Lacuna #1: Tides & Strides (Part 2)

Foreign Talent or Foreign Worker?

Neoliberalism within Immigration Policy in Singapore

by Sanjeevani Sriram

Foreign Talent or Foreign Worker? Neoliberalism within Immigration Policy in Singapore

This article examines the role of neoliberal governmentality in shaping immigration policy, and considers the ways in which immigration under such a neoliberal agenda is contingent on the commodification, segmentation and subsequent precarisation of labour markets. The “tides” of the situation is the current state of immigration policy and the debilitating structural violence it transmits to low-skilled migrant workers. As opposed to a purely neoliberal approach, this article proposes a humanistic approach as the “stride” necessary, and suggests how prevailing immigration policies and discourse can be modified to achieve this.

Reluctantly leaving home or taking public transportation on a daily basis in fear of being scrutinised. Selling land and taking on loans only to accumulate debts in agency fees with salaries for the first year going back to repaying them. Working prolonged hours in labour-intensive jobs and going home to bland, nutritionally deficient food. Being herded at the back of lorries sans seatbelt, jostled around at every road bump and curve. Sleeping on bunk beds in dormitories with two ceiling fans shared amongst twenty others. Being denied medical treatment for an injury sustained on-site because their employer refuses to pay for surgery. These are neither anecdotes from a foreign land nor exaggerations of an underdeveloped country.These are some of the injustices happening much closer to home than anticipated; these are injustices happening right here in Singapore.

Interpreting Singapore’s “Neoliberal Governmentality”

Embodying free marking competition, neoliberalism is a market philosophy characterised by individualism and privatisation. This marks a shift away from state welfare provision and government activity. Over time, neoliberalism has evolved and departed from its strict economic tenets, manifesting as an ideology of governance. Neoliberal governmentality argues that neoliberal political rationality should be used to achieve the ultimate goal of resource optimisation (Liow 2011).

Singapore's embrace of neoliberalism emerges from their adoption of an uncompromising and pervasive survivalist ideology post-independence (Dugo 2022). Recognising the value of resource optimisation in a sparsely populated and land-constrained nation, the city-state’s leadership spearheaded a shift towards neoliberalism in political-economic practices. Amidst the 1980s, these neoliberal inclinations eventually became ratified imperatives (Dugo 2022). Neoliberal principles had become the ultimate compass dictating the government’s political action in virtually every sphere, from public health to correctional policy.

Singapore’s immigration policy is no exception to this. Access to rights is tiered based on how economically desirable a prospective migrant is perceived to be in accomplishing the national objective of sustaining growth in the most economically efficient way possible (Yeoh 2004). To facilitate such “efficiency”, the state has created an apparatus of tier-like visa categories: from the Employment Pass, to the S-Pass, to the Work Permit, with each category distinguishing workers based on their skill and education level, and subjecting workers to distinct immigration and social policy accordingly.

The Skills-Based Distinction

Highly-skilled workers are recruited under the Employment pass as foreign talents, deemed as agents for socio-economic transformation, and anticipated to contribute significantly to the nation's long-term economic growth (Dugo 2022). Employment pass holders are managed through relatively-liberal immigration policy to draw these workers in, enabling easy capitalisation of these investments in human capital and allowing for “technology transfers” in creating Singapore as a “Talent Capital” (Hui 1998). Furthermore, they are granted the concomitant rights that would be expected of citizens, as well as additional white-glove treatment, such as the ability to transfer to different jobs and bring their families along with them, in an effort to persuade them to settle here.

Embodying free marketing competition, neoliberalism is a market philosophy characterised by individualism and privatisation.

Neoliberalism within Immigration Policy in Singapore

Conversely, the Work Permit category is located at the bottom of the visa tier-list. Comprising 16.7% of Singapore’s total population, these pass holders occupy the bulk of the migrant worker landscape. Separated into two categories: Construction, Marine Shipyard and Process (CMP) and Migrant Domestic Worker (MDW) pass holders, this pass is designed to help Singapore fill urgent labour shortages in traditionally shunned areas of work (Ministry of Manpower 2021). These unskilled or semi-skilled workers are subject to starkly differential immigration treatment and policy measures that restrict them in virtually every realm of life to ensure that they do not gain a permanent foothold in the geobody of the nation (Yeoh 2004). For example, they are not granted the privilege of bringing their children or spouses with them, are required to undergo bi-yearly medical examinations to check for pregnancy, and are proscribed from marrying Singaporean nationals without state permission. They have virtually zero chance of remaining in Singapore as permanent residents, let alone acquiring citizenship.

In other words, work pass holders are mere economic tools for Singapore’s survival. They are only permitted entry into the city-state to erect the necessary infrastructure, clean the area, and serve the needs of local Singaporeans and foreign talents, and are discarded when this work is done.

