New Zealand International Review November/December 2024

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NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL

REVIEW

Hugh White reflects on AUKUS and the future of the Asian strategic order. 7 Rules and power

Malcolm McKinnon places New Zealand foreign policy in historical context.

12 A new era of co-operation

Ashok Sharma considers the India–US strategic partnership under Modi and Biden.

16 Democracy, peace and stability

Joanne Ou comments on the shared values of the New Zealand–Taiwan partnership.

20 Confounding expectations

Dmitry Shlapentokh discusses recent efforts to resolve water issues in Central Asia.

22 CONFERENCE REPORT

Focusing on the Caribbean

Saskia Grant provides insights from a recent youth roundtable discussion.

AI, realism and the Ukraine conflict

Grace Cartman critiques an artificial intelligence generated account of the origins of the Russo-Ukraine War.

25 BOOKS

Bruce Wolpe: Trump’s Australia: How Trumpism changed Australia and the shocking consequences for us of a second term (Reuben Steff).

Anne-Marie Schleich (ed): Perspectives of Two Island Nations: Singapore–New Zealand (Peter Hamilton).

Christopher Miller: The War Came to Us: Life and Death in Ukraine (Kyrylo Kutcher)

29 OBITUARY

Priscilla Jane Williams QSO (Felicity Wong and Denise Almao).

31 INSTITUTE NOTES

33 INDEX TO VOLUME 49

Managing Editor: IAN McGIBBON

Corresponding Editor: STEPHEN HOADLEY (Auckland)

Book Review Editor: ANTHONY

SMITH

EditoriaI Committee: ANDREW WIERZBICKI (Chair), PAUL BELLAMY, BOB BUNCH, GERALD McGHIE, MALCOLM McKINNON, ROB RABEL

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New Zealand International Review is the bi-monthly publication of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (ISSN0110-0262, print: ISSN2230-5939, online)

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The views expressed in New Zealand International Review are entirely those of the authors and do not reflect those of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, which is an independent non-governmental organisation fostering discussion and understanding of international affairs, and especially New Zealand’s involvement in them. By permission of the authors the copyright of all articles appearing in New Zealand International Review is held by the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs.

Beyond unipolarity

Hugh White reflects on AUKUS and the future of the Asian strategic order.

Australia and New Zealand confront a major crisis in global and regional order stemming from the continuing rise of Asian great powers. Asia is seeing the emergence not of one great power but two — China and India — or even three, if Indonesia’s growth continues. Given the unlikelihood that America can maintain its strategic primacy in the Western Pacific, Australia and New Zealand must adjust to the new situation and adapt their defence policies. They have big choices to make about whether, and if so how, they might prepare to defend themselves independently from attack by a major Asian power.

In this article I am going to address the big choices that Australia and New Zealand face about how best to navigate the very difficult strategic environment we both face in our wider region today. In doing so I am going to take the liberty of using plural pronouns like ‘our’ and ‘we’ to mean both Australia and New Zealand together. I will do that not because I believe our two countries’ strategic perspectives, interests and policies are, or should be, identical. On the contrary, precisely 40 years’ experience has taught me that despite our closeness in so many ways, Australia and New Zealand often differ, and at times differ quite sharply, on these matters. That experience has also taught me how important it is for Australians to recognise these differences and understand their deep roots in our different geographies, histories and outlooks. Nonetheless, I am going to use these pronouns collectively here because I think that, in the circumstances we now face, our differences will become less important as the demands of a new regional and global order drive us closer to each other. We face a new era in which our two countries will be more alone, together, than we have ever been before.

Prof Hugh White AO is emeritus professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University. This article is based on the address he gave to a NZIIA meeting in Wellington on 7 August. His visit to New Zealand was sponsored by Helen Clark and Don Brash.

One might say that this convergence is already happening. On both sides of the Tasman, national debates about how best to respond to our more dangerous strategic situation has become focused on the same awkward acronym — AUKUS. Of course, AUKUS means different things in our two countries. In Australia the Pillar 1 plan to buy and build nuclear powered submarines looms very large, while here in New Zealand Pillar 2 takes centre stage. But, in fact, AUKUS is much more than either of its two ‘pillars’. Most fundamentally, and most importantly for both Australia and New Zealand, commitment to AUKUS is a declaration of strategic alignment with America in Asia over the years ahead. While it does not embody the kind of formal strategic commitments that are found in ANZUS, signing up to either pillar of AUKUS does signal strong support for America’s approach to its strategic contest with China, and to the US vision of global and regional order that underpins that approach. That is certainly the way it is seen in Washington. In fact, for them, this is the whole point of AUKUS.

It is, therefore, very important that any decision about

whether to join AUKUS should pay a lot of attention — primary attention, in fact — to the merits of America’s approach to China’s challenge and of its vision of global and regional order. We need to decide whether we agree with Washington that the only acceptable response to China’s challenge is to resist any substantive accommodation of Chinese ambitions, and insist on the perpetuation of the long-standing unipolar US-led order in Asia and globally. And we need to decide whether we agree with Washington that it should be willing to go to war with China if necessary to achieve this outcome. These are big and difficult questions, and they deserve careful thought.

Considering order

We face these difficult questions today because we confront a major crisis in global and regional order. They are unfamiliar questions because we have not confronted this kind of crisis for many decades. We have enjoyed a series of orders which have been generally very stable and benign — even if we have not always appreciated this. It is now 35 years since the end of the Cold War saw the emergence of a unipolar global order under US leadership which was strongly aligned with our values and largely served our interests. It is even longer — over 50 years — since America’s opening to China effectively ended the Cold War in Asia and inaugurated an era of unparalleled peace and prosperity throughout East Asia and the Western Pacific. And it is almost 80 years since the defeat of the Axis powers brought to an end the last serious war between major powers, and began the establishment among Western nations of the kind of international order based on democratic politics and market economics that we have always seen as consonant with our values and conducive to our interests, and have always hoped to see flourish more broadly. It is thus a long time since we have faced serious questions about the kind of international order we would like to live under, and the costs and risks we are willing to incur to help create and defend that order.

in Europe, the place of Japan in Asia — that needed to be addressed and resolved. It was in this spirit that A.J.P. Taylor wrote, in his starkly controversial account of the causes of the Second World War, ‘This is a story without heroes; and perhaps even without villains.’²

Taylor was thrown out of the British Academy for that, but he had a point, and his insight matters for us today. We, too, easily believe that today’s challenge to our preferred regional and global order arises from the ambition and arrogance of leaders like Xi and Putin. In fact, there are much deeper factors at work today, as there always are in any sustained and serious challenge to the international order. In Asia, where our attention is naturally most focused, the primary underlying factor is one we are all aware of but still struggle to quite comprehend: the economic rise of the region’s — and the world’s — biggest countries, China and India. This is the biggest and fastest shift in the global distribution of wealth and power in history, and it simply cannot leave the regional and global international order unchanged. It would be a cardinal mistake to assume that the only or the best response to the challenge we face today is to try to preserve the old status quo, and to go to war to do so, even if we do believe that the status quo is morally superior to any alternative. As Carr noted,

Today we face such questions again. At both the regional and global level, the US-led order based on those congenial values — what we sometimes call the ‘rules-based order’ — is being challenged by powerful states in three key regions of the world: Eastern Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. Our initial reaction to this challenge is anger and resolve — anger that any country should seek to overturn an order which seems so obviously to be in everyone’s best interest, and resolve to defend it by whatever means are necessary. This response is entirely natural and predictable. Writing about the challenges to international order in the 1930s in The Twenty Years’ Crisis, E.H. Carr observed how readily we attribute unique moral status to an international status quo that suits our interests, and condemn those who seek to change it as inherently evil. And as he went on to say, ‘It becomes almost fatally easy to attribute the catastrophe solely to the ambitions and the arrogance of a small group of men, and to seek no further explanation.’1 He was right, of course. We blame the Kaiser and Hitler, Hirohito and Tojo for the disasters of the two world wars, but there are always deeper forces and issues at work — the place of Germany

If a change is necessary and desirable [or, one might add, inevitable], the use or threatened use of force to maintain the status quo may be morally more culpable than the use or threatened use of force to alter it.3

A little later he makes the same point even more starkly: It is a moot point whether the politicians and publicists of the satisfied Powers, who attempted to identify international morality with security, law and order and other time-honoured slogans of privileged groups, do not bear their share of responsibility for the disaster as well as the politicians and publicists of the dissatisfied Powers, who brutally denied the validity of an international morality so constituted.⁴

The lesson to draw is a simple one: when we face a challenge to the existing international order, fighting to preserve the old

E.H. Carr

Hugh White responds to a question following his address in Wellington on 7 August; John Mckinnon is to his right

order is not the only, or necessarily the right, policy response. Our aim should be to seek the outcome which best protects our interests and preserves peace in the radically new circumstances in which we find ourselves.

China’s challenge

Let us look at what these thoughts mean in relation to Asia today. The essential feature of the regional order in East Asia and the Western Pacific which America seeks to defend is US strategic primacy. China aims to overturn this order and replace it with one based on Chinese primacy, and in which America plays no significant strategic role. It is as simple, as stark and as momentous as that. The world’s two strongest states are competing over which of them will be the predominant power in the world’s most prosperous and dynamic region, and the outcome of that contest will have profound implications for the global order as well.

To understand where this rivalry is heading and how it will end we need to explore how it actually works in practice. There are many dimensions to the rivalry — economic, technological, diplomatic and even in a minor way ideological. But as always when great questions of international order are at stake, the ultimate contest is strategic: it is a contest of military power and resolve. Taiwan is its primary focus, but that is not because of the intrinsic significance of Taiwan’s political future to either party — even to China. It is because since 1949 Taiwan has been, for both rivals, the primary test-site for their relative power and resolve. There are others — contested territories in the South and East China Seas — but Taiwan remains the most important by far. As long as America can deny Taiwan to China, its position as the primary strategic power in East Asia and the Western Pacific remains relatively secure. If China can take Taiwan in defiance of America, then America’s strategic position in the region becomes untenable.

this opportunity by attacking Taiwan.

The key question, then, in assessing the trajectory of this rivalry concerns the robustness of each side’s deterrence of the other. The answer is not reassuring. We might start by recognising that we have already seen in Eastern Europe a major failure of America’s capacity to deter a direct military challenge to America’s strategic position in a key part of the world. There are good reasons to fear that the same could well happen in Asia. The primary reason is that America has allowed its previously overwhelming advantage over China in conventional air and naval capabilities to erode as Chinese capabilities have grown dramatically, while America’s have not. There is now no realistic chance that it could win a maritime war against China in the Western Pacific over Taiwan or anything else. That really matters because it is hard to convince the Chinese that America is willing to fight a war it has no serious chance of winning. For many years now, Washington has increasingly relied on US nuclear forces to provide the deterrent instead. But as Chinese nuclear forces grow in scale and sophistication, US threats to go nuclear in a war over Taiwan become less and less credible too.

America has tried to offset these trends by enlisting other countries to bolster its deterrence by supplementing its declining relative power. Hence, all the talk from Washington of strengthening US alliances and creating new coalitions like the Quad. AUKUS is very much part of this effort. But none of this has materially improved America’s declining deterrent, for two reasons. First, none of America’s allies or partners are clearly committed to support America in a war with China, not even its closest allies, Japan and Australia. There is almost no chance that its most powerful new partner, India, would do so. This means that America’s network of alliances, coalitions and partnerships in Asia have nothing like the deterrent effect that, for example, NATO had in its heyday. Second, even if some of them did join the fight, none of America’s potential supporters have armed forces that would materially affect the outcome. Not even Japan’s forces would give America a real chance of decisively defeating China. Why then would these uncertain allies do much if anything to help deter China?

America’s imperatives

The reason is simple enough. America’s regional strategic position depends on its key alliances, especially on its alliance with Japan without which it could not hope to sustain a strong strategic position in the Western Pacific. Its alliances depend ultimately on the credibility of America’s guarantees to defend them against China. America has always understood, accepted and acknowledged that its willingness to defend Taiwan is a critical test of the credibility of its alliance commitments elsewhere in East Asia. That has become clearer still as Washington has in effect abandoned ‘strategic ambiguity’ through President Biden’s repeated unconditional promises that America would defend Taiwan if it is attacked. If America fails to fulfil that promise, the credibility of its Asian alliance commitments would be fatally compromised, and the alliances themselves severely, and perhaps fatally damaged. This presents China with an alluring opportunity. If America can be deterred from intervening to defeat a Chinese attack on Taiwan, then Beijing will take a giant step towards realising its goal of pushing America out of the region and taking its place. Conversely, the more Beijing believes there is a significant chance that America will fight for Taiwan, the more likely it is to be deterred from trying to exploit

How has this situation arisen? How has America allowed its capacity to defend its strategic leadership in Asia to deteriorate so far? The answer is to be found in the simple balance between cost and benefit. Americans — or at least most of those in the US elite circles that talk about foreign policy — might want to perpetuate the strategic primacy in Asia that America has exercised since the turn of the last century. But they will not accept the costs and risks of doing so against a rival as formidable as China. Today US defence spending as a share of GDP is at its lowest level since the late 1990s, when America faced no great power rivals. Although they identify China as a uniquely powerful adversary, American leaders have not been willing to ask US taxpayers to fund the major increases in defence spending to levels that would be needed to restore US deterrence against it — levels comparable to those of the Cold War. Nor are they willing to explain to Americans that resisting China’s challenge entails accepting the risk of nuclear war, just as they did during the Cold War.

There is a robust underlying reason for this which goes beyond mere talk of a resurgence of ‘isolationism’. The fact is that the imperatives for America to resist China’s challenge in Asia today are not nearly as strong as those that drove America to its exceptional efforts in the Cold War. Containing the Soviet chal-

President Joe Biden

lenge was a truly vital US interest because if Moscow’s ambitions were not resisted there was a very real chance that the Soviet Union, surrounded as it was by weak and vulnerable neighbours, could come to dominate the whole of Eurasia, and American strategists had always held that a power that dominated Eurasia could pose a mortal threat to America itself in the Western Hemisphere. China today poses no similar threat. It has no serous chance of achieving Eurasian hegemony, because the distribution of wealth and power in Eurasia is very different today than it was in the decades after 1945. Unlike the Soviets, it would face resistance from at least three formidable Eurasian powers — India, Russia and Europe. China today is stronger than the Soviet Union ever was, but it does not enjoy the preponderance of strength over other Eurasian powers that the Soviets enjoyed at their height. Hence, they do not seem capable of posing the kind of existential threat to America that the Soviets might once have done. And that means that America has little to fear from a China that achieves it ambition by dominating East Asia and the Western Pacific. That would not give China the power to threaten America itself, which means America does not have the imperative to shoulder the costs and risks required to prevent China taking its place in East Asia and the Western Pacific. And that explains why they are not doing so, and why there is little chance that America will win the contest with China over the future strategic leadership of East Asia and the Western Pacific — nor, more broadly, will it find a way to perpetuate the unipolar US-led global order of which its primacy in our region is such a central plank.

Multipolar order

There is, of course, a clear disconnect between what America — at least under Biden — has been saying about its determination to preserve the US-led order regionally and globally, and what it has actually been doing. As I have suggested, the lack of concrete action reflects the true underlying strategic dynamics of America’s situation and the lack of any direct threat posed to its vital interests by the revisionist authoritarian powers that confront it. Washington’s bellicose ‘new Cold War’ rhetoric is, on the other hand, underwritten by the conviction that if the global US-led unipolar liberal order is not preserved, then its place will be taken by a unipolar global authoritarian order led by China, from which America’s and other democracies’ political systems and values would face a mortal threat. But this is a most unlikely scenario. It is far more likely that the post-Cold War US-led global order will be replaced by a multipolar global order dominated by a number of great powers — five at least and possibly more in time — manifesting a wide range of different political systems and values. Such an order is unfamiliar to us but not to history. Such an order kept the peace in Europe and framed the global order throughout the 19th century. And it was just this kind of order which the architects of the United Nations envisaged for the post-war world in 1945 — reflected in the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — before it was superseded by the bipolar order of the Cold War. Future historians may well judge that this multipolar order has already materialised — we in the West just have not understood and accepted this yet.

A key feature of such an order is that each of the major powers seeks to exercise some degree of hegemony in its own near region. For us, then, one key question is what this means in Asia. Many assume, and fear, that it means an Asia dominated by China. But that overlooks the fact that Asia is seeing the emergence not of one great power but two, or even three. India is already the third biggest economy in the world in

PPP terms, and it will overtake America to become the second biggest within a couple of decades. There is no serious chance that China will be able to assert primacy over such a powerful rival. Instead, the most likely outcome is that two Asian giants will sit at the top table in the global multipolar order, and each will establish a sphere of influence over their nearer regions. Asia will be divided between them, with India dominating South Asia and the Indian Ocean and China dominating East Asia and the Western Pacific.

