Lacuna #1: Tides & Strides (Part 1)

Editor’s Note

This inaugural issue has long been in the making. As a small group of university students passionate for change and solving issues through public policy, we always had had our eye on starting a publication to communicate our ideas objectively and succinctly so more can get onboard, work together and drive change. After all, our vision is to create a Community of Curious, Critical, and Constructive Changemakers.

Yet, we knew we wanted our publication to be more than just a platform showcasing high-quality analysis of policy issues. We also wanted to provide an avenue of development for anyone willing to take the plunge to learn more about the policy world. Thus, the following works you will be reading are products of our team’s efforts.

Lacuna: “An unfilled space, a blank in the portion of a manuscript”

We chose the name Lacuna to represent the aspirations of the publication. Blanks and information gaps are all too common even in today’s internet age. We hope to be the publication people turn to when there is a lacuna of knowledge in complex policy issues. To demystify the black box of policy analysis for readers through good research and concise expression is a key objective of ours.

The story of our inaugural issue’s theme, “Tides and Strides”, was unconventional. Our team had been wrecking our brains for the better part of a month settling on a good theme. It was only after I had explained the vision for the publication to a friend over lunch that she suggested it. “Tides” has been used as a popular metaphor for ebb and flow of the state of situations, as evidenced by quotes such as in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, “There is a tide in the affairs of men.” All pieces in this issue will begin by providing a survey of the flow of affairs within the respective policy domains they will be engaging on. Of course, simply being more aware is not sufficient to encourage the move towards creating tangible impact. Each of our articles have also attempted to visualise the “Strides” we can take as a society to progress towards resolving said issues.

The road to publication has not been an easy one and we have learned a lot along the way. I would like to extend my deepest appreciation for our staff advisor, Dr Tan Poh Lin, for the advice and guidance to keep us on track; our volunteer, Mr Chua Jun Yan, for conducting a series of workshops on writing and editing; the friends that have helped us along the way; and last but certainly not least, all publication team members past and present for the hard work designing, writing and editing to create the best we can offer.

I now humbly present to you, dear readers, the fruits of our labour.

Green is the New Black

by Odele Pang

Green is the New Black

This article considers the phenomenon of greenwashing and the current measures (or lack thereof) taken to address the issue. The ‘tides’ of the situation is the present response taken by governments and regulatory bodies to tackle greenwashing. The ‘strides’ proposed is a call for a clearer framework in defining greenwashing, and the mandating of corporate social responsibility and sustainability reporting. The article highlights that current measures undertaken by the government are lacking and addresses the existing gaps.

Sustainability and green practices have crept into our lives as the way forward to ensure our future on this planet. Key phrases such as “zero plastic” and “carbon-free” have become increasingly ubiquitous among the rhetoric of governments and companies have shifted their advertising strategies to highlight the environmentally-friendly origins of their products. However, as such claims proliferate, so do consumer scepticism and accusations of greenwashing — are these mere marketing gimmicks? Furthermore, since organisations can easily jump on the sustainability bandwagon without actually committing to their promises and profit off misleading their customers, this raises the question if more definitive action should be taken to regulate and verify such claims. As such, this article will focus on the issue of corporate greenwashing and explore the actions that can be enacted by governments to guard against such falsehoods.

What is greenwashing?

Defined by Nick Feinstein as “false and misleading environmental claims in advertising”, greenwashing can manifest in various different forms — selective disclosure, false labelling and vague, sweeping claims, among many others. (Lyon & Montgomery, 2015; Feinstein, 2013) Both green marketing and greenwashing are by no means new phenomena; the former took off in the 1980s in response to demands of the new generation of environmentally-conscious consumers (Feinstein, 2013). Since then, green marketing has evolved into a relatively lucrative marketing strategy, as seen from how 66% of consumers are willing to pay higher prices for environmentally-friendly goods (Nielsen Media Research, 2015). As such, as the demand for sustainable alternatives increases, corporations have begun to spend more money on marketing and social media campaigns to seem committed to sustainability.

However, the reality is that these claims of sustainability are often duplicitous — a global sweep of websites conducted by the UK’s Competition and Market Authority (CMA) revealed that up to 40% of green claims could be misleading to consumers. Similarly, a report by Changing Markets Foundation called out 60% of British and European fashion brands for making unsupported statements.

This included global fast-fashion company H&M, which has been criticised for using more synthetics than normal in their “Conscious Collection”, which has been marketed as being made from more sustainable materials (Butler, 2022). In fact, greenwashing is a popular tactic employed by companies whose very business models revolve around unsustainable practices, especially in the fossil fuel industry (Carrington, 2021). For instance, oil giant Shell has been lambasted for creating a false image of sustainability by promoting their investment into lower-carbon energy resources, despite contradictory plans to expand their fossil gas business (ClientEarth, n.d.). These unethical and exploitative practices erode the trust of consumers in corporations and breeds scepticism, which causes customers to become hesitant to trust firms whose products are genuinely environmentally friendly. If left unregulated, this could escalate and set humanity back in the course towards sustainability (Israel et al., 2021; Brouwer, 2016).

40% 60%

of green claims can be misleading to consumers of British & European fashion brands make unsupported green statements

Greenwashing can manifest in various different forms — selective disclosure, false labelling and vague, sweeping claims, among many others.

Green is the New Black

What is being done to tackle greenwashing?

Despite greenwashing being a decades-old conundrum, there is still a surprising lack of comprehensive legislation to curb this issue in some countries. While most have general marketing and advertising regulations that corporations must abide to, not all of them have specific clauses targeting greenwashing. This lack of an established framework for what constitutes greenwashing is problematic, as it facilitates unintentional greenwashing and passes on the burden of defining greenwashing to consumers instead (Low & Yock, 2021). Fortunately, as the climate crisis accelerates, more governments have started to recognise the detrimental effects of greenwashing and startedtoscrutiniseit.ThisisespeciallythecaseinEurope — the European Commission has identified greenwashing as part of its five priority areas in its New Consumer Agenda, which outlines their focus for consumer policy in 2020-2025 (European Commission, 2020). Starting with a focus on greenwashing in its yearly sweep to detect breaches of consumer law, the Commission is set to develop a legislative proposal that would require firms to back up their green claims with evidence (European Commission, 2021; European Commission, 2020). Similarly, the UK recently introduced the Green Claims Code in 2021, which effectively laid down formal guidelines by which companies must abide by when making green claims.

Yet, it should be noted that even in countries where guidelines have been established, they are often not strictly enforced.IntheUS,theFederalTradeCommission’s(FTC) Guidelines for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims (also known as the ‘Green Guides’) is often referred to as the authority for green marketing guidelines, but its lack of legal binding power means that greenwashing often goes unpunished (Rotman et al., 2020). The situation is even less optimistic in countries such as Singapore, where greenwashing is not even fully defined in the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act and Singapore Code of Advertising Practice (Low & Yock, 2021). As posited by the Climate Social Science Network (CSSN), there is also a general lack of regulation to restrict greenwashing outside of commercial advertisements (Nemes et al., 2021). A large proportion of the burden of greenwashing detection has therefore fallen instead onto the shoulders of non-governmental organisations such as ClientEarth and Greenpeace, which have previously filed lawsuits against BP Oil and Walmart respectively for greenwashing practices (ClientEarth, 2019; Gatti et al., 2019).

What should governments do to tackle this?

Perhaps the first step that governments should take is to set out a clear framework for what constitutes greenwashing. As part of this, clear quantitative benchmarks should be specified for keywords such as “biodegradable”, as such ambiguity in FTC guidelines has been previously raised as being confounding to American firms (Burbano, 2015). It is also crucial to ensure that regulatory bodies have legal power to enforce punishments on those found guilty of greenwashing, lest this framework gets dismissed by corporations as yet another toothless set of guidelines. On an international scale, there have also been calls for a global standardised definition of greenwashing to eradicate discrepancies in regulatory practices, which multinational firms can exploit (Burbano, 2015).

Unfortunately, while implementing an overarching approach may seem ideal in terms of ease and portability of regulations, constructing a comprehensive set of guidelines that can fully address the complex nature of greenwashing will prove a Herculean task. Not only must it cover outright unsubstantiated claims and vague wording, it must also be able to encompass craftier tactics where the green claims promulgated are not necessarily false, but still serve to distract consumers from other non-environmentally friendly practices that the corporation is involved in. To help with the conceptualising of this framework, governments could consult the public to find out their perception of greenwashing, as well as work with non-governmental organisations to draw on their expertise from monitoring corporate green claims (Rotman et al., 2020).

