Political Expression and Press Freedom in Singapore

by Isaac Neo

Political Expression and Press Freedom in Singapore

This article examines the relationship between political expression and press freedoms in Singapore by observing the current state of affairs. The ‘tides’ of the situation is the current restricted state of press freedom in the country, particularly in the context of political expression. The ‘strides’ proposed is a theoretical argument arguing for greater political expressions concessions in the press. The article proposes that the affordance of greater press freedoms could prove beneficial for Singapore.

By many international press freedom rankings, Singapore is considered to be heavily limited in the press, especially in the context of political expression. For instance, Singapore ranks 139 out of 180 countries in a global press freedom ranking in 2022 according to international campaign group Reporters Without Borders. The ranking asserts that the government has a "regulatory arsenal" that allows it to directly recruit members of boards and the editors of the major media outlets, who are obligated to safeguard the government’s position. While it is difficult to wholly determine the truth of their claim, it is evident that

To better understand the present state of press freedom in Singapore and its limitations, this article examines case studies wherein political expression in the press has been restricted. Consequently, this paper adopts John Stuart Mills’ marketplace of ideas, to argue that the expansion of press freedoms through greater political expression may be a better way forward.

The State of Press Freedom

Although the Singapore press enjoys a certain degree of press freedom, its purpose is confined to “simple journalism and straightforward reporting” (George, 1998), and while it is permissible to report errors, corruption, and critique certain policies, the press cannot contradict issues deemed fundamental by authorities (Tey, 2008). This constrained role of the press is exemplified by the government's gatekeeping of reporting behaviour, limiting press freedom by barring certain opinions and ideas.

The government’s approach to press freedom was succinctly articulated by then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in a statement he made:

“The question for the Singapore media was this: who voted for you that you should be entitled to speak for the voters or tear down the government policies? The Singapore journalist did not go through the baptism of fire of a general election, so could only claim limited privilege in the debate on national policies” (Cheong, OB Markers: My Straits Times Story, 2013).

This set the tone for press freedoms in the country, that ordinary journalists and citizens have not earned the right to criticise government policies and implicitly assigns a subsidiary role to the press - to report objectively.

Alternatives to driving include returning to the basics of walking, the use of conventional bicycles, and the use of more sophisticated electronic Personal Mobility Devices (PMDs) like e-scooters, e-bikes and other eco-mobility vehicles.

Case Study: Mr Brown

To exemplify Lee’s point, Today columnist Lee Kin Mun, under the alias Mr Brown, had his column suspended in 2006 when a satirical piece he published about the rising costs in Singapore, was publicly denounced as "distort[ing] the truth” by the Ministry of Information, Communication and the Arts (MICA). This reinstates the government’s belief that “[t]he freedom of the press must be subordinated to the integrity of Singapore and the primacy of purpose of an elected government” (Cheong, Press freedom was a fine balancing act with Mr Lee Kuan Yew, 2015). Mr Brown’s column was a satirical commentary of the then state of affairs and given the purpose of satire to bring about change through ridicule”, his column could be argued as purposeful in highlighting the impacts of the rising cost of living. However, the censuring of his personal opinions for having been perceived as challenging state authority and legitimacy, further reveals the limits to reporting behaviour in Singapore.

Case Study: Catherine Lim

Numerous policies were undertaken to facilitate the adoption of such alternative options as a way of life. In the 2016 Committee of Supply Debate, the government had committed nearly $1billion to improve first-and-last-mile connectivity for all commuters (Ministry of Transport, 2016). A tender for an operator to build a bicycle-sharing system in the Jurong Lake District was called in July 2016 but the tender was ultimately not awarded with the emergence of fully privately funded dockless bicycle-sharing services in early 2017 like oBike, ofo and MoBike (“Bike sharing in Singapore”, 2018). Nonetheless, these private companies provided the supply of alternative mobility options for Singaporeans willing to make the switch. December 2016 also saw trials to allow commuters to bring their PMDs within a certain size range onto public transportation (Abdullah, 2016). ‘Car-Lite’ Singapore seemed to be set for success as the popularity of PMDs surged. By 2019, there were around 13,000 registered e-bikes, compared to more than 90,000 e-scooters. The public was generally receptive to the promotion of PMD use because they fulfilled their mobility needs. These new devices offered greater speeds and comfort for travel relative to walking, while remaining affordable and requiring little skills for users to operate (Koay et. al., 2019). The pivot towards PMDs also coincided with the explosion of the food delivery industry. Their use benefitted delivery platform users and riders alike by allowing riders to navigate the streets with both speed and agility as they delivered their goods. A 2019 estimate showed that around 7,000 riders utilised e-scooters to carry out their job (Ministry of Transport, 2019).