Structural Violence and the Lived Realities of Migrant Workers

Neoliberal hegemony has come to narrowly reward those who are able to produce certain forms of economic worth. For those who cannot adequately produce, there is erasure of voices, social exclusion and degraded worth (Somers 2010). Such forms of structural violence forms an everyday reality for migrant workers at every juncture of their lives. From the beds they wake on, to the transport that ferry them to work, to the lack of bargaining power they wield, migrant workers are disempowered on a daily basis, treated as economic apparatus instead of humans. We observe how structures of exploitation fold into Singapore’s neoliberal immigration policies, forming the context in which violence against migrant workers persists.

Take the example of migrant workers being compressed into vehicles without safety equipment to transport them from their dormitories to their worksite. Given that buses are the safer choice for transporting migrant workers, why do migrant workers continue to be carried on lorries, where their safety is so vastly compromised? The Singapore government argues practical and operational concerns, and that using buses instead of trucks increase costs resulting in considerable productivity loss since buses cannot be used to dually convey both personnel and equipment. At the heart of this issue lies the tradeoff between cost and worker safety. There is little doubt that it will cost more to improve worker safety, but ethically, do economic considerations outweigh the safety of workers? In any situation, it is difficult to justify how human safety can be compromised for the sake of money. It appears that the lives of migrant workers are too cheap to push the policy to change. As a society, Singapore must recognise that migrant workers are equals and not merely factors of production or a means to an end.

The government is not oblivious to this role that has been carved out for migrant workers—the commodification and precarisation of migrant workers is a deliberate effort as economic prosperity is contingent on such differential treatment of immigrants and subsequent exploitation of the low-skilled. The Work Permit scheme is designed to perpetuate such structural violence through a network of complicity that includes the state, employers, agents and others. Workers are kept economically insecure through employment terms which include low wages, short fixed-term contracts and numerous intermediaries (recruitment agencies, sub-contractors) (Chin 2019). Representatives from Humanitarian Organization for Migration Economics (HOME) and Transient Workers Count Too (TWC2) raised issues such as “late or non-payment of salaries, poor accommodation conditions and food provision, the constant threat of forced repatriation, workplace injuries and lack of medical assistance, and the government’s placing of heavy burdens of proof on foreign workers in adjudication of disputes.” (TWC2 2014)

In other words, work pass holders are mere economic tools for Singapore’s survival.

Recommendations

As a country whose economic success is largely founded on the labour of immigrants, Singaporean society must redefine its discourse on migrant workers. As a democratic state, Singapore must accept that social harmony rests upon the fair treatment of all communities, and that it cannot be at the expense and exclusion of minorities. Although migrant workers are recognised to the extent that their existence is accepted as a reality for Singapore’s economic prosperity, much can be improved by adopting a more humanised portrayal of migrant workers as integral to the socio-cultural fabric of society, as opposed to the prevailing idea that they are transient.

It is also vital that the government grows cognisant of the oppressive structural policies that form a reality for minorities, and understands the intrinsic inequality that comes with neoliberal ideology and the commodification of migrant workers. The state should recognise that migrant workers are not transactional economic apparatus, but individuals with humanity. With immigration policy, an added human-rights approach is necessary counter to a purely neoliberal approach.

A human-rights approach should prioritise long-term preservation of migrant workers’ rights while also valuing their personal autonomy and capacity to contribute to economic development. Such an approach would involve strengthening existing policy measures to remedy the structures that debilitate migrant workers. Key policy improvements include reducing or eliminating recruitment fees, establishing higher standards for living conditions, incorporating more comprehensive and inclusive social protection schemes, and working proactively with the private-sector, especially small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), to improve awareness about and actions in support of migrant workers

(International Organization for Migration 2021)

Chin, Chuanfei. 2019. “Precarious Work and Its Complicit Network: Migrant Labour in Singapore.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 49 (4): 528–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2019.1572209.

Dugo, Andrea. 2022. “Neoliberal Singapore: Nation-State and Global City.” Singapore’s First Year of COVID-19, 23–51. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-0368-7_2.

Hui, Weng-Tat. 1998. “The Regional Economic Crisis and Singapore: Implications for Labor Migration.” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 7 (2-3): 187–218. https://doi.org/10.1177/011719689800700204.

International Organization for Migration. 2021. “Spotlight on Labour Migration in Asia.” Geneva: International Organization for Migration (IOM). https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/Spotlight-on-Labour-Migration-in-Asia.pdf.

Liow, Eugene Dili. 2011. “The Neoliberal-Developmental State: Singapore as Case Study.” Critical Sociology 38 (2): 241–64. https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920511419900.

Ministry of Manpower. 2021. “Foreign Workforce Numbers.” Ministry of Manpower Singapore. 2021. https://www.mom.gov.sg/documents-and-publications/foreign-workforce-numbers.

Somers, Margaret R. 2010. Genealogies of Citizenship : Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

TWC2. 2014. “How ‘Law’ Fails Migrant Workers.” TWC2. March 14, 2014. https://twc2.org.sg/2014/03/27/how-law-fails-migrant-workers/.

Yeoh, Brenda S. A. 2004. “Cosmopolitanism and Its Exclusions in Singapore.” Urban Studies 41 (12): 2431–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/00420980412331297618.