This would not be an easy or restful region for Australia and New Zealand to navigate, but two blessings of our geography would make it easier than we might otherwise assume. One is that we would remain relatively distant from the great powers themselves. The other is that we would sit on the boundary line between their respective spheres of influence, which would give us ample scope to play them off against one another to avoid falling too far under the sway of either of them. What complicates this picture in the longer term is the very real possibility that Indonesia will emerge as a third Asian great power, powered by an economy which is set to become the world’s fourth largest by mid-century. How it would fit into the Asian strategic order is one of the biggest uncertainties in Asia’s longer-term future. And for Australia at least, how we would manage relations with a great power right on our doorstep may well turn out to be our biggest long-term strategic challenge.

Nonetheless, as long as we can adapt to these changes and rise to these challenges there is no reason to assume that our two countries could not survive and thrive in this kind of Asian order — an order framed and shaped by Asian great powers rather than outsiders. That is not to say there will not be painful adjustments for us and potentially much worse for others. One must realistically expect, for example, that if this is indeed Asia’s trajectory then Taiwan has little or no chance of avoiding absorption by China, just as in Europe it is hard to imagine that Ukraine will escape Russia’s shadow. The hard questions we must face, as others have faced so often before, is whether the alternatives are worse. At Yalta in 1945 Roosevelt and Churchill acquiesced to Stalin’s demands for primacy in Eastern Europe in order to avoid a new war with the Red Army. It is easy to recognise the tragic consequences of this decision for the peoples of Eastern Europe: it is hard to argue that the probable alternative of another full-scale war in Eastern Europe would not have been much worse.

War risk

There is no doubt, in my mind at least, that the post-Cold War,

Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta

US-led regional and global order has been very good for us, and that our interests would be best served by its preservation. But history strongly suggests that that if we do not accommodate changes to the international order to reflect major shifts in the distribution of wealth and power, we will face a very real risk of major war — and in this era that means nuclear war. So our task, and indeed our duty, as we face today’s crisis of global and regional order is to balance the very real costs and risks of accommodating a new order against the costs and risks of resisting it. This is the choice that the West faces today in Ukraine. It has always been clear that failure to decisively defeat Russia’s invasion would mark a historic shift in Europe’s strategic order with clear implications for the global order too. It is now clear that Russia cannot be decisively defeated without direct military intervention by NATO forces. It is also clear that this would carry a very real risk of nuclear war. The question is simply whether the risk of nuclear war outweighs the cost of failing to defeat Russia.

Today America and its allies and partners in Asia face a similar question, because the risk of a US–China war over their respective future roles in the Asian order is very real. The temptation for China to test America’s resolve by moving militarily against Taiwan — or by provoking a confrontation in the South China Sea — is great. The more convinced Beijing is that America is bluffing when it promises to defend Taiwan or support the Philippines with armed force, the more likely they are to call America’s bluff. China has good reason to think they are bluffing, because it has seen how little America has done to prepare to fight and win a war with China in the Western Pacific. An America which was really serious about that would have begun to prepare a decade ago with major increases in defence spending, doubling the size of its submarine fleet and creating an Asian NATO with real strategic and operational teeth. None of that has happened, so there is a real risk that Beijing will draw the natural conclusion. That risk is all the higher because the payoff for China — and for today’s Chinese leadership — if they can show America is bluffing is so great. As we have seen, by fatally undermining US credibility they can take a big step towards pushing America out of East Asia and taking its place. What happens if Beijing rolls the dice? How would America respond? The reality is that no one knows — including US leaders in Washington. They themselves do not seem sure whether they are bluffing or not. The danger is that when confronted with the choice in the Situation Room at 3 am they would suddenly decide they were not bluffing after all, and take America into the first great-power war since 1945, a war that it cannot win and that has a very high chance of going nuclear, and a war they would expect us to follow them into.

AUKUS choice

These somber observations bring us back to the choices we face about joining AUKUS. We cannot make those choices without deciding whether we support the idea that America should go to war with China if necessary to try to preserve the US-led order in Asia and globally. That is not because AUKUS would necessarily oblige us to go to war with them. It is because our participation in AUKUS would be seen by Washington — and would be intended by Washington — as an unambiguous statement of support for that idea. That is what AUKUS is really all about. My belief that AUKUS is a bad option ultimately rests on my conviction that this idea should not be supported. Not just because that is a war that America could not win, but because, more fundamentally, the profound shift in the global distribution

of wealth and power makes it impossible for America to remain the primary power in Asia or globally.

What then is the alternative for New Zealand and Australia? First, we should accept that we live in a multipolar world, and instead of trying to deny that, focus on helping to build a new order and institutions to make that new order work as well as possible for small and medium powers like us. That is what we did the last time we had a chance to help reshape the global order, at the end of the Second World War — witness the 1944 Anzac Pact, whereby we sought to frame the post-war order in the South Pacific, and our work at the 1945 San Francisco Conference to shape the United Nations. We need some of that vision and ambition again.

Second, we need to recognise and accept that Asia will no longer be dominated and made safe for us by Britain or America. Instead we will have to make our own way in a region dominated by Asian powers. As I have noted, that need not be disastrous for us, but it will make new demands on us, and we need to do a lot more to prepare to meet those demands. For our diplomacy, it means recognising that now, more than ever, our Asian neighbours are more important to our future than our old Anglo-Saxon friends. Above all, we have a vital opportunity to build on the fact that between us and Asia’s two great powers lie a constellation of middle and smaller powers with interests and objectives very like ours. They, too, want to find a way to live in peace with the great powers while avoiding falling too far under their shadow. We have done far too little so far to cultivate these opportunities.

We also need to adapt our defence policies. Asia’s great powers do not threaten us militarily today, but the risk that they might in future will be higher in an Asia without a preponderant US strategic presence. That means we have big choices to make about whether, and if so how, we might prepare to defend ourselves independently from attack by a major Asian power. I have argued elsewhere that this is not impossible, but that it is demanding. It would require us to rethink our approach to defence quite fundamentally, just as we have to rethink our diplomacy and indeed reimagine our place in a world which is very different from the one we expected at the turn of the century 25 years ago. But that should not surprise or dismay us. What we have come to realise in that time is that with the rise of the Asian great powers we are witnessing the biggest shift in our international setting since European settlement of our islands. The adaptations we will have to make are correspondingly large. And, as I suggested at the outset, one consequence is that we will face these challenges, increasingly, together.

NOTES

1. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis [2nd edn] (London, 1946), p.xi.

2. A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London, 1961), p.40.

3. Carr, p.191.

4. Ibid., p.208.

Peter Fraser, prime minister of New Zealand (right), and Dr H. V. Evatt, Australian minister of external affairs, looking on as Australian Prime Minister John Curtin signs the Anzac Pact

Rules and power

Malcolm McKinnon places New Zealand foreign policy in historical context.

There is much contemporary comment about the shift that has taken place in global affairs from rules to power. The contrast is applied here to a three-fold historical analysis of New Zealand’s foreign policy: its relations with Britain, the United States and their allies — a world of rules; its relations with rivals to Britain and the United States — a world of power; and its relations with the world of the erstwhile European empires, the British Empire most prominent among them — also a world of power. The on-going relevance of the analysis, including in respect of New Zealand’s foreign policy towards its regional neighbourhood, is considered.

In the strategic foreign policy assessment Navigating a Shifting World Te Whakatere i tētahi ao hurihuri, which it released in 2023, New Zealand’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade drew attention to a challenging global shift from ‘rules to power’.1 This essay applies this approach retrospectively to the history of New Zealand foreign policy, using a three-strand analysis rooted in that history but still relevant.

The first strand arises from the relations of a self-governing colony, later dominion, in the British Empire, later Commonwealth — a domain of rules, with power masked or tamed. The empire has long gone, but this facet of it remained in a succession of iterations, notably the mid-20th century Anglo-American alliance. Contemporary terminology ranges from the ambiguous ‘like-minded’ and the dubious ‘Anglosphere’ to the more specific ‘Five Eyes’ (the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand) and to the ‘West’, usually including Europe and Japan.

The second strand is a by-product of Britain’s relations and conflicts with other great powers. The Cold War saw conflict reconfigured as one between the US-led Western alliance, of which Britain and New Zealand were part, and a communist bloc led by the Soviet Union and China. A contemporary contest pits the West against China and Russia.

Dr Malcolm McKinnon is on the NZIR’s Editorial Committee. He is the author, among other works, of Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the world since 1935 (Auckland University Press, 1993).

The third strand is a by-product of the British Empire’s rule (and at one remove the rule of other empires) over non-selfgoverning territories — which included Māori Aotearoa until its autonomy was suppressed in the 1860s. Decolonisation in the mid-20th century dramatically changed this world. In its contemporary form, the strand takes in relations with an array of excolonial states across three continents and oceans, identified in the post-colonial decades as the ‘Third World’ and in the 2020s as the Global South.

In both these latter strands power is more visible, with rules occasionally masking or taming it. ‘By-product’ indicates that historically both played out at one remove from New Zealand’s immediate preoccupations.

In the rest of this essay these two strands will mostly be referred to in shorthand as relations with the second and third worlds. The terminology is unsatisfactory but so is varying it

p A New Zealand soldier instructing Ukrainian troops in the United Kingdom

from decade to decade.

1945-2010: The Second World War is a useful starting point for closer analysis. It ended in an Allied victory over the Axis powers, indeed in ‘unconditional surrender’, in 1945. Would this allow a world of rules to replace worlds of power? The United Nations, like its ill-fated predecessor the League of Nations, was intended to accomplish that and was vigorously supported by New Zealand, which saw the United Nations as an enlarged version of British Commonwealth relations, to that end.2

Two developments

Two developments, the Cold War and decolonisation, provided sharp reminders of the existence of second and third worlds.

The onset of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union shattered the ambition of a rules-based order based on a great power condominium. An ‘iron curtain’ divided Europe. Across the expanse of the Pacific, US hegemony was uncontested. But communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949 ended US influence on most of the Asian mainland. US strongpoints in Japan, Okinawa and further south confronted the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam. New Zealand engaged with this contest at one remove, its deployments in Korea and Vietnam being made alongside the forces of the United States and its allies.

For its part, decolonisation challenged the assumption of the European UN member states — Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal — that they would keep their empires. The newly independent states varied in the extent to which they sought a rupture with their erstwhile rulers but were unanimous on certain issues, notably the future of Palestine and the fate of white rule in southern Africa.

New Zealand was engaged in two phases — the British Confrontation with Indonesia over Malaysia, and the challenge to white-rule in southern Africa. Indonesia retreated but survived, white rule in South Africa did not. Power had shifted from European overlords to locals.

From the 1970s to 1990: These two worlds — the communist second and the ex-colonial third — abutted more directly on New Zealand in the 1970s than before.

Third World calls for a new international economic order and for an end to white rule in southern Africa were more than matched by the impact of successive Middle East crises and consequential oil shocks, which dramatically altered the balance of economic power between the region’s main oil producer states, on the one hand, and the United States and its oil-consuming partners, on the other.

Conversely, the United States’ embrace of détente introduced a view of great power relations, not free of power but in which rules were delimited. This culminated in Europe in the Helsinki Accords of 1975 and in Asia with the US recognition of Communist China, and adoption of a one-China policy, in 1979.

Unpredictable mix

Coupled with New Zealand’s need to economically diversify in the wake of Britain’s approach and eventual entry into the European Economic Community, these developments prompted New Zealand into direct dealings with countries beyond its traditional partners in the British Commonwealth and the United States (and newer partners in Western Europe and Japan). These dealings were governed by an unpredictable mix of rules and power.

New Zealand did business with the oil rich Middle East, the Soviet Union and China, and the burgeoning capitalist econo-

mies of East Asia. Such efforts gave point to then Prime Minister Robert Muldoon’s claim that ‘New Zealand’s foreign policy is trade’. As did the suppression in New Zealand of the documentary Death of a [Saudi] Princess, and the reluctance to forego trade ties with Iran and the Soviet Union in the face of crises in both countries’ relations with the United States.³

The anti-nuclear breach between the United States and New Zealand in the mid-1980s introduced New Zealand to the exercise of power in the domain — of allies and friends — where rules were the norm. But the confrontation was limited, a limitation captured neatly in the opinion polling of the time which revealed that most New Zealanders both supported the ANZUS alliance and the antinuclear policy.

The 1990s and 2000s: The 1990s transformed relations with the second and third worlds yet again.

Communist regimes collapsed in Europe. China had embarked on economic liberalisation in 1978. The two Koreas joined the United Nations in 1991 and committed to peaceful reunification.

The post-Second World War wave of decolonisation ended with the dismantling of South Africa’s apartheid regime. But equally, with oil prices falling and India and other developing states embarking on economic liberalisation, the days of radical challenges seemed over.

For New Zealand the most important transformation was regional. APEC (‘Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation’) was established, a grouping of fast-growing economies led by Japan. Over the next decade a dense mesh of rules-based economic and security ties embraced not just the United States and its long-standing partners in the region — Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea — but the (mostly newly independent) countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Communist China. Thus connecting parts of the West, the second and the third worlds.

Since 2010: As after the Second World War, it became evident that longstanding fracture lines in world politics had not vanished. In the 2010s and 2020s they returned, and a threestrand analysis of New Zealand foreign policy remained relevant.

New competitions

For the Third World, the notion of rules replacing power had always depended on where you stood. The United States’ rift with the Islamic Republic of Iran was never overcome and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein was overthrown by a US-led coalition in 2003. Meanwhile radical Islamist forces mobilised. Combined, both led to years of US-led or overseen governance in the region alongside on-going support for Israel.

A different Third World development was the rise of the BRICS — a highly instrumental association of four, then five

Robert Muldoon

President Bill Clinton with other APEC leaders in Auckland in 1999

countries — India, South Africa and Brazil along with China and Russia — which did not so much seek to upturn the Western-led global economic order as to gain a greater say in setting its rules.

The world of rival great powers also returned. Russia’s ‘wild East’ 1990s was prelude not to ever-closer entanglement in a Western rules-based order but to a disillusionment with it exploited by Vladimir Putin, whose leadership has spanned the 21st century to date.

Even more important for New Zealand was the economic and political trajectory of mainland China. ‘Peak Japan’ proved to be 1989, when Japan’s economy was many times the size of China’s; by 2010, in an astonishing development, the rankings had reversed. The government in Beijing had concepts of world order which differed sharply from those in the West in many specifics. It also saw itself as a legatee of the unfinished business of the Chinese Civil War, and a determined aspirant to at least regional hegemony, to which the United States still barred the way as it had in 1949.

A world at war?: Studies with titles such as America, China and the struggle for world order have been published for a decade or more. In the mid-2020s the narrative of a global US contest with China, the latter supported variously by Russia, North Korea and Iran, has become a commonplace.⁴

In regional diplomacy the talk is of the Quad, AUKUS, tripartite solidarity among the United States, South Korea and Japan, speculation on when (not if) war will break out in the Taiwan Strait and initiatives on combating Chinese manoeuvring in the China Seas and among the Pacific Islands states.⁵

Watching brief

NATO, historically a European Cold War alliance, has assumed a watching brief in the region, and at its 75th anniversary summit in July criticised China for its support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. New Zealand is training Ukrainian soldiers in the United Kingdom, and has supported US–UK Red Sea operations against the Iran-supported Houthi in Yemen.

New Zealand has embarked on a liaison with the US Space Force, which is strongly talking up the threat of China under the hashtag ‘#FightIsOn’ and the slogan ‘the threat is real’.6 There is discussion — and controversy — about New Zealand participating in Pillar 2 of AUKUS.7

The language of New Zealand foreign policy, reflecting shifts not just from ‘rules to power’ but from ‘economy to security’ and ‘efficiency to resilience’, is also indicative.⁸ Five Eyes collaboration is increasingly prominent.⁹

The SIS has reported on foreign power interference in New Zealand domestic affairs.10 A language of friends and enemies, of espionage and undercover activities has become widespread. Critical statements about breaches of human rights abuses in putative adversaries, notably China, have become routine.

Echoes from world wars and the Cold War make familiar the notion of a liberal New Zealand aligned politically and militarily with like-minded states and at odds with predatory rivals and authoritarian rulers.11

Such rhetoric may also thrive for ‘legacy’ reasons. Sixtyfive per cent of a recent sample of New Zealanders thought the United Kingdom ‘important’ or ‘very important’ to New Zealand’s future.12 Retropolitics buttresses geopolitics.

Different analysis

As during the Cold War, such a focus on a global struggle between two blocs, one observing rules, the other exercising power, can blur thinking about other ways of engaging with the ‘second’ and ‘third’ worlds (the latter now usually referred to as the Global South).

The brittle decade, the 1970s, provides a better guide (if not much reassurance) than any other. That is because it was a decade in which the intersection of rules and power was complex, as in the 2020s.