Another widely supported policy that governments could consider is the implementation of mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability reporting. In fact, such a practice has already been mandated in the EU for companies with more than 500 employees (European Commission, n.d.). Since environmental conservation is considered a social responsibility, green marketing is often linked to the wider issue of CSR. In fact, voluntary CSR reporting has been identified as a source of greenwashing, as the lack of regulation means that corporations with poor CSR can improve their image by selectively disclosing information that will portray them in a positive light (Christensen et al., 2021). However, by making CSR reporting a mandatory practice, governments can dictate the types of information that corporations must reveal, thereby reducing the chances of them misleading consumers by hiding certain facts.

Of course, for this solution to be truly foolproof, governments will also need to create ways to hold corporations accountable for their reports (Christensen et al., 2021). This could be incorporated into the set of punishments and legal powers afforded to regulatory bodies mentioned above.

However, unlike the universal framework proposed before, guidelines and requirements for mandatory CSR reporting will likely need to be tailored to meet the different characteristics of each industry. As a result, it could be difficult to compare the CSR and greenwashing levels of corporations from different industries. Similarly, governments need to be cautious when crafting the different metrics of CSR reporting, as a non-representative set of criteria could motivate firms to focus solely on the metrics being measured and neglecting others (Christensen et al., 2021).

Of course, while the solutions explored in this article represent only two options among the multitude of policies that can be used to tackle greenwashing, these will be crucial for establishing a broad foundation that will enable governments to enact more policies to target the nuances of the different types of greenwashing in different industries. As we move into a world geared increasingly towards sustainable practices, and with corporations seeking new ways to improve their brand image, it is crucial that we have the right regulations and bodies in place ready to weed out these masquerades and protect consumers from falling prey to these acts.

As we move into a world geared increasingly towards sustainable practices, and with corporations seeking new ways to improve their brand image, it is crucial that we have the right regulations and bodies in place ready to weed out these masquerades and protect consumers from falling prey to these acts.

Brouwer, A.R. (2016). Revealing Greenwashing: A Consumers' Perspective. International Association for Development of the Information Society.

Butler, S. (2022, January 14). Dirty greenwashing: watchdog targets fashion brands over misleading claims. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/jan/14/dirty-greenwashing-watchdog-targets-fashion-brands-over-misleading-claims

Burbano, V. C. (2015). Three Essays on Social Corporate Responsibility. [Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles]. eScholarship. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6c75g1w1

Carrington, D, (2021, 19 April) ‘A great deception’: oil giants taken to task over ‘greenwash’ ads. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/apr/19/a-great-deception-oil-giants-taken-to-task-over-greenwash-ads

Christensen, H. B., Hail, L. & Leuz, C. (2021) Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review. Review of Accounting Studies, 26, 1176-1248. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-021-09609-5

ClientEarth. (2019, 4 December). Lawyers take action against BP’s climate “greenwashing” advertising campaign”. [Press release] https://www.clientearth.org/latest/press-office/press/lawyers-take-action-against-bp-s-climate-greenwashing-advertising-campaign/ ClientEarth. (n.d.) Greenwashing Files: Shell. Retrieved March 2, 2022, from https://www.clientearth.org/projects/the-greenwashing-files/shell/#greenwashing

European Commission. (2020, 13 November). New Consumer Agenda: European Commission to empower consumers to become the driver of transition. [Press release] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2069

European Commission. (2021, 28 January). Screening of websites for ‘greenwashing’: half of green claims lack evidence. [Press release]. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_269

European Commission. (n.d.) Corporate sustainability reporting. Retrived 3 March, 2022 from https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/corporate-sustainability-reporting_en Feinstein, N. (2013). Learning from Past Mistakes: Future Regulation to Prevent Greenwashing. Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 40(1), 229-257. https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol40/iss1/6

Gatti, L., Seele, P. & Rademacher, L. (2019) Grey zone in — greenwash out. A review of greenwashing research and implications for the voluntary-mandatory transition of CSR. International Journal of Corporate Social Responsibility, 4(6) https://doi.org/10.1186/s40991-019-0044-9

Israel, M., MacLennan, J. & Citron, P. (2021, September 28). UK clampdown on greenwashing. White & Case LLP. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/uk-clampdown-greenwashing

Low, L. & Yock, Y. (2021, November 29). Time for better consumer safeguards in S’pore over ‘greenwashing’ products that are not sustainable. Today. https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/time-better-consumer-safeguards-over-greenwashing-products-are-not-sustainable

Lyon, T. P., & Montgomery, A. W. (2015). The Means and End of Greenwash. Organization & Environment, 28(2), 223–249. https://doi.org/10.1177/1086026615575332

Nemes, N., Stabinsky, D., Scanlan, S.J., Smith, P., Smith, T., Aronczyk, M., Lewis, S.L., Montgomery, A.W. & Tubiello, F.N. (2021). An Integrated Framework to Assess Greenwashing. [Working Paper] CSSN. https://www.cssn.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/CSSN-Working-Paper-2021-on-Assessing-Greenwashing-1.pdf

Nielsen Media Research. (2015, October 12). The sustainability imperative. https://nielseniq.com/global/en/insights/analysis/2015/the-sustainability-imperative-2/

Rotman, R. M., Gossett, C. J. & Goldman, H.D. (2020). Greenwashing No More: The Case for Stronger Regulation of Environmental Marketing. Administrative Law Review 72 (3), 417-443.

The Plastic Problem: A case study of Indonesia

by Sanmay Bose

The Plastic Problem: A case study of Indonesia

This article offers Indonesia as an example of a “waste-sink” that faces the brunt of global plastic waste pollution. The “tides” of global plastic waste trade have had a severe effect on Indonesia’s environment as well as on its most vulnerable communities. However, the Indonesian government has taken “strides” to address these negative externalities by commissioning an extensive policy review that aims to reduce Indonesia’s plastic pollution. While their solutions are comprehensive, this article looks into further implications of Indonesia’s plastic waste management policies.

Christine Figgener, a marine biologist, in 2015 filmed a short video of her team removing a plastic straw from a distressed sea turtle’s nose. It garnered millions of views and kick-started an international movement that pledged to end single-use plastics. While Figgener’s campaign has inspired an international effort to reduce the usage of single-use plastic products, there has not been a sufficient spotlight on the structures of global plastic waste. A more significant implication of plastic use is the international trade in plastic waste that occurs between developed and developing nations. Indonesia is one such developing southeast Asian nation that faces the brunt of global plastic waste. The Indonesian government’s response to the plastic problem, though imperfect, is worthy of mention as a blueprint for other “waste-sink” nations in Asia and beyond. In examining Indonesia, this article will show that plastic waste, despite its global dimensions, manifests primarily as a local issue faced by poor communities, and left to local authorities to remedy.

Indonesia as a “Waste-Sink”

In her paper “Distancing of Waste: Overconsumption in a Global Economy,” Jennifer Clap explores the issue of waste distancing and waste-sinks. She posits that in industrialised waste-producing nations, the issue of waste is divorced from consumption. As waste is taken “away” from the consumer the geographical and mental distance grows between the consumer and the waste generated (Clapp, 2002). Although Clapp broadly focuses on consumption as a whole, the issue of plastic waste is applicable to her analysis. In particular, Clapp’s concept of waste-sink is applicable to Indonesia. We observe that in Indonesia international plastic waste is imported from major industrialised countries and dumped at local waste sites. Although the Indonesian waste management sector benefits monetarily by re-exporting processed plastic waste, the volume of imported plastic waste far exceeds its domestic plastic waste. (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2020).

The accumulation of plastic waste burdens their internal waste processing capacity which then leads to negative ecological and health consequences for vulnerable communities.

A 2019 study commissioned by a consortium of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), focused on the harms of chemical pollutants, found that the increase in the importation of plastic waste into Indonesia has contributed to a significant rise in hazardous chemical pollution as excess plastic waste is burned openly (Petrlik et al, 2019). The study examined free-range chickens in Bangun and Tropodo for dioxins – also known as persistent organic pollutants (POPs) – and found that their eggs registered the second-highest level of dioxins in Asia, similar to the level of dioxins measured in Vietnam following the US Army’s use of Agent Orange (Petrlik et al, 2019). The study notes that exposure to high levels of dioxins can lead to, “cardiovascular disease, diabetes, cancer, porphyria, endometriosis, early menopause, alteration of testosterone and thyroid hormones, and altered immune system response…” (Petrlik et al, 2019).

Predictably, it was the poorest communities that were closest to these toxic sites and felt the brunt of the environmental impact. Moreover, the associated hazards of living near facilities that burn plastic have not dissuaded the villagers in Bangun to move. Since they have no other economically viable alternatives for generating income, they choose to stay near landfills and plastic-burning factories (Bengali, 2019).