Cambodia’s Cultural Policy: Healing Trauma in a Post-conflict Society

by Isha Gupta

Cambodia’s Cultural Policy: Healing Trauma in a Post-Confluct Society

This article considers the Cambodian Arts and Culture scene, and the significant historical and policy impact on its current state. The ‘tides’ of the situation is the current handling of cultural ventures as a public interest issue has largely been undertaken by NGOs. The ‘strides’ proposed are a partnership model between the government sector, the private sector, and NGOs. The article links art to healing societal trauma and highlights artists with relevant practices and their works.

Cambodia’s art scene suffered greatly under the Khmer Rouge regime. The systematic targeting of intellectuals and artists has had impacts that can be felt to this day. While UNESCO and other international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have supported and preserved ancient cultural heritage—most notably Angkor Wat—other art forms have not fared quite as well (Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2018). This article discusses how by fostering collaborations between the government, NGOs, and the public, Cambodia’s cultural policy can heal the trauma faced by its post-conflict society.

The Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979) represented a brutal period in Cambodia’s history. One-quarter of the population was killed either directly through mass killings or indirectly through malnutrition or overwork (Bockers et al 2011, 71). Others were denied their individuality and treated like cogs in an ideological system. Extreme negation of culture and attempts at reconstructing Cambodian history under the regime was manifested by declaring the start of the Khmer Rouge regime as ‘Year Zero’ in Cambodian society (Holocaust Memorial Day Trust). Coupled with the 12 years of Vietnamese occupation that followed, there had been significant destruction of various institutional structures—such as health, education, and culture—and a decline in Cambodia’s artistic scene, including the visual and performing arts (Copic and Dragicevic 2018, 4).

To this day, its legacy continues to affect Cambodian society. The horrors and violence experienced during the regime have caused considerable trauma, mental health issues, and underlying feelings of anger and resentment among the population (Bockers et al 2011, 71). Trauma can be individual, societal, or generational; though with the mass killings and extreme violence of the Khmer Rouge, a combination of all three has been common in Cambodian society. Nonetheless, memories and trauma surrounding such upheaval and violence in Southeast Asia can be in part constructed, reconstructed, and questioned through art.

Is art about the genocide cathartic or traumatic?

Is art about the genocide cathartic or traumatic? It remains a difficult question to answer, but the importance of art as a tool for visual testimony and the contribution of artistic practices to societal cultural cannot be disregarded. Closure and healing trauma is fundamental to reconciliation in a post-conflict society (Bockers et al 2011, 72). Art can potentially be one such method as art presents a constructive way of managing and expressing emotions. This applies not only to the artist but to society as well, facilitating a gradual process toward reconciliation with the past. Examining how artists represent and process this trauma—whether that be individual, societal, or generational trauma—is essential, especially given the destruction of Cambodia’s artistic scene under the Khmer Rouge and the consequent restoring and rebuilding of it.

As a post-genocide society, Cambodia’s central cultural policy issue is not modernization or maximizing efficiency but the level of cultural responsibility undertaken by the government by viewing culture as a public interest issue (Copic and Dragicevic 2018, 4). In recent years this responsibility has been largely undertaken by Cambodian NGOs with occasional foreign aid (Copic and Dragicevic 2018, 4). The National Policy for Culture, in accordance with the UNESCO framework particularly the 2005 Convention, was developed to address the links between culture and development by integrating aspects such as education, environment, science, media, and health (Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2018). It has functioned as a guideline for the development of measures and mechanisms to promote arts and culture nationally and internationally (Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2018).

Additionally, the government’s endeavors in supporting culture, especially promotions of cultural industries have started in recent years. For example, artists have been able to showcase their work to both national and international audiences due to the strong involvement of NGOs and government support (Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2018).

However, these are not enough for the substantial development and promotion of the creative sector. The creative arts and entertainment activities such as photography, television broadcasting, film productions, art galleries, etcetera will need stronger policies to support them, along with new forms of public funding (Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2018). The government of Cambodia can include the expansion of education and training opportunities in cultural management and entrepreneurship, and the provision of cultural infrastructure to enable and encourage the production and dissemination of creative work (Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2018).

The four main problems in reaching this goal are a relatively weak system of cultural governance, a lack of cultural funds, a lack of social dialogue around the subject, and a lack of ability to use all potential resources available in society (Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2018).

Recommendations

Overall, a balance between public responsibility, private entrepreneurialism, and civil society visions needs to be struck (Copic and Dragicevic 2018, 4). One of the public-civic partnership’s first tasks should be raising awareness about systemic issues and about educational needs that exist throughout the cultural sector (CCSCPublic-Civic Partnership). While the government does not need to bear the cultural responsibilities of the NGOs, (Copic and Dragicevic 2018, 5) a democratization of cultural policy in Cambodia, wherein a new type of partnership model with NGOs as key players in a cultural sector, leading its development could be effective (Copic and Dragicevic 2018, 12). Cambodian NGOs have gained knowledge and skills in cultural governance and established a sort of system parallel to the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts (MOCFA). In accompaniment with this, the government should increase resources and efforts towards the creation of educational services and organizations for artistic and professional development.