New Zealand and the great power contest: Accepting the reality of a great power contest does not mean there is only one possible position on it. The Second World War demand for the ‘unconditional surrender’ of the enemy will always sound heroic. The most fleeting reflection suggests that even the notion of regime change is implausible and unrealistic, especially with respect to Beijing. Yet there are advocates.13

The quandary, if such it is, does not arise so acutely over New Zealand’s support for Ukraine, in part because ties with Russia have never been extensive, in part because the outcome of that conflict lies largely in the hands of the combatants and of NATO.14

In respect of China, matters are different, given its greater importance to both New Zealand and the United States. That said, there are nuances. In a recent interview, the American ambassador to China, Nicholas Burns, explained that the United

New Zealand gunners in action in Korea in 1951

Saddam Hussein

President Vladimir Putin

States had to ‘manage this relationship in such a way that we defend American national interests but avoid a conflict at the same time’.15 That is a commitment to détente — though the term is no longer favoured — and to setting rules of engagement.

Such restraint should suit New Zealand, which cannot benefit from the outbreak of war between China and the United States, not only because it would be economically catastrophic and immensely destructive, but because in consequence it is unlikely to advance the ethical or humanitarian objectives which many China critics focus on.

New Zealand and the Global South: Navigating a shifting world refers to a ‘diverse range of partners, across the IndoPacific, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America’. Pacific Islands countries, small island developing states and ASEAN are also instanced.

The notion of a single global contest between rules and power, rights and might does not provide guidance for New Zealand on the Israel–Hamas conflict, nor on other rivalries among regional powers in the Middle East. It does not provide guidance for dealing with the crisis in Myanmar, with democratic but powerful and assertive states such as India and Indonesia or with the wealthy absolute monarchies of the Gulf.

Different situation

Something rather different goes for the Pacific, where power favours New Zealand rather than its Pacific Islands neighbours. The challenge for New Zealand is to pursue policies where rules, for example on military activities, climate change, migrant labour and trade, bind all powers and New Zealand as much as those neighbours.16

New Zealand can use multilateral diplomacy to engage with the states in the Global South in ways which promote its own interests and values and connect with those states’ approaches to the global disposition of rules and power.

New Zealand activism on nuclear disarmament and indeed disarmament in general is shared with many such countries. Conflict resolution can also be common ground.17 So also support for debt relief. On this latter, the Third World quest for a ‘New International Economic Order’ in the 1970s and 1980s was promoted by then New Zealand Prime Min-

ister Robert Muldoon. ‘To those used to… treating international relations as a zero-sum battle between democracy and authoritarianism’, wrote two observers earlier this year, ‘it can be hard to conceive that… today as in 1974, the fulcrum of geopolitics is the… struggle to right systemic inequities, between what are now typically called the global north and global south.’18

New Zealand and the West: Relations with Western states are the most rules-based of the three strands, but in a time of geopolitical competition, the pressure to conform, to ‘pay one’s dues’, is ramped up.

That said, this is the strand in which a practice of disagreement over interests and values, of ‘independence’, is long-established, most apt, most legitimate and most readily expressed. Given that New Zealand is formally allied to only one country, Australia, the opportunity to disagree, to think independently, should thrive. Norway, a NATO member, is renowned for its peace activism; surely New Zealand, neither in NATO nor any comparable alliance, can question directions which its ally and its close partners take in world affairs.

Such efforts need not or should not mean a complete break. In the post-Cold War environment, former New Zealand diplomat Bryce Harland published On our own: New Zealand in the emerging tripolar world 19 Harland’s tripolarity was the United States, Europe and Japan — a reminder of how much the world can change in a generation. But the finding endures — a small relatively isolated state can lose friends more easily than gain them, and global rules will not always compensate. A New Zealand withdrawal from say Five Eyes intelligence collaboration could mean forgoing a diplomatic asset for uncertain result.

Salient limitation

New Zealand and Pacific Asia: The limitation for New Zealand of a binary and polarised approach to world affairs is most salient in respect of its home region which, to avoid arbitrating between ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘Asia–Pacific’, is here labelled ‘Pacific Asia’ (the Indian Ocean may be proximate for Australia but hardly for New Zealand).

Pacific Asia is the geographic locus of the contest between the United States and China, home to close partners Australia and Japan and home to ASEAN. The three strands of New Zealand foreign policy still meet in the region.

South-east Asian countries do not wish to choose between China and the United States. Even the alignment of US allies Japan and South Korea can be qualified. Japan’s public remains divided over amending the war-renouncing Article 9 of the country’s Constitution.20 For South Korea a key variable will always be its wish to engage with China on North Korea.

Singapore Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen would have spoken for many in the region when he argued that ‘all of us should be very, very careful to avoid any physical conflict for at least this decade, if not for longer, because discovery will be very painful and will probably be life-changing.’21

No region in the world is more important to New Zealand. For New Zealand the objective is surely continued support for the ‘rules of regional order’ which were laid down in the 1990s and 2000s, even if they are under extreme stress. To keep open lines of communication with China and the United States, to maintain close relations with Australia, Japan and South Korea and to invest in relations with ASEAN and in the myriad dimensions of ASEAN centrality, including the East Asian Summit.

APEC’s annual meeting, set for 10–24 November in Lima, Peru, at which both the United States and China, as well as the nineteen other member ‘economies’, one of which is Taiwan,

Ng Eng Hen

An Israeli airstrike in Gaza in October 2023

will be present, is another opportunity to focus on commonalities, to sustain the rules that constrain power across the many facets of regional relations.

NOTES

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Strategic Assessment 2023: Navigating a Shifting World, pp.6, 18–21.

2. On the British Commonwealth origins of the United Nations, see Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: the End of Empire and the Origins of the United Nations (Princeton, 2013).

3. Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the world since 1935 (Auckland, 1993), pp.201–4, 219–22.

4. See, eg, Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine, ‘The Axis of Upheaval, How America’s Adversaries Are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order’, Foreign Affairs, May–June 2024 (www.foreignaffairs. com/china/axis-upheaval-russia-iran-north-korea-taylor-fontaine).

5. Minister of Defence, 28 Aug 2024 (www.beehive.govt.nz).

6. RNZ, Phil Pennington, 7 Aug 2024 (www.rnz.co.nz/news/natio nal/524369/nz-endorses-us-push-to-expand-weapons-makingdefence-industrial-base; 24 Jun 2034 (www.rnz.co.nz/news/po litical/520385/nz-embeds-itself-in-us-space-force-which-is-talkingup-chinese-threat).

7. See, eg, The Post, Thos Manch, 10 Sep 2024 (www.thepost.co.nz/ politics/350420442/aukus-countries-confirm-consultations-newzealand-about-co-operation).

8. MFAT 2023 Strategic Assessment, Navigating a Shifting World

9 See, eg, Newshub, 12 Dec 2023 (www.newshub.co.nz/home/poli tics/2023/12/winston-peters-seeks-closer-ties-with-five-eyes-pow er).

10. The SIS report can be found at www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/NZSISDocuments/New-Zealands-Security-Threat-Environment-2024. pdf; see also Stuff, Paula Penfold, 23 Sep 2024 (www.stuff.co.nz/ nz-news/350423709/we-dont-feel-safe-here-new-zealand-call-ur gent-inquiry-foreign-interference).

11. www.beehive.govt.nz for speeches by the prime minister (15 Aug 2024), the minister of foreign affairs (1 May 2024) and the minister of defence (28 Aug 2024) touching on this theme.

12. Asia New Zealand Foundation (www.asianz.org.nz/our-resources/ reports/new-zealanders-perceptions-of-asia-and-asian-peoples2024).

13. See, eg, Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher, ‘No Substitute for Victory, America’s Competition With China Must Be Won, Not Managed’, Foreign Affairs, 10 Apr 2024 (www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/ no-substitute-victory-pottinger-gallagher).

14. See further Foreign Affairs. 13 Jul 2023: ‘Should Ukraine Negotiate With Russia? The Debate Over How to End the War’, responses to Samuel Charap’s ‘An Unwinnable War’ (www.foreignaffairs.com/re sponses/should-america-push-ukraine-negotiate-russia-end-war).

15. ‘Is America’s China Policy Too Hawkish?’, Ambassador Nicholas Burns in conversation with Ravi Agrawal, Foreign Policy, 5 Sep 2024 (foreignpolicy.com/2024/09/05/us-china-policy-taiwan-sulli van-visit/).

16. For a critique of New Zealand policy, see Grant Brookes, ‘New Zealand imperialism in the Pacific’ (iso.org.nz/2024/09/24/newzealand-imperialism-in-the-pacific-in-the-21st-century/).

17. Consider, eg, Max Harris, Thomas Nash, Nina Hall and Fairlie Chappuis, Aotearoa New Zealand and Conflict Prevention: Building a Truly Independent Foreign Policy, New Zealand Alternative, Wellington, 2018 (www.nzalternative.org/nza-aotearoa-nz-and-conflictprevention-report).

18. Michael Galant and Aude Darnal, ‘Who’s Afraid of the Global South? Revisiting two 50-year-old UN resolutions should dispel fears about a shifting economic world order’, Foreign Policy, 14 Apr 2024 (for eignpolicy.com/2024/04/14/global-south-united-nations-new-inter national-economic-order). Relatedly, see Brian Easton, ‘Trading towards a multipolar world’, Pundit, 23 Aug 2024 (www.pundit. co.nz/content/trading-towards-a-multipolar-world).

19. Bryce Harland, On our own: New Zealand in the emerging tripolar world (Institute of Policy Studies, 1992). ‘On our own’ was also invoked by Foreign Minister Brian Talboys in 1981 (McKinnon, p.222).

20. Kyodo News, 2 May 2024 (english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/ 05/9b84e18c3f04-65-feel-japan-need-not-rush-to-debate-constitu tion-revisions-poll.html).

21. ‘How Singapore Manages China–U.S. Tension’, Ng Eng Hen in conversation with Ravi Agrawal, Foreign Policy, 17 Jul 2024 (foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/18/singapore-manage-u-s-china-tensions-ngeng-hen).

A new era of co-operation

Ashok Sharma considers the India–US strategic partnership under Modi and Biden.

The India–US strategic partnership has significantly evolved under Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Joe Biden, marking a new era of collaboration. This partnership has deepened across various sectors, including defence, technology, clean energy, health and space exploration, driven by shared democratic values and mutual interests. Amid rising tensions with China, India has become a key partner for the United States in addressing global challenges such as climate change and security in the Indo-Pacific region. Key milestones and areas of co-operation during this transformative period have emphasised the strategic significance of the partnership, which is poised for further growth.

The strategic partnership between India and the United States has undergone a significant transformation under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Joe Biden. Building on decades of co-operation, the partnership has seen substantial growth in areas like defence, technology, clean energy, health and space exploration, reflecting the mutual desire of both nations to strengthen their bilateral relations. Amid the escalating strategic tensions between the United States and China, India has assumed a significant position in US efforts to combat major global concerns like climate change, artificial intelligence, mending the global supply chain and safeguarding a free, secure and open Indo-Pacific region. This article delves into the key areas of collaboration between India and the United States during the Modi–Biden era, highlighting the important milestones and the strategic importance of this partnership in a changing global order.

Modi has made several important trips to the United States during his time in office. However, his latest visit in late September, and his meeting with Biden, has been much more transformative. India–US relations have come a long way. During the Cold War era, relations between the two countries were not particularly cordial. The end of that confrontation gave both countries new flexibility to mend their relationship. Despite India’s nuclear test in 1998, ties between the two countries continued to improve. Since that time, they have deepened across multiple fields.

Dr Ashok Sharma is a visiting fellow at the Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra and an academic fellow at the Australia–India Institute at the University of Melbourne. He was the deputy chair of the NZIIA’s Auckland branch from 2012 to 2022.

The signing of the US–India civilian nuclear accord in 2005 marked a key turning point in the post-Cold War relationship, which removed India from its nearly three-decades-long nuclear pariah status. Ending the system of technological exclusion for India, it paved the way for collaboration in the civilian nuclear energy sector, as well as the transfer of high-tech and sensitive defence technologies to India.1

Significant improvements were made throughout the George W. Bush and Atal Bihari Vajapayee administrations, and India and the United States were positioned as ‘natural allies’. With the rise of China, and in the post-9/11 security environment, both leaders worked to establish a more stable course for the US–India relationship. The current partnership, then, finds its

antecedent goodwill in these initial dealings.

The shared commitment to democratic values, principles, a democratic way of life and safeguarding democratic norms and institutions has served as the foundation for both nations’ ties over the years. Modi and Biden affirmed that the US–India partnership must be anchored in upholding democracy, freedom, the rule of law, human rights, pluralism and equal opportunities for all, as both countries strive to become more perfect unions and meet their shared destiny.

Elevating relations

Modi and Biden have ushered in a new phase of the India–US partnership, characterised by heightened engagement and increased dynamism. During their bilateral talks on the sidelines of the Quad Summit in Delaware in September, both leaders reiterated their commitment to further deepening ties between the two countries.²

Modi expressed his appreciation for Biden’s ‘unparalleled contributions’ to enhancing the bilateral relationship, as noted by India’s Ministry of External Affairs. These engagements have brought unprecedented depth to the partnership, and both leaders have emphasised that India and the United States now share a robust global strategic relationship, driven by democratic values, common interests and strong people-to-people connections.

This partnership has evolved into a comprehensive one, encompassing all aspects of human endeavour, from defence and security to economic co-operation, health and education. Both leaders have consistently explored opportunities to strengthen co-operation in key areas of mutual interest and exchanged views on global and regional issues, particularly in the IndoPacific region.

During his first state visit to the United States in June 2023, Modi addressed a joint session of Congress, held talks with Biden and concluded agreements aimed at strengthening the US–India Comprehensive Global and Strategic Partnership. During the bilateral summit, Biden and Modi announced a large number of commitments that covered a wide range of topics, including defence and security, co-operation in space and emerging technologies with a path towards technology transference in jet engines, drones, health, energy and mobility. The two leaders termed the deepening ties between the two countries as the ‘Next Generation Partnership’.³

Global leadership

Under Modi, India has emerged as a key player in global governance, particularly through platforms like the G20 and the Quad. Biden has acknowledged this leadership and praised

Modi’s role in strengthening the Quad, an informal security association between the United States, India, Japan and Australia, which is committed to ensuring a free, open and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. Since the emergence of the Quad in 2004,4 India has played a pivotal role in shaping the group’s objectives and initiatives. Under Modi’s leadership, India has enhanced its engagement with Quad partners, emphasising a free and open Indo-Pacific region. His commitment to multilateral co-operation has significantly strengthened India’s position within the Quad, promoting collaborative efforts in areas such as security, technology and climate change.⁵

India’s efforts to address global challenges, from the Covid-19 pandemic to the consequences of international conflicts, have not gone unnoticed. Biden has lauded Modi’s historic visit to Ukraine and Poland in August, where he delivered a message of peace amidst the on-going conflict between Russia and Ukraine. This visit marked the first time an Indian prime minister had visited Ukraine in decades and symbolised India’s growing role as a global peace broker.

Biden’s endorsement of India’s leadership extends to supporting its bid for a permanent seat on a reformed UN Security Council. India has long sought this position, which would reflect its growing influence on the global stage. The United States backing for this initiative underscores Washington’s recognition of India’s importance in shaping global governance structures.

New frontiers

The India–US partnership is making significant strides in critical and emerging technologies, marking a new era of collaboration. Of central importance is the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), which aims to enhance co-operation across various sectors, including space, semiconductors, advanced telecommunications, artificial intelligence and quantum technology. These domains are pivotal for shaping the future global economy and security, making collaboration essential for both nations.

Space co-operation has emerged as one of the most promising areas of this partnership. Recent developments include joint scientific research between NASA and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), culminating in an upcoming mission to the International Space Station in 2025. This collaboration underscores the synergies developing between the United States and India in space exploration, which not only fosters technological advancements but also bolsters national security.

In the semiconductor sector, both countries have committed to establishing manufacturing facilities in India. Aligned with their national security objectives, this initiative addresses the urgent need to diversify semiconductor supply chains — a critical

Narendra Modi meets with President Joe Biden in the White House in 2023

Narendra Modi, President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese meet in Wilmington, Delaware for the 6th QUAD Leaders’ Summit on 21 September

concern highlighted by the Covid-19 pandemic and increasing geopolitical tensions. Strengthening this sector is vital for both nations as they navigate complex global dynamics.

During Modi’s state visit to the United States in 2023, both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to a free, open, inclusive, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region, emphasising respect for territorial integrity and international law. The strengthening ties between India and the United States have significant implications for geopolitical stability in the Indo-Pacific region, an aspect closely monitored by China.

Chinese assertiveness

China’s assertiveness in emerging technologies and its dominance in renewable energy and space pose challenges. Initiatives like ‘Made in China 2025’ and ‘China Standards 2035’ reflect Beijing’s ambitions to control critical technology industries.⁶ In response, the United States and India are accelerating their defence and technological collaboration, focusing on high-end technologies and addressing emerging concerns related to the digital revolution, including data privacy and cybercrime.