It is unfortunate that this has occurred despite Indonesia’s ratification of the Basel Convention in 1993 (United Nations Environment Programme, n.d.) and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants in 2009 (United Nations Treaty Collection, n.d.).

Indonesia’s Strategic Action for plastic waste

Indonesia in recent years has taken on a more active role in dealing with and preventing the build-up of hazardous plastic waste. The recent National Plastic Waste Reduction Strategic Actions (NPWRSA) for Indonesia is drafted by the Indonesian government in consultation with the United Nations Environment Programme. It signals a monumental effort that dissects the plastic problem into manageable segments that can be targeted with specific solutions.

From regulation and institutional to financial and social, as well as infrastructure, the NPWRSA outlines the five key systems that will require a change in order to combat the problem of plastic waste and pollution (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2020). This comprehensive policy review approach allows the government to tailor their intervention to specific sectors of the economy and society. Rather than only considering consumers as the main stakeholder, the NPWRSA highlights the importance of producers, formal and informal waste collectors, recyclers, and local authorities. The Strategic Action’s use of Gap Analysis has helped the Indonesian government identify that it needs to develop local plastic waste management capacity to deal with the open burning of plastic waste and of leakages to the marine environment.

Reversing the adverse environmental and health impact that has already occurred in communities such as Bangun and Tropodo will be impossible. Nonetheless, through the tightening of domestic plastic waste management, Indonesia can hope to prevent further degradation in such communities. Most importantly, the NPWRSA aims to reduce plastic waste generated by 70% by 2025 (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2020). Enforcing stricter import laws will bring forth two substantial effects; first, the amount of plastic waste domestic waste management facilities will have to deal with will be reduced; second, and more importantly, leakages that lead to marine pollution from plastic waste will also decrease. Together, these will contribute to Indonesia’s overall plastic reduction goal.

Recommendations

However, there is still room for improvement. The Ikatan Pemulung Indonesia (IPI) – an association for Indonesian waste collectors – estimates that there are around 2 million “scavengers” that make up the informal sector of waste collectors (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2020). They are responsible for recovering 26% of the plastic waste that appears in landfills (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2020). It is therefore commendable that the NPWRSA’s “5-Year Plan for Plastic Waste Reduction” includes them as a stakeholder and notes that “taking care of [the informal waste worker’s] working environment” is a key priority for the central government from 2022 to 2025 (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2020).

With the eventual reduction of plastic waste, it is expected that there will be a loss of income for the informal waste collectors that rely on collecting, sorting, and reselling plastic waste. To combat this, the government should corral the informal sector (i.e., the “scavengers”) into the formal or semi-formal sector. The government can fund the purchase of proper equipment and safety gear necessary for plastic waste collection as well as implement greater checks for open burning sites and ensure villages be a safe distance away from landfills – something that has been overlooked in the NPWRSA. Additionally, there should be an emphasis on retraining “scavengers” for jobs in the recycling sector and sustainability sphere. Working closely with the IPI will ensure that any alteration to the plastic waste management systems does not unintentionally disadvantage them. As Indonesia looks toward a future free from the burdens of plastic waste, it cannot forget the communities most impacted by its presence and absence.

Concluding Remarks

Plastic waste and pollution is undoubtedly a transboundary issue not only isolated to Indonesia that the global community needs to tackle head-on. From its creation to destruction, current paradigms around plastic production to consumer habits and waste management have to shift. Clapp’s 2002 paper raised the concern of waste distancing and waste-sinks, and 20 years on we see that not much has changed. The Bangun and Tropodo pollution is a direct consequence of the issues raised by Clapp. With the NPWRSA’s policy proposals implementation, Indonesia can look to reduce the repetition of such gross negligence that has left many in Bangun and Tropodo facing long-term health repercussions from plastic waste pollution.

As Indonesia looks toward a future free from the burdens of plastic waste, it cannot forget the communities most impacted by its presence and absence.

The Plastic Problem: A case study of Indonesia

While Indonesia is mentioned as a waste-sink in this article, many (developing) countries – in Asia, South America, and Africa – have had similar experiences long before Indonesia. Even within these countries the stratification of society along socio-economic lines insulates some and burdens others with the problem of plastic waste. These social and economic relations – both inter-country and intra-country – are complex and go beyond the issue of plastic waste management. As Indonesia moves toward reducing plastic waste within its borders, other developing countries could commission similar reports (such as the NPWRSA) and commit to implementing viable solutions in consultation with its citizens. It will nonetheless be an uphill battle given the current economic incentives around plastic importation and trade.

Bibliography

Bengali, Shashank. “Your trash is suffocating this Indonesian village. Here’s how,” Los Angeles Times, October 25, 2019. https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-10-25/plastic-pollution-waste-recycling-indonesia Clapp, Jennifer. “Distancing of Waste: Overconsumption in a Global Economy.” In Confronting Consumption, Edited by Tom Princen, Michael Maniates, Ken Conca, 155-176. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2022. Ministry of Environment and Forestry. “National Plastic Waste Reduction Strategic Actions for Indonesia, Republic of Indonesia.” Accessed August 12, 2022. https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/32898/NPWRSI.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

International Pollutants Elimination Network. “Plastic Waste Poisons Indonesia’s Food Chain.” Accessed August 12, 2022. https://ipen.org/news/plastic-waste-poisons-indonesia%E2%80%99s-food-chain.

United Nations Environment Programme. “Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal.” Accessed August 12, 2022. http://www.basel.int/?tabid=4499.

United Nations Treaty Collection. “Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.” Accessed August 12, 2022. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-15&chapter=27&clang=_en.

The State of Car-Lite

Singapore — A Reflection

by Evelyn Lee

The State of Car-Lite Singapore — A Reflection

Having read about political and economic logic playing out within environmental issues, we now turn our attention to those effects in the urban policy space. The following is a reflection inspired by the author’s visit to the Singapore City Gallery. The piece focuses on the future of transportation in Singapore, in particular, the implementation of the “Car-Lite” vision the state had promoted as early as 2014. The author suggests that its failure is due to unclear policy design as a result from attempts to navigate and balance multiple stakeholder needs.

My half-day visit to the Singapore City Gallery was an enriching one. I learned of the exciting possibilities city planning and design could bring to our urban lives in future. Of the numerous exhibitions, I was most intrigued by those on the future of our transportation. The panel (Figure 1) that caught my attention was the one on reclaiming our streets from vehicle traffic. A complete redesign of streets with the adoption of Autonomous Vehicles is something I have never envisioned and would like to see in the future.

These investments are only rational and cost-effective given the presence of a dense urban population we have in Singapore. A hefty $60 billion plan is underway to grow Singapore’s extensive 200km long rail network to 360km, twice the length of our coastline by 2030, to bring 8 in 10 households within 10 minutes walking distance of a train station (Land Transport Authority, 2019) (Toh, 2021). Another S$1 billion will go into doubling bicycle infrastructure from 460km of cycling paths to 800km of cycling path network by 2023, and tripling by 2030 to more than 1300km (Land Transport Authority, 2021)(Ong, 2020). Adoption of other technological solutions such as the creation of an underground mover system to meet our logistic needs more effectively (see Figure 2), adopting Electric Vehicles (EV) and Autonomous vehicles, and implementing a car-sharing system are also in the works. Budget 2021 has set aside S$30 million over the next five years for EV-related initiatives, alone (Lam, 2021).

Central to the future of Singapore transportation is the move to a “Car-Lite” society. This transition was announced in November 2014 by Lee Hsien Loong with the unveiling of the Sustainable Singapore Blueprint (SSB) 2015 (Prime Minister’s Office Singapore, 2014)(Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources et. al., 2015). The policy is an extension of Singapore’s long-standing fight to control traffic congestion problems, with one added consideration: Sustainability. As a city-state, Singapore is precisely the “entropic black [hole] drawing in energy and matter from all over the ecosphere” Rees and Wackernagel (1996) describes cities to be (p.237). However, Singapore is also aware that we have economies of scales that places us in a unique position of “enormous leverage in the quest for global sustainability” (p.242). “Car-lite” Singapore takes full advantage of this by building better infrastructure.

I was surprised by how long ago this policy direction was proposed. More than seven years have elapsed since going “Car-Lite” emerged as a buzzword for our urban planning. Yet from the gallery visit and my own experience of commuting on the island, it is still something to look forward to in the future. Given Singapore’s reputation to get things done efficiently, I am a little dismayed by this long-wait for “Car-Lite” Singapore. Hence, I would like to reflect on “Car-Lite” Singapore and investigate why the plan is not seeing resounding success despite all the brilliant ideas.

