously hostile religious groups and clashes of civilizations even in the midst of what Huntington defines as “Western Civilization”. This volume will also examine developments such as new structures of information and the Internet, and explore how the latter might build bridges spanning old cleavages within Islam by breaking down old religious entities and by allowing “new intellectuals” to emerge.

National interest and small group action Some of the bloodiest wars in the history of mankind have been between states of supposedly similar civilizations and/or religions, a fact perhaps explained by the many ideological, cultural and theological divisions within civilizations.33 Indeed, Huntington has been criticized because he supposedly fails to see the cleavages and fissures within civilizational entities. The policies of the various states within a civilization are seen as following state interests rather than being based on an abstract idea of civilization, or some form of religious solidarity.34 States within so-called Islamic civilization have often been split and have seldom managed to act in concert, at times supporting nonMuslim countries, even supposedly enemies, against members of their own civilization. There are many examples of this: in 1976 supposedly Muslim Syria even supported the Christian Lebanese militia against other Muslims because of national interest. The Christian Maronite militia was also supported

by Israel, which technically put Syria on the same side as Israel. Muslim countries have also often engaged in civil wars and covert actions in other Muslim countries, sometimes to the detriment of their war efforts against “enemies outside their civilization”. According to Anwar al-Sadat, former president of Egypt, in 1967 Egypt for example deployed 30 per cent of its infantry, 16 per cent of its armour, and 10 per cent of its artillery in Yemen to support its allies 6

introduction in the Yemeni civil war (1962–1970).35 Sadat claims that this seriously weakened Egypt in its 1967 war against Israel. Despite knowing that Israel was a potent non-Muslim enemy, Egypt chose to contribute heavily to fighting fellow Muslims rather than use these resources to fight non-Muslims.

Notably, Huntington acknowledges the fact that state interests remain essential, but he also claims that the states are losing power and will lose even more power in the future. To Huntington, the “clash of civilizations� is becoming more essential because of the recent global trends weakening the power of states. States are losing control over money flows, the flow of ideas, technology and people.36 People move from place to place, global news networks such as Al-Jazeera and CNN spread news and ideas across borders, as does the Internet. Also, new global actors have emerged: al-Qaeda, a non-state actor, created a watershed in international politics when it launched attacks against the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and possibly Capitol Hill on 11 September 2001. Polls in the United Kingdom suggested an increase in hostile attitudes towards Islam after September 11 and the various terrorist attacks in Europe, indicating that actions of relatively small groups can change public opinion in a country.37 Indeed, in the case of al-Qaeda and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, actions of a single non-state organization indirectly triggered, and/or legitimized, two large wars, in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as new alliances, and new bureaucratic structures, which drastically changed state structures and politics around the world. Huntington sees the state as weakened and national interests as becoming less important and/or having to take different forms, converging with the interest of the civilization in question, and making transnational religions more significant. In short, individuals and organizations are increasing their power compared to states, with individual interests often defined by a civilizational sense of belonging.38 Huntington also sees regional entities such as the European Union creating new identities, which again have the potential to create new conflicts as civilizations united by such arrangements engage in competition.39 Additionally, leaders might become more dependent on social sentiments, their weakened state apparatus putting them in need of popular support that civilizational rhetoric might conveniently create.

Grievances On 30 June 2006, fifty-four civilians, thirty-four of them children, died during an Israeli attack on the Lebanese city of Qana.40 The conflict between 7

the borders of islam Hezbollah and Israel lasted from 4 June until the ceasefire on 14 August 2006, and was broadcast around the world.41 One of the authors saw how the campaign enraged Muslims in the relatively secular country of Turkey, and there were demonstrations in places as far away as in Mogadishu, Somalia.42 In a sense this was the effect of modernity described by Huntington; that is, global news networks such as Al-Jazeera and CNN spreading the news around the world with consequent effects on civilizations. However, it also illustrates several points raised by the critics of Huntington who focus on how such grievances as the suffering and poverty of the Muslim world have fuelled the conflicts explored by his books.43 Some critics go so far as claiming that Huntington was right when he claimed that there were conflicts along civilizational fault lines, but that he failed to understand why these conflicts occurred.