The launch of the iCET in Japan prior to Modi’s United States visit signaled a commitment to advancing collaborative research in various fields, including data science, artificial intelligence, agriculture and environmental science. This broadbased approach to research and development will facilitate the achievement of iCET’s objectives, fostering innovation and mutual trust between the two nations.

The emphasis on artificial intelligence, critical technologies and technology transfer reinforces the growing confidence shared by the United States and India. As the Comprehensive Global and Strategic Partnership evolves, we can expect increased co-operation across the space, defence and technology sectors, paving the way for a robust and forward-looking asssociation. This partnership not only reinforces bilateral relations but also enables both countries to tackle global challenges in a more competitive environment. It is expected to grow even stronger, given the limitless strategic alignment in response to China’s authoritarianism and its aspirations for global dominance.⁷

As India’s importance in critical and emerging technologies continues to grow, its role becomes increasingly vital in shaping the future global economy and security, making co-operation essential for both nations. Although India’s tech engagements may appear transactional and at times inconsistent, they are fundamentally pragmatic, enhancing its appeal as a partner.⁸

Enhancing collaboration

Defence ties between the United States and India have

strengthened significantly, with collaboration becoming a vital aspect of their strategic partnership.⁹ Under leaders Modi and Biden, this co-operation has reached new heights. A pivotal milestone in this relationship is India’s acquisition of 31 General Atomics MQ-9B remotely piloted aircraft, which will significantly enhance India’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities across various domains.

Significant strides have also been made in co-producing defence equipment. The US–India Defense Industrial Cooperation Roadmap aims to establish joint production of critical defence technologies, including jet engines and munitions. This initiative supports India’s goal of ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ (self-reliant India) by reducing dependence on foreign military imports.

A noteworthy collaboration was announced between Lockheed Martin and Tata Advanced Systems to create a maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) facility for the C-130J Super Hercules aircraft in India, further solidifying India’s role as a regional aerospace hub. Biden expressed support for this agreement, which aims to enhance the readiness of both Indian and global C-130 operators.

The leaders also acknowledged the positive impact of India’s new goods and services tax rate of 5 per cent on the MRO sector, simplifying the tax structure and fostering a robust ecosystem for aviation services in India. US industries are encouraged to invest in MRO capabilities, including support for unmanned aerial vehicles.

The India–US Defense Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X), launched in 2023, has fostered innovative defence collaboration among governments, businesses and academic institutions. Recent summits have seen the signing of memoranda to enhance partnerships, including joint challenges in technologies related to undersea communications and maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

Moreover, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to deepening military co-operation and inter-operability to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific region. India recently hosted the largest bilateral tri-service exercise, TIGER TRIUMPH, showcasing advanced capabilities and technologies.

In terms of cyber defence, on-going efforts aim to strengthen the US–India co-operation framework, with upcoming engagements focusing on threat information sharing and cyber-security training. The establishment of liaison officers, including the first Indian officer in US Special Operations Command, marks another step in enhancing military ties.

Overall, the growing defence partnership between India and the United States reflects a shared commitment to advancing security and innovation, setting the stage for a robust, cooperative future in defence and aerospace.

Energy initiatives

As the world grapples with the consequences of climate change, clean energy has become a critical focus of the India–US partnership. Both nations are committed to enhancing clean energy supply chains, particularly through joint manufacturing initiatives in the renewable energy sector.

The leaders endorsed efforts to unlock $1 billion in multilateral financing for clean energy projects, with a focus on renewable energy, green technology and zero-emission vehicles. The US International Development Finance Corporation has already provided substantial loans to Indian companies like Tata Power Solar and First Solar for establishing manufacturing facilities in India. These efforts are part of a broader push to accelerate the transition to clean energy and reduce global carbon emissions.

US marines and sailors of USS Germantown arrive in Visakhapatnam, India, on 13 November 2019 to participate in the first-ever India–US tri-service exercise, TIGER TRIUMPH

The collaboration on energy issues reflects India’s pressing need for energy security in a carbon-controlled environment for its developmental goals and aim of lifting millions of people out poverty.10

Another notable initiative is the collaboration on establishing a National Center for Hydrogen Safety in India. Hydrogen is seen as a key component of the future clean energy mix, and this collaboration aims to promote research and development in hydrogen technologies, which have the potential to revolutionise energy systems and reduce reliance on fossil fuels.

Health co-operation

Health co-operation between India and the United States has been further solidified during the Modi–Biden era. One of the standout achievements is the new US–India Drug Policy Framework, which focuses on combating synthetic drug trafficking and enhancing public health collaboration. The opioid crisis in the United States and the growing global threat of synthetic drugs make this partnership particularly timely.

In August, the inaugural US–India Cancer Dialogue took place, marking the beginning of a long-term collaboration aimed at accelerating cancer research and development. This initiative underscores the shared commitment of both nations to improving global health outcomes.

On the economic front, the two leaders emphasised boosting co-operation between US and Indian small- and mediumsized enterprises. This collaboration aims to enhance trade, technology transfers and green economy initiatives, while also addressing regulatory challenges that have historically hindered economic growth.

The India–US strategic partnership under Modi and Biden has emerged as one of the most dynamic and multifaceted bilateral relationships in the world today. It encompasses a wide range of areas, from defence and technology to clean energy and health, reflecting the shared values and interests of both nations.

As the global geopolitical landscape continues to evolve, this partnership will likely play a crucial role in shaping the future of the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. The leadership of Modi

and Biden has laid the foundation for even deeper co-operation in the coming years, with both nations committed to working together to address the challenges of the 21st century. This strategic partnership, built on mutual respect and a shared vision for the future, is set to grow stronger, benefiting not only India and the United States but also the broader global community.

NOTES

1. For details, see Ashok Sharma, Indian Lobbying and its Influence in US Decision Making: Post-Cold War (New Delhi, 2017).

2. The White House, Joint Fact Sheet: ‘The United States and India Continue to Expand Comprehensive and Global Strategic Partnership’, Statements and Releases, 22 Sep 2024 (www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/ 2024/09/21/joint-fact-sheet-the-united-states-and-india-continueto-expand-comprehensive-and-global-strategic-partnership/).

3. Ashok Sharma, ‘Narendra Modi’s State Visit to the US: The “Next Generation Partnership”’, Australian Outlook, 7 Aug 2023; The White House, ‘Joint Statement from the United States and India’, 22 Jun 2023 (www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/06/22/joint-statement-from-the-united-states-and-india).

4. Ashok Sharma, ‘The Quadrilateral Initiative: An Evaluation’, South Asian Survey, vol 17, no 2 (2012), pp.237–53.

5. PMINDIA, ‘Joint Fact Sheet: The United States and India Continue to Expand Comprehensive and Global Strategic Partnership’, 22 Sep 2024 (www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/jointfact-sheet-the-united-states-and-india-continue-to-expand-compre hensive-and-global-strategic-partnership/).

6. Yi Wu, ‘China Standards 2035 Strategy: Recent Developments and Implications for Foreign Companies’, China Briefing, 26 Jul 2022 (www.china-briefing.com/news/china-standards-2035-strategy-recent-developments-and-their-implications-foreign-companies/).

7. Ashok Sharma, ‘The Third India–US 2+2 Dialogue: Defence, China, and Indo-Pacific Security’, Australian Outlook, 6 Nov 2023 (www.in ternationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-third-india-us-22-dia logue-defence-china-and-indo-pacific-security/).

8. Trisha Ray, ‘India’s Technology Engagement Strategy: Beyond the Quad’, The Diplomat, 22 Sep 2024 (thediplomat. com/2024/09/indias-technology-engagement-strategy-beyondthe-quad/).

9. Ashok Sharma, ‘US–India Defence Industry Collaboration: Trends, Challenges and Prospects’, Maritime Affairs, vol 13, no 1 (2013), pp.129–47.

10. For details, see Ashok Sharma, India’s Pursuit of Energy Security: Domestic Measures, Foreign Policy and Geopolitics (New Delhi, 2019).

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Volodymyr Zelensky watch as documents are signed during Modi’s visit to Kyiv in August

Democracy, peace and stability

Joanne Ou comments on the shared values of the New Zealand–Taiwan partnership.

Taiwan faces immense challenges. It has, in recent decades, become a target of hybrid aggression by the People’s Republic of China, with the Taiwan Strait a flashpoint that could trigger catastrophic large-scale wars. PRC incursions into Taiwan air and sea space and grey zone harassment happen almost on a daily basis. Taiwan stands as a beacon of democracy and a mirror of transformation from dictatorship to a free society. Despite the severe disadvantages it faces, it has become a pivotal player in global technology supply chains. It manufactures more than 64 per cent of the world’s semiconductors and 92 per cent of the most advanced chips.

We find ourselves in a world increasingly fraught with uncertainty and instability. From Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine to North Korea’s unpredictable rocket and missile launches; from dangerous vessel collisions in the South China Sea to escalation of tensions across the Taiwan Strait. These conflicts underscore how authoritarian regimes prioritise their political agenda to the detriment of human dignity, trade development and regional peace. In a time of autocratic expansionism, democracies must enhance collaboration with each other, to safeguard our shared values, national security and international rules-based order.

Situated nearly 9000 kilometres from New Zealand, Taiwan stands as a beacon of democracy and a mirror of transformation from dictatorship to a free society. The island nation not only possesses common values with Aotearoa New Zealand but also shares whakapapa ties. It manufactures more than 64 per cent of the world’s semiconductors and 92 per cent of the most advanced chips, making it a pivotal player in global technology supply chains. The challenges Taiwan faces today are survival issues, because of the Chinese Communist Party’s global ambition of ‘Rejuvenation by 2049’.

Joanne Ou is mission head of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in New Zealand. This article is based on the speech she gave to the NZIIA’s Wellington branch at Victoria University of Wellington on 11 September 2024.

In recent decades, Taiwan has become a target of hybrid aggression by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the Taiwan Strait is a flashpoint that could trigger catastrophic largescale wars. PRC incursions to Taiwan air and sea space and grey zone harassment happen almost on a daily basis. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has also conducted military drills encircling Taiwan, showcasing China’s growing military might. For China, no one should stand in its way of a ‘unified and rejuvenated Chinese nation’, a goal to be achieved by force if necessary. These manoeuvres, which include repeated violations of Taiwan’s airspace and waters and daily incursions across the median line of the Taiwan Strait, are designed to coerce Taiwan, to create a ‘new normal’ with constant transgression and intimidation.

By testing international responses, the PRC persistently undermines Taiwan’s sovereignty, and seeks to reshape the status quo and balance of power in its favour. The international community must heed the lessons of past world wars: allowing such

p Amis harvest festival, Taiwan

indulgences only emboldens autocracies to push boundaries further, undermining global stability and the existing status quo and jeopardising principles of international law, such as freedom of navigation and overflight.

The Taiwan government deeply appreciates the New Zealand government’s constant calls for de-escalation of tension, for the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, for there to be no unilateral changes to the status quo and no use of force, threats or coercion, and for emphasising that differences must be resolved only through dialogue and peaceful means. Such voices for peace and joint action by the international community can effectively ease tensions and potential conflict across the Taiwan Strait.

Important difference

For years, the PRC has imposed on the world its version of the ‘one-China principle’, while most countries have instead their own ‘one-China policy’. Like most democracies, New Zealand only ‘acknowledges’ in the 1972 joint communiqué PRC territorial claims, but did not ‘recognise’ them. In other words, the majority of countries have expressed their understanding of, but not agreement with China’s sovereignty proclamations over Taiwan. From 193 countries in the world, 136 nations, like New Zealand, have their own one-China policy, which differs in content from the PRC’s one-China principle.

China’s actions are not confined to military threats alone. It not only manipulates each country’s independent China policy but also distorts the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, conflating it with PRC’s one-China principle. The purpose is to use the resolution as a justification for its eventual military invasion of Taiwan.

Resolution 2758 only addressed the question of China’s seat at the United Nations. It neither stated that Taiwan is a part of the PRC, nor granted the PRC the sovereign right to represent the people of Taiwan in international organisations. As a matter of fact, the resolution did not mention Taiwan at all, much less define the legal status of Taiwan. The resolution did not reflect the United Nations’ institutional position, nor an international consensus about the PRC’s claims over Taiwan; it just resolved the China UN seat question. Over the years, the CCP manipulated its interpretation and used Resolution 2758 to fulfil its political purposes.

Recently, China has introduced extra-territorial legal measures against Taiwanese or any foreign citizens who spoke out against or dared to disagree with PRC territorial claims. Those ‘secessionists’ are elevated to the category of ‘die-hard separatists’, and the penalties for independentists who commit ‘statecrimes’ are grave, including capital punishment, and being tracked down internationally through overseas united front operations. This extra-territorial jurisdiction is deeply disturbing, as it runs against principles of criminal law, in that it has no statute of limitation on prosecutions, and court trials can be conducted ‘in absentia’.

The controversial long-arm jurisdiction mirrors China’s 2020 imposition of national security laws in Hong Kong, which severely curtailed dissent and human rights activists. The Basic Law of Hong Kong eroded the autonomy and pluralism of the Pearl of Orient; the assurance of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ became an empty promise. Instead of 50 years of autonomy, Hong Kong’s free society was destroyed in just 24 years.

Today, the situation in the Taiwan Strait illustrates how China is applying a familiar playbook to achieve its political ambitions. By escalating these threats and expanding its legal long reach, China is signaling its intent to undermine UN resolutions and the existing global order and force compliance through fear, repression and intimidation.

Foreign interference

China’s ambition extends well beyond its borders across the Taiwan Strait, affecting global order and trade stability through sophisticated manoeuvring of economic coercion and foreign interference.

As a major global market and the primary trading partner for many countries, China leverages trade dependency, exploiting the vulnerability of its trading partners in order to advance its geopolitical requests. Since 2022, it has banned more than 2450 agricultural and fishery products from Taiwan. However, Taiwan is not an isolated case. The PRC’s weaponisation of trade and tourism has been equally targeted at Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Mongolia, the United States, Norway, Lithuania and other European Union countries.

Taiwan also became a testing ground for China’s foreign interference strategies, exploiting its democratic openness and the kindness of its people. Just to name a few: disinformation divulgation and AI generated content, cognitive warfare, cyber-attacks and obstruction of election processes and parliamentary functions. In Taiwan, the PRC also remains as the main source of intelligence concerns, posing severe and complex challenges to our society’s transparency, democratic vitality, media and civil organisations’ pluralism.

China’s interference is not limited to Taiwan; similar infiltra-

Joanne Ou addresses the Wellington branch on 11 September

NZIIA members listening to Joanne Ou’s address in Wellington

tion tactics have been identified in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and now in New Zealand.1 In all these countries, instances of foreign interference have raised concerns among governmental officials and the public. Now alerted, democracies will remain vigilant, continue to raise public awareness and open discourse on how to discern and counter interference and espionage.

Failing to hold authoritarian regimes accountable only emboldens them to act with impunity, pushing the boundaries of acceptable behaviour in the international community. It is crucial for democratic nations to recognise and confront these threats before they undermine the foundations of our freedom and the well-functioning of our democratic institutions.

Indispensable player

Taiwan, located at the centre of the First Island Chain, stands as a forefront nation containing the rising tide of authoritarianism. Ensuring peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is vital for global prosperity and the rules-based order. Taiwan is not merely an island; it is an indispensable player in the global supply chain, dominating global high-end semiconductor manufacturing. It occupies a strategic geographic position: more than 50 per cent of the world’s seaborne trade passes freely through the waters of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan is also a busy air traffic hub, its Taipei Flight Information Region (FIR) controlling around 2 million flights globally, accommodating more than 72 million travelers, including 560,000 passengers from Australia and New Zealand. Air New Zealand has three direct flights weekly from Auckland to Taipei. According to economists, potential consequences of a conflict across the Taiwan Strait could soar to an alarming US$10 trillion global loss, representing at least one-tenth of the world’s total GDP. The price tag of Chinese ambition is simply too costly, dwarfing the blow from the war in Ukraine, the Covid-19 pandemic and the global financial crisis.²

Beyond the economic impacts, the geopolitical implications are even more profound. If Taiwan were to be swallowed by a power-hungry PRC regime, China might gain a chokehold over both global supply of advanced semiconductors and crucial maritime routes. Given Taiwan’s strategic geographic location, China’s capture of Taiwan would reposition its weapons and military assets to hold the rest of Asia hostage to its demands.3 Tensions in the South China Sea and East China Sea would be further heightened.

Obtaining Taiwan is just China’s first step to realising its global predominance dreams. No country in recent decades has been expanding its military might with greater speed, intensity and clear intention than the PRC.⁴ The CCP has been quite vocal about achieving its ambition through military invasion, strangulation by blockade, coercive annexation and economic coercion. Defending Taiwan is not about safeguarding a single island — it is about defending democratic values, upholding freedom of navigation and overflight, preserving global economic stability and, most importantly, deterring the annexation attempts of a totalitarian aggressor whose appetite seems insatiable.