Figure 1: An exhibition panel proposing segregation of streets with the use of Autonomous Vehicles. Photo taken at Singapore City Gallery on 4 Feb 2022.

Figure 2: An exhibition panel on the future of transport in Singapore. Photo taken at Singapore City Gallery on 4 Feb 2022.

Why the “Car-Lite” vision did not translate well on the ground

In my opinion, the root cause of “Car-Lite” Singapore’s mediocre performance is its need to negotiate and accommodate the interests of different stakeholders in the city. Since 2008, Singapore has progressively moved towards the creation of a people-centred land transport system (Land Transport Authority, 2019). Like other transportation policies, the SSB that introduces “Car-Lite” Singapore had taken in the views of more than 130,000 people via consultations on land transport and urban development master plans, public dialogues and surveys (Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources et. al., 2015). While these efforts by urban planners to consult and formulate this policy with the people at heart is commendable, these created lacklustre implementation because policy goals are difficult to define and stakeholder interests often lead to conflicting policy outcome desires. Accommodation of stakeholders for “Car-Lite” Singapore has made it difficult to define a clear success goal for measurement of acihievement that most can agree on. Considering the history of Singapore’s transportation policies, I believe that Singapore’s urban planners conceptualised the “Car-Lite” plan with the primary intention to discourage the use of private vehicles. The plan would thus be more appropriately termed “Car-free” Singapore. Nonetheless, Singapore’s urban planners were prudent to aim for a less ambitious “Car-Lite” plan. This is likely an accommodation to people who have genuine needs for a private vehicle for point-to-point travels such as, travelling with young children or people with disabilities, or for the movement of bulky items.

The success criteria of “Car-Lite” is more complicated than simply attempting to achieve “Car-free” Singapore. The latter could simply be achieved by monitoring and strictly controlling the vehicle population on the island. There are few physical indicators to measure Singapore’s progress towards being “Car-Lite” because it entails a more dynamic shift where people generally reduce their desire to commute using private vehicles. Yet, car ownership figures remained in the limelight as a proxy data for policy makers to monitor their progress in reducing the desire of the population to utilise private vehicles. No proxy measure is perfect, but this outcome measure of choice is problematic because a solution targeted toward the proxy data had potentially undercut the actual objective of the “Car-Lite” plan.

To reduce car-ownership figures while accommodating the needs of the select group, ride-sharing services have been promoted as the future of mobility. Theys are thought to build in greater efficiency into our transportation needs, because fewer vehicles are required to service the travel demand of more people as people share their rides. This will in turn create a reduced demand for car and road related infrastructure, easing the developmental strains on land-scarce Singapore.

Land-scarcity is a salient cause for creating the most value out of our transportation infrastructure. Currently, road infrastructure occupies 12% of our urban landscape, even though only a minority of Singaporeans use private transportation (Ministry of Transport, 2021). This figure may not seem as alarming as in US cities where roads take up 18-30% of the urban land, but it is a concerning figure when we consider that only 14% of our land is allocated for our entire island’s housing needs (Duxfield, 2021)(Centre for Liveable Cities Singapore & Urban Land Institute Asia Pacific, 2016). Encouraging ridesharing provides an alternative for car-owners to give up their vehicles while not suffering the drawbacks of travelling without a private vehicle. It is a great solution to meet the reduced car-ownership criteria of success.

Yet, this fails to tackle the root objective of a “Car-Lite” society: reducing the population’s reliance on private vehicles. Personally, I have not felt much change or noticed significant reductions the desire to commute using a car in the people around me. In fact, I have noticed the converse. The rise of share-hire services, like Grab, have only incentivised people, especially those without their own personal transport, to use these for-hire private vehicles for their commute because of its convenience. Pre-pandemic figures released by the Land Transport Authority (LTA) in 2018 showed an increase in the number of daily journeys made by taxi and private hire cars from 0.8 million in 2013 to 1 million in 2017 attributed to the emergence of private hire cars (CNA, 2018). Admittedly, the trend observed from these figures is not a straightforward indicator of “Car-Lite” Singapore’s success because two scenarios could explain the data. Ideally, a positive substitution effect occurred. The number of vehicles on the road was reduced as commuters who formerly drove their own vehicles decided to rely on these car-sharing services for their transportation needs (Transport & Environment, 2017). But this does not exclude the less ideal substitution effect I have observed taking place concurrently, where commuters who previously used public transportation switch to for-hire or car-sharing services due to convenience.

This increase in demand for private vehicular transportation may even lead to an increase in the number of vehicles on the road as they fulfil the market demands, antithetical to the original goals of “Car-Lite: Singapore (Funk, 2019).

There are more instances where varied interests in the community have led to conflicting policy directions, the most prominent example being the use of mobility devices for first and last-mile travel. First and last-mile connectivity had been identified early on as an area of focus for Singapore to achieve our ”Car-Lite” goals. Alternative mobility options were a beacon of optimism with the 2016 “Car-Lite” Urban Mobility report by the Centre of Liveable Cities suggesting a plethora of options for this switch. Alternatives to driving include returning to the basics of walking, the use of conventional bicycles, and the use of more sophisticated electronic Personal Mobility Devices (PMDs) like e-scooters, e-bikes and other eco-mobility vehicles.

Numerous policies were undertaken to facilitate the adoption of such alternative options as a way of life. In the 2016 Committee of Supply Debate, the government had committed nearly $1billion to improve first-and-last-mile connectivity for all commuters (Ministry of Transport, 2016). A tender for an operator to build a bicycle-sharing system in the Jurong Lake District was called in July 2016 but the tender was ultimately not awarded with the emergence of fully privately funded dockless bicycle-sharing services in early 2017 like oBike, ofo and MoBike (“Bike sharing in Singapore”, 2018). Nonetheless, these private companies provided the supply of alternative mobility options for Singaporeans willing to make the switch. December 2016 also saw trials to allow commuters to bring their PMDs within a certain size range onto public transportation (Abdullah, 2016). “Car-Lite” Singapore seemed to be set for success as the popularity of PMDs surged. By 2019, there were around 13,000 registered e-bikes, compared to more than 90,000 e-scooters. The public was generally receptive to the promotion of PMD use because they fulfilled their mobility needs. These new devices offered greater speeds and comfort for travel relative to walking, while remaining affordable and requiring little skills for users to operate (Koay et. al., 2019). The pivot towards PMDs also coincided with the explosion of the food delivery industry. Their use benefitted delivery platform users and riders alike by allowing riders to navigate the streets with both speed and agility as they delivered their goods. A 2019 estimate showed that around 7,000 riders utilised e-scooters to carry out their job (Ministry of Transport, 2019).

Even as many were reaping the benefits of a more widespread adoption of alternative mobility devices, concern was growing. These predominantly came from the pedestrians who were sharing the same paths these alternative devices were allowed on. Without specific regulations in place, PMDs, particularly, were increasingly seen as a hazard for pedestrians who were not used to having such devices zipping around. Reported accidents involving PMDs increased from 54 in 2016 to 228 in 2017 and 2018 (Abdullah, 2019) (Tseng, 2021). In 2019, active mobility devices related offences hit a high of 4,900 incidences (Tseng, 2021). High profile reports of fatalities from PMD-related accidents along with viral videos of pedestrian-PMD rider altercations further pushed segments of the population against the unregulated use of PMDs (CNA, 2019)(Siswandjo, 2020) (Chen, 2019). A public petition to ban PMDs from public footpaths gained more than 69,000 signatures (Hoe, 2019).

Alternatives to driving include returning to the basics of walking, the use of conventional bicycles, and the use of more sophisticated electronic Personal Mobility Devices (PMDs) like e-scooters, e-bikes and other eco-mobility vehicles.

Numerous policies were undertaken to facilitate the adoption of such alternative options as a way of life. In the 2016 Committee of Supply Debate, the government had committed nearly $1billion to improve first-and-last-mile connectivity for all commuters (Ministry of Transport, 2016). A tender for an operator to build a bicycle-sharing system in the Jurong Lake District was called in July 2016 but the tender was ultimately not awarded with the emergence of fully privately funded dockless bicycle-sharing services in early 2017 like oBike, ofo and MoBike (“Bike sharing in Singapore”, 2018). Nonetheless, these private companies provided the supply of alternative mobility options for Singaporeans willing to make the switch. December 2016 also saw trials to allow commuters to bring their PMDs within a certain size range onto public transportation (Abdullah, 2016). ‘Car-Lite’ Singapore seemed to be set for success as the popularity of PMDs surged. By 2019, there were around 13,000 registered e-bikes, compared to more than 90,000 e-scooters. The public was generally receptive to the promotion of PMD use because they fulfilled their mobility needs. These new devices offered greater speeds and comfort for travel relative to walking, while remaining affordable and requiring little skills for users to operate (Koay et. al., 2019). The pivot towards PMDs also coincided with the explosion of the food delivery industry. Their use benefitted delivery platform users and riders alike by allowing riders to navigate the streets with both speed and agility as they delivered their goods. A 2019 estimate showed that around 7,000 riders utilised e-scooters to carry out their job (Ministry of Transport, 2019).