Reconciliation

Acknowledgment and public-civic partnership regarding representation and collective memories of societal conflicts are essential for reconciliation in post-conflict societies. There are a few artists and fewer institutions actively engaging with the memories of the regimes through art in Cambodia.

These artists include:

Vann Nath (born 1946): One of the prisoners who survived the S-21 Prison under the Khmer Rouge Regime. The scenes of torture and death depicted in his paintings constitute the most vivid account of the horrors of S-21 and the crimes of the Khmer Rouge to date.

Vann Nath The Commandant, also known as Painting Pol Pot for Duch 1996. Acrylic on canvas, 98 x 142 cm

Vann Nath, Painting of S-21

Cambodia’s Cultural Policy: Healing Trauma in a Post-Confluct Society

Kim Hak (born 1981): A photographer reflecting on past and modern-day Cambodia.

(Top, Bottom, Right) Kim Hak, Left Behind Series, 2017

Acknowledgment and public-civic partnership regarding representation and collective memories of societal conflicts are essential for reconciliation in post-conflict societies.

Cambodia’s Cultural Policy: Healing Trauma in a Post-Confluct Society

Chov Theanly (born 1985): A painter who mixes the personal and the political. His artworks come from a specific national context, burdened by the weight of recent violence and its consequent trauma, yet also universal.

(Top) Chov Theanly, Striving 11, 2016, Oil painting on canvas

(Right) Chov Theanly, Striving 6, 2016, Oil painting on canvas

Another approach to promote reconciliation in post-conflict society is through creating sites and ways of remembrance such as the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, which the painter Vann Nath played a big role in the creation of (Bockers et al 2011, 74). Sites and practices of remembrance provide intervention at the individual and the community level for victims, perpetrators, and future generations to help in recognizing and honoring the victims suffering, creating sites for grieving, and educating younger generations (Bockers et al 2011, 74). Hopefully, with evolving national policies for culture and increased discourse around both the importance of cultural policy and the ability to reach reconciliation of societal trauma in part through art, there will be a new advent in the Cambodian artistic scene.

Bockers, Estelle, Nadine Stammel, and Christine Knaevelsrud. “Reconciliation in Cambodia: Thirty Years after the Terror of the Khmer Rouge Regime.” Torture : quarterly journal on rehabilitation of torture victims and prevention of torture. U.S. National Library of Medicine, 2011. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21715956/.

“Cambodia 2016 Report.” Diversity of Cultural Expressions, April 10, 2018. https://en.unesco.org/creativity/governance/periodic-reports/2016/cambodia

CCSC - Public-Civic Partnership. https://www.spacesandcities-toolkit.com/tools/public-civic-partnership.

“Chov Theanly.” Aura Asia Contemporary Art Project. https://aura-asia-art-project.com/en/artists/chov-theanly/.

ČOPIČ, V.; DRAGIĆEVIĆ ŠEŠIĆ, M. (2018). Challenges of public-civic partnership in Cambodia’s cultural policy development. ENCATC Journal of Cultural Management and Policy, 8 (1), 4-15,

DeHart, Jonathan. “Preserving Cambodia's Artistic Heritage.” – The Diplomat. for The Diplomat, August 3, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/preserving-cambodias-artistic-heritage/.

“Left Behind.” Kim Hak. https://www.kimhak.com/works/left-behind/.

“Khmer Rouge Ideology.” Holocaust Memorial Day Trust. https://www.hmd.org.uk/learn-about-the-holocaust-and-genocides/cambodia/khmer-rouge-ideology/.

“National Policy for Culture.’” Diversity of Cultural Expressions, January 26, 2021. https://en.unesco.org/creativity/policy-monitoring-platform/national-policy-culture

“Making Arts Accessible in Rural Areas of Cambodia.” ASEF culture360, May 18, 2021. https://culture360.asef.org/magazine/making-arts-accessible-rural-areas-cambodia/

“Understanding Cambodian's Cultural Policy - Khmer Times.” Khmer Times - Insight into Cambodia, February 6, 2020. https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50687900/understanding-cambodians-cultural-policy/.

Political Expression and Press Freedom in Singapore

by Isaac Neo

Political Expression and Press Freedom in Singapore

This article examines the relationship between political expression and press freedoms in Singapore by observing the current state of affairs. The ‘tides’ of the situation is the current restricted state of press freedom in the country, particularly in the context of political expression. The ‘strides’ proposed is a theoretical argument arguing for greater political expressions concessions in the press. The article proposes that the affordance of greater press freedoms could prove beneficial for Singapore.

By many international press freedom rankings, Singapore is considered to be heavily limited in the press, especially in the context of political expression. For instance, Singapore ranks 139 out of 180 countries in a global press freedom ranking in 2022 according to international campaign group Reporters Without Borders. The ranking asserts that the government has a "regulatory arsenal" that allows it to directly recruit members of boards and the editors of the major media outlets, who are obligated to safeguard the government’s position. While it is difficult to wholly determine the truth of their claim, it is evident that

To better understand the present state of press freedom in Singapore and its limitations, this article examines case studies wherein political expression in the press has been restricted. Consequently, this paper adopts John Stuart Mills’ marketplace of ideas, to argue that the expansion of press freedoms through greater political expression may be a better way forward.