Notably, scholars such as Thomas and Sayyid see the weakening of western hegemony, western ideology and western discourse as leading to an increasing relevance of religion and culture, but without sharing Huntington’s other assumptions. For Thomas this is because of a search for non-western authenticity.44 For Sayyid, who has a totally different epistemological approach to Huntington, the conflicts between non-western and western cultures and religion are a form of anti-western resistance.45 Mohammed Ayoob follows this line of argument, while highlighting many of the mechanisms described

by Huntington, most importantly western support for autocracies in the Middle East based on western secular ideologies, autocracies that failed to establish legitimacy and thus de-legitimized the supposedly western ideology they were based on. However, Ayoob adds that injustice could make Islamism the voice of the global poor.46 Political grievances may in a direct way contribute to hate and conflict. For instance, western states, the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba have supported highly repressive regimes in the Middle East. Egypt, a major receiver of American military aid, has actively used torture and systematic censorship of the press.47 Iraq, having benefited from American, Soviet and Cuban military support, was equally repressive.48 Repression and torture of religious activists have been an essential part of the policies of the allies of the great powers, to the extent that Esposito and Tamimi use the expression “militant secular fundamentalism” to describe their actions.49 There are real reasons for these grievances, and they are prominent in the rhetoric of organizations for example al-Qaeda, such that Osama bin Laden could ask “How many acts of oppression, tyranny and injustice [have] you carried out, O callers to freedom?”50 According to Fawaz A. Gerges, western support for local repressive regimes 8

introduction was a fundamental factor for several jihadist organizations in the change of focus from aiming at the removal of local regimes to targeting non-Islamic targets in the West.51 Significantly, the frontline fighters of al-Qaeda seem to be from relatively rich (middle class) families, and usually from families remote from the various conflicts, lending credibility to claims that personal grievances are not creating such extremism.52 Nonetheless, in a world under the constant gaze of global news-networks, these frontline fighters will inevitably have been exposed to pictures from Lebanon and Palestine. After the Iraq invasion, images and stories from Iraq have seemingly been the main rallying symbol for the recruitment of jihadists.53 Pictures from these conflicts are effectively used for recruitment and motivation sessions hosted by extremist organizations.54 The messages on jihadist web sites exploring these conflicts are numerous, especially for the Iraq war. Names such as Faluja and Abu Ghraib have entered into the discourse of the jihadists, and pictures of prisoners tortured by American guards are extensively used. Indeed, of the twelve statements released by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2004, only one failed to mention Iraq.55 The screening and distribution of gory videos from conflicts in the border zones of Islam was a vital recruitment strategy for London Imam Abu Hamza al-Misri, whose recruits were in turn involved in the 7 July 2005 attacks against the underground system in London.56 Repressive regimes, often supported by the West, can also play a “blame game” in which all ills can be blamed upon sources outside the control of the regime in question, namely western powers. Such regimes might encourage the media to print such hyped-up conspiracy theories as the obviously fake “Protocols of Zion the Wise” employed in the propaganda of Adolf Hitler, in order to distract attention from abysmal internal conditions.57 As suggested

by Edward Said, long-time critic of United States policies in the Middle East, this might even lead to a stereotyping of non-Muslims, including entities such as the United States, reinforcing the possibilities of a clash of civilizations.58

Of “clash” theories Until quite recently, the study of “religion and politics” had been a rather neglected topic; it was not seen as an important factor in itself but rather as a mere instrument that could be manipulated by the existence of other dominating factors.59 As argued by Philpott, the dominating approaches to international relations to a certain extent neglected religion, or claimed that at best 9

the borders of islam it was an instrument that could be used to fool the masses into obedience.

Classical Marxism saw religion as “opium for the people”.60 Realism, a theoretical approach to international relations that focuses on state interest and international anarchy as the main determining factors of international politics, left little room for religion in shaping national interests, and failed to examine the way religions can create supra-national loyalties.61 The general realist claim was that states should place their own security and survival over compliance with any absolute moral obligation, even when such obligation is rooted in a rationally discernible common morality; as a result religious morality could and should not influence policy.62 Liberalists neglected the topic; moreover, they predicted that religion was being replaced by rational calculations. During the 1960s and 1970s philosophers and social scientists such as Peter Berger pronounced that religion was dying and that rationalism was taking over.63 As Scott Thomas claimed, what the world witnessed was rather a resurgence of religion.64 Regimes such as Iran and the Soviet Union, which had tried to secularize their own populations, often with violence, collapsed. Indeed, religious issues now constitute a significant parcel of the international agenda.

Broadly speaking, there are three different approaches to the role of religion in politics.65 The first view is that of the “primordialists”, who point to the “autonomous conflict-generating power of religious difference” and claim that irreconcilable understandings of religious similarities and differences are and will be the primary causes of contemporary and future conflicts.66 They hold that because the Cold War is over, the impact of religion will be increasingly felt on the foreign policy behaviour of states of relevant civilizations. Alliances between states of similar religious traditions and backgrounds against other states of cosmologies/civilizations that are built upon (rival) religious traditions will become increasingly common. The primordialist approach marshals a pragmatic and simplistic construction of religiosity as a self-contained practice in which certain subjects are forever locked. Variations in the interpretation of the values of a specific religion over time, for example why Christians have stopped burning witches, are neglected.