In response to these concerns, the government has introduced a slew of regulations pertaining to PMDs since 2019. The most controversial of which being the ban of PMDs from footpaths citing that their main priority is to “return safety to pedestrians on footpaths” (Co, 2019). There are no inherent flaws in a government choosing to protect the well-being of pedestrians. However, this move to ban PMDs on footpaths is a contradictory step for a policy vision that wishes to nudge Singapore in the direction of going “Car-Lite”. The ability to travel practically anywhere is a key reason why PMDs served as an excellent alternative to driving for commuters. Footpaths facilitated access and provided commuters on PMDs with a level of flexibility and convenience that even cars and public transportation cannot compete against. For comparison, the ban limits PMDs to the measly patchwork of 440km of cycling and shared paths, less than ten times of the 5,500km footpaths across Singapore (Abdullah, 2020). The practical benefits of PMDs has thus evaporated, giving little reason for people to choose PMDs as an alternative mobility option. Being reliant on PMDs for their livelihoods, the ban has caused an uproar among food delivery riders with the numerous appeals being made culminating in a 7 million dollars trade-in grant by the government to help riders switch to a PMD alternative (Co & Phua, 2020)(Lim, 2019)(Ministry of Transport, 2019). Other regulations since 2019 include the need to register all e-scooters, and the requirement for all riders above the age of 16 to take a mandatory theory test (Land Transport Authority, 2021)(CNA, 2019). These further raise the barriers of adoption for the public, a move that goes against the original objective of incentivising the public to take up alternative mobility options.

Even though I personally see the merits behind the creation of such regulations in response to concerns of segments of the public, these regulations are not necessarily helpful in the bid to make Singapore “Car-Lite”.

Lessons from our “Car-Lite” journey thus far

As I thought about the reasons for “Car-Lite” Singapore’s uninspiring performance, two main points stood out. First, the need to strike a balance in transport policy between competing stakeholder interests is part of the larger dilemma urban planners face when designing a liveable city. It is, thus, crucial that we consider who our target audience of the urban policies design is. Chan (2015) also specifically mentions this as an aspect urban planners need to clearly define, otherwise “we may end up addressing issues that are different from what we should be concerned about.” (p. 17) The promotion of car-sharing services reflects this point. Since “Car-Lite” Singapore was made with the masses in mind, accommodations of specific subsets of the population hindered the formation of a clear target audience and goal. Concessions to promote a “Car-lite” policy made to mitigate the inconveniences of one group eventually had the unintended consequence of creating an effect contrary to the original objective. Instead of reducing the desire for people to commute using private vehicles, some people are more inclined to use private vehicles through car-sharing platforms because of its convenience. On navigating between stakeholders, Chan (2015) also writes of a challenge urban planners face, “when you try to make things liveable for one segment, are we making things less liveable for another segment?” (p. 17) The trajectory of Singapore’s promotion of active mobility neatly exhibits this point. As some segments of the population benefit from the quicker and more convenient commute with the use of PMDs, other road users suffer from the safety hazard of these fast-moving devices.

On the other hand, the decision to ban PMDs in favour of pedestrian safety concerns tipped the scale in the opposite direction where livelihoods of some were sacrificed. Perhaps this is when stronger leadership from the urban planners needs to be called for. Cities are a place for the reproduction of social relationships and the task of urban planners is “[t]o embody these new possibilities in city life, which come to us not merely through better technical organization but through acuter sociological understanding, and to dramatize the activities themselves in appropriate individual and urban structures” (Mumford, 1937, p.96). Amidst all the competing social relations and stakeholder interests, policy makers need to have a clear plan for the implementation of the larger community vision so that all can benefit.

Second, the purportedly people-centred “Car-Lite” policy creating significant tensions in society highlights the intricacies of community engagement. Head (2007) points out the benefits of involving the community in the urban planning process but cautions that the visibility of these positive outcomes is contingent on the government’s ability to devolve power and their ability to motivate citizens to participate effectively (p. 449 & p. 452). SSB 2015 introducing “Car-lite” Singapore was made with the idea to “encourage civic participation for an active and gracious community”. However, concrete measures to facilitate such participation fell short. The International Association for Public Participation categorised public participation and empowerment into five levels. In order of increasing engagement, they are: Inform, Consult, Involve, Collaborate and Empower (see Figure 3). With large numbers of surveys, focus group discussions and public feedback sessions undertaken, “Car-Lite” Singapore was formulated with the “Consult” level of measures as its basis. Some “Involve” level measures like workshops and panel discussions were also reportedly utilised as cited in the 2016 “Car-Lite” Urban Mobility report by the Centre of Liveable Cities (Centre for Liveable Cities Singapore & Urban Land Institute Asia Pacific, 2016, pp. 49-62). The failure to drive civic participation at a higher level for “Car-Lite” Singapore is probably a reason stakeholder tensions pulled the policy apart. Without this involvement, various parties affected by the “Car-Lite” policies do not have an avenue to communicate and understand each other’s positions. For instance, unhappiness and tensions faced by pedestrians in relation to delivery riders and PMD users were allowed to fester and escalate over time. Lack of ownership in the policy direction made it harder for all to be more accommodative and cooperate in pursuit of the overall “Car-Lite” goal urban planners are striving towards.

First, the need to strike a balance in transport policy between competing stakeholder interests is part of the larger dilemma urban planners face when designing a liveable city.

My little trip to the Singapore City Gallery had inspired me to delve deeper into “Car-Lite” Singapore. I was able to draw links between my own experience living in Singapore’s urban environment, and the various issues and lessons related to the topic. However, I am not able to offer better solutions to address the challenges faced. Hopefully, these policy contradictions will be eventually resolved as we refine our policy goals as a nation. I am excited to see the future of urban mobility envisioned by “Car-Lite” Singapore.

Second, the purportedly people-centred “Car-Lite” policy creating significant tensions in society highlights the intricacies of community engagement.

Figure 3: Different levels of public engagement (Head, 2007, p. 445).

Abdullah, A. Z. (2019, November 12). Demand for e-Bikes Expected to Increase, but Retailers Taking It Slow. CNA. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/ebikes-demand-expected-increase-pmd-ban-footpaths-849106.

Abdullah, A. Z. (2020, October 31). In Focus: The PMD Footpath Ban a Year on - What Has Changed? CNA. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/in-focus-singapore-pmds-ebikes-footpath-ban-1302501.

Abdullah, Z. (2016, November 24). Trial to Allow All-Day Access for Folding Bikes, Personal Mobility Devices on Trains and Buses to Begin in December. The Straits Times. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/transport/trial-to-allow-all-day-access-for-folding-bikes-pmds-on-trains-and-bus es-to.

Bike Sharing in Singapore. Land Transport Guru - Singapore Public Transport Information at a glance! (2018, June 14.) Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://landtransportguru.net/bike-sharing-in-singapore/#:~:text=Bicycle%2Dsharing%20operators%20entered%20the,domi nated%20the%20market%20ever%20since.

Centre for Liveable Cities Singapore & Urban Land Institute Asia Pacific (2016). Creating Liveable Cities through Car-Lite Urban Mobility - CLC. carlite-urban-mobility-finalreport, 2016. https://www.clc.gov.sg/docs/default-source/books/carlite-urban-mobility-finalreport.pdf.

Chan, D. (2015). Chapter 2: Liveability Matters. In Liveability in Singapore: Social and behavioural issues (pp. 15–29). essay, World Scientific Publishing.

Chen, J. (2019, August 7). Commentary: Can We Co-Exist with PMDS? Yes, but We Need to Take a Different Path. CNA. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/ban-pmd-scooter-bicycle-shared-pathway-singapore-car-lite-vision-86352 6.

CNA (2019, September 25). Elderly Woman Injured in Bedok e-Scooter Collision Dies in Hospital. CNA. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/elderly-woman-bedok-pmd-escooter-collision-dies-in-hospital-1326821.