The State of Press Freedom

Although the Singapore press enjoys a certain degree of press freedom, its purpose is confined to “simple journalism and straightforward reporting” (George, 1998), and while it is permissible to report errors, corruption, and critique certain policies, the press cannot contradict issues deemed fundamental by authorities (Tey, 2008). This constrained role of the press is exemplified by the government's gatekeeping of reporting behaviour, limiting press freedom by barring certain opinions and ideas.

The government’s approach to press freedom was succinctly articulated by then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in a statement he made:

“The question for the Singapore media was this: who voted for you that you should be entitled to speak for the voters or tear down the government policies? The Singapore journalist did not go through the baptism of fire of a general election, so could only claim limited privilege in the debate on national policies” (Cheong, OB Markers: My Straits Times Story, 2013).

This set the tone for press freedoms in the country, that ordinary journalists and citizens have not earned the right to criticise government policies and implicitly assigns a subsidiary role to the press - to report objectively.

Alternatives to driving include returning to the basics of walking, the use of conventional bicycles, and the use of more sophisticated electronic Personal Mobility Devices (PMDs) like e-scooters, e-bikes and other eco-mobility vehicles.

Case Study: Mr Brown

To exemplify Lee’s point, Today columnist Lee Kin Mun, under the alias Mr Brown, had his column suspended in 2006 when a satirical piece he published about the rising costs in Singapore, was publicly denounced as "distort[ing] the truth” by the Ministry of Information, Communication and the Arts (MICA). This reinstates the government’s belief that “[t]he freedom of the press must be subordinated to the integrity of Singapore and the primacy of purpose of an elected government” (Cheong, Press freedom was a fine balancing act with Mr Lee Kuan Yew, 2015). Mr Brown’s column was a satirical commentary of the then state of affairs and given the purpose of satire to bring about change through ridicule”, his column could be argued as purposeful in highlighting the impacts of the rising cost of living. However, the censuring of his personal opinions for having been perceived as challenging state authority and legitimacy, further reveals the limits to reporting behaviour in Singapore.

Case Study: Catherine Lim

Numerous policies were undertaken to facilitate the adoption of such alternative options as a way of life. In the 2016 Committee of Supply Debate, the government had committed nearly $1billion to improve first-and-last-mile connectivity for all commuters (Ministry of Transport, 2016). A tender for an operator to build a bicycle-sharing system in the Jurong Lake District was called in July 2016 but the tender was ultimately not awarded with the emergence of fully privately funded dockless bicycle-sharing services in early 2017 like oBike, ofo and MoBike (“Bike sharing in Singapore”, 2018). Nonetheless, these private companies provided the supply of alternative mobility options for Singaporeans willing to make the switch. December 2016 also saw trials to allow commuters to bring their PMDs within a certain size range onto public transportation (Abdullah, 2016). ‘Car-Lite’ Singapore seemed to be set for success as the popularity of PMDs surged. By 2019, there were around 13,000 registered e-bikes, compared to more than 90,000 e-scooters. The public was generally receptive to the promotion of PMD use because they fulfilled their mobility needs. These new devices offered greater speeds and comfort for travel relative to walking, while remaining affordable and requiring little skills for users to operate (Koay et. al., 2019). The pivot towards PMDs also coincided with the explosion of the food delivery industry. Their use benefitted delivery platform users and riders alike by allowing riders to navigate the streets with both speed and agility as they delivered their goods. A 2019 estimate showed that around 7,000 riders utilised e-scooters to carry out their job (Ministry of Transport, 2019).

Another example of the limitation of press freedoms was when social commentator Catherine Lim commented in a published opinion piece entitled “One Government, Two Styles” that “Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s promise of a more open, consultative, and consensual leadership style had been abandoned in favour of the authoritarian style of his predecessor, referring specifically to the former premier Lee Kuan Yew”. Her comments drew flak from then-PM Goh, who responded to her claims, warning her that “If a person wants to set the agenda for Singapore by commenting regularly on politics…the person should do this in the political arena” (Hoong, 1994).

Ordinary journalists and citizens have not earned the right to criticise government policies and implicitly assigns a subsidiary role to the pressto report objectively.

Goh’s stern response distinctly draws the limits of the political expression of regular Singaporean citizens - on the basis of their lack of political membership. He maintains that the entitlement to publicly comment on politics is exclusive. This episode made explicit the limits of the freedom of press, particularly in the political domain.

Applying John Stuart Mill’s Marketplace of ideas

John Stuart Mill’s marketplace of ideas is described as “If only truth is left free to combat error, in an open-marketplace of ideas, humanity is bound to become more enlightened and better off, in the long run; for the only effective way to deal with erroneous or dangerous ideas is to refute them, not to suppress them” (Bay, 1975). Indeed, this notion acknowledges that in the long run, “[f]rom the free competition of ideas in the marketplace would emerge ‘truth’, namely the best method to accomplish this aim” (Gordon, 1997). This principle of the marketplace of ideas, therefore, suggests the ineffectiveness of censorship and the limitation of the different opinions, for the natural laws of the marketplace ensures that the best idea will prevail. Thus, by restricting press freedoms, the government effectively monopolizes the marketplace of ideas, leading to inefficiency as the lesser of ideas is selected.