Strengthening resilience

In response to concerns that potential conflict across the Taiwan Strait might involve other countries, Taiwan has outlined a comprehensive approach to safeguard its security, known as the ‘Four Pillars of Peace’ Action Plan. This includes enhancing national defence to establish credible deterrence, demonstrating a commitment to self-defence, developing asymmetric com-

bat capabilities, strengthening economic resilience and fostering stable yet principled leadership across the Strait.

We believe that preventing a war across the Taiwan Strait is not only necessary but also totally feasible, that the preservation of peace is only possible through strength and that small states can prevail by fighting smart. To maintain peace, democracies must be united and prepared for the worst case scenario. Democracies must show the determination, the will and capability to fight effectively, and to fight smartly. We must let China, Russia, North Korea and other autocracies know that in launching a needless war, they would face a high probability of defeat, resulting in the leaders’ personal reputation being ruined and economic disaster. It is only through unity, readiness, strength and resolve that democracies can deter and dissuade dictators’ expansionist ambitions.

Values-based policy

The new government of Taiwan, inaugurated in May, has introduced ‘values-based diplomacy’. This approach emphasises the importance of shared-values partnership with like-minded countries in maintaining regional stability and peace in the Indo-Pacific region. Deepening co-operation with like-minded countries — such as New Zealand, Australia, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and the European Union — will bolster the resilience of democracies against coercive threats and serve as a collective deterrent to authoritarian regimes. When faced with aggression, it is crucial for more voices to stand up in defence of shared values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights, sustainable development and global inclusiveness.

Recognising that economic security is integral to national security, Taiwan has focused on becoming a reliable and able partner in secured global supply chains by diversifying investment in markets. As a result, Taiwan’s trade volume with the PRC has decreased from 50 per cent in 2010 to 28 per cent in 2023; while its overseas investment to China has dropped significantly from 85 per cent to currently 11 per cent.

To further enhance industrial capabilities, Taiwan has identified five key sectors for development: semiconductors, artificial intelligence, military, security and surveillance and communications. This strategic focus aims to strengthen the country’s economy resilience, while ensuring its national security in an increasingly complex global landscape.

International organisations

It is disheartening that our people must continually struggle for recognition and representation, seeking a fair chance to be heard and treated equally in international arenas. Not only has Taiwan been excluded from the UN system since 1971 but also the 24 million Taiwanese citizens and journalists are being banned from accessing UN premises, attending meetings and engaging in newsgathering. Nowadays, the UN Secretariat, claiming that it is following Resolution 2758, requests citizens from Taiwan to present an identity document from China.

While the United Nations has successfully included both North and South Korea and granted observer status to Palestinians, Taiwan remains excluded and discriminated against by the UN agencies because they have wrongly embraced the PRC’s claims. This exclusion runs against the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, which recognises in its preamble ‘We the people’ and equal sovereign rights for all nations, regardless of the size of the country.

The United Nations’ mission is to promote international peace and security, yet Taiwan’s exclusion from key international forums impairs its ability to obtain timely information to protect its 24 million people and to make a contribution to the world. As a result, transnational efforts to overcome global challenges remain ineffective. Taiwan calls for the United Nations to ‘return to neutrality’ and resume its role as an honest broker and negotiator of peace and facilitator of dialogue, in line with its founding principles.

Including Taiwan in international organisations, such as the WHO, United Nations, ICAO, Interpol, UNFCCC among others, is not merely about representation; it is essential for effective global governance. Taiwan offers valuable expertise and abundant resources, especially in technology and regional security that would benefit international discussions, humanitarian assistance and collective efforts to tackle global challenges.

Loophole plugging

Since 1993 Taiwan has actively participated in the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) as a development partner, addressing the pressing challenges faced by Pacific Islands nations. Aligning with PIF centrality and the ‘Pacific Way’, Taiwan collaborates with member nations and like-minded democracies to implement crucial development programmes in agriculture, healthcare, sustainable energy, climate change and education with scholarships for all members. These efforts underscore Taiwan’s commitment and ability to tackling global issues alongside the international community.

However, during this year’s 53rd Pacific Islands Forum Leaders’ Meeting, discussions were overshadowed by China’s and its proxies’ attempt to prevent Taiwan’s continuous engagement, diverting attention from real crucial issues of ‘Pacific Priorities’. This incident reflects a broader pattern where political agendas of non-democracies hinder collective efforts on real imperative issues, such as climate change, transnational crimes and transmittable diseases.

For instance, in the face of climate change, Taiwan has proactively aligned with the rest of the world, enacting the Climate Change Response Act, and climate accountability legislation, codifying the ‘2050 Zero-Net Emission Goal’ into law, despite Taiwan’s exclusion from the UNFCCC. By elevating the net-zero targets from policy declaration to a legal requirement, Taiwan has demonstrated its determination to cut emissions. In addition, the Taiwan government is setting up a carbon pricing mechanism and introducing financial incentives to guide businesses toward sustainable development. These policies promoting low-carbon technologies highlight Taiwan’s commitment to sustainability, emphasising that every contribution matters in combating climate change.

Similarly, Taiwan’s exclusion from Interpol for the past 40 years poses serious risks in combating transnational crimes. Today we are facing new forms of transnational crime that transcend borders, such as online scams, human trafficking and the extreme violence of internet-facilitated terrorism. As New

Zealand’s Christchurch Call well put it: ‘global problems require global solutions’.

Despite being one of the safest countries, Taiwan’s lack of access to Interpol’s criminal intelligence information (Interpol i-24/7 system) leaves it vulnerable to transnational crime. Without the island nation’s participation, there is a gap in the global crime prevention network; excluding Taiwan creates a loophole for criminals to have their way. Only by establishing a seamless police alliance can the world successfully combat transnational crimes. Our law enforcement officers can best work without political obstruction. After all, sharing crucial information and providing timely assistance can make a difference in saving the lives of many.⁵

These examples illustrate how political biases undermine global collaboration in addressing urgent issues. Excluding Taiwan not only violates the rights of its 24 million people but also poses a significant threat to global security and sustainability. Embracing Taiwan as a partner in tackling these global challenges is essential for a safer and more sustainable world.

Democratic beacon

Taiwan stands as a beacon of democracy, a force for good and a reliable partner for global collaboration. It also serves as an example for China’s potential transformation into a democracy. The 1.4 billion Chinese people deserve the same freedoms and democratic rights that we all cherish; if Taiwan can become democratic, so can China!

As a global technological powerhouse and a frontline state against the expansion of autocracies, Taiwan is ready and able to partner with like-minded democracies and international organisations. Global challenges require imperative global collaboration; climate change, transmittable diseases, international aviation safety, transnational crimes, foreign interference and violent extremism are just a few issues that demand international co-operative action.

While the world strives for peace and stability, we must not appease aggression or tolerate annexation. As President Ronald Reagan well put it: ‘To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means to preserve peace’. Peace is only possible through building up strength. Raising public awareness and encouraging discourse are crucial steps; enhancing defence capability with a holistic plan is a necessary action to ensure survival. For democracies to work together, for smaller countries to fight smart, these are essential self-protective measures in an era of geopolitical instability.

We can harbour hope, but not illusions. Facing the expansionist ambition of authoritarian regimes, we should carefully discern their true intentions by observing their actions, rather than merely believing their words. ‘Actions speak louder’: this old saying is still true today. In a time when the international rules-based order is under threat, it is crucial to take decisive actions to protect the status quo. Our actions or hesitation today will define the kind of world we leave to the next generation.

NOTES

1. www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/NZSIS-Documents/New-Zealands-Secu rity-Threat-Environment-2024.pdf.

2. newsroom.co.nz/2024/09/16/taiwan-on-a-mission-to-win-heartsand-minds-at-critical-moment/.

3. Matt Pottinger (ed), The Boiling Moat: Urgent Steps to Defend Taiwan (Stanford, 2024).

4. media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILI TARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

5. www.thepost.co.nz/nz-news/350111229/letters-editor-november-16.

Joanne Ou with Wellington branch chair Angus Middleton and committee member Prof Roberto Rabel

Confounding expectations

Dmitry Shlapentokh discusses recent efforts to resolve water issues in Central Asia.

Central Asia has relatively few sources of fresh water. They include two major rivers that run into the Aral Sea, which, until recently, was one of the biggest freshwater lakes on the planet. Given these limited assets, competition and conflict between the newly emerging states of the region seemed inevitable when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991. And, indeed, such fears seemed to be borne out in the immediate postSoviet era. But recent agreements between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan indicate that such issues can be resolved peacefully, and that countries of Central Asia can co-operate with each other.

It is widely assumed that the collapse of empire is followed by conflict between the resulting new emerging states and that these conflicts are especially ferocious when there is competition for scarce resources, such as water. Events in Central Asia in the early post-Soviet era seemed to confirm these assumptions. Yet recent agreements between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan indicate that such issues can be resolved peacefully, and that countries of Central Asia can co-operate with each other. Central Asia has relatively few sources of fresh water. They include two major rivers — the Amur Darya and the Syr Darya. Both run into the Aral Sea, which, until recently, was one of the biggest freshwater lakes on Earth. Central Asia was a place of flourishing agricultural civilisations already thousands of years ago. Still, there was apparently not much of a problem with water and ancient travellers described the Oxus (Amur Darya) as a mighty river full of water. The situation changed after the Second World War when Moscow wanted to be self-sufficient in cotton production.

p The Rogun Dam

Ukrainian-born Dr Dmitry Shlapentokh is an associate professor in Indiana University South Bend’s Department of History.

As a result of the planned economy and regional division of production, some republics of Central Asia, especially Uzbekistan, were pushed to increase cotton production dramatically. Cotton consumes a lot of water and drainage of water from major rivers leads to increasing problems with water supply. The shortage became visible by the 1960s. An increasing amount of the water was used for irrigation at the expense of the Aral Sea, which began to shrink. Responding to the situation, Moscow designed a plan that implied transfer of water from the European part of the Soviet Union and/or Siberia. The project, however, faced a series of problems. To start with, it was prohibitively expensive and would have taken many years to finish. Secondly, the project faced serious opposition from some Russian nationalists, who insisted that the project would damage Russia’s environment. The discussion of the project continued approximately to the beginning of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Perestroika

The political instability and collapse of the Soviet Union finally put the discussion to rest. From then Central Asian states were compelled to solve their water problems alone. From the beginning of post-Soviet history, it looked like the post-Soviet

states would fail to find solutions. Even so, recent years’ experience indicates that Central Asian states were able to solve problems together.

While during the Soviet era Moscow tried to regulate the relationship between republics and ensure equitable distribution of water, the end of imperial power led to increasing rivalry and introduced the possibility of military conflict. Water problems were one of the reasons for this apparent danger. This was especially the case with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The root of the problems was the geographical location of the two states. Most Central Asian rivers originate in Tajikistan and only later flow into Uzbekistan, whose agriculture is focused on cotton production. By controlling the flow of water, Tajikistan can exert pressure on Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan’s concern became even stronger when Tajikistan decided to build the Rogun Dam to produce electricity. Uzbekistan believed that filling the artificial lake would require a lot of water and increase Tajikistan’s ability to regulate the water flow downstream. This was possibly the major reason for tension, or at least one of the major reasons, for hostility between the two states had other causes as well. Neither Dushanbe nor Tashkent was historically on friendly terms with each other.

The encouragement of mutual animosities was, in fact, the very reason why two republics had been created in the Soviet past. The present day Central Asian states’ formation had been completed by the late 1930s. But their creation was not because the Soviet Union was an ‘affirmative action empire’, a notion that was almost unquestionably ‘politically correct’ mantra until the war with Ukraine began in 2022. Nor, of course, was Moscow implicitly hostile to minorities, a new equally wrong dogma that emerged recently. Stalin was a pragmatist, and all his actions should be seen in the context of his drive to strengthen the Soviet state, and, therefore, his power. The unity of Central Asians could have hindered this aim by stimulating the emergence of international jihadism. In fact, Moscow confronted the ‘Basmachi’, the internationalist Islamists, almost to the 1930s.

Nationalistic division prevented Central Asian unity. In addition, Stalin delineated state borders in such a way as to create a permanent source of friction between members of the Central Asian elite, leaving Moscow as the natural arbiter. It was the old divide et impera (divide and rule) model. The situation became especially tense because of the nature of the regime of Islam Karimov, the first Uzbekistan president. He dreamed of making Uzbekistan the Central Asia hegemon, modelling himself on Timur, the brutal creator of a huge empire with Samarkand as its capital. He was also proclaimed to be Uzbekistan’s founder.

At the same time, Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rakhmonov (from 2007 Rakhmon) proclaimed Tajiks to be the true ‘Arians’ and descendants of the great Persian empire, whereas Uzbekistanis were seen as descendants of the brutal Timur’s horde and unable to do anything constructive. Water distribution sat on the top of other grudges with no solution seemingly in sight. The tension rose with

Kasimov apparently contemplating a military solution of the problem. Here he looked like an Egyptian leader outraged by Ethiopian construction of a dam on the Nile that could endanger the water flow downstream. Moscow was apparently happy with the tension, since it helped its on-going control of the region. Nonetheless, the situation changed after Karimov’s death in 2016 and the emergence of Shavkat Mirziyoyev (Mirzueev).

Deciding to depart from Karimov’s brutal and mostly isolationist policy, Mirzueev engaged in a charm offensive. At the outset of his rule, he visited Dushanbe to mend the relationship with Tajikistan and in recent visits this year outlined a policy of co-operation with it. The most important thing here was the notion that both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan would co-operate in dealing with water distribution. These would include monitoring the water flow through the Fergana Canal. Built during Soviet era, it was the major avenue for sending water through Central Asia.

The new arrangement would lead to monitoring of water flow so as to provide for equitable use of water resources. The rapprochement between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also affected the other countries of Central Asia. Uzbekistan’s relationship with Kazakhstan is an example here. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were not as bitter rivals as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Nevetheless, both engaged in a quest for regional hegemony and there were no signs of co-operation in water distribution in the past. Even so, change can be seen here as well. Recently, Uzbekistan agreed to provide a considerable amount of water for irrigation.

What is the broad implication of these arrangements and water sharing? They challenge the widespread notion that the collapse of multi-ethnic empires necessarily unleashes endless conflicts between new nations. Alhough such conflicts do indeed happen, there is no ironclad rule. It is apparent that new states can co-operate with each other even if the start of their relationships was not promising.

Shavkat Mirziyoyev

Tajikistan is sponsoring efforts to resolve regional water issues

Focusing on the Caribbean

Saskia Grant provides insights from a recent youth roundtable discussion.

The NZIIA’s Wellington branch recently hosted a roundtable between visiting Caribbean youth and local New Zealand students. The event, organised in conjunction with the Caribbean Council (New Zealand), was an opportunity for participants to connect on shared challenges facing youth across different cultural contexts. The Caribbean attendees, visiting New Zealand for the 12th Commonwealth Youth Parliament in Wellington, represented the Turks and Caicos Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, Saint Lucia and Guyana. New Zealand’s high commissioner to the Caribbean, Linda Te Puni, was also in attendance.

In his welcome, Karim Dickie, Caribbean Council (New Zealand) member and NZIIA Board member, underscored the importance of fostering relationships with Caribbean countries and the common challenges experienced by both Caribbean and Pacific Islands countries and territories. Participants were divided into smaller groups, providing a forum for closer discussions. The dialogue spanned various topics, with participants bringing their insights to the fore on areas such as climate change, education, mental health, crime, geopolitical tensions, misinformation and colonialism. Despite the diverse political contexts, participants connected on a range of shared challenges, while also exploring values, goals and visions for the future.

New Zealand students were fortunate to hear first-hand accounts of the complexities of different Caribbean political environments. Guyanese representatives shed light on mounting domestic concerns over escalating Venezuelan claims to the Essequibo River territory. This issue has drawn salience in the Caribbean, linked to contentions over oil resources, refugees and rising militarisation. Similarly, issues of crime, drug use and immigration in Turks and Caicos were raised, with representatives sharing personal insights into key challenges plaguing their communities. Given that the Caribbean often receives limited attention in New Zealand reporting, facilitating a better understanding of these intricate political situations was valuable for local Wellington students. Conversations also explored geopolitical tensions in both the Caribbean and Pacific. Amplifying competition between the United States and China in the Pacific was compared to similar tensions in the Caribbean. In recent years, China has heightened its engagements in the Caribbean through both investment and intervention. Students discussed how, similarly to their Pacific coun-

Saskia Grant, a NZIIA Wellington branch Student Committee representative, is in her final year at Victoria University of Wellington, majoring in international relations and political communication.

terparts, Caribbean countries operate in a cross-fire of tensions between larger powers, where local communities must navigate entangled opportunities and challenges.

Delving into the topic of modern media, the participants recognised the difficulties posed by developing technologies and the challenges of growing up in a digitally-oriented world. An interesting idea was the tension between the imperative to protect youth against the harms of modern media amidst the equal need for youth to be equipped to successfully operate within its realms. For instance, social media plays a detrimental role in both mental health and political disengagement. However, it simultaneously provides a useful avenue to harness grassroots movements and mobilise social change. There was agreement when the conversation turned to misinformation, with representatives of various countries emphasising its growing danger to polarisation, social trust and political stability.