CNA (2019, July 1). More than 85,000 e-Scooters Registered as Deadline Closes: LTA. CNA. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/pmd-more-than-85000-e-scooters-registered-deadline-closes-lta-868121. CNA (2018, August 31). Private vehicle journeys declined for the first time since 1997: LTA. CNA. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/private-vehicle-journeys-declined-first-time-1997-lta-807476.

Co, C., & Phua, R. (2020, February 4). MPs Express Concern over Livelihoods of Food Delivery Riders, Jail Terms for Underage PMD Users. CNA. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/pmd-ban-mps-food-delivery-riders-underage-active-mobility-bill-774726. Co, C. (2019, November 12). Government's Main Priority Is to Return Safety to Pedestrians on Footpaths: Lam Pin Min. CNA. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/lam-pin-min-dialogue-session-food-delivery-riders-anchorvale-849316. Duxfield, I. (2021, June 21). Identifying the Amount of Urban Space Occupied by Roads. Eltis. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.eltis.org/in-brief/news/identifying-amount-urban-space-occupied-roads.

Funk, J. (2019, April 21). Commentary: Ride-Sharing Should Reduce Congestion, Not Increase It. CNA. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/ride-sharing-singapore-congestion-traffic-drivers-grab-go-jek-885791.

The Gig-A Failure of the Gig Economy

by Evelyn Lee & Odele Pang

The Gig- A Failure of the Gig Economy

Mobility is not limited to that of the physical. Labour mobility trends with the rise of the gig economy have been brought front and center, particularly by the Covid pandemic. This joint article by Odele and Evelyn will take a closer look at the gig economy through the lens of neoliberalism, and propose potential policy solutions to mitigate the problem.

The COVID-19 pandemic has thinned the streets of people. Despite the surmounting health risks presented, a dedicated army of workers continue to mill around cities delivering essential services. Most of these workers can be distinguished by their brightly coloured shirts that identify the huge technology firm they work for. For others, the applications on constant display on their phone screen is all they have that ties them to their jobs. Societies have grown increasingly reliant on these workers that are the backbone of an economic boom vastly enjoyed by consumers since the dawn of the decade – gig workers and the gig economy.

What is the gig economy?

As the name suggests, the gig economy is centred around the idea of gigs, a short-term arrangement of work. Each worker will be paid according to the amount of work they have completed. There is little guarantee of continuous work, nor career advancement in the future. Researchers like Woodcock and Graham characterise the gig economy in the following way:

“What the term ‘gig economy’ captures is an economic transformation in which work in many sectors is becoming temporary, unstable and patchworked. It entails workers spending less time at one job, a risk of time spent without income, workers undertaking more jobs (possibly at the same time), and unpaid time spent searching for tasks or gigs.”

The growth potential of the gig economy is staggering. A study conducted by Mastercard in 2019 predicts that the Global Gig Economy is expected to grow from $204 billion in 2018 to $455 billion in 2023, a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 17.4%.

Yet, the onset of the pandemic has highlighted a paradox in the emerging industry. On one hand, the pandemic has accelerated the growth of the gig economy due to a redefinition of work (Fleming & Head, 2021). With more people being forced to stay indoors, gig workers have become more essential to the procurement of consumer goods for most. Southeast Asia's largest ride-hailing and food delivery firm Grab Holdings Inc has witnessed a 58% increase in sales at its deliveries unit. On the other hand, restrictions have tossed gig workers in other sectors into the deep end, leaving them to fret over their livelihoods. For instance, those working in the transportation sector found themselves suddenly out of work, due to the reduced number of commuters.

Such instability is something gig workers are intimately aware of and troubled by: 45% of full-time gig workers have a high Economic Anxiety Index score compared to 24% of traditional full-time employees (Edison Research, 2018).

Large fluctuations in demand for work raise red flags for those concerned about economic and social stability. Yet, the gig economy was precisely built on the foundations of such oscillations.

The Gig Economy: The Good and the Ugly

At its core, the gig economy functions based on the principle of outsourcing. Instead of having employees officially join the company to complete tasks, work is made available for any sufficiently qualified individuals without the need to officially on board them into the organisation. Known as freelancers or “independent contractors”, these people form the backbone of the gig economy. With recent technological advancements and digitalisation, such freelance work is increasingly made available through digital platform companies like Uber, Upwork or, more popularly in Singapore, Grab and FoodPanda.

Participation in the gig economy is often viewed as the new frontier of work arrangement ostensibly to enhance the welfare of workers. Compared to a traditional 9-to-5 job, the greatest draw of gig work is its flexibility that will allow participants to better tend to other commitments. These commitments range from taking care of family to spending time on their hobbies, or even running a side hustle. Of course, companies providing such temporary work also have much to gain from the arrangement. First, companies usually incur lower costs relative to their production when they outsource their work, because companies only pay based on the assignments completed. This is in contrast to paying employees for their time, which may not even be spent completely devoted to the assignments, as usually is the case for long-term employment or even part-time work.

The greatest draw of gig work is its flexibility that will allow participants to better tend to other communities.

The Gig- A Failure of the Gig Economy

Costs are further minimised when we consider that the fleeting nature of gig work eliminates the need for talent development costs and other typically mandated benefits, like annual leave or insurance.

Second, companies are more agile and have greater flexibility to respond to market changes. Admittedly, this ability for companies to scale their production is subjected to general limitations, like the availability of workers who are willing and able to take up the job and time lags between market changes and corresponding changes in company policies. However, since the relationship between the gig worker and the company is purely a transaction based on available work, the flexibility stems from the greater agency and autonomy in the hands of the company. Without long-term contracts to bind the companies to the workers, companies can decide to increase or reduce the amount of help they need from gig workers by changing the available assignments. These can be done at short notice in response to market conditions.

Evidently, this does not bode well for the job security of workers, and in turn, their financial and mental wellbeing. A survey by Edison Research freelancers employed in various fields found that in the US, 80% of freelancers whose primary source of income is from the gig economy said that they would have difficulty in paying an unexpected $1000 expense. In comparison, only 54% of people employed but not in the gig economy reported the same in the survey. Similarly, gig workers are more anxious about their finances. Based on the Economic Anxiety Index Tool developed by Edison Research, 45% of full-time gig workers have a high Economic Anxiety Index score compared to 24% of traditional full-time employees (Edison Research, 2018). In some way, the problems faced by workers of the gig economy are a symptom of neoliberal policy that has dominated the global economy since the 1980s.

Neoliberal ideas have their roots in classical liberal ideals championed by Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. Both advocated for market competition to promote the efficient use of scarce resources.

The central mechanism of the gig economy exemplifies. To optimise their production, companies have the autonomy to quickly adjust the number of workers employed on relatively short notice based on changes in the market.

However, there is more to neoliberalism. England and Ward (Springer et al., 2016) identified four main aspects of Neoliberalisation in their review of the academic debate around the term. They are:

1. Neoliberalisation as an ideological hegemonic project,

2. Neoliberalisation as statecraft,

3. Neoliberalisation of policy and programme,

4. Neoliberalisation as governmentality.

This essay will focus on the impacts of the second feature, “Neoliberalisation as statecraft” on the wellbeing of workers in the gig economy. In short, the feature refers to the heavy reliance of states to shape policies through the lens of economic profitability and competitiveness. Davies (2017) describes neoliberalism as something

“perhaps best understood with reference to an intellectual and political movement that sought to reinvent liberalism in a twentieth-century capitalist context.”

Neoliberalism blurs the economic and political realms by promoting the use of purposeful governmental intervention in the economy to enable markets to work as freely as possible. The socially-oriented goals of states thus increasingly meld and become subordinated to the profitability goal of markets. Birch and Siemiatycki (2015) affirms this in their paper, stating that neoliberal marketisation has prioritised fiscal concerns such that “it becomes harder to legitimate public goods driven by equity, environmental concerns and social justice criteria.”

In the context of the gig economy, the financial insecurity faced by workers and the potentially large fluctuations in the labour market is precisely the social justice problem exacerbated by neoliberal policies due to this conflation of economic and social goals. Since the 1980s, the general trend of welfare rollbacks—in the name of efficient management of government revenues, has weakened social safety nets. Most of these were part of Keynesian policies put in place after the Great Depression to better protect the basic job security for workers. A classic example of the cut back in social spending is Reagan’s decision to cut spending for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1981, which paved the way for other welfare cuts in the following decades. Additional requirements for qualification for welfare are also among the arsenal of tactics used to make it harder for individuals to lead a dignified life when they are down on luck.