However, Brietzke (1997) points out that the assumption that market competition will naturally correct destructive ideas, as the invisible hand of the ideas market guides the truth to victory, is a flawed assumption in Smith’s marketplace of ideas. Brietzke advances that If this was truly the case, it is expected that demonstrably false ideas, such as instances of racism, would have lost influence over time. Yet, in current political and socio-economic events, occurrences of such pernicious ideals are still present.

Taking Brietzke’s criticisms into consideration, a measured approach to press freedom should be adopted. For instance, certain forms of political expression in the press are not necessarily constructive, and could prove dangerous to society. On the other hand, constructive criticism and political opinions expressed by concerned citizens, such as Mr Brown and Catherine Lim, provide a citizen’s perspective of current affairs, and these are valuable insights that could aid in the government’s policy-making agendas.

In sum, the Singapore government should encourage press freedom by allowing the publication of constructive contrarian or critical opinions that go against the state narrative. Regardless “if the opinion in question is false, we nonetheless benefit from its expression since we come to understand the arguments for the opposing view and therefore gain a livelier and more vital understanding of our own opinions”. A measured and increased level of concession to political freedom in the press could allow for a freer exchange of ideas. This, in turn, could serve to improve the government’s policies, by providing insights and addressing certain blindspots of the government. Therefore, encouraging press freedom by allowing the publication of certain controversial political opinions could in turn be beneficial.

Conclusion

As worded by Ambassador-at-Large Tommy Koh, “we should welcome criticism as long as the critic loves Singapore and is not out to destroy Singapore”. Koh makes a succinct case encouraging political expression in the press, for there is inherent value in constructive criticism, as the contestation of ideas is a crucial and critical part of democracy. It is in this vein that the limitations on political expression and press freedoms will only seek to harm Singapore.

“We should welcome criticism as long as the critic loves Singapore and is not out to destroy Singapore.”

George, C. (1998). Newspapers: Freedom from the Press. Conference on the Limits of Control: Media and Technology in China, Hong Kong and Singapore.

Tey, T. H. (2008). Confining the Freedom of the Press in Singapore: A "Pragmatic" Press for "Nation-Building"? Human Rights Quarterly, 876-905.

Today. (2015, September 08). Leaders’ duty: To be ‘trustees and stewards’ of S’pore Read more at https://www.todayonline.com/ge2015/leaders-duty-be-trustees-and-stewards-spore. Today.

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Chua, B. H. (2017). Liberalism Disavowed. In Liberalism Disavowed: Communitarianism and State Capitalism in Singapore (pp. 50-73). Cornell University Press.

Chua, B. H. (2005). Liberalization without Democratization: Singapore in the Next Decade. In Southeast Asian Responses to Globalization: Restructuring Governance and Deepening Democracy (p. 76). ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute.

Cheong, Y. S. (2013). OB Markers: My Straits Times Story. Singapore: Straits Times Press.

Cheong, Y. S. (2015, March 25). Press freedom was a fine balancing act with Mr Lee Kuan Yew. Retrieved from The Straits Times: https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/press-freedom-was-a-fine-balancing-act-with-mr-lee-kuan-yew Brietzke, Paul H. (1997). How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails. The Valparaiso University Law Review, 951 -969.

What does the End look like?

by Indraneel Paranjape

What does the End look like?

When the hammer fell, most people around the world had no inclination as to how long the COVID-19 pandemic would extend, and just how many aspects of our life it would come to dominate. Safe to say, we were unprepared for this particular tide that swept the globe. It is within this context that the following piece was written in the early weeks of 2022, as an analysis of how mindset affects the mitigation policies and their impact vice versa. It aims to capture the uncertainty that represents the zeitgeist of early 2022, and offers a novel framework that readers may use to categorise and contemplate policy responses to a public health crisis of this stature. With the benefit of hindsight, readers can consider how the differences in policy approaches as proposed by the framework ultimately lead to differing outcomes for respective countries.

Some of us have been languishing. Tested by the many faces of the Pandemic that needs no other identifier, we’ve been tried and nearly outlasted by the crusade of the packet of genes known as Sars-CoV-2. Regarded in the beginning as an oddity to be investigated, or maybe a passing disturbance, COVID has long overstayed its welcome. It’s still here, running its paces. Now there’s a tremor in that placid confidence we once held: that one day the unmasking of our countenance may represent a curtain draw, revealing a stage fully reset, all traces of the previous act erased. The story of societies has echoed that of the individual: the initial disarray from the upending of our routine lives, followed by a slew of cobbled-together interim measures. Group size limits; sealed exits; and varying degrees of lockdown that were all supposed to disappear. Except that they stayed. With it, we began to accept the inevitability of our reality– and sense the weight of the past two years.