The second and perhaps biggest group is called “instrumentalists”. They believe that the causes of clashes or political violence do not stem from differences in religious cosmologies but from “growing economic, social and political inequalities in and between nations”.67 They hold that political entrepreneurs often try to cloak existing cleavages in religious terms in such a way that their ability to mobilize their constituency is through instrumentalizing “old myths and sacred traditions for their own aggrandizement”.68 In some 10

introduction instances this is done to cover global structural problems that benefits specific individuals, in some cases by rulers/political leaders, who employ religion to create support and further their own ambitions. However, this approach often neglects the limits the tenets of religion put on political entrepreneurs: you have to maintain a religious reputation to be perceived as religious, and cannot act publicly in ways that disturb that image, and there are social rules that must be kept. Moreover, such an approach neglects the way in which religion reshapes actors as well as being reshaped by social interaction.

The third group consists of the “constructivists”. The latter hold that political or religious conflicts are the products of cognitive structures such as ideology and religion, which provide shared understandings for the public and the elites. In this view religions are intersubjective structures, which equip actors with “value-laden conceptions of the self and others and consequently affect their strategic choices”. That is, an actor’s identity is significantly shaped by a religious doctrine, which affects the behaviour of actors according to the dictates of that doctrine. Like the instrumentalists, the constructivists locate the political entrepreneurs at a centre stage because of their power and ability to “muster mass support for their plans and to try to invoke the religious traditions of their societies in order to legitimize their choices”. However, unlike the instrumentalists, the constructivists hold that the ability of the leaders to manipulate religion is limited.69 The leader has to follow at least a minimum of requirements stipulated in the religion to be believed. Some constructivists even claim that individual identity and perception will be formed by the general beliefs held within an organization, or groups.70 Leaders, as well as followers, might fully believe in the religion, despite the religion being socially constructed, its contents varying over time, and the religion being far from primordial.

Within the last approach, religion becomes something changing; religious regulations and the meaning of a religious identity might change over time.71 The norms and social rules within religions tend to change as time goes by.

Secondly, identities and interests are not given or unchanging but contingent and formed through discourse. It is not a given that a particular issue should create religious hatred. The way Jews were treated by priests in Spain during the Spanish inquisition, compared with the way Jews are treated by Catholic clergy nowadays illustrates the point: what initially was a violent relationship has changed into a peaceful one, although the clergy continues to be Christian. Thirdly, if the sources and traditions of great religions are multifaceted and subject to systematic reinterpretations and rearrangements by the political 11

the borders of islam and social authorities, then clearly the contemporary call to arms of the militants against the infidels or lukewarm believers is one privileged interpretation over others and is unavoidably historical and contingent. The situation in Iraq could for example be interpreted as a clash between Islam and the West; indeed many jihadists interpret it like this. However, it is not the only interpretation: the war can also be seen as a clash between Shias and Sunnis, and it can be seen as a clash between criminal elements and an Iraqi state, between a specific American administration and Iraq, or a situation in which initially peaceful groups fail to communicate and this creates problems. Conflicts are not inevitable, because there is a dynamic of escalating the status of cultural and religious differences (existing within and between religious communities).

Cultural and religious discourse might define perception for many individuals, and many individuals will act upon their beliefs, and even have the potential to influence global relations. Organizations such as al-Qaeda can also be seen as forms of a belief system, in which individuals join up, not because they are recruited actively by the organization—they might never meet other members of the organization at all—but because they believe in the organization’s credo.72 Indeed, the argument of “clash of civilizations” itself may serve as a belief system at the service of a wide range of opportunists from political to religious fields. The insights from instrumentalist and constructivist approaches can help us delineate how, once political and religious actors really believe in the “clash” thesis, then the “clash”, supported by strategies of actors that want to use the clash thesis instrumentally, can indeed come true.

The choice of cases The border zone of Islamic civilization, with the inclusion of the new borders, numbers more than fifty countries; not all of them can be studied in detail in one volume. Rather than touching vaguely upon all cases, this book will present selected cases in more detail. The cases are chosen on the basis of the size of the various countries as well as their prominence in the media (the latter potentially enhances the global impact of the case, as it can be used by various political and religious groups to argue for popular mobilization). Each of the cases is studied by experienced area experts. The cases are tied together by regional introductions that examine the regional dynamic of that specific border zone, identifying similarities and differences within the zone. The book 12

introduction will be divided into five parts, the first analysing Islam’s Asian borders (Israel/ Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines), the second analysing its African borders (Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia), the third its European borders (Chechnya, Turkey, Bosnia, and Spain) the fourth the new Islamic borders created by emigration and technology (UK, Spain, United States, France, Scandinavia, and the Internet).

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