Thus, this reinforces the dependency of workers on their companies for a steady flow of jobs and income. Yet even if we discount the issues brought on by neoliberal policies, the novelty of such a model means that previously established rules to protect workers may not be as appropriate or effective. For instance, regulations on off-days, paid sick leave or insurance are usually not offered to gig workers because of the lack of regularity in their work arrangements. With the pandemic pushing many into gig work as a lifeline after losing their original jobs, the gig economy looks like it is here to stay. Hence, it is even more pertinent that more should be done to address these problems faced by the growing numbers of gig workers.

Possible solutions

A large proportion of these issues can be traced back to gig workers’ lack of access to social protection and welfare systems, which leave them at high risk of being exploited by firms. It would therefore be in governments’ best interests to enact new legislation or reform existing ones to better accommodate gig workers and their unique employment relationships. While this issue has only been brought into the public spotlight in recent years, potential solutions can be drawn from other similar case studies in past years or even examining the small steps that governments have begun to take to address this issue.

1. Collective bargaining

Perhaps one of the most obvious solutions for improving worker welfare is to grant them the right to collective bargaining, as recommended by the International Labour Organisation. Not only is it a powerful tool that can prevent worker exploitation, it can also help strengthen workers’ overall freedom of association.

This is especially important for gig workers, who, owing to the nature of their work, often work remotely and independently (Petropolous et.al, 2019). Unfortunately, this right is not automatically accorded to gig workers because such legislation only covers workers employed under traditional conditions. Several legislations, such as that of the European Union, consider gig workers as self-employed, hence they are not afforded protections. This places them under the scope of Article 101 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, which prohibits collective bargaining (Latham & Watkins, 2021).

Although this measure is an effective way to stop contractors from fixing prices, it causes more harm than good when applied to gig workers who have little to no autonomy over the price of their services (Meyers, 2021). In response to this, a number of courts have granted gig workers the right to strike and unionise, such as the UK Supreme Court in the case of Uber drivers in April 2021. Such concessions, however, are often made as part of a wider decision to reclassify the workers as employees; this opens up access to a wide variety of other benefits, including paid holidays (Butler, 2021). This illustrates how the issue of employment benefits is not only due to a lack of communication channels between workers and employees, but rather a deeper flaw in the system - the inaccurate classification of gig workers as independent contractors.

2.1. Reclassification of gig owners

It is for this reason that some countries have started to classify gig workers as employees instead of self-employed, thereby allowing them to access the benefits and protections that permanently employed workers are accorded. However, such efforts to reclassify gig workers have largely been done on a case-by-case basis, based on an evaluation of several aspects of the worker-organisation relationship (Petropolous et.al, 2019). The factors taken into consideration differ according to country, but they generally include the level of control that the platform has, restrictions on whether workers can provide their services through other companies, and reliance on firms to provide equipment. Countries such as France also look at the level of integration of the workers into the company, while the Netherlands considers whether the worker completes the task personally or hires other workers (Norton Rose Fullbright, 2020). Although this will ensure that no gig worker is exploited by their company, there is also a risk that the increased control that the firms have over them will cause them to lose some freedom and flexibility, which is one of the biggest appeals of platform work.

The Gig- A Failure of the Gig Economy

2.2 Third Category of Workers

Another similar solution would be to create a third category of workers, as has been done in a number of countries. Known as employee-like people in Germany or dependent contractors in Canada, this third category is for workers whose working arrangements are a blend of employees and independent contractors. The benefits accrued to them can be a variation of that of traditional employees, such as paid holidays and parental leave. Similar to gaining employee status, tests to determine workers as belonging to this third category often take into account economic dependence, among other factors (Petropolous et.al, 2019). However, with countries such as Canada, Germany and Italy introducing these in the 1970s, it should come to no surprise that gig workers are often not officially incorporated into this category (Petropolous et.al, 2019). Despite this, there is strong potential for the creation of a third worker status category to be the solution to this problem; unlike the binary employee/self-employed system, this intermediate category can help preserve the unique flexibility and freedom of gig work while ensuring that gig workers are given some access to social protection.

However, governments must be very careful when crafting the classification criteria, as companies in Italy have formerly taken advantage of the cheaper cost of hiring quasi-subordinates by downgrading their existing employees. Instead of increasing worker protection, the introduction of a third category produced the opposite effect by allowing firms to evade the responsibility and costs of providing employee benefits, which later prompted legislators to adjust the laws and cause more confusion (Cherry et.al, 2018). In Spain, the high 75% economic dependence threshold laid out in their Self-Employed Workers’ Statute failed to account for gig workers who work for more than one platform and do not heavily rely on one employer. When introduced in tandem with a series of other stringent and time-consuming requirements, this meant that only the law only had a limited coverage. This was similar to Germany, although their Collective Agreements Act does stipulate a less burdensome requirement of 50% economic dependence (Cherry et.al, 2018). It can therefore be seen that the successful introduction of a third employee status will largely rely on the government’s ability to walk the fine line between setting enough criteria to avoid mislabeling of workers and keeping the process simple enough for it to remain effective.

3. Portable Benefits

Another possible solution that governments can consider is the concept of portable benefits. Rather than attaching benefits to a person’s job or work status, this would involve attaching benefits to the individual themselves. As identified by Libby Reder, Shelly Steward and Natalie Foster (2019), an ideal portable benefit model should satisfy three conditions: portable, prorated and universal. The element of portability means that this system, unlike the previous solutions, is able to accommodate workers who work for multiple employers. Meanwhile, having a prorated system means that benefits are provided based on the amount of work done, while universal refers to universal benefits. Similar to portability, the prorated system is suitable for multiple employees, so long as the contributions are collected together in a centralised fund.

Examples of portable benefits systems can already be found in several cities around the world, although with varying coverage of workers and types of worker benefits. Take for instance the European Economic Area (EEA), where countries have agreed to ensure the portability of social protection benefits across borders. What this means is that nationals of EEA member states and Switzerland are covered by only one country’s system at a time and are guaranteed the same protection and services as other nationals, even if they are not living in that country (European Commission, n.d.; Petropolous et.al, 2019). Another example can be found in New York’s Black Car Fund for livery and for-hire drivers (Palagashvili, 2020). Established in 1999 by the state of New York, the Fund provides workers’ compensation to independent contractors hired under 300 participating companies and is financed by an additional 2.5% surcharge on all black car rides (Rolf et. al, 2016). This model has the potential to be further developed and/or merged with other types of portable benefits systems to create a more comprehensive version that can not only provide other forms of employment benefits, but also extend its reach to include other cities and industries.

Establishing a portable benefits system also has its advantages for both workers and employers. For workers, it means that they can receive compensation from multiple employees, while the centralization of funds means employees need not worry that their provision of benefits will be seen as employee benefits.

This could be a concern that some companies face when deciding whether to provide benefits, as some courts do interpret the availability of benefits as a sign of an employer-employee relationship, rather than employer-contractor (Palagashvili, 2020). It should also be noted, however, that a portable benefits system does not cover all the rights that workers should be afforded. Matters such as protection against harassment and discrimination, as well as collective bargaining, will need to be addressed by separate policies (Reder et. al, 2019).

As the world transitions from pandemic to endemic and the global economy pieces itself back together, the pervasiveness of the gig economy in our “new normal” and the resultant nature of work is not crystal clear, but it seems safe to say that gig work will not disappear. While neoliberal policies have enabled companies to capitalise off this unregulated labour force by paying low wages, the financial instability and mental health issues that this breeds among gig workers renders this model unsustainable and inhumane. It is time for governments to update their legal frameworks to ensure that all workers’ rights are protected, in order to ensure the longevity of this budding industry.

Provide gig workers with means of negotiating with employers for better working conditions.

Give all gig workers access to all social protection afforded to traditional.

Can provide employee benefits that are suitable for gig work, while preserving its flexible nature.

Easy to accommodate gig workers t hat have multiple jobs.

Interested to learn more about how businesses have adapted to this new work culture? Check out our article Changes that are here to stay!

Fails to address wider issue of misclassifying gig workers.

Could result in workers’ loss of freedom and autonomy.

Need to be careful when crafting the conditions that will distinguish these workers from employees

Does not cover all types of social protection, such as protection against discrimination.