And by no means has that been small. In fact, tracking word choices across large datasets provides a window into changes within the public psyche as a public crisis scales and lengthens. Whereas studies recording data in the first few weeks of the pandemic may depict mindsets buoyed by confidence, the consideration of a longer time period records a plummet in mood. In a Singapore study tracking word usage on social media and search terms, optimistic phrases like “stay safe” are prominent in week 6 (Ridhwan & Hargreaves, 2021). By week 12, however, we see words like “death” and “spread” creep into larger usage. Elsewhere, a China study identifies a “sustained decline in social media public sentiment values” (Tan, H et al. 2021) and an OECD paper records a significant uptick in rates of depression in 2020 (OECD, 2021).

More than a year into the pandemic, the New York Times ventured to appoint “languishing” as the dominant emotion of 2021 (Grant, 2021). The undercurrents of helplessness and listlessness embedded in the public outlook are not isolated and imagined– they are real and arguably foreseeable in a public crisis. This is the juncture governments will find themselves at: a society, potentially weakened in its resilience, awaiting the answer to the unspoken yet perhaps universal question – what does the end look like?

On a public policy level, the correct resolution of this question will alleviate further regression in economic activity and quality of life. An unmotivated and restrained workforce harms productivity, which is crucial for ushering in economic recovery. Yet, the pandemic continues to be persistently damaging to it (Dieppe, 2021). In addition, anomalous reactions triggered by the pandemic, such as the unprecedented and sharp increase in resignations observed in the US in 2021 from increasing stress and shuffling of priorities (Ng, 2021), worsen cyclical employment. Extending beyond just efficiency reasons, however, forming a policy response is necessary because of its spillover effects into many domains. The mindset countries’ institutions adopt towards COVID will determine the nature of the measures countries will take to extricate themselves from the limbo of stopgap measures–if at all. The public narrative matters and, as we will illustrate, the people’s psyche will determine whether measures worked to restore security. In this way, mindset and policy are a two way street.

In particular, we could categorise countries’ possible strategies by the differences in the attitudes towards the end. Such a framework splits cases on whether a retroactive or prospective mindset towards the end has been adopted. Here, the differences in policy responses quickly become apparent. These will be the bifurcations in the COVID-19 story. Is a certain answer inherently better?

The denouement of a public health outbreak is shaped as much by policy as it is by mindset. How should countries manage it?

The Retroactive Mindset

The retroactive mindset places the end of the pandemic, as a concept, at some date in the past. In the retroactive lens, the uncontrollable and deadly spreading event of the virus is viewed as concluded. It sees the situation we have to deal with today as simply an aftershock; a mere ripple on the water surface. Absolute containment and eradication is largely pointless in this world, therefore resources are not wastefully spent pursuing this goal. Instead, effort is diverted to management strategies. The sustained success of the retroactive viewpoint is significantly predicated on widespread and effective vaccination. A failure in this regard tightens the availability of ICU resources that could be redirected to other needs, accumulating undue pressure on healthcare systems. In addition, rampant transmission in this model engenders a climate of uncertainty. If individuals and businesses self-isolate, society would once again accrue some of the mental health and productivity losses associated with isolation.

At worst, then, the retroactive model devolves into entropy, where the burden of one’s safety is individualised. On the flip side, the retroactive mindset is visionary. Well-implemented with tight healthcare safety nets, it is sustainable. By supporting an increase in the fluidity of economic activity, the retroactive model promotes the release of economic flows from a chokehold. Infrastructure adapts over time to suit evolving needs. In its ideal form, the jarring hindrances of the pandemic gradually fade away from the public consciousness.

Cases: studied

By way of case studies, we can pull examples that evince the retroactive model from various regions around the globe. The most extreme application comes in the form of driving at herd immunity with few safeguards. In other words: Boris Johnson’s contentious “herd immunity” model in its vanilla incarnation. While arguably reckless in its manifestation, Johnson remains perhaps one of the earliest to recognise that were the battle with Covid prove to be long-drawn, it would perhaps be wiser and more economical not to bottle it. Instead, striving towards a state of equilibrium as fast as possible to minimise lasting harm may prove more beneficial. Overall, the UK’s easing of restrictions, including the recent rollback on mask-wearing, puts the UK firmly in the retroactive camp. Yet, the focus on the resumption of business and personal activity may come at the expense of the National Health Service.

On a more deliberate front, Singapore offers a more tempered version of the Retroactive soup. The government’s recent shift in the public narrative emphasising an “endemic” mindset (Low, 2021) fits neatly into the retroactive model- nudging the public, in the Singaporean fashion, to move on. Where there were multi-week lockdowns when daily cases hit the thousands in 2020, we find the government barely flinching in early 2022. Instead, external border control measures were adjusted- a frontier that evidently still has the government beat. To augment the earlier point, the government has also shifted away from reporting daily numbers in the newspapers so prominently, further retracting the spotlight on the infection.