Another example of the limitation of press freedoms was when social commentator Catherine Lim commented in a published opinion piece entitled “One Government, Two Styles” that “Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s promise of a more open, consultative, and consensual leadership style had been abandoned in favour of the authoritarian style of his predecessor, referring specifically to the former premier Lee Kuan Yew”. Her comments drew flak from then-PM Goh, who responded to her claims, warning her that “If a person wants to set the agenda for Singapore by commenting regularly on politics…the person should do this in the political arena” (Hoong, 1994).

Goh’s stern response distinctly draws the limits of the political expression of regular Singaporean citizens - on the basis of their lack of political membership. He maintains that the entitlement to publicly comment on politics is exclusive. This episode made explicit the limits of the freedom of press, particularly in the political domain.

Applying John Stuart Mill’s Marketplace of ideas

John Stuart Mill’s marketplace of ideas is described as “If only truth is left free to combat error, in an open-marketplace of ideas, humanity is bound to become more enlightened and better off, in the long run; for the only effective way to deal with erroneous or dangerous ideas is to refute them, not to suppress them” (Bay, 1975). Indeed, this notion acknowledges that in the long run, “[f]rom the free competition of ideas in the marketplace would emerge ‘truth’, namely the best method to accomplish this aim” (Gordon, 1997). This principle of the marketplace of ideas, therefore, suggests the ineffectiveness of censorship and the limitation of the different opinions, for the natural laws of the marketplace ensures that the best idea will prevail. Thus, by restricting press freedoms, the government effectively monopolizes the marketplace of ideas, leading to inefficiency as the lesser of ideas is selected.

However, Brietzke (1997) points out that the assumption that market competition will naturally correct destructive ideas, as the invisible hand of the ideas market guides the truth to victory, is a flawed assumption in Smith’s marketplace of ideas. Brietzke advances that If this was truly the case, it is expected that demonstrably false ideas, such as instances of racism, would have lost influence over time. Yet, in current political and socio-economic events, occurrences of such pernicious ideals are still present.

Taking Brietzke’s criticisms into consideration, a measured approach to press freedom should be adopted. For instance, certain forms of political expression in the press are not necessarily constructive, and could prove dangerous to society. On the other hand, constructive criticism and political opinions expressed by concerned citizens, such as Mr Brown and Catherine Lim, provide a citizen’s perspective of current affairs, and these are valuable insights that could aid in the government’s policy-making agendas.

In sum, the Singapore government should encourage press freedom by allowing the publication of constructive contrarian or critical opinions that go against the state narrative. Regardless “if the opinion in question is false, we nonetheless benefit from its expression since we come to understand the arguments for the opposing view and therefore gain a livelier and more vital understanding of our own opinions”. A measured and increased level of concession to political freedom in the press could allow for a freer exchange of ideas. This, in turn, could serve to improve the government’s policies, by providing insights and addressing certain blindspots of the government. Therefore, encouraging press freedom by allowing the publication of certain controversial political opinions could in turn be beneficial.

Conclusion

As worded by Ambassador-at-Large Tommy Koh, “we should welcome criticism as long as the critic loves Singapore and is not out to destroy Singapore”. Koh makes a succinct case encouraging political expression in the press, for there is inherent value in constructive criticism, as the contestation of ideas is a crucial and critical part of democracy. It is in this vein that the limitations on political expression and press freedoms will only seek to harm Singapore.

George, C. (1998). Newspapers: Freedom from the Press. Conference on the Limits of Control: Media and Technology in China, Hong Kong and Singapore.

Tey, T. H. (2008). Confining the Freedom of the Press in Singapore: A "Pragmatic" Press for "Nation-Building"? Human Rights Quarterly, 876-905.

Today. (2015, September 08). Leaders’ duty: To be ‘trustees and stewards’ of S’pore Read more at https://www.todayonline.com/ge2015/leaders-duty-be-trustees-and-stewards-spore. Today.

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Chua, B. H. (2017). Liberalism Disavowed. In Liberalism Disavowed: Communitarianism and State Capitalism in Singapore (pp. 50-73). Cornell University Press.