Birch, K., & Siemiatycki, M. (2015). Neoliberalism and the geographies of marketization. Progress in Human Geography, 40(2), 177–198. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132515570512

Butler, S. (2021, February 19). Uber drivers entitled to worker’s rights, UK Supreme Court rules. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/feb/19/uber-drivers-workers-uk-supreme-court-rules-rights

Cherry, M.A., Aloisi, A. (2019) A Critical Examination of a Third Employment Category for On-Demand Work (In Comparative Perspective). In Nestor M. Davidson, Michèle Finck and John J. Infranca (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Law of the Sharing Economy. Forthcoming. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108255882.024

Davies, W. (2017, July 13). What is "Neo" about neoliberalism? The New Republic. Retrieved February 6, 2022, from https://newrepublic.com/article/143849/neo-neoliberalism

Edison Research (2018, December) Gig Economy. Marketplace-Edison Research Poll. Retrieved February 6, 2022, from

https://edisonresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Gig-Economy-2018-Marketplace-Edison-Research-Poll-FIN AL.pdf

European Commission (n.d.) EU social security coordination. Retrieved January 4, 2022, from https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=849&langId=en

Fleming, J., & Head, L. L. (2021). Ultimate Gig: Flexibility, freedom, rewards. Emerald Publishing.

Petropolous, G., Marcus, J.S., Moës, N., Bergamini, E. (2019) Digitalisation and European Welfare States. Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Bruegel_Blueprint_30_ONLINE.pdf

Latham & Watkins. (2021) European Commission Invites Comments regarding Collective Bargaining for the Self-Employed. Latham & Watkins.

https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/european-commission-invites-comments-regarding-collective-bargaining-fo r-the-self-employed

Lau, A. (2020, February 19) Hiring On-Demand Consultants and Advisors As The Gig Economy Matures. Forbes Human Resource Council.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbeshumanresourcescouncil/2020/02/19/hiring-on-demand-consultants-and-advisorsas-the-gig-economy-matures/?sh=6cc07f3d4f6d

Meyers, Z. (2021, August 100) Driving Uncertainty: Labour Rights in the Gig Economy. Centre for European Reform.

https://www.cer.eu/insights/driving-uncertainty-labour-rights-gig-economy

Norton Rose Fullbright (2020) Doing business in the gig economy: A global guide for employees.

https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/nl-nl/knowledge/publications/87afaec5/doing-business-in-the-gig-economy-a-g lobal-guide-for-employers

Palagashvili, A. (2020) Barriers to Portable Benefits Solutions for Gig Economy Workers [Policy paper]. The Centre for Growth and Opportunity.

https://www.thecgo.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Barriers-to-Portable-Benefits-Solutions-for-Gig-Economy-Work ers.pdf

Sathyan, S. (2020, January 23) Gearing Up For The Gig Economy: How Organisations Can Prepare For A Changing Workforce. Forbes Business Development Council.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesbusinessdevelopmentcouncil/2020/01/23/gearing-up-for-the-gig-economy-how-organiz ations-can-prepare-for-a-changing-workforce/?sh=4a862bcf56df

Springer, S., Birch, K., MacLeavy, J., England, K., & Ward, K. (2016). Theorizing Neoliberalization. In The Handbook of Neoliberalism (pp. 50–59). essay, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Wright, S. (n.d.) How the gig economy is changing the employment landscape. Association of MBAs. Retrieved January 3, 2022 from https://www.associationofmbas.com/how-the-gig-economy-is-changing-the-employment-landscape/

Head, B. W. (2007) Community Engagement: Participation on Whose Terms? Australian Journal of Political Science, 42(3), 441–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/10361140701513570.

Hoe, I. (2019, November 5). Commentary: E-Scooter Ban on Footpaths – Here's a List of Those Who Got off Scot-Free. CNA. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/singapore-parliament-ban-pmd-e-scooters-bikes-transport-mobility-8477 46.

Koay, A., Tan, J., Lee, J. (2019, November 9). How Pmds Got Banned from S'pore Footpaths in 6 Years, Explained. Mothership.SG - News from Singapore, Asia and around the world. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://mothership.sg/2019/11/why-are-pmds-banned-from-footpaths/.

Lam, F. (2021, February 16). Budget 2021: S$30m for EV Initiatives; Electric Cars' Road Tax to Be Adjusted. Businesstimes.com.sg. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/singapore-budget-2021/budget-2021-s30m-for-ev-initiatives-elect ric-cars-road.

Land Transport Authority (2021). Cycling. LTA| Cycling. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.lta.gov.sg/content/ltagov/en/getting_around/active_mobility/walking_cycling_infrastructure/cycling.html.

Land Transport Authority (2019). Land Transport Master Plan 2040. LTA LTMP2040 eReport. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from

https://www.lta.gov.sg/content/dam/ltagov/who_we_are/our_work/land_transport_master_plan_2040/pdf/LTA%20LTMP%2 02040%20eReport.pdf.

Land Transport Authority (2021, June 30). Mandatory Theory Tests for Power-Assisted Bicycle and E-Scooter Riders

Launched from 30 June 2021. LTA. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.lta.gov.sg/content/ltagov/en/newsroom/2021/6/news-release/mandatory-theory-tests-for-power-assisted-bicycl e-and-e-scooter-riders.html.

Land Transport Authority (2019). Rail. LTA| Rail. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.lta.gov.sg/content/ltagov/en/who_we_are/our_work/public_transport_system/rail.html.

Lim, K. (2019, November 12). Group of Food-Delivery Riders Asks for 6-Month 'Probation' to Use e-Scooters on Roads or Footpaths. TODAY. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/group-food-delivery-riders-asks-6-month-probation-use-e-scooters-roads-or-foot paths.

Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources, Ministry of National Development, Centre for Liveable Cities Singapore (2015). Sustainable Singapore Blueprint. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.clc.gov.sg/docs/default-source/books/ssbcombined-cover-text.pdf.

Ministry of Transport (2019, November 8). $7 Million E-Scooter Trade-in Grant to Help Food Delivery Riders Switch to Alternative Modes of Transport. Ministry of Transport. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.mot.gov.sg/news-centre/news/detail/7-million-dollars-e-scooter-trade-in-grant-to-help-food-delivery-riders-s witch-to-alternative-modes-of-transport.

Ministry of Transport (2021). Road Network. Ministry of Transport. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.mot.gov.sg/About-MOT/Land-Transport/Motoring/Road-Network/.

Ministry of Transport (2016, April 12). Speech by Senior Minister of State Josephine Teo at the Committee of Supply

Ministry of Transport (2016, April 12). Speech by Senior Minister of State Josephine Teo at the Committee of Supply Debate 2016, on Improving First-and-Last-Mile Connectivity, on 12 April 2016. Ministry of Transport. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from

https://www.mot.gov.sg/news-centre/news/Detail/Speech-by-Senior-Minister-of-State-Josephine-Teo-at-the-Committee-of -Supply-Debate-2016-on-Improving-First-and-Last-Mile-Connectivity-on-12-April-2016.

Mumford, L. (1937) What Is a City? Architectural Record, 92–96.

Ong, J. (2020, March 14). Explainer: How Are Cycling Paths Built, and Why Do They Cost so Much? TODAY. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from

https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/explainer-how-are-cycling-paths-built-and-why-do-they-cost-so-much#:~:text=SI NGAPORE%20%E2%80%94%20The%20Government%20in%20January,original%20target%20date%20was%202030.

Prime Minister's Office Singapore (2014, November 28). Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's Speech at Clean & Green Singapore 2015 Launch on 8 November. Prime Minister's Office Singapore. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/transcript-prime-minister-lee-hsien-loongs-speech-clean-green-singapore-2015-launc h-8.

Rees, W., & Wackernagel, M. (1996). Urban Ecological Footprints: Why Cities Cannot Be Sustainable—and Why They Are a Key to Sustainability. Environ Impact Assess Rev 16, 223–48. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-73412-5_35.

Siswandjo, P. (2020, January 20). Netizens Defending PMD Rider Who Knocked down Little Girl Reflect Why an e-Scooter Ban May Soon Exist in Singapore. The Pride. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://pride.kindness.sg/netizens-defending-pmd-rider-who-knocked-down-little-girl-reflect-why-an-e-scooter-ban-maysoon-exist-in-singapore/.

Transport & Environment (2017, June). Does sharing cars really reduce car use? Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.transportenvironment.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Does-sharing-cars-really-reduce-car-use-June%202017 .pdf.

Tseng, C. (2021, April 16). Commentary: The PMD Problem in Singapore Is Not Just about Jostling for Space. CNA. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/pmd-pavement-mobility-accidents-ban-policy-214816.

Wei, T. T. (2021, April 5). Parliament: $60 Billion to Expand and Renew Rail Network in next Decade. The Straits Times. Retrieved March 1, 2022, from https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/parliament-60-billion-to-expand-and-renew-rail-network-in-next-decade#:~:text=SI NGAPORE%20%2D%20More%20than%20%2460%20billion,Transport%20Minister%20Khaw%20Boon%20Wan.