The Prospective Mindset

We now consider the prospective mindset. The prospective model is a little apprehensive, a little stern, all in all relatively uncompromising. Time until first response is of the essence, and a desire for perfect knowledge of the situation accompanies it. The prospective mindset puts the end of the pandemic, conceptually, as a state at some point in the future – a specific goal to be attained. In this model, the imposition of lockdowns is no surprise. The endgame is a normalcy indistinguishable from the one that we once had, and the operating assumption is that any measures and incursions into freedoms are temporary, finite, and interim. Vaccinations, again, are important – albeit for a slightly different purpose. Here, vaccines help lower rates of infection and ensure future safety. COVID is a bug to be stamped out of existence.

In its worst embodiment, the prospective model fabricates a draconian world. A ring-file’s worth of additional measures become second nature: mask-wearing, advance bookings, verifications of test statuses and various versions of testing. In its best iteration, these measures continue for a while, but ultimately magnificently reduce or stop. This would occur when transmission has become entirely negligible or essentially wiped out, as observed with some of the periodic scares we’ve had in the past. Till then, these measures are uncompromisingly necessary to achieve a reality of strict eradication.

What does the End look like?

Cases: studied (again)

As case studies of the prospective mindset, we’ll look at three different examples: China, New Zealand, and certain aspects of Singapore’s approach. The most aggressive of these is China’s covid-zero stance (CNA, 2022). In a bid to completely stamp out the coronavirus, China and Hong Kong have pursued the harsh policy of enacting widespread lockdowns, shuttering of small businesses, and returning to work from home. As time wears by, the resolve of the people is appearing to be buckling under the burgeoning economic and psychological tolls. Especially on the former front, those who were already struggling to make ends meet may be harder hit (Hernandez, 2020). New Zealand pursued a similar strategy in its initial response, placing a blanket lockdown and following that up with stringent border restrictions. As of the time of writing, these are still largely in place. By isolating themselves from the rest of the world, New Zealand was able to enjoy life unmasked in 2020 to a greater extent as compared to most other nations. Stimulus packages managed to protect economic growth, but inequality is poised to balloon this year. Can New Zealand’s privileged state of affairs tide them through tili transmission is negligible?

Shifting to Singapore, the implementation of TraceTogether suggests how the prospective mindset may create a more paternalistic social contract. TraceTogether began as the answer to the problem: how do we trace close contacts, especially when people are in public spaces with a large density of them? Movements are logged via bluetooth and linked to one’s health information. At the point of writing, it is almost impossible to enter any mall or communal locations without checking in via TraceTogether. In a scenario probably unimaginable pre-COVID, the people of Singapore have essentially consented to having their personal location information stored in a central database in exchange for the ability to visit malls and public places. Recently, it was announced that this data, initially declared as being collected purely for contact tracing, would now be available to the police. Clearly, this turn of events puts more power into the hands of the authority. While no misuse of this data is to be expected or reported, some oppose the granting of this power on a purely symbolic level, because it could provide precedent for future unilateral action.

Where should we go from here?

As we can clearly see, the stance adopted by a country, and the underlying assumptions, have implications on the resultant policy and shape the eventual narrative. Given the severity and length of the pandemic, the impacts have been manifold. COVID changed work, commuting and energy consumption patterns. It fuelled the rise of new industries, and added new words into our everyday lexicon. It affected our mental health and our economies. So a full response to COVID is not just an economic response, or a psychological response. It is all these and more. It is thus maybe unsurprising to find that important determinants of community resilience as identified by disaster-response research include factors we have discussed: governance, economic investment, healthcare, and the maintenance of a community network (Patel et al., 2017).

Stamping a virus out may seem like the only attractive and secure option upfront, but it comes with heavy costs. Harsh and prolonged lockdowns stopper economic activity, separate families from each other, and are a manpower-intensive operation. Once vaccines exist to reduce the lethality of contracting the virus, it may arguably be more sustainable and smarter to adopt the retroactive mindset, making a country more flexible in its response to new mutations and changing infection rates. Instead of a vice-like grip threatening to snap, a deliberate but dampened rise in infections may be the more prudent option that fends off chaos when the hammer falls.

Nevertheless, it remains important that governments conceptualise an end– whether either of the two models or a custom blend of their own, so that its citizens may eventually be able to do so too. And when we’re finally at the end we so valiantly seek, we’ll know it doubtlessly . “What was COVID-19?”

Oh, that.

CNA. (2022, January 28). 'whack-a-mole': Experts call Hong Kong's Zero-covid policy unsustainable. CNA. Retrieved February 20, 2022, from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/hong-kong-zero-covid-19-policy-experts-unsustainable-2465396

Dieppe, A. (2021). What Happens to Productivity During Major Adverse Events . In Global productivity: Trends, drivers, and policies. essay, World Bank Group. Retrieved from https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/394411593465307419-0050022020/original/GlobalProductivityChapter3.pdf

Grant, A. (2021, April 19). There's a name for the blah you're feeling: It's called languishing. The New York Times. Retrieved February 20, 2022, from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/19/well/mind/covid-mental-health-languishing.html

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