The dialogue saw interesting contributions in the area of inter-cultural relations. Both sides shared valuable insights about indigenous groups, decolonisation and on-going challenges and opportunities within communities. An interesting point for New Zealanders was the strong sense of regional identity shared amongst the distinct Caribbean communities. The Caribbean Community, a grouping spanning 21 countries and a myriad of ethnic groups, remains the longest serving integration movement of the developing world. Visiting youth were equally fascinated to learn about New Zealand’s colonial history and Māori–Pakeha relations. Conversations featured unanimous recognition of the importance of strong community connections, particularly in the face of challenges like polarisation, securitisation and rising geopolitical tensions. Ultimately the dialogue provoked valuable reflection on how to build strong social ties to bridge cultural differences and diverse identities.

Speaking to representatives from islands like Saint Lucia or Turks and Caicos, which have 180,000 and 47,000 people respectively, highlights how New Zealand is a larger country than we traditionally see ourselves. Despite these differences and others, there remain many similarities in the challenges facing today’s youth. As the evening drew to a close, attendees shared key takeaways from the dialogue. The importance of sharing both wisdom and passion was highlighted as a key first step to finding solutions. Respondents also emphasised the invaluable role of promoting international connections and solidarity.

Although the conversations focused on pressing political issues and complex international challenges, the evening resonated with enthusiasm from youth passionate about making a positive difference, both in their communities and the wider world. The dialogue served as a reminder of the importance of leveraging both cross-cultural engagements and avenues for youth to share their ideas, advocate for their communities and contribute to driving social change.

ESSAY PRIZE WINNER

AI, realism and the Ukraine conflict

Grace Cartman critiques an artificial intelligence generated account of the origins of the RussoUkraine War.

Through a realist lens, I will examine ChatGPT’s essay regarding the factors behind the Russo-Ukraine War. ChatGPT argues that the war is multifaceted with various factors. It discusses historical and cultural aspects, emphasising that Russia never accepted Ukraine’s sovereignty and that Ukraine’s ethnic divide has created tension. It considers material factors, such as NATO’s expansion, which Russia sees as threatening, and the economic and geopolitical significance of Ukraine for Russia. Nationalism is considered as integral to Ukraine’s resistance, whereas Russia used it as a justification for the war. It addresses international responses, focusing on sanctions.

I will argue using realism that the main factor was the security threat posed by NATO expansion, which prompted Russia to seek security by maximising its relative power through Ukraine. I will also engage with economic and geopolitical factors and argue against ChatGPT’s non-material factors. Realists agree that states are self-interested and that survival is their main goal. States must be self-reliant to survive within the anarchical international system. Power is exercised in relation to other entities and states are interested in relative material power.1

The essay prize, which the NZIIA established at Victoria University of Wellington in 2014, encourages and recognises undergraduate excellence in the study of international relations, consistent with the NZIIA’s long-standing commitment to enhancing New Zealanders’ understanding of international issues. It is awarded on the recommendation of the head of the School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations in consultation with the academic staff and head of programme in Political Science and International Relations. For further details see www.wgtn. ac.nz/scholarships/annual-prizes/current/ nziia-prize-in-international-relations.

Realists would agree with ChatGPT that NATO’s expansion created a security threat for Russia, as it made them relatively weaker than NATO states, particularly the United States as a dominant power, and caused them to lose regional influence. NATO expanded after the Soviet Union dissolved, with Poland,

Grace Cartman is a second-year student studying law, international relations and French at Victoria University of Wellington. This essay won the 2024 NZIIA essay prize in international relations. Contestants were given a 48-hour assignment to prepare a critique of an AI-generated article provided to them.

Hungary and Czechia joining in 1999, and others in 2004.² In 2008, NATO issued a statement favouring Georgia and Ukraine joining the alliance.³ Russia retaliated by invading Georgia later that year, and annexing Crimea in 2014, commencing the current war.⁴ This timeline supports NATO expansion as the main factor, and the annexation can be seen as an effort to demonstrate Russian power — pertaining to political scientist Hans Morgenthau’s power pattern of ‘prestige’ — and unwillingness to yield Ukraine to NATO.⁵ However, NATO continued expanding and by 2019 Ukrainian accession to NATO and the European Union seemed inevitable.⁶

Due to the uncertainty about other states’ intentions within the anarchic system, Russia assumed the worst of NATO’s expansion and invaded Ukraine in 2022, intensifying the war.⁷ This was done to increase their relative power vis-à-vis NATO states and prevent Ukraine’s accession to NATO, which would relatively weaken Russia further. Geopolitical ambitions are linked with NATO expansion. Realists would agree that Russia’s actions in Ukraine convey attempts to ‘reassert its dominance’ in the region but would see this not only because of the Soviet Union’s collapse, which lost Russia influence in the region, but also as a means of counterbalancing NATO’s expansion, which weakened their regional influence further.

Ukraine’s integration into the European Union and NATO would cause material losses for Russia, as it would weaken Russian trade and decrease Ukraine’s economic dependence on Russia. While realists would agree that Ukraine has traditionally been economically dependent on Russia, the ChatGPT essay omits to mention that this dependence decreased after the Crimean annexation, with Ukraine developing many sectors and increasingly being recognised as an important economy with great potential.⁸ Russia wants to prevent Ukraine from integrating with the European Union and NATO so it can maintain its influence in that country and take its wealth, counterbalancing NATO’s expansion by increasing Russia’s material capabilities.

Invasion excuses

Realists would disagree with ChatGPT’s inclusion of historical and cultural factors, arguing that Putin’s claims about protect-

ing the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine and his claim that Ukraine is part of Russia’s identity are excuses. For realists, these cannot be factors because states are self-interested and motivated by power, not cultural ties.⁹ ChatGPT asserts that ethnic diversity in Ukraine has caused tension, and that the Russian government’s claim to be protecting Russian speakers has added ‘fuel to the fire’. Putin claimed that the 2022 invasion of Ukraine was to protect Russian speakers who had been facing genocide in the Donbas region.10 However, this allegation was false, undermining cultural factors and corroborating that they are excuses. These allegations echo those made to justify the invasion of Georgia and the Crimean annexation, where, similarly, Russian speakers were not under real threat.11 This furthers my argument as it elucidates a pattern of Putin using baseless allegations to increase Russian power in the face of NATO expansion.

ChatGPT asserts that Russia has never accepted Ukraine’s sovereignty, seeing it as tied to its historical identity. Realists would disagree that Russia is motivated by historical identity factors, seeing them as excuses and actions to muster nationalism. While nationalism is not a realist concept, international relations scholar John Mearsheimer argues that it can be used as a ‘power multiplier’ to mobilise armies.12 At the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in 2023, Putin defended the war as a counterbalance to US global dominance.13 This supports the idea that identity claims were excuses, that have not been sustained for the duration of the war, with Putin now attempting to justify it for what it is: an attempt to increase Russia’s relative power.

A realist understands the international responses to make sense within their balance of power theory. ChatGPT states that sanctions imposed on Russia are a response to Russian actions in Ukraine, seemingly implying their human rights breaches. For realists, states disregard international law.14 Realists would understand US sanctions as an effort by the United States to maintain dominant status by balancing Ukraine against Russia to prevent it from gaining more power and threatening the United States and its allies. European sanctions would be understood similarly, given that a stronger Russia could directly threaten them. This realist argument is strengthened because many Western powers, particularly the United States, are inconsistent in their efforts to oppose illiberal states, sometimes ignoring human rights breaches when those states do not constitute a threat to Western interests.15 Thus, the United States and its allies are imposing sanctions in order to prevent Russia from becoming a regional hegemon, which would constitute a real threat.

ChatGPT’s multifaceted approach to the factors behind the Russo-Ukraine War is wrong from a realist perspective. The primary factor behind the war was the security threat posed to Russia by NATO expansion, prompting Vladimir Putin to seek security by maximising Russia’s relative power through Ukraine and preventing that country’s accession to NATO. Russia’s claims that Ukraine is part of Russian identity and that the war is about protecting Russians in Ukraine are merely excuses to justify Russia’s actions.

NOTES

1. John Baylis et al, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford, 2020), pp.135–41.

2. Danny Singh, The Tripartite Realist War: Analysing Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine (London, 2023), p.77.

3. Ibid., p.75.

4. Dana Tandilashvili, ‘Classical Realist and Norm-Based Constructivist Analysis of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and Annexation of Crimea’, Classical Realist and Norm-based Constructivist, no 49 (2015), p.10 (bpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/wp.towson.edu/dist/b/55/files/2016/06/ SPRING16FALL15ISSUEpt2-1jhiif 4.pdf).

5. Baylis, p.136.

6. Singh, p. 85.

7. Baylis p.137; Singh, p.133.

8. Justin Ho, ‘How industrial standards help explain Russia’s economic motives for invading Ukraine’, Market Place, last modified 17 May 2022 (www.marketplace.org/2022/05/17/industrial-standards-helpexplain-russias-economic-motives-inva ding-ukraine/).

9. Alexander Bukh, ‘Realism/Neo-Realism,’ 18 Jul 2023, Victoria University of Wellington.

10. Elizabeth Wilmshurst, ‘Ukraine: Debunking Russia’s legal justifications’, Chatham House, last modified 24 Feb 2022 (www.chathamhouse.org/2022/02/ukraine-debunking-russias-legal-justifications).

11. Tandilashvili, p.10.

12. Konstantinos Kostagiannis, Realist Thought and the Nation-State (London, 2018), p.153.

13. Mark Trevelyan, ‘Putin uses BRICS summit to justify Russia’s war in Ukraine’, Reuters, last modified 23 Aug 2023 (www. reuters.com/world/putin-uses-brics-summit-justify-russias-warukraine-2023-08-23/).

14. Bukh, op cit.

15. Singh, pp.109–10.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE

‘Prosperity: Security: Values. New Zealand Foreign and Trade Policies in Contested Spaces’

12 June 2025

Venue: Tākina Wellington Convention & Exhibition Centre

Grace Cartman with NZIIA President James Kember (left) and Wellington branch chair Angus Middleton after receiving her certificate for winning the NZIIA essay prize in international relations

BOOKS

TRUMP’S AUSTRALIA: How Trumpism changed Australia and the shocking consequences for us of a second term

Author: Bruce Wolpe

Published by: Allen & Unwin, Melbourne, 2023, 320pp, $39.99.

In the context of a truly extraordinary US national election, Bruce Wolpe’s insightful book contains an examination of how the first Trump presidency (Trump I) reshaped global dynamics, particularly in relation to Australia, and he considers the potential implications of a second Trump term (Trump II) and how Australia should prepare for it.

Wolpe, a dual national of the United States and Australia, brings a wealth of expertise as a media and political analyst, having grown up in Washington DC and having lived in Australia for decades. He draws on insights gleaned from interviews with senior American and Australian officials and other commentators, most of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Central to his argument is Trump’s transactionalism, whereby the former president typically prioritised short-term gains over long-term stability. He characterises Trump’s first term as marked by ‘isolationism, protectionism, and nativism’ and ‘the most divisive and disruptive in modern history’, with a chaotic approach that favoured authoritarian leaders over democratic principles. Wolpe pulls no punches, saying ‘Trump is a double-barrelled authoritarian: he uses autocratic means to undercut democratic ends, and he uses the tools of democracy to bury democracy’. He warns that if Trump secures a second term, the consequences for US democracy could be dire, possibly leading to its unravelling as we know it.

Wolpe believes that a Trump II will not only maintain his previous foreign policy approaches but also will do so with even greater resolve, relatively unhindered by traditional checks and balances, given that he seeks to ‘radically reshape the federal government’ and fill ‘career posts with loyalists to him and his

Notes on reviewers

Dr Reuben Steff is a senior lecturer in politics and international relations at the University of Waikato.

Peter Hamilton is a former New Zealand high commissioner to Singapore and leader of the New Zealand negotiating team which completed the New Zealand–Singapore Free Trade Agreement in 2000.

Kyrylo Kutcher is a Ukrainian-New Zealander and holds a master of science degree from National Technical University of Ukraine (Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute). He is currently in the Politics and International Relations programme at Massey University.

America First ideology’.

The book’s first part outlines Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy, which ignited strategic competition with China and introduced a new dynamic in international relations. Wolpe discusses the ‘spectacle diplomacy’ with North Korea and the formation of the AUKUS pact, predicting that these policies will likely persist under Trump II — although on things like AUKUS Trump will drive a harder bargain.

Wolpe then dives into the negative impacts of Trump’s policies for economic and climate issues. Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement and Trans-Pacific Partnership (and more broadly Trump’s retreat from global leadership) have left Australia in a precarious position, he believes, necessitating a re-evaluation of its own climate commitments and trade relationships.

In a compelling section, Wolpe examines how Trumpism has infiltrated Australian politics (via an ‘echo chamber effect’), eroding democratic norms, weakening trust in institutions and emboldening local extremists. The cultural wars and issues of race are thoroughly explored, revealing that while Australian conservatism is less extreme than its American counterpart, the influence of Trump’s divisive rhetoric cannot be under-estimated.

Wolpe also considers the potential for a Trumpist ideology to persist beyond Trump himself. Florida Governor Ron DeSantis’s policies are considered with this in mind. Wolpe can be forgiven for being wrong on this issue as his book was released in June 2023. Given recent developments — specifically Trump’s audacious pick of JD Vance as his vice president — it is now clear Vance is the heir apparent. Indeed, Vance is much better at packaging and conveying an American First ideology than Trump himself is. Vance is also connected to the emergent post-liberal New Right that has common cause with a forming counter-elite: Peter Thiel, Elon Musk, Jeffrey Sachs, Vivek Ramaswamy, Tulsi Gabbard, RFK Jr and others.

The final part of the book considers whether Australia can withstand the potential assault on democracy that a second Trump term would entail. Wolpe expresses optimism, citing Australia’s robust democratic norms and traditions, a reserve bank and high court less relatively prone to direct political influence and a strong Australian Electoral Commission. The latter includes logical districting and compulsory voting — factors that can help mitigate the influence of radical fringe groups and ambitious outsiders. Australia’s media system is also competitive, which prevents Murdoch’s outlets from dominating the discourse. Apparently, therefore, ‘Trumpism can never be replicated in Australia’. Really?

Wolpe urges his readers to consider some uncomfortable questions: what happens if Trump cuts a deal with China and

abandons Taiwan? Could he withdraw US forces from South Korea and Japan? Could he increase the costs of Canberra purchasing Virginia-class submarines via AUKUS, and assert that all related production and servicing be done in the United States? Wolpe then considers a most dramatic possibility: could Australia’s strategic alignment with the United States survive Trump II if he dismantles democratic structures at home and illiberalism fully takes hold. He urges Australian policy-makers to reflect on this dilemma (and, I suggest, so should New Zealanders), emphasising the need for Australia to assert its own interests more vigorously. He recommends that the Australia–US alliance be maintained but that Canberra balance this by pursuing independent policies on trade and climate commitments, advocating for enhanced diplomacy, strengthening commitment to multilateral agreements, increasing its involvement in the Pacific Islands Forum and energising relationships with vital regional partners, like Japan, South Korea and Indonesia. In short, Canberra will have to learn to say ‘no’ more often to Washington and the potential for a more transactional relationship necessitates that Australia bolster its own strategic initiatives to hedge against unpredictable US policy in the region.

Wolpe’s book contains paradoxes: on one hand, Australian governments during Trump I were able to capably navigate the bilateral relationship (a ‘clear win’), yet Trump II will be so much worse that Australia will not be able to do the same again? Perhaps. At the same time, the Australia–US relationship is deeply embedded in a substrate of defence and intelligence links (not to mention AUKUS — an initiative that militarily-industrially is wedding them together) that stretch far beyond relations at the prime ministerial and presidential level. This, presumably, offers a lot of ballast for the relationship.

More could have been said as to why Trumpism exists, and now looks set to live on irrespective of the 2024 election and even Trump himself. It is the product of structural issues — decades of growing socio-economic inequality, hollowing out of American industry and manufacturing, wage stagnation and lib-

eral elites who seemingly ‘look down’ on the Americans that have been left behind. Biden is attempting to respond to this via his ‘foreign policy for the middle class’ and industrial policy. But will it be enough? How do we gauge this and if it is/is not how may that change US domestic politics in the years to come? How will that influence US foreign policy and thus Australia?

A final paradox: while Trump’s transactionalism causes Wolpe consternation, would the obverse be better: an ideologicallydriven Trump? Trump, after all, did not start any new wars. He rocked the cage (and the world) vis-à-vis North Korea and Iran, but his unpredictability (which may be an outgrowth of his lack of ideological conviction) did seem to keep most revisionist actors in check. Admittedly, there is also no guarantee Trump will play his hand similarly should he return and thus Wolpe’s charge that Trump II may be completely unhinged and unrestrained should not be lightly dismissed.

In concluding his analysis, Wolpe underscores the existential competition between autocratic and democratic systems, urging Australia to be vigilant and recognise that democracy can be revitalised and made to work effectively. The stakes are high — not just for the United States and Australia, but for the global order at large. Overall, the book offers a nuanced understanding of how the legacy of Trump's presidency continues to influence the world stage and what may await us should the former president pull off one of the most astonishing comebacks in modern American political history.

REUBEN STEFF

PERSPECTIVES ON TWO ISLAND NATIONS:

Singapore–New Zealand

Editor: Anne-Marie Schleich

Published by: World Scientific Publishing, Singapore, 389pp, US$45.

Dr Anne-Marie Schleich, editor of this volume on Singapore–New Zealand relations, is a former German diplomat who was ambassador to New Zealand from 2012 to 2016. Married to a Singaporean, she is now adjunct senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

Dr Schleich has brought together 27 prominent New Zealanders and Singaporeans to present perspectives on foreign policy, economy, sustainability, climate change, creative sectors, museums and the ageing sectors. On the bilateral front, reviews cover defence, trade and business.

This volume has been published to coincide with the 60th anniversary of Singapore–New Zealand relations. The title Perspectives of Two Island States is key: it is not (just) a volume about New Zealand and Singapore’s bilateral relationship, although this is covered in impressive detail. It includes some thought provoking and refreshing essays on a wide range of current political, social, economic and foreign policy challenges from the perspective of each country. Many of these deserve to have a life well beyond the current publication as quality analyses.

I will deal first with the specifically bilateral essays. Peter Carter’s comprehensive chapter on the ‘Establishment of the New Zealand–Singapore Diplomatic Relationship’ delves back into the early days of political contacts, from the time of Singapore’s disengagement from Malaysia. It is good to see highlighted the important role played by New Zealand diplomats such as Foss

Anne-Marie Schleich with Foreign Minister Winston Peters, who launched Perspectives of Two Nations

Shanahan, Brian Lendrum, Jim Weir and others in developing links with the embryonic People’s Action Party (PAP — Singapore’s ruling party) and its feisty young leader, Lee Kuan Yew. Presciently, Shanahan thought Lee was ‘no communist’ (at a time when Lee was an unknown quantity and was thought to be flirting with the communists) and the ‘ableist man in the Legislative Assembly’. Lee’s visit to New Zealand in 1965 underscored the importance to him personally of links with New Zealand leaders at a time when Singapore was finding its own feet internationally.

Lee admired aspects of New Zealand’s welfare state and, although the closeness of the relationship weakened somewhat as Singapore’s immediate focus shifted to its near neighbourhood and the development of ASEAN, Lee retained an admiration for New Zealand (even sending his son and future prime minister, Hsien Loong, to live with Sir Frank Holmes in Wellington, evidently to ensure his son gained a wider international experience). In later years, Lee and his Cabinet colleagues remembered former high commissioner Jim Weir (1966–70) with great affection.

The essay by Tim Groser, former MFAT trade negotiator and trade minister, on the origins and early days of trans-Pacific trade partnerships, which he personally helped create and promote, is required reading for anyone interested in the development of the bilateral, and then regional, trade relationship. The New Zealand–Singapore Free Trade Agreement reflected the intentions of both states to be early leaders in driving a region-wide trade deal.

Likewise, David Capie’s essay on bilateral defence and security co-operation canvasses its origins following the Second World War, through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and then the current Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), after Britain’s withdrawal east of Suez (announced in 1968). Despite the overall positivity of the defence connection, other reviews have identified a ‘significant capability gap between the two militaries’. Lee, too, could be critical privately of aspects of New Zealand’s defence policy, especially our air defence capability.

Gabrielle Rush, our current high commissioner to Singapore, and William Tan, her Singapore counterpart, review the current positive bilateral relationship and scope to improve co-operation. Diplomatically, mention is avoided of one area of historical concern to New Zealand: Singapore’s long-standing retention of the death penalty.

The volume contains several fine essays on each countries’ perspective of key current challenges. Former diplomat Michael Powles’s essay, written with Mary Seet-Cheng, draws on his wide diplomatic experience of the South Pacific and Asia and highlights the challenges facing Pacific Islands countries, including regional cohesion and climate change, and US–China strategic competition.

Professor Tommy Koh, Singapore’s most respected and experienced diplomat, discusses Singapore foreign policy, the growth of ASEAN and the challenges Singapore has faced (and one might add, has expertly managed) in its relations with China and the United States. Missing perhaps is an explanation of why,

despite active engagement as a global citizen, Singapore had avoided putting its hand up again to serve on the UN Security Council. It has done so only once, from 2001–02, when encouraged to do so by New Zealand. I suspect Singapore now prefers to avoid the obvious entanglements which Security Council membership would involve for it in its carefully balanced relationships with the United States and China (and Russia).

Brian Easton and Manu Bhaskaran canvass economic challenges and how working together in the international arena has benefited both countries.

I found Chris Finlayson’s essay on the New Zealand government’s attempts to address Maori grievances particularly revealing, especially as it is written from the perspective of one who had a major personal and positive role to play during his time as our attorney-general during the Key administration.

There are too many contributors to this volume to review each individually, but overall Dr Schleich is to be congratulated for assembling such a varied, high-quality list. Some of the topics covered will appeal more to experts in a particular field, but there are fascinating insights here, too, for the general reader. There is always a need for quality analysis and commentary on New Zealand’s bilateral relationships. It would be great to see similar volumes published on our relationships with other ASEAN members.

New Zealand’s relationship with Singapore has matured and developed since those early days when Foss Shanahan and Jim Weir played a role much more prominent than is usual nowadays for a high commissioner. I love the comment, reported in Carter’s essay, that Shanahan, on departing Singapore at the end of his posting, broadcast a farewell speech to the people of Singapore on local radio.

New Zealand politicians have long had a fascination with Singapore, eyeing with interest, if not envy, the city state’s phenomenal economic success, ability to attract good foreign investment, its good governance, success in green urban and housing development, environmental protection, traffic management, how its politicians engage with the general voter, as well as Singapore’s success in managing its race relations. But they have not always known how best to take full advantage of the relationship. There is clearly scope for Singapore to invest more in New Zealand through its investment arm, Temasek, but, as Ken Hickson’s article indicates, the business sector is actively engaged in exploring business ventures.

At the end of the day there is no substitute for people-topeople contacts in underpinning a bilateral relationship. New Zealand and Singapore do not play cricket or rugby together, but an abiding memory of my own time in Singapore is the exuberant hero’s welcome accorded to Jonah Lomu by the wildly excited pupils of several Singapore high schools when he visited as our rugby ambassador. A relationship cannot get much closer than that!

PETER HAMILTON

THE WAR CAME TO US: Life and Death in Ukraine

Author: Christopher Miller

Published by: Bloomsbury, London, 2023, 400pp, £20.20.

Many have weighed in with their comments about the RussoUkrainian War and their opinions about how it will or should end. However, there are far too few who understand the civic and

historical context to suggest a viable resolution. People often have trouble believing that the genocidal carnage unleashed by invaders on their neighbours in Europe is even conceivable. Some revisionist foreign commentators and academics tend to think there must be something flawed about Ukraine that justified Russian aggression, and perceive accusations from Ukrainians against Russians to be exaggerated and surely prejudiced. The reality in Ukraine is that, in the words of Shakespeare in The Tempest, ‘hell is empty, and all the devils are here’, and they are Russians.

Christopher Miller is an unbiased Westerner who over the last fifteen years got to know Ukrainians as well as observed Russian deeds all over Ukraine. This lies at the heart of his message to the world in his book The War Came to Us, which is a collection of his reporting from the fighting fronts. As a foreign war correspondent, Miller has been to the most ravaged places and seen the utmost suffering and fortitude at the frontline, including during Ukraine’s darkest hours in 2022. This builds on his earlier experiences in 2014–15 reporting from both sides of the front in eastern Ukraine, from Crimea during its annexation by Moscow and from the heart of the Revolution of Dignity in Kyiv. But before that, he got to know Ukrainians as an English teacher in peacetime Ukraine. Ukrainians are highly committed to democratic practice and pluralism. They used to be very tolerant of everything Russian, but were, and remain, a distinctively independent and proud nation. After a short history, and with a prologue dated 24 February 2022, the first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the author fills 75 pages of the first part with a description of his life in the country and the people he met. This account covers 2009–12 — and is mainly reporting from Donbas, Ukraine’s eastern region, before turning to Kyiv in 2013. Miller starts by explaining how he, in his mid-twenties, looking forward to experiencing life in Africa as a volunteer, was sent to Ukraine instead. It was a country with which he had no pre-existing connections, nor knowledge of. He gives a very good introduction to Ukraine’s diverse and beautiful culture.

Miller then describes the people of Donbas, specifically in the town of Bakhmut, which became his ‘second home’ in Ukraine, including their characters and political views. Travelling extensively around the regions, learning the language (not Ukrainian first though, but Russian), he observes no trace of active separatist sentiments, neither radical nationalism nor intolerance, but rooted irritation towards politicians in power. Having failed to coerce Ukrainians into the ‘Russian World’, Putin resorted to aggression. The second part starts with a intense first-person account of the 2013–14 winter streets of Kyiv. He describes what began as the peaceful Euromaidan protest against Ukraine’s then-president’s last minute decision, under pressure from Putin, to scrap the partnership with the European Union. Government forces resorted to unprovoked violence against the ‘Revolution of Dignity’ and later

slew more than a hundred protesters. Miller then rushes to Crimea to witness the unmarked ‘little green men’ (evidently regular Russian military) conducting an illegal annexation of the peninsula and its incorporation in the Russian World.

In 2014, as Russians invaded part of Ukraine’s Donbas region, Putin blatantly lied to the world. In the third part, Miller utilises his connections in Donbas and, as a foreign journalist, gets press credentials from both sides of the war that started in 2014. He learns about Russia’s special forces, which attempted coups in multiple administrative centres of eastern and southern regions of Ukraine and eventually started the war; about Russians in all the leadership roles of the sham republics; about Russian military equipment and regular forces on the ground. Miller endeavours to investigate the shooting down by Russian forces of Air Malaysia Flight MH17 in July 2014, confirming the first deaths of New Zealanders (among the passengers) in Ukraine. Also, Miller meets the commanders of Ukrainian voluntary battalions, which aided Ukraine’s regular army to fight back against Russia’s militia and regular forces, and explains how and why they formed. Along the way, he does not exclude from his reporting any personal views of the local population, who often find themselves conflicted about what is happening around them, being affected by Russian television propaganda, proximity or family links to Russia and lingering pro-Soviet sentiments.

The last part of the book covers the events of the largest military invasion in Europe since the end of the Second World War. It is a report about destruction, carnage and suffering inflicted by the Russian armed forces on Ukraine, but it is also the story of the stoicism and bravery of Ukrainians courageously fighting back against ‘Russian fascism’ (in Miller’s apt phrasing). Miller gives a good background to the invasion by describing the actions of the Ukrainian government and the mood amongst the people in the months preceding the warned-about invasion. There are insights into Ukrainian President Zelensky’s political story and personality.

After the invasion starts, Miller witnesses both the despair and resolve of common Kyivans protecting their families and aiding the defence efforts with whatever they can, the preparedness and wit of the military and the true heroism of immensely outnumbered Ukrainian soldiers. From the liberated territories, the author provides an account of heinous and unspeakable crimes conducted by ordinary Russians against the civilian Ukrainian population, talks to the survivors of excruciating experiences in Russian captivity and describes the siege of Mariupol — both the selflessness of the defenders and the tragedy of its population through kidnapping, inhuman filtration camps, deportations and indoctrination. Miller also writes about: the treason of the Kherson regional department of Ukraine’s Security Service in the south (which aided invading Russian forces); successful counter-offensives in the east; attending funerals in the west; witnessing the last days of his Bakhmut prior to its destruction; and living through Russia’s unabated terrorising of Ukrainian cities with destructive missiles and drones.

The War Came to Us is a first-person account of what is happening in Ukraine — the crisis of Russian fascism spilling into Europe and the remarkable spirit of the Ukrainian nation, which is paying in blood to protect the lives and future peace of not only Ukrainians but also Europeans.

KYRYLO KUTCHER

OBITUARY

Priscilla Jane Williams QSO

17 June 1940–17 June 2024

Priscilla Williams QSO, a leading New Zealand diplomat, died on 17 June 2024. As one of our earliest women ambassadors, she blazed a trail through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. She was committed to quality advocacy on behalf of New Zealand and, in particular, to the strategic advantage of multilateralism for advancing the interests of our distant, trading, liberal democracy and its regional Asian and Pacific partners. In her long career Priscilla led New Zealand’s responses to numerous trans-boundary problems — climate change, human rights, regional poverty and trade disadvantage — while forging strong bilateral relationships.

Priscilla Williams was a direct descendant of three Anglican bishops. Her great-great-grandfather was William Williams, an early church missionary and te reo Anglican scholar and New Zealand’s first bishop of Waiapu; her great-grandfather Bishop Leonard Williams was the third bishop of Waiapu; and her grandfather Bishop Herbert Williams was the sixth bishop of Waiapu; Herbert’s son, Canon Nigel Williams, was her father. Priscilla was born in Wanganui in 1940, after her parents returned from Malaya to take up a parish position in Marton.

With her beloved older sister Sheila, Priscilla attended the prestigious Nga Tawa Diocesan School, which later honoured her as a female role model. From 1958 to 1961 Priscilla attended Victoria University of Wellington (Te Herenga Waka) graduating with an MA in history. A revised version of her research essay for that degree, ‘New Zealand at the 1930 Imperial Conference’, was published in 1971.

When she first applied to join the Department of External Affairs’ diplomatic service in the early 1960s, Priscilla was advised that she would have been accepted ‘had she been a man’. The following year she was invited to re-apply by the secretary of external affairs, Alister McIntosh, because of a shortage of male applicants due to the dip in war-time births. She was officially taken into the diplomatic stream as a ‘research assistant’ as this was still the period when women were given a lower rank on recruitment, expected to resign upon marriage and almost never given overseas postings.

It is difficult to imagine how high the barriers to women’s professional success were at that time. While the department was comparatively progressive, McIntosh was cautious and rigorous in building its quality and had decided to employ women as a temporary measure rather than lower its entry standards. With Priscilla more than meeting the criteria, her exceptional career took off in November 1961. She was sophisticated, intelligent and energetic, ready to continue the intellectual nationbuilding of her forebears, combined with her Yorkshire mother’s

direct and practical caring approach. She got the measure of people and complex situations quickly and was an excellent judge of people.

McIntosh had recently expanded New Zealand’s overseas offices into South-east Asia. Priscilla was well prepared to take up her first posting at the high commission in Kuala Lumpur in April 1964 after a year looking after foreign students attending New Zealand institutions under the Colombo Plan for Pacific and Asian Commonwealth countries, and a year as the Southeast Asia desk officer in the department’s Asia Division. In Kuala Lumpur she undertook political and aid work.

Priscilla forged her long multilateral career on her return to Wellington in October 1966, with a two-year stint in the United Nations Division before being posted in January 1969 to the New Zealand Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York, where she represented New Zealand at the United Nations Second Committee (Economic/Development) and the Third Committee (Human Rights/Social). At that time Priscilla was one of few women diplomats on the world stage and in 1972 was a member of New Zealand’s delegation to the First World Environment Conference, Stockholm. Its declaration set the agenda for efforts to address global environmental degradation, an issue to which she was committed throughout her long career.

Back in Wellington (1973–76), Priscilla had various management roles (including heading the ministry’s Property Division) and in 1975 was a New Zealand delegate to the First United Nations World Conference on Women in Mexico, and then to the UN General Assembly in 1975, representing New Zealand at the First Committee (Disarmament).

A three-year posting to Bangkok as deputy head of mission and consul-general followed, with accreditations to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Her travel was prodigious, in Asia and the Pacific and elsewhere.

After a time as head of Information in head office in Wellington, Priscilla was appointed high commissioner to Tonga (July 1983–October 1985), one of a handful of women serving as heads of mission. In Tonga she oversaw the construction of a new chancery building, which was opened by Prime Minister David Lange in 1985.

From 1986 to 1989 Priscilla served as deputy high commissioner to Australia. This was during the fraught years following the deep differences between New Zealand and its ANZUS partners. This posting reflected the ministry’s confidence in Priscilla’s abilities to help maintain New Zealand’s most important political and economic relationship.

Priscilla’s reliability in getting things done was also recognised by her appointment as high commissioner to India in 1989 to oversee the building of the new chancery in New Delhi (opened in 1992). It was a defining role following the restoration of the important relationship with India that she filled with aplomb after the success of her illustrious predecessor, Sir Edmund Hillary.

