Confounding expectations

Dmitry Shlapentokh discusses recent efforts to resolve water issues in Central Asia.

Central Asia has relatively few sources of fresh water. They include two major rivers that run into the Aral Sea, which, until recently, was one of the biggest freshwater lakes on the planet. Given these limited assets, competition and conflict between the newly emerging states of the region seemed inevitable when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991. And, indeed, such fears seemed to be borne out in the immediate postSoviet era. But recent agreements between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan indicate that such issues can be resolved peacefully, and that countries of Central Asia can co-operate with each other.

It is widely assumed that the collapse of empire is followed by conflict between the resulting new emerging states and that these conflicts are especially ferocious when there is competition for scarce resources, such as water. Events in Central Asia in the early post-Soviet era seemed to confirm these assumptions. Yet recent agreements between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan indicate that such issues can be resolved peacefully, and that countries of Central Asia can co-operate with each other. Central Asia has relatively few sources of fresh water. They include two major rivers — the Amur Darya and the Syr Darya. Both run into the Aral Sea, which, until recently, was one of the biggest freshwater lakes on Earth. Central Asia was a place of flourishing agricultural civilisations already thousands of years ago. Still, there was apparently not much of a problem with water and ancient travellers described the Oxus (Amur Darya) as a mighty river full of water. The situation changed after the Second World War when Moscow wanted to be self-sufficient in cotton production.

As a result of the planned economy and regional division of production, some republics of Central Asia, especially Uzbekistan, were pushed to increase cotton production dramatically. Cotton consumes a lot of water and drainage of water from major rivers leads to increasing problems with water supply. The shortage became visible by the 1960s. An increasing amount of the water was used for irrigation at the expense of the Aral Sea, which began to shrink. Responding to the situation, Moscow designed a plan that implied transfer of water from the European part of the Soviet Union and/or Siberia. The project, however, faced a series of problems. To start with, it was prohibitively expensive and would have taken many years to finish. Secondly, the project faced serious opposition from some Russian nationalists, who insisted that the project would damage Russia’s environment. The discussion of the project continued approximately to the beginning of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Perestroika

The political instability and collapse of the Soviet Union finally put the discussion to rest. From then Central Asian states were compelled to solve their water problems alone. From the beginning of post-Soviet history, it looked like the post-Soviet states would fail to find solutions. Even so, recent years’ experience indicates that Central Asian states were able to solve problems together.

While during the Soviet era Moscow tried to regulate the relationship between republics and ensure equitable distribution of water, the end of imperial power led to increasing rivalry and introduced the possibility of military conflict. Water problems were one of the reasons for this apparent danger. This was especially the case with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The root of the problems was the geographical location of the two states. Most Central Asian rivers originate in Tajikistan and only later flow into Uzbekistan, whose agriculture is focused on cotton production. By controlling the flow of water, Tajikistan can exert pressure on Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan’s concern became even stronger when Tajikistan decided to build the Rogun Dam to produce electricity. Uzbekistan believed that filling the artificial lake would require a lot of water and increase Tajikistan’s ability to regulate the water flow downstream. This was possibly the major reason for tension, or at least one of the major reasons, for hostility between the two states had other causes as well. Neither Dushanbe nor Tashkent was historically on friendly terms with each other.

The encouragement of mutual animosities was, in fact, the very reason why two republics had been created in the Soviet past. The present day Central Asian states’ formation had been completed by the late 1930s. But their creation was not because the Soviet Union was an ‘affirmative action empire’, a notion that was almost unquestionably ‘politically correct’ mantra until the war with Ukraine began in 2022. Nor, of course, was Moscow implicitly hostile to minorities, a new equally wrong dogma that emerged recently. Stalin was a pragmatist, and all his actions should be seen in the context of his drive to strengthen the Soviet state, and, therefore, his power. The unity of Central Asians could have hindered this aim by stimulating the emergence of international jihadism. In fact, Moscow confronted the ‘Basmachi’, the internationalist Islamists, almost to the 1930s.

Nationalistic division prevented Central Asian unity. In addition, Stalin delineated state borders in such a way as to create a permanent source of friction between members of the Central Asian elite, leaving Moscow as the natural arbiter. It was the old divide et impera (divide and rule) model. The situation became especially tense because of the nature of the regime of Islam Karimov, the first Uzbekistan president. He dreamed of making Uzbekistan the Central Asia hegemon, modelling himself on Timur, the brutal creator of a huge empire with Samarkand as its capital. He was also proclaimed to be Uzbekistan’s founder.

At the same time, Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rakhmonov (from 2007 Rakhmon) proclaimed Tajiks to be the true ‘Arians’ and descendants of the great Persian empire, whereas Uzbekistanis were seen as descendants of the brutal Timur’s horde and unable to do anything constructive. Water distribution sat on the top of other grudges with no solution seemingly in sight. The tension rose with Kasimov apparently contemplating a military solution of the problem. Here he looked like an Egyptian leader outraged by Ethiopian construction of a dam on the Nile that could endanger the water flow downstream. Moscow was apparently happy with the tension, since it helped its on-going control of the region. Nonetheless, the situation changed after Karimov’s death in 2016 and the emergence of Shavkat Mirziyoyev (Mirzueev).

Deciding to depart from Karimov’s brutal and mostly isolationist policy, Mirzueev engaged in a charm offensive. At the outset of his rule, he visited Dushanbe to mend the relationship with Tajikistan and in recent visits this year outlined a policy of co-operation with it. The most important thing here was the notion that both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan would co-operate in dealing with water distribution. These would include monitoring the water flow through the Fergana Canal. Built during Soviet era, it was the major avenue for sending water through Central Asia.

The new arrangement would lead to monitoring of water flow so as to provide for equitable use of water resources. The rapprochement between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also affected the other countries of Central Asia. Uzbekistan’s relationship with Kazakhstan is an example here. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were not as bitter rivals as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Nevetheless, both engaged in a quest for regional hegemony and there were no signs of co-operation in water distribution in the past. Even so, change can be seen here as well. Recently, Uzbekistan agreed to provide a considerable amount of water for irrigation.

What is the broad implication of these arrangements and water sharing? They challenge the widespread notion that the collapse of multi-ethnic empires necessarily unleashes endless conflicts between new nations. Alhough such conflicts do indeed happen, there is no ironclad rule. It is apparent that new states can co-operate with each other even if the start of their relationships was not promising.

Ukrainian-born Dr Dmitry Shlapentokh is an associate professor in Indiana University South Bend’s Department of History.