Chua, B. H. (2005). Liberalization without Democratization: Singapore in the Next Decade. In Southeast Asian Responses to Globalization: Restructuring Governance and Deepening Democracy (p. 76). ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute.

Cheong, Y. S. (2013). OB Markers: My Straits Times Story. Singapore: Straits Times Press.

Cheong, Y. S. (2015, March 25). Press freedom was a fine balancing act with Mr Lee Kuan Yew. Retrieved from The Straits Times: https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/press-freedom-was-a-fine-balancing-act-with-mr-lee-kuan-yew Brietzke, Paul H. (1997). How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails. The Valparaiso University Law Review, 951 -969.

What does the End look like?

by Indraneel Paranjape

What does the End look like?

When the hammer fell, most people around the world had no inclination as to how long the COVID-19 pandemic would extend, and just how many aspects of our life it would come to dominate. Safe to say, we were unprepared for this particular tide that swept the globe. It is within this context that the following piece was written in the early weeks of 2022, as an analysis of how mindset affects the mitigation policies and their impact vice versa. It aims to capture the uncertainty that represents the zeitgeist of early 2022, and offers a novel framework that readers may use to categorise and contemplate policy responses to a public health crisis of this stature. With the benefit of hindsight, readers can consider how the differences in policy approaches as proposed by the framework ultimately lead to differing outcomes for respective countries.

Some of us have been languishing. Tested by the many faces of the Pandemic that needs no other identifier, we’ve been tried and nearly outlasted by the crusade of the packet of genes known as Sars-CoV-2. Regarded in the beginning as an oddity to be investigated, or maybe a passing disturbance, COVID has long overstayed its welcome. It’s still here, running its paces. Now there’s a tremor in that placid confidence we once held: that one day the unmasking of our countenance may represent a curtain draw, revealing a stage fully reset, all traces of the previous act erased. The story of societies has echoed that of the individual: the initial disarray from the upending of our routine lives, followed by a slew of cobbled-together interim measures. Group size limits; sealed exits; and varying degrees of lockdown that were all supposed to disappear. Except that they stayed. With it, we began to accept the inevitability of our reality– and sense the weight of the past two years.

And by no means has that been small. In fact, tracking word choices across large datasets provides a window into changes within the public psyche as a public crisis scales and lengthens. Whereas studies recording data in the first few weeks of the pandemic may depict mindsets buoyed by confidence, the consideration of a longer time period records a plummet in mood. In a Singapore study tracking word usage on social media and search terms, optimistic phrases like “stay safe” are prominent in week 6 (Ridhwan & Hargreaves, 2021). By week 12, however, we see words like “death” and “spread” creep into larger usage. Elsewhere, a China study identifies a “sustained decline in social media public sentiment values” (Tan, H et al. 2021) and an OECD paper records a significant uptick in rates of depression in 2020 (OECD, 2021).

More than a year into the pandemic, the New York Times ventured to appoint “languishing” as the dominant emotion of 2021 (Grant, 2021). The undercurrents of helplessness and listlessness embedded in the public outlook are not isolated and imagined– they are real and arguably foreseeable in a public crisis. This is the juncture governments will find themselves at: a society, potentially weakened in its resilience, awaiting the answer to the unspoken yet perhaps universal question – what does the end look like?

On a public policy level, the correct resolution of this question will alleviate further regression in economic activity and quality of life. An unmotivated and restrained workforce harms productivity, which is crucial for ushering in economic recovery. Yet, the pandemic continues to be persistently damaging to it (Dieppe, 2021). In addition, anomalous reactions triggered by the pandemic, such as the unprecedented and sharp increase in resignations observed in the US in 2021 from increasing stress and shuffling of priorities (Ng, 2021), worsen cyclical employment. Extending beyond just efficiency reasons, however, forming a policy response is necessary because of its spillover effects into many domains. The mindset countries’ institutions adopt towards COVID will determine the nature of the measures countries will take to extricate themselves from the limbo of stopgap measures–if at all. The public narrative matters and, as we will illustrate, the people’s psyche will determine whether measures worked to restore security. In this way, mindset and policy are a two way street.

In particular, we could categorise countries’ possible strategies by the differences in the attitudes towards the end. Such a framework splits cases on whether a retroactive or prospective mindset towards the end has been adopted. Here, the differences in policy responses quickly become apparent. These will be the bifurcations in the COVID-19 story. Is a certain answer inherently better?