In Wellington from 1993 to 1998 Priscilla directed New Zealand’s multilateral activities through a network of New Zealand diplomats at home and abroad, first, as head of the Environment Division and then of the United Nations and Commonwealth Division. A creative thinker, superb networker and formidably experienced multilateralist, Priscilla was generous in sharing her experience and mentoring younger colleagues and new recruits. During her tenure in Environment Division she worked and gained acceptance for the raft of new processes and commitments that were emerging internationally through her representation at many international and regional environmental conferences. These included United Nations Environment Programme meetings, the Conference on Small Island States held in Barbados in 1994 and the Basel Convention on Hazardous Wastes, leading the New Zealand negotiations on the Pacific Convention on Hazardous Wastes. She contributed the chapter on the environment for the publication New Zealand as an International Citizen (Wellington, 1995) edited by Malcolm Templeton.

Priscilla also represented New Zealand at many international conferences on United Nations and Commonwealth matters, including the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing 1995, the World Social Summit in Copenhagen 1995 and the International Habitat Conference in Istanbul 1996. In charge of Commonwealth policy work for the period when New Zealand hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Auckland in 1995 and subsequently when New Zealand was its chair, Priscilla shaped New Zealand’s approach and support for their initiatives.

From 1998 to 2002, Priscilla was New Zealand’s consulgeneral in Sydney, Australia. Further testimony to her formidable diplomatic talents was demonstrated by her role in the commemoration of the Glebe Island Bridge that was about to be re-named the Anzac Bridge with a statue of an Australian digger installed at one end. With her characteristic persistence and persuasiveness, Priscilla succeeded in convincing the local authorities to recognise the New Zealand contribution to the Anzac story by committing to erect a memorial statue of a New Zealand soldier at the other end. The Anzac Memorial and plaque with both countries’ coats-of-arms were officially unveiled by NSW Premier Bob Carr MP on Anzac Day 2000 with Priscilla in attendance.

Priscilla was a true professional, who embraced every posting and assignment with enthusiasm and energy and, occasionally, bravado. In 1994 while leading the New Zealand delegation to the first global Conference on Small Island States in Barbados, she boldly managed to seat herself next to Fidel Castro, whom she succeeded in charming to the consternation of his bodyguards.

With typical humour, Priscilla admitted some of her flashes of inspiration were risky. In Sydney, for example, she memorably arranged for mountain-climbing Prime Minister Helen Clark to climb the Sydney harbour bridge, only to find when they reached the top that lightning struck. Upon hearing of Priscilla’s death, Clark tweeted:

RIP Priscilla Williams: an outstanding NZ diplomat who served with distinction in a range of posts. Priscilla once hosted me in Tonga giving me insights into how effective our hard-working diplomats can be. Priscilla was a great character with a strong sense of humour.

In 2004 Priscilla was appointed a companion of the Queen’s Service Order for public services.

Enmeshed in the intellectual life of Wellington, Priscilla’s pace did not slow upon ‘retirement’ from the Foreign Ministry in April 2002. From 1995 until her death, she was a trustee and honorary secretary of the Henry and William Williams Memorial Museum Trust. Her advocacy for the long-term protection of New Zealand’s history and heritage was significant. She followed a period as an executive member of the Government Superannuitants Association (2006–10) with ten years as an active committee member of Historic Places Wellington.

She lived in a beautiful house in Kinross St bordering the 4.5 acres of the Victorian-era Bolton Street Cemetery, where most of Wellington’s early citizens were buried. She devoted herself to the curation of its historic and aesthetic surroundings, protecting and enhancing its legacy as one of Wellington’s most interesting and beautiful public spaces. She served as president of the Friends of the Bolton St Cemetery from 2005 to 2016 and remained actively involved in securing its future until her death from cancer on her 84th birthday.

Reflecting the love and admiration so many had for Priscilla, St Peter’s on Willis (of which she was a long-time member of the congregation) was packed to its sizeable rafters with friends and colleagues (and many more via zoom). Her death was just days before she was to unveil a heritage plaque for that magnificent wooden Wellington church.

Felicity Wong and Denise Almao

NOTE

1. Priscilla Williams, ‘New Zealand at the 1930 Imperial Conference’, New Zealand Journal of History, vol 5, no 1 (1971).

RECENT PUBLICATION

New Zealand’s Foreign Service: A History

Edited by Ian McGibbon 576pp, $59.99

Available from Massey University Press, Massey University, Albany, Auckland 0632

INSTITUTE NOTES

National Office and branch activities

Auckland

In conjunction with the New Zealand United States Council, a discussion with Peter McKenzie, the 2024 NZUS Media Fellowship winner, was held on 19 August. He spoke about the evolving US–China relations and their impact on New Zealand and the Pacific.

The following meetings were also held:

1 Aug Andrew Wierzbicki (NZIIA Board member), ‘Crafting New Zealand’s Defence Policy: Misconceptions and Challenges’.

8 Aug Dr Reuben Steff (senior lecturer in geopolitics and international relations, University of Waikato), ‘ “Are we all realists now?” New Zealand’s Geopolitics and the US–China Competition’.

1 Oct Prof Todd Belt provided an in-depth analysis of the 2024 US election and its global ramifications, exploring candidate strategies and crucial voter demographics.

Christchurch

On 23 July Prof Harsh V. Pant, vice president of the Observer Research Foundation, India’s foremost think tank on international relations, gave a zoom presentation on ‘Modi 3.0, and India’s Global Outreach’.

Dr James To (Asia New Zealand Foundation) addressed the branch on 3 October on ‘Growing New Zealand’s Competence in Asia’.

Hawke’s Bay

The following meetings were held:

1 Aug Suzannah Jessep (chief executive, Asia New Zealand Foundation and NZIIA Board member), ‘New Zealand’s Asia Outlook’.

27 Sep HE Ömür Ünsay, Turkish ambassador to New Zealand.

Nelson

The following meetings were held:

30 Jul Vangelis Vitalis (MFAT’s deputy secretary New Zealand Trade and Economic Group), ‘New Zealand’s Export Future’.

10 Sep HE Harinder Sidhu (Australian high commissioner to New Zealand).

Palmerston North

On 17 July the branch convened an expert panel to discuss ‘Pacific Security: Why it Matters to Aotearoa’ in a meeting sponsored by the Southeast Asia CAPE. The panellists were Associate Prof Anna Powles, Dr José Sousa Santos and former deputy chief of army in the New Zealand Defence Force Chris Parsons MNZM, DSD. They were hosted by branch board member Daniel Garnett.

On 19 September, in conjunction with the Palmerston North City Council and the ASEAN New Zealand Business Council, the branch held a meeting on ‘ASEAN: Open Doors for Agritech’, which delved into the dynamic opportunities for New

Reuben Steff addresses the Auckland branch on 8 August

Prof Hugh White (centre) with Dr Hamish McDougall and Prof Rouben Azizian following his address in Auckland on 5 August

Prof Todd Belt speaks about the US election in Auckland on 1 October

Andrew Wierzbicki delivers his address in Auckland on 1 August

Zealand businesses in South-east Asia, with a particular focus on food and agribusiness. Participants included HE Waravuth Pouapinya (ambassador of Thailand and chair of ASEAN Committee, Wellington), Peter Kell (unit manager, MFAT’s Economic Division) and Mark Piper (CEO, New Zealand Plant and Food).

Wairarapa

On 19 September Martin Harvey, the immediate past New Zealand high commissioner to Canada, addressed the branch.

Wellington

The NZIIA Wellington student group held a panel event on ‘New Zealand’s Stance on AUKUS’, with speakers including Dr Iati Iati, Nicky Hager and Dr Reuben Steff, and on 16 July held a student mixer event at the Hunter Lounge with Mike Asplet from the Ministry of Defence. On 14 August there was a student roundtable with EU Ambassador HE Lawrence Meredith at the Kelburn Campus.

On 15 August the branch staged their inaugural international film evening with a screening of French film The Taste of Things at Light House Cuba cinema. Prior to the film Eric Soulier, cultural counsellor of the French embassy, provided introductory comments on the background and directorship of the film.

A youth roundtable, organised in conjunction with the Caribbean Council (New Zealand), was held with visiting Caribbean students on 2 September. A report is to be found elsewhere in this issue.

On 16 September, in conjunction with the UN Association, the branch held an interactive dialogue on ‘Inequalities in Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in New Zealand and the Wider Asia–Pacific Region’. It was led by Karim Dickie, NZIIA Board member and UNANZ president, and Joy Dunsheath MNZM, executive vice-chair of WFUNA, in conversation with Pio Smith, Asia–Pacific regional director for the UN Fund for Population Activities.

The branch’s annual Careers Without Borders was held at Victoria University of Wellington on 18 September.

On 27 September the branch held its second diplomatic tree planting day in Ōwhiro Bay supported by the embassy of the EU Delegation to New Zealand. Representatives from the embassies of the European Union, Italy, Germany, France, Ireland, Australia, the United States, East Timor, Argentina and the United Kingdom planted a number of native tree varieties on a sunny Wellington spring day followed by lunch.

The following meetings were also held:

23 Jul Kevin Vuong (Canadian member of Parliament), ‘Canada’s Challenges with Foreign Interference: The Current Landscape, and Lessons for New Zealand’.

28 Aug Andrew Wierzbicki (NZIIA Board member), ‘Crafting New Zealand Defence Policy: Some Reflections on the Challenges and Misconceptions’.

11 Sep Joanne Ou (mission head of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in New Zealand), ‘Democracy, Peace and Stability — Shared Values of a New Zealand and Taiwan Partnership’. This was the branch’s Spring Lecture. (The edited text of Ou’s address is to be found elsewhere in this issue.)

25 Sep Andy Cameron (senior consultant at large, International Energy Agency), ‘Energy, Geopolitics, and the Return of Industrial Policy: a Kiwi View from Inside the International Energy Agency’.

4 Oct Prof Todd Belt (George Washington University, Washington DC), ‘The State of the 2024 Election in the United States’.

The meeting on 16 September on sexual and reproductive health

Angus Middleton with representatives of the United Kingdom, Italy, Ireland and Germany at the tree planting

A group photo following the tree planting in Ōwhiro Bay, Wellington

US Ambassador Thomas Udall and Angus Middleton

INDEX TO VOLUME 49

(Issue number in bold)

ARTICLES

AMARSINGHE, Punsara, ‘The good, the bad and the ugly’ 1, 13

AZIZIAN, Rouben, ‘Self-determination or territorial integrity?’ 1, 2

BEAGLEHOLE, Ann, see McKINNON, Malcolm

BEAU, Laurence, ‘Paris 2024: Olympics à la française’ 4, 11

CARTMAN, Grace, ‘AI, realism and the Ukraine conflict’ 6, 23

CHABAN, Natalia, and Svitlana Zhabotynska, ‘Fighting the narrative battle’ 1, 6

DAVIDSON, Lee, ‘Cultural diplomacy between New Zealand and Latin America’ 2, 13

DODD, Olga, ‘The greatest opportunity’, 3, 12

DUNCAN, Ramola, ‘Fostering connections’ 4, 25

EASTON, Brian, ‘Working together’ 4, 19

GOERTZEN, Zinzan, ‘The United Nations: a flawed instrument’ 1, 23

GRANT, Saskia, ‘Focusing on the Caribbean’ 6,22

HARRIS, Stephen, ‘The view from behind the curtain’ 1, 19

IATI, Iati, ‘Navigating geopolitical competition in the Pacific’ 3, 2

KEATING, Colin, ‘Lessons from a genocide’ 5, 15

KUTCHER, Kyrylo, ‘The problem of war’ 1, 10

LYNCH, Brian, ‘Making way in a polycrisis’ 4, 14

McGIBBON, Ian, ‘Remembering a diplomatic milestone’ 5, 24

McKINLAY, Michael, ‘The unquestioning and unthinking that is AUKUS’ 5, 2

McKINNON, John, ‘China in 2024’, 5, 10

McKINNON, Malcolm, ‘Eighty years on: the United Nations, new states and self-determination’ 5, 22

‘Rules and power’ 6, 7 and Ann Beaglehole, ‘Beyond polarisation?’ 3, 7

McLENNAN, Sharon, ‘Cuba, New Zealand and doctors for the Pacific’ 2, 18

O’MEAGHER, Matthew, ‘Presenting the Latin American option’ 2, 22

OU, Joanne, ‘Democracy, peace and stability’ 6, 16

PETERS, Winston, ‘Challenges and opportunities’ 4, 2 PILATOWSKY GOÑI, Priscila, ‘Shared horizons: New Zealand–Latin America connections’ 2, 2

ROSS, Ken, ‘A leap in the dark’, 1, 15

‘Gerald Hensley’s Kahu Despatches’ 4, 21

‘Peter Fraser: towards a proper evaluation’ 2, 26

‘Keir Starmer: a grown-up prime minister, at last’ 5, 18

SHARMA, Ashok, ‘A new era of co-operation’ 6, 12

‘The Quad on a roll’ 3, 16

SCHLAPENTOKH, Dmitry, ‘Confounding expectations’ 6, 20

SIDHU, Harinder, ‘A partnership for a changing world’ 4, 7

THOMSON, Scott, ‘AUKUS from an armchair’ 3, 24

VALDÉS LÓPEZ, Edgardo, ‘Cuban foreign policy and New Zealand relations’ 2, 10

WHITE, Hugh, ‘Beyond unipolarity’ 6, 2

ZHABOTYNSKA, Svitlana, see CHABAN, Natalia

INTERVIEWS

BRAVO, Alfredo Pérez, ‘New Zealand–Mexico diplomacy insights’ (Priscila Pilatowsky Goñi) 2, 6

SIKORSKI, Radosław, ‘Having ‘moral clarity about our values’: a message to democracies’ (Roberto Rabel) 5, 7

SZEPTYCKI, Andrzej, ‘Poland takes a new path’ (Andrew Wierzbicki) 3, 19

BOOKS

(Reviewer’s name in brackets)

BOLLARD, Alan, Economists in the Cold War: How a Handful of Economists Fought the Battle of Ideas (Brian Easton) 4, 27

CANYON, Deon, Strategic Competition & Security Competition in the Blue Pacific (Andrew Wierzbicki) 1, 28

CHAN, Gerald, China’s Health Silk Road: Vaccine Diplomacy and Health Governance (Stephen Hoadley) 4, 28

DEMARAIS, Agathe, Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape the World Against U.S. Interests (Liam Williams) 1, 27

HANSON, Stephen E., and Jeffrey S. Kopstein, The Assault on the State, How the Global Attack on Modern Government Endangers Our Future (Stephen Hoadley) 5, 28

HILL, Richard S., and Steven Loveridge, Secret History: State Surveillance in New Zealand, 1900–1956 (Anthony Smith) 1, 26

HOVERD, William, and Deidre Ann McDonald (eds), State of Threat: The Challenges to Aotearoa New Zealand’s National Security (Nicholas Ross) 3, 26

KOPSTEIN, Jeffrey S., see HANSON, Stephen E.

LEONARD, Griffin Manawaroa, Joseph Llewellyn and Richard Jackson, Abolishing the Military: Arguments and Alternatives (Jim Rolfe) 5, 26

LOVELL-SMITH, Margaret, ‘I Don’t Believe in Murder’: Standing Up for Peace in World War I Canterbury (Steven Loveridge) 3, 27

LOVERIDGE, Steven, see HILL, Richard S.

McDONALD, Deidre Ann, see HOVERD, William

McDOUGALL, Hamish, New Zealand, Britain, and European Integration Since 1960: Staying Alive (Serena Kelly) 4, 26

MILLER, Christopher, The War Came to Us: Life and Death in Ukraine (Kyrylo Kutcher) 6, 27

REESE, Roger R., Russia’s Army: A History from the Napoleonic Wars to the War in Ukraine (Colin Robinson) 5, 27

SCHLEICH, Anne-Marie (ed), Perspectives on Two Island Nations, Singapore–New Zealand (Peter Hamilton) 6, 26

STONE, I.F., The Hidden History of the Korean War: New Edition (Stephen Hoadley) 3, 28

TADROS, Sherine, Taking Sides: a memoir about love, war, and changing the world (James Kember) 2, 30

WOLPE, Bruce, Trump’s Australia, How Trumpism changed Australia and the shocking consequences for us of a second term (Reuben Steff) 6, 25

MISCELLANEOUS

Institute Notes: 1, 32; 2, 32; 3, 32 ; 4, 31; 5, 32; 6, 31

Obituaries: Edward Allan Woodfield (Andrew Wierzbicki) 1, 30; Dame Alison Quentin-Baxter DNZM, QSO (Sir Kenneth Keith) 1, 31; Kenneth John Aldred OBE (Ian McGibbon) 2, 31; Gerald Christopher Philip Hensley CNZM (Simon Murdoch) 3, 29; Alison Vale Stokes QSO (Ian McGibbon) 4, 30; Graham Keith Ansell

CMG (Brian Lynch), 5, 30; Priscilla Jane Williams QSO (Felicity Wong and Denise Almao), 6